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PART 43.

FURTHER CORRESPONDENCE

RESPECTING THE

AFFAIRS OF MOROCCO.

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July to December 1911.

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91	To Mr. Rennie ..	78	July 17, 1911	France and Spain. Spanish Government fear France will come to an arrangement with Germany without their knowledge and present Spain with a *fait accompli*. It would be open to Spain, however, to offer compensation to Germany on her own account. Sir A. Nicolson told Spanish Ambassador he believed these fears quite unfounded	64
92	To Sir M. de Bunsen	79	17,	Spain and France. Spanish Ambassador has enquired whether His Majesty's Government would support Spanish Government in proposing *modus vivendi* to France by which Spain would undertake not to send another soldier to Alcazar on condition France made no trouble there. He was informed that His Majesty's Government were anxious that there should be no alteration of grouping of Powers, and that the only thing for Spain to do was to remain as quiet as possible at Alcazar..	64
93	Mr. White ..	212	11,	Arrest and imprisonment of British courier. Refers to No. 28. Transmits despatches from Consul MacLeod, giving additional particulars	65
94	„ „ ..	213	11,	Alcazar. Refers to No. 80. Transmits despatch from Mr. Carleton, reporting facts with regard to Colonel Silvestre's action in turning Moorish troops out of their barracks and in informing them that they were under his orders and were not to perform guard or patrol duties	68
95	„ „ ..	133 Tel.	18,	Agadir. German vice-consul at Mogador has invited Sid Thami Glawi to go to Agadir and have an interview with captain of German cruiser. Landing parties (see No. 88) are made for purposes of shooting	69
96	„ „ ..	134 Tel.	18,	Arrest of French vice-consul at Alcazar. Reports temporary arrest of M. Boisset by Spanish guard at Alcazar. French chargé d'affaires much annoyed	69
97	To Sir F. Bertie ..	295	18,	Franco-German negotiations. French Ambassador has called attention to views of Admiralty as expressed in 1904 with regard to a German port on Atlantic. Sir E. Grey replied that as it was preferable that settlement should be made which did not give Germany a footing in Morocco, it seemed unnecessary to discuss Admiralty point of view now	70
98	To Sir R. Rodd ..	113	18,	Franco-German negotiations. Italian Ambassador states that, though Italy, owing to Franco-Italian agreement, could not oppose French political action in Morocco, she could not be disinterested in possible alteration of equilibrium in the Mediterranean. She, therefore, wished to make her voice heard in time. He added that attitude of Italian Government appeared to be much the same as that of His Majesty's Government. He was informed that action of Germany had engaged British interest on the side of France ..	70

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99	Sir F. Bertie ..	330	July 18, 1911	Arrest of M. Boisset (see No. 96). French press comments on incident in very strong terms, and "Temps" calls on Government to demand an apology from Spain. It is reported that French Government have demanded explanations from Spain ..	71
100	Mr. Rennie ..	59 Tel.	19,	Arrest of M. Boisset. Refers to No. 96. French Ambassador has been instructed to demand apologies both through Spanish Ambassador at Paris and from Colonel Silvestre at Alcazar	71
101	To Sir F. Bertie ..	180 Tel.	19,	Franco-German negotiations. Refers to No. 87. Since France considers German demands too high, she should now make counter-proposals embodying what concessions in Congo she is ready to grant. Will telegraph again as to course developments may take in the event of Germany refusing to reduce her demands.. ..	71
102	„ „ ..	181 Tel.	19,	Franco-German negotiations. Refers to No. 87. In the event of a breakdown of negotiations, His Majesty's Government might propose a conference, but first they must know whether France would consider proposal agreeable, and whether she would absolutely refuse to allow Germany a foothold in Morocco. His Majesty's Government would not consider that British interests were vitally affected by Germany being admitted into Morocco. If Germany cannot be compensated in Congo, she can only be kept out of Morocco by war. Two alternatives would then be left: either consolidation of French position in Morocco by Germany getting some compensation in that country or a return to *status quo* under the Act of Algeciras. His Majesty's Government must know definite and final view of French Government as to former alternative in principle before they take any step	71
103	Mr. Rennie ..	127	18.	Spanish complaints of French agents at Alcazar. See No. 75. Minister for Foreign Affairs in a more satisfied frame of mind. He said that further orders had been sent to Alcazar to observe the utmost caution, and that a new Spanish consul was being sent there. German Ambassador had informed him that conversations now proceeding at Berlin did not affect interests of a third Power	72
104	Sir F. Bertie ..	333	19,	Franco-German negotiations. Has suggested to Minister for Foreign Affairs that Germany has put forward such excessive proposals in order to bring France to prefer that she should establish herself at Agadir rather than give her concessions in Congo. Minister for Foreign Affairs replied that if Germany was allowed to remain permanently at Agadir there was no reason why other Powers on some equally shallow pretext should not establish themselves on the coast of Morocco. Arrest of M. Boisset (see No. 96). Minister for Foreign Affairs has informed Spanish Ambassador that if facts were as stated, matter was very serious and required explanations and apology from Spanish Government	73

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105	Mr. White.. ..	135 Tel.	July 20, 1911	Agadir. French consul at Mogador reports return from Agadir of Kaïd of Kourima, who was well received by commander of German cruiser, who said that Germany had rights over country between Saffi and Agadir. German consul at Mogador has advised Kaïd of Kourima to resist by force any attempt to dispossess him ..	73
06	Sir F. Bertie ..	105 Tel.	20,	Franco-German negotiations. Has communicated contents of No. 102 to Minister for Foreign Affairs, who will see him again on the subject. Spanish Government have apologised for treatment of M. Boisset	73
107	Mr. Rennie ..	60 Tel.	20,	Arrest of M. Boisset. Refers to No. 100. Spanish Ambassador at Paris has apologised to French Government, and Colonel Silvestre has been instructed to apologise at Alcazar	74
108	To Sir F. Cartwright	47	20,	France and Germany. Has spoken to Austrian Ambassador in same sense as to Italian Ambassador (see No. 98), adding that settlement depended on Germany, and it rested with her to give things a satisfactory turn	74
109	To Mr. Malcolm .	..	20,	Major Spilsbury's concession in Sus. Refers to No. 57. Mining regulations have been drawn up, and will, it is hoped, soon be promulgated. Under these regulations it will be open to claimants to advance and make good their claims	74
110	Sir F. Bertie ..	336	20,	Franco - German negotiations. Transmits memorandum handed to Minister for Foreign Affairs, embodying substance of No. 102 and French reply thereto. If negotiations break down France would not reject idea of England proposing a conference, but they could not admit that conference should entertain idea of any cession, however small, of Moorish territory to Germany	74
111	„ „ ..	106 Tel.	20,	Franco-German negotiations. Substance of French reply to memorandum embodying No. 102 (see No. 110)..	76
112	„ „ ..	107 Tel.	21,	Franco-German negotiations. At interview on 20th between German Minister for Foreign Affairs and French Ambassador former complained strongly of French indiscretion to press, and demanded that nothing should be communicated to press unless previously approved by himself and Ambassador. Latter replied he had communicated nothing to press, and was ready to give undertaking demanded by Minister for Foreign Affairs. M. de Selves says there is as much leakage at Berlin as at Paris	76
113	Mr. White ..	136 Tel.	21,	Agadir. Refers to No. 105. French chargé d'affaires has communicated substance of No. 105 to German Minister, who said he had no information, but did not think commander of German cruiser could have made statement attributed to him ..	77

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114	To Sir E. Goschen ..	164	July 21, 1911	Franco-German negotiations. Has informed German Ambassador that British silence must not be interpreted as meaning British disinterestedness. There was anxiety as to extent of German demands, and if negotiations failed a very embarrassing situation would arise, and we might be obliged to do something to watch over British interests and become a party to a discussion of the situation. Ambassador was not in a position to give any information, but deprecated assumption of possible damage to British interests. Ambassador went on to speak of situation generally, but it was pointed out to him that this was not relevant to the question of how British interests might be affected. Sir E. Grey again impressed on Ambassador that if no settlement with France were reached we should have to join in discussion, and the fact of Germans remaining at Agadir must result in an embarrassing situation	77
115	Sir F. Bertie ..	337	21,	Franco - German negotiations. Refers to No. 112. Transmits article from "Echo de Paris," to which German Minister for Foreign Affairs took exception. Article states that conversations at Berlin are not "négociations," but "'marchandage' dans le sens le plus mercantile"	78
116	„ „ ..	338	21,	France and Germany. Transmits article from "Temps" entitled "L'Erreur de l'Allemagne," pointing out mistakes committed by Germany, first, by sending a ship to Agadir, and, secondly, by putting forward such preposterous claims. Germany was now, as in April 1905, offering France alternative of war or humiliating pacific capitulation	79
117	Mr. White ..	137 Tel.	22,	Agadir. Refers to No. 105. British vice-consul at Mogador reports that statement of commander of German cruiser was that "he was in charge of coast-line of South Morocco from Saffi to Agadir".. ..	81
118	„ „ ..	138 Tel.	22,	Alcazar. Further detachment of 400 Spanish infantry have landed at Laraiche. Further incident at Alcazar, where Lieutenant Thiriet has been attacked by Spanish native police. Colonel Silvestre says Lieutenant Thiriet was the aggressor ..	81
119	Mr. Rennie ..	61 Tel. Confidential	22,	Alcazar (see No. 118). Spanish Government much annoyed at fresh incident, and have instructed Spanish Ambassador at Paris to suggest to French Government desirability of removing Lieutenant Thiriet. No further recruiting of natives for Spanish tabors is to take place in Alcazar district ..	82
120	To Mr. Rennie .	83 Tel.	22,	Alcazar. He should support representations which French Ambassador is making in regard to travellers to and from Fez being allowed to pass through Alcazar without hindrance	82
121	Extract from the "Times"	..	22,	Speech by Mr. Lloyd George. Text of speech at Mansion House on 21st July, declaring that if England is to be treated where her interests are affected as if she were of no account, peace at that price would be an intolerable humiliation ..	82

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122	Sir F. Bertie ..	108 Tel.	July 22, 1911	Alcazar (see No. 118). French version of incident in which Lieutenant Thiriet was involved. French Minister for Foreign Affairs has given orders that French officers are to avoid contact with Spanish officers	83
123	Mr. White.. ..	217	14,	Moorish police. Refers to No. 8. Transmits report of Inspector-General. French chargé d'affaires takes exception to reference in report to part taken by Rabat police in the fighting between Sallee and Knitra and Colonel Müller's disclaimer in regard to financial department	83
124	„ „ ..	218	15,	Road dues at Mogador (see Part 42, No. 28). Arrangement made by Sir R. Lister with Kaid Anfloos has never been carried out owing to impotence of Makhzen. French consul has made fresh arrangement with local kaids. Transmits letters from French chargé d'affaires to doyen of diplomatic body, informing him of these arrangements	84
125	„ „ ..	222 Very Conf.	16,	Alcazar. Position of affairs remains very unsatisfactory. Spanish military authorities have given French good grounds of complaint by their action, and constant dispatch of fresh troops to Alcazar seems quite unnecessary. It is rumoured that Spaniards intend to march to a point more than half-way to Fez, and this the French could not possibly allow. French are much annoyed at practical suppression of Moorish troops at Alcazar and prohibition of any Makhzen troops whatever to pass through with arms	85
126	„ „ ..	223 Confidential	16,	Agadir. No further news from Agadir. Report has been spread among southern kaids that they are to be dispossessed by M'Tougi, and French chargé d'affaires says tranquillising instructions have been sent to these kaids. Unconfirmed rumour that Sultan has protested against German action through Dr. Vassel. It is alleged that Mulai Hassan gave German Minister in 1890 a promise of a cession of territory, but the latter positively denied this report at the time (see Part 3, No. 125) ..	86
127	„ „ ..	224	18,	Mannesmann enterprises. Transmits despatch from Consul Madden, reporting conversation with German Doctor Arning, who said mineral possibilities of Morocco were enormous. A great trade in deeds of properties at Agadir is going on at Mogador, but it is very doubtful whether purchasers will be able to prove a good title	87
128	Sir E. Goschen ..	203	21,	Franco-German negotiations (see No. 112). Further meeting between French Ambassador and Minister for Foreign Affairs on 20th instant. No progress was made, and conversation consisted almost entirely of complaints on part of Minister for Foreign Affairs. Minister for Foreign Affairs states that negotiations are rendered very difficult by rapacity of German Colonial Office, who cannot grasp idea that a small slice of German territory must be given up to save French prestige. Summary of press comments on present state of negotiations	87

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129	Sir F. Bertie ..	340	July 22, 1911	Franco-German negotiations. Refers to No. 115. Berlin correspondent of "Echo de Paris" telegraphs that negotiations are being seriously hindered by press campaign in England and indiscretions of French newspapers. French Ministry for Foreign Affairs have issued a notice stating that the reports of the negotiations which have appeared in French press are not based on any communication, and their authors are alone responsible ..	90
130	To Sir E. Goschen ..	167	24,	Franco-German negotiations. German Ambassador has made official communication to the effect that Germany had sent ship to Agadir to protect German interests, and for no other reason. Not a man had been landed; there was no reason for thinking German intentions had changed, and German Government regretted credence given to such reports. Germany had no intentions on Moorish territory, but demanded that, unless France kept strictly to Algeciras Act, she should come to terms with Germany. In spite of promise of strictest secrecy, France had given partial and misleading information respecting negotiations to the press and to her friends. Even if negotiations came to nothing, Germany would have no designs on Moorish territory, but would insist on Algeciras Act being fully carried out, and would count on support of other signatories to Act, including England. Germany had made no demand as to right of pre-emption in Belgian Congo. Ambassador requested that no public statement should be made respecting this communication	90
131	Mr. Rennie ..	62 Tel.	25,	Alcazar. Refers to No. 112. Minister for Foreign Affairs and French Ambassador have drafted *modus vivendi* under which neither French nor Spanish officers are to cross into each other's zone. Arrangements are to be made for mutual arrest and exchange of deserters; and consular permits to carry arms are to be issued to European travellers passing through Alcazar	91
132	To Sir E. Goschen ..	168	25,	Franco-German negotiations. German Government cannot consent to Count Metternich's communication (see No. 130) being used in Parliament after Mr. Lloyd George's speech (see No. 121), which is considered as provocatory. German Ambassador read communication to the effect that German Government did not think a conference would be necessary, as, if negotiations fell through, Germany would be prepared to vindicate her treaty-rights alone. Ambassador then read further communication about Mr. Lloyd George's speech, which had produced bad effect in Germany. German Government considered that if His Majesty's Government desired to express any wishes, these ought to have been conveyed through the diplomatic channel and not by a speech which press in England and France had interpreted as a warning bordering on menace. If His Majesty's Government had intended to embroil the situation they could not have chosen a better means than speech. Sir E. Grey	

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				replied that speech only claimed that England must be considered one of the great nations, and it dealt in general terms with remote contingencies. His Majesty's Government sincerely desired that negotiations should succeed	92
133	To Mr. Carnegie ..	305	July 25, 1911	Franco-German negotiations. Has informed French Ambassador of conversations with Count Metternich (see Nos. 130 and 132). Agrees with French Ambassador that conference should only be last resort. If negotiations failed, it would be necessary for England and France to discuss situation together. Ambassador himself is not pessimistic about situation	93
134	Mr. White ..	225	20,	Spanish vice-consul at Alcazar. Refers to No. 43. M. Villalta, who has been insane ever since his return from Alcazar, died at Tangier	94
135	„ „ ..	226	20,	German consul at Fez. Transmits despatch from Consul MacLeod, reporting that Dr. Vassel has been summoned to Berlin in connection with present situation ..	94
136	Mr. Rennie ..	130 Confidential	22,	Alcazar (see No 119). Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs in no way perturbed over recent Thiriet incident, and did not seem inclined to make capital out of it. French Ambassador has had a friendly conversation with Minister for Foreign Affairs, who touched on general question of desirability of resuming Madrid conversations	94
137	Consul-General Sir F. Oppenheimer	Confidential	25,	Germany and France. Germany seized Agadir with the object of forcing France to declare her intentions openly, failing which Emperor intended to turn it into a permanent naval base. He was only dissuaded by strong pressure from Minister for Foreign Affairs and Admiral von Tirpitz. Minister for Foreign Affairs wants to acquire the French Congo, though he is willing, in order to save French prestige, that Germany should cede some territory elsewhere in exchange. It is generally believed in Germany that negotiations will succeed	96
138	Sir E. Goschen ..	52 Tel.	26,	Franco-German negotiations. French Ambassador has been instructed to inform German Government that France cannot possibly entertain exorbitant German demands. He has telegraphed to Paris, asking if this is last word, as such a communication will almost certainly cause rupture of negotiations. German Minister for Foreign Affairs states that Germany cannot modify her demands because of indiscretion of French Government in communicating them to the press and because of threatening language of French newspapers	97
139	Mr. Rennie ..	63 Tel.	26,	Alcazar. Refers to No. 131. French Ambassador and Minister for Foreign Affairs have exchanged verbal declarations in the sense of the draft *modus vivendi* ..	97

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140	To Mr. Carnegie ..	312	July 26, 1911	Franco-German negotiations. French Ambassador has communicated substance of recent conversations in Berlin. Germany held to her demand for such a cession of French Congo as would bring Cameroons to Congo River, but had considerably increased her offers of territorial compensations to France elsewhere, and had promised France an absolutely free hand in Morocco. French Government could not agree to so large a cession, as French Chambers would never ratify it, and if they ceded Libreville or any place on Congo coast to Germany they would be accused in England of betraying British interests. Sir E. Grey assured Ambassador that His Majesty's Government were ready to make it clear in England that they had previously agreed to any cessions France considered reasonable. Sir E. Grey also showed Ambassador records of conversations with Count Metternich (see Nos. 114, 130, and 132) ..	92
141	Extract from Parliamentary Debates	..	27,	Statements in House of Commons by Prime Minister, Leader of Opposition, and Leader of Labour party	98
142	Mr. Rennie ..	64 Tel.	27,	Alcazar. Refers to No. 139. Verbal declaration as to *modus vivendi* has been approved by French Government, who have given necessary instructions to chargé d'affaires at Tangier. Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs has expressed his satisfaction, and hopes that way will now be open to conversations of a more extended nature ..	100
143	To Sir G. Buchanan..	386 Tel.	27,	Franco-German negotiations. Has informed Russian Ambassador, in order that Russia should be prepared beforehand for possible eventualities, that Germany had stated clearly that if negotiations did not succeed she would require that French military occupation of Morocco should cease entirely, and that France should observe strictly Algeciras Act. A conference might then be proposed	101
144	To Sir E. Goschen ..	172	27,	Franco-German negotiations. German Ambassador has made communication to the effect that German Government hope that Sir E. Grey is convinced that negotiations do not touch British interests, and that he will be able to state this fact in Parliament. German Government do not see how Sir E. Grey can describe German demands as obviously impossible without knowing what Germany intends to offer to France in return. Adverse criticism from English side renders negotiations more difficult, and a public statement that England wishes negotiations to succeed would have a beneficial and calming result. Sir E. Grey informed Ambassador he would not comment on communication until after statement on Morocco to be made by Prime Minister that afternoon (see No. 141)	101
145	To Mr. White ..	62	27,	Road tolls at Mogador. Refers to No. 124. Concurs in his views and approves his language to French Minister	102
146	To Sir E. Goschen ..	154 Tel.	28,	Franco-German negotiations. Informs of No. 144	102

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147	To Sir F. Bertie ..	318	July 28, 1911	Franco-German negotiations. French Government enquire whether, if negotiations fail, His Majesty's Government will propose a conference, even though Germany indicates she will not accept idea; and whether, if in that event Germany remains and lands men at Agadir, His Majesty's Government will make observations to Germany and send ships to Agadir. Sir E. Grey was unable to give definite answer, as action of His Majesty's Government must depend on actual situation when failure of negotiations took place; but, speaking personally, he thought conference should be proposed, but that no ship should be sent to Agadir unless this was regarded as possibly the first step in a war. Has made a personal suggestion to M. Cambon that possibly French might be able to offer larger concessions to Germany if it was previously arranged that French protectorate over Morocco should be confirmed by an international conference	103
148	Sir E. Goschen ..	205 Confidential	26,	Franco-German negotiations. Conversation with Minister for Foreign Affairs, who pointed out that France had, in return for a free hand in Morocco, squared England, Italy, and Spain. Why, therefore, should not Germany receive compensation too? He had been prepared for bargaining over German demands, but indiscretions of French Government to press and Mr. Lloyd George's speech, which had rendered situation much more difficult, rendered it impossible for him to reduce German demands. If France refused to compensate Germany whole Morocco question would have to be reopened, probably much to the disadvantage of France. Both Minister for Foreign Affairs and M. Cambon seem depressed at situation, and both are equally angry with indiscretions of French Government and violent tone of French press	104
149	" ..	206	27,	Mr. Lloyd George's speech. Comments of German press. Indignant tone of press has increased in last few days and speech is regarded as a threat. Translation of leading article from 'Berliner Tageblatt," which points out that Germany is being kept in complete ignorance of what is going on and demands more information..	106
150	" "	208	28,	Military preparations in Germany. Transmits despatch from military attaché, pointing out that, in spite of alarmist reports in French press, there are no indications of unusual military activity in Germany. Time of year is, no doubt, favourable for a sudden mobilisation, but no proceedings of any unusual character can be perceived	108
151	Mr. Carnegie ..	347	28,	Mr. Asquith's statement (see No. 141). French press comments are very favourable. It is pointed out that England, while not intervening in the negotiations, has unanimously ranged herself on the side of France and given a striking proof of the *entente cordiale*	109

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152	Sir F. Bertie ..	110 Tel. Confidential	July 29, 1911	Franco-German negotiations. Account of interview on 28th instant between German Minister for Foreign Affairs and French Ambassador. Former renewed his complaints of insufficiency of French offers of territory, of Mr. Lloyd George's speech, and of press indiscretions. Germany has no fresh suggestion to make, and he would bring question of utility of further conversations before Emperor and Chancellor. M. de Selves was very agitated, and stated he could not possibly cede French Congo. He showed on the map alternative cessions which France was prepared to make. If Germany rejected these offers he would be obliged to discontinue conversations at Berlin	110
153	" " ..	111 Tel. Confidential	29,	Franco-German negotiations. Negotiations are approaching a crisis. French Ambassador is to have a further interview on 31st instant with German Minister for Foreign Affairs, and French Government beg that definite view of His Majesty's Government respecting cession of French islands may be communicated at once (see Erratum at end of Contents)	112
154	" " ..	112 Tel. Confidential	29,	Franco-German negotiations. Refers to No. 152. French Minister for Foreign Affairs has enquired whether, in event of negotiations failing, if Germans increased their naval force at Agadir and landed men His Majesty's Government would join French, and possibly Spanish Governments, in sending ships to Agadir to do just what the Germans did, and whether, if Germany demanded France to withdraw her military forces from Morocco, His Majesty's Government would propose a conference. Sir F. Bertie replied that His Majesty's Government would certainly be prepared to call a conference, but sending ships to Agadir would require consideration. He also pointed out it would be more advantageous to France if conversations were broken off by Germany rather than by France. French Minister for Foreign Affairs is by no means pessimistic, and hopes for successful issue to negotiations	112
155	" " ..	113 Tel. Confidential	29,	Franco-German negotiations. Refers to No. 154. Has enquired whether, in the event of Germany consenting to a conference, it might be possible for France to come to a preliminary understanding with her..	113
156	Sir E. Goschen ..	54 Tel. Confidential	29,	Franco-German negotiations (see No. 152). Conversation on 28th instant between Herr von Kiderlen and M. Cambon was very unsatisfactory. Former said he could not modify German demands. He took his stand on Act of Algeciras, and said that German Government considered Franco-German understanding of 1909 to be non-existent. He would communicate decision of Imperial Government to M. Cambon on 31st July	113

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157	Sir F. Cartwright ..	83 Tel. Very Conf.	July 29, 1911	France and Germany. Is confidentially informed by editor of "Fremdenblatt" that latter has been told by German Ambassador that if British and French ships are sent to Agadir, Germany will at once mobilise two army corps in Alsace-Lorraine	113
158	Mr. White ..	140 Tel.	29,	Alcazar. 106 deserters from Moorish troops at Alcazar have been embarked on a Spanish steamer with unknown destination. French Government object to appointment of French consul *de carrière* at Alcazar (see No. 125)	114
159	Sir G. Buchanan ..	168 Tel.	30,	Franco-German negotiations. Acting Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs does not think Germany will push matters to an extremity, and thinks it would be well to await result of German Minister for Foreign Affairs' interview with His Majesty. He fears that if Germany secures large compensation, other Powers, such as Italy and Austria, may put forward similar demands. French Ambassador at St. Petersburgh is convinced that France can count on material support from Russia if Germany pushes matters too far.. ..	114
160	To Sir F. Bertie ..	187 Tel.	'30,	Franco-German negotiations. Refers to No. 153. His Majesty's Government recognise right of French Government to make what proposals they please respecting islands. There does not seem any *primâ facie* objection to cession of islands on strategic grounds, and if French Government propose such cession Sir E. Grey will regard action of French Government as perfectly loyal to *entente* ..	115
161	Mr. White ..	227	21,	Situation at Fez. Transmits despatch from Consul MacLeod, reporting conversation with Sid Taib Mokri. French troops have pacified tracts between Mequinez and Rabat, and Fez-Mequinez plain is quite orderly. "Tertib" is to be introduced into one tribe after another. Makhzen's military position is very weak, and Sid Taib did not see how number of French troops could prudently be diminished. Sid Taib stated that Sultan had not protested against German ship being sent to Agadir, but had expressed his surprise to Dr. Vassel	115
162	" " ..	228	21,	Union des Mines and M. Langenheim. German Minister informed Mr. Harris that German Government were much annoyed with union for their treatment of German engineer, M. Langenheim, and that he had reported case fully to Berlin. Mr. Harris thereupon showed him all the papers and proved to German Minister that he had been entirely misinformed. Latter promised to transmit copies of documents to Berlin	116
163	" " ..	230	22,	Alcazar. Refers to No. 125. Transmits despatch from consular agent, giving both French and Spanish versions of Thiriet incident. French version seems the most probable. Unless steps are taken to modify the position, serious trouble may be expected at Alcazar at any moment ..	117

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164	Mr. White ..	231	July 23, 1911	Acquisition of real property by foreigners. Refers to Part 42, No. 422. Guebbas has addressed further letter to diplomatic body, saying reference to article 63 of Algeciras Act should have been to article 65. Guebbas does not give information desired, and renews protest of Makhzen against unauthorised purchase in the meantime of land outside 10-kilom. zone	119
165	" " ..	232	23,	Agadir. Refers to No. 126. Expands Nos. 105 and 117. Kaïd Gilooli states that Germans are landing in parties of forty men and making marches into the country, but it appears this is for purposes of sport. German vice-consul at Mogador has been extending German protection to principal men in the south. Action of German vice-consul in connection with dispossessed Kaïd of Kourima	119
166	" " ..	233	23,	Ceuta – Tetuan road. Refers to No. 46. Spaniards are continuing road to Tetuan side of Cape Negro. Anjera people are complaining that Ruham is compelling them to sell their land to Spaniards. According to previous reports, Spaniards have dealt very fairly as regards purchase of land	120
167	" " ..	235	23,	Spanish forces at Alcazar and Laraiche. 1,800 troops at Alcazar with artillery and 1,400 at Laraiche	120
168	Sir R. Rodd ..	115	25,	Attitude of Italy. Italy is tied by her obligations to France and her alliance to Germany, and must therefore stand outside. But, if either party secure distinct advantages, Italian opinion will be highly excited unless Italy secures some corresponding advantage. Does not consider it probable that there is an intimate connection between Albanian and Moroccan questions, indicating collusion between Berlin and Vienna	121
169	Sir A. Hardinge ..	122 Africa Confidential	28,	Franco-German negotiations. Minister for Foreign Affairs has heard nothing about alleged German proposals respecting French right of pre-emption over Belgian Congo. He considered that any transfer or abandonment of that right by France would require consent of Belgian Government. Belgium, now that she has annexed Congo, will stick to it at all costs ..	122
170	To Sir F. Bertie ..	188 Tel.	31,	Franco-German negotiations. Approves language reported in No. 154. If France and Germany did not come to an agreement previous to a conference result might be restoration of *status quo* under Algeciras Act, with which no one is now content. His Majesty's Government, however, are prepared to call a conference if negotiations fail	122
171	" " ..	321	31,	Franco-German negotiations. French Ambassador has communicated same information as contained in No. 152. He was told that he would be informed on following day whether, if negotiations failed, His Majesty's Government would propose a conference to decide in what respects there had been a departure from Algeciras Act and whether Act should be altered ..	123

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172	Mr. Rennie ..	134 Confidential	July 27, 1911	Alcazar (see No. 142). Transmits *déclaration verbale* respecting *modus vivendi* at Alcazar. Form adopted indicates temporary nature of situation and provisional character of measures to be applied. Spanish Government are pleased at conclusion of this arrangement	123
173	Sir E. Goschen ..	55 Tel.	Aug. 1,	Frrnco-German negotiations. Minister for Foreign Affairs has returned from Swinemünde, and enquired from French Ambassador what terms his Government proposed. On hearing what French Government offered, Minister for Foreign Affairs said they formed an acceptable basis for discussion	124
174	To Sir F. Bertie ..	329	1,	Franco-German negotiations. Has informed M. Cambon that German desire for expansion in Africa could be met if Portuguese colonies or Belgian Congo were for sale. In such circumstances, His Majesty's Government would not oppose German expansion. Has also pointed out that apprehension of France that Germany might repudiate any present arrangement as she had that of 1909 would be removed if arrangement was subsequently confirmed by a conference which put an end to Algeciras Act. M. Cambon said he had already put this view before his Government ..	124
175	„ „ ..	330	1,	Franco-German negotiations (see No. 171). M. Cambon states that M. de Selves concurs in our suggestion as to the grounds on which a conference might be proposed if the Franco-German conversations broke down. He has been informed that His Majesty's Government have considered the matter, and that if the conversations did break down they would be prepared to propose a conference of the Powers parties to the Algeciras Act "to decide in what respects there has been a departure from the Act of Algeciras and what the situation requires"	125
176	Mr. White ..	141 Tel.	2,	Expulsion of newspaper correspondents from Agadir. Correspondents of "Daily Express" and "Westminster Gazette" have been expelled nominally because they brought no letters of recommendation and refused to explain object of their visit. They would no doubt have been allowed to remain if they had given usual presents. Vice-consul at Mogador is making representations	125
177	To Sir F. Bertie ..	334	2,	Franco-German negotiations. Interview between French Ambassador in Berlin and Herr von Kiderlen. Present position apparently is that Germany would admit France to access to the Benue River, while France would concede to Germany a strip of territory from the Cameroons to the River Congo, but in no circumstances west of the River Sanga. In return she would have a practical protectorate in Morocco. It might be difficult to use word "protectorat," but that was a question of drafting. M. Cambon's idea of a French protectorate in Morocco is that the position of the Sultan would remain, but France would have right of police and financial control. Economic liberty and rights of	

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				commerce would be preserved, and a special arrangement would be made as regards Tangier. Position of Spain in her sphere would be similar to that of France	126
178	Sir F. Bertie ..	356	Aug. 2, 1911	Principles of commercial equality and mining concessions in Morocco. Transmits reply of French Government to No. 89. They are determined to maintain the principle of commercial equality throughout Morocco. As regards mines, they would propose to apply the organisation defined in the mining regulations proposed by the technical delegates of the four Powers. They will take further steps to obtain the adhesion of the Netherlands Government to these proposals, or will amend them to meet Dutch objections. Will His Majesty's Government support them? ..	126
179	„ „ ..	114 Tel.	2,	Franco-German negotiations. Account of interview in Berlin between Herr von Kiderlen and M. Jules Cambon on 1st August (see No. 177). French Minister for Foreign Affairs is more hopeful of an understanding, but he cannot say how French Government will view German demand for a band of territory to Congo River	127
180	To Mr. White ..	60 Tel.	3,	Expulsion of newspaper correspondents from Agadir. Refers to No. 176. He should protest against interference with correspondents, and insist on their being allowed to return if they wish. It is understood that French and Germans are allowed to land and move about freely at Agadir, and there can be no excuse for treating British subjects differently ..	128
181	To Sir F. Bertie ..	328	3,	Police. Transmits No. 123, enclosing Inspector-General's report. He should ascertain what action French Government propose to take in the matter	128
182	Sir R. Rodd ..	116 Confidential	July 31,	Attitude of Italy. Reports conversation with Minister for Foreign Affairs, who stated that Italy's position in Triple Alliance did not compel her to disinterest herself in Morocco in favour of Germany or to renounce her rights as a signatory of Algeciras Act. So far as France was concerned, Italy would have no right to question French annexations in Morocco, but would be perfectly justified in considering how far her interests and balance of power in the Mediterranean would be affected by such annexation, and how far she might not be obliged to redress the balance by taking some definite step in Tripoli	128
183	Sir F. Bertie ..	357 Secret	Aug. 3,	Franco-German negotiations. Refers to No. 179. Both Minister for Foreign Affairs and President of the Council are more optimistic as to their outcome in consequence of change in attitude of Herr von Kiderlen, who no longer demands the cession of French Congo down to the sea. French Government are confident that they will be able to come to an arrangement with Spain, though latter country may have to cede Spanish Guinea in return for German recognition of Spanish occupation in Morocco. Minister for	

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				Foreign Affairs personally appears to be willing to consent to German demand for territorial connection with French Congo, but he foresees opposition from French Colonial Department and colonial party .	129
184	Sir E. Goschen ..	51 Tel.	Aug. 4, 1911	Franco-German negotiations. Transmits official communiqué published announcing a rapprochement on matters of principle in conversations between Minister for Foreign Affairs and French Ambassador ..	129
185	Mr. White ..	142 Tel.	4,	Laraiche and Alcazar. Spanish cruiser has arrived with 400 troops, and more are expected	130
186	„ „ ..	143 Tel.	4,	Alcazar. Colonel Silvestre has ordered officer commanding Moorish troops to vacate barracks and withdraw his force from town. Officer consulted Guebbas, who instructed him not to yield except under compulsion	130
187	Sir F. Bertie ..	115 Tel.	5,	Franco-German negotiations. Interviews between French Ambassador and German Minister for Foreign Affairs. Latter defined German demands, which French Government are determined not to concede. They will also not cede Comoro Islands, as suggested by German Government. Herr von Kiderlen has alluded vaguely to possible disappearance of Congo State, but has proposed to acquire by secret treaty with France pre-emptive rights which she has by secret treaty with Spain over Spanish Guinea	130
188	Sir M. de Bunsen ..	65 Tel.	7,	Franco-Spanish negotiations. Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs has suggested to French Ambassador that he should arrange with Sir M. de Bunsen a date for resuming conversations discontinued in June. French Ambassador thinks it important to ascertain present nature of Spanish aspirations, and is therefore in favour of meeting wishes of Spanish Government without awaiting conclusion of Berlin negotiations. Is authorised to take part in conversations if French Government agree	131
189	Mr. White.. ..	241	July 29,	Political situation. Financial difficulties of Makhzen owing to impossibility of issuing a loan in existing political situation. Sultan's consequent resort to old system of extortion. Complication of situation by presence of Spaniards in north and Germans in south, to whom all those who are threatened apply for protection. Case of Kaïd Krafes. French chargé d'affaires has sent instructions to Consul Gaillard to obtain Krafes' reappointment as Kaïd of Arwa	131
190	„ „ ..	242	29,	Suppression of slave trade. Refers to No. 33. Has discussed matter with French chargé d'affaires, who thinks it would be impossible for the present to obtain suppression of Marrakesh slave market, but that it might be possible to obtain from Sultan that no slaves should be sold by auction in Fez. British and French consuls at Fez have been asked for their views. Fez and Marrakesh are only towns where consuls reside where slave markets are regularly held. It would be quite impossible to prohibit private sales of slaves, even at	

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				ports. Gives reasons for considering Mr. Donald Mackenzie's estimate of number of slaves entering Morocco each year exaggerated	132
191	Mr. White ..	244 Confidential	July 30, 1911	Agadir (see No. 165). Reports interview between Sid Guebbas and German Minister with reference to former's complaint as to armed parties from "Berlin" landing at Agadir. Minister denied report, though it is confirmed from many sources. Transmits despatch from vice-consul at Mogador reporting interview between chiefs of tribes at Agadir and German naval officers, and influx of German subjects to the port to buy land and open commercial relations with the natives	132
192	„ „ ..	245	30,	Alcazar. French claim to have proof that Spaniards employ agents to induce Moorish soldiers to desert and then enrol them in Spanish battalions. Reports from Laraiche state that 106 of these deserters have been embarked on board Spanish steamer, which sailed probably either for Ceuta or Melilla. Spanish Minister professes ignorance, but told French chargé d'affaires that *modus vivendi* was not retroactive, and that only future deserters were to be restored. Spaniards are strengthening their position at Alcazar and throwing up entrenchments	134
193	„ „ ..	248	Aug. 2,	Expulsion of newspaper correspondents from Agadir (see Nos. 176 and 180). Transmits despatch from vice-consul at Mogador. He has written to Governor of Mogador, requesting that an explanation of the matter may be obtained from Kaïd Guilooli. Report of landing of armed parties from German ship appears to have been founded on a misconception (see No. 191)	134
194	Sir E. Goschen ..	213	4,	Franco-German negotiations (see No. 173). Change in Herr von Kiderlen's manner and tone after return from seeing Emperor at Swinemünde. French Ambassador has now informed him of French proposals, and he has replied that they appear to provide an acceptable basis for discussion. Both Herr von Kiderlen and M. Cambon have informed Sir E. Goschen that matters are going better. Attitude of German press	136
195	„ „ ..	217	3,	Germany and Morocco. Transmits extract from statement published in "Hamburger Nachrichten" by German Colonial Company, protesting against proposed evacuation of Morocco by Germany and substitution of part of French Congo for footing in Morocco. Moderate article by "Hamburger Nachrichten," criticising above statement	138
196	Sir M. de Bunsen ..	137	5,	Franco-Spanish negotiations. Conversation with Minister for Foreign Affairs, who expressed hope that Sir M. de Bunsen would be authorised to take part in conversations if they were resumed as proposed. Has replied that Sir E. Grey may perhaps think it better to await outcome of Franco-German negotiations. Warning addressed to Señor García Prieto of danger of Spain pursuing aggressive attitude towards France in Morocco. He	

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				seems sincerely desirous of proceeding on basis of a renewed understanding with France and England, and has given positive assurance that Spain has not remotest understanding with Germany ..	139
197	Sir F. Cartwright ..	128	Aug. 6, 1911	Franco-German negotiations. Comments of Vienna press. Calls special attention to article in "Wiener Allgemeine Zeitung," stating that good reception given to German Emperor in London misled German Government to think that England would not support France in Morocco. Chancellor of Exchequer's speech showed Germany her mistake	140
198	Sir V. Corbett ..	40	6,	Franco-German negotiations. Transmits extracts from articles in "Muenchener Neueste Nachrichten," commenting on position of negotiations and deprecating excessive optimism or depression ..	141
199	Sir E. Goschen ..	218	6,	Franco-German negotiations. Transmits extracts from violently chauvinistic article in the "Post" alluding to recent communiqué (see No. 184), calling on the Chancellor and Minister for Foreign Affairs to resign, and reproaching the Emperor for "Germany's humiliation." Censure of article by Government and other organs..	143
200	Sir M. de Bunsen ..	139	6,	Franco-Spanish relations in Morocco. French Ambassador is now on excellent terms with Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs, but states that *modus vivendi* respecting Alcazar and its district had only been concluded just in time to prevent tension between French and Spanish officers becoming unbearable. Some points of divergence still exist as to extent of territory near Alcazar in which Moorish mehalla under Lieutenant Thiriet may operate, and M. Geoffray has supported Spanish view in communication to his Government	144
201	„ „ ..	66 Tel. Confidential	9,	Franco-Spanish negotiations. Refers to No. 188. French Government have replied that they consider it would be wiser to defer resumption of conversations with Spain until result of Berlin negotiations is known. French Ambassador, having been consulted by his Government as to arrangement which France will have to make with Spain if she gets a free hand in Morocco, has reported that he presumes Morocco would have to be partitioned into spheres of influence in accordance with article 3 of secret Franco-Spanish convention of 1904, France and Spain directing administration of Makhzen in their respective spheres. M. Geoffray considers secret convention should be published as soon as an agreement with Germany has been reached	145
202	To Sir M. de Bunsen	84 Tel.	9,	Franco-Spanish negotiations. Refers to No. 188. Concurs in French view that it would be wiser to await conclusion of agreement at Berlin before reopening Berlin negotiations	146

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203	To Sir F. Bertie ..	344	Aug. 9, 1911	Mining law. Refers to No. 178. His Majesty's Government cannot reply to French enquiry as to British support for suggested compromise with Netherlands Government respecting the mining law until they know at least general outline of compromise ..	146
204	To Sir G. Buchanan..	219	9,	Franco-German negotiations. Attitude of Russia. Has observed to Russian Ambassador that Herr von Kiderlen may possibly be prolonging negotiations in order to choose his own moment for giving them an unfavourable turn. If so, much would depend on what Russia was prepared to do. Ambassador replied that, owing to terms of Franco-Russian alliance, it was pretty clear what Russia would do	146
205	To Sir M. de Bunsen	86	9,	France and Spain. Conversation with King of Spain, who stated that he wished to continue policy of working with England and France. Sir E. Grey reciprocated this feeling, and said he would do his utmost to secure the three countries being kept together, whatever settlement might be reached, and that as soon as a Franco-German understanding had been reached he would promote a satisfactory arrangement between France and Spain. In reply to a pressing request from His Majesty to support the 1904 convention, Sir E. Grey repeated he would do his utmost to keep the three countries together ..	147
206	Sir F. Cartwright ..	130	6,	Franco-German negotiations. Refers to No. 197. Article in "Neue Freie Presse" states, with reference to official communiqué (see No. 184), that France has admitted German point of view, and that England has acquiesced in this admission. This is a great success for Germany. Tone of article seems to show that inspired press have been ordered to make the best of a bad job and maintain that Germany has gained her point	148
207	Communicated by French Embassy	..	10,	Dutch objections to mining law. Refers to No. 178. Transmits memorandum by M. Agoillon, and enquires whether His Majesty's Government concur in amendments suggested therein to meet wishes of Netherlands Government	149
208	To Sir M. de Bunsen	88	10,	Franco - Spanish negotiations. Spanish Government anxious to continue discussions with France. Has informed Spanish Ambassador that resumption of these discussions now would hinder rather than facilitate negotiations at Berlin. Has promised to authorise Sir M. de Bunsen to take part in negotiations if and when France proposes or agrees to consider them	151
209	Sir M. de Bunsen ..	142	8,	Franco-Spanish negotiations Reviews summarily points discussed at meetings in the spring between Minister for Foreign Affairs, French Ambassador, and himself (see Part 42, Nos. 279, 322, 341, and 369)	151

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210	Sir E. Goschen ..	219	Aug. 8, 1911	Franco-German negotiations. Attitude of German press. Nearly whole press strongly disapproves "Post's" attack on Emperor (see No. 199). Herr Harden has now published just as strong an article in the "Zukunft" attacking the Emperor, and containing scathing criticisms of the Chancellor and Minister for Foreign Affairs. Effect of article will be to render Anglo-German relations still more unpleasant	155
211	Sir F. Bertie ..	117 Tel. Confidential	12,	Franco-German negotiations. Negotiations are proceeding on basis of Germany ceding Togoland and Bec du Canard and giving France a free hand in Morocco and France ceding certain territories in French Congo. French Minister for Foreign Affairs foresees great difficulty in arranging questions affecting concessions to commercial companies	155
212	" " ..	118 Tel.	12,	Reported attack on Tarudant. French consul at Mogador reports attack and fear of danger to Germans, who are the only Europeans there	156
213	Mr. White ..	145 Tel.	12,	Attack on Tarudant (see No. 212). Reports attack and anxiety as to fate of Mannesmann party there	156
214	To Count Bentinck ..	..	12,	Dutch objections to mining law. Transmits Nos. 178, 203, and 207. He should support any proposals based on M. Aguillon's memorandum which his French colleague may be instructed to make ..	156
215	Mr. White ..	146 Tel.	13,	Attack on Tarudant. Refers to No. 213. Tribesmen entered town, but were eventually driven out. Mannesmann agents consist of one German and one Austrian, with Algerian interpreter, and their position still causes anxiety	156
216	" " ..	249	5,	Lemta outrage. Refers to No. 64. Transmits despatch and other papers from Consul MacLeod containing his detailed observations on memorandum of French Minister for Foreign Affairs of 17th June (see Part 42, No. 404)..	157
217	" " ..	250 Confidential	5,	Alcazar. Raisuli complains bitterly of ill-treatment and injustice which inhabitants of Alcazar are suffering at hands of French vice-consul (M. Boisset) and his Algerian interpreter. He said inhabitants were delighted at presence of Spaniards, who behaved admirably. He added that almost everybody in the district had French or Spanish protection, especially the former	168
218	" " ..	253	5,	Expulsion of correspondents from Agadir. Refers to No. 193. Transmits despatch from vice-consul at Mogador, letter of protest from Mr. Ostler, and note addressed to Guebbas in accordance with instructions in No. 180. Mr. Ostler showed great want of tact in not having taken the trouble to obtain Government escort and letter of introduction ..	168

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219	Mr. White ..	254	Aug. 6, 1911	Alcazar. Expands No. 186. Has informed French chargé d'affaires that Guebbas's instructions to kaid not to vacate barracks unless forcibly compelled to do so by Colonel Silvestre were very rash, and might provoke a serious incident ..	172
220	" " ..	255	7,	Arrest of German protégé at Fez. Transmits despatch from Consul MacLeod reporting details. Protégé has now been released, and Makhzen will apologise to acting German consul..	172
221	" " ..	257	8,	Expulsion of correspondents from Agadir. Refers to No. 218. Transmits despatch from vice-consul at Mogador, reporting that Kaïd Guilooli has sent a further letter of apology and promised that correspondents will be well received if they return to Agadir. Latest news of German movements at Agadir..	173
222	" " ..	258	8,	Expulsion of correspondents from Agadir. Refers to No. 218. Transmits letter from Guebbas, stating that he has written very strongly to Governor of Agadir on the subject, and requesting that in future British subjects going to Agadir may be furnished with letters from Governor of Mogador	175
223	Sir M. de Bunsen ..	143 Confidential	9,	Franco-Spanish negotiations. Refers to No. 201. French Ambassador has informed French Government that in any negotiations it will be necessary to fall back on Secret Franco-Spanish Convention of 1904, and recognise that Spain must have liberty of action in her sphere free from French interference. Ambassador is fully conscious of extreme difficulty of devising a settlement with Spain which will secure to her free action in her sphere while maintaining unity of Sultan's administration throughout Morocco. He has been instructed to inform Spanish Government that moment has not yet arrived for resuming conversations	175
224	Sir F. Bertie ..	366	12,	Police. Refers to No. 181. Question of police at ports will be studied by French Government, who are quite ready to come to an understanding with His Majesty's Government..	176
225	" " ..	120 Tel. Confidential	14,	Franco-German negotiations. Refers to No. 211. Further discussion at Berlin on 11th August of territory to be ceded by France. Questions at issue are to be submitted to Emperor on 17th August, after which Minister for Foreign Affairs is going to Marienbad for a week.. ..	176
226	" " ..	121 Tel. Confidential	14,	Attack on Tarudant (see No. 215). Minister for Foreign Affairs thinks it probable Germans are promoting disturbances in Sus in order to have pretext for landing troops. Eventual preparations for landing troops at Agadir are being studied by German General Staff. Minister for Foreign Affairs wishes to know whether His Majesty's Government would be prepared to join Minister for Foreign Affairs in landing troops at Agadir if Germans do so	177

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227	To Sir F. Bertie ..	348	Aug. 14, 1911	Agadir. M. Cambon has communicated news about Tarudant (see No. 226), and enquired what we thought should be done if Germans landed. Sir E. Grey has replied that it would be difficult to come to a decision before knowing what circumstances were..	177
228	Lord Acton ..	120	14,	Dutch amendments to mining law. Refers to No. 214. French Minister has been instructed to postpone making communication to Netherlands Government pending concurrence of German and Spanish Governments in proposed compromise ..	178
229	Sir F. Bertie ..	122 Tel.	15,	Franco - German negotiations. German Minister for Foreign Affairs has informed French Ambassador that Germany cannot cede Togoland, and that she requires both banks of River Sangha. M. Cambon has replied that French Government cannot entertain latter proposal, and that as Togoland cannot be ceded there must be great reductions in French cessions. M. Cambon is to have a further interview with Minister for Foreign Affairs on 16th August..	178
230	Sir V. Corbett ..	43 Confidential	12,	Franco-German negotiations. Disappointment and disillusion are severe now that it is becoming known that Germany will not get a footing in Morocco, and confidence and enthusiasm respecting Herr von Kiderlen is rapidly evaporating. Democratic papers are demanding summoning of Reichstag or Foreign Affairs' Committee of Bundesrath. Discusses powers and position of latter. Summarises article in "Deutsche Export-Revue" pointing out that if Germany yields, not only German prestige but German export trade and commerce will suffer	178
231	Sir F. Bertie ..	123 Tel.	16,	Franco-German negotiations (see No. 229). Interview between German Minister for Foreign Affairs and French Ambassador fixed for 16th has been postponed till 17th	181
232	To Sir F. Bertie ..	192 Tel.	16,	Agadir (see No 227). Has informed French Ambassador that if Germans landed at Agadir on some reasonable pretext, such as death of German at Tarudant, we should not act at once. If landing were prolonged indefinitely we might either propose a conference or send ships to Agadir. In the latter case Germany might mobilise on French frontier, and we ought to be prepared beforehand for such an eventuality	181
233	Sir F. Bertie ..	126 Tel. Very Conf.	18,	Franco-German negotiations. Minister for Foreign Affairs thinks that unless pan-Germans persuade Emperor to insist on German demands His Majesty will remain pacific. German Minister for Foreign Affairs' procrastination may be due to his waiting to see whether strikes in England will affect England's intervention in foreign affairs	181

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234	Sir E. Goschen ..	60 Tel	Aug. 18, 1911	Franco-German negotiations. Minister for Foreign Affairs stated on 17th instant that negotiations were not making good progress, and it did not seem clear how any satisfactory arrangement could be reached. At interview on 18th between Minister for Foreign Affairs and M. Cambon, former did not seem unwilling to consider cession to France of a strip of Togoland, and he accepted French definition of Morocco, *i.e.*, including Sus, definite French protectorate, and non-interference in eventual Franco-Spanish negotiations. M. Cambon is not dissatisfied. Minister for Foreign Affairs will be away from Berlin till 28th ..	182
235	Mr. White ..	260	11,	Sultan of Morocco. Sultan is anxious to go to Rabat, but French are opposed to it, and it is therefore unlikely that he will leave Fez. Sultan's health is reported to be in a very bad state owing to drink ..	182
236	" " ..	263	12,	Alcazar. Refers to No. 217. Raisuli has had long interview with French chargé d'affaires, who did not resent his plain-speaking about M. Boisset's proceedings, but took him to task for alleged extortions. Chargé d'affaires is well pleased with result of interview, and impressed by what Raisuli said	183
237	" " ..	264	12,	Alcazar. Refers to No. 219. Spanish troops have taken possession of barracks without any incident occurring. Moorish troops marched to other side of Loukkos River, where they joined mehalla under Lieutenant Thiriet	183
238	" " ..	265	13,	Movements of General Moinier. General is at present on his way to Mequinez and Fez, where he will discuss with Sultan measures to be taken to pacify tribes, who are becoming restless owing to exactions of Makhzen. Ait Yusi are threatening trouble, and disturbances are feared elsewhere. General will eventually return to Shawia through Zaer country	184
239	" " ..	266	13,	Tarudant. Expands Nos. 213 and 215. German and Austrian consuls at Mogador have asked Kaïd Guilooli to march a force to Tarudant. French chargé d'affaires fears that such action would cause a general rising, and has recommended that release of Europeans should be effected by negotiation	184
240	" " ..	267	14,	Agadir. Transmits despatch from vice-consul at Mogador reporting visit of Spanish steamer, with Spanish consul and other Spanish passengers on board, to Agadir, where they landed. One of the latter reports that German officers seldom land, and do not make any shooting expeditions into the interior	185

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242	Sir F. Bertie ..	125 Tel.	18,	Franco-German negotiations. Reports interview at Berlin between German Minister for Foreign Affairs and French Ambassador on 17th instant (see No. 234) ..	186
243	„ „ ..	127 Tel.	19,	Franco - German negotiations. Refers to No. 234. French Minister for Foreign Affairs denies Herr von Kiderlen's statements that France has not only reduced her first offers, but is asking for more, and says he has had no heated discussion with German Ambassador in Paris. As regards press indiscretions, there have been more at Berlin than at Paris	186
244	„ „ ..	128 Tel. Secret	20,	Franco - German negotiations. Interview with Prime Minister, who inquired whether, if France had to cede to Germany territory which would cut off Northern Congo from sea, His Majesty's Government would consider proposal for an exchange of territory which would give France access from Northern Congo to her possessions north of Nigeria through Bec du Canard. He added that if Germans landed men at Agadir French will send ships to Mogador and Saffi, and take there whatever action Germans may take at Agadir	187
245	Sir E. Goschen ..	232	18,	Franco - German negotiations. Expands No. 234	187
246	To Sir F. Bertie ..	195 Tel.	21,	Proposed Franco-British exchange of territory. Refers to No. 244. Proposal will receive careful consideration of His Majesty's Government. Trusts French Government will not take so decisive a step as to send ships to Saffi and Mogador without further consideration and until Sir E. Grey has discussed matter further with French Ambassador	188
247	Sir V. Corbett ..	45 Confidential	20,	Franco-German negotiations. Feeling of profound disappointment continues to find expression in German press. Attitude of England and Russia is as surprising as it is disconcerting to German mind. Lecture by Professor Eckhardt, urging acquisition of Morocco as a German colony. After lecture a telegram was sent to Chancellor demanding that there should be no abandonment of Morocco or withdrawal from Agadir	189
248	Sir F. Bertie ..	372 Secret	21,	Franco-German negotiations. Expands No. 244. M. Caillaux pointed out that pan-Germans were getting out of hand, and danger was that Herr von Kiderlen's personal reputation was involved. M. Caillaux alluded to changed spirit in France and confidence felt in the army ..	190

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250	„ „ ..	129 Tel.	21,	Proposed Franco-British exchange of territory. Has communicated substance of No. 246 to President of Council, who expressed grateful appreciation. He will do nothing in regard to sending ships to Mogador and Saffi till Sir E. Grey has discussed matter with French Ambassador	191
251	Sir M. de Bunsen ..	147	16,	France and Spain. Refers to No. 205. Comments on King of Spain's statement that Spain had delayed 1904 agreement with France in order to obtain consent of His Majesty's Government, and that agreement was less favourable to Spain than if it had been made at once. His Majesty was probably referring to abortive Franco-Spanish negotiations in 1902, when Spanish sphere was to include Fez and Taza ..	191
252	Sir F. Bertie ..	130 Tel. Confidential	22,	Franco-German negotiations. Reports conference between principal Cabinet Ministers and French Ambassadors in London and Berlin. French Government have decided to make large offers of territory to Germany, and if she rejects them it will mean she does not desire to come to an arrangement. French Government think that if negotiations fail Germans will stay at Agadir, and public opinion will then force French Government to send ships to Morocco. They wish to know whether His Majesty's Government could convey to German Government that landing or increase of force at Agadir will render an amicable arrangement impossible ..	192
253	To Sir F. Bertie ..	200 Tel.	23,	Franco-German negotiations (see No. 252). Has informed French Ambassador that His Majesty's Government think that before active measures such as sending ships to Morocco are taken a conference should be proposed. French Ambassador enquired how His Majesty's Government would proceed if Germany refused a conference, and was informed that Sir E. Grey must consult Prime Minister before replying	193
254	„ „ ..	355	23,	Franco - German negotiations. Expands No. 253. French Ambassador has shown Sir E. Grey draft of a Franco-German convention. Sir E. Grey saw no objections to draft in principle. Has discussed question of conference with French Ambassador	193
255	Sir G. Buchanan ..	190 Tel.	24,	Franco-German negotiations. Russian Government have given French Ambassador formal assurance that France can count on Russia's military as well as diplomatic support	194
256	Sir F. Bertie ..	134 Tel. Confidential	24,	Franco - German negotiations. Refers to Nos. 253 and 254. Has asked Minister for Foreign Affairs whether he could not persuade his colleagues not to bring matter to a crisis by a hurried occupation of Saffi, Mogador, and Marrakesh if Germans take further action at Agadir. Question will be discussed at Council of Ministers on 25th August	195

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257	Sir F. Bertie ..	376 Most Conf.	Aug. 23, 1911	Franco-German negotiations. Conversation with Spanish Ambassador, who spoke of desirability of Spain joining in the Berlin negotiations. Conversation with Russian Ambassador, who expressed view that presence of Germans at Agadir could do no harm to France. Minister for Foreign Affairs stated subsequently that views of Russian Ambassador were not those of Russian Government, and that attitude of latter was entirely satisfactory. Minister for Foreign Affairs has informed Spanish Ambassador that moment has not yet come for resumption of conversations at Madrid, and that it was Germany which had declined to allow Spain to participate in Berlin conversations ..	195
258	„ „ ..	132 Tel. Confidential	24,	Franco-German negotiations. Refers to No. 257. Specifies four alternative cessions of territory in Africa which French Government are ready to offer in succession to Germany (see No. 252) . ..	197
259	„ „ ..	133 Tel. Confidential	24,	Franco-German negotiations. Refers to No. 257. Reports conversation between French Minister for Foreign Affairs and German Ambassador in Paris, when latter made enquiries as to nature of the free hand which France wished in Morocco, and said it would be desirable that any railways in the Sus should be in German hands. Minister for Foreign Affairs rejected the idea. The territorial cessions were also discussed, and German Ambassador advanced impossible pretensions. Minister for Foreign Affairs can hardly believe German Government wish negotiations to succeed	197
260	Sir M. de Bunsen ..	67 Tel.	25,	Franco-Spanish negotiations. French Government intend to submit to His Majesty's Government new draft Franco-Spanish Convention, in which no reference is made to Ifni, which French Government wish to obtain in compensation for their cessions to Germany. French Ambassador has notified to Spanish Government increase of French military mission at Fez	198
261	Sir F. Bertie .	135 Tel. Confidential	25,	Franco-German negotiations (see No. 256). It was decided at a meeting of Paris Cabinet that Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs were authorised to use their discretion as to what action, if any, should be taken if *status quo* at Agadir were altered. Sir F. Bertie thinks nothing will be done without previous consultation with His Majesty's Government..	198
262	„ „ ..	136 Tel.	25,	Franco-German negotiations (see No. 259). Further conversation between Minister for Foreign Affairs and German Ambassador, at which President of Council was present. German Ambassador again showed disposition to claim Alima' line, but M. Caillaux flouted the idea	199

No.	Name.	No.	Date.	Subject.	Page
263	Sir F. Cartwright ..	85 Tel.	Aug. 26, 1911	"Neue Freie Presse" article. Unsigned article appeared on 25th instant purporting to give views of an English diplomatist respecting Germany's action in Morocco. Article is by Dr. Muenz. German Embassy in Vienna are attributing article to Sir F. Cartwright, and intend to start a campaign against him in the German press	199
264	Mr. White ..	147 Tel.	27,	Tarudant (see No. 266). Guebbas has requested German Minister to instruct Germans at Tarudant to return to the coast. German Minister has replied that captain of cruiser at Agadir reports that Tarudant is quiet, and that German Government expect Makhzen to assure safety of Germans there	199
265	„ „ ..	269	17,	German influence in Morocco. German action at Agadir has made considerable impression on native population, and embarrassing appeals are being made to German Minister. Large deputation recently waited on him to expose their grievances respecting state of streets and drains at Tangier, and insisted on Minister's conveying their appeal to the German Emperor	200
266	„ „ ..	271	19,	Tarudant. Refers to No. 239. German Minister, at suggestion of his French colleague, has requested Guebbas to secure safe return to coast of Europeans at Tarudant. Guebbas has sent necessary instructions to Guilooli, but there are difficulties in the way of restoring peace as Mannesmanns have instructed their agents to remain at Tarudant..	200
267	„ „ ..	273	19,	Slave Trade at Rabat. In compliance with Mr. White's request, Guebbas gave stringent orders for discontinuance of public sale of slaves in a "fondak." British vice-consul at Rabat reports that Government has now entirely prohibited sale of slaves by auction	201
268	„ „ ..	275	21,	Tarudant (see No. 266). Transmits copy of radiogram from Agadir, stating there are twelve Europeans at Tarudant, including one Englishman. German lately returned from Agadir says surrounding tribes resent presence of Europeans, and have lately shown signs of hostility	201
269	Sir E. Goschen ..	241 Confidential	25,	Germany and England. Conversation with Herr Zimmermann, who complained bitterly of Mr. Lloyd George's speech, which had been quite unexpected in Germany. German public did not understand why England made such a fuss about the dispatch of a ship to Agadir, which had been the Emperor's idea, and which had been meant to make it easier for the French Government to defend in the Chamber any concessions to Germany. Ambassador said he thought ship was sent to protect interests of Hamburg merchants, at which Herr Zimmermann smiled	202

No.	Name.	No.	Date.	Subject.	Page
270	Sir E. Goschen ..	243	Aug. 25, 1911	German foreign policy (see No. 210). Further article in "Zukunft" by Herr Harden, who points out that effect of Potsdam conversations and Russo-German agreement has been to compel Austria to come to terms herself with Russia, to alienate the Turks, and to drive M. Pichon out of office. Article violently attacks Chancellor and Minister for Foreign Affairs for their Morocco policy, and points out that the dispatch of French troops to Fez did not violate the Algeciras Act or the Franco-German Agreement of 1909	203
271	Sir F. Cartwright ..	145	26,	"Neue Freie Presse" article. Refers to No. 263. Transmits translation of article	205
272	Sir V. Corbett ..	47	27,	Franco-German negotiations. South German press has developed a calmer tone, but feeling of disappointment and humiliation is widespread. Opinion differs as to what attitude of Government should be, but Sir V. Corbett thinks no solution can be permanent which does not guarantee exploitation of South Morocco to German enterprise. Transmits extracts from various press articles	207
273	Sir F. Cartwright ..	146	29,	"Neue Freie Presse" article. Refers to No. 271. Summary of articles in "Reichspost" violently attacking the "Neue Freie Presse" for having published utterances so hostile to Germany. "Neue Freie Presse" has published an answer to article written by Professor Delbrück. This answer is very moderate in tone. Editor of semi-official "Fremdenblatt" has offered to publish anything Sir F. Cartwright wishes, but agreed that best thing was to ignore article	210
274	Sir M. de Bunsen ..	70 Tel.	31,	Franco-Spanish negotiations. Refers to No. 260. If His Majesty's Government concur, French Ambassador is to submit draft convention to Spanish Government in the event of Berlin negotiations resulting in France obtaining a free hand in Morocco. French Ambassador has spoken in general sense of draft convention to Minister for Foreign Affairs, who was greatly startled to learn that France expected Spain to renounce Ifni. Surrender of Ifni will be very unpopular, but otherwise draft meets Spanish demands very fairly	211
275	To Sir M. de Bunsen	87 Tel.	31,	Ifni. Spanish Ambassador states that Spain intends to take possession of Ifni on 3rd September, whether Moorish commissioner is there or not	212
276	To Sir F. Cartwright	95 Tel.	31,	"Neue Freie Presse" article. Refers to No. 263. Sir E. Grey proposes to make statement to press that Ambassador neither communicated nor inspired article, and that His Majesty's Government had no cognizance of it. Would Ambassador prefer to make this communication in Vienna or shall it be done by Foreign Office in London?	212

No.	Name.	No.	Date.	Subject.	Page
277	Sir F. Bertie ..	384 Most Conf.	Aug. 29, 1911	Franco-German negotiations. Spanish Ambassador has again pressed for admission of Spain to Berlin conversations. Minister for Foreign Affairs pointed out that, if Spain were admitted, it was possible that Germany might ask her for compensation, such as cession of Spanish Guinea and Fernando Po. Minister for Foreign Affairs has had conversation with Russian Ambassador, who enquired whether France would accept arbitration if negotiations failed, and suggested Emperor of Austria as possible arbitrator. Minister for Foreign Affairs pointed out unsuitability of Emperor, and said that, though France was ready to go to utmost limit of concessions to avoid a conflict, public opinion was calm and collected, and would not give way beyond a certain point and relied on Russian help ..	212
278	„ „ ..	141 Tel.	Sept. 1,	Attitude of Russia. Minister for Foreign Affairs has learnt from French Ambassador in Berlin that Herr Zimmermann had begged His Majesty's Ambassador to request His Majesty's Government to use their influence at Paris to prevail on French Government to be conciliatory, and that same request had been addressed to Russian Government. Russian Ambassador in Paris saw Minister for Foreign Affairs in the morning, and made an official communication to the effect that Russian Government were perturbed at state of affairs, and trusted that French cessions would be sufficient to satisfy Germany. Ambassador also enquired whether, if negotiations failed, France would accept arbitration by Emperor of Austria (see No. 277). Minister for Foreign Affairs replied that he was surprised and grieved at Russian communication. It led him to think that Russian Government could not have been kept accurately informed of course of negotiations, the failure of which would mean that Germany did not desire them to succeed. It was out of the question to consider or talk of arbitration at present. Minister for Foreign Affairs has instructed French Ambassador in St. Petersburgh to explain situation fully to Russian Government and to Emperor in person, and to express hope that Russia will adhere, as in the past, to her part of faithful ally of France	214
279	Sir F. Cartwright ..	87 Tel.	1,	"Neue Freie Presse" article. Refers to No. 280. Article was telegraphed to Berlin for comment before publication. On morning of publication German chargé d'affaires at Vienna summoned German correspondents, and instructed them to point to Sir F. Cartwright as the author and to make the greatest possible stir over it. German chargé d'affaires has carefully avoided coming near British Embassy or making any enquiries as to authorship of article	215

No.	Name.	No.	Date.	Subject.	Page
280	To Sir F. Cartwright	Telegraphic	Sept. 1, 1911	"Neue Freie Presse" article (see No. 276). German Ambassador has stated that, in view of excitement in German and Austrian press, German Chancellor thinks an official utterance by Sir E. Grey would be of great value. Has told Ambassador that article was not inspired by any British diplomatist, and that it was doubtful whether official denial would do much good. Is there sufficient ground for informing Count Metternich that German Ambassador in Vienna inspired attack on Sir F. Cartwright?	215
281	Mr. White ..	281	Aug. 26,	Sultan's health. Refers to No. 235. Consul MacLeod has heard nothing to confirm report that Sultan's mind is in any way affected. Latter has recently been seen in public, and appeared well	216
282	„ „ ..	282 Confidential	26,	"Bureaux arabes" in Shawia (see Part 42, No. 189). French military authorities are doing all they can to induce natives to sell their land to Frenchmen and to prevent its purchase by other foreigners. French authorities are demanding extortionate fees in connection with execution of legal documents. They are also extending French protection on a wholesale scale to Makhzen authorities. Action of "Contrôle de la Dette" (see Part 42, No. 23) has also caused annoyance to British subjects. Explains French point of view in this matter. M. Guiot has shown a conciliatory spirit, and satisfactory arrangement has been reached in all cases which have so far been dealt with ..	216
283	„ „ ..	285	26,	Ifni (see No. 275). Spanish Ambassador in Paris has spoken to French Minister for Foreign Affairs, who has requested views of French chargé d'affaires. Latter has replied that Moorish Government had declared they would not fulfil their engagements while Spanish troops remained at Alcazar and Laraiche, and that they were unlikely to facilitate Spanish occupation of Ifni. Moreover, season of the year was not a favourable one for taking possession of Ifni	217
284	„ „ ..	286	27,	Tarudant. Refers to Nos. 239 and 268. No British subjects were there at time of the attack, though Mr. Manners Sutton has since gone there. Transmits *aide-mémoire* given to Guebbas by German Minister on subject of request of Makhzen that Christians should leave Tarudant (see Nos. 264 and 266)	218
285	Sir F. Cartwright ..	147	31,	"Neue Freie Presse" article (see No. 273). Reports article in "Reichspost," which, after alarmist statements as to tension between England and Germany and military preparations in Belgium and Holland, reverts to question of article. Public opinion in Germany is clamouring for satisfaction from England, and the whole world is unanimous in ascribing article to Sir F. Cartwright. Article in "Germania" says that British Government must clear up matter or else German Foreign Office will have to place it firmly before them. Germany will no longer stand such barefaced insults. Similar violent articles in other newspapers	218

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286	Sir F. Bertie ..	386 Confidential	Sept. 1, 1911	Franco-Spanish negotiations (see No. 274). Transmits text of draft convention. Minister for Foreign Affairs says text is not definitive, and he would be glad of observations of His Majesty's Government. No mention is made in draft of Ifni, which Minister for Foreign Affairs hopes Spain will be ready to give up. Minister for Foreign Affairs has received no communication of intention of Spanish Government to occupy Ifni (see No. 275)	220
287	„ „ ..	143 Tel. Confidential	2,	Attitude of Russia (see No. 278). French Ambassador at St. Petersburgh is convinced that instructions on which Russian Ambassador founded his communication were inspired by himself, and were not due to any change of attitude on Emperor's part. From language of Grand Dukes and Emperor's entourage there can be no doubt that Emperor intends faithfully to adhere to assurances of support to France. French Ambassador will take an opportunity of speaking to Emperor about strange communication of Russian Ambassador in Paris	223
288	Mr. White.. ..	148 Tel.	2,	Ifni. Refers to No. 275. Spanish representative at Tangier has no information respecting proposed occupation of Ifni ..	223
289	Sir M. de Bunsen ..	71 Tel.	2,	Franco-Spanish negotiations. Refers to No. 274. Has accepted invitation of Minister for Foreign Affairs to resume conversations with him and French Ambassador. At meeting French Ambassador read to Minister for Foreign Affairs abstract of new draft convention (see No. 286). Minister for Foreign Affairs reserved his comments till he had studied full text, but declared that Spain could never give up Ifni. Minister for Foreign Affairs consented, however, to endeavour to obtain postponement of occupation of Ifni for a few days	223
290	Sir G. Buchanan ..	196 Tel.	3,	Attitude of Russia. Refers to Nos. 278 and 287. French Ambassador is confident that in event of a rupture of Franco-German negotiations Russia will support France, and adduces in proof categorical assurances already given by Russia, consultations between French and Russian chiefs of the staff, and language of Grand Duke Nicholas. Russian Prime Minister thinks Germany is only bluffing, and that there will be no war	224
290*	Mr. White.. ..	287	Aug. 28,	Expulsion of correspondents from Agadir. Refers to No. 222. Transmits letter which Mr. Ostler has addressed to His Majesty's vice-consul at Mogador, stating that he expects a personal apology from Kaid Guilooli and severe punishment of Governor of Agadir. Proposes to await instructions	224A
291	Sir M. de Bunsen ..	151	30,	Franco-Spanish negotiations. Summarises draft convention (see No. 286). Expands No. 274	225
291*	Sir E. Goschen ..	250	31,	"Neue Freie Presse" article (see No. 285). Comments of German press are very bitter, and article has undoubtedly added fuel to flame of indignation against England. Summarises articles in leading papers, and transmits translation of article in "Frankfurter Zeitung"	226A

No.	Name.	No.	Date.	Subject.	Page
292	Sir E. Goschen ..	251	Aug. 31, 1911	Franco-German negotiations. Transmits text of resolution passed at meeting of pan-Germans in Berlin, to the effect that France must be required to return to Act of Algeciras or else Germany must obtain same rights in West Morocco as France claims in other parts of Morocco. Characteristics of meeting were friendly tone towards France and strong animosity against England	226
292*	„ „ ..	252 Secret	Sept. 1,	"Neue Freie Presse" article (see No. 263). Transmits despatch from military attaché recording conversation with German Emperor, who maintained that views expressed in article were those of Sir F. Cartwright, who was violently Germanophobe. The German people were furious about it	226*
293	„ „ ..	67 Tel.	4,	Franco-German negotiations. Minister for Foreign Affairs and French Ambassador met on the 4th instant, and latter handed Herr von Kiderlen draft of a convention, which latter is to submit to Chancellor and give M. Cambon an answer on 6th instant. Minister for Foreign Affairs took exception to several articles, but M. Cambon appears to be not dissatisfied with results of meeting	226
294	To Sir G. Buchanan..	242	4,	Franco-German negotiations. Has informed Russian Ambassador that outcome of negotiations was obscure. If Germany landed a force in Morocco or sent an ultimatum to France it would mean that she intended war. Otherwise some settlement would be patched up. Whole question could have been settled but for action of Germany in mobilising public opinion by sending a ship to Agadir. Attacks on Sir F. Cartwright in connection with "Neue Freie Presse" article had been worked up from German sources, and the object might be to cover German retreat by ascribing failure of Germany to action of England	227
295	To Sir M. de Bunsen	93	4,	Franco-Spanish negotiations. Has informed Spanish Ambassador, who said Spain could never give up Ifni, and that there was no reason why Spain should compensate France for a settlement with Germany, that His Majesty's Government could not agree with this principle; and that France could not be expected to pay whole price for Spanish as well as French free hand in Morocco. Ambassador said Spain could not be expected to pay both Spain and Germany. Sir E. Grey replied that he had spoken on the assumption that Germany would claim no compensation from Spain	227
296	Sir V. Corbett ..	53	2,	Franco-German negotiations. Summarises article in "Münchener Neueste Nachrichten," giving under eleven headings "guiding lines" adopted by German Government in regard to Morocco question. Article comments on these "guiding lines," and says they give general impression that Germany is making perceptible sacrifices for the sake of a more or less uncertain draft on the future ..	228

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297	Sir V. Corbett ..	54	Sept. 2, 1911	England and Germany. Transmits article in "Münchener Zeitung" entitled, "English hatred of Germany," which is believed to represent views of Bavarian Government. Gist of article is that England should refrain from interference in negotiations with France, and that unless English press refrains from its misrepresentations German public will lose their patience	230
298	Sir M. de Bunsen ..	72 Tel. Confidential	5,	Franco-Spanish negotiations. King of Spain is hurt by peremptory nature of communication from French Ambassador, to the effect that France will withdraw her favourable offers respecting Spanish sphere in Northern Morocco unless Spain surrenders whole of sphere in Southern Morocco and establishes a custom-house at Melilla at once. These demands, made in the form of an ultimatum, were very wounding to Spanish pride. King relies on Sir E. Grey's friendly offices to induce French Government to moderate their demands. Meanwhile, occupation of Ifni will be delayed	230
299	To Sir E. Goschen .. „ Sir F. Cartwright	208 60	5,	"Neue Freie Presse" article (see No. 280). Has requested German Ambassador to inform German Chancellor that article was written by Dr. Münz, who had had a few minutes' conversation with Sir F. Cartwright; that it had been telegraphed to Berlin before publication; and that on same morning German correspondents had been summoned to German Embassy in Vienna. Violence of articles in German press was such that no denial would have any effect, and all Sir E. Grey could suggest was that a communication should be made to the press avowing that communications had passed between British and German Governments, and that the latter were satisfied Sir F. Cartwright had no hand in the matter. Count Metternich will suggest this to Chancellor	231
300	To Sir F. Bertie ..	374	5,	Franco-German negotiations (see No. 293). French Ambassador has communicated summary of conversation on 4th September between German Minister for Foreign Affairs and M. Cambon. Latter accepted in principle project for what was virtually French protectorate over Morocco, but took exception to limitation of economic equality to thirty years, to judicial organisation, and question of protégés. Sir E. Grey said he thought personally France should, if necessary, increase her offers of territory in the Congo, but Ambassador said this was impossible	232
301	Sir M. de Bunsen ..	152	3,	Franco-Spanish negotiations. Expands No. 289, reporting first meeting between Minister for Foreign Affairs, French Ambassador, and himself. Minister for Foreign Affairs was generally satisfied with French draft convention, but said Spain could not agree to cede Ifni. From private conversation with Minister for Foreign Affairs, Sir M. de Bunsen gathered that Spanish Government regarded French demand as exorbitant and entirely inadmissible	232

No.	Name.	No.	Date.	Subject.	Page
302	Mr. White ..	149 Tel.	Sept. 6, 1911	Ifni (see No. 288). French consul at Mogador reports arrival of Spanish vessel with three Spanish officers to take Spanish consul to Ifni. Spanish consul asked Governor that Moorish delegates should accompany him. Governor applied to Guebbas, who has telegraphed to Mokri for instructions	234
303	Sir M. de Bunsen ..	73 Tel. Confidential	6,	Franco-Spanish negotiations. Refers to No. 298. French Ambassador states that he merely read to Minister for Foreign Affairs telegram from French Government confirming demand for establishment of a custom-house at Melilla and surrender of Ifni, and that there was nothing in this communication in the nature of an ultimatum	234
304	Sir F. Bertie ..	144 Tel.	6,	Franco-German negotiations. Minister for Foreign Affairs has seen Russian and German Ambassadors. Former did not revert to suggestion of arbitration (see No. 278). Latter said he was not kept informed on question of Morocco, and seemed much mortified	234
305	Sir G. Buchanan ..	201 Tel.	7,	Attitude of Russia. Refers to No. 278. Minister for Foreign Affairs states that Germany has not invited Russia to give counsels of moderation to France, but Russian Government have instructed Russian Ambassador in Paris to point out that if in this last stage of negotiations France were to show an unconciliatory spirit very grave results would ensue. A war for the sake of Morocco would be very unpopular in Russia. Minister for Foreign Affairs promised to inform Emperor of what Ambassador said respecting baselessness of German accusations that His Majesty's Government had tried to hinder negotiations at Berlin..	235
305*	„ „ ..	202 Tel.	7,	Attitude of Russia. Refers to No. 305. French Ambassador has been received in audience by Emperor, and is entirely satisfied with result. Emperor's language was quite firm, and Ambassador is convinced he will carry out his engagements under Franco-Russian alliance	235*
306	Sir E. Goschen ..	69 Tel.	8,	Franco-German negotiations. At interview between Minister for Foreign Affairs and M. Cambon on 7th instant, former produced a rough German counter-draft of Morocco convention. M. Cambon does not think it will be acceptable to French Government, as it places the two Powers on same political plane, and makes excessive pretensions in regard to railways ..	235
307	To Sir F. Bertie ..	230 Tel.	8,	Franco-German negotiations. French Ambassador has communicated substance of interview between German Minister for Foreign Affairs and French Ambassador on 7th September (see No. 306). It appears that ground of difficulty has been shifted, and that now economic interests in Morocco and not French Congo are the subject of discussion. French Ambassador observed that to give German subjects or commerce a privileged position in Morocco would be impossible, as other Powers would object	236

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308	To Sir E. Goschen .. „ Sir F. Cartwright	209 61	Sept. 8, 1911	"Neue Freie Presse" article. Refers to No. 299. German Ambassador has communicated text of communication which German Government would be willing to make. This text does not state that German Government were satisfied, and Sir E. Grey pointed out that unless this were done it would not put an end to German press attacks on Sir F. Cartwright	236
309	To Sir G. Buchanan..	245	8,	Attitude of Russia. Conversation with Russian Ambassador, who had heard of suggestion of arbitration made by Russian Ambassador in Paris (see No. 278), and explained how natural it was that Russia should suggest every possible means of averting war. Sir E. Grey replied that one could not expect France to submit to Austrian arbitration, but that principle of arbitration should not be dismissed as an impossible suggestion in the last resort ..	237
310	Sir F. Bertie ..	399	8,	Condition of French army. Transmits despatch from military attaché, discussing extent to which confidence of France in the army is justified. French army has never been so well trained or ready as at present moment. Gives reasons in favour and against war at present moment. Balance of evidence is in favour of war ..	237
311	„ „ ..	400 Confidential	8,	Franco-German negotiations. Transmits text of draft Morocco convention ..	239
312	„ „ ..	147 Tel. Confidential	8,	Franco-German negotiations. Refers to No. 306. French Minister for Foreign Affairs says there is a complete change of front on part of German Government, who now lay great stress on political matters in Morocco, and do not seem to attach same importance to Congo cessions. Minister for Foreign Affairs cannot make out whether this is due to Emperor and Chancellor not concurring in Herr von Kiderlen's line of negotiations, or to a desire to cause latter to fail. French Minister for Foreign Affairs' views on probable German objections to French draft convention ..	242
313	Sir M. de Bunsen ..	74 Tel.	9,	Franco-Spanish negotiations. Further interview between Minister for Foreign Affairs, French Ambassador, and himself. Spanish Government had considered French proposals and those respecting Spanish sphere would require modification. Spain could not cede coast opposite Canary Islands, including Ifni, but would be prepared to consider cession of territory corresponding to cession France was making in Congo. Minister for Foreign Affairs has promised to formulate reply to French Government on these lines	243
314	Sir F. Cartwright ..	94 Tel. Very Conf.	10,	Attitude of Austria. Minister for Foreign Affairs has in most friendly way told French Ambassador that, though Austrian Government claimed nothing for themselves in Morocco, they would be very glad to see a prompt arrangement, and they hoped France would be generous in satisfying German claims. French Ambassador thinks that Count von Aehrenthal has spoken in this way in order that if Germany asks for Austrian support in Paris he may be able to say that he has already done all he can	243

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315	Mr. White.. ..	291	Sept. 1, 1911	Kaïd Kourimi. Refers to No. 165. In spite of French advice to the contrary, Kaïd Kourimi has been dispossessed. This has placed Germans at Agadir in an awkward position, as, if nothing is done, German prestige will suffer. At request of German Minister, Guebbas has instructed Kaïd Mtougi not to do anything in regard to Kourimi to create disturbances.. ..	244
316	„ „	292 Very Conf.	2,	Ifni. Refers to No. 283 (see Nos. 288 and 302). Spanish Minister and Guebbas state definitely that they have no information of alleged intention of Spanish Government to take possession of Ifni at once. French Minister appears to hope that Spain will eventually be jockeyed out of her rights in the south, and that everything should be done to prevent her getting a footing there	245
317	Sir G. Buchanan ..	255	6,	Attitude of Russia. Expands Nos. 290 and 305. French Ambassador has had most satisfactory audience with Emperor, who repeated assurances that France could count on diplomatic and military support of Russia	245
318	Sir E. Goschen ..	263	8,	Franco-German negotiations. Summary of press articles in connection with resumption of negotiations. Most noticeable point is unanimity with which England is regarded as the source of all evil, and as being wholly responsible for French resistance to German demands	247
319	„ „ ..	265	8,	Franco-German negotiations (see No. 306). French Ambassador has been given by Minister for Foreign Affairs rough draft of German counter-project, which he thinks is quite inacceptable. German project provides that 30 per cent. of railways in Morocco should be German, and the remaining 70 per cent. French. There can be no further discussion at Berlin till French Government have considered German draft and sent instructions to M. Cambon. Latter thinks Minister for Foreign Affairs desires a settlement, but is greatly hampered by rapacity of Colonial Department. Herr Zimmermann has used violent language about French proposals to Russian and Italian representatives	250
320	Mr. White.. ..	150 Tel.	9,	Alcazar. Spanish authorities have ordered kaïds and other Makhzen officials to take no steps without their consent. Raisuli is very indignant, and has asked French chargé d'affaires for advice	251
321	To Sir F. Bertie ..	376	11,	Franco-Spanish negotiations. Refers to No. 286. His Majesty's Government see no objection to draft convention. In order to safeguard provision in Anglo-French declaration of 1904 respecting non-fortification of Moorish coast, it would be desirable that Spain's adherence to above declaration should be definitely stated in new convention Places on record opinion of His Majesty's Government, that it is essential that Tangier should maintain its international position with a zone of 15 kilom.	251

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321*	To Mr. White ..	73	Sept. 11, 1911	Expulsion of correspondents from Agadir. Refers to No. 290*. Considers that action already taken by Makhzen is sufficient, and does not propose to press for any further reparation or apology. He should inform Vice-Consul Johnstone to that effect	251*
322	Sir M. de Bunsen ..	152	9,	Spanish military operations in the Riff. Extension of Spanish occupation up to Wady Kert has caused unrest among the tribes, who attacked a Spanish survey party. Considerable punitive measures have been adopted by General Aldave, but their success is as yet far from complete ..	252
323	To Mr. White ..	74	12,	"Bureaux arabes" in Shawia. Refers to No. 282. It is difficult to take action on vague complaints reported in No. 282, but on learning definite cases of injustice or obstruction by French authorities, question of representations at Paris will be considered	252
323*	Sir E. Goschen ..	268	9,	Morokko Mannesmann Compagnie. Company has been registered at Tangier with head office at Hamburg. Objects of company are to export and import goods. Working capital is 25,000*l*. ..	252*
324	Sir F. Bertie ..	405 Confidential	12,	Franco-German negotiations (see No. 319). Transmits text of German counter-draft. Points out that this text completely changes essential provisions from French point of view, much to the detriment of French interests in Morocco ..	252
325	Sir G. Buchanan ..	207 Tel.	13,	Franco-German negotiations. Reported recall to their regiments of German reservists at Riga has caused excitement. German chargé d'affaires has explained that this is not an unusual step. Minister for Foreign Affairs thinks latest German demands for privileged economic position in Morocco quite indefensible, and that it would be impossible for France to concede them	256
326	Sir E. Goschen ..	70 Tel.	14,	"Neue Freie Presse" interview (see No. 308). Transmits text of communiqué published in "North German Gazette" to the effect that Sir F. Cartwright had nothing to do with the article, and that the incident is satisfactorily closed as far as German Government are concerned	257
327	Sir F. Bertie ..	408	14,	Franco-Spanish negotiations. Has communicated substance of No. 321 to Minister for Foreign Affairs. Latter said he would certainly insert in new convention article to make provision for non-fortification of coast	257
328	Communicated by French Ambassador	..	16,	Franco-German negotiations. Text of despatch from French Minister for Foreign Affairs to French Ambassador in Berlin, pointing out serious French objections to German draft convention (see No. 324), which Ambassador should communicate to German Minister for Foreign Affairs ..	257
329	Sir E. Goschen ..	71 Tel.	15,	Franco-German negotiations. French reply (see No. 328) to German counter-draft has been handed to German Minister for Foreign Affairs. French Ambassador says latter's attitude was fairly reasonable ..	259

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330	Sir G. Buchanan ..	213 Tel.	Sept. 15, 1911	Franco-German negotiations. German representative has informed Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs that German Government were not asking for economic privileges in Morocco, but only for equal treatment. After this official declaration, Minister for Foreign Affairs thinks that Germany can hardly refuse to modify German counter-draft in sense desired by France. German representative also explained that reservists of one class only were being recalled from all foreign countries, not all reservists from Holland and Russia alone (see No. 325)	259
330*	Sir M. de Bunsen ..	75 Tel.	16,	Franco-Spanish negotiations. Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs has informed French Ambassador and Sir M. de Bunsen that Spanish Government must have an assurance that if they agree to French demands for territory in South Morocco they would be guaranteed against a demand by Germany or any other Power for compensation in return for recognition of Spanish sphere	259*
331	Mr. White ..	296	9,	Agadir. Transmits despatch from vice-consul at Mogador, reporting arrival at Mogador, *en route* for Agadir, of two of Mannesmann Brothers with eight employés	260
332	„ „ ..	299	9,	Ifni. Refers to No. 316. In reply to enquiry of Spanish consul at Mogador as to whether Moorish delegate was ready to proceed with him to Ifni, Governor of Mogador has been instructed to say that Sultan had been asked for instructions	260
333	„ „ ..	300 Confidential	9,	Alcazar. Expands No. 320. Has discussed situation caused by Spanish action with French chargé d'affaires, who seemed uncertain whether to recommend a protest to diplomatic body or to suggest that Raisuli should be given a hint to raise the hill tribes against Spaniards. Has pointed out to chargé d'affaires that it would be a suicidal policy to attack the Spanish troops	261
334	„ „ ..	301	9,	Arrest and imprisonment of courier (see No. 93). Transmits despatch from Consul MacLeod, reporting formal apology made by Sid Taib Mokri	261
335	Sir E. Goschen ..	275	16,	Franco-German negotiations. Refers to No. 329. No further information respecting last conversation available beyond that in No. 329. French Ambassador thinks there is no likelihood of complications arising out of present situation. Transmits text of statement published in "Lokal-Anzeiger," to the effect that complete agreement may soon be hoped for	262
336	French and German Draft Conventions	..	September ..	French and German draft Morocco conventions. Text in parallel columns, showing differences between the two texts ..	263

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337	Sir F. Bertie ..	153 Tel.	Sept. 19, 1911	Franco-German negotiations. French Ambassador at Berlin has had a satisfactory conversation with German Minister for Foreign Affairs, who is prepared to meet most of French objections, but wishes for exchange of secret notes on certain points, and a promise that Moorish Government will view with favour French and German tenders. M. de Selves will refuse to comply with latter suggestion, and he is opposed to secret notes and secret agreements	272
338	Sir E. Goschen .	72 Tel.	19,	Franco-German negotiations (see No. 337). French Ambassador states that German Minister for Foreign Affairs has abandoned principal German proposals and only questions of detail now remain to be settled. Only point of danger is violent campaign in French press against concessions in French Congo. German Minister for Foreign Affairs has spoken very strongly about violent language of French press	272
339	Sir F. Bertie ..	414	19,	Interview between French Minister for Foreign Affairs and Sir R. Lister. Transmits memorandum by Sir R. Lister, who called attention of M. de Selves to fears of British commercial community in Morocco that they would be ousted by French. M. de Selves said he was prepared to give every guarantee that complete commercial equality should be maintained, and begged Sir R. Lister to communicate with his French colleague if any case arose. M. de Selves said that as regards Spain, he was prepared to make as large concessions as possible, but must have some sort of apparent concession from Spain in order to satisfy French public opinion	273
340	„ „ .	415	19,	Proposed Franco-British exchange of territory. Refers to No. 250. Transmits French memorandum containing alternative proposals for cession to France of certain portions of Nigeria and Gold Coast Colony and map showing territories in question	274
341	Sir M. de Bunsen ..	155	19,	Franco-Spanish negotiations. Detailed report of meetings between Minister for Foreign Affairs, French Ambassador, and himself on 8th and 14th September. Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs before formulating an offer to France has asked what guarantee can be given that Spain will not subsequently have to make concessions to Germany; he has Spanish Guinea in his mind. Minister for Foreign Affairs speaks with bitterness of exclusion of Spain from Berlin negotiations, and is much upset at report that German Government have agreed to definition of Morocco as extending southwards to boundary of Rio de Oro, thereby shifting the southern boundary of Morocco in a sense contrary to Franco-Spanish convention of 1904 ..	275

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342	Sir F. Bertie ..	154 Tel.	Sept. 22, 1911	Franco - German negotiations. Refers to No. 337. German Chancellor has concurred in German Minister for Foreign Affairs' views. French Minister for Foreign Affairs has instructed M. Cambon not to mention territorial compensations till complete agreement about Morocco has been reached. Views of M. de Selves on points still outstanding. He will not accept any system of mixed tribunals such as exist in Egypt. German Minister for Foreign Affairs stated that His Majesty's Government would be opposed to any other system than that of mixed courts. M. de Selves is about to submit a project to French Cabinet	277
343	Mr. White ..	151 Tel.	22,	Spanish military railway from Laraiche to Alcazar. Consular agent at Alcazar has learnt that railway is to be built. Spanish Minister has no official information ..	278
344	" " ..	303	16,	Agadir. Mr. Grey, who has just returned from Agadir, states that Kaid Guilooli and other Moorish officials are entirely in hands of Germans, and are endeavouring to exclude all other foreigners. Four Frenchmen at Agadir are practically prisoners. Germans at Agadir and Mogador say they have received a hint to purchase land and push their interests in the Sus, and do not believe that Germany intends to relinquish Southern Morocco ..	278
345	" " ..	304	16,	Purchase of land by Spaniards opposite Alhucemas. Large tract on mainland has been bought by Spaniards acting on behalf of Spanish Government. French chargé d'affaires thinks a good port could be made there, and that this is Spanish object	278
346	" " ..	306	16,	Alcazar. Refers to No. 333. French chargé d'affaires has advised Raisuli to take no steps, but to leave matter in hands of Gueblas. Meanwhile, Raisuli has arrested several sheikhs who refused to pay taxes, but Spanish authorities appear to have taken no notice. Serious fighting at Melilla will probably make Spaniards wish to avoid trouble in other districts. Spanish Minister says he has heard nothing from Alcazar to confirm reports of Colonel Silvestre's action	279
347	Sir M. de Bunsen ..	158	22,	Franco - Spanish negotiations. Refers to No. 341. Minister for Foreign Affairs having received no answer from French Ambassador on points raised does not intend to summon another meeting before leaving for Madrid. M. Geoffray thinks it will be difficult for France to give guarantee asked for by Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs that Spain will not also have to pay a price to Germany ..	279
348	Sir F. Bertie ..	417 Confidential	25,	Franco - German negotiations. Transmits text of amended Morocco convention as approved by French Government and sent to Berlin for communication to German Government. Minister for Foreign Affairs proposes there shall be an exchange of notes with German Government, leaving it to France to come to an understanding with Spain in regard to future position of Spanish spheres	280

No.	Name.	No.	Date.	Subject.	Page
349	Communicated by French Embassy	..	Sept. 28, 1911	Franco-German negotiations. Despatch from French Minister for Foreign Affairs to French Ambassador in Berlin, enclosing draft notes to be exchanged between French Ambassador and German Minister for Foreign Affairs, agreeing (1) that if Germany wishes to acquire from Spain Spanish Guinea, the Corisco and the Elobey Islands, France will renounce her preferential rights; (2) that Germany will not intervene in subsequent Franco - Spanish agreements about Morocco; (3) that the French Government will be pleased to see "associations d'intérêt" between French and German subjects; (4) that the Fez-Tangier railway shall be one of the first enterprises to be undertaken by Moorish Government; and (5) that the opening of Agadir shall be demanded	283
350	To Sir M. de Bunsen	99	28,	Franco-Spanish negotiations. Spanish Ambassador has noticed inclination on the part of France to maintain that Franco-Spanish Treaty of 1904 had lapsed owing to creation of new situation, and he enquired whether His Majesty's Government considered that Spain was entitled to rights accorded her by that Treaty, and whether they would so inform French Government. Ambassador was informed that His Majesty's Government had no indication that French Government desired to depart from treaty which His Majesty's Government certainly considered to be in force. This is view of His Majesty's Government, subject to reservation that Spain must give France reasonable compensation	285
351	Sir F. Bertie ..	422 Confidential	28,	Fortification of Moorish coast (see No. 327). Reviews negotiations preliminary to Anglo - French Declaration of 1904 in regard to fortification of Morocco coast, and suggests desirability of obtaining from French Government a formal undertaking that no part of coast south of Sebou River shall ever be fortified, and of intimating that His Majesty's Government would consider that any fortification created a material change in *status quo* and in relative naval position of three Powers parties to 1907 agreement	285
352	" " ..	423 Confidential	28,	Franco - German negotiations. Transmits memorandum showing modifications which German Government desire to make to last French draft, copy of which was enclosed in No. 348	287
353	Mr. White ..	310	23,	Proposed Spanish military railway from Laraiche to Alcazar (see No. 343). Consular agent at Alcazar has been informed of proposal by Colonel Silvestre. Spanish Minister has no official knowledge of the matter, but gave impression that Spanish Government were contemplating laying such a line	289

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354	To Sir F. Bertie ..	404	Sept. 30, 1911	Franco - German negotiations Refers to No. 342. Consular jurisdiction. He should inform French Government that German Minister for Foreign Affairs had no authority to say His Majesty's Government would be opposed to any judicial system but that of mixed courts, but that if consular jurisdiction in Morocco is abolished His Majesty's Government would expect a revision of state of things in Egypt	289
355	Sir F. Bertie ..	162 Tel.	Oct. 2,	Franco-German negotiations. Refers to No. 352. Questions at issue are in a fair way of settlement. Only outstanding points are those of protégés and Madrid Convention	289
356	.. .. .	429	3,	Franco-German negotiations. Congo cession. Endeavours are being made to bring pressure on French Government to curtail extent of territory to be ceded to Germany. Madame de Brazza has addressed an open letter to the President, and M. Hanotaux and M. Joseph Reinach have written articles strongly opposing cession ..	290
357	To Sir F. Bertie ..	409	4,	Franco-German negotiations. In draft notes to be exchanged at Berlin (see No. 349) passage occurs to the effect that French Government "verra toujours volontiers des associations d'intérêt se produire entre les nationaux de nos deux pays." As this may give rise to misunderstandings, he should inform French Government that His Majesty's Government understand all Powers will be on same footing as regards industrial enterprises in Morocco, and that passage in question should be so construed	291
358	Sir F. Bertie ..	430	4,	Franco-German negotiations. Refers to No. 356. Congo cession. M. Sembat has declared that the unified Socialist party, who number 75 deputies, intend to vote in favour of a Franco-German agreement in order to put an end to the existing state of tension	291
359	.. .. ..	431	4,	Franco-German negotiations. Consular jurisdiction. Has carried out instructions contained in No. 354. Transmits copy of memorandum handed to French Minister for Foreign Affairs, who said view of His Majesty's Government seemed to him quite reasonable	291
360	To Sir F. Bertie ..	417	6,	Franco-German negotiations. French Ambassador expects that Germany will accept fifth draft of Morocco convention, which was now ready, but question of Congo remained, and a strong feeling was growing up in France against large concessions to Germany. Sir E. Grey pointed out that public opinion here would be surprised if French were to refuse considerable concessions, as France had got the best of the negotiations, and had acquired control over Morocco	292

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361	To Admiralty	..	Oct. 6, 1911	Non-fortification of Moorish coast (see No. 351). It has been suggested that His Majesty's Government should endeavour to obtain from French Government, in connection with negotiations at Berlin, an undertaking that no part of Atlantic coast south of Sebou River should ever be fortified. Requests views of Admiralty on value and importance to Great Britain of any such undertaking	293
362	Mr. White ..	312	Sept. 30,	Marokko Mannesmann Company. Refers to No. 323*. Company has been established for general and trading purposes. The Mannesmanns have now four separate concerns in Morocco for mining, land purchase and farming, steam mills and general trade. They are reported to be very active in the south, and to have arrived at Marrakesh with a large quantity of presents	293
363	„ „ ..	313	30,	Franco-German negotiations. Consular jurisdiction. British merchants at Casa Blanca express great alarm at reports of intention to abolish consular jurisdiction. If it is abolished there will be a great outcry among British subjects, who are convinced that non-French applicants to French officials and tribunals will not obtain justice	294
364	„ „ ..	315	Oct. 1,	Situation at Fez. Transmits despatch from consul at Fez, reporting submission of fractions of Ait Yusi tribe. Arab tribes near Fez are quiet, but situation among Berber tribes is unsatisfactory. Troops recruited under French instructors are turning out well. Sultan is not so tractable as at moment of danger when French came to his relief, but he realises that he is entirely dependent on French support ..	294
365	„ „ ..	317	1,	Edhem Bey. Transmits despatch from vice-consul at Mogador, reporting arrival of Edhem Bey, who is said to be a Turkish secret agent. He desires to proceed through Sus country. French consul at Mogador is making enquiries	295
366	Sir F. Bertie ..	166 Tel.	6,	Franco-German negotiations. Refers to No. 355. Divergences still exist respecting Madrid convention, protégés, and mineral taxes. German Minister for Foreign Affairs complains of indiscretions of French press. French Minister for Foreign Affairs complains of similar indiscretions on part of German press, and has pointed out that there would have been no trouble if German Government had acted up to their original attitude, *i.e.*, to accept a French protectorate in all but name provided there were economic equality	296
367	Sir M. de Bunsen	165	5,	Fighting on Kert River. Refers to No. 322. Conflict between Spaniards and tribes between Alhucemas and River Kert is assuming proportions of a war. Spanish Minister for War has gone to Melilla, and it is expected that a supreme effort to dislodge the enemy will shortly be made..	297

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368	Sir E. Goschen ..	309 Secret	Oct. 6, 1911	Franco-German negotiations. Conversations between French Ambassador and German Minister for Foreign Affairs, who was much annoyed that latest French proposals should have been communicated to French press before the German Government, and who had rejected them *en bloc*. M. Cambon is depressed, but has no doubt that an arrangement will finally be effected ..	297
369	Earl Granville ..	82 Tel.	9,	Franco-German negotiations. M. Cambon thinks Morocco part of agreement is now concluded, provided that French Government accept, as they probably will, a very slight modification	298
370	Sir F. Bertie ..	437	8,	Franco-German negotiations. Consular jurisdiction. Refers to No. 359. Transmits copy of note from Minister for Foreign Affairs, stating that in accordance with article 2 of Anglo-French agreement, 1904, French Government will, when consular jurisdiction is abolished in Morocco, support His Majesty's Government in adopting similar reform in Egypt ..	298
371	„ „ ..	168 Tel.	10,	Franco-German negotiations. Refers to No. 366. Germans have given away about Madrid convention and other points, and French Minister for Foreign Affairs hopes that Morocco part of negotiations may be considered at an end	299
372	To Sir R. Lister ..	80	11,	Franco-German negotiations. Consular jurisdiction. Refers to No. 363. He should inform Casa Blanca merchants that abolition of consular jurisdiction connot take place without consent of His Majesty's Government, who, if approached, will give due consideration to proper security for British interests	299
373	Earl Granville ..	86 Tel.	11,	Franco-German negotiations M Cambon and Herr von Kiderlen signed final draft of Morocco convention this morning. Changes made in draft as compared to that enclosed in No. 348 appear to be few in number and unimportant ..	300
374	Sir F. Bertie ..	439	12,	Franco-German negotiations. Deputy for the Lozère has put forward a motion calling upon Minister for Foreign Affairs to give particulars of negotiations to Budget Commission. Attempts are being made to rouse public opinion against Congo cession, and violent attacks will probably be made on Cabinet ..	300
375	Mr. White ..	319	4,	Spaniards at Alcazar. Refers to No. 346. Moorish officials appear to have been gained over by Spaniards, as only two of them have replied to Guebbas in regard to Raisuli's complaint. In these circumstances, Guebbas does not propose to make any communication to Spanish Minister ..	301
376	Sir F. Bertie ..	444 Confidential	15,	Franco-German negotiations. Has carried out instructions contained in No. 357. Transmits memorandum from French Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the effect that passage in draft note means what His Majesty's Government understand, *i.e.*, that all Powers are on the same footing in regard to industrial enterprises in Morocco	301

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377	Sir F. Bertie ..	449 Confidential	Oct. 16, 1911	Franco-German negotiations. Transmits copy of latest (6th) text of convention relating to Morocco	302
378	Sir A. Nicolson ..	..	18,	France and Spain. See No. 380. Conversation with French Ambassador, who enquired what Sir A. Nicolson thought of French Minister for Foreign Affairs' idea of handing over portion of Morocco to Spain in absolute sovereignty. Ambassador was informed that a reply could not be given off-hand, but that Sultan's consent did not seem altogether impossible ..	305
379	Sir F. Bertie ..	175 Tel.	18,	Franco-German negotiations. Congo. Negotiations have made little progress. Herr von Kiderlen says he cannot cede whole of Duck's Beak, and presses for the "coupure" in French Congo, which was offered only on supposition that France would obtain Duck's Beak and rectification of Togoland frontier	306
380	„ „ ..	451 Confidential	19,	France and Spain. In view of difficulties which would arise if Morocco were to come under French protectorate and Spanish zones were still included in Morocco, Minister for Foreign Affairs thinks of proposing that certain portions of Morocco should be absolutely ceded to Spain. He will not propose this if His Majesty's Government object, and would be glad of their views..	306
381	Earl Granville ..	90 Tel. Confidential	19,	Franco-German negotiations. Congo. M. Cambon has put forward on his personal initiative arrangement whereby Germany would gain points of contact on Congo and Ubanghi. Suggestion has been accepted by Herr von Kiderlen, and M. Cambon has telegraphed it to M. de Selves, who will submit it to Cabinet to-morrow	307
382	Sir R. Lister ..	323	14,	Situation at Tangier. General calm prevails, and bickerings between French and Spaniards appear to have ceased. Commercial circles are uneasy as to future of Tangier under new régime, and maintain that if it is to be internationalised its commercial prosperity will suffer, especially if Casa Blanca is connected by rail with Fez before Tangier–Fez line is built ..	307
383	Sir F. Bertie ..	177 Tel. Confidential	21,	Franco-German negotiations. Congo. A band of territory across French territory to navigable part of Ubanghi will probably be conceded to Germany, to enable construction of railway from Cameroons. A give-and-take arrangement is probable in regard to Duck's Beak. Discussion is to take place at Berlin this evening ..	308
384	Sir M. de Bunsen ..	173 Confidential	19,	France and Spain. French Ambassador has informed Spanish Government that French Government do not consider time has come yet to resume negotiations with Spain. French Ambassador has received new draft Franco-Spanish convention from Paris. Gives details respecting this draft, and points out that compared with draft enclosed in No. 286 it invests Central Government at Fez with full powers over Spanish zone, and Spanish zone would therefore be under French control. Position is one of great difficulty, and Señor Moret	

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				advocates a scheme of giving Spain absolute sovereignty over a restricted zone, excluding Laraiche and Alcazar. Shares view of French Ambassador that such a scheme would never be accepted by Spain	308
385	Earl Granville ..	331 Confidential	Oct. 20, 1911	Franco-German negotiations. First four days of negotiations in regard to session in Congo seemed hopeless. Then French Ambassador on his own initiative sketched on map a rough outline giving Germany narrow strips running down to Ubanghi and Congo. This suggestion was accepted by German Government, and French Ambassador has telegraped it to Paris and asked for instractions. Attitude of German press	311
386	Sir F. Bertie ..	455 Confidential	21,	Franco-Spanish negotiations. Refers to No. 380. Transmits and summarises draft Spanish-Moorish agreement respecting Spanish zone and draft French declaration respecting Tangier, which were communicated by M. Regnault. Has informed Minister for Foreign Affairs that new drafts seemed a great departure from intentions of 1904 arrangements, and that His Majesty's Government would have difficulty in agreeing to them. Minister for Foreign Affairs said proposals were only a sketch, and he would not put them forward without concurrence of His Majesty's Government	312
387	To Mr. Carnegie ..	443	23,	Franco-German negotiations. French Ambassador states that negotiations in regard to Morocco will very soon be finished	316
388	Earl Granville ..	92 Tel.	22,	Franco-German negotiations. Congo. Refers to No. 381. Everything is settled except Duck's Beak. Herr von Kiderlen has promised final answer to-morrow. If this answer is in the negative French Government may give up their extra demands, as they are very anxious to finish whole negotiations	316
389	Sir R. Lister ..	154 Tel.	23,	Raisuli and Colonel Sylvestre. Raisuli is in great agitation at Spanish demand that for the future troops under his command should be placed under a Spanish instructor, from whom they will receive pay. French chargé d'affaires takes very serious view of this attempt of Spain to modify *status quo* on the eve of negotiations. Moreover, if Raisuli is turned out, tribes may attack Spaniards. It is to be hoped Spanish Government will withdraw their instructions to Colonel Sylvestre ..	316
390	Sir M. de Bunsen ..	80 Tel.	24,	Raisuli and Colonel Sylvestre. Refers to No. 389. French Ambassador knows nothing of Colonel Sylvestre's demands. He thinks a French protest would have no effect, and best course would be to leave Spain unimpeded in her own sphere ..	317
391	To Sir R. Lister ..	82 Confidential	24,	Situation at Tangier. Refers to No. 382. Points out that possibility of Casa Blanca-Fez Railway being built before Tangier-Fez Railway seems to be excluded by provision in notes to be exchanged between German Minister for Foreign Affairs and French Ambassador at Berlin (see No. 349)	317

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392	Sir M. de Bunsen ..	82 Tel.	Oct. 25, 1911	Raisuli and Colonel Sylvestre (see No. 390). French Ambassador has addressed stiff letter of protest to Spanish Government, adding that French Government decline all responsibility as to results of Spanish action. Proposes to support French warning by pointing out inopportuneness of Colonel Sylvestre's demands . ..	317
393	„ „ ..	83 Tel. Confidential	25,	France and Spain. Minister for Foreign Affairs has made categorical declaration to the effect that Spain would only be induced by overwhelming force to retire from Laraiche and Alcazar. King, Council of Ministers, and Conservative Opposition leader all agree with this view	318
394	To Sir M. de Bunsen	108	25,	France and Spain. Conversation with Spanish Ambassador, who complained that French Government had not kept their word as to continuing negotiations with Spain as soon as Morocco negotiations in Berlin were concluded. Ambassador expressed fear that French Government would take view that previous Franco-Spanish agreements were superseded, and that Spain could only have what France considered she could spare. Ambassador enquired whether His Majesty's Government would support view that Franco-Spanish agreements must be carried out. Sir E. Grey replied that it was only reasonable that Spain should concede something to France, who had paid whole price of buying off Germany	318
395	Sir M. de Bunsen ..	84 Tel.	26,	Colonel Sylvestre and Raisuli. Refers to No. 392. Spanish Government deny French version of facts, and say that only payment of native troops was discussed, and that Colonel Sylvestre's language has been entirely misrepresented. Proposes nevertheless to warn Spanish Government of danger of any action which might cause irritation in Paris	318
396	To Sir M. de Bunsen	95 Tel.	26,	Colonel Sylvestre and Raisuli. Refers to Nos. 392 and 395. It is unnecessary for His Majesty's Government to associate themselves with threats as to possible consequences of Spanish action, but he should support his French colleague in pointing out inadvisability of making any change in *status quo* at moment when negotiations are to begin	319
397	Mr. Carnegie ..	468	26,	Oudjda. French colonists from Algiers have been pouring in to this part of Morocco and developing agricultural properties. Explains *modus operandi* of buying land from Moors. Natives are being spoliated in most shameful fashion	319
398	Sir M. de Bunsen ..	175 Confidential	19,	France and Spain. Transmits articles relating to Tangier in new draft Franco-Spanish convention, substance of which is reported in No. 384	320

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399	Sir R. Lister ..	329	Oct. 22, 1911	Appointment of Mennou as Basha of Marrakesh (see Part 42, No. 416). Mennou's conduct growing daily more unsatisfactory. Has urged French chargé d'affaires to carry out at once his idea of the reappointment of Hadj Thami. Latter is in Fez and is much pleased with proposed arrangement under which he pays 20,000*l.* to Sultan and retains his properties at Marrakesh	320
400	„ „ ..	331	22,	Situation at Fez. Dr. Verdon reports great changes at Fez as regards appearance of town. Glawi is now on good terms with the Sultan, to whom he has given large sums. Moors are very sore, and dislike French. Sultan is more unpopular than ever	321
401	To Mr. Carnegie ..	457 Confidential	28,	Franco-German negotiations. At last moment German Minister for Foreign Affairs has requested French Ambassador to address him secret letter, declaring that if question of taking over Belgian Congo were to arise, French Government would take no steps without first consulting Germany. French Minister for Foreign Affairs considers this quite inadmissible, and rupture of negotiations may ensue ..	322
402	Earl Granville ..	334 Confidential	22,	German policy. Minister for Foreign Affairs told Netherlands Minister that he had never really meant strong attitude he had adopted, and that he considered it would have been foolish and criminal to fight about Morocco. Crown Prince had thought otherwise. Netherlands Minister did not think his Government would make difficulties about the Franco-German agreement when concluded	322
403	Sir M. de Bunsen ..	179	26,	Raisuli and Colonel Sylvestre. Refers to No. 392. Transmits correspondence between French Ambassador and Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs. Latter disputes correctness of facts, and says Colonel Sylvestre's language and intentions have been entirely misrepresented, and there is no idea of Spain occupying Arzila ..	323
404	Earl Granville ..	345 Confidential	27,	Franco-German negotiations. Negotiations still dragging on. French Ambassador thinks Minister for Foreign Affairs is purposely delaying them to avoid conclusion of agreement before adjournment of Reichstag. Nothing worth reporting in numerous press comments	325
405	To Mr. Carnegie ..	455	30,	Franco-Spanish negotiations. French Ambassador informed that His Majesty's Government cannot support any negotiations with Spain unless based on agreements of 1904, and that Sir F. Bertie has been instructed to speak very strongly on this point to French Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs	325

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406	To Mr. Carnegie ..	458 Confidential	Oct. 30, 1911	Franco-German negotiations. Refers to No. 401. French Minister for Foreign Affairs is thinking of suggesting formula with regard to Belgian Congo. French Ambassador in London informed that Sir E. Grey considers any mention of Belgian Congo might arouse apprehensions in Belgium that France, Germany, and perhaps England were dividing Belgian Congo. This would have undesirable political effect	325
407	Sir M. de Bunsen ..	182	28,	Spain and France. Spanish Government are considerably alarmed at contention of French press that Spain must evacuate Alcazar and Laraiche as a preliminary to a satisfactory settlement. Minister for Foreign Affairs says no Spanish Government could possibly consent to evacuation, which would humiliate country and endanger stability of existing institutions. Prime Minister's organ has published article in this sense	326
408	To Sir E. Goschen ..	252	31,	France and Spain. German Government learn that French Prime Minister is disposed to press Spain very hard and only to give her the Riff, France receiving rest of Morocco and Canary Islands. German Government felt that if Spain were treated in this way Spanish monarchy would be endangered. German Ambassador informed in reply that Sir E. Grey had always assumed that Franco-Spanish negotiations would be on basis of 1904 agreement	327
409	Earl Granville .	350	30,	Franco-German convention and the Reichstag. National Liberals demand that convention should be submitted to approval of Reichstag before being finally concluded. Government have decided that convention is no concern of the Reichstag, and will merely be communicated to that body for its information. Strictly legal correctness of this view is generally admitted. Rumour of serious differences between Chancellor and Colonial Secretary which will lead to resignation of latter ..	328
410	To Sir M. de Bunsen	114	Nov. 2,	France and Spain. Spanish Ambassador states that his Government understand French Government will lay down as basis of negotiations that Spain should evacuate Laraiche and Alcazar. Spanish Government cannot possibly do so, and would be glad if His Majesty's Government would inform French Government to that effect. Spanish Government have reason to believe that German Government will require some concession from Spain, and they could not pay twice over	329
411	„ „ ..	115	2,	France and Spain (see No. 405). Spanish Ambassador informed that His Majesty's Government will assume in any conversations with French Government that 1904 agreements will be the basis of Franco-Spanish negotiations. Ambassador again referred to impossibility of a Spanish withdrawal from Laraiche and Alcazar ..	329

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412	To Sir R. Lister ..	84	Nov. 2, 1911	Basha of Marrakesh. Approves language reported in No. 399 with regard to re-appointment of Hadj Thami. He should discuss matter again with French chargé d'affaires unless a change has been made in the meantime	330
413	Sir M. de Bunsen ..	183	Oct. 31,	German-Spanish mining dispute in the Riff. Refers to Part 42, No. 310. Dispute between Herr Natter and Spanish Riff Mining Company was referred last summer to a mixed commission, which has settled the rival claims. Spanish company has now secured undisputed right to work its mines without interruption within a fixed boundary	330
414	Sir R. Lister ..	332 Confidential	29,	Raisuli and Colonel Sylvestre. Expands No. 389	331
415	French Minister ..	..	Nov. 3,	Franco-German convention. Morocco. Transmits text and requests adherence of His Majesty's Government	332
416	War Office ..	..	3,	Fortification of Moorish coast. Refers to No. 361. Army Council are disposed to think that formal undertaking not to fortify coast might be desirable from purely military point of view, but they doubt whether military value of such an undertaking would outweigh other possible objections	335
417	Sir M. de Bunsen ..	85 Tel.	4,	Morocco convention. Convention has been communicated to Spanish Government by French Ambassador, who hoped Spain would be able to adhere. France understood that special arrangements would have to be made to satisfy acknowledged Spanish claims	335
418	Sir F. Cartwright ..	119 Tel. Very Conf.	4,	Morocco convention. French Ambassador has communicated convention to Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs, who said that if Austria adhered it must be regarded as a friendly act towards France. It seems that Germany does not wish to press for immediate Austrian adherence in order apparently to enable Austria to squeeze a loan out of France	336
419	To Sir M. de Bunsen	116	4,	Franco-German convention. French Government have communicated convention to Spanish Government, saying that though Morocco was treated therein as a whole they had not lost sight of fact that they must come to a special arrangement with Spain. Spanish Government do not like this wording, as no allusion is made to special position Spain already holds in Morocco	336
420	Sir F. Bertie ..	490 Confidential	2,	Franco-Spanish negotiations. Has informed Minister for Foreign Affairs that His Majesty's Government consider that substitution of France for Spain in zone on north-west coast of Morocco, as proposed in projet enclosed in No. 386, would constitute a very serious departure from arrangements made in 1904 to which they were a party, and that they could not give such a policy support at Madrid. His Majesty's Government consider that Franco-Spanish negotiations should be on basis of 1904 agreements with deviations	

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				to give reasonable compensation to France. Minister for Foreign Affairs admitted force of British objections, and undertook to inform President of the Council of views of His Majesty's Government. Discussion with Minister for Foreign Affairs as to what arrangements could be made with Spain. Minister for Foreign Affairs said he was anxious to avoid wounding Spanish susceptibilities and throwing her into arms of Germany	336
421	Sir F. Bertie ..	495 Confidential	Nov. 3, 1911	Franco-Spanish negotiations. Refers to No 420. Interview with President of the the Council, who showed no signs of any intention to adopt conciliatory attitude towards Spain. He recapitulated French grievances, rejected idea of French compensation in south of Morocco, and ridiculed value of problematical Spanish support to France in time of crisis. If His Majesty's Government supported Spain in refusing satisfaction to French claims there would be danger of France and England falling out. He regarded Regnault projet (see No. 386) as essential to French interests ..	338
422	Admiralty	Confidential	3,	Fortification of Morocco coast. Refers to No. 361. Admiralty consider it desirable that formal undertaking should be obtained from French Government. Harbour will eventually be constructed on west coast, and it will be to British advantage that such a harbour should be purely commercial and not fortified	340
423	Sir F. Bertie ..	496	4,	Franco-Spanish negotiations. Transmits article by M. Calmette in "Figaro," recommending that France should keep her former engagements with Spain. If she can obtain compensations from Spain, given in a cordial spirit, so much the better	340
424	Sir E. Goschen ..	360	4,	Resignation of German Colonial Secretary. Dr. Solf, ex-Governor of Samoa, has been appointed to take temporary charge of Colonial Office. "Lokal-Anzeiger" severely blames Herr von Lindequist for his behaviour during negotiations; "Tageblatt" highly praises his strength of character and independent views ..	341
425	Sir F. Bertie ..	499 Confidential	5,	Franco-Spanish negotiations. Refers to No. 421. Further conversation with President of the Council, who maintains his intention of pressing Regnault projet on Spanish Government. It is possible, however, that he will reconsider his position, as his colleagues are by no means unanimous in approving his policy	342
426	Sir F. Cartwright ..	121 Tel.	6,	Austrian adherence to Morocco convention. Refers to No. 418. Minister for Foreign Affairs states there must necessarily be some delay before consent of the two Parliaments can be obtained. He earnestly hopes that His Majesty's Government will influence France to consider favourably Spanish claims, as every effort ought to be made to strengthen Spanish monarchy	342

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426*	To Sir E. Goschen ..	215 Tel.	Nov. 6, 1911	"Neue Freie Presse" interview (see No. 326). Text of answer which Sir E. Grey proposes to return to parliamentary question on the subject. He should communicate it to Chancellor or Minister for Foreign Affairs, saying, it has been drafted with a desire to to avoid embarrassing the Chancellor ..	342*
427	„ „ ..	263	6,	Franco-German convention. Morocco. Count Metternich has communicated text and asked for British adherence. He was informed that His Majesty's Government would study it as a whole, but could at once express their satisfaction at conclusion of agreement, which would relax tension and remove a great obstacle from European diplomacy	343
428	Sir E. Goschen ..	364	4,	Franco-German convention. Convention respecting Morocco and Congo, signed at 5 P.M. by French Ambassador and German Minister for Foreign Affairs	343
429	„ „ ..	365	5,	Germany and England. Reports article in "Deutsche Tageszeitung" by Count Reventlow, attempting to show that though England endeavoured to interfere in Franco-German negotiations her action had no effect on their result. Article attacks Sir A. Nicolson and Sir F. Bertie for their Germanophobe policy	343
429*	Admiralty	..	6,	Franco-Spanish negotiations. Refers to Nos. 384 and 386. It is immaterial from Admiralty point of view how coast-line is divided between Spain and France, provided that a stipulation is obtained that neither Power shall fortify any port on Mediterranean or Atlantic seaboards ..	344*
430	Spanish Ambassador	..	7,	Franco-German convention. Spanish Government are not in a position to adhere to convention till they have obtained necessary securities for their political and particular interests in Morocco	344
431	Sir E. Goschen ..	99 Tel.	7,	"Neue Freie Presse" interview. Refers to No. 426*. Chancellor very grateful for text of proposed answer. Nothing in it will cause him any embarrassment, but he would like one small alteration	344
432	Extract from "Parliamentary Debates"	..	7,	Cartwright interview (see No. 426*). Statement by Sir E. Grey in reply to Mr. King, M.P., that communications between British and German Governments in regard to interview and to false report of Mr. McKenna's speech were not of a nature to cause any difficulty between the two Governments. Sir E. Grey warned public not to be carried away by false statements, and expressed hope that suspicion and misconstruction in press would disappear..	345
432*	Sir A. Hardinge ..	49 Tel.	7,	Portuguese adherence to convention. French are urging early adherence, while Spain urges delay. Portuguese Government would be glad to oblige France, but for internal reasons wish to avoid displeasing Spain. They request advice of His Majesty's Government	345*

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433	Sir M. de Bunsen ..	86 Tel.	Nov. 8, 1911	Spanish adherence to Morocco convention (see No. 417). Spanish Government have in reply to French note stated that they will adhere subject to conclusion of satisfactory arrangements in accordance with terms of secret treaty of 1904. They have replied to German note in similar terms ..	346
434	Sir E. Goschen ..	368	6,	Views of German press on convention. It is difficult to come to any exact conclusion respecting real feeling of German public opinion. Anti-Government and pan-German press describe convention as a national shame. Radical papers are less violent but not less hostile, and Conservative press is reserved. On the whole, it appears that elections and internal politics are chiefly responsible for abuse lavished on agreement, but German people at large are not really dissatisfied	346
435	Sir V. Corbett ..	77	7,	Views of South German press on convention. With exception of "Frankfurter Zeitung" and "Schwäbischer Merkur," press universally lament a German diplomatic defeat, which is largely ascribed to British intrigue. Line taken is to blame Prince Bülow rather than present Chancellor ..	348
436	To Board of Trade ..	..	9,	Franco-German convention. Transmits convention, and enquires whether Board of Trade consider that it fully safeguards commercial rights and economic equality in Morocco of British subjects	348
437	Sir F. Bertie ..	507	9,	Publication by "Matin" of secret Franco-Spanish Treaty, 1904. Publication has created a great stir in parliamentary circles. Transmits extract from "Figaro" on the subject, stating that general opinion is that provisions of this secret treaty greatly diminish value of Franco-German convention	349
437*	To Sir A. Hardinge..	50 Tel.	10,	Adherence of Portugal to Morocco convention. Refers to No. 432*. His Majesty's Government are still considering convention, and cannot therefore advise its immediate acceptance by others. Portuguese Government would be justified in giving convention similar examination, and they might explain to Spanish Government that though this will take some time they cannot unreasonably delay their answer to French Government	349*
438	Sir F. Bertie ..	511	9,	Franco-Spanish negotiations. Reports article by M. Tardieu in "Temps" urging that Spain is bound not to insist on provisions of Franco-Spanish Treaty of 1904, and that His Majesty's Government ought to bring this home to Spanish Government. Object of article is to press His Majesty's Government to support French claims against Spain	349
439	„ „ ..	514	10,	Proceedings of Commission for Foreign Affairs of Chamber of Deputies. Transmits extract from "Matin," reporting proceedings. French Minister for Foreign Affairs appeared before commission and *inter alia* stated that France had not protested against Spanish occupation of Laraiche and Alcazar	350

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440	Sir C. Spring-Rice ..	18 Tel.	Nov. 11, 1911	Convention. Swedish Ministers at Paris and Berlin have been instructed to express adherence of Swedish Government ..	352
441	Mr. O'Beirne ..	273 Tel.	12,	Franco-Spanish negotiations. Russia is strongly supporting Spain, and has appealed to France to observe her treaty obligations in dealing with Spanish Government	352
442	Sir E. Goschen ..	369	7,	Germany and England. Transmits telegram published by "Fränkische Kurier," stating that when danger of war reached its acutest stage Emperor summoned Minister for War and Secretary of State for the Navy. Former reported army absolutely ready. Latter declared he would engage on war with qualms, and gave four reasons	352
443	Sir A. Hardinge ..	130 Confidential	7,	Adherence of Portugal to Morocco convention (see No. 432*). Portuguese Minister for Foreign Affairs is being pressed by France to adhere and by Spain to defer adherence to convention, and asks for advice of His Majesty's Government. He clearly wishes to use Portuguese deference to Spanish wishes as a lever to get Spain to agree to deal with Portuguese royalist exiles. He appears to be still under impression that His Majesty's Government may be persuaded to mediate between France and Spain	353
444	Sir E. Goschen ..	370	9,	Morocco debate in Reichstag. Debate will take form of electioneering speeches and attacks on Prince Bülow. Convention will remain unaffected, as Reichstag only has power to discuss it. Strong attack on convention by "Tageblatt"	354
445	„ „ ..	371	10,	Cartwright interview. Refers to No. 432. German press comments on Sir E. Grey's statement in House of Commons. On the whole, statement has been well received, and has set people thinking whether moment has not arrived to begin to establish more satisfactory Anglo-German relations	355
446	„ „ ..	373	10,	Speech by German Chancellor in Reichstag on 9th November. Transmits full translation. Summarises debate, which included violent anti-British speech by Herr von Heydebrand, the Conservative leader. Comments of press are strictly on party lines	356
447	Sir F. Bertie ..	515	11,	Secret Franco-Spanish treaties, 1902 and 1905. Transmits text of treaty of 1902, published by "Figaro." This treaty was not signed, as at the last moment Spanish Government were afraid of England; transmits text of treaty of 1905, published by the "Matin" (see Part 27, No. 52) ..	364
448	„ „ ..	516	11,	Proceedings of Commission for Foreign Affairs of Chamber of Deputies. Refers to No. 439. Paris press comments very unfavourably on statement of M. de Selves on 9th November that France had neither protested nor made reservations on learning of Spanish occupation of Laraiche and Alcazar. On 10th November, M. de Selves made a statement to the commission that he had been mistaken, and that France had protested vigorously. This statement elicited numerous protests from the commission	369
449	Sir E. Goschen ..	374	Nov. 11, 1911	Speech by German Chancellor in Reichstag on the 10th November. Transmits speech in Reichstag in which Chancellor strongly protested against violent anti-English language of Herr von Heydebrand. Speech has created a great excitement, as Herr von Heydebrand was spokesman of Conservative party. Tone and language of speech are said to have been arranged between Chancellor and Emperor ..	370
450	Sir F. Bertie ..	518	12,	Proceedings of Commission for Foreign Affairs of Chamber of Deputies. Refers to No. 448. Wrong information given to commission by Minister for Foreign Affairs, and removal of M. Bapst from post of Political Director, form subject of abundant comment in the press. Transmits strongly worded article by editor of "Figaro"	373
451	Sir F. Cartwright ..	189	11,	Attitude of Austrian press. Transmits résumé of press comments on Morocco debate in Reichstag	374
452	„ „ ..	190	11,	Attitude of Austian press. Refers to No. 451. Transmits article from "Zeit" giving an account of what took place in July. Article is the first attempt of Austrian press to explain situation in a sense more or less exculpating His Majesty's Government	374
453	Sir F. Bertie ..	519	12,	Franco-Spanish negotiations. Transmits article from "Matin," which is directly inspired by President of Council, declaring that continued Spanish occupation of Laraiche and Alcazar is impossible, and suggesting that Spain should be allowed to annex the Riff outright	375
454	„ „ ..	521	13,	Removal of M. Bapst from post of Political Director. Refers to No. 450. The "Temps" has published article accusing M. Herbette of preventing M. Bapst from being fully informed of Moorish affairs. M. Herbette denies the charge, and has requested Minister for Foreign Affairs to institute an enquiry. For some time past there has been a personal animosity between foreign editor of "Temps" and M. Herbette	376
455	Sir M. de Bunsen ..	91 Tel. Confidential	14,	Request for coaling facilities at Spanish port for three Moorish coastguard vessels. Spanish Government have received request from French chargé d'affaires. It would have been more correct if Makhzen had addressed request to Spanish Minister at Tangier, and Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs will probably reply that France is acting prematurely in exercising her protectorate before it has been recognised by the Powers	377
456	To Sir F. Bertie ..	475 Confidential	14,	Fortification of Morocco coast. Refers to No. 351. Informs of substance of No. 460, and transmits copies of Nos. 415 and 458..	377

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457	Sir A. Nicolson to French Minister	..	Nov. 14, 1911	Morocco convention. A note is being sent to him announcing adherence of His Majesty's Government, subject to certain observations. Latter will delay their reply to German Government till they receive French reply to above-mentioned note ..	378
458	To French Minister ..	..	14,	Morocco convention. His Majesty's Government adhere to convention subject to assumption (1) that French engagements under articles 4 and 7 of Anglo-French Declaration of 1904 will not be affected; (2) that words in article 1, "economic equality between the *two* nations," do not give German nationals any superior claim to equality of treatment; and (3) that adequate arrangements will be made to place town and municipal district of Tangier definitely under international control ..	378
459	„ „ ..	..	14,	Morocco convention. His Majesty's Government have not yet received text of notes relative to convention exchanged between French and German Governments, and their adherence is therefore limited to actual convention	379
460	To Admiralty .. „ War Office ..	Confidential	14,	Fortification of Morocco coast. Refers to Nos. 416 and 422. After consideration of recent Franco-German convention, Sir E. Grey considers it would not be politic to make adherence of His Majesty's Government conditional on undertaking not to fortify coast. Explains reasons for above. Wishes of Admiralty will be borne in mind in the event of future negotiations with French Government	379
461	Sir F. Bertie ..	522	14,	Publication of secret agreements by French press. Refers to No. 447. "Journal des Débats" has published a protest pointing out that such indiscretions are likely to compromise vital interests of the country	380
462	To Sir M. de Bunsen	97 Tel.	15,	Coastguard vessels for Moorish Government. Refers to No. 455. Proper procedure would have been that request should have been addressed through Spanish representative at Tangier. Spanish Government might point out irregularity of procedure, but agree to the request on condition it should not be cited as a precedent, and that future requests from Moorish Government should be communicated through Spanish representative in Morocco	381
463	To Sir F. Bertie ..	476	15,	Publication of secret Franco-Spanish convention, 1904. French Minister has been informed that His Majesty's Government have no objection to publication. Former objections of French Government to publication no longer held good, and existence of convention was generally known ..	381
464	Sir E. Goschen ..	377	13,	Morocco debate in Reichstag on 9th and 10th November. Refers to Nos. 446 and 449. Analysis of speeches by Herr Bebel, Herr Bassermann, and others. Speeches were more electioneering addresses than speeches upon an important arrangement with a foreign country. It was unanimously decided to refer conventions to Budget Commission of Reichstag ..	381

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465	Sir F. Cartwright ..	191	Nov. 13, 1911	Austria and German policy in Morocco. Refers to No. 451. Summarises article in press calling attention to danger to European peace involved by violent attitude of German Conservatives towards Morocco convention and England. Austria is true to her ally, but will not go to war to satisfy pan-German ambitions. Jewish world in Austria is much perturbed by warlike feeling among the pan-Germans ..	385
466	Sir E. Goschen ..	379	14,	Union des Mines and Mannesmann Syndicate. An agreement has been signed between Union and Mannesmann Syndicate for a fusion of their interests on a basis of equality. Each party participates to extent of 40 per cent., and remaining 20 per cent. will be taken over by French banks	385
467	Sir M. de Bunsen ..	92 Tel.	16,	Coastguard vessels for Moorish Government. Refers to No. 462. Spanish Government have replied to French note that Spanish representatives at Paris or Tangier have been instructed to settle matter directly with Mokri or with Guebbas	386
468	Sir F. Bertie ..	528	15,	Franco-Spanish negotiations. Transmits leading leading article from "Temps," urging in strongest manner that France should have complete territorial control of route from Tangier to Fez. Article also comments on exceptional position of Tangier, and states that but for agreements with Spain and England, Morocco ought to be governed from Tangier rather than Fez. Article summons England to support France against Spain in the matter ..	386
469	„ „ ..	531	16,	Proceedings of Commission for Foreign Affairs of Chamber of Deputies (see No. 439). Commission inclined to delay approval of Morocco convention until result of Franco-Spanish negotiations is known. Minister for Foreign Affairs has strongly insisted that Parliament should ratify convention as soon as possible	388
470	Board of Trade ..	..	16,	Morocco convention. Refers to No. 436. Board do not find it necessary to offer any observations on convention .	388
471	French Minister ..	..	17,	Morocco convention. Transmits text of notes exchanged between German Minister for Foreign Affairs and French Ambassador at Berlin. Germany agrees to French protectorate of Morocco, to eventual suppression of consular tribunals, and to refer differences of interpretation to The Hague. France agrees to renounce her preferential rights to Spanish Guinea, Corisco, and Elobey Islands, and to no railway being built previous to Tangier–Fez railway and to Agadir being opened to commerce ..	389
472	To Sir F. Bertie ..	481 Confidential	17,	Secret articles of Anglo-French Declaration of 1904. Refers to No. 447. Indiscretion of "Temps" will render it difficult to refuse publication of secret articles. He should enquire whether French Government agree to their publication	391

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473	To Sir E. Goschen ..	281	Nov. 17, 1911	England and Germany. Conversation with German Ambassador respecting Chancellor's first speech, a passage in which had given impression that His Majesty's Government had recoiled before menacing communication from Germany in connection with Mr. Lloyd George's speech. Sir E. Grey would have to deal with this point. He intends to respond most cordially to Chancellor's words that settlement reached with France ought to improve Anglo-German relations	391
474	Sir R. Lister ..	336	12,	Arrival of Spanish cruiser "Cataluña" at Tangier. Cruiser dispatched on pretext of excitement caused by sanitary measures. French cruiser is to remain as long as Spanish cruiser remains	392
475	„ „ ..	337	12,	Reappointment of Hadj Thami as Basha of Marrakesh. Refers to No. 412. French chargé d'affaires says that when Glawi Brothers have finally settled their accounts with the Sultan French will put Hadj Thami's candidature forward. He has written to French consul to push matter on	393
476	„ „ ..	338	12,	Union des Mines and Spanish authorities. Transmits letter from Mr. Harris complaining of action of Spanish authorities, who asked Union not to take possession of mine near Ceuta till local situation was more settled, and then seized it themselves and refuse to give it up. French chargé d'affaires believes complaint to be justified	393
477	Sir F. Bertie ..	533	15,	Charges brought by "Temps" against M. Herbette. Refers to No. 454. Committee of enquiry consisting of French Ambassadors at Rome, Tokyo, and St. Petersburgh have completely exonerated M. Herbette	394
477*	M. Daeschner ..	..	17,	Morocco convention. Acknowledges receipt of No. 458. Economic benefits in the convention extend to all Powers, and articles 4 and 7 of the Anglo-French Declaration of 1904 will not be affected in any way	394*
478	To Sir F. Bertie ..	303 Tel.	18,	Secret articles of Anglo-French Declaration, 1904. Refers to No. 447. He should enquire whether French Government have any objection to their publication ..	394
479	To Sir E. Goschen ..	282	18,	England and Germany. German Ambassador has made communication from Chancellor, expressing hope that Sir E. Grey was satisfied with his references to Mr. Lloyd George's speech. Chancellor would like to know what Sir E. Grey intended to say in Parliament, as he would have to make further references to speech in forthcoming plenary sessions of Reichstag. Sir E. Grey promised to discuss question with Prime Minister and Mr. Lloyd George	394
480	Sir F. Bertie ..	186 Tel.	19,	Secret articles of Anglo-French Declaration, 1904. Refers to No. 478. French Government have no objection to their publication	395

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481	Sir F. Cartwright ..	123 Tel. Secret	Nov. 19, 1911	Austrian adherence to Morocco convention (see No. 426). Minister for Foreign Affairs has handed to French Ambassador curiously worded memorandum, expressing hope that present excellent Austro-French political relations would be extended to economic relations, and asking that Austrian loan of a billion francs may be facilitated in Paris. French Ambassador infers that Austrian policy is changing, and that Austria is now holding out friendly hand to Triple *Entente*. Ambassador says that if loan is allowed France would have to insist on formal assurances of Austrian neutrality in event of Franco-German war	395
482	Sir E. Goschen ..	381	16,	England and Germany. Reports article in "Lokal-Anzeiger" confirming Chancellor's opinion that there was nothing in Mr. Lloyd George's speech to justify reproach that Germany had swallowed a humiliation. Mr. Lloyd George, however, could not be absolved from reproach that he had chosen a very inauspicious moment for speech	396
483	„ ..	383 Confidential	16,	Morocco debate in Reichstag (see No. 464). Though not a good word was said for convention, if it had been put to the vote it would have been passed by large majority. Features of debate were violent chauvinistic language of Herr von Heydebrand, onslaught made on him by Chancellor, and part played by Crown Prince. Chancellor's speech was a personal triumph, but if Conservatives leave Bloc, it will be impossible to pass any Government legislation. In that event, either there must be a new arrangement of parties or Chancellor will have to resign	396
484	To Sir F. Bertie ..	304 Tel.	20,	Publication of secret articles of Anglo-French Declaration of 1904. Refers to No. 480. Proposes to lay secret articles before Parliament at once, and suggests simultaneous publication by French Government	398
485	„ „ ..	4-5 Confidential	20.	Morocco convention. Refers to No. 458. Transmits No. 477*, and points out that it does not specifically answer question of His Majesty's Government as to authoritative text of article 1, nor does it refer to internationalisation of Tangier. States position of His Majesty's Government in regard to latter point, and requests that it may be explained to French Government, as British adherence to convention is subject to satisfactory settlement of this point	398
486	Sir E. Goschen ..	387	19,	England and Germany. Press telegram states that confidential *exposé* made by Herr von Kiderlen to Reichstag commission shows that criticisms of German diplomatic action as regards exchange of views with England were not justified. Annexed to despatch is "Times" translation of extracts from above-mentioned confidential *exposé*, which were officially published in Berlin on 21st November, giving German version of communications with England. In a minute by Sir E. Crowe, it is pointed out that Herr von Kiderlen's statement is a	

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				flagrant breach of established rule that communications with foreign Governments cannot be published without latter's consent	399
487	French Minister ..	..	Nov. 21, 1911	Morocco convention. Refers to No. 458. Conveys official assurances from French Government that they will not withdraw from position adopted in Franco-Spanish Convention of 1904 relative to special position of Tangier	458
488	Sir F. Bertie ..	188 Tel.	20,	Franco-Spanish negotiations. President of the Council has drawn up proposals for an arrangement with Spain, and will communicate them shortly for consideration of His Majesty's Government	405
489	„ „ ..	189 Tel.	21,	Franco-German-British Works Syndicate. Project is being arranged by a Paris financier and Dr. Schwabach. Paris financier enquires if British participation in such a syndicate would be viewed with satisfaction by His Majesty's Government: he says Herr von Kiderlen and M. Caillaux approve project	405
490	„ „ ..	190 Tel.	21,	Withdrawal of German ship from Agadir. Question of withdrawal has been discussed between French and German Governments. German Minister for Foreign Affairs demurred to its withdrawal before convention had been ratified, but has consented to withdraw it as soon as French Chamber has approved convention ..	405
491	„ „ ..	545	21,	Proceedings of Commission of Foreign Affairs of Chamber of Deputies. Transmits extract from "Temps," reporting questions asked by M. Millerand respecting (1) French right of pre-emption of Belgian Congo, (2) retention by Germany of post-offices in Morocco, and (3) responsibility of France in the event of German complaints of occurrences in Spanish zone. It appears from answers given by Minister for Foreigh Affairs that French right of pre-emption over Congo still exists, and that German post-offices will eventually disappear .. .	405
492	To Sir F. Bertie ..	487	22,	Morocco convention. Refers to No. 485. Transmits copy of No. 487. He should express satisfaction of His Majesty's Government at assurances respecting Tangier, and their confidence that adequate arrangements will be made for definite international control. His Majesty's Government trust proposals in this sense will be contained in draft Franco-Spanish arrangement (see No. 386)	407
493	Lord Acton ..	44	20,	Attitude of German press. Press continues very hostile to England, and feeling in military circles is very bitter	407
494	French Minister ..	..	22,	Morocco convention. Refers to No. 458. Transmits copy of convention, with amended article 1, which properly reads "l'égalité économique entre les nations," and not "entre les deux nations" ..	409

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495	War Office ..	Secret	Nov. 22, 1911	Franco-Spanish negotiations. Refers to Nos. 384 and 386. French proposals by which north-west corner of Morocco becomes French instead of Spanish would considerably increase risk of transport of troops in and out of the Mediterranean, and would constitute an additional menace to Gibraltar: proposals must therefore be regarded as disadvantageous to Great Britain from military point of view ..	412
496	To Sir E. Goschen ..	222 Tel.	23,	Statement by German Minister for Foreign Affairs to Reichstag Commission (see No. 486). Action of Herr von Kiderlen in making public his version of conversations between German Ambassador and Sir E. Grey, without previous reference to the latter, is unusual, if not unprecedented, but Sir E Grey proposes, in his forthcoming speech, only to do what German Minister for Foreign Affairs has already done. Meanwhile, Sir E. Goschen should say nothing to Herr von Kiderlen..	413
497	To Sir F. Bertie ..	488	23,	Anglo-Franco-German commercial syndicate. Refers to No. 489. He should inform Paris financier that His Majesty's Government are in principle favourable to association of British and foreign capital, but cannot give formal assurance of support till they are in receipt of detailed information ..	413
498	To Sir E. Goschen ..	286	23,	England and Germany. Disclosures in Captain Faber's speech and English press comments have caused great agitation in Germany, and German Ambassador, by instructions, hoped Sir E. Grey's speech would attempt to soothe feeling of antagonism. Sir E. Grey said that, as Herr von Kiderlen had made selections of conversations (see No. 496) without consulting him, he must do the same. It was untrue that His Majesty's Government had prepared for aggressive action in the summer, and if German public opinion thought so it must be remembered that British public opinion thought the same about Germany..	413
499	Sir E. Goschen ..	390	21,	Convention. See No. 491. Herr von Kiderlen has informed Reichstag Commission that convention does not affect freedom of coasting trade or foreign post-offices in Morocco, and that all German treaty rights remain in force	415
499*	To M. Daeschner ..	..	24,	Franco-German convention. Refers to No. 471. Expresses thanks for communication of notes exchanged at Berlin, of which His Majesty's Government have duly taken note	415*
500	Sir F. Cartwright ..	198	23,	Attitude of Austrian press. "Neue Freie Presse" increases in violence every day. Reports article severely attacking British policy	415
501	To Sir A. Hardinge..	51 Tel.	25,	Portuguese adherence to Franco-German convention. Refers to No. 437*. He should ascertain whether Portuguese Government have decided whether they can adhere, and in that event whether they will now do so	416
502	Sir F. Bertie ..	191 Tel.	25,	Morocco Works Syndicate. Refers to No. 497. German, French, and British participations would be equal. Is sending rough draft of agreement	416

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503	Sir F. Bertie ..	193 Tel. Confidential	Nov. 26, 1911	Franco-Spanish negotiations. Has had very satisfactory conversation concerning Spanish zones in Morocco and position of Tangier, and it is unnecessary to act on instructions contained in Nos. 485 and 492	416
504	Sir R. Lister ..	339	17,	Appointment of Mokri as Grand Vizier. Appointment is reported in Tangier press ..	417
505	„ „ ..	340	18,	Basha of Tangier. Serious disclosures have been made respecting conduct of Basha, who is a son of Mokri. He has been guilty of extortion and corruption, and torturing. Whole matter is being sifted	417
506	„ „ ..	341	19,	Hadj Thami (see No. 475). Hadj Thami's arrangements with Sultan have now been concluded. French chargé d'affaires hopes it may soon be possible to give effect to proposed reorganisation of southern bashaliks	417
507	Sir M. de Bunsen ..	193	22,	Franco-Spanish negotiations. No change in attitude of Spanish Government. Spain demands virtual possession of her sphere, and will not hear of any cession in north. Press report that Spanish Government were weakening on this point in return for a French loan has been indignantly denied by Spanish Premier. Renewed discussion in Madrid press as to whether Spanish occupation of Alcazar infringed secret treaty of 1904. Return of French Ambassador to Madrid is awaited with impatience.	418
508	Sir E. Goschen ..	393	24,	England and Germany. Minister for Foreign Affairs' statement (see Nos. 486 and 518). Centre approve attitude of Government and National Liberals and Social Democrats criticise it. Reports speeches by Herr Bebel and Herr Arendt in Budget Committee and reply of Minister for Foreign Affairs	319
509	„ „ ..	394	24,	Employment of coloured troops by France in European warfare. Transmits despatch from military attaché, reporting discussion in Reichstag. Representative of Prussian War Office asserted that danger was not so great as had been believed, and that many years must elapse before large bodies of troops could be raised in Morocco ..	421
510	„ „ ..	396	24,	England and Germany. Minister for Foreign Affairs' statement. Refers to No. 508. German press comments on statement. While, with the exception of the inspired press, no German papers have expressed entire approval of German policy, not one has a good word for England. By his statement Herr von Kiderlen has created a very strong feeling against England, and his object was evidently to distract public attention from his own shortcomings	422
511	Sir F. Bertie ..	553	25,	Publication of secret articles of Anglo-French Declaration. Transmits article by M. Lauzanne, editor of the "Matin," defending M. Delcassé. Article affirms that in 1900 Mr. Chamberlain was advocating partition of Morocco between England, Germany, and Spain, and M. Delcassé was therefore well advised to come to an arrangement with Spain and England in order to avert being confronted by an Anglo-German combination.	425

No.	Name.	No.	Date.	Subject.	Page
512	Sir F. Bertie ..	556	Nov. 25, 1911	France and Spain. Reports leading article in "Temps" in connection with secret clauses of Anglo-French Declaration, 1904. Article urges that England should support France in claiming hinterland of Morocco coast	426
513	Sir E. Goschen ..	106 Tel.	27,	Agadir. "North German Gazette" announces that German warship will leave Agadir on 28th November, as all is now quiet there..	426
514	Sir R. Lister ..	156 Tel.	27,	Commission d'Hygiène. Resolution to add twelve Moorish notables to commission passed at last meeting and communicated to Conseil sanitaire, whose assent is necessary. French chargé d'affaires prompted this proposal. His idea is to obtain in this way a majority of the commission, which has always been looked upon as embryo of future municipality. Proposal is strongly condemned by Spanish and Russian Ministers, and is wholly inadmissible. Has informed M. de Billy that absolute maintenance of *status quo* was essential	427
515	Nil.				
516	To Count Metternich	..	27,	Morocco convention. His Majesty's Government have decided to adhere to convention	427
517	To Board of Trade ..	..	27,	Reported agreement between Union des Mines and Mannesmann Syndicate. Transmits No. 466. British share in Union is now reduced to a negligible quantity, and Sir E. Grey is considering whether it would be advisable to intimate to French Government his dissatisfaction with smallness of share allotted to Great Britain in these international Morocco syndicates. Requests views of board	428
518	Extract from "Times"	..	23,	England and Germany. Minister for Foreign Affairs' statement (see No. 486). Continuation of official extracts from Herr von Kiderlen's *exposé* to Reichstag Commission. Minute by Sir E. Crowe, pointing out that (1) we are now for the first time told officially that M. Rouvier in 1905 made overtures to Germany for a definite understanding, (2) Mr. Joseph Chamberlain is officially declared to have proposed a partition of Morocco to Germany: there is no record of this in our archives, but this is not a reason for questioning accuracy of statement, (3) Herr von Kiderlen's account of Germany's attitude in regard to alleged French violation of Algeciras Act is entirely misleading ..	428
519	Sir F. Bertie ..	561 Very Conf.	26,	Franco-Spanish negotiations. Refers to Nos. 485 and 492. Minister for Foreign Affairs' proposals, which have been accepted by his colleagues and President, are that Franco-Spanish Agreement of 1904 should form basis of negotiations: that no compensation from Spain should be sought in the north beyond a slight rectification of Loukkos boundary line: that France should claim southern Spanish zone except Ifni: that Tangier should be internationalised at once, and that Tangier-Fez Railway should be built by the two Governments in co-operation: and that Sultan should appoint a commissioner with full powers to represent him and treat all questions between Spain and Makhzen	431

No.	Name.	No.	Date.	Subject.	Page
520	Sir F. Bertie ..	562	Nov. 27, 1911	International Morocco Works Syndicate. Refers to No. 502. Transmits draft agreement respecting	433
521	Sir R. Lister ..	157 Tel.	28,	Commission d'Hygiène. Refers to No. 514. M. de Billy is referring resolution to his Government. He appears to have realised foolishness of course he has adopted, and is endeavouring to show that responsibility for resolution is in no way his	435
522	To Sir M. de Bunsen	123	28,	Franco-Spanish negotiations. Spanish Ambassador informed that French proposals had not yet been submitted to Foreign Office. Ambassador agreed that some concession should be made by Spain, but not in parts of Morocco which were vital to her. He feared French wished to become *de facto* the supreme authority in Tangier. He stated that his Government would keep as quiet as possible and avoid any incidents in Morocco	436
523	Parliamentary Debates	..	27,	England and Germany. Sir E. Grey's speech in House of Commons on Anglo-German relations in connection with Morocco question	436
524	Sir E. Goschen ..	400	29,	Sir E. Grey's speech (see No. 523). Reports criticisms of German press and transmits leading article in "Lokal-Anzeiger." Speech has met with a very mixed reception ..	447
525	„ „ ..	401	29,	England and Germany. Minister for Foreign Affairs' statement (see Nos. 486 and 518). Semi-official communiqué has appeared, stating that German Minister for Foreign Affairs had nothing to do with communication published by Telegraph Bureau in regard to his statement in secret commission of Budget Commission	452
526	Sir F. Bertie ..	569	30,	Franco-Spanish negotiations. Transmits "avant-projet" of Franco-Spanish convention. Internationalisation of Tangier will form subject of an annex to convention, and will be communicated later. French Minister for Foreign Affairs is anxious to have British observations on draft as soon as possible	452
527	To Sir F. Bertie ..	329 Tel.	Dec. 1,	Franco-Spanish negotiations. Has not had time to study French draft (No. 526) in detail, but will give it general support, as affording a fair basis for discussion. Presumes Ifni will be left to Spain, and that latter will be assured that Germany will not also claim compensation from her ..	456
528	Sir R. Lister ..	342 Confidential	Nov. 26,	Commission d'Hygiène (see Nos. 515 and 521). Expands No. 514, and gives full details of conversations with Russian and Spanish Ministers. Transmits note by Spanish Minister and text of letter from commission to Sanitary Council. Considers it essential that it should be made clear at Paris that we intend to have a real internationalisation of Tangier, and not a municipality on which French, through Moorish representatives selected by Makhzen, will wield the real power ..	456
529	„ „ ..	343	26,	Commission d'Hygiène (see No. 528). Short sketch of origin and composition of commission	459

No.	Name.	No.	Date.	Subject.	Page
530	Sir F. Bertie ..	571	Dec. 1, 1911	Franco-Spanish negotiations. Refers to No. 526. Transmits draft regulations respecting administration of Tangier ..	459
530*	To Board of Trade ..	..	2,	International Syndicate for Public Works. Transmits Nos. 489 and 520, and enquires whether there is any objection to informing organiser of syndicate that if British capital participates on equal terms with foreign capital, and if syndicate is supported by French and German Governments, His Majesty's Government will also support it as far as they properly can ..	463*
531	Sir E. Crowe ..	..	3,	Tangier municipality. Memorandum pointing out unsatisfactory nature of French proposals (see No. 530), which do not provide for real internationalisation of Tangier	463
532	Sir A. Hardinge ..	139 Confidential	Nov. 25,	Adherence of Portugal to Morocco convention. Refers to No. 437*. French Government are pressing Portuguese Government to adhere, and Minister for Foreign Affairs has frankly informed French Minister of Portuguese reasons for delay. Has communicated to Minister for Foreign Affairs contents of No. 501, but thinks it would be unwise to take further action, or Portugal will hold Great Britain responsible for results of disregarding Spanish wishes ..	465
533	Sir E. Goschen ..	405 Confidential	30,	Sir E. Grey's speech. Refers to No. 524. No improvement in tone of German press. Chief complaint is that as Great Britain was not bound to afford armed assistance to France, her readiness to give such assistance was clearly dictated by hostility to Germany. Feeling in official quarters is that speech will not have desired effect of calming public opinion in Germany ..	466
534	Sir F. Bertie ..	573	Dec. 2,	Speech by M. Millerand. M. Millerand recommended approval of Franco-German convention by Chamber, and said England would have to be closely associated with settlement to be reached with Spain, both because she was the "témoin" of the 1904 agreements and for the sake of the *entente cordiale*	467
535	„ „ ..	574	2,	Mr. Chamberlain's alleged proposal for Anglo-German partition of Morocco. Refers to No. 511. Transmits letter from M. d'Estournelles de Constant to President of Council, declaring that no such desire existed on part of Mr. Chamberlain in 1903–4, and giving reasons for this statement. Transmits reply from M. Lauzanne in the "Matin," pointing out that it was German Minister for Foreign Affairs who attributed desire to Mr. Chamberlain (see No. 518), and that Mr. Chamberlain did hold such views in 1899, if not in 1903–4	467
536	Sir V. Corbett ..	81	2,	Sir E. Grey's speech. Criticisms of South German press. Press expresses disappointment and harp on the theme of England's desire to be *arbiter mundi*	470

No.	Name.	No.	Date.	Subject.	Page
537	To Sir F. Bertie ..	334 Tel.	Dec. 4, 1911	Franco-Spanish negotiations. Refers to No. 527. His Majesty's Government can support draft proposals (see No. 526) as a basis for discussion, but must not be regarded as committed to details. French Ambassador states that French Government will leave Ifni to Spain, but are unwilling to say so at once	470
538	To Sir A. Hardinge ..	52 Tel.	4,	Portuguese adherence to Franco-German convention (see No. 532). French Ambassador states that Portuguese Government say they are awaiting our opinion as to whether they should adhere. He should inform Minister for Foreign Affairs, and say we see no reason why they should not adhere	472
539	To Sir M. de Bunsen	125	4,	Franco - Spanish negotiations. Spanish Ambassador informed that Sir E. Grey was not sure if French Government desired Sir M. de Bunsen to take part in negotiations, but that Sir E. Grey had contemplated Ambassador being ready to use his good offices if required. Sir E. Grey had not yet read French proposals respecting Tangier, but they were satisfactory in principle	472
540	„ „	126	4,	Tangier police arrangements. Spanish Ambassador states that if French Government objected to prolongation of police arrangements, Spanish Government would suggest they should be prolonged for six months	472
541	„ „	127	4,	Reported intention of France to land near Rio del Oro. Spanish Government have heard report to this effect from Mogador. In 1904 French Government had agreed with Spanish Government that territory in question was outside Morocco	472
542	Sir F. Bertie ..	576 Confidential	3,	Franco-Spanish negotiations. M. Caillaux's views. Conversation with M. Caillaux, who said that, out of deference to His Majesty's Government, France would not claim Laraiche and Alcazar; but it was essential that line of Spanish zone should be altered in Lukkos district, and that guarantees should be given for security of Tangier - Alcazar railway. Ambassador explained to M. Caillaux that, though general policy of His Majesty's Government was to keep Spain with her, in this instance all they asked for was observance by France of her 1904 treaty engagements	473
543	„ „ ..	577 Confidential	4,	Position of French Cabinet. Opinion in Paris is divided as to whether Cabinet will survive interpellations on foreign policy. It is suggested that Parliament should approve Franco-German convention first and then continue debate. This would not suit Cabinet	474
544	„ „ ..	578	3,	Franco-Spanish negotiations. Transmits leading article from "Gaulois," setting forth Spanish views. It is contended that Spain owes no compensation to France, but her desire for conciliation is so great that she might be ready to cede Alcazar. It is pointed out that Tangier-Fez can never be a strategical line, as England would never allow Tangier to be turned into a port of war	474

No.	Name.	No.	Date.	Subject.	Page
545	To Sir R. Lister ..	67 Tel.	Dec. 5, 1911	Commission d'Hygiène. Refers to Nos. 514 and 528. Approves his action. His Majesty's Government are strongly opposed to any change at present in constitution of commission, and he should endeavour to defeat proposal. . .	477
546	Sir E. Goschen ..	111 Tel.	6,	Speech by German Chancellor on the 5th December (see No. 555). Chancellor maintained that England had had full information, and that if explanation given on the 1st July had been accepted, and Mr. Lloyd George had not made his speech, tension would not have occurred. Germany claimed right not to be set aside in matters affecting German interests, and England and France had done this in 1904 in regard to Morocco. Chancellor heartily reciprocated Sir E. Grey's desire for better relations	477
547	Sir F. Bertie ..	198 Tel.	6,	Franco-Spanish negotiations. Refers to No. 526. Has received a fresh edition of Franco - Spanish convention. Specifies differences in articles 2 and 12 ..	478
548	To Sir M. de Bunsen	102 Tel.	6,	Franco-Spanish negotiations (see No. 539). He may associate himself with negotiations. His Majesty's Government consider draft proposals respecting Tangier inacceptable, and a despatch to Paris is being drafted (see No. 564) .. .	478
549	Sir F. Bertie ..	583	6,	Franco - Spanish draft convention (see No. 547). Transmits new text of article 2 respecting delimitation of Spanish zone and of article 12 respecting financial arrangements	478
550	„ „ ..	584	6,	Franco-Spanish negotiations (see No. 537). Has informed Minister for Foreign Affairs that His Majesty's Government were ready to give general support to French "avant-projet" as the basis of discussion with Spain, but that they did not consider proposals about Tangier satisfactory. French Minister for Foreign Affairs has informed Spanish Ambassador that French Government, far from objecting, would welcome participation of Sir M. de Bunsen in negotiations ..	480
551	„ „ ..	200 Tel.	6,	Morocco Works Syndicate. Refers to No. 520. Paris financier enquires whether His Majesty's Government have taken any decision in regard to British participation	480
551*	Sir M. de Bunsen ..	94 Tel.	7,	Franco-Spanish negotiations. Conference with Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs and French Ambassador. Latter communicated draft convention, which Minister for Foreign Affairs said he would carefully examine, but would like first to be assured that Spain would not be required to make any concession to Germany. French Ambassador thought it would be useless to sound Germany as to her ultimate intentions, and suggested that any engagements for a cession of territory should be made conditional on no German demand for compensation being put forward. Minister for Foreign Affairs agreed	480*

No.	Name.	No.	Date.	Subject.	Page
552	To Sir F. Bertie ..	338 Tel.	Dec. 7, 1911	Police. Mandates to France and Spain for policing ports expire on the 31st December. He should ascertain if French Government would be ready to suggest to Powers prolongation of mandates for three or six months. Such a prolongation would seem desirable	481
553	„ „ ..	342 Tel.	7,	Morocco Works Syndicate. Refers to No. 551. If British capital participates on equal terms with foreign capital, His Majesty's Government will, if syndicate is supported by French and German Governments, support it as far as they properly can ..	481
554	Sir C. Spring-Rice ..	217	2,	Sir E. Grey's speech. Reports mistranslation of passage in speech as published in "Hamburger Nachrichten"	481
555	Sir E. Goschen ..	415	6,	Speech by German Chancellor on 5th December (see No. 546). Transmits translation of third speech in Reichstag by Chancellor. Tone and manner differ considerably from that of first two speeches, and it was strongly anti-English. Press hails speech with satisfaction	482
556	Board of Trade ..	..	7,	International Syndicate for Public Works. Board see no objection to reply suggested in No. 530*	485
557	To Sir M. de Bunsen	104 Tel.	8,	Franco-Spanish negotiations. Spanish Ambassador states that French draft (No. 526) has made a very bad impression on his Government, who do not get a free hand in Spanish sphere, especially as regards customs. Sir E. Grey expressed disappointment that Spanish Government showed no satisfaction about Laraiche and Alcazar being left to them, and said Spanish objections seemed to be points of detail	486
558	Sir V. Corbett ..	83	7,	German Chancellor's speech (see No. 555). Press considers speech an effective reply to British speeches, and selects for commendation the passages least friendly to England	486
559	To Sir F. Bertie ..	347 Tel.	9,	Morocco Works Syndicate. Refers to No. 553. Conditional promise of support does not involve obligation on His Majesty's Government to give exclusive support to syndicate	487
560	Sir E. Goschen ..	416	6,	German Chancellor's speech (see No. 555). Press are loud in praise of Chancellor, and there is unanimity with regard to his language about England. Speech must be regarded as a great personal success from point of view of internal German politics. Chancellor's phrase, "We want deeds and not words," has excited much discussion, and French Ambassador asked Chancellor outright if he had any special case in his mind. Chancellor replied in negative. Transmits article on speech from "Kölnische Zeitung"	488
561	Sir F. Cartwright ..	207	7,	German Chancellor's speech (see No. 555). Austrian press express admiration of speech, except "Zeit," which prophesies that approaching German elections will show unfavourable verdict of Germany on the negotiations	490

No.	Name.	No.	Date.	Subject.	Page
562	Sir F. Bertie ..	588	Dec. 8, 1911	Franco-Spanish negotiations. Has informed M. Caillaux in reply to latter's enquiry that His Majesty's Government had accepted "avant-projet" as a basis for discussion, but that proposals respecting Tangier were not acceptable. M. Caillaux said French Government would be quite ready to modify latter	491
563	„ „ ..	589	8,	Franco-Spanish negotiations. Spanish Ambassador says French "avant-projet" is a great disappointment to his Government. He dilated on Spanish grievances, and contended that no compensation was really due to France. Unfortunately, Spain was not strong enough to ensure respect for her rights. He contended that Spanish Guinea and Fernando Po were included in Franco-Anglo-Spanish agreements of 1907	492
564	To Sir F. Bertie ..	522	11,	Franco-Spanish negotiations. Tangier. Refers to No. 530. Transmits memorandum (No. 531) criticising French proposals respecting Tangier, the cardinal defect of which is that they do not provide for real internationalisation. Explains necessity for control of Tangier to be in hands of foreign community, and suggests international settlement at Shanghai as a model. Considers that drawing up of details should be entrusted to diplomatic body at Tangier. He should explain views of His Majesty's Government to Minister for Foreign Affairs	493
565	Sir A. Hardinge ..	145	8,	Portuguese adherence to Morocco convention. Has spoken to Minister for Foreign Affairs in sense of No. 538. Latter has explained to French Minister that Portugal was anxious not to offend Spain, and French Minister admitted reasonableness of Portuguese argument	494
566	Sir F. Bertie ..	206 Tel.	12,	Police. Refers to No. 552. Moorish Government intend to ask State bank for funds for a three months' prolongation from the 1st January of mandates for policing ports of Morocco. French Government do not consider it necessary to consult Powers	495
566*	Sir M. de Bunsen ..	96 Tel.	12,	Franco-Spanish negotiations (see No. 576). Second meeting between Minister for Foreign Affairs and two Ambassadors. Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs' main criticisms of French draft proposals are that France reserves power of intervention in Spanish sphere. He will prepare counter-draft for next meeting. He declares that Spain cannot concede territory demanded by France, but both Ambassadors think Spain desires to reach a settlement	495*
567	To Sir M. de Bunsen	133	12,	Franco-Spanish negotiations. Conversation with Spanish Ambassador, who thanked His Majesty's Government on behalf of his Government for what they had done. Spanish Government could never cede Ifni, though they were willing to cede hinterland to the south. They had not received proposals about Tangier, but they were very anxious that internationalisation should be real and not illusory	495

No.	Name.	No.	Date.	Subject.	Page
568	Sir M. de Bunsen ..	198	Dec. 10, 1911	Franco-Spanish negotiations. Expands No. 551*, and explains circumstances in which he attended meeting between Minister for Foreign Affairs and M. Geoffray ..	495
569	To Sir F. Bertie ..	367 Tel.	13,	Police. Refers to No. 566. French Government will presumably inform Spanish Government. Arrangement is unlikely to meet with objection from other treaty Powers, and has concurrence of His Majesty's Government	496
570	„ „ ..	536	15,	Adherence of Portugal to Morocco convention (see No. 565). Has informed French Ambassador of instructions sent to Sir A. Hardinge (No. 238), and told him real reason of Portuguese hesitation.. ..	497
571	Sir R. Lister ..	344 Very Conf.	1,	Commission d'Hygiène. Refers to No. 528. Conversation with French chargé d'affaires, whom he informed that action of commission seemed to him most regrettable and inopportune. M. de Billy's arguments in favour of resolution were unconvincing, and he seems to realise he has made a mistake. He is trying to throw all the blame on Ali Zakki and the Makhzen. A committee of prominent Moors has been formed to protect native interests, and they have passed resolutions of protest against proposal of Commission d'Hygiène. Committee have invited Mr. Harris's co-operation	497
572	„ „ ..	351 Confidential	10,	Commission d'Hygiène. Refers to No. 571. Proposal to add twelve members to commission may be considered as completely defeated. Feeling amongst French colony in Tangier is very bitter against England, who, in their opinion, is responsible for the northern shore and Laraiche and Alcazar remaining to Spain instead of being given to France	499
573	Admiralty.. ..	Confidential	14,	Non-fortification of Moorish coast. Refers to No. 460. Admiralty, while accepting decision of Sir E. Grey not to press matter, are glad to learn that he does not intend to lose sight of their wishes if a suitable opportunity occurs of pressing them on French Government	500
574	Sir F. Bertie ..	602	15,	Morocco debate in French Chamber of Deputies. Summary and text of speeches by Minister of Foreign Affairs and Minister of the Colonies	500
575	Sir E. Goschen ..	427	11,	Meeting of pan-German League. League has passed resolution demanding a change in the directors of German policy. The president, Dr. Class, author of the pamphlet "West Marokko Deutsch," maintains his charge of breach of faith and untruth against German Minister for Foreign Affairs. The "Post" states public opinion is surprised that Herr von Kiderlen should not have taken up this charge	520

No.	Name.	No.	Date.	Subject.	Page
576	Sir M. de Bunsen ..	199	Dec. 14, 1911	Franco-Spanish negotiations. Refers to No. 566*. Transmits abstract of written comments by Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs on French draft. Principal Spanish objections are extent of territorial compensation demanded by France and character of proposed administration of Spanish zone. Minister for Foreign Affairs declared nothing would induce Spain to surrender territory in south, declared by 1904 convention to be outside Morocco. French Ambassador warned Minister for Foreign Affairs that France was not likely to yield on territorial question beyond giving Spain strip of coast at Ifni. Objections to administration of Spanish zone are (1) fact that reform regulations for whole of Morocco are to be drawn up by Makhzen, *i.e.*, by France, which would thus have power over Spanish zone, and (2) fact that control of customs in Spanish sphere is to be in hands of French officers of the Public Debt ..	521
577	Sir F. Bertie ..	607	16,	Morocco debate in Chamber of Deputies. Refers to No. 574. Reports speeches by M. Vaillant (Socialist), M. Abel Ferry, and M. Millerand, who made a most important and eloquent speech as spokesman of the Republican-Socialist group. M. Millerand, who advocated adoption of convention, made a great impression on the Chamber	525
578	Sir E. Goschen ..	440	16,	Speech of French Minister for Foreign Affairs (see No. 574). German press have made comparatively little comment; Conservative papers maintain almost complete silence. Comments of "Vossische Zeitung" show that it realises real importance of M. de Selves' disclosures	526
579	Sir F. Bertie ..	610	17,	Morocco debate in French Chamber of Deputies. Refers to No. 577. Reports speeches by MM. Sembat, Deschanel, and Denys-Cochin. It is thought debate will be over by 19th December	527
580	To Sir M. de Bunsen	135	18,	Franco-Spanish negotiations. Spanish Ambassador has expressed thanks of his Government for exercise of British influence in support of their claims to Laraiche and Alcazar. Spanish Government much disturbed at French claim to territory recognised by 1904 convention to be outside Morocco and their claim to administer customs in Spanish zone. Spanish Government would be willing, if they had the administration, to guarantee sums due on account of loans	538
581	Sir F. Bertie ..	613	19,	Debate in French Chamber of Deputies (see No. 579). Speech by President of the Council, containing very able defence of French policy. Speech made strong impression on the Chamber	529
582	Sir R. Lister ..	162 Tel.	21,	Lighter basin at Casa Blanca. It has been decided to construct basin. French consul proposed system of *marché de gré à gré* should be adopted, and French state engineer wishes work to be divided into two halves, one to be paid for by "Caisse spéciale," the other out of Shawia indemnity, and to be given to French contractor. Thinks it undesirable that first important work should be treated exceptionally to the benefit of the French, and requests instructions ..	531

No.	Name.	No.	Date.	Subject.	Page
583	Sir F. Bertie ..	615	Dec. 21, 1911	Debate in French Chamber of Deputies (see No. 581). Franco-German convention passed by 393 votes to 36. There were 141 abstentions. Latter part of debate was occupied by great speech of M. Jaurès, in which he examined influence of financiers on French policy, and made an impassioned argument against war. References to English friendship and support made during debate evoked cordial manifestations. Curious scene, in which Minister of Colonies played chief part, consequent on reference to Alsace-Lorraine	531
583*	Sir M. de Bunsen ..	98 Tel.	26,	Franco-Spanish negotiations. Refers to No. 584. French Ambassador has received comments of French Government on Spanish proposals. French Government continue to urge that general regulations for whole Empire should be drawn up by Makhzen, and they cannot agree to exclusion of French loan representatives from collecting customs in Spanish sphere ..	532*
584	„ „ ..	202	21,	Franco-Spanish negotiations. Transmits Spanish counter-proposals handed by Minister for Foreign Affairs to French Ambassador at third meeting on 18th December. Spanish draft purposely omits all mention of territorial compensation to France and deals exclusively with administration of Spanish zone, its main purpose being to eliminate from zone all influence and action of central Moorish Government. Draft contains important financial provisions respecting mutual surrender in each other's zone of security for the two war indemnities, and assumption by Spanish Government of responsibility for payment of interest on French loans. Meeting passed off without any friction	532
584*	To Sir R. Lister ..	69 Tel.	27,	Casa Blanca lighter basin. Refers to No. 582. Entirely agrees with his views. He should insist on principle of adjudication being upheld	536*
585	To Sir M. de Bunsen	137	27,	Franco-Spanish negotiations. Refers to No. 576. Question of Tangier is predominating one for His Majesty's Government, who must insist that town and municipal district should be outside both spheres and administered internationally. His Majesty's Government also consider it essential that stipulations in 1904 convention respecting non-alienation of territory and non-fortification should be embodied in new convention	536
586	Sir F. Bertie ..	620 Confidential	27,	Proceedings of commission of French Senate. Transmits extract from "Figaro." Minister for Foreign Affairs was pressed on subject of secret interpretative letter annexed to Franco-German agreement of 1909 (see Part 40, No. 55), and finally offered to make known its contents on condition of secrecy. Condition was not accepted and matter dropped. Whole question of treaty appears about to be reopened and fresh opportunity is offered to attack and criticise Cabinet	537

No.	Name.	No.	Date.	Subject.	Page
587	Board of Trade ..	..	Dec. 27, 1911	Reported agreement between Union des Mines and Mannesmann Syndicate. Refers to No. 517. Board think it would be desirable to obtain a larger allotment, and suggest effort should be made to secure at least 20 per cent. There would be little difficulty in inducing British subscribers to come forward	539
588	Sir F. Bertie ..	622	28,	Proceedings of Senate Commission. Refers to No. 586. Summary of article in "Journal des Débats," drawing special attention to application of Franco-German agreement of 1909, as shown by Herr von Kiderlen's complaint against action of France in opposing Germany in connection with Bagdad Railway. Article expresses fear that Herr von Kiderlen may appeal to spirit of 1911 convention in a similar way to demand economic facilities in other parts of the world, and states that it is essential that commission should demand explicit declaration as to precise scope of 1911 convention	539
589	„ „ ..	218 Tel.	28,	Franco-Spanish negotiations. President of Council complains of attitude and requirements of Spanish Government, and considers Spanish counter-project inacceptable. He hopes Sir E. Grey will moderate zeal of Spanish Government	540
590	Sir R. Lister ..	163 Tel.	28,	Lighter basin at Casa Blanca. Refers to No. 584*. French Government maintain that either whole work must be carried out by funds already affected to Casa Blanca port, or that work and payment should be divided between Caisse spéciale and Shawia indemnity. Has informed French chargé d'affaires that it would be most regrettable to depart from principle of adjudication, and also to divide work. French Government assume that if whole work is defrayed out of indemnity there will be no question of adjudication or intervention of Public Works Committee. Requests instructions	540
591	To Sir R. Lister ..	70 Tel.	29,	Lighter basin at Casa Blanca. Refers to No. 590. Principle involved is too important to admit of hurried decision, and he should ask for delay in settling question. He should furnish full report, explaining bearing of proposal to meet cost out of Shawia indemnity on question of adjudication	541
592	Sir R. Lister ..	355	2,	Lighter basin at Casa Blanca. Expands No. 582, and gives details of meeting of Public Works Committee	541
593	Sir F. Bertie ..	626	29,	Franco-German Agreement of 1909. M. Pichon has made communication to press to the effect that 1909 agreement never referred to general policy of France or Germany elsewhere than in Africa, and no mention was ever made in preceding or ensuing negotiations of questions outside scope of agreement	542

No.	Name.	No.	Date.	Subject.	Page
594	Sir F. Bertie ..	627	Dec. 29, 1911	Proceedings of Senate Commission to examine Franco-German convention. Transmits account published in "Matin." Members of commission displayed considerable curiosity as to Kissingen conversation (see No. 83), and who first suggested cession of Congo territory. Matter was not cleared up	542
595	Sir R. Lister ..	164 Tel.	30,	Casa Blanca lighter basin. Refers to No. 591. French chargé d'affaires much upset by delay. Suggests that Sir F. Bertie might discuss matter with M. Porché, who is in Paris. Complete change takes place in Committee of Public Works after 1st January, and new committee will not be favourable to French proposals .	543
596	" " ..	165 Tel.	30,	Casa Blanca lighter basin. Refers to No. 595. M. Llorens has communicated telegram from M. Porché, from which it appears that latter had at first desired to construct an "épi" or wall for sheltering lighters, but has dropped this plan in favour of basin and terreplein. Company who are building the mole have all the requisite plant on the spot	543

ERRATA.

The following should have appeared as a footnote to No. 153, page 112:—

The French islands referred to are:—

Mozambique Channel ..	..	Iles Glorieuses, Europa, Barsas du India.
Indian Ocean	..	St. Paul and Amsterdam Islands, Kerguelen.
Comoro Archipelago ..	..	Comoro Islands and Grand Comoro.
French Polynesia ..	..	Marquesas Islands, Tuamotu, Gambier Islands, Tubuai Islands.

The possible cession of these islands to Germany formed the subject of a verbal communication to Sir E. Grey from the French Ambassador.

Page 436.—For "No. 422" read "No. 522."
Page 541, No. 592.—For "Tangier, December 2, 1911," read "Tangier, December 21, 1911."

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CONFIDENTIAL.

Further Correspondence respecting the Affairs of Morocco.

Part 43.

[25641]

No. 1.

Aide-mémoire communicated by Count Metternich, July 1, 1911.

DES maisons allemandes établies au sud du Maroc, et notamment à Agadir et dans ses environs, se sont alarmées d'une certaine fermentation parmi les tribus de ces contrées que semblent avoir produite les derniers événements dans d'autres parties du pays. Ces maisons se sont adressées au Gouvernement Impérial pour lui demander protection pour leur vie et leurs biens. Sur leur demande le Gouvernement a décidé d'envoyer au port d'Agadir un bâtiment de guerre, pour prêter, en cas de besoin, aide et secours à ses sujets et protégés ainsi qu'aux considérables intérêts allemands engagés dans lesdites contrées. Dès que l'état de choses au Maroc sera rentré dans son calme antérieur, le bateau chargé de cette mission protectrice aura à quitter le port d'Agadir.

Minute by Sir A. Nicolson.

Sir Edward Grey,

The German Ambassador called this morning and said he had been instructed to make a verbal communication, which is recorded in the above *aide-mémoire*. A similar communication was, Count Metternich said, being made to the French and Spanish Governments by the German Ambassadors at Paris and Madrid. I merely remarked that Agadir was not an open port, and that I was unaware that any German or foreign subjects resided there or in its neighbourhood.

Count Metternich continued by saying that he wished to make an explanatory statement: the advance of France to Fez, in regard to the necessity of which German reports differed from those of the French, and also the establishment both by France and Spain of military posts in various parts of Morocco, had created a new situation and one which rendered the provisions of the Act of Algeciras illusory. By that Act France and Spain were only authorised to organise police forces in certain open ports. The German Government had no desire to pass any criticisms on the above action of France and Spain, but they were bound to lend an ear to the requests of German subjects and protected subjects in districts in the south where no organised police forces existed. It was the duty of the German Government to afford the necessary protection to the lives and properties of their subjects in the south, and to continue to afford such protection until a condition of normal peace and tranquillity had been re-established. The German Government were ready to endeavour to find with the French and Spanish Governments a definite solution of the Morocco question. They were well aware that there were difficulties in the way of reaching a solution, but owing to the friendly relations between Germany, France, and Spain they did not consider that such difficulties were insurmountable. If the British Government were ready to assist towards this end their aid would be gladly welcomed.

I said that I would repeat to you as faithfully as possible what he had said to me. He could understand that the communication was one of great importance and would have to be very carefully considered.

A. N.

Foreign Office, July 1, 1911.

P.S.—I should add that Count Metternich said that a return to the *status quo ante* was out of the question.

A. N.

[25652] No. 2.

Mr. White to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 1.)

(No. 119.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Tangier, July* 1, 1911.

GERMAN Minister called on the Commissioner for Foreign Affairs this morning and made a statement, of which he left an *aide-mémoire*.

The following is translation of the *aide-mémoire* :—

"German houses established in Southern Morocco, especially at Agadir and its neighbourhood, are alarmed at certain amount of excitement which appears to have been produced among tribes of those regions by recent events in other parts of the country. They have petitioned the Imperial Government for protection. On their demand Government has decided to station a man-of-war at Agadir to assist and succour its subjects and protégés as well as considerable German interests engaged in those regions. As soon as the state of things in Morocco has returned to its former calm vessel charged with this mission will have to leave port of Agadir." (End of R.)

French chargé d'affaires, to whom Commissioner for Foreign Affairs communicated German Minister's memorandum, is much perturbed and also perplexed as to the line that he should take, as he thinks that action may be result of Kissingen meeting between M. Cambon and the German Minister for Foreign Affairs. He has, however, heard nothing from his Government on the subject.

[25648] No. 3.

Count de Salis to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 2.)

(No. 42.)
(Telegraphic.) *En clair.* *Berlin, July* 2, 1911.

THE "Norddeutsche," which appeared last night, publishes following statement:—

"The German firms interested in South Morocco have drawn the attention of the Imperial Government to the dangers which threaten German interests there in view of the possible spread of the disorders prevailing in other parts of the country, and have begged for steps for the protection of the lives and property of Germans and German-protected subjects. With this object Imperial Government have decided to send 'Panther' to harbour of Agadir, and have so informed Powers. At the same time, the Moroccan notables in the district have been informed that the appearance of a German war-ship does not betoken any unfriendly intention either towards Morocco or its inhabitants."

[25649] No. 4.

Count de Salis to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 2.)

(No. 43. Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Berlin, July* 2, 1911.

MOROCCO. My telegram No. 42.

I learn confidentially that, in the course of an interview with the Spanish Ambassador, the Acting Secretary of State declared that the dispatch of a German man-of-war to Agadir was prompted by the following motives:—

1. The agitation of the partisans of El Glawi, who were menacing German interests in their efforts to avenge his disgrace. There might at any time be an outbreak of this agitation.

2. The German Government could not stand by while the country was being divided up by other Powers. Public opinion would not allow it.

Herr Zimmermann also said that it would depend upon Spain and France as to how long the German ship would stay at Agadir; both these countries were violating the Algeciras Act. There were two solutions of the question, either an arrangement between the three Powers or a return to the *status quo*, which, if not impossible, was improbable.

Spanish Ambassador also enquired as to the extent of the German pretensions, and was informed that that had not yet been decided, but that proposals should not come from Berlin. The "Panther" would remain at Agadir pending a settlement of the matter, which it was desirable should be prompt.

[25650] No. 5.

Count de Salis to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 2.)

(No. 44.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Berlin, July* 2, 1911.

MOROCCO.

My telegram No. 43.

In view of what he has been told in Berlin, the Spanish Ambassador is, I understand, confident of a resumption of conversations *à trois*, the only difference being that, instead of England, Germany will in future be the third party.

[25653] No. 6.

Mr. White to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 2.)

(No. 120.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Tangier, July* 2, 1911.

MY telegram No. 119 of 1st July.

German Minister called on the French chargé d'affaires yesterday afternoon and made a communication similar to that he had made to Guebbas. In reply to enquiry he told the French chargé d'affaires that as German Minister he could say nothing, but that in his private personal capacity he might say that the German action was, he thought, based on an understanding with France. French chargé d'affaires has no information from his Government on the subject.

No news has reached Tangier of any disturbances in the neighbourhood of Agadir, nor are any German subjects established there, though a few Germans have recently visited those regions prospecting for minerals. Germans have recently been purchasing land there, but this has been done through natives.

[25881] No. 7.

Mr. O'Beirne to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 2.)

(No. 139.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *St. Petersburgh, July* 2, 1911.

GERMANY and Morocco.

I saw the Spanish chargé d'affaires yesterday, who informed me that his Government had reason to think that Germany meant to take energetic action in Morocco, and that they knew several days ago that Germany intended to dispatch a man-of-war to a Moorish port.

The above is confidential.

[25740] No. 8.

Mr. White to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 3.)

(No. 175.)

Sir, *Tangier, June* 24, 1911.

COLONEL MÜLLER, Inspector-General of the Police, has just presented his annual report to the Makhzen under article 7 of the Algeciras Act, and communicated it to the diplomatic body as required under article 8 of the Act. The report will be printed as soon as possible, and I shall have the honour to transmit a copy to you in due course.

After reporting the result of his inspection of the police at all the ports, Colonel Müller draws attention to the work upon which the police have, in certain cases, been employed. (1.) The Tetuan police have a post of five men permanently established at the fondak on the Tangier road, at a distance of 30 kilom. from Tetuan. (2.) At Laraiche the police are employed to secure the observance of consular regulations regarding scavenging and street-lighting. (3.) Fifty men of the Tangier police were for some time posted at Dshar Jedid, 25 kilom. from the town. (4.) At Saffi the police force was marched out for a distance of more than 30 kilom. to protect a European. (5.) The Rabat police took part in the fighting in which the Fez column were engaged between Sallee and Knitra. (6.) The greater part of the Laraiche police have recently been sent to occupy Alcazar without the authorisation of the Makhzen. These last two cases Colonel Müller considers to be entirely contrary to the spirit of the Algeciras Act.

The Inspector-General draws attention to the fact that the term of five years, for which, under article 4 of the Act of Algeciras, he himself and the inspector were appointed, will expire on the 31st December next, and that no decision has been taken as to whether they will be kept on or not, whereas it is necessary that this should be known in time, as various administrative measures have to be adopted.

Colonel Müller further points out that experience has shown that various modifications must be introduced into the regulations. In conclusion, he observes that he is not in a position to exercise any control or make any report on the finances, as he has not been able to obtain full information from the Budget Commission. He, therefore, disclaims all responsibility in that respect.

I have, &c.
HERBERT E. WHITE.

[25741] No. 9.

Mr. White to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 3.)

(No. 176.)

Sir, *Tangier, June* 24, 1911.

MR. HARRIS informs me that he wrote a letter to the Spanish Minister a day or two ago to express the thanks of the Union des Mines for the facilities which had been afforded by the authorities at Ceuta to the engineer they had sent to their antimony mine near that town, but in Moorish territory. M. de Villasinda, in reply, expressed the desire to speak to Mr. Harris on the subject, and sent one of the secretaries of the legation, M. Figuerola, to see him.

M. Figuerola enquired of Mr. Harris whether the Union des Mines would not be disposed to sell the mine in question to a Spanish company. Mr. Harris said he would submit the matter to the directors in Paris, and suggested that the Spanish company should make an offer.

M. Figuerola then enquired why the Union was closing its office in Tangier, and Mr. Harris informed him that they were going to devote all their attention for the present to the rich mineral deposits they had acquired on the Algerian frontier, and, on M. Figuerola saying that he understood that the Spanish shareholders in the Union were not to participate in the profits of mines on the Algerian frontier, Mr. Harris assured him that he was misinformed, and that all the shareholders in the Union, of whatever nationality, would participate in the profits of these mines in due proportion.

M. Figuerola then enquired how many protégés the Union des Mines had in the Riff. Mr. Harris replied that they had none whatever. M. Figuerola expressed his surprise at this, saying that they had understood that the Union extended protection to whole villages in that district.

On leaving, M. Figuerola expressed his great satisfaction at what Mr. Harris had told him, as the Spanish Government had evidently been misinformed on these points. He thought, in the circumstances, M. Villasinda would desire to communicate with Madrid before speaking to him on the subject.

Mr. Harris told me that he thought the Union des Mines would be quite willing to sell to Spanish companies all the mines they had "denounced" near Tetuan, as they were really of no great value, and they did not propose in any case to work them.

I have, &c.
HERBERT E. WHITE.

[25743] No. 10.

Mr. White to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 3.)

(No. 178.)

Sir, *Tangier, June* 24, 1911.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith copy of a despatch I have received from His Majesty's consul at Casa Blanca, communicating extracts from letters from the vice-consul at Marrakesh giving the latest news as regards the situation at that place.

I have, &c.
HERBERT E. WHITE.

Enclosure 1 in No. 10.

Consul Madden to Mr. White.

(No. 110.)

Sir, *Casa Blanca, June* 30, 1911.

I HAVE the honour to enclose herewith, for your information, copy of extracts from a letter I have this day received from Mr. Vice-Consul Lennox relative to affairs in Marrakesh.

I have, &c.
A. M. MADDEN.

Enclosure 2 in No. 10.

Vice-Consul Lennox to Consul Madden.

(Extracts.) *Marrakesh, June* 17, 1911.

SID-EL-MADANI'S khalifa, Omar-ben-Addi, returned last night from Fez with a letter from the French consul at Fez and Sid-el-Madani, containing instructions to Hadj Thami to make out a list of all his relatives who would receive French protection. Hadj Thami went to M. Maigret, French vice-consul, who confirmed the instructions, and told him that they were not to be afraid of making too long a list. Hadj Thami sends me this message. He is now very happy, and his scribes are very busy making a list of all the slaves, relatives, and all the glawi.

During the last few days the basha has been trying to get protection for all his friends; he has been sending to me and to others.

His brother Hassi has sold all his grain to Brandt and Toel (German firm), hoping this way to get protection.

Protection and rifles have been in great demand these days, but seeing the French are giving protection wholesale it will no longer be asked for from other Powers.

The tribes around no longer pay any heed to the soldiers of Hadj Thami, who may be sent out about any cases. Yesterday there was a madman went through the streets proclaiming Mulai Mohammed, but he was put in prison.

Hadj Thami acknowledges that his power has ceased, and that the tribes will no longer acknowledge his authority.

It is to be hoped that the new governors and kaids will soon arrive. It is only the grain that is keeping the tribes quiet; they are anxious to secure as much as they can.

Marrakesh, June 18, 1911.

. . . . I do not think there will be any danger for the Europeans, especially if the French are taking all the glawi under their protection. . . . .

. . . . The M'Tougi are becoming very insolent in the streets, cursing Europeans. It is said that Ayadi is to remain kaid, which is probable, as he was the great favourite and defender of Hafid, and seems to be on good terms with some of the French. Kaid Hummo of Tilwat is, I hear, a semsar of the Union des Mines. The whole world has gone over to the French, even the chief judge, Hadj Mustafa.

[25744] No. 11.

Mr. White to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received July* 3.)

(No. 179.)

Sir, *Tangier, June* 24, 1911.

I HAD occasion yesterday to call upon the Spanish Minister, and he opened the subject of Franco-Spanish relations in this country, complaining bitterly of the tone of French papers, especially the "Temps" and the local paper, the "Dépêche marocaine." He said he had hitherto restrained the Spanish paper, the "Porvenir," but he would not be able to do so longer if the "Dépêche marocaine" did not alter its tone. He had spoken to M. de Billy on the subject, but without any result.

I observed that newspaper polemics were always to be deprecated, but after all it was the attitude of the French Government and their representative which was important, and I was happy to think that the relations between the French and Spanish Governments and between the two legations were always good. The "Temps" was now an Opposition paper, and the French Government could not be held responsible for its utterances; it was also quite possible that M. de Billy could not exercise all the control he would wish over the local paper.

M. de Villasinda, whilst complaining that he found M. de Billy very difficult to deal with, admitted that the attitude of the French Government had been perfectly correct, but, on the other hand, there was no getting over their actions—they were pushing forward in this country and refused satisfaction in regard to the Spanish demands.

I observed that the French Government had been ready to meet Spain half way, and that in negotiations of this nature there must be give-and-take on both sides. The negotiations were, as I understood, suspended owing to the absence of Sir M. de Bunsen, but I trusted that eventually a satisfactory settlement would be arrived at. In M. de Geoffray they had a man of most conciliatory disposition, and Sir M. de Bunsen's one object was to smooth over difficulties and to bring about a good understanding. On the other hand, it appeared to me that some of the Spanish demands could hardly be accepted by the French Government, and Spain would, I hoped, give way on them, as a friendly settlement was most desirable.

M. de Villasinda said he could not remember the details of the negotiations, and added that Spain had lost all her colonies and had no desire for new ones; she had no desire to obtain any portion of Morocco herself, but, at the same time, she could not sit quiet and see France gradually establish herself in this country. She was actually in occupation of a large part of the country. In moving troops to Alcazar the Spanish Government had no thought of occupation—it was merely a temporary measure to meet special circumstances—but she feared that, were she to withdraw her troops, her place would at once be taken by France. Captain Moreau was already in that neighbourhood. What was he doing in the Spanish sphere?

I replied that the French Government had given very positive assurance, upon which His Majesty's Government confidently relied. The French Government would undoubtedly withdraw her troops in due time, and I was sure, were Spain to withdraw hers, there would be no fear of their place being taken by French troops. As for Captain Moreau, it must be borne in mind that he has always been stationed in this district, being the instructor of the troops at Tangier.

M. de Villasinda went on to say that he was somewhat perturbed at the report that Raisuli was to be replaced by Kaïd Bu Auda, an officer entirely in the hands of the French, and, he believed, under French protection. The Spaniards had no great love for Raisuli, who had extorted heavy contributions from their protégés, but, at any rate, he was a strong man and maintained order in the district, which was what they required. He much feared that if Kaïd Bu Auda were appointed there would be trouble. Captain Moreau and the French vice-consul at Alcazar had already been trying to create disturbances, and the dismissal of Raisuli would facilitate their schemes.

I replied that there had been a report, some time since, that Raisuli was to be

replaced by Bu Auda, but nothing more had been heard on the subject, and I did not believe any such intention now existed. As for Raisuli, this legation had no cause to have any great affection for him, but, at the same time, it must be admitted that he had maintained order and done well. He had, it is true, been accused of extorting heavy contributions from the people, but there was undoubtedly much truth in his excuse that he was acting under instructions from Fez, and had remitted large sums to the Sultan. He was a rich man when he was appointed governor, and I did not believe he had since then enriched himself to anything like the extent that was imagined. At the present moment, from all I heard it was undoubtedly his intention to maintain tranquillity in the district, and I trusted that there was no danger of disturbances, as the Moorish Government did not desire that any should occur, and I was convinced that the reports which had reached him in regard to Captain Moreau and M. Boisset were entirely unfounded. It was impossible to imagine that the French should wish to create disturbances in the vicinity of Alcazar; it would be the last thing they would desire, for they would have nothing to gain and everything to lose were disturbances to arise.

In answer to an expression of my regret as to the state of health of M. Villalta, the Spanish Minister replied that it was not true that his brain was affected. He had merely had a recurrence of trouble in his digestive organs, and had gone to Cadiz for treatment. I was surprised at this statement, as all reports agree that M. Villalta had an attack of insanity. The first report was received at the French Legation from their vice-consul at Alcazar. On the following day the French vice-consul at Laraiche reported the arrival there of M. Villalta suffering from insanity, and I subsequently received a despatch from our vice-consul at Laraiche, reporting his removal to Cadiz on account of his brain being affected. The general belief amongst his friends at Tangier was that he was insane, and I am informed that telegrams to that effect were received from Cadiz by members of his family here.

I have, &c.

HERBERT E. WHITE.

[25746] No. 12.

Mr. White to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received July* 3.)

(No. 181.)

Sir, *Tangier, June* 25, 1911.

IN answer to my enquiries, the British consular agent reports that it is true that on their arrival some of the Spanish troops were encamped in a Moorish cemetery, as stated by Sid Guebbas in his letter, copy of which was enclosed in my despatch No. 165 of the 17th instant, but that when Colonel Silvestre took over the command he had them moved to some land belonging to Mr. Carleton adjoining the cemetery.

He also confirms Sid Guebbas' other statements as to the threats of Captain Ovilo to make prisoners of the Moorish soldiers if they continued to patrol the town, but adds that these soldiers were not ill-treated. Sid Guebbas himself has informed me that by ill-treatment he merely meant verbal ill-treatment and not any personal violence.

Mr. Carleton also tells me that Captain Ovilo insisted on the town gate being left open at night, and that the deputy governor complied, placing a picket as guard at the gate.

With regard to the assassination of Ben Malek and his two sons, Mr. Carleton reports as follows: Upon hearing of the pretender's arrival at Mesmouda, Hamed-ben-Malek moved his family to Zugara, a village of the Beni Malek tribe. Hearing a few days later that the pretender had taken possession of his house, he sent his son El Alami with two horses and 100 dollars as a present to him. The pretender received El Alami politely, but refused the presents. He gave El Alami a sacred book for his father, and said he desired to see him, as he might be useful to him. Ben Malek consequently went with his two sons to the pretender, who received him well. They had a long conference, which ended in the arrest of the Ben Maleks. The following day, hearing of the approach of Captain Moreau's mehalla, the pretender sent the Ben Maleks under guard to a sanctuary in the Mesmouda, so that they should not escape. On the following day the pretender's forces were completely defeated, and the pretender himself fled to the Ben Mesara tribe. The people of the Mesmouda tribe thereupon dragged the Ben Maleks out of the sanctuary and killed them.

Mr. Carleton states that he knew the two sons of Ben Malek, and that the elder

was a married man of about 25 years of age, whilst the younger one was about 20. He adds that Ben Malek was a cruel man and was hated by his tribe, and that he had heard that the tribe had paid the pretender a sum of money to procure his arrest.

I have, &c.
HERBERT E. WHITE.

[25747] No. 13.

Mr. White to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 3.)

(No. 182.)
Sir, *Tangier, June 25, 1911.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith copy of a despatch I have received from the British consular agent at Alcazar, giving the numbers and composition of the Spanish force at that place.

I have, &c.
HERBERT E. WHITE.

Enclosure in No. 13.

Mr. Carleton to Mr. White.

Sir, *Alcazar, June 24, 1911.*

I HAVE the honour to inform you that yesterday at 5 P.M. a cavalry squadron arrived here composed of 150 horses, one battery section, and a wireless telegraphy section. At present there are here about 800 Spanish troops, 150 cavalry, and two battery sections.

There is much excitement amongst the natives, and they are beginning to suspect that Spain has intentions of conquest.

I have, &c.
E. P. CARLETON.

[25883] No. 14.

M. Cambon to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 3.)

(Confidentielle.) *Ambassade de France, Londres,*
Cher Sir Edward, *le 1er juillet, 1911.*

M. DE SELVES a reçu aujourd'hui la visite de l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne à Paris, qui lui a remis le mémorandum suivant :—

"Des maisons allemandes établies au sud du Maroc, notamment à Agadir, se sont alarmées de la fermentation parmi les tribus de ces régions. Elles se sont adressées au Gouvernement Impérial pour réclamer protection de leur vie et de leurs biens. Sur leur demande le Gouvernement Impérial a décidé d'envoyer au port d'Agadir un bâtiment de guerre pour prêter, en cas de besoin, aide et secours à ses sujets et protégér les importants intérêts allemands engagés dans ces contrées. Dès que l'état de choses au Maroc sera rentré dans son calme antérieur, le bateau chargé de cette mission protectrice aura à quitter le port d'Agadir."

En remettant ce document, M. de Schoen a dit que la situation du Maroc rendait nécessaire à bref délai une conversation entre les deux Gouvernements ; qu'il n'y avait pas lieu d'examiner si l'envoi d'un bâtiment de guerre à Agadir était conforme à l'Acte d'Algésiras, cet Acte ayant reçu trop d'atteintes pour être allégué avec autorité ; que l'opinion allemande était très nerveuse au sujet du Maroc et que l'envoi d'un navire de guerre avait en grande partie pour but de la calmer ; que cette mesure de précaution ne devait pas influer sur les relations des deux Gouvernements et qu'il importait de ne pas laisser la presse en dénaturer le caractère.

M. de Selves a exprimé à M. de Schoen ses vifs regrets de la décision du Gouvernement allemand. Il s'est déclaré convaincu de l'utilité d'une conversation sur les affaires marocaines, mais l'envoi d'un bâtiment allemand modifiera la situation, et l'opinion publique en France sera difficile à persuader de la réalité du motif allégué par le Gouvernement allemand.

En me priant de vous faire connaître l'acte de ce Gouvernement, M. de Selves me charge de vous demander comment vous l'envisagez et quel moyen vous paraît possible d'adopter pour en restreindre la portée. Il ajoute que nous pouvons être amenés à envoyer de notre côté un navire à Mogador, et il demande si vous seriez disposés à envoyer vous-même un bateau dans les eaux marocaines de l'Océan Atlantique.

Je reçois toutes ces indications trop tard pour vous en saisir autrement que par cette lettre, et je vous serais obligé de me faire connaître vos vues par l'intermédiaire du Foreign Office.

Votre sincèrement dévoué,
PAUL CAMBON.

[25790] No. 15.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 3.)

(No. 307.)
Sir, *Paris, July 2, 1911.*

I HAVE the honour to inform you that the news which was only generally known this morning in Paris, that the German Government had decided to send a war-ship to Agadir, has created a great sensation in Paris.

All the papers devote a large space to commenting on this event, which was quite unforeseen by French public opinion. The "Matin" protests against it as contrary to German engagements towards France. It observes that of late certain German papers have been declaring that France owed to Germany some compensation for not having made opposition to the French expedition to Fez. At the beginning of last month M. Jules Cambon and M. de Kiderlen-Waechter had two interviews at Kissingen, at which the desire was expressed that the relations between their respective countries should be as satisfactory as possible, and with that end in view, that a conversation should take place between the two Governments. The despatch of a war-ship to Agadir would appear to be in the nature of a notice to France that Germany has something to offer in a negotiation.

M. Calmette, editor of the "Figaro," declares that when the three principal departments of a country (viz., for foreign affairs, war, and marine) are disposed of at the caprice of one man, or at the dictation of coteries, a country is at the mercy of any provocation and of any surprise.

M. Jaurès, writing in the "Humanité," says that what he has never ceased to foretell has unfortunately come to pass. Germany, after Spain, has followed the example set by France of intervening in Morocco on the classical excuse of protecting her subjects. She has entered by the door criminally opened by the French colonial party. A protest against German action as being contrary to the Act of Algeciras is absurd on the part of France, for if this Act be violated by an intervention to protect German subjects, it follows that France has also violated it herself, and her protest cannot be effective.

The "Eclair" observes that France instinctively understands from the departure of the gunboat "Panther" for Agadir that Germany, while her attitude continues for the present to be correct, has *arrière-pensées* which are less innocent. She has fixed her choice on territory which would establish her on the Atlantic within reach of French stations. She would in this way have the means of counteracting French influence and of raising up numberless difficulties for France. A frontier with Germany on one continent is enough ; France does not want an African frontier with her also.

The "Action" remarks that between Germany and France no *casus belli* should be allowed to arise in regard to the affairs of Morocco. These affairs are essentialy international ; it is the duty of all Europe to settle a difference of this sort, if a difference arises.

The "Petite république" declares that the act of the German Government recalls proceedings of Prince Bülow, when he affirmed in 1904 that the Anglo-French agreement did not injure any German interests in Morocco, and when he all the same induced the Emperor William II to make the famous journey to Tangier in March 1905, which was to be the prelude of the most serious crisis which France and the peace of Europe have experienced since the scare of 1875 and the Schnoebelé incident.

The correspondent of the "Matin" at Berlin telegraphs to his paper that he has learnt in quarters with which the Mannesmann Brothers have relations, that one of the firm was captured two years ago by the Moors in the "hinterland" of Agadir, in the

Souss district, and that during his captivity there, which lasted three months, he discovered that it was extremely rich in copper. He subsequently made large purchases of land there.

The general impression derived from the press this morning is that the action with regard to Agadir on the part of Germany has occasioned mingled feelings of astonishment and indignation in France, comparable with what was felt at the time of the visit of the German Emperor to Tangier in 1905.

The fact that the German action should have taken place at a time when a new Minister for Foreign Affairs, without previous experience of the conduct of foreign affairs, has just taken over that department increases the unpleasant impression in Paris.

M. de Selves, according to present arrangements, is to leave Paris to-morrow for Holland in attendance on the President of the Republic.

I have, &c.
(for the Ambassador),
L. D. CARNEGIE.

[27150] No. 16.

M. Nératof to Count Benckendorff.—(Communicated to Foreign Office, July 3.)

(Traduction.)
(Confidentiel.)
(Télégraphique.) *Saint-Pétersbourg, le 2 juillet*, 1911.

D'ORDRE de son Gouvernement, l'Ambassadeur de France m'a entretenu de la situation créée par la décision du Gouvernement allemand d'envoyer un navire de guerre à Agadir pour la protection de ses sujets et des intérêts allemands.

Le Gouvernement de la république se rend compte de la gravité de la mesure adoptée et hésite sur les décisions à prendre. J'ai cru devoir signaler quelques côtés de la situation méritant une attention particulière. Du moment que l'Allemagne a informé toutes les Puissances de sa décision, il ne peut pas espérer qu'elle y renonce. Il y a lieu de considérer sa décision comme un fait accompli. Le côté militaire de la question ne paraît avoir qu'une importance secondaire—sa portée est diplomatique : assurer les intérêts politiques de l'Allemagne en présence de l'infraction déjà accomplie aux formalités de l'Acte d'Algésiras. Le désir de l'Allemagne est probablement d'entamer de nouvelles négociations avec la France au sujet de la question marocaine en s'appuyant sur un fait accompli. Il résulte de mes explications avec M. Louis que la France se déciderait peut-être à envoyer un bâtiment de guerre à Mogador à proximité d'Agadir afin de répondre à la mesure militaire de l'Allemagne par une mesure militaire, en justifiant celle-ci par la nécessité de renforcer la police à Mogador en conformité de l'Acte d'Algésiras.

Pour le côté diplomatique de la question, M. Louis s'est exprimé dans le sens d'un caractère international à donner aux négociations (et je me suis rangé à cette opinion), et non dans le sens de négociations franco-allemandes, qui, selon moi, seraient moins propice à une solution pacifique.

Il faut donc s'attendre à ce que le Cabinet de Paris prenne comme base de sa réponse à l'Allemagne les Actes internationaux et qu'il fasse part de cette réponse par communications ultérieures à toutes les autres Puissances engagées par les Actes en question. M. Louis n'est pas favorable à l'éventualité d'une conférence.

Le Gouvernement britannique étant touché par la présente question de plus près que nous, il est désirable de conformer avec soin les points de vue anglais et russes.

Veuillez vous informer de la manière de voir du Cabinet de Londres et nous télégraphier d'urgence.

[25945] No. 17.

Mr. T. Russell to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 3.)

(No. 64.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Vienna, July 3*, 1911.

THE French Ambassador, who saw Count d'Aehrenthal this afternoon, was informed by the latter that the German Ambassador's announcement to him on Saturday last regarding the dispatch to Morocco of a German ship, was the first

he had heard of the matter. He had received no previous warning from the German Government, and M. de Tschirschky's announcement had coincided with that made in the press. Count d'Aehrenthal had, he said, merely taken act of the statement made to him, and had not committed himself to any expression of opinion, thus adopting the same attitude that he had taken up on the occasion of the previous similar announcements made by the French and Spanish Governments.

It is hoped here that any interference in the Albanian question by Germany will be prevented by the recent action of the latter in sending a ship to Morocco; Germany's action is, I think, for this reason not unwelcome to the Austrian Government.

[26033] No. 18.

Sir Edward Grey to Count de Salis.

(No. 127.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, July 3*, 1911.

MOROCCO.

I informed the German Ambassador this afternoon that after seeing the Prime Minister we considered the situation created by the dispatch of the "Panther" to Agadir as so important that it must come before a meeting of the Cabinet. I would say nothing more pending the Cabinet meeting, but I wished the German Government to learn at once that in our view the situation was serious and important. It was also very delicate, and I thought personally that public opinion here and elsewhere must not be inflamed if it was desired to create an atmosphere favourable to a satisfactory and peaceful discussion of the situation. Public opinion in England had been excited by the very abrupt action of Germany.

The German Ambassador repeated what he had said to Sir A. Nicolson, and stated the reasons for the German action. I observed that I thought that British commercial interests in Morocco were considerably larger than the German interests, and that, therefore, the German reasons would apply at least as strongly to us. His Majesty's Government could not remain mere passive spectators of a new Franco-German-Spanish settlement to take the place of the Act of Algeciras, but must take part in any such discussion. The Ambassador urged that a favourable development would greatly depend upon whether or not we made France feel that we would support her against Germany. I replied that purely British interests were preoccupying me at the moment rather than our obligations to France. The situation might develop so as to affect British interests directly.

[26236] No. 19.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 260.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, July 3*, 1911.

I TOLD M. Cambon to-day that we regarded the situation created by the German move to Agadir as very serious. I had seen the Prime Minister, and a Cabinet was to be held to-morrow morning. Till that was over I could not say anything which would commit the Government.

M. Cambon told me that Herr Zimmermann, the Acting Minister at the German Foreign Office, had told the Spanish Ambassador in Berlin that the German Government had sent a ship to Agadir not only to protect their own subjects, but because German opinion demanded that the Government should show that they were not disinterested in Morocco. When the Spanish Ambassador asked how long the ship would stay, Herr Zimmermann had said that it must stay until things had returned to their previous normal state : a solution which he did not think possible, or until a settlement had been come to by conversation "à trois" between France, Spain, and Germany. In saying this, he had added that the conversation must be "à trois seulement."

I told M. Cambon that, though pending the Cabinet I could not say anything, except to express my own personal opinion, I thought it was necessary that we should make it quite clear that we were interested in a settlement of the Moroccan question. We had both commercial and strategic interests to consider. As long as only France and Spain, who were charged with special functions in Morocco, were dealing with the situation there, there was no need for us to take any step. But now that Germany

had taken special steps on her own account, it would be natural that we should take special steps to protect our own interests.

I was therefore considering whether, having regard to the suggestion in his communication of sending a ship to Mogador, we should not send a ship to Agadir. Agadir was not an open port, though the question of its being opened had been discussed, and we should require a report on the situation. If we did take separate steps to protect our interests, as we had recognised by the agreement of 1904 that it belonged specially to France to take measures of pacification in Morocco, I should recall this in any announcement I made, and say that any measures which we would take on our own behalf would be taken in consultation with the French Government.

M. Cambon expressed strongly his personal view that we should send a ship to Agadir. He said that the French Government also might send a ship.

I observed that it was a question, if France sent a ship, whether it should not go to some other place than Agadir so as to avoid the umbrage which might be given by putting a French ship and a British ship one on each side of a German ship at a particular spot.

M. Cambon readily agreed that there was force in this consideration.

I informed him that I was going to see the German Ambassador this afternoon, but only for the purpose of telling him that we regarded the question as serious, and were going to have a Cabinet to discuss it to-morrow. I thought it desirable that the German Government should know as soon as possible that their action made it necessary for us to consider British interests.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[25955] No. 20.

Mr. White to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 4.)

(No. 183.)
Sir, *Tangier, June 27, 1911.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith copy of a despatch which I have received from His Majesty's consul at Casa Blanca, containing a letter from the vice-consul at Marrakesh, in which he reports that there is no danger to Europeans in that town.

I have, &c.
HERBERT E. WHITE.

Enclosure in No. 20.

Consul Madden to Mr. White.

(No. 116.)
Sir, *Casa Blanca, June 24, 1911.*

THE vice-consul at Marrakesh writes to me as appended below with regard to the safety of Europeans there:—

"*Marrakesh, June 21, 1911.*

"I do not think that Europeans here will be in any danger, even if there are disturbances in the country districts.

"Things are very much changed now that the French have occupied Fez, Mequinez, and other towns; and, besides, the wholesale protection offered by them to all the Glawi and their friends has knocked all the spirit of "Jehad" (Holy War) out of the people. And there is no one to encourage such a spirit as there was in 1907, when Mulai Hafid and his friends were at the root of all.

"There is no need to be worried about British subjects. I shall certainly be on the watch, but I am sure there will be no danger.—ALAN LENNOX."

I have, &c.
A. M. MADDEN.

[25956] No. 21.

Mr. White to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 4.)

(No. 184.)
Sir, *Tangier, June 27, 1911.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith copy of a despatch I have received from the consular agent at Alcazar, reporting that some excitement had been caused by the Spanish cavalry marching through the town with drawn swords, and riding out some distance into the country in the direction of the hill tribes.

I took an opportunity of mentioning the matter to the Spanish Minister, referring to our recent conversation reported in my despatch No. 179 of the 24th instant, in which he expressed the anxiety of his Government lest any disturbance should be created near Alcazar. M. de Villasinda stated that he had been informed that the cavalry march had produced a very good effect. I said that that was not the opinion of Mr. Carleton, who had resided a long time at Alcazar and was in touch with the people; it appeared to me quite likely that an attack might be made on a small body of cavalry riding out to the neighbourhood of the hills.

M. de Villasinda promised to communicate with Colonel Silvestre on the subject, and I trust that more care will be exercised in future, as, should disturbances once occur, it may be found difficult to prevent them spreading.

I have, &c.
HERBERT E. WHITE.

Enclosure in No. 21.

Mr. Carleton to Mr. White.

Sir, *Alcazar, June 25, 1911.*

I HAVE the honour to report that yesterday at 4 P.M. the Spanish cavalry squadron of 150 horses made a long ride. They passed through the town with drawn swords and caused great excitement, especially amongst the women. They returned to camp at 9 P.M.; Mr. Engerer was their guide. I fear that, sooner or later, these military rides will be the cause of trouble. I am informed that the Spanish squadron rode towards the vicinity of el Serif tribe.

I am, &c.
E. P. CARLETON.

[25959] No. 22.

Mr. Rennie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 4.)

(No. 113.)
Sir, *Madrid, June 30, 1911.*

THE French chargé d'affaires has been good enough to give me an account of a long conversation he had with Señor Canalejas, whom he met yesterday at the palace.

Señor Canalejas commenced by saying that he did not understand why the French Government had suspended the Madrid conversations. To this M. Martin replied frankly that the occupation of Alcazar on the part of Spain while the conversations were actually going on made their continuance impossible until the situation became clearer, and until the Spanish Government had given some indication as to the scope and meaning of their move in that direction. He pointed out that the French Cabinet, in the counter-proposals they had made, had done their best to meet the wishes of the Spanish Government, and had made several very real concessions.

Señor Canalejas at this point of the conversation appeared to be extremely vague as to the nature of those counter-proposals, which he said he had not seen, and on M. Martin's explaining them admitted that they did in fact offer very material satisfaction on some points to the Spanish demands. He went on, however, to confess that what the Spanish Government had been anxious to get was something more showy. He could not deny that it was with this object that the move on Alcazar had been made, though it had also to a great extent been inspired by the jealousy existing in army circles of the French expedition to Fez.

Quite enough had now been done, and he was determined to resist any demands that might be made for another forward move. There were rumours current that the Gebel Dersa, a position 2 miles from Tetuan which completely dominates the city, was to be occupied. These rumours were unfounded, and he intended not to move one step farther, as he had already declared in the Cortes last week. As regards Colonel Silvestre's movements at Alcazar, Señor Canalejas said that he thought they were undesirable, and that he had ordered the chiefs of all military units in Morocco, and especially Colonel Silvestre, not to extend their sphere of action.

As regards observations from the Powers against the Spanish action, he maintained that none had been received. All that had been received was the protest of the Sultan, which he did not regard as of much importance, as that Sovereign now appeared to be "mediatised." He appeared to consider that the remarks made to the Spanish Ambassadors in London and Paris were not to be included under the heading of "observations," nor were the talks which had taken place between M. Geoffray and Señor Garcia Prieto here.

I met Señor Canalejas to-day and had a brief conversation with his Excellency. As regards the occupation of Alcazar, he spoke in a similar strain to that of his statements to the French chargé d'affaires. The Spanish action was not to be extended in either the Alcazar or Ceuta districts, and all talk of a move on Wazzan or on Arzila was without foundation.

I have, &c.
ERNEST A. RENNIE.

[26081] No. 23.

Count de Salis to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 4.)

(No. 45. Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Berlin, July 4, 1911.*

I AM told by the Spanish Ambassador in confidence that he had a conversation yesterday with the Chancellor on the situation in Morocco, and that the latter had affected to make light of the step taken by the despatch of a ship to Agadir. Herr von Bethmann Hollweg thought that the settlement of the matter would be easy either by returning to the *status quo* or, as appeared to his Excellency far more probable, by arrangement between the three Powers interested. The Ambassador inquired whether the Chancellor anticipated any difficulties on the part of England. His Excellency insisted that he did not, as that country was not directly interested. Anglo-German relations were now, moreover, excellent, and he had every reason to believe that England was animated by most friendly feelings towards Germany.

The prospect of Moroccan affairs now being discussed in conversations in which France would necessarily be in a minority afforded lively satisfaction to the Spanish Ambassador.

The above is confidential.

[26093] No. 24.

Count de Salis to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 4.)

(No. 46.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Berlin, July 4, 1911.*

IT is announced in the unofficial part of this evening's edition of the "Nord-Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung" that the "Berlin," which apparently has a displacement of more than 3,000 tons, will shortly replace the "Panther" at Agadir, as the latter ship is in urgent need of docking for repairs.

[26096] No. 25.

Sir F. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 4.)

(Unnumbered.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Trieste, July 4, 1911.*

COUNT D'AEHRENTHAL, in replying yesterday to the French Ambassador's enquiry as to his views on German action in Morocco, assured him that he had

first heard of it last Saturday from the German Ambassador, and had had no previous knowledge of it, but that he was not surprised, as he had been expecting a *coup de main* from Germany in that direction for some time. The Minister for Foreign Affairs said that, in taking act of German statement that it was only a temporary occupation of a Moroccan port, he did not comment on it to German Ambassador.

[26235] No. 26.

Sir Edward Grey to Count de Salis.

(No. 147.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, July 4, 1911.*

I INFORMED Count Metternich to-day, on behalf of His Majesty's Government, that I must tell him that our attitude could not be a disinterested one with regard to Morocco. We must take into consideration our treaty obligations to France and our own interests in Morocco. We were of opinion that a new situation had been created by the dispatch of a German ship to Agadir. Future developments might affect British interests more directly than they had hitherto been affected, and, therefore, we could not recognise any new arrangement which was come to without us.

Count Metternich asked me whether he might take down the exact words. I therefore dictated them to him, observing, however, that he must take this as a conversation and not as a written communication.

He remarked that the new situation had been created by French and Spanish action.

I said I understood the view of the German Government to be that the French and Spanish action had made it necessary for them to calm German public opinion by showing that Germany was not disinterested in the question of Morocco. They had taken the overt step of sending a ship to Agadir. We had not taken any overt step, though our commercial interests in Morocco were greater than those of Germany. It was therefore the more incumbent upon us to make it clear that we, no more than Germany, could let things develop without taking an interest in them.

Count Metternich then said that the attitude of our press towards the sending of a German ship to Agadir was not likely to foster that favourable atmosphere for discussion for which I had expressed a wish in conversation yesterday. The German press, on the other hand, had been very calm.

I said that I had stated yesterday that the action of Germany in sending a ship to a closed port, where it was not known that commercial interests existed, was sure to excite the press here and elsewhere. If we, instead of the German Government, had sent a ship to Agadir while the German Government did nothing, the German press would have been equally excited.

In commenting upon the communication which I had made, Count Metternich said that he was sure the German Government would understand that it was natural for us to take an interest in the question.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[26228] No. 27.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 261.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, July 4, 1911.*

I TOLD M. Cambon to-day that we had decided not to send a ship to Agadir at present, because if we sent one at all it must be with instructions to remain as long as the Germans remained; we could not send a ship, and then remove it before the German ship went.

M. Cambon enquired whether, if the Germans landed a force, or sent a stronger naval force to Agadir, we would send a ship.

I replied that, if new circumstances arose, we should reconsider the question of sending a ship.

I then informed him that I was authorised by the Government to say that our attitude would be to fulfil our treaty obligations to France in the diplomatic discussions which were now inevitable, and which, in our opinion, must be discussions *à quatre*, between France, Germany, Spain, and ourselves, and not *à trois* without us.

Before entering upon such discussions, it was essential to settle the solution which we wished to attain in the discussions. We ought, therefore, to know what France would consider a reasonable and practical solution from the point of view of French interests; for instance, the restoration of the previous *status quo* by the withdrawal of Germany from Agadir, and of Spain from Alcazar and Laraiche, as well as of France from Fez and the posts in the interior.

M. Cambon here observed that the French force had already been withdrawn from Fez. The French instructors were left there, but they had been there from a period anterior to the Algeciras Act. Their continued presence in Fez was not, therefore, a disturbance of the *status quo ante*.

To this I of course agreed.

M. Cambon explained that the only posts established had been for the purpose of victualling the French column, and these would naturally be withdrawn.

I then suggested that a new arrangement might be preferred by France, consolidating her position in Morocco, and giving Germany compensation either in Morocco or elsewhere to secure her recognition of the new arrangement. In such an event, we should have to consider what conditions we should require on the part of Germany to secure British interests.

I also informed M. Cambon of what it had been decided to say to the German Ambassador as to our attitude towards Morocco, and told him that I intended to carry out this decision this afternoon.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[26114] No. 28.

Mr. White to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 5.)

(No. 187.)

Tangier, June 29, 1911.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith copies of two despatches received from His Majesty's consul at Fez in regard to the arrest and imprisonment of a British courier, and the seizure and opening of the letters addressed to His Majesty's consul.

With the concurrence of the French consul and of Sid Taib Mokri, Mr. MacLeod, during the siege of Fez, corresponded with this legation through Hadj Mohammed Mikwar, Mulai Zin's vizier at Mequinez, as that was the best way of getting letters through the rebel lines. The courier arrested was bringing in Mr. MacLeod's letters from Mequinez, and the allegation made by the Makhzen as an excuse for arresting him, viz., that he was also carrying letters of a seditious character for a Moor in Fez, appears to be false, the letter in question having probably been seized on some other courier. Even, however, had it been true, it could afford no excuse for the Makhzen imprisoning the man without even giving notice to His Majesty's consul, and still less for their seizing and opening letters addressed to Mr. MacLeod.

Even after Mr. MacLeod heard of the matter and made strong representations on the subject to Sid Taib Mokri the action of the Makhzen was most unsatisfactory, and would appear to have been intentionally discourteous to His Majesty's consul. It appears to me, therefore, that the case is one which calls for strong measures, and that at any rate a formal apology should be insisted on, as well as an undertaking that couriers carrying letters for His Majesty's Legation and for British consular officials will not in future be in any way molested. It appears to me also that in the absence of proof that the courier was knowingly carrying seditious correspondence due compensation should be demanded for the ill-treatment he suffered.

I do not propose, however, to take any action in the matter until I am in receipt of your instructions on the subject.

I have, &c.
HERBERT E. WHITE.

Enclosure 1 in No. 28.

Consul MacLeod to Mr. Lister.

(No. 41.)

Fez, June 7, 1911.

Sir,

WITH reference to my despatches No. 35 of the 25th ultimo and No. 36 of the 1st instant, I beg to state that some friends of the British courier, Hamoo Heida, came

to me subsequently, and stated that they had heard he had been flogged at the Palace so severely that he had died. Their statement, however, rested merely on an alleged statement of a native doctor who visits the Palace, but whom the courier's friends have failed to bring to me, or even to give me his name.

I mentioned the report, however, to Sid Taib Mokri, and said that, to prevent the circulation of exaggerated stories, I would be glad to have the courier produced. To this Sid Taib Mokri agreed, and I went to the Palace on the 30th ultimo for that purpose. One of Sid Taib Mokri's secretaries, El Arbi Hrishi, was deputed to talk with me on the matter. I was told that as the Sultan had not come out that day nothing could be done about producing the courier. I was asked, however, to take over certain letters for me which the courier had brought, and which had been opened when he was arrested. These were shown to me, and consisted of—

Letter of the 18th May from M. Enyart to me.
Letter of the 20th May from M. Enyart to me.
Letter of the 18th May from M. Enyart to Mr. Swanson.
Official letter of the 8th May from Vice-Consul Cross to me.
Private letter of the 8th May from Vice-Consul Cross to me.

All in English.

With these was exhibited a letter in Arabic alleged to be from a certain Fki Sendisi of Mequinez to a shereef here containing denunciations of the Sultan Mulai Hafid, and appealing to the Fez people to rebel, and suggesting how they should proceed to that end, which—the Makhzen alleged—had been found on this courier when he was searched. The opening and detention of all his letters and his imprisonment was (so the Makhzen contended) therefore quite justifiable.

I replied that I had no knowledge either of the sender or addressee of that letter, nor of its contents, that the courier had stated he had brought nothing but a cover for me, and that in any case it was manifestly unjust to hold a courier responsible for, and punish him for, the contents of letters he carried. It was absurd to suppose that the writers of seditious letters would be terrified by punishments that fell on others than themselves. Under the present circumstances the detention of a seditious letter was intelligible, for it was the letter which could do harm, but to punish the ignorant bearer of it was grossly unjust. Moreover, had this courier really brought such a letter, why (since he stated he was a British courier, and carried letters—one a large official-looking one too—written in English) was I not told of the arrest at the time? To this it was answered that, finding the seditious letter in Arabic upon him, the Makhzen concluded the man was merely lying in saying he was a British courier, and his letters had been merely put aside and the man sent to prison. However, here were my letters now, and would I, as a friend of the Makhzen, take them and say no more. The courier would be released by-and-by. I then read the letters in English, and pointed out that they were full of friendly matter to the Makhzen; that I had been at pains to tell both the Makhzen and the French consul, when sending off that very courier, that I was corresponding with Hadj Mohammed Mikwar, as the only channel then open through whom to communicate with your Excellency; that such messages to and from you were sent in cypher so as to be intelligible to nobody else, and that both the Makhzen and the French consul had approved of all this. I could not tell whether these were all the letters the courier had brought for me, as I had not seen the man himself, and so I could not take them over. They had been given to the courier by the senders, and it was for the courier to come to my house with them.

Later, Sid Taib Mokri sent me word that my letters were at my disposition, but that the Sultan could not release the courier, but would do so soon.

To-day I received your Excellency's despatch No. 16 of the 2nd instant, and, lest its contents might tempt the Sultan to indulge his temper indirectly, I went to the Palace at 4 o'clock and asked to see the courier, as his friends were in great anxiety about him, alleged he was dead, and so forth, and I did not desire to report anything but the facts of his condition. (I reflected, of course, that all this might afford the Makhzen a decent opportunity to release the man.) Sid El Arbi Hrishi sent in word of this to Sid Taib Mokri, who was inside with the Sultan. A reply came that the courier would be shown to me, but half-hour after half-hour passed and he was not forthcoming, but finally at half-past 6 o'clock (after several reminders) he was brought out, hobbling laboriously in heavy iron fetters.

I asked him whether he was all right and being fed? He replied cheerily in the affirmative, and so I said that was sufficient, thanked Sid El Hrishi, and left, thinking

it safest, for the man's sake, to ignore the incivility of presenting the prisoner to me in irons. Two hours later a messenger came from Sid Taib Mokri with many apologies for the keeping of me waiting for two and a-half hours, and to say that the presenting of the man in irons was merely an accident, a stupidity of the gaoler, for which Sid Taib had severely reprimanded him, and now here was the prisoner, free, and Sid Taib hoped there would be no more heard of the matter.

Thereafter I questioned the courier as to what had happened, and he again affirmed he had brought no letter save the cover from Hadj Mohammed Mikwar and M. Enyart; that on being arrested he was alone, and had declared he was a British courier and was taking a packet to me from Hadj Mohammed Mikwar, and was thereupon arrested by Dris Wuld Hadj Mennou, the new Governor of Marrakesh, who took his packet from him and sent him to prison, where he was put in irons. Some days later (*i.e.*, after I was trying to get him released) he had been removed to a small room in the Palace and his irons were removed. In the prison he had had the food I sent him, but at the Palace only one small loaf a day and water had been given him. He had not been thrashed, but had been left absolutely alone in that room, seeing only the gaoler, who came once a day with his bread and water (I reckon this solitary imprisonment lasted fourteen days), and that the irons were replaced on him this afternoon before he was shown to me. (The getting of the blacksmith and the rivetting of the fetters obviously accounts for the delay in producing him.) He had been suffering from dysentery for several days.

Before reporting conclusively on the matter, however, I await M. Enyart's answer to my enquiries as to whether this courier was given any letters except for me, and as to what letters were given to him.

I have, &c.
J. M. MACLEOD.

Enclosure 2 in No. 28.

Consul MacLeod to Mr. White.

(No. 52.)
Sir, *Fez, June* 23, 1911.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 41 of the 7th instant, I have had no reply from M. Enyart about the case of the courier, Hamoo Heida, so possibly my letter on that matter has not reached M. Enyart.

Hadj Mohammed Mikwar, however, tells me that he distinctly remembers dispatching that courier, and that only one cover was given to him, namely, that which contained the letters of Mr. Vice-Consul Cross and M. Enyart, and no other letter. A request written in Arabic and signed by Hadj Mohammed Mikwar was inscribed on the cover for it to be passed freely through the insurgents' camp. Hadj Mohammed states also that the courier was only at his house while at Mequinez, and was never at the Dar Makhzen there, and so Hadj Mohammed does not think it at all likely that the courier could have been given letters by anybody else. The courier himself still asserts that he brought nothing but the cover from Hadj Mohammed Mikwar.

He says also that while waiting at the Palace, when he was first arrested, one Si Omar—a retainer of Sid Taib Mokri's—spoke to him, and on learning that he was a courier from Hadj Mohammed Mikwar looked scared, and ran off to Sid Taib's office.

A few evenings ago Sid Ben Azuz, a German protégé, who has frequently done commissions in Germany from the Sultan, and is one of His Majesty's entourage, mentioned to me that he had chanced to be seated with the Sultan, Dris Wuld Hadj Mennou, and Sid Taib, when the news of the courier's arrest was mentioned, and that it was on Sid Taib's suggestion—and not of that of Dris Wuld Hadj Mennou—that the courier was imprisoned, but whether this referred to the first imprisonment or to the transfer of the courier from the public prison to the Palace Sid Ben Azuz did not remember.

The courier now says also that, during the first three days he spent at the Palace, he was given no food or water whatever, and was in the greatest terror, both of the darkness and because he supposed it was intended to starve him to death. Latterly he managed (so he affirms) to loosen a stone in the wall and attracted a slave's attention by continually beating his cell door with it. He gave the slave 3 pesetas, and thereafter the slave brought him one small loaf (weight about 12 oz.) and a supply of drinking water daily.

The courier has been treated by the missionaries' ladies here for the dysentery which followed on all this, and, though still unfit to work, he seems now to be recovering.

I have, &c.
J. M. MACLEOD.

P.S.—The letters for me which the courier brought are still retained at the Palace.
J. M. MACL.

[26243] No. 29.

Mr. White to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 5.)

(No. 123.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Tangier, July* 5, 1911.

WITH reference to my telegram No. 122:

According to report from consular agent at Alcazar, Colonel Silvestre has written to Raisuli to say that he intends to come to Arzila to visit him. On this occasion his cavalry will remain at one hour's and his infantry at four hours' march from the town.

[26235] No. 30.

Sir Edward Grey to Count de Salis.

(No. 129.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, July* 5, 1911.

MOROCCO.

I told the German Ambassador this afternoon, on behalf of His Majesty's Government, that our attitude with regard to Morocco could not be a disinterested one, and that we must take into consideration both our own interests in Morocco and our treaty obligations to France. A new situation had been created by the dispatch of the "Panther" to Agadir, and future developments might affect our interests more directly than before. For this reason we could not recognise any new arrangement arrived at without our being consulted.

[26698] No. 31.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 181.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, July* 5, 1911.

I TOLD Count Benckendorff to-day, in answer to his enquiry as to our attitude with regard to Morocco, what I had said to the German Ambassador yesterday.

He asked whether I thought of suggesting a conference.

I said that I thought it would be desirable that the four Powers most interested—France, Spain, Germany, and ourselves—should come to an understanding before any conference met in order to avoid the wranglings which there were at the Algeciras conference. But France was the Power which had the greatest interest in this question, and I should not propose a conference or anything of that sort, but leave it to her to say what she wished in that respect.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[26699] No. 32.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Rennie.

(No. 72.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, July* 5, 1911.

I OBSERVED to the Spanish Ambassador this afternoon that the consequences which I had feared from the Spanish action at Alcazar had come to pass. I now had recent reports that more and more Spanish troops were being sent to Alcazar, whereas the French had withdrawn theirs from Fez. I urged that the situation had become one which made it necessary to be very careful.

The Ambassador said that he had not heard of the dispatch of any reinforcements to Alcazar since what he had said to Sir Arthur Nicolson a few days ago, but all the Spanish couriers and post between Alcazar and Laraiche had lately been robbed.

The Ambassador assured me that his Government did not know beforehand of the German intention to send a ship to Agadir, though they had known for some time that Germany intended to do something.

His Government were not now having conversations with anyone, but they had gathered that the view of the German Government was that an appeal by France to the juridical effect of the Franco-German agreement about Morocco and of the Algeciras Act would not facilitate a peaceful solution. The French had fooled others by going to Fez.

I asked whether the German Government meant that the action of the French in going to Fez had not been straightforward?

The Spanish Ambassador confirmed this.

I said that, if that was so, then the action of the German Government had been anything but straightforward. When they received the news of the French expedition to Fez, they had expressed confidence in the loyalty of the French assurances, and they had not deprecated the expedition. Though they had expressed apprehensions that the French might be forced to stay in Fez longer than was expected, they had given all of us to understand that, if the French expectations of speedy withdrawal were realised, there would be no complaint. The moment when the French were carrying out the withdrawal even more rapidly than had been anticipated was not the time to accuse them of want of straightforwardness.

The Ambassador said that the French expedition had led to other punitive expeditions in the interior. He then went on to say that the French must not suppose that, by delaying their withdrawal while the Germans stayed at Agadir, a solution of the question could be reached. Germany was determined to have a settlement of the Moroccan question. The settlement might perhaps be a return to the *status quo ante*; but this was difficult, if not impossible, seeing that by the fact of the French expedition to Fez the Sultan had been placed practically under French protection, and that a return to the *status quo* would entail the withdrawal of the French not merely from Fez but also from Casablanca, where the presence of a French force was a breach of the Algeciras Act. The German Government therefore thought that there would have to be a new arrangement—in fact, a partition of Morocco.

I said that it was useful to know what the view of the German Government was. The only comment I would make upon it for the moment was that a communication which I had made to Count Metternich yesterday, in which I had stated that we could not recognise any new arrangement which was come to without us, was even more timely than I had realised at the moment.

The Spanish Ambassador said that, of course, the arrangement would have to be between the four Powers most interested, of which we were one.

I observed that British interests were now likely to be affected in a more direct way than had hitherto been the case, and that the situation was too serious for me to make further comment upon it at the moment.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[22882] No. 33.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. White.

(No. 48.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, July 5, 1911.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 71 of the 2nd June, 1909, I transmit to you copies of correspondence with the Anti-Slavery and Aborigines Protection Society on the subject of the Slave Trade in Morocco and the carriage of a slave girl on board the steam-ship "Penshurst" of the Power line.*

I also transmit a copy of a letter which I have caused to be addressed to the owners of the vessel.†

I should be glad to receive your observations in regard to any action which you consider might usefully be taken in regard to the slave-markets in the interior.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

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* Part 42, No. 376; and No. 35.

† No. 34.

[22882] No. 34.

Foreign Office to Messrs. James Power and Co.

Gentlemen, *Foreign Office, July 5, 1911.*

INFORMATION has reached Secretary Sir E. Grey to the effect that, on a recent voyage from Mogador to Tangier, the steam-ship "Penshurst" of your line carried a slave girl who was accompanied by a slave dealer, and that the master of the vessel drew the attention of a passenger to her presence, although he was apparently not aware that he had any responsibility in the matter.

You will recollect that, in 1909, representations were made to your agent at Gibraltar in regard to a somewhat similar case, and that he then gave an assurance that all masters of the company's ships should be warned not to receive slaves on board.

I am to call your attention to the incident, and to impress upon you the very serious character of the offence of carrying slaves from one port to another, if knowingly perpetrated, and I am to request that you will take special precautions with a view to the prevention of any recurrence of the offence.

I am, &c.
W. LANGLEY.

[22882] No. 35.

Foreign Office to Anti-Slavery and Aborigines' Protection Society.

(Confidential.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, July 5, 1911.*

I AM directed by Secretary Sir E. Grey to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 10th instant on the subject of the Slave Trade in Morocco.

Sir E. Grey is consulting His Majesty's Minister at Tangier in regard to any action which can usefully be taken at the present time with reference to the Slave Trade in Morocco, and he has caused a communication to be addressed to the owners of the steam-ship "Penshurst," calling attention to the seriousness of the offence of carrying slaves from one port to another if knowingly perpetrated.

I am, &c.
W. LANGLEY.

[26266] No. 36.

Mr. Rennie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 6.)

(No. 116.)
Sir, *Madrid, July 3, 1911.*

THE news of the dispatch of a German man-of-war to Agadir appeared in the press of the evening of the 1st July, and is commented on at length by yesterday's and to-day's papers, which, during the past week, have been showing considerable reserve on the Morocco question.

The general tone of the newspapers of all shades of opinion seems to be one of expectant excitement mingled with almost undisguised pleasure at the embarrassment that it is expected will be caused to France by this latest development of events. Attention is called to the fact that it is the French sphere that is to be the scene of the German move. It is also pointed out with a show of satisfaction that the dispatch of the German warship is merely analogous to the late Spanish action at Alcazar, which now thus finds its justification. The key to the question is held to be the attitude which will be adopted by His Majesty's Government.

(Confidential.)

The German Ambassador, whom I saw this morning, told me that on the receipt of his instructions the day before yesterday he had gone to see Señor Garcia Prieto, and had conveyed to him the notification in the form of a *pro-memoriâ*, which his Excellency had received without comment, merely stating that he would communicate it to the Cabinet. The interview seems to have been of a brief description. Prince

Ratibor said that the news had come to him as a surprise, and that he knew nothing of what had occurred at Agadir beyond the statements contained in the telegram from his Government.

I have, &c.
ERNEST RENNIE.

[26243] No. 37.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Rennie.

(No. 80.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, July 6, 1911.*

TANGIER telegram No. 123 of the 5th July. Movements of Colonel Silvestre.

Please inform Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs that His Majesty's Government consider that the action of the Spanish authorities in Morocco at the present moment is likely to endanger seriously the prospect of finding a satisfactory solution of the existing difficulties by friendly agreement among the Powers chiefly interested.

His Majesty's Government confidently hope that instructions may be given to the Spanish authorities in Morocco to abstain from any forward military movements which may create serious European complications if persisted in.

[26700] No. 38.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 276.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, July 6, 1911.*

M. CAMBON informed me to-day that he had a communication from M. Caillaux, who was taking charge of foreign affairs in the absence of M. de Selves, that M. Jules Cambon had been instructed to say at Berlin that, as Germany had expressed a wish to converse on the subject of Morocco, it was for her to express her views. M. Jules Cambon had been instructed to ask for explanations. M. Caillaux expressed his satisfaction at the statement made by me to M. Cambon the day before yesterday. He wished to know whether I had any positive views as to the compensation to be given to Germany. It would not be well to suggest compensation in Morocco.

M. Cambon proceeded to discuss the matter on the assumption that under no circumstances could Great Britain agree to any territory being given to Germany in Morocco, and that therefore any compensation of that sort must be found outside. He thought that as German interests in Morocco were understood to be economic, she should be asked what it was that she required to satisfy them. Our interests, M. Cambon assumed, consisted of our treaty obligations to France and our commercial interests.

I said that we should have to consider our strategic interests also, if there was any question of fortifying a naval base on the flank of our trade routes.

M. Cambon said this was exactly why it was impossible for Great Britain to agree to any territorial compensation to Germany in Morocco.

I said it would be preferable that whatever Germany received, in return for giving France a free hand in Morocco, should be outside Morocco; but from our own point of view, though it was difficult, it was not impossible to find something for her in Morocco. An open commercial port, for instance, would not be irreconcilable with our interests, though no doubt we should wish to have some compensation from Germany for seeing her established in Morocco.

M. Cambon urged that a commercial port might at any moment become a fortified one.

I replied that, if there was an international agreement that it was not to be fortified, we could always interfere to prevent its fortification, and if necessary we would do so. I agreed, however, that France should find out what Germany wanted. When this had been ascertained, France could consider whether it was reconcilable with her interests, and we could consider whether it was reconcilable with ours.

In reply to further arguments on M. Cambon's part, to the effect that we should lay it down as absolutely impossible that Germany should have any territorial sphere in Morocco, I said it would be preferable that anything Germany had should be outside Morocco, but that though difficult it was not impossible for us to conceive conditions under which she could get some compensation in Morocco in return for a politically

free hand for France. I would not, however, suggest anything which France regarded as irreconcilable with her interests, and I merely wished M. Cambon to understand that we did not, from our point of view, wish to shut the door in advance upon any possible solution. I asked him what the French view would be as to giving Germany anything in Morocco.

He replied that he did not know.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[26390] No. 39.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 7.)

(No. 315.)
Sir, *Paris, July 6, 1911.*

I HAVE the honour to report that the French press, after the first shock of surprise and indignation at the news of the dispatch of a German gun-boat to Agadir, has, generally speaking, had the appearance of obeying a *mot d'ordre* that the German action had better be minimised and regarded as a temporary move to induce the French Government to hasten negotiations with Berlin and to make some offer to Germany, not necessarily in Morocco, as an offset to the extended action of France in Morocco.

The "Bureau de la Presse" at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs has during the last two or three years been reorganised and managed on different lines with the object of enabling the Ministry to induce the press, or at any rate the chief organs which write with authority on foreign affairs, to present a unanimous front in any crisis of foreign policy. In the affair of the Casa Blanca deserters the Ministry for Foreign Affairs expressed their satisfaction at the manner in which the French press had obeyed the indications given them as to how to deal with the demands of Germany. The treatment of the Agadir incident is to all appearance another example of the relative readiness of the chief Paris papers to conform their utterances to an indication given them from official quarters.

The "Matin" this morning believes that the German attitude may be expressed by the sentence "Que m'offrez-vous?" It adds that the French Government, however, do not mean to make a definite answer as to what they are ready to offer, as the German Government would be sure to declare that they were not offered enough and would ask for more.

Satisfaction is shown by the papers at the attitude of the French Government in delaying any action in reply to the German move until they have consulted the British and Russian Governments.

I have the honour to transmit to you herewith an article from the "Temps" of to-day's date which states that everything leads to the conclusion that the German demonstration at Agadir is a summons to France to enter upon a negotiation of some kind. The article observes that it is therefore of interest to review what has been realised or attempted of late in the way of recent Franco-German agreements on economic questions. It enumerates those dealing with the "Union des Mines marocaines," the "Société marocaine de Travaux publics," the "Société française du Gabon" (a negotiation in which the Ngoko Sangha Company were involved; see my despatch No. 39, Africa, of the 3rd instant), the Moorish railways, and the Cameroon–Congo Railway.

The article concludes that it is not difficult for France and Germany to talk over matters. They have only to continue with increased activity conversations already begun.

Little or nothing is said in the French press as to the possibility of Germany establishing herself at Agadir or as to the objections from the point of view of naval strategy which such an eventuality might entail. The impression given is that the French feel that Great Britain would be more affected than France thereby, and that His Majesty's Government can be counted upon to prevent Germany from obtaining an undue advantage on the Atlantic coast line.

I have, &c.
(For the Ambassador),
L. D. CARNEGIE.

Enclosure in No. 39.

Extract from the "Temps" of July 6, 1911.

LES CONVERSATIONS FRANCO-ALLEMANDES DEPUIS 1909.

SI, comme tout porte à le croire, la démonstration de l'Allemagne à Agadir est un appel—fâcheux dans la forme—à une négociation positive dont on ignore d'ailleurs quel sera l'objet, il n'est pas sans intérêt de montrer avec précision quelles ont été, depuis deux ans et demi, les tentatives et les réalisations d'accords franco-allemands dans l'ordre économique. L'origine de ces accords se trouve, comme on sait, dans la déclaration du 8 février, 1909.

1. *Accord du 8 février*, 1909.

Cet accord avait pour objet de faciliter l'exécution de l'Acte d'Algésiras et d'éviter pour l'avenir les malentendus. Il envisageait, pour cela, une association économique, contre-partie de la promesse de l'Allemagne de ne pas entraver les intérêts politiques spéciaux de la France au Maroc. On y lisait :—

"Le Gouvernement de la République française, entièrement attaché au maintien de l'intégrité et de l'indépendance de l'Empire chérifien, résolu à y sauvegarder l'égalité économique, et par suite à ne pas y entraver les intérêts commerciaux et industriels allemands,

"Et le Gouvernement Impérial allemand, ne poursuivant que des intérêts économiques au Maroc, reconnaissant d'autre part que les intérêts politiques particuliers de la France y sont étroitement liés à la consolidation de l'ordre et de la paix intérieure, et décidé à ne pas entraver ces intérêts,

"Déclarent qu'ils ne poursuivront et n'encourageront aucune mesure de nature à créer en leur faveur ou en faveur d'une Puissance quelconque un privilège économique, et qu'ils chercheront à associer leurs nationaux dans les affaires dont ceux-ci pourront obtenir l'entreprise."

Cet accord constituait un programme d'avenir. Il énonçait un principe dont il restait à définir les applications, soit au Maroc, soit ailleurs. Quelles ont été ces applications ?

2. *Union des Mines marocaines.*

La première a porté sur les mines marocaines. Dès l'automne de 1907 les grands consommateurs de minerais et d'autres industriels, sans distinction de nationalité, s'étaient groupés. Ce groupement comportait 62 pour cent de capitaux français, 20 pour cent de capitaux allemands, 6 pour cent de capitaux espagnols, 6 pour cent de capitaux anglais, 4 pour cent de capitaux italiens, 2 pour cent de capitaux portugais.

Au lendemain de l'accord franco-allemand de 1909 et en exécution immédiate de cet accord, l'Union des Mines s'est transformée. La part française a été réduite à 50 pour cent environ. La part allemande est restée fixée à 20 pour cent. La part anglaise est passée à 9 pour cent. Enfin, deux parts nouvelles ont été faites aux capitaux autrichiens et belges. Ces pourcentages n'ont pas été discutés de chancellerie à chancellerie. Mais ils ont été soumis au préalable aux Gouvernements intéressés, qui les ont approuvés.

Il faut ajouter toutefois que la mise en actes de cet accord a été gênée depuis lors par la concurrence des frères Mannesmann, qui prétendaient avoir part égale avec l'Union, ce qui eût donné aux intérêts allemands beaucoup plus que la majorité au lieu du cinquième qui leur avait été réservé de consentement commun. C'est justice de reconnaître que le Gouvernement allemand, malgré une très vive campagne de presse, a refusé de céder à cette pression. Par contre, l'envoi de la "Panther" à Agadir n'a d'autre objet local que de protéger—si besoin est, ce qui est douteux—deux agents de MM. Mannesmann installés à Taroudant.

3. *Société marocaine de Travaux publics.*

Les premiers pourparlers en vue de la constitution de cette société eurent lieu en mai 1909. C'est en décembre qu'ils aboutirent, toujours en exécution de l'accord de

février. Mais le Gouvernement allemand, n'ayant pas trouvé suffisante la part faite à l'Allemagne, la négociation se rouvrit et le contrat définitif ne fut signé qu'en janvier 1910. Les deux groupes français et allemands s'adjoignirent des représentants d'autres nationalités et la répartition fut établie comme suit : France trois sixièmes du capital, six administrateurs sur douze et la présidence ; Allemagne deux sixièmes du capital, quatre administrateurs et la vice-présidence ; un sixième à l'Angleterre et à l'Espagne avec deux administrateurs. Nous avons rappelé il y a quelques mois que la large part faite à l'Allemagne avait provoqué à Londres quelque mécontentement.

A Berlin au contraire on avait été satisfait de la constitution de la société, et l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne avait exprimé l'opinion qu'elle serait, sur le terrain économique, la base de rapports cordiaux. Toutefois, pour que cette cordialité se manifestât, il eût fallu que la société pût agir. Or depuis dix-huit mois aucun des projets qu'elle a présentés (phares, ports, chemin de fer) n'a reçu même un commencement d'exécution. Cette stagnation, dont ce n'est pas ici le lieu de rechercher à qui incombe la responsabilité, a été commentée avec défaveur.

4. *Société française de Gabon.*

En juillet 1909 M. Pichon, désireux de prévenir le retour des incidents franco-allemands sur la frontière Congo-Cameroun, envisagea avec le Gouvernement Impérial la création d'une société française constituée en territoire français avec 50 pour cent de capital allemand, fixation de points de douane d'un commun accord pour empêcher la contrebande, garantie de frontière du Tchad à la mer, et interdiction aux commerçants allemands, sous peine du retrait de la licence commerciale, de trafiquer en territoire français.

Au Sénat, le 30 juin dernier, M. Pichon a expliqué en ces termes le but qu'il s'était donné :—

"On me fit observer qu'il semblerait opportun de demander aux nationaux des deux pays de s'inspirer, dans leurs rapports, des principes de collaboration économique qui venaient d'être consentis dans l'accord de février 1909.

"Que disait cet accord ?

"'Les deux Gouvernements chercheront à associer leurs nationaux dans les affaires économiques dont ceux-ci pourront obtenir l'entreprise.'

"Une association des intérêts commerciaux pouvait amener, semblait-il, une conciliation entre colons rivaux."

Le 19 novembre, 1909, M. Jules Cambon, Ambassadeur de France, écrivait dans une dépêche citée par M. Pichon :—

"Je verrais avec satisfaction que l'idée du consortium pût heureusement aboutir. J'y trouverais un grand avantage : elle créerait un point où les intérêts allemands et les intérêts français seraient solidaires, et par là elle rendrait plus difficiles les interventions que nous pourrons avoir à craindre."

Enfin le 27 décembre, 1909, le Ministre des Colonies écrivait à son collègue des Affaires Étrangères dans une lettre également lue à la tribune par M. Pichon :—

"Quant à la création de la Société franco-allemande, le Gouverneur général de l'Afrique équatoriale considère qu'elle ne pourrait être que profitable à la sécurité, au calme et à l'exploitation de notre colonie du Congo ; il partage pleinement ainsi, sur l'opportunité de cette création, l'avis que vous avez bien voulu exprimer."

Les négociations franco-allemandes aboutirent en mai 1910 à un projet d'accord, qui fut modifié sur certains points par la Commission des Concessions coloniales, et en décembre 1910 le projet définitif rectifié et approuvé par les organes compétents fit l'objet d'un engagement écrit de MM. Pichon et de Schoen, sous réserve de l'approbation parlementaire.

Le 25 janvier, 1911, M. Pichon fit à la Commission du Budget la déclaration suivante :—

"La constitution d'un consortium franco-allemand était et demeure le but poursuivi.

"Le projet de consortium sera déposé sans délai sur le bureau de la Chambre et soumis à la ratification du Parlement, dont les droits restent réservés."

Par contre, au début d'avril 1911 M. Messimy, Ministre des Colonies, fit savoir à la Commission du Budget et à la Chambre que le Cabinet Monis avait décidé de ne pas donner suite à l'engagement signé en décembre 1910 par MM. de Schoen et Pichon. Le projet fut ainsi abandonné.

5. *Chemins de Fer marocains.*

En janvier et février 1910, MM. Pichon et Jules Cambon engagèrent des négociations au sujet de la construction de chemins de fer au Maroc, d'accord entre la France et l'Allemagne. La base de ces négociations était d'une part la reconnaissance renouvelée de l'intérêt politique spécial de la France, d'autre part un large avantage accordé en matière de fournitures à l'industrie allemande. Ces négociations étaient assez avancées quand le Cabinet Briand donna sa démission. Elles n'ont pas été continuées depuis lors (février 1911).

6. *Chemin de Fer Cameroun–Congo.*

En avril et mai 1911 des négociations furent engagées avec l'Ambassade d'Allemagne à Paris par M. Caillaux, Ministre des Finances, préoccupé de ne pas laisser tomber complètement l'entretien commencé antérieurement. Il s'agissait d'un chemin de fer à construire du Cameroun au Congo français avec prolongation possible jusqu'au Congo belge. On envisageait une garantie kilométrique des Gouvernements français et allemand. Un programme de société d'études fut établi. Mais l'accord ne s'étant pas fait entre les différents Ministères intéressés, cette négociation stoppa et ne fut pas menée plus avant (juin 1911).

Telles ont été, depuis deux ans et demi, les conversations franco-allemandes. Elles se caractérisent d'abord par leur continuité, qui prouve qu'un égal désir de conciliation existait des deux parts. Leur efficacité, par contre, a été médiocre, tantôt par suite d'hésitations locales, notamment au Maroc, tantôt par suite de l'intervention regrettable des querelles de politique intérieure dans des questions internationales. Quoi qu'il en soit, la France et l'Allemagne, pour causer, n'ont aucun effort à faire. Elles n'ont qu'à reprendre avec plus d'activité un entretien dès longtemps commencé.

[26576] No. 40.

Mr. White to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 7.)

(No. 125.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Tangier, July 7, 1911.*

FRENCH chargé d'affaires has received report of vice-consul at Laraiche that Spaniards have taken possession by force of one barracks at Alcazar; also Colonel Silvestre informed Moorish authorities that Spanish troops would maintain order, and that Moorish troops were not to take upon themselves that duty; any soldiers found performing or attempting to perform such duties would be arrested.

(Repeated to Madrid.)

[26227] No. 41.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Rennie.

(No. 73.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, July 7, 1911.*

THE Spanish Ambassador called at this office on the 1st instant, and the following are the chief points touched on by his Excellency in the conversation which ensued.

He said it was reported that the Makhzen, instigated thereto by the French, were contemplating the appointment of a new governor at Alcazar in place of Raisuli, who was represented there by a deputy. The Spaniards could not admit the installation of a new governor, who would probably arrive with a mehalla, and they would have to consider their position were such a new governor sent.

His Excellency stated that El Mokri was being requested by the Spanish Ambassador at Paris to explain to the Sultan the nature of the measures recently taken by Spain, and to protest against the menace of the Moorish Government to disavow all engagements taken in regard to the Riff being carried into effect. If a satisfactory

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reply were not received from the Makhzen within a reasonable delay, Spain "would find it necessary to adopt certain measures."

M. de Villa Urrutia finally enquired whether it would not be possible for a discussion to take place here in regard to the police question, *i.e.*, between himself, M. Cambon, and the Foreign Office.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[30187] No. 42.

Extract from the "Times" of July 7, 1911.

MOROCCO AND THE POWERS.

MR. BALFOUR (City of London) asked the Prime Minister whether he could give the House any information in regard to the state of affairs in connection with Morocco.

Mr. Asquith.—Recent events are causing discussion between the Powers most interested in Morocco, and at this stage I can say little of the negotiations which are passing between them. But I wish it clearly to be understood that His Majesty's Government consider that a new situation has arisen in Morocco, in which it is possible that future developments may affect British interests more directly than has hitherto been the case. I am confident that diplomatic discussion will find a solution, and in the part that we shall take in it we shall have due regard to the protection of those interests and to the fulfilment of our treaty obligations to France, which are well known to the House. (Cheers.)

[26606] No. 43.

Mr. White to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 8.)

(No. 188.)
Sir, *Tangier, June 29, 1911.*

WITH reference to the last paragraph of my despatch No. 179 of the 24th instant, I have the honour to report that there can be no doubt that M. Villalta quite lost his reason whilst acting as Spanish vice-consul at Alcazar.

M. Capacete, a brother-in-law of M. Villalta, went to Cadiz and brought him to Tangier against the expressed wish of the Spanish Legation. He states that M. Villalta has been mad and violent, but since his return here has been better, though periods of violent insanity still occur. The madness, he says, was brought on by the idea that he was going to be the cause of an European war.

It was natural that the Spanish Legation did not wish it to be known that their vice-consul at Alcazar, on whose reports they had based their action, was a madman, but it is now quite clear that that was the case.

I have, &c.
HERBERT E. WHITE.

[26607] No. 44.

Mr. White to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 8.)

(No. 189.)
Sir, *Tangier, June 30, 1911.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 163 of the 17th instant, I have the honour to report that the French chargé d'affaires informs me that he has heard from M. Gaillard that the Sultan had made a point of the nomination of Dris Ould Hadj Mennou as Governor of Marrakesh, saying that he had confidence in his loyalty, but that before his departure from Fez to take up his appointment His Majesty sent for him and, in the presence of General Moinier, gave him clearly to understand that if he committed any act of oppression or extortion, or if well-founded complaints were received against him, he would be at once dismissed.

I have not much faith in the efficacy of this threat, nor, indeed, in Mulai Hafid's sincerity in making it, but as M. de Billy considered the guarantee satisfactory and

the appointment had evidently been made with the concurrence of General Moinier and M. Gaillard, it appeared to me useless to pursue the matter further.

I have the honour to transmit copy of a despatch from His Majesty's consul at Casa Blanca reporting the arrival of M'Tougi and Ould Mennou at Marrakesh.* The former appears to have received large powers over all the district from Shawia to the Atlas, and, as will be seen from the despatch of the vice-consul at Marrakesh (copy of which I beg leave to enclose herewith*), it is likely that he will proceed to squeeze out of the tribes the little left to them by the Glawis.

There have already been some minor disturbances in various districts consequent upon the arrival of the new kaïds, and there will probably be more trouble, though Mr. Vice-Consul Lennox does not anticipate that there will be any danger to Europeans.

The French vice-consul at Marrakesh and the legation here will find themselves in a somewhat difficult position in endeavouring to fulfil their promises to the Glawi family and to protect them against the rapacity of Kaïds M'Tougi and Ould Mennou, as well as of the Sultan. Hadj Thami and his brother have undoubtedly enriched themselves at the expense of the Makhzen, and have much Government property in their hands, which they will do their best to keep, and it will be a difficult task to negotiate and practically arbitrate between them and the Makhzen.

I have, &c.
HERBERT E. WHITE.

[26610] No. 45.

Mr. White to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 8.)

(No. 192.)
Sir, *Tangier, July 1, 1911.*

I TOOK an opportunity of enquiring of M. de Billy whether any definite decision had yet been come to as to General Moinier's plans.

M. de Billy said that so far as he was aware the general would proceed to Sefroo from the Beni M'tir castle, el Hajeb, where he was now, and that posts would be established at those places, but that the remainder of the troops would pass the hot season at Mequinez, as they required a good rest and the heat was affecting them. Whilst there the officers of the Bureaux indigènes would enter into relations with the tribes and endeavour to bring about a good understanding with them. In September further operations would be commenced, and M. de Billy thought a road would be made through the dangerous country lying in the direct line between Mequinez and Casa Blanca, and communications between those places would be kept open. The direct road to Rabat would also be opened and the Zaers would be punished.

The Zemmour and other tribes occupying the district embraced in the triangle Rabat–Mequinez–Casa Blanca have always been practically independent. It was only with great difficulty and with the loss of much of his baggage that even Mulai Hassan, at the height of his power, succeeded in marching from Mequinez to Rabat direct.

His Majesty's consul at Fez reports that none of the Zemmour tribe have yet made their submission, but that fractions of the Gerwan, Beni M'tir, and Ait Yusi have come in.

In the meantime, recruiting has commenced for the new Moorish army under French officers, which is to take the place of General Moinier's column on its withdrawal from Fez. Difficulty is experienced at present in obtaining a suitable class of men for this force, partly on account of all the able-bodied men in the country being engaged in the harvest, and partly because many of the tribes have not yet made their submission. It is hoped, however, that after the harvest is completed and the tribes have come in, and when it is realised that the troops will be properly paid, fed, and clothed, numbers of suitable men will offer themselves as recruits.

I have, &c.
HERBERT E. WHITE.

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* Not printed.

[26611] No. 46.

Mr. White to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 8.)

(No. 193.)
Sir, *Tangier, July 1, 1911.*

I HAVE the honour to report that the Spaniards have been working on the road from Ceuta to Tetuan, and have already carried it as far as Wad Smir, about 15½ miles from Tetuan. They have a large number of natives employed on the work, which is being pushed on rapidly. M. de Billy showed me a despatch he had received from the French vice-consul at Tetuan, who had ridden out some distance towards Ceuta with a French engineer. He forwarded a sketch-map showing the position of the road, which he says is evidently being built for military purposes.

You will remember that the question of this road gave rise to considerable discussion at Tangier, and that it was decided that it should be constructed by the Public Works Commission, but that the road from Martin to Tetuan should be first made. Subsequently, as reported in Sir R. Lister's despatch No. 72 of the 6th May, 1910, an agreement was come to on the subject by France and Spain.

I have, &c.
HERBERT E. WHITE.

[26614] No. 47.

Mr. White to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 8.)

(No. 196.)
Sir, *Tangier, July 1, 1911.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 186 of the 28th ultimo, I have the honour to report that Captain Moreaux returned to Tangier on the 28th ultimo, leaving a French lieutenant with Kaid-el-Sherkawi's force. He informed M. de Billy that, in his expedition of the 27th ultimo, Colonel Silvestre was accompanied by a force of 200 infantry and 100 cavalry. He marched towards Gibel Sarsar, keeping on the north side of the River Lukkos until he reached Subbah, where the force forded the river. The march home was along the road to the south of the river, and thus outside the Spanish zone. Captain Moreaux was apparently especially annoyed that the Spanish force should have passed within about 200 metres of his camp, and when Colonel Silvestre enquired whether he was in camp he directed that a reply in the negative should be given.

I have, &c.
HERBERT E. WHITE.

[26615] No. 48.

Mr. White to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 8.)

(No. 197.)
Sir, *Tangier, July 1, 1911.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 179 of the 24th instant, I have the honour to report that Mr. Harris informs me that, at an interview he had with him yesterday evening, the Spanish Minister stated that the articles that had been appearing lately in the "Times" had done much harm to the Spanish cause, and that they very much regretted the change of policy in that influential paper, from which they had expected support.

Mr. Harris replied that there had been no change on the part of the "Times" or of himself as its correspondent here. He had no desire to write anything unpleasant about Spain, but when the Spanish Government adopted the policy of attempting to shut all non-Spanish enterprise out of the Moorish districts adjoining their possessions he was bound to take up the cudgels on behalf of the Union des Mines, and in the same manner he had to write about the recent action of the Spanish Government at Laraiche and Alcazar.

M. de Villasinda said that he had been looking up the matter, and had found that it had been the policy of his predecessor, M. de Merry del Val, to shut all foreign enterprise, mining or other, out of the districts adjoining their possessions, and that he had given instructions to that effect, but he himself was quite convinced that a

great mistake had been made, and he had given instructions in the opposite sense, as the Union des Mines found when their engineer visited the antimony mines near Ceuta.

M. de Villasinda went on to say that he considered that M. de Merry del Val had made another great mistake in the wholesale manner in which he distributed Spanish protection. He said he had been horrified at learning the numbers of Moorish subjects to whom Spanish protection had been extended. He was desirous of reducing protection to the narrowest limits, and he would be very glad to see the matter discussed by the diplomatic body and an agreement arrived at limiting the grant of protections.

The rest of the conversation was much on the same lines as that between Mr. Harris and M. Figuerola reported in my above-mentioned despatch, and was of less general interest. The views, however, of M. de Villasinda on the subject of protection are interesting, and will greatly facilitate the discussion of this subject on the return of el Mokri.

I should mention that Mr. Harris informed me also that M. de Billy had spoken to him on the subject of the reported intention of the Union des Mines to surrender their mining rights in the neighbourhood of Tetuan, and expressed the hope that they would not allow them to be transferred to Spanish hands, as it would be very unfortunate from a political point of view, especially at the present moment, that Spaniards should acquire interests near Tetuan. Mr. Harris replied that the matter, so far as the Union des Mines was concerned, was a purely commercial one; they were an international company, and could not allow political considerations to influence them in any way.

I have, &c.
HERBERT E. WHITE.

[26617] No. 49.

Mr. White to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 8.)

(No. 199. Confidential.)

Sir, *Tangier, July 2, 1911.*

YESTERDAY morning the German Minister called upon Cid Guebbas and informed him that, owing to the excitement produced in Southern Morocco by recent events and the alarm caused thereby to German subjects and protégés, the Imperial Government was sending a vessel of war to Agadir to protect their interests, but that this vessel would be withdrawn as soon as the state of things in Morocco returned to its former calm, and, in order that there should be no misunderstanding as to the language he had used, Baron von Seckendorff left with Sid Guebbas an *aide-mémoire*, copy of which I have the honour to transmit herewith.

Sid Guebbas immediately informed the French chargé d'affaires, communicating to him the *aide-mémoire*, and M. de Billy came to see me and subsequently furnished me with a copy of that document.

M. de Billy was much perturbed at the news, which he characterised as very serious. He was at a loss to know what line to adopt, as he thought it very probable that the action of Germany was based upon an understanding come to at the recent interview at Kissingen between M. Cambon and M. Kiderlen-Waechter. The disturbances at Agadir and that neighbourhood were more imaginary even than those at Alcazar, and the German subjects at Agadir whose lives were to be protected were non-existent, unless two or three Germans prospecting for mines in the Sus are referred to.

This morning I again saw M. de Billy, and he told me that he had as yet heard nothing from his Government, except that the German Ambassador at Paris had made a statement to M. de Selves identic to that made by Baron von Seckendorff to Sid Guebbas. He added that the German Minister had called upon him yesterday afternoon, but could give him no additional information. He had apparently received telegraphic instructions to make the declaration to Sid Guebbas and nothing further. M. de Billy asked him whether the action of Germany was taken in consequence of an understanding with France. He replied, "As German Minister I can tell you nothing; as Baron von Seckendorff I may say that I think it is." M. de Billy said that it seemed to him that the only thing for the Makhzen to do for the present was to send a force to Tarudant to maintain order. He said that, when talking to Baron von Seckendorff of

the state of affairs in the south, he observed that, so far as he knew, the country was quite quiet; as a proof of this, he mentioned the visit made by the French consul at Mogador to Kaïd Guillouli, and he told him of the arrangement come to regarding the tolls levied at the "nzail" (see my despatch No. 195 of the 1st instant). Baron von Seckendorff answered somewhat cynically, "I was much interested before in the question of the 'nzail,' but now——" finishing the sentence merely with a shrug of the shoulders.

Shortly after my return from the French Legation Baron von Seckendorff came to see me, and said that he had no instructions to make any communication to his colleagues, as his Government was informing the various Powers through their Ambassadors, but that he had acquainted the French chargé d'affaires with the communication he had made to Sid Guebbas, and, as an act of courtesy, he had come to inform me also.

I thanked him for his visit, and enquired whether the appeal of the German subjects for protection had passed through the legation or had been made direct to his Government, and also what news had reached him regarding disturbances in the Sus. He smiled as he said that one of the Mannesmanns had been arrested in the Sus, and that difficulties were placed in the way of their travelling in that country. He admitted that travelling in the Sus had never been permitted, and that, with the exception of the Mannesmann's engineers, there were no German subjects in those regions. He was indeed at no pains to disguise the fact that the pretext was a shallow one put forward to cover a political move, and that the orders of his Government had come upon him as a complete surprise. In answer to a further enquiry, he said that he thought that there must have been a previous understanding with France and with His Majesty's Government, and he asked whether I had heard anything from you on the subject. I, of course, told him that I had not. Baron von Seckendorff told me further that, in making the communication to Sid Guebbas, he had assured his Excellency that, in taking this step to protect German interests in the south, his Government was not animated with any feeling of hostility towards the Makhzen, and that Sid Guebbas had replied that he unreservedly accepted these assurances and fully relied on Germany's good faith.

The action of Germany has naturally caused considerable commotion at Tangier, and the wildest rumours are current, such as the approaching occupation of Tangier by British troops. The general impression appears to be that, if some understanding has not yet already been come to by the principal Powers interested, the action of Germany, following upon that of Spain, will bring matters to a crisis, and an arrangement will have shortly to be come to on the *do ut des* principle.

I have, &c.
HERBERT E. WHITE.

Enclosure in No. 49.

Aide-mémoire communicated to Sid Guebbas.

DES maisons allemandes établies au sud du Maroc, et notamment à Agadir et dans ses environs, se sont alarmées d'une certaine fermentation parmi les tribus de ces contrées que semblent avoir produit les derniers événements dans d'autres parties du pays. Ces maisons se sont adressées au Gouvernement Impérial pour lui demander protection pour leur vie et leurs biens. Sur leur demande le Gouvernement a décidé d'envoyer au poste d'Agadir un bâtiment de guerre pour prêter aide et secours à ses sujets et protégés ainsi qu'aux considérables intérêts allemands engagés dans lesdites contrées. Dès que l'état des choses au Maroc sera rentré dans son calme intérieur, le bateau chargé de cette mission protectrice aura à quitter le port d'Agadir.

[26724] No. 50.

Mr. White to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 9.)

(No. 126.)

(Telegraphic.) R. *Tangier, July 9, 1911.*

VICE-CONSUL at Mogador reports that "Panther" arrived there early on 6th July, and, after communicating with German vice-consul, left for the south the same morning. He says: "There is a rumour on good authority that two German ships

arrived at Agadir on 3rd July. Sheikh went on board, and returned with four men, whom he escorted to town to show them lie of Agadir and its hills."

French chargé d'affaires has also received report from his consul at Mogador that three German ships visited Agadir, but as these reports are from native sources they are very likely incorrect. "Panther" probably returned to Agadir to convey instructions to "Berlin," and proceeded to Canary Islands.

[26834] No. 51.

Sir V. Corbett to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 10.)

(No. 29. Confidential.)

Sir, *Munich, July 6, 1911.*

IN the course of a conversation which I had with Count Podewils to-day I asked him if he could tell me anything which might help me to reconcile the divergent explanations I had seen given in the press for the dispatch of a German ship of war to Agadir.

His Excellency replied that the whole matter was very simple. German merchants were constantly complaining that their overseas interests were neglected by the Government, and that German representatives abroad would give them no help lest it might provoke diplomatic complications. As long as two years ago, when Baron Schoen was still Foreign Secretary, the question of the protection of German interests at Agadir had been raised by Messrs. Mannesmann, and the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Federal Council (of which he himself is *ex officio* chairman) had agreed that, if menaced, they were worthy of protection. The condition of Morocco had lately called for European intervention in other provinces, and nothing could be more natural than that Germany should send a gun-boat to Agadir to see that the interests of her nationals were not imperilled.

In answer to my question as to whether there were many German subjects in the Sus valley and in what their interests consisted, his Excellency said, rather vaguely, that Messrs. Mannesmann certainly had large interests in those regions. He added that their group had lost considerable sums of money, and that they were inclined to ascribe the fact to the insufficient Government backing they had received. He did not, however, pretend that anything particular had recently occurred in those regions to call for exceptional precautions.

I observed that it seemed to be generally accepted by public opinion that the dispatch of the "Panther" implied a new political departure, intended to lead up either to a modification of the Algeciras Convention or to some kind of negotiation in which Germany would be able to obtain what was termed "compensation." Count Podewils assured me that there had been no new departure. If any change of policy had been contemplated he would have been informed, whereas he had just received a letter from Count Lerchenfeld telling him that there was no fear that the dispatch of the "Panther" would lead to any political complications, that the Emperor had already left for Norway, and that the Imperial Chancellor was just off on his holiday.

As I was leaving, his Excellency referred me to what he said was an interesting article on the subject which had appeared in to-day's edition of the "Münchener Zeitung." He had not himself had time to read it, as the paper had only just arrived, but, from what he had been told about it, it seemed to very fairly interpret the German attitude. The article in question, which has all the appearance of an authoritative statement, is as follows:—

"The Morocco question affords no ground for serious alarm. Germany's action at Agadir took place, and had to take place, because disturbance and excitement had manifested themselves in South Morocco, a part of the country unvisited by either French or Spanish troops, and might endanger German interests there. Germany has, however, no intention of remaining permanently at Agadir or of establishing herself at all in South Morocco. She will certainly quit the harbour of Agadir as soon as France and Spain withdraw their troops from the country. Germany's withdrawal will follow *pari passu* on the retreat of the two Powers, since her standpoint continues afterwards, as it was before, to be based on the Convention of Algeciras, by which the integrity of the Shereefian Kingdom was established. Germany is now waiting quietly for France to approach her with proposals for settling matters in Morocco. All the chanceries of Europe are, however, convinced that out of the Morocco question no conflict can arise calculated to lead to complications dangerous to the peace."

The impression left on my mind was that Count Podewils was not entirely ingenuous in his statement. He particularly insisted that the German action had been dictated by anxiety for German commercial interests only, and had no reference to the action of any other country, whereas the article above quoted, to which he referred me, argues an intimate relation between the action of Germany and that of France and Spain.

I do not know what rôle the Foreign Affairs Committee fills, and as it has, I believe, held no sitting for more than six months, it is probable enough that Count Podewils is not very precisely informed of Herr von Kiderlen's views or intentions.

The most generally accepted opinion here seems to be that the recent French expedition to Fez and the apparently wanton descent of the Spaniards on Laraiche made it incumbent on this Government to do something which would look like an assertion of German influence. The existence, real or imaginary, of German interests at Agadir suggested a demonstration at that place, the policing of which does not, I believe, come under the Act of Algeciras. Such action might never have been taken place if it had not been for the measures taken by Spain, and, while not intended to provoke an immediate crisis, is nevertheless in the nature of pegging out a claim for the time which it is anticipated is not far distant when the whole situation in regard to Morocco will have to be reviewed.

My French colleague, who has several times spoken to me on this subject, has repeatedly insisted on the perfect good faith of his Government in their desire to carry out both the letter and the spirit of the Algeciras Convention, but he has been equally emphatic in declaring his belief that the German Government, while ready to admit a French sphere of influence in Morocco, were determined, as the price of their benevolent attitude, to obtain compensation "there or elsewhere." In making both these statements I have reason to believe that he is only echoing the words of his late chief, M. Cruppi.

I have, &c.
VINCENT CORBETT.

[26728] No. 52.

Count de Salis to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 10.)

(No. 191.)

Sir, *Berlin, July 8, 1911.*

MR. ASQUITH'S statement on Thursday afternoon in the House of Commons respecting Morocco was awaited here on Thursday evening with some impatience by the German papers. But some of the interest with regard to its purpose had already been discounted by hints dropped by the Press Bureau on the strength of the conversation you had already had to Count Metternich respecting the views of His Majesty's Government. In an article contributed by Herr Stein, its Berlin correspondent, the "Frankfurter Zeitung" was able to announce on Thursday morning that there would be no dispatch of vessels to the Atlantic coast of Morocco, either by Great Britain or France. On the contrary, the next step in the matter is to be the initiation of "discussions which will be calm and businesslike." These discussions, it is suggested elsewhere, may take the form of an extension of the Franco-German agreement of 1909. Any increase of French political influence is to be compensated by concessions to Germany of an economic character. But the German public must not expect that their Government is aiming at territorial aggrandisement. The Italian Ambassador assures me that he has good authority for knowing that these views correspond to statements made by Herr von Kiderlen himself at a very recent date. He would not, however, express a positive opinion as to whether they represent the definite intentions of the German Government or are merely intended to cover it, should the result of the negotiations fall short of the hopes of the Chauvinist press.

Neither M. Pansa nor the Austro-Hungarian Embassy had, I venture to think, any prior information respecting the dispatch of the "Panther." I now learn that the Spanish Ambassador has informed one of his colleagues in confidence that about a fortnight before the event the Emperor remarked to him that "the Algeciras Act was an instrument which could be stretched in different directions," a statement which may now be interpreted to mean that Germany also contemplated taking some step which was not strictly in harmony with the treaty. But the eagerness shown by M. Polo de Bernabé, as soon as the dispatch of the "Panther" was announced, to

procure interviews with the Acting Secretary of State and the Chancellor and a certain readiness to communicate the result of them to both the French Embassy and to me, have certainly left an impression on my mind that he had not previously been in the secret.

The following dates may be of some interest in establishing the relation between various incidents connected with the matter :—

June 19, 20.—Meeting of M. Cambon and Herr von Kiderlen at Kissingen. M. Cambon is not authorised to make any proposals, only to give assurances as to early retirement from Fez.

June 23.—Abrupt return of Herr von Kiderlen to Berlin.

June 25.—Herr von Kiderlen leaves for Kiel.

June 26.—Conference at Kiel—the Emperor, the Chancellor, and Herr von Kiderlen.

June 27.—The "Berlin" receives orders to prepare.

June 30.—The "Berlin" leaves Kiel.

Herr von Kiderlen is stated to have left for Stuttgart on private affairs.

July 1.—The "Norddeutsche" announces the dispatch of the "Panther."

July 2, 3.—Excitement in Paris and London.

July 3, 4.—The Emperor's departure for his cruise, fixed for the 3rd, is postponed on account of bad weather.

July 4. Interview of Sir E. Grey and Count Metternich. Decision not to send an English ship.

July 5.—The Emperor starts on his journey. Herr von Kiderlen reappears in his office.

There seems to be some reason for supposing that Herr von Kiderlen passed the days from the 1st to the 4th July with the Emperor at Kiel. An inspired telegram in the "Cologne Gazette" gave a circumstantial account of an interview he had had at Stuttgart with the Prime Minister of Wurtemberg on the 5th July, although he had unexpectedly reappeared that morning in his office in Berlin. This small incident and the care taken by the inspired press to contradict the suggestion that the postponement of the Emperor's departure was due to anything but anticipation of bad weather are perhaps indications that the reply of His Majesty's Government was awaited with an anxiety which the German authorities were desirous of concealing.

I have, &c.
J. DE SALIS.

[26787] No. 53.

Sir F. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 10.)

(No. 115.)

Vienna, July 8, 1911.

Sir,

WITH reference to my immediately preceding despatch, I have the honour to report that the Viennese press continues to discuss with great interest the effects on the Morocco question of the attitude of His Majesty's Government as laid down in Mr. Asquith's statement.

The "Neue Freie Presse" continues its complaints that England should again have taken a foremost place in the Morocco question, and that she should have interposed herself like a screen to prevent France and Germany from coming to a separate agreement. While welcoming the news of the probable withdrawal from Fez of the French troops, it expresses grave doubts as to the possibility, after recent events, of combining the commercial equality in Morocco of all the Powers with French predominance in that country and the mere semblance of a Sultan's authority.

The "Zeit" characterises the internationalisation, now inevitable, of the whole question as a severe blow to French policy and as a triumph for Germany, who has succeeded in showing France that she cannot act alone in Morocco.

The "Wiener Allgemeine Zeitung," so often used for official purposes, remarks that Mr. Asquith's statement makes it clear that England will now assume the leading rôle among the Triple *Entente* Powers in the Morocco question. Her contention that a new situation has arisen may be true as regards herself, but cannot be admitted unreservedly in other quarters. The standpoint of His Majesty's Government appears from Mr. Asquith's words as to treaty engagements to be "back to 1904," and not "back to Algeciras"—a standpoint likely to cause grave difficulties.

The "Vaterland" makes a somewhat bitter attack on England's "shifty policy" for disturbing the situation, which had remained comparatively tranquil until Mr. Asquith's statement. It concludes the article with the following remarkable words :—

"Mr. Asquith's speech in the House of Commons leaves no doubt as to the attitude which England intends to take in the latest phase of the Morocco affair. She places herself entirely on the side of France and against Germany. That is the new situation, which was caused not by the dispatch of the 'Panther' but by Mr. Asquith's declaration. France, supported by England, now enters upon diplomatic discussions with Germany, who will be obliged to reckon also upon the withdrawal of Spain from the neutral zone as soon as England wishes it. Mr. Asquith's declaration has also altered the situation in regard to us. Up till Thursday we did not need to abandon our attitude of reserve, for previously to that date our interests in Morocco were assured by the appearance of the German war-ship at Agadir. Now, however, more than the duties of a neutral are incumbent on us, not only on account of our alliance, but also in order that we may protect our interests, now immediately affected by the English move. We shall know how to preserve in the future the reputation which we won in the past of having been a brilliant second to Germany in Morocco."

This is the first reference in any paper to a desire on the part of Austria-Hungary to follow Germany into a Moroccan policy directed against England and France, and also the first implication that Austrian interests in Morocco are protected by Germany's presence there. Although the article quoted above may represent the views of the circles by which the "Vaterland" is so often inspired, the more official utterances, and in particular the statement made by the Hungarian Prime Minister, have shown sufficiently clearly that these views are not shared by the Austro-Hungarian Government.

I have, &c.
(For His Majesty's Ambassador),
MICHAEL PALAIRET.

[26874] No. 54.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 10.)

[By Post.]

(No. 92.)

(Telegraphic.)

Paris, July 9, 1911.

I HAD a long interview this morning with M. de Selves, in the course of which he gave the most formal assurances of the desire of himself and M. Caillaux's Ministry to continue the policy of free and confidential communication with His Majesty's Government, so that, their interests being identic on all great questions, they may be able to co-operate and support each other's interests. He is quite aware that the German *coup* at Agadir is for the purpose of testing the solidity of the *entente* between England and France, which the German Government hoped had lately been weakened, and partly to have something in hand to keep if resistance were not strong or to give up for a consideration elsewhere in the course of conversations.

M. de Selves gave me the following account of his interviews with the German Ambassador :—

On Saturday, the 1st July, M. de Schoen sent a secretary to the Quai d'Orsay to ask for an appointment to see M. de Selves on a very pressing matter. When M. de Selves received M. de Schoen the Ambassador was very embarrassed in his manner, saying that he regretted to begin his relations with the Minister, which he hoped would be most cordial for the benefit of Germany and France, by a communication which M. de Selves might not think quite agreeable. Representations had been made to the German Government by Germans having interests at Agadir and the Sus country that there was agitation in the district and their interests were endangered. The German Government had consequently determined to send a vessel of war to Agadir to protect those interests. He then handed the circular communication to M. de Selves, who, after reading it, asked whether the determination was irrevocable, for if not he would suggest that the ship should not be

sent, for it would not be viewed by French public opinion as a *bon procédé* preliminary to a discussion as to the need of a vessel at Agadir, where, so far as he knew, there were no disturbances or excitement. On the Ambassador stating that the vessel was already at Agadir, and that the German Government were quite ready to consider any proposals that the French Government might have to make, M. de Selves said that he took note of the communication made by the Ambassador. It was, however, a matter which did not seem to be consistent with the Act of Algeciras, and was much too serious for him to make observations on it as Minister for Foreign Affairs until he had brought the subject before the Cabinet and the President of the Republic, whom he had arranged to accompany to Holland on the Monday on an official visit to the Queen. He therefore begged that M. de Schoen would obtain from Berlin further particulars as to the precise object of the dispatch of the vessel. M. de Schoen having then said that the German Government desired to have conversations ("causer") with the French Government, but professing not to know about what, M. de Selves, speaking not as Minister to Ambassador, but as one man of the world to another, asked whether the dispatch of a ship to Agadir did not seem to be an unusual mode of beginning a friendly conversation, but he begged the Ambassador to obtain instructions from the German Government to enable him to discuss the matter with the French Minister for Foreign Affairs on his return from Holland.

The next day, at a garden party at the Elysée, M. de Selves bantered the Ambassador ("blagué") on the new system of beginning conversations, which he did not think very "élégant," for even in a duel the adversaries began by saluting each other, and not by one giving the other a sword-thrust in the stomach, nor when one person desired a conversation with another did one generally begin by a blow with the fist.

On the day of M. de Selves' return from Amsterdam (Friday, the 7th July) M. de Schoen called on M. de Selves, and stated that M. de Kiderlen-Waechter considered that, as there had been conversations between himself and the French Ambassador at Kissingen, they had best be continued between them at Berlin. Those conversations, M. de Selves told me, had only been on general subjects, such as were usual between diplomats after dinner over a cigar, and there had been nothing precise or important so far as he knew. M. de Selves stated to M. de Schoen that he had no objection to conversations between the French Ambassador and the German Secretary for Foreign Affairs regarding any matter which the German Government might desire to bring before the French Government, but that he (M. de Selves) was not going to give up the reins to anyone else, and he must reserve to himself the right to discuss any such questions with the German Ambassador, who should seek instructions from his Government for the purpose.

The German Ambassador called again on M. de Selves yesterday, and in reply to an enquiry of the previous day by M. de Selves as to what it was that the German Government had in mind in referring to conversations between M. de Kiderlen-Waechter and M. Jules Cambon, stated that the Congo had been discussed by them. This surprised M. de Selves, and he has telegraphed to M. Jules Cambon to report by telegraph whether there were any, and, if so, what, conversations concerning the Congo.

At this last interview with the German Ambassador M. de Selves told him that the German Government, if they had any idea of a permanent stay on the Morocco coast, must put it away from their thoughts, for it would be entirely inconsistent with great French interests and would raise again the whole question of Morocco.

M. de Selves concurs in your opinion that it will not be advisable for the present to send French and British ships to Agadir, but he is inclined to think that it may become necessary, and to invite the Spanish Government to do the same if the German force be increased or remain too long. He considers that the question of Germany and Morocco must not be allowed to drag on so that the German Government may by procrastination await another and perhaps more favourable opportunity of asserting themselves, such as complications in the East. The French Government cannot acquiesce in the establishment of Germany on the coast of Morocco in any way, not even in the form of a so-called free port. He has no doubt that there has been an understanding, though, perhaps, not a written one, between Germany and Spain. He has reliable information that the German Government have applied to the Spanish Government for facilities for using Spanish ships of war and stations for passing on wireless telegraph communications from German ships in Morocco waters, but he does not know what answer the Spanish Government have made to the application.

M. de Selves will keep you informed of all that passes between the French and German Governments, and he will agree to nothing without full consultation with

His Majesty's Government. He feels sure that you will equally consult with him on all communications which you may receive from the German Government. He will not consent to discussions to be restricted to Germany and France, or to the two with Spain added.

[27021] No. 55.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 10.)

(No. 47. Secret.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Berlin, July 10, 1911.*

A LONG conversation took place yesterday on the subject of Morocco between the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and M. Cambon. Though very stiff at first, the conversation appears to have resulted in both parties admitting that an understanding on the following lines might be reached:—

On the condition that she should receive from France some compensation outside Morocco, such, for instance, as a suitable rectification of the Congo frontier, Germany would abandon the idea of obtaining a footing in Morocco either of a territorial or a political nature.

Herr von Kiderlen said that he must be given time to consult Secretary of State for the Colonies and others before engaging himself to any definite step in this direction. The participation of any third Power in negotiations directed towards an understanding on the above lines seemed to him impossible: firstly, because the two Governments were the only parties concerned in the question of compensation outside Morocco; and secondly, if the conversations were extended to one Power, all the other, including the smaller, signatories of the Algeciras Act would feel entitled to participate. M. Cambon told me that the following were his reasons for expressing agreement with Herr von Kiderlen on this point: because, firstly, he was of opinion that, since England would without any trouble to herself attain her object, she would, in such a case, have no desire to interfere; and because, secondly, the consent of Germany, which she now seemed disposed to give, to abandon her pretensions in Morocco would be rendered more difficult by a general conversation. Moreover, there would always be time for Great Britain to insist upon having her say if, as might unfortunately quite well happen, the present idea of compensating Germany outside Morocco fell through, and she insisted on a sphere of influence inside that country. Finally, French Ambassador informed Secretary of State that France intended to remain absolutely true to her understanding with England, and that any conversations which might be held on the above lines, or on any others, might naturally be communicated to His Majesty's Government.

M. Cambon is of opinion that Mr. Asquith's statement in the House of Commons is almost entirely responsible for Herr von Kiderlen's present attitude. French Ambassador begged that the fact of his having communicated to me his conversation with Herr von Kiderlen might not be mentioned to French Government.

[27186] No. 56.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 279.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, July 10, 1911.*

M. CAMBON showed me to-day two communications which he had received from M. de Selves yesterday. The German Ambassador in Paris had informed M. de Selves that, in his opinion, Germany did not entertain any territorial designs on Morocco, and wished to talk about the Congo. M. de Selves would like to know whether we saw any objection to the discussion of this subject with Germany.

I said that I assumed it was the French Congo which was meant.

M. Cambon confirmed this.

I then said that I did not see how there could be any objection on our part.

M. Cambon told me that M. de Selves feared that Germany was going to ask something of France that would put her interest and ours in opposition.

I repeated that I did not see how any such objection could arise in connection with the French Congo.

M. Cambon also told me that M. de Selves would like us to join with France and Russia in making a representation in Berlin to the German Government to withdraw their ship from Agadir. If Germany refused, he thought that we and France ought to send ships to Agadir and Spain might be asked to send one too.

I replied to this that the moment did not seem to me to be opportune for sending ships to Agadir. It would be better to wait and see what answer was given to the French Ambassador in Berlin, who had been instructed to enquire whether what the German Ambassador had said in Paris about the French Congo represented the view of the German Government. The sending of ships now to Agadir would prejudice the opening of the conversation. Further, I did not see any object in asking Germany to withdraw her ship at this moment. She would certainly say that she could not withdraw her ship until order had been restored in Morocco; which meant, until she had secured some settlement. No doubt, as we were the stronger naval Power, we could turn German ships out of Agadir, and prevent any others from being sent there; but this would be an act of war, and the situation did not demand it. If the conversations as to Morocco resulted in a settlement, the situation at Agadir would solve itself.

M. Cambon informed me very definitely that under no circumstances could the French allow Germany to establish herself in Morocco. It would be an *enclave* on the flank of the French possessions, and constant trouble would be made from it.

I said that, as far as we were concerned, though public opinion here would expect guarantees from Germany, and some compensation for her being established in Morocco, we did not mind an open port on the west coast of Morocco. We thought that it would be physically very difficult for Germany to turn it into a naval base, and that if she attempted to do so, so long as we had the stronger fleet we could prevent its being done. But if France was decided that it was irreconcilable with her interest that Germany should be established in Morocco, there remained two solutions: one was to get back to the *status quo* of the Algeciras Act, which was difficult, because it would raise the question of the French force at Casa Blanca and every change made since the Algeciras Act; the other was that Germany should concede to France the same position in Morocco as we had conceded, but she could not be expected to do this without some compensation. Germany's argument had always been that we had received compensation for conceding this position to France, and that as Germany also had interests in Morocco she should also receive something.

I said that of course the French Government would keep us informed of what Germany said, and M. Cambon said this could be done.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[27199] No. 57.

Mr. Malcolm to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 11.)

Sir, 58, *Lombard Street, London, July* 10, 1911.

HEREWITH I have the honour to enclose copy of translation of a concession granted on the 28th June, 1897, by the chiefs of Sus to Major A. Gybbon Spilsbury, who was sent out to that country by myself and some friends.

This translation was certified, as you will observe, on the 2nd July, 1897, by Mr. R. L. N. Johnston, the British vice-consul at Mogador. The original certified translation is to-day in my possession, and the original document in Arabic is in the possession of the official receiver, who was appointed liquidator of the Globe Venture Syndicate (Limited), which was formed mainly for the purpose of trading in Sus, and which in consequence of the action taken by the British Government went into liquidation.

You will notice that, according to clause 5 of the concession or treaty, Major Spilsbury was granted the right to work the mines in Sus. At that time it was held by the Moorish Government (I believe, at the instigation of M. Hanatau) that the tribes had no power to grant such a concession without the consent of the Moorish Government, and the British Government appeared to concur in that view.

Now, it appears to me that if the Sus chiefs are held by the German Government to have granted a valid concession to Messrs. Mannesmann Brothers, then, from the point of view of the German Government, at any rate, the Sus chiefs had the right to grant our representative the concession of the 28th June, 1897, which must render

Messrs. Mannesmann Brothers' concession nugatory, the political situation in the Sus country not having changed at all.

I also venture to recall to mind the Tourmaline expeditions of 1897, which were formed and sent to Sus for the purpose of putting our concession into operation. That expedition included a M. A. C. Beyerle, a German subject, and officer *à la suite*, son of my friend, the late M. Beyerle, the administrator delegate of the Crédit foncier égyptien, who had sent him to me in London to learn business. I mention this circumstance, because it is interesting to note that whilst the British Government sanctioned the prosecution and imprisonment of some members of the expeditions who were British subjects, and who were overwhelmed and captured by Kaïd Gibuli, M. Beyerle, who was amongst the captured, on arriving at Tangier, was released unconditionally at the instance of the German Minister at Tangier, on the grounds, as I understood from M. Beyerle, that, in the opinion of the German Government, any European had the right to go to and trade in the Sus country. Subsequent to M. Beyerle's release and return to London he visited Baron von Richthoven, the then German Foreign Minister, who was anxious to know what could be done in Sus.

These later developments of German activities in that country seem to have originated since that time.

The concession from the Sus tribes and the two Tourmaline expeditions created a sufficient interest in the public press at the time for it ever to be denied that such a concession was granted—whether it was a valid concession or not.

Under the circumstances, I beg most respectfully to express the hope that His Majesty's Government, in the event of Messrs. Mannesmann Brothers' claim to a concession in the Sus country being supported by the German Government, will not fail to maintain our anterior rights to the development of the minerals in Sus, which we acquired at very considerable expense in money and damage to our reputation.

The original certified translation above referred to, as also any other information that I may possess, are entirely at your disposal.

I have, &c.
JAMES A. MALCOLM.

Enclosure in No. 57.

Concession granted to Major Spilsbury.

(Translation.)

PRAISE to the one God; may God bless our Lord Mahommed, his brethren, and his friends!

We, the undersigned on this contract, Sidi Mohamed u Mhamd Tazeroually Tamanary, living at Taleawean, at the mouth of Assaka, and Sheikh Embark Ben Hamed Yazo Asbaeyo, who have signed their names under date and with power and permission of the chiefs of the tribes, and with the power we have of ourselves, which is in our hands and attached to this contract, we have agreed with Major A. Gybbon Spilsbury, the Englishman belonging to London, to trade with us in our country and jurisdiction, with the conditions which we are going to state further:—

1. We accept the said Major Spilsbury to trade, buy, and sell in our country at the ports of Erksees and Assaka or any other port opened by him in our country.

2. We engage ourselves to allow Major Spilsbury to build the port stores and houses where there is going to be the trading station, and we engage ourselves to give to him the quantity of ground he requires for building.

3. Major Spilsbury engages himself not to charge us or the tribes any outlay he may make for the said buildings under clause 2.

4. All goods arriving from the Christian country or any other country, and also all goods leaving our country to other countries by sea, must pay 10 per cent., and the said Major Spilsbury has to pay it and deliver it to the signatories of this contract, Sidi Mohamed u Mhamd Tazeroually, who lives at Taleawean, at the mouth of the Assaka, and Sheikh Embark Ben Hamed Yazo Asbaeyo, so that they may divide it among the tribes as God may point out to them.

5. Major Spilsbury can work the mines and ship minerals, but will have to pay 15 per cent. duty, and deliver it to the said parties under clause 4.

6. Sidi Mohamed u Mhamd and Sheikh Embark Ben Hamed Asbaeyo engage themselves and in the name of the tribes not to allow any stranger or other company to work with us without the consent of Major Spilsbury, and Major Spilsbury engages, so as to avoid disputes with us, to give his consent only in writing.

7. In case of a dispute in trading, buying, or selling between the tribes and the said Major Spilsbury, the tribes shall appoint two persons and Major Spilsbury another two to decide, and in case of non-agreement the tribes shall appoint a third person and Major Spilsbury a third person, and the decision of these last two shall be final.

8. All questions between Christians shall be submitted to Major Spilsbury's jurisdiction.

9. All disputes amongst the tribes shall be submitted to the jurisdiction of the Ait Arbein.

10. As steamers coming to the ports will require coals, the tribes give power to Major Spilsbury to build a place to store them.

11. The landing and shipping of goods shall be carried out by lighters furnished by and belonging to Major Spilsbury, and not to the tribes.

12. As we engage not to receive any one without Major Spilsbury's consent, he binds himself to bring from Europe all our requirements without exception, and the tribes will deal with him as may be arranged by both parties.

13. All goods, money, or other things which Major Spilsbury may give on credit without the consent of the signatories, Sidi Mohamed u Mhamd and Sheikh Embark Ben Hamed, and which may be lost, shall be to his own loss, and the guarantors shall not be held liable for such loss.

14. Sidi Mohamed u Mhamd and Sheikh Embark Ben Hamed, with the authority of the tribes, engage themselves on behalf of the tribes and Ait Arbein to protect and guard Major Spilsbury and all who may be with him, and those that may come to him from the land of the Christians, as also the goods that he may have, and Major Spilsbury engages himself to give assistance to the tribes in case of their having disputes with other tribes, and to protect them strongly.

15. Should either party to this agreement break any one of the conditions above stated, he shall pay a fine of 500,000 dollars.

16. This document is made by the said three persons, one copy to be retained by Sidi Mohamed Bel Hosein Ben Hashem, one by Sidi Mohamed u Mhamd and Sheikh Embark Ben Hamed, and the third by Major Spilsbury, this 28th day of Moharram el Haram, year 1315 (corresponding to the 28th June, 1897).

I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true translation of the original document exhibited before me this day.

R. L. N. JOHNSTON,
British Vice-Consul.

Mogador, July 2, 1897.

[27234] No. 58.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received July* 11.)

(No. 94.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Paris, July* 11, 1911.

IN the course of my conversation to-day with M. de Selves, which was reported in my immediately preceding telegram, he told me that he had had an interview with the Spanish Ambassador, and that the latter had shown a desire to join in the conversations respecting Morocco.

M. de Selves assurred M. Pérez Caballero that for the moment Spanish interests were not in question, but that, if they became in any way affected, he would be happy to discuss them with his Excellency.

[27235] No. 59.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received July* 11.)

(No. 95.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Paris, July* 11, 1911.

I TOLD M. de Selves in the course of my interview with his Excellency this morning that there could not be any doubt that the avidity of French financiers who wished to keep everything for themselves in Morocco had caused considerable irritation in British, no less than in German, commercial circles.

[27230] No. 60*.

Mr. White to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 11.)

(No. 128.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Tangier, July 11, 1911.*

FRENCH chargé d'affaires has heard from French consul at Mogador that on 6th July there was a German merchant-vessel at Agadir as well as cruiser.

[27236] No. 60.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 11.)

(No. 97.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Paris, July 11, 1911.*

PLEASE see telegram No. 58 of the 11th July from His Majesty's chargé d'affaires at Madrid.

Ministry for Foreign Affairs informs me that the French officers have received the most categoric instructions that they are not to cross the River Lukkus, and that they are to prevent the Moorish mehalla from crossing it. I have so informed Mr. Rennie by telegraph.

No. 61.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. White.

(No. 58.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, July 11, 1911.*

YOUR despatch No. 187 of 29th June.

You should make strong protest against arrest and treatment of British courier and opening of correspondence. You should demand apology and moderate compensation for courier.

[23882] No. 62.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 282.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, July 11, 1911.*

WITH reference to your Excellency's despatch No. 288 of the 18th ultimo, enclosing a memorandum from the French Foreign Office in regard to what is known as the Lemta incident in Morocco, I transmit to you herewith a copy of a despatch which I have addressed to His Majesty's representative at Tangier on the subject.*

I should be glad if you would inform the French Minister for Foreign Affairs that I have absolute confidence in the accuracy of the reports received from His Majesty's consul at Fez on the subject, but that a copy of the memorandum has been forwarded to Consul MacLeod for his observations.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[26364] No. 63.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Rennie.

(No. 74.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, July 11, 1911.*

THE Spanish Ambassador called at this Office on the 3rd instant, and stated that his Government were taken completely by surprise by the recent communication from the German Government. He asserted most positively that there had been no previous communications between Berlin and Madrid on the subject.

His Excellency also reiterated his previous assurances that Spain had not been "pushed" by Germany to take the action she had done at Laraiche and Alcazar.

Sir A. Nicolson replied that, while he fully believed these assurances, he was not so sure that Spanish action at Laraiche and Alcazar had not "pushed" Germany to Agadir.

In answer to a question, M. de Villa Urrutia stated that M. Garcia Prieto had simply replied to the German communication regarding Agadir that he would "take note" of it, and that he would have to submit it to the King and Cabinet.

His Excellency stated that the Spanish Government were naturally desirous of

* No. 64.

ascertaining the views of the British and French Governments before definitely replying to Germany, and was informed by Sir Arthur Nicolson that the subject would be considered at a meeting of the Cabinet.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[23882] No. 64.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. White.

(No. 53.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, July* 11, 1911.

YOU will have seen from the Morocco Print sections that I have been in correspondence with His Majesty's Ambassador at Paris in regard to what is generally known as the Lemta incident in Morocco.

I transmit to you herewith a copy of a despatch from Sir F. Bertie, enclosing a further memorandum from the French Foreign Office on the subject, together with a copy of my reply.* I do not propose to leave unanswered the aspersions contained therein on the accuracy of Mr. MacLeod's reports, and although his recent despatches shed light on many of the points at issue, I should be glad if you would instruct him to furnish me with his observations on the memorandum in a connected and detailed form, which, if considered advisable, I could communicate to the French Government.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[27296] No. 65.

Señor de Villa Urrutia to Sir A. Nicolson.—(Received July 12.)

Dear Nicolson, *Spanish Embassy, London, July* 9, 1911.

MY Government has received urgent and serious news from Alcazar, where the French lieutenant instructor, who tried to provoke disturbances in the town during the absence of Colonel Silvestre, has called to his camp the kaïds of the mehalla and the garrison, and has read to them a letter from the Sultan commanding them to obey any orders that the French officers may give them respecting Spain, even to fire against the Spanish soldiers. Another camp of about 200 cavalry soldiers has been formed close to Captain Moreau's mehalla on the border of the Sveus, and it is announced that the mehalla which the Sultan is sending to Alcazar will shortly arrive there. Those facts, menaces, and rumours make it impossible for His Majesty's Government to leave the Spanish soldiers at Alcazar exposed to a dangerous surprise, and therefore Colonel Silvestre will be furnished with more adequate defensive elements. These preventive measures have been forced upon the Spanish Government against its will by the conduct of the French agents at Alcazar, of which we have so often and unsuccessfully complained.

I have been instructed to lay the matter before the British Government without delay, and, as I do not think that Sir Edward is in town, I beg you to let him know as soon as possible this unpleasant incident provoked by the *trop de zèle* of the French agents, who desire to force us to withdraw from Alcazar and even from Morocco.

Yours sincerely,
W. R. DE VILLA URRUTIA.

[27343] No. 66.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 12.)

(No. 93.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Paris, July* 11, 1911.

FRENCH Minister for Foreign Affairs sent for me this morning. He read to me the reports by telegram and despatch from French Ambassador at Berlin of his interview with the German Minister for Foreign Affairs, which were as follows :—

* Part 42, No. 404; and No. 62.

After the usual exchange of compliments and an enquiry by the French Ambassador why so soon after the conciliatory conversations at Kissingen a German ship had appeared at Agadir without apparent reason, there were some recriminations, fencing, and *gestes* which it is not necessary to repeat. German Minister for Foreign Affairs first stated that German interests in the district were endangered, but when asked to indicate the dangers he shifted his ground and said that the German Government had gone to Agadir for the same reasons as the French Government had gone to Fez, for there were equal interests to protect, but he then went on to say that public opinion in Germany required such a demonstration, for the French Government had not carried on in the spirit of their engagement of 1909. M. Cambon reminded the German Minister for Foreign Affairs that there was also a public opinion in France, which had been much surprised at what the German Government had done, and German Minister for Foreign Affairs, when asked to specify breaches of the engagement of 1909, stated in the matter of railways nothing had been done except to construct French military railway—to which M. Cambon reminded him that the German Government had made no objection when informed of its proposed construction. This the German Minister for Foreign Affairs admitted, but he contended that the French were monopolising everything and keeping Germans out of all undertakings in Morocco, and it was necessary to come to an understanding before matters went further and to "causer."

M. Cambon then said that the French Government were quite ready to "causer." What had the German Minister for Foreign Affairs to propose? The answer was "nothing." M. Cambon gave the same reply to an enquiry by the German Minister for Foreign Affairs as to what the French Government had to propose. After a long pause the German Minister for Foreign Affairs said that he would be prepared to negotiate in regard to Morocco with M. Cambon at Berlin, but there must be no third party. The matter of an arrangement between Germany and France did not concern England. If she were brought in Spain would claim to join in the negotiations and then Russia and Austria, and there would be a renewal of the Algeciras Conference, which might lead to complications.

M. Cambon replied that the French Minister for Foreign Affairs was quite ready to converse with the German Government, but he must reserve to himself right of conversing through German Ambassador at Paris as well as through the French Ambassador at Berlin, and he must reserve to himself the right of keeping the British Government informed of the communications with the German Government, for France had engagements regarding Morocco with England, who had interests there, and also with other countries and with Spain, and though for the moment there was a divergence of views with Spain, the French Government were fully determined to adhere to their agreements with England and Spain, between whom there were also engagements regarding Morocco.

M. Cambon noticed that the German Minister for Foreign Affairs was surprised, "ému," and "atteint" at the attitude taken up by the British Government and public opinion in England.

German Minister for Foreign Affairs, after speaking for some time on the interests of Germany in Morocco, expressed his readiness to renounce all German political interests in Morocco in exchange for compensations elsewhere. When M. Cambon asked where and of what kind, German Minister for Foreign Affairs replied that Germany had all she required in the East. It was in the Congo that she would desire her compensations. He expressed surprise at M. Cambon's not having instructions on the subject, as the Congo had been mentioned in Kissingen conversations, and at M. Cambon's saying he must refer matter to Paris; and when he asked for some particulars German Minister for Foreign Affairs stated that he must wait a few days for return to Berlin of the Minister of Colonies, whom it would be necessary to consult.

M. Cambon has come to conclusion from attitude of German Minister for Foreign Affairs and what he hears at Berlin that there was a conviction there, resulting from impressions produced by exchange of civilities between Sovereigns of England and Germany and the visit of Crown Prince of Germany to London for Coronation and by reports made to German Government, that England disinterested herself entirely concerning Morocco, and that Germany might squeeze France without raising any question with England. In these circumstances she would have remained permanently at Agadir and elsewhere on Atlantic coast of Morocco. M. Cambon thinks that a few days' delay for return of Minister of Colonies is really for time to communicate with Emperor.

French Minister for Foreign Affairs intends to instruct French Ambassador that

there can be no question of territorial concessions to Germany in Morocco either by occupation of a port, even as a commercial one or otherwise, but that he is prepared to consider any suggestions that German Government may desire to make for compensation in return for renunciation by Germany of all political interests in Morocco. He gathers from French Ambassador in London that there would not be objection on the part of His Majesty's Government to concessions being made to Germany in regard to Congo. I told him I could not say, as, Congo being of great extent, it was impossible, until German desires were made known, to judge how British interests might be affected by their being granted. With regard, however, to an establishment of Germany on Atlantic coast of Morocco, even if there were a French Government prepared to acquiesce in such an arrangement British Government would never consent to it, for it would be contrary to vital interests of England, and the supposition that Germany had such an intention raised a strong feeling in country, as must have been evident to German Government from English news. French Minister for Foreign Affairs said that French Government could not for a moment think of such a thing as to consent to establishment of Germany anywhere in Morocco. It would be contrary to essential interests of France as well as of England.

After completion of negotiations with Germany, French Ambassador proposes to enter into negotiations with Spanish Government and His Majesty's Government for giving satisfaction, as far as may be possible and reasonable and in large spirit, to Spain. He trusted that meanwhile you will exert your influence at Madrid to restrain Spanish Government from foolish actions such as they have recently committed in Morocco, and appear bent on continuing. French Minister for Foreign Affairs would be glad to have your views on situation, as described to me by him.

[27350] No. 67.

Mr. White to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received July* 12.)

(No. 130.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Tangier, July* 12, 1911.

BRITISH vice-consul at Laraiche, writing morning of 11th July, reports arrival of 203 men and 4 officers of mountain artillery, with 89 mules and horses, by Spanish merchant-vessel. Cruiser "Carlos V" arrived night of 10th July, and vice-consul was informed that she also brought troops.

(Repeated to Madrid.)

[27474] No. 68.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received July* 13.)

(No. 323.)
Sir, *Paris, July* 12, 1911.

I had the honour to receive yesterday evening your despatch No. 276 of the 6th instant recording a conversation which you had had that day with the French Ambassador on the subject of Morocco. I was not previously aware of the possibility of His Majesty's Government acquiescing in the establishment of Germany on the Coast of Morocco. My fear was that the French Government, if hard pressed by the German Government, might prefer to consent to Germany obtaining a footing on the Atlantic Coast of Morocco, which would be more injurious to British than to French interests, and thus cast on His Majesty's Government the whole odium of opposing the fulfilment of objects which Germany was anxious to obtain, and France might not be entirely resolved to refuse. When, therefore, in the course of my interviews with the French Minister for Foreign Affairs on the 9th and 11th, which are reported in my telegrams Nos. 92 and 93 of those two dates, I learnt that he had informed the German Ambassador on the 8th instant that if the German Government had any idea of a permanent stay on the Morocco coast they must put it away from their thoughts, for it would be entirely inconsistent with great French interests, and when he informed me that the French Government could not acquiesce in the establishment of Germany on the Coast of Morocco in any way, not even in the form of a so-called free port, I encouraged him in that view by reminding him of the case of Batoum and the falsified assurances given in 1878 by Russia.

At the interview of yesterday M. de Selves expressed the intention to instruct the French Ambassador at Berlin that there can be no question of territorial concessions to

Germany in Morocco either by the occupation of a port, even as a commercial one, or otherwise. On this I observed to M. de Selves that even if there were a French Government prepared to acquiesce in the establishment of Germany on the Atlantic Coast of Morocco, the British Government would never consent to it, for it would be contrary to the vital interests of England, and the supposition that Germany had such an intention had raised a strong feeling in England, as must have been evident to the German Government from the English newspapers. M. de Selves replied to this observation that the French Government could not for a moment think of such a thing as to consent to the establishment of Germany anywhere in Morocco. It would be contrary to the essential interests of France as well as of England.

In saying what I did to M. de Selves, I had in mind what occurred in regard to the assurances given by Russia in 1878 respecting Batoum. By article 59 of the Treaty of Berlin the Emperor of Russia declared his intention to constitute Batoum a free port essentially commercial. Eight years later the Russian Ambassador in London delivered to the Earl of Rosebery a notice announcing the intention of the Emperor of Russia to terminate that arrangement, but stating that Batoum would preserve in the future the character of a port essentially commercial. Lord Rosebery instructed His Majesty's Ambassador at St. Petersburgh to inform the Russian Government that His Majesty's Government could not consent to recognise or associate themselves in any shape or form with this proceeding, and that they were compelled to place on record their view that it constituted a violation of the treaty of Berlin, unsanctioned by the signatory Powers. So far as I can recollect no other Power signatory of the Berlin treaty made any like protest, and Batoum became a fortified port. I did not suppose, judging by the history of our relations with the German Government, that any assurances in regard to the character of a port in their possession or occupation could be relied on to be observed by them beyond such period as they might consider necessary in their own interests. They might adhere in the letter to assurances that the port would remain a free port and a commercial port and yet accumulate at it for future use a store of guns, and make other military preparations for converting it at short notice and at a favourable opportunity, first by earthworks and later on by more formidable defences, into a fortified naval base, and so create a danger to British interests.

I have, &c.
FRANCIS BERTIE.

[27481] No. 69.

Mr. White to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received July* 13.)

(No. 131.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Tangier, July* 13, 1911.

I LEARN from Mr. Vice-Cousul Forde that the Spanish cruiser "Carlos V," to which reference was made in my telegram No. 130, has landed at Laraiche 400 marines with two guns destined for Alcazar.

Reports have reached this legation to the effect that a Spanish post is to be established at a spot near Fishtala, on the south-west point of their zone. They would march through Masmouda to reach this spot, which is more than half-way to Fez from Alcazar. No confirmation of this report has reached me. M. de Billy stated to me that his Government could not allow such action to be taken by Spain.

He also informed me that the Makhzen soldiers stationed at Alcazar are being bribed by the Spaniards to desert with their arms and join the police.

[27343] No. 70.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 174.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, July* 13, 1911.

MOROCCO. Your telegram No. 93 of the 11th July.

A settlement by which Germany, in return for compensation in the French Congo, ceased to raise difficulties in Morocco would appear *primâ facie* to be without prejudice to our interests and very satisfactory; at any rate, it would be infinitely preferable to any basis of negotiations which included compensation to Germany in Morocco. But,

until I know precisely what Germany intends to ask and to give, I cannot, of course, express any final opinion.

His Majesty's Government would consider absolutely irreconcilable with British interests any settlement of Moorish question which gave Germany a footing on the Mediterranean. Regarded solely from British point of view, a footing on the west coast of Morocco is not vital, provided no port is fortified. We should require a binding engagement to that effect, and we could rely on our naval power to prevent fortification. But, if Germany obtains territorial or political footing in Morocco, we should, in order to satisfy public opinion here, have to obtain something from her elsewhere, and it is the least desirable form that settlement could take. I understand from the French Government that it would be objectionable to France in the highest degree. If this is the case, we need not discuss question of bringing it into the negotiations.

[27622] No. 71.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen.

(No. 148.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, July* 13, 1911.

ITALIAN Ambassador having asked my opinion about Morocco, I said that Germany had opened the question in the worst possible way. Having given it to be understood that her interests were only commercial, she had gone to a port which was closed commercially; she had thus made it clear that commercial interests were only a pretext. Agadir happened also to be the port most suitable for a naval base. Germany had thus at the outset mobilised the whole of British public opinion, and made it certain that our interests would be engaged on the side of France.

It is now for Germany, if she wishes to make conversations easy, to do so by removing first impression created by her action.

We do not wish to impede a settlement between her and France, but we must wait to know what Germany's object is before we can decide whether British interests require us to intervene in discussions.

You should adapt your language to these views when the occasion demands it, or if it becomes necessary to repeat or supplement what I said to German Ambassador on 4th July.

[27479] No. 72.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 283.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, July* 13, 1911.

THE French Ambassador called on Sir A. Nicolson on the 8th instant and read to him a telegram from M. de Selves, stating that he had asked the German Ambassador to call at the Quai d'Orsay, and had explained to him that the French Government desired to ascertain in a friendly manner what were the desiderata of the German Goverment and to discuss matters amicably. The German Ambassador had replied that he had no instructions on the subject, and that he thought the conversations between the French and German Governments should take place at Berlin. To this M. de Selves had demurred, and he had requested the German Ambassador to telegraph to his Government and urge that the discussions should be proceeded with at Paris.

Sir Arthur Nicolson told M. Cambon that he did not quite comprehend M. de Selves's procedure, as he had been under the impression that the British and French Governments were, in the first place, to come to an understanding as to what line was to be followed with Germany, and that they would then address themselves together to Berlin. M. Cambon agreed, but said that it was necessary, before taking any step, to ascertain what Germany actually wanted. When Germany had formulated her requirements the moment would then arrive to tell her, as indeed had already been done, that the French Government must consult with His Majesty's Government, and M. de Selves might repeat this to the German Ambassador at their next meeting. The French Government were at present only endeavouring to ascertain what Germany wanted, but it was their intention to fall in with the British view that they should

explain clearly to the German Government that France would not enter into discussions without the participation of His Majesty's Government.

M. Cambon then read a second telegram, in which M. de Selves expressed the hope that His Majesty's Government would associate themselves with the French Government in requesting the German Government, with the view of rendering the discussions easier, to withdraw their ship from Agadir. While expressing doubts whether the German Government would agree to do this, Sir A. Nicolson replied that he would refer the point to me.

M. Cambon again laid stress on the fact that whatever compensations might eventually be accorded to Germany, they must on no account be given in Morocco. This was, for the French Government, a condition *sine quâ non*. His Excellency added that this was as much in the interests of Great Britain as of France.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[27568] No. 73.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 285.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, July* 13, 1911.

THE French Ambassador called at the Foreign Office on the 11th instant and read to Sir A. Nicolson a telegram from Berlin giving an account of the conversation respecting Morocco between the German Minister for Foreign Affairs and M. Jules Cambon, the French Ambassador there. The latter had emphasised with M. de Kiderlen that France must keep both His Majesty's Government and Spain fully informed of what passed, and consult both Powers as to any arrangements. Sir A. Nicolson observed that he was glad to hear Spain had been so specifically mentioned, as the Spanish Ambassador had recently expressed some uneasiness lest Spain should be left out in the cold until all had been practically settled; and he gave M. Paul Cambon a short account of what had passed between M. de Villa Urrutia and himself on the preceding day.

His Excellency said it was now necessary to wait to hear what Germany wanted, and he seemed to be somewhat perplexed as to what she would claim as an equivalent to giving France a free hand in Morocco.

He asked if Sir A. Nicolson had noticed reports in the press as to a secret treaty between Mulai Hafid and France. The facts were that last year the Sultan had suggested—

1. That France should guarantee him in possession of his throne;
2. That he should be given a money advance;
3. That in return he would promise always to employ French military instructors; and
4. To give France the preference in any concessions.

France had refused to enter into any such engagements.

M. Cambon observed more particularly that, as regards No. 1 the responsibilities would be too great; that as regards No. 3 the French had military instructors already; while No. 4 was contrary to the Act of Algeciras.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[27630] No. 74.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 14.)

(No. 99.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Paris, July* 14, 1911.

FRENCH Minister for Foreign Affairs informs me that the French Ambassador had another interview yesterday with the German Minister for Foreign Affairs, who stated that Germany has no intention to establish herself in Morocco ("prendre pied au Maroc"), that German Government realised that Sultan cannot of himself re-establish his authority. German Government are therefore prepared to recognise that task of preventing disorder and anarchy and restoring authority of the Sultan properly devolves on France. In return for this recognition it would be necessary

that there should be some rectifications of frontier between the Cameroon and the French Congo which the German Minister for Foreign Affairs did not specify. He further said that German metallurgic industry has mining interests in the Sus country, and the German Government would wish to know what guarantee to that interest French Government would be prepared to give.

[27639] No. 75.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 14.)

(No. 100.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Paris, July 14, 1911.*

I BROUGHT unofficially to the notice of the Minister for Foreign Affairs this morning complaints made to Sir A. Nicolson by Spanish Ambassador respecting the proceedings of certain French agents at Alcazar.

French Minister for Foreign Affairs said that complaints were pretexts on the part of Spanish authorities for sending artillery and reinforcements to Alcazar. He had interview on 12th July with Spanish Ambassador, who had made several such complaints. He told him that French Government desired very much to spare the susceptibilities of Spain, and at proper moment to come to an understanding with Spain, but proceedings of Spanish officers rendered position very difficult, and they appeared to regard districts which they have occupied without the authority of the Sultan as conquered territory, and they forbid Moorish authorities from carrying out their duties. France is acting at the request of the Sultan. Spain is acting contrary to his wishes. The action of French officers has for its object maintenance or re-establishment of the authority of the Sultan, whereas proceedings of the Spanish authorities appear to be directed to its destruction. In order to obviate friction and probable conflicts between mehallas under French officers and Spanish troops he has impressed on French commanders the advisability of avoiding as much as possible going into neighbourhood of Spanish troops and of observing greatest tact when they come into contact with or relations with Spanish officers.

Spanish Ambassador takes line of argument that Spanish troops have been obliged to act as they have done, and the occupation of the country must be taken as an existing fact and be considered from that point of view.

[27637] No. 76.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 14.)

(No. 48.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Berlin, July 14, 1911.*

A FORMAL demand appears to have been made by the Spanish Government both here and in Paris to be allowed to participate in the conversations now proceeding between France and Germany. To this Herr von Kiderlen objected, and made the suggestion that a refusal couched in practically identic terms should be sent by the German and French Governments to this demand. His Excellency drafted a reply himself, which he has addressed to the Spanish Ambassador here, and which, as I am given to understand, has been addressed to the Spanish Ambassador in Paris by the French Minister for Foreign Affairs.

The following is secret:—

I learn that Herr von Kiderlen told French Ambassador that, in the event of the Spanish Government persisting in their demand, he would tell the Spanish Ambassador that, in return for Germany's disinterestedness in Moroccan affairs, France was ready to sacrifice some colonial territory. He said he would then ask Spanish Ambassador what his Government were prepared to offer if they were ready to take a similar course, and would add that there could not possibly be any reason why Spain should participate in the conversations unless she wished to make an offer similar to that of France.

[27567] No. 77.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Rennie.

(No. 77.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, July 14, 1911.*

THE Spanish Ambassador called at the Foreign Office on the 8th instant, but had little to say that was new beyond the usual complaints as to French action at Alcazar. The Spanish Government are chiefly exercised at the report that the French were instigating the Sultan to send a mehalla to Alcazar. His Excellency stated that, if this were the case, Spain would immediately reinforce her troops there. On this point Sir A. Nicolson gave his Excellency the usual advice.

In answer to a question whether the Spanish Government had any news as to what it was that Germany desired to obtain his Excellency replied in the negative, but stated that the German Government had informed the Spanish Government some little time ago that the price they would ask would be a "big one."

His Excellency further said that Spain did not at all like the establishment of the Germans at Agadir in proximity to the Canaries.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[27874] No. 78.

Mr. Rennie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 17.)

(No. 119.)
Sir, *Madrid, July 7, 1911.*

YESTERDAY, at his last weekly reception before Señor Garcia Prieto leaves for San Sebastian, I enquired what truth there was in the reports contained in Mr. White's telegrams Nos. 121, 122, and 123 regarding the landing of 200 engineers at Laraiche and the projected occupation of Arzila.

His Excellency immediately said that there was no intention whatever on the part of the Spanish Government either to move on Arzila or to extend their scope of action in the Arzila district, and he asked me to inform you of his categorical denial. He then proceeded to say that Colonel Silvestre, who has, I understand, been displaying somewhat undue activity of late near Alcazar, had been summoned to Tangier to confer with the Spanish Minister, and to receive instructions as to the exact limits to which he was to confine himself. He had travelled overland viâ Arzila, and had been accompanied by a small escort.

As regards the reported intention to dispatch a battalion of marines to Alcazar, the rumour was entirely unfounded. The number of engineers landed had also been exaggerated. The number actually dispatched had been well under 100, he thought about 60, but he would enquire of the Minister of War. These men had been sent to put up some shelter huts at Laraiche and a portable hospital at Alcazar.

Señor Garcia Prieto gave similer explanations yesterday afternoon, after I had seen his Excellency, to the French chargé d'affaires, who, noticing in the evening newspaper the publication of similar reports, had telephoned to ask whether there was any foundation for them.

The "Times" correspondent, who had seen the president of the council earlier in the day, informs me that his Excellency gave him an equally categorical denial of any intention on the part of the Spanish Government to extend their sphere of action.

The Spanish Government have been somewhat exercised of late by Colonel Silvestre's undue activity. Señor Canalejas, as I have already reported, told the French chargé d'affaires on the 29th June that orders had been sent to all officers commanding units in Morocco not to extend their limits of action, and that Colonel Silvestre had been specially warned. At one time, I believe, the Spanish Government intended to recall that officer, but it was finally decided to retain him, in view of his local experience and general knowledge of the situation, and to order him to Tangier, there to receive precise verbal instructions from the Spanish Minister, and also maps to show him the limits to which he was to confine his action.

I have, &c.
ERNEST RENNIE.

[27875] No. 79.

Mr. Rennie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 17.)

(No. 120.)

Sir, *Madrid, July 7, 1911.*

THE tone of the Madrid press, which at first showed considerable pleasure and excitement at the first news of the German move on Agadir, is beginning to modify, and it appears now to be realised that the embarrassment it causes to France may be to a certain extent shared by Spain.

There seems reason to believe that the receipt of the German notification has been far from welcomed by Government circles. When I saw the Minister for Foreign Affairs yesterday his Excellency was inclined at first to be reserved, but he went on to say that the German action had been quite unexpected, and admitted that it might prove embarrassing to Spain in view of the proximity of Agadir both to Ifni and the Canariesi. The return of M. Selves to Paris, he said, must now be awaited.

M. Martin, the French chargé d'affaires, tells me that in his conversation with Señor Garcia Prieto yesterday his Excellency, though disinclined to talk about Agadir except in a vague general manner, had almost gone out of his way to be conciliatory and friendly; he had promised to arrange for a speedy settlement of various small outstanding cases, and had talked of the possibility of influencing the press to adopt a more favourable tone towards France. M. Martin, too, notices signs that the intervention of a third Power in the Morocco question is by no means pleasing here.

As regards their own action at Alcazar, however, the Spanish Government appear by no means inclined to change their attitude. It is true that the murder of Ben Malek, the Spanish protégé, has been practically discarded as one of the motives of their move. Señor Canalejas admitted as much in a conversation that I had with him last week, when he talked of the French action at Fez and of the necessity which had been thereby caused for Spain to assert herself, and yesterday Señor Garcia Prieto spoke in a similar strain. In the course of our conversation I had said that it seemed a pity that the Spanish Government had never seen their way to making a more precise statement of intentions with regard to Alcazar. To this his Excellency replied, almost impatiently, that no date could possibly have been fixed, and that the move had been forced upon Spain by the French action at the Moorish capital and by the delay of the French Cabinet in dealing with various demands put forward by the Spanish Government during the Madrid conversations. His remarks as regards Fez were very similar to those made to me by Señor Canalejas last week. It seemed useless, in the circumstances, to enter into an argument with his Excellency, who then turned the conversation to more general topics.

I have, &c.
ERNEST RENNIE.

[27868] No. 80.

Mr. White to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 17.)

(No. 209. Confidential.)

Sir, *Tangier, July 8, 1911.*

THE French chargé d'affaires came to see me yesterday morning and enquired whether I had received news of the grave events that had occurred at Alcazar.

I informed M. de Billy that the British consular agent had unfortunately been absent from Alcazar. He had called at the legation on the morning of the 5th and told me he had been obliged to come to Tangier on urgent private affairs. I had instructed him to return to his post atonce, and he had promised to leave the following morning, but I had not yet received any report from him.

M. de Billy said that unfortunately M. Boisset had also been absent from Alcazar on private affairs, and that the Spaniards had apparently taken advantage of the absence of the French and English consular officers to take action. M. Marchand, the French vice-consul at Laraiche, had reported that he had heard from the acting vice-consul at Alcazar that Colonel Silvestre had been behaving in a very high-handed

manner, had turned Moorish troops out of their barracks and disarmed them, forbidding them to do any guard or patrol duties, and threatening them with arrest should they disobey his orders in this respect.

M. de Billy appeared much annoyed at the proceedings of the Spaniards, who were constantly increasing their forces and asserting themselves more and more, and he asked my advice as to what should be done to check them, observing that nothing short of sending some French ships to Laraiche would have any effect.

I said that it appeared to me that there was nothing to be done but to keep his Government informed and leave it to them to decide what steps should be taken.

He replied that that was all very well, but it involved a loss of time, and it was necessary to do something at once: he mentioned that the Sultan was sending a force of cavalry to Alcazar.

His Majesty's consul at Fez had reported to me the dispatch of 130 cavalry, but had said that its object was to patrol the country south of the River Lukkos, and maintain order in that district, so I enquired of M. de Billy whether this force was actually to enter Alcazar or to remain on the other side of the river. He replied that the force was to come to Alcazar, as the Sultan had said that he could not admit that his own troops could not enter that town: the French officer attached would not, however, cross the river.

I observed that the entry of this force into Alcazar at this moment might well give rise to an unpleasant incident, there would even be danger of an actual conflict, and if any fighting were to occur there was no knowing where it would stop.

M. de Billy appeared at first to doubt whether active opposition on the part of the Moorish troops was not to be desired, but I pointed out to him that there was nothing to gain and everything to lose by adopting such a line of policy. Should any fighting occur the Spanish Government would undoubtedly immediately send large reinforcements to Alcazar, and they would occupy a much more extensive region—it was, indeed, impossible to foresee the consequences. I most strongly urged him to follow a course of great prudence and to do all he could to maintain calm and prevent the occurrence of any disturbance.

M. de Billy in the end agreed with me and promised to follow my advice. He has since communicated to me copy of a report he has received from Lieutenant Thiret, who remained with Shekawi's mehalla after the departure of Captain Moreaux. It gives a detailed account of what passed when Colonel Silvestre visited the barracks of the Sultan's troops. The barracks which the Spaniards are said to have taken possession of were those of the force under Raisuli's representative, Ben Dahan.

M. de Billy this afternoon read me a telegram he had received from his Government informing him that the Spanish Ambassador had complained that Moorish troops had taken advantage of the absence of Colonel Silvestre, with a considerable number of his troops, to take possession of barracks in the occupation of the Spaniards, and that Colonel Silvestre had been obliged in consequence to hurry back to Alcazar instead of coming to Tangier as he had intended. M. de Billy also read me his reply, to the effect that the facts were exactly the contrary to what was stated by M. Pérez Caballero.

Mr. Consular Agent Carleton informed me, when he called at this legation on the 5th instant, that when at Arzila, on his way here, he had seen Raisuli, who had been annoyed at receiving a letter from M. Engerer informing him that Colonel Silvestre was coming to see him at Arzila, that he would leave the infantry accompanying him at Tlata Raisana, about four hours' march from Arzila, and the cavalry would stop at an hour's distance, only a small escort accompanying him to Arzila. M. Engerer, the writer of this letter, is a native of Malta, who used to keep a small café at Tangier, but has now been established for some years at Alcazar. He acted as Spanish vice-consul for a short time, and is said to have been active in the distribution of Spanish protection amongst the natives. The Spanish Government conferred upon him the cross of Isabel la Católica in 1910. Captain Ovilo and Colonel Silvestre have made much use of him, and, as I learn from Mr. Carleton, he has generally accompanied the Spanish column as guide on their various expeditions from Alcazar.

Raisuli told Mr. Carleton that he did not intend to answer M. Engerer's letter, but I understand that subsequently he changed his mind, and replied that he would be happy to receive a visit from Colonel Silvestre privately, but could not consent to any armed troops entering the town.

As stated above, Colonel Silvestre did not reach Arzila, but returned hurriedly to Alcazar. I endeavoured, without success, to obtain some information on the subject at the Spanish Legation. M. de Villasinda happened to be out, and M. Padilla, the first

secretary, whom I saw, informed me that they had no information at the legation as to the reason of Colonel Silvestre's return to Alcazar, or as to any incident having occurred at that place.

I have, &c.
HERBERT E. WHITE.

Enclosure in No. 80.

Report communicated to the Lieutenant-Colonel Commanding the Military Mission at Fez by Lieutenant Thiret.

Agissements des Espagnols.

DES faits extrêmement graves se sont produits aujourd'hui à El Ksar.

Vers midi une troupe espagnole d'environ une centaine d'hommes (troupes blanches et indigènes de la police) a pris possession, définitivement, de la caserne Dar Rilan, où les Espagnols n'avaient placés le 3 juillet qu'un poste de vingt-cinq hommes. Une quinzaine d'hommes du tabor Ben Dahan qui s'y trouvait été désarmés et gardés à vue. Un homme a été brutalisé, un malade qui se trouvait dans une chambre a été enlevé et jeté dans la cour au milieu des chevaux. Le consul d'espagne était présent.

Les Espagnols ont installé un poste sur la route de Fez, au gué du Loukkos (rive droite) avec des vedettes sur la rive gauche. Je me rendais à El Ksar vers 4 heures de l'après-midi pour y régler des questions privées à la poste française quand je fus arrêté par ces vedettes. C'était d'ailleurs une méprise ainsi que me l'expliqua le chef du poste. Les vedettes auraient eu simplement l'intention de désarmer un cavalier du tabor de Ben Dahan qui se rendait à la ville en même temps que moi. Je pus continuer ma route sans difficultés.

De nombreuses patrouilles espagnoles circulent dans la ville.

Dans la soirée, vers 7 heures et demie, des hommes du tabor d'Abdesselam, qui assuraient leur service de garde journalier, ont été désarmés par les Espagnols et arrêtés, puis relâchés. Les armes confisquées par les Espagnols n'ont pas été rendues, pas plus que les chevaux pris à la kechla Dar Rilan.

Vers 8 heures, je me trouvait à la caserne du Caïd Abdesselam, où j'avais été prendre mon cheval, que j'y avais remisé. Je m'apprêtais à rejoindre mon camp, lorsqu'une troupe espagnole forte d'environ cinquante à soixante hommes se présenta devant la caserne. Le Colonel Silvestre suivi d'un groupe d'officiers et accompagné du consul d'Espagne pénétra sous la porche. Je m'y trouvait à ce moment avec les caïds tabors Abdesselam. Je crus devoir m'avancer vers le colonel et le saluer.

Le colonel me fit connaître qu'il désirait parler aux caïds tabors et qu'il trouvait étrange de les voir se refuser à tout entretien avec lui. Quelques heures avant le colonel avait fait appeler le Caïd Ben Dahan par son propre caïd tabor et quelques cavaliers, dont un mit en joue le Caïd Ben Dahan, pendant que le caïd du tabor espagnol lui transmettait l'ordre de se rendre auprès du colonel. Ben Dahan s'y était refusé.

Je me trouvais acculé à une conversation que je désirais éviter. Je répondis néanmoins au colonel que les caïds tabors se trouvaient devant lui et je les lui présentai. Je crus devoir ajouter que ces officiers n'avaient reçu aucun ordre pour se mettre à sa disposition et que personnellement j'avais la charge de l'instruction et de l'administration des tabors d'El Ksar et que dans cet ordre d'idées mon autorité s'étendait sur leurs chefs.

Le colonel me fit connaître qu'il était chargé par son Gouvernement d'assurer la sécurité dans El Ksar, que toutes les troupes de la ville y compris les troupes chérifiennes se trouvait, par suite, placées sous ses ordres qu'à l'avenir il assurait seul le service de garde de la ville et que les Caïds Ben Dahan et Abdesselam devraient lui obéir.

Je répondis que je n'avais pas qualité pour poursuivre cette conversation et je laissai le colonel s'adresser aux caïds tabors. Il dit alors à ces derniers qu'ils devraient se placer sous son autorité, que les troupes espagnoles d'El Ksar servaient sous le drapeau marocain et que lui et ses troupes faisaient partie de la police du Sultan.

Les caïds lui répondirent qu'un ordre écrit du Sultan ou du naïb leur était nécessaire et que faute de quoi ils continueraient à faire leur service comme par le passé.

Au cours de la conversation, le Colonel Silvestre me fit connaître que des hommes de la méhalla de Mazagan venaient en ville avec leurs fusils. J'ai opposé un démenti

formel à cette allégation. Les hommes de ladite méhalla ne sont à El Ksar qu'en permission régulière et sans armes.

En ce qui me concerne, je n'ai jamais pensé qu'El Ksar me fût interdit pour y régler des questions personnelles. Je n'y suis allé que rarement et je n'y ai jamais conduit ni une troupe ni un homme en armes. Ma présence y serait pourtant bien nécessaire pour me permettre de surveiller l'instruction et l'administration des tabors chérifiens. Jusqu'à ce jour je suis resté étranger au service intérieur de ces tabors. Je n'ai jamais pénétré dans le camp de Ben Dahan.

Le khalifa de Raisuli à Ksar aurait, dit-on, été prévenu des projets des Espagnols, notamment en ce qui concernait le désarmement des soldats. Il n'en avait rien dit aux caïds tabors et il est fort heureux que cette omission, sans nul doute volontaire, n'ait pas eu les pires conséquences. Mais les soldats étaient prévenus depuis plusieurs jours de n'avoir à opposer aucune résistance quoiqu'il arrivât. Ils n'ont pas été surpris des mesures brutales prises par les Espagnols et se sont laissés désarmer sans résistance. L'action que j'ai cru devoir exercer sur les caïds tabors a eu comme objet d'éviter une effusion de sang possible. Ce résultat a été obtenu grâce au sang-froid des caïds.

Je suis convaincu que sans ma présence toute fortuite à la caserne Abdesselam les Espagnols y auraient pénétré—la présence du consul d'Espagne l'indique clairement. C'était la fin du tabor de la ville, qui est ici maintenant le seul vestige de l'autorité du Maghzen, bien qu'il se trouve dans l'impossibilité de continuer à assurer son service, puisque les patrouilles espagnoles désarment les postes qu'il fournit.

Plus que jamais il me semble que ma situation à El Ksar soit bien précisée et que mon rôle auprès des tabors soit affirmé. Ce serait le contre-poids nécessaire à l'action espagnole. Il ne me suffit plus de dire aux tabors de continuer à faire leur service comme par le passé. Après ce qui s'est passé aujourd'hui, cela n'est plus possible. Aucun service de garde ou de patrouille ne sera plus fourni par ces tabors, sauf la garde de la poste de la caserne Abdesselam. Pas un soldat en armes ne circulera en ville, de façon à éviter tout frottement avec les Espagnols et tout prétexte. Personnellement, je ne quitterai pas Boudjenah ; j'attendrai ainsi vos instructions.

Je crois encore devoir insister sur ma conviction que les Espagnols ne reculeront devant rien pour assurer le champ libre dans El Ksar et que le khalifa de Raisuli à El Ksar favorise leur action.

THIRET.

Boudjenah, le 5 juillet, 1911.

[27869] No. 81.

Mr. White to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 17.)

(No. 210.)

Sir, *Tangier, July 9*, 1911.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 199 of the 2nd instant, I have the honour to transmit herewith copy of a despatch I have received from His Majesty's consul at Fez, reporting that the German consul had had an interview with the Sultan, and had informed His Majesty that a German vessel had been sent to Agadir. Mulai Hafid, according to Dr. Vassel, appeared unpleasantly taken aback at this communication, upon which, however, His Majesty offered no comment.

In a radiogram dated the 6th instant, which, however, was delayed in transit owing to the Casa Blanca apparatus being in constant use by the French military authorities, and only reached me to-day, His Majesty's vice-consul at Mogador states that, according to a report which he considers reliable, two German vessels arrived at Agadir on the 3rd instant in addition to the "Panther," which arrived on the 2nd. The French consul at Mogador sent a similar report to his legation, but giving the 4th instant as the date of the arrival of the two vessels. These reports are, however, from native sources, and must be received with caution ; they probably arose from the arrival of the "Berlin" to replace the "Panther," which apparently called at Mogador for instructions and proceeded to the Canary Islands after revisiting Agadir.

I beg leave to transmit herewith a paraphrase of the radiogram received from Mr. Vice-Consul Johnstone.

The present action of the German Government explains their reluctance to consent to anything approaching even a partial and temporary opening of that port to trade when it was suggested to send foodstuffs there by sea to relieve the famine-stricken inhabitants (see Sir R. Lister's despatches No. 11 of the 27th January and No. 18, Confidential, of the 5th February last).

With regard to the owning of land in that neighbourhood, I would recall the fact that British subjects and protégés have also made such purchases, as reported in Sir R. Lister's despatch No. 13 of the 30th January last. As to commercial interests, the table of statistics enclosed herewith proves that British trade far exceeds that of Germany. I have quoted the trade of Mogador separately, as it is through that port that all the trade of Agadir and the Southern districts now passes. It is only in the way of prospecting for mines that, owing to the activity of the Brothers Mannesmann, German interests are more important than those of Great Britain, but it must be borne in mind that the Union des Mines has very important mining interests in Sus, and probably other companies and individuals have also denounced mineral deposits in those regions.

I have, &c.
HERBERT E. WHITE.

Enclosure 1 in No. 81.

Consul MacLeod to Mr. White.

(No. 57. Confidential.)
Sir, *Fez, July 5*, 1911.

LAST evening the German consul here, Dr. Vassel, told me privately that the other day he received instructions from his Government to obtain an audience of the Sultan, and to inform His Majesty that, in view of the dangers to which German subjects and German interests were exposed at Agadir, both by reason of local conditions and the effects there ("répercussion") of events elsewhere in Morocco, the German Government had decided to send a ship of war to that port.

No mention was made of the size of the vessel or as to whether forces would be landed from it.

Dr. Vassel added that he had made the above communication to the Sultan, and that His Majesty appeared unpleasantly taken aback and had offered no comment upon it.

Agadir being a closed port, I was somewhat at a loss to think how German subjects could, legitimately, be settled and trading there, to which Dr. Vassel replied that he had no particulars, but he imagined there might be agents and mining interests of the Mannesmann firm in the Agadir region.

No more was said. Dr. Vassel's statement, naturally, recalled to my mind the reports so often current in recent years, especially in the spring and summer of 1905, of Germany contemplating the acquisition of a port in Southern Morocco, possibly for development into a naval station.

In the spring of 1905 I remember the French Minister, M. St. René Taillandier, reading to me a communication he had had from his Government that the British Ambassador at Paris had been making inquiries of them on that subject, and asking M. St. René Taillandier for his views as to that report being true.

I have, &c.
J. M. MACLEOD.

Enclosure 2 in No. 81.

COMPARATIVE Statement of Trade with Morocco.

Country.	Mogador.		All Ports.	
	1909.	1910.	1909.	1910.
Imports.	£	£	£	£
Great Britain	183,011	115,005	1,294,385	973,791
France	192,780	133,019	1,039,741	926,925
Germany	29,195	30,412	203,873	285,185
Total all Countries	411,034	115,005	2,809,597	2,468,459
Exports				
Great Britain	139 362	73,585	799,206	413,160
France	35,835	40,702	323,139	351,928
Germany	99,158	120,720	339,428	380,459
Total all Countries	301,770	277,401	1,807,549	1,575,385
Total Trade.				
Great Britain	322,373	188,590	2,093,591	1,386,954
France	228,615	173,721	1,362,880	1,277,983
Germany	128,353	151,132	543,301	665,644
Total all Countries	712,804	564,812	4,617,146	4,043,844

Enclosure 3 in No. 81.

Vice-Consul Johnstone to Mr. White.

(Telegraphic.) P. *Mogador, July 8*, 1911.

GERMAN ship "Panther," which it is stated is the vessel which arrived at Agadir last Sunday, arrived at this port from the south at an early hour this morning. The German vice-consul here went on board after receiving the visit of some of the ship's officers. The "Panther" left southwards again to-day at 10·30 A.M.

On 3rd July, according to well-founded reports, two German vessels visited Agadir. Four men went on shore with the Sheikh Hamed Albot, who had gone on board. He accompanied them through the town, and explained to them the position of Agadir and its surrounding hills.

The representative of Kaïd Guilluli left Mogador yesterday, and I hear that his representative at Agadir has also left that place.

[27870] No. 82.

Mr. White to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 17.)

(No. 211.)
Sir, *Tangier, July 9*, 1911.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 192 of the 1st instant I have the honour to report that, having received the submission of all the factions of the Beni M'tir, General Moinier proceeded to open the direct road from Mequinez to Rabat through the Zemmour country. This he has now successfully accomplished after defeating that tribe in an engagement on the 3rd instant which lasted several hours, and in which their losses must have been considerable, although the French losses were trifling. Three posts have been established on the road, including "Camp Monod" at Barrawi, where General Ditte was encamped, and Sok-el-Arba where the fighting took place, where 1,200 men will be stationed.

General Moiner, with the remainder of the column, was reported to be returning to Mequinez, and it is not yet known what his plans now are. It is possible that recent events may cause him to modify his former intention of remaining at Mequinez during the hot season. A despatch from His Majesty's consul at Casa Blanca, copy of which I have the honour to enclose, would make it appear that the campaign against

the Zaers is to be undertaken at once, but M. de Billy told me this morning that he had no information on the subject.

In the meantime the French have burnt all the crops between Sallee and Mehdia as a punishment. The British vice-consul in reporting this says, "these measures, though seemingly harsh, are nevertheless necessary, as the Sallee–Mehdia road is still quite unsafe. Tribes are now sending in their submission."

Mr. Consul MacLeod reports that there are a number of cases of typhoid and dysentery amongst the French troops, and the Charsa Bennis, usually assigned as the residence of foreign Ministers visiting the court, has been turned into a hospital, where there are at present over 100 cases. There is another house used as a hospital for less serious complaints.

Mr. MacLeod remarks on the behaviour of the French troops at Fez, which he says has been surprisingly good; the men being kept well in hand by their officers.

M. de Billy informs me that Colonel Mangin is going home on leave, Major Bremond remains as head of the French Military Mission. I should not be surprised were Colonel Mangin to be given a post elsewhere, as I think it is realised that he is not quite the man for his present post, though a good and fearless soldier and personally a charming man. M. de Billy said that it was quite necessary that he should go on leave, as the trying times he had passed through had told on his nerves and he was in an excitable state and required a rest. He has, I know, recently complained rather bitterly of the English residents at Fez, and it is realised at the French Legation that his judgment is warped and that he takes a wrong view of things.

I have, &c.
HERBERT E. WHITE.

Enclosure in No. 82.

Consul Madden to Mr. White.

(No. 135.)

Sir, *Casa Blanca, July* 6, 1911.

THIS morning a column some 2,000 strong, with artillery and guns, left Casa Blanca under command of M. le Colonel Branlière to concentrate at Camp Boulhaut, the objective being the punishment of the Zaer tribes for the ambushing and murder of an officer and soldiers in the present year under circumstances which I had the honour of reporting to His Majesty's Legation at the time.

It was generally said that the Zaer punitive expedition was to be held back till the cooler weather, but reasons for its rather sudden departure are not known.

In private circles I have heard it stated that General Moinier may be back in Casa Blanca before very long, and that he would then go to Paris.

I have, &c.
A. M. MADDEN.

[27849]

No. 83.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 17.)

(No. 194. Very Confidential.)

Sir, *Berlin, July* 12, 1911.

MY French colleague has kindly communicated to me confidentially all that has passed between him and Herr von Kiderlen both at Kissingen on the 20th ultimo and at Berlin since his return from Paris.

It appears that it was at Kissingen, in the course of conversation, that M. Cambon first pointed out plainly to Herr von Kiderlen that there was one thing to which, in the face of public opinion, the French Government could not possibly assent, namely, that Germany should obtain a political or territorial footing in Morocco. To this Herr von Kiderlen replied that German public opinion must also be taken into account; that in German commercial and industrial circles much resentment was felt at the manner in which France had neglected to carry out the provisions of the 1909 agreement from which they had hoped so much; and that this resentment would be extended to the Imperial Government if the latter sat still with folded arms while

France was doing what she liked with Morocco. M. Cambon appears to have admitted that in some respects, particularly as regards certain projected railways, the German expectations under the 1909 agreement had not been entirely realised. This had been the fault of circumstances, but not the result of any want of good faith on the part of the French Government. If, as appeared from what Herr von Kiderlen had said, the German Government felt aggrieved in this respect, he thought that his Government would be ready to give some satisfaction, always presupposing that territorially and politically speaking Germany would disinterest herself from Morocco, and seek such satisfaction as might be justifiable outside, and not in, that country. After a conversation of considerable length, Herr von Kiderlen said that as France seemed determined to exclude Germany from Morocco, and as M. Cambon had given him to understand that in the present state of feeling in France no Government could stand who took an opposite view, he supposed that he must make the best of it, and seek the satisfaction to which Germany was clearly entitled in some other quarter. He thought he would be justified in asking for some colonial advantages such as it was in the power of France to give, and suggested that a rectification of the Congo frontier in a manner favourable to German interests might be acceptable. Perhaps Germany might also ask for something in the East ("dans l'Orient"). M. Cambon must at this point have shown some sign of interruption, because Herr von Kiderlen added quickly, "Well, that will probably not be necessary, as after all we have all we want there!"

Finally, Herr von Kiderlen begged M. Cambon to lay the above suggestion before the French Government, and this M. Cambon, in the idea that a declaration on the part of Germany of disinterestedness as regards Morocco was worth a considerable sacrifice, promised to do.

Thereupon M. Cambon left for Paris, and arrived there to find the Ministry fallen. He was therefore unable for the moment to report his conversation with Herr von Kiderlen. In the meantime he received a letter from his naval attaché, dated from Kiel, saying that the Emperor had been particularly gracious to him, and had again and again assured him of the friendly feelings felt by both him and his Government for France, and of their lively desire that the question of Morocco should be settled without any friction between the two Governments. The letter, which was apparently written on the very day when the fall of the French Government had been announced, added that the Emperor had said that it would facilitate matters very much if the personage chosen to succeed M. Cruppi were a statesman thoroughly acquainted with international affairs and accustomed to deal with them: such a man, for instance, as M. Delcassé, who would seem indicated for the post. On the day following the receipt of this letter M. Cambon called upon the President of the Republic, and after communicating to him the substance of the Kissingen conversation, backed his opinion of the hopefulness of the outlook by producing the letter from Kiel and reading to the President the Emperor's gracious and friendly words. The President, according to M. Cambon's account, did not attach much importance to the Emperor's language, in fact, rather the contrary, but he seemed to think that the Kissingen conversation opened the door to an amicable arrangement. On the next day came the news of the dispatch of a German war-ship to Agadir. M. Cambon, after a further interview with the President, went straight to Herr von Schön, and, after informing him of what had passed at Kissingen, told him in the strongest possible language what he thought of Herr von Kiderlen's proceedings. Herr von Schön asked him whether he should repeat his language to Herr von Kiderlen, and M. Cambon replied, "Certainly! I beg you to do so."

After receiving his instructions, which, he said, were of a vague nature, M. Cambon returned to Berlin, and at once called upon Herr von Kiderlen. He found the latter naturally somewhat embarrassed and ill at ease. Herr von Kiderlen asked him whether he had any proposal to make with regard to Morocco. M. Cambon replied in the negative, and in putting the same question to Herr von Kiderlen received a similar answer. A silence ensued which lasted for quite an appreciable period. M. Cambon debated with himself whether he should let the interview rest there and take his leave, but decided that after all it would be better to stay and have the matter out. He therefore reminded Herr von Kiderlen of the Kissingen conversation, and asked whether he was prepared to renew it. On Herr von Kiderlen signifying his assent, M. Cambon said that before any discussion could take place there were certain things which required explanation, as the situation had been changed by the sudden dispatch, after Herr von Kiderlen's friendly language, of a German war-ship to Agadir. "I had barely time," M. Cambon said, "to reach Paris, a bearer of what I was entitled to regard as a friendly and conciliatory message from you, when the news of the

extraordinary action of the Imperial Government reached me." M. Cambon added that he was all the less able to understand this sudden move on the part of the Imperial Government, as only the day before the news had reached him he had received a letter from a member of his staff at Kiel saying that, amongst other gracious utterances, the Emperor had assured him of his friendly sentiments towards France, and of the fervent hope, both of himself and his Government, that nothing would occur in Morocco which could possibly give rise to any friction between the two countries. Surely the Imperial Government must have been aware that nothing was more likely to excite public opinion in France than the dispatch of a German war-ship to a closed port without any obvious reason!

Herr von Kiderlen replied that there was a public opinion in Germany as well as in France, and that enormous pressure had been brought upon him to send a ship to Agadir for the protection of German subjects and of Germany's important interests in the south of Morocco. He added that he had received hundreds of letters from German firms of the greatest influence and importance, pointing out the dangers to which German subjects and employés were exposed, and demanding that some steps should be taken by the Government to protect their lives and property. These demands it had been impossible for him to ignore. M. Cambon said that he had never heard that Germany had interests in South Morocco of such magnitude as to render it necessary to send a ship to Agadir for their protection, but that, as Herr von Kiderlen said that they existed, he was bound to believe it. Nevertheless, it had been a strong and a sudden step, and it seemed to him to require a little more explanation. What rendered the step most inexplicable, and he must return to that point, was that it had been taken only four days after he, Herr von Kiderlen, had given him to understand that Germany would, on certain conditions, be prepared to disinterest herself of Morocco. He (M. Cambon) had on that occasion expressed the opinion that the French Government would not be averse to making the sacrifices entailed by the conditions suggested, but before he could even report the conversation the German ship had been sent to Agadir. The treatment he had received in this matter was certainly not calculated to impress the French Government with a sense of security in any future conversations which might take place.

Herr von Kiderlen then again alluded to the grievances felt in German industrial and commercial circles with regard to the 1909 agreement and the systematic manner in which their interests had been disregarded by France; but M. Cambon having eased his mind of some of the resentment which he felt against Herr von Kiderlen's proceedings, and which he had put in far stronger language than I have ventured to write, suggested that they should put the past on one side, drop recriminations, and devote themselves to discussing the present situation and to an endeavour to find a solution satisfactory to both countries. From this point on the conversation assumed a more friendly tone, and, from the account given to me by M. Cambon, was more or less a repetition of what had been said already at Kissingen.

The end of it was that Herr von Kiderlen said, "Vous voulez donc que nous faisions notre deuil du Maroc," and on M. Cambon replying that, as a matter of fact, that was what France desired, Herr von Kiderlen said that in that case they must see what could be done elsewhere. He personally still held the opinion that a rectification of the Congo frontier offered a solution, but before engaging himself in any way he would have to consult the Minister of the Colonies and others. Herr von Kiderlen also expressed the opinion that any negotiations on the lines suggested should be conducted by the two Governments alone. M. Cambon told me that he had concurred in this view, making it at the same time clear to Herr von Kiderlen that his concurrence in this respect only extended to conversations which had for their basis disinterestedness on the part of Germany as regards Morocco and satisfaction for Germany in some quarter where the interests of other Powers were not involved. He had also, he said, pointed out that if their negotiations for such outside satisfaction failed, and Germany made claims for territory or political influence in Morocco, it was perfectly certain, from what the British Prime Minister had said, that England would insist upon having her say in the matter. It was, he had added, absolutely necessary that the substance of all their conversations should in any case be communicated to Great Britain and Spain. This closed the conversation. I did not understand from M. Cambon that up to the present any allusion had been made on either side to the duration of the stay of the German ship at Agadir.

Having occasion to see Herr von Kiderlen with regard to some minor matters, I called upon his Excellency yesterday. As, from what M. Cambon had told me, I gathered that things were going fairly smoothly as regards Morocco and making for

a settlement which might prove satisfactory to His Majesty's Government, I abstained, on Herr von Kiderlen making some general reference to the Morocco question, from making any remarks which might disturb his equanimity. I only said that the attitude of His Majesty's Government had been made absolutely clear both by your observations to Count Metternich and Mr. Asquith's statement in the House of Commons. He would have gathered from those utterances that in the new situation caused by the dispatch of a German ship to Agadir His Majesty's Government were determined to watch matters very closely. I added that there had at one time been some mention of a "conversation à trois" between Germany, France, and Spain. He would, I was sure, readily understand that such a conversation would not coincide with the views of His Majesty's Government, and that they would not be able to recognise any new arrangement arising out of it, particularly such as might affect British interests.

Herr von Kiderlen said that there had never been any idea of such a "conversation à trois"; no member of the German Government had ever made such a suggestion; rumours to that effect had, he believed, appeared in the French press, but they were utterly untrue, and he hoped that I would write in that sense to my Government. As a matter of fact, both the Chancellor and Herr Zimmermann made the suggestion to the Spanish Ambassador, but as this fact had been communicated by the latter to this embassy in strict confidence, I did not pursue the subject. Herr von Kiderlen then told me that he had had very friendly conversations on the subject of Morocco with my French colleague. They had done their best to avoid all recriminations and to find a *modus vivendi*. He had strong hopes that they would succeed, but it was too early to speak with any certainty on the subject.

I have, &c.
W. E. GOSCHEN.

[27838] No. 84.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 17.)

(No. 200.)

Sir, *St. Petersburgh, July 12, 1911.*

THE French Ambassador tells me that he has every reason to be satisfied with the attitude adopted by the Russian Government with regard to the dispatch of the German gun-boat "Panther" to Agadir. The Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs had, M. Louis said, replied to the first communication made to him on the subject by the German Ambassador by stating that Russia had a double interest in this question, as, in the first place, she was the ally of France, and, in the second, she was a signatory of the Act of Algeciras. M. Nératof had ever since continued to give him every assistance in his power, and had collaborated with him in endeavouring to solve the problem as to what were the real objects and intentions underlying Germany's action.

From the conversations which I have had both with M. Louis and M. Nératof, I gather that neither has yet succeeded in finding a solution that entirely satisfies him, and that while the latter is inclined to look on the Agadir incident as merely a fresh move made by Germany in the Moroccan game, the former believes that it has a much wider significance. Though the immediate object of this sudden display of the German mailed fist is, in his opinion, to obtain concessions in Morocco by exercising pressure on France, the policy which dictated the dispatch of the "Panther" is, he thinks, part and parcel of Germany's general foreign policy, and he considers that there is an intimate connection between the Albanian and Moroccan questions, which indicates collusion between Berlin and Vienna.

In the first conversation which I had with M. Nératof after my return from London, his Excellency told me that the German Ambassador had just been to see him, and had made a second communication, in answer apparently to the explanations which his Excellency had asked for on the receipt of the first. Count Pourtalès had now assured him that there was no question at present of disembarking troops; that the German Government did not contemplate the occupation of any portion of Moroccan territory; and that their ship would be withdrawn as soon as order was restored. These assurances, his Excellency said, had given him satisfaction, as they went further than what had been said in the original communication. In speaking of the withdrawal of the "Panther" as soon as order was restored, Count Pourtalès had omitted

the words "in Morocco," and he interpreted this omission to mean that the "Panther" would leave as soon as calm once more reigned at Agadir.

I remarked that his Excellency seemed to me to be taking too optimistic a view, as I did not think that Count Pourtalès' words necessarily bore the interpretation which he had put on them, and on calling on M. Nératof two days later I found that he had been undeceived. He had, he said, made enquiries at Berlin, and had found that the language which was being held there and in some other capitals did not confirm what the German Ambassador had said to him. He supposed, therefore, that Count Pourtalès had made the communication in somewhat milder terms than he had been authorised to do by his instructions. The French Ambassador, however, explains this discrepancy by the fact that the German Foreign Office often adapts the language which its representatives abroad are instructed to hold in the place and person to whom a communication is to be made, and that consequently the same communication may be couched in different language at different capitals.

I have, &c.
GEORGE W. BUCHANAN.

[27994] No. 85.

Mr. Rennie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 17.)

(No. 126.)
Sir, *Zarauz, July 13, 1911.*

I WENT to see Señor Garcia Prieto on the 10th July at San Sebastian, where his Excellency had arrived two days previously in order to be in attendance on the King.

In reply to my enquiry, he informed me that he understood that the incident which had occurred at Alcazar between Colonel Silvestre and Lieutenant Tessier had now been satisfactorily settled. Colonel Silvestre, as has been already stated, had been on his way to Tangier to see the Spanish Minister, but had been recalled when he had reached Arzila on account of the arrival of Lieutenant Tessier in the neighbourhood of the River Lukkos.

Señor Garcia Prieto then went on to say in anxious tones that what was greatly preoccupying the Spanish Government was the news that a Moorish mehalla from Fez was advancing on Alcazar. The Spanish representatives in London and Paris had been instructed to represent the danger of complications which must ensue were this force to endeavour to cross the River Lukkos. This the Spanish Government were firmly resolved to oppose, whatever might be the consequences. His Excellency was most insistent, and tried to contend that Spain now that she was in occupation of Alcazar was responsible for the maintenance of order there.

I asked if the Spanish Government would equally object to the arrival of Shereefian troops, even if they were unaccompanied by French officers. His Excellency, who had meanwhile become less agitated, said that this would make no difference. Later on during the conversation I alluded to the rumour that had appeared in the "Epoca" the previous evening, to the effect that preparations were being made at Carthagena to embark a further body of marines, and suggested that if the report were correct this force might perhaps be intended for Ceuta or Melilla. His Excellency replied that if the mehalla from Fez endeavoured to cross the River Lukkos Colonel Silvestre would be reinforced. According to Mr. White's reports this now appears to have been actually done. I said to his Excellency that I knew that the last wish of the French Government was to take any steps that might provoke an incident. His Excellency admitted that this was the case, but he seemed less confident of the good faith of the French officials on the spot.

Señor Garcia Prieto thus admitted that the Spanish Government were determined to oppose the entry into the Spanish sphere of any troops belonging to the Sultan, whom he now considers to be completely under French influence.

The French chargé d'affaires told me yesterday that when he had gone to tell Señor Garcia Prieto of the projected expedition to punish the Zaer tribe, his Excellency had said that he could now only consider the Sultan in the light of a "préfet français." Subsequently to M. Martin's visit I went to see his Excellency, who was then inclined to look at matters in a more judicial spirit. I again tried to convince him that there was no reason to doubt the sincerity of the intentions of the French Government.

His Excellency seemed inclined to concur, and admitted the good services of the French Ambassador, who is now on leave in Paris, in pointing out the Spanish side of the question.

I have, &c.
ERNEST A. RENNIE.

[27851] No. 86.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 17.)

(No. 196. Very Confidential.)
Sir, *Berlin, July 14, 1911.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 194 of the 12th instant, I have the honour to report that my French colleague has given me the following account of a further conversation which he has had with Herr von Kiderlen-Waechter on the subject of Morocco. Herr von Kiderlen said that he had had some conversation with the Minister of the Colonies on the subject of the proposed rectification of the Congo frontier. The Minister had not shown himself averse to a settlement of the nature proposed, but his ideas of colonial expansion, inherited doubtless from his predecessor, were, in Herr von Kiderlen's opinion, rather too large for present purposes, and he had seemed to require rather more than France could be expected to give. Herr von Kiderlen, however, thought that the Minister could be induced to modify these ideas, and, if not, he had no doubt that some arrangement of a give-and-take nature could be made which would satisfy the German colonial authorities, and at the same time not render the conditions too onerous for France. The great point was to satisfy public opinion on both sides, and the Secretary of State thought that there was no insuperable difficulty in the way of attaining that result. M. Cambon, without laying too great a stress on the point, said that he thought matters would be simplified and their conversations rendered easier if the Imperial Government could see its way to removing the direct cause of the present feeling of uncertainty in France and elsewhere. Herr von Kiderlen, however, avoided any discussion on that point, and turned the conversation to the demand which had just been formally put forward by Spain, that she should be admitted to the conversations now proceeding between France and Germany. He said that he was entirely against Spain taking part in these conversations, and proposed that, as Spain had made their demand simultaneously at Berlin and Paris, the two Governments should give a polite refusal to the Spanish Government in more or less identic terms. On this he produced a draft answer, which M. Cambon telegraphed to Paris, and which, I believe, was adopted by M. de Selves, and which Herr von Kiderlen has since addressed to the Spanish Ambassador at Berlin. In continuing his conversation with M. Cambon, Herr von Kiderlen said very characteristically that if the Spanish Government persisted in their demand he should tell the Spanish Ambassador that, if his Government insisted upon sacrificing a portion of their colonial possessions in order to secure German disinterest in Morocco, he would be glad to know what they had to offer; that if, on the contrary, Spain had nothing to offer, there was no point in her taking part in a conversation which had colonial sacrifice as its basis.

M. Cambon thinks that up till now the outlook for a satisfactory settlement is favourable, but says that he will not feel quite at ease until he has Germany's renunciation of all territorial and political aggrandisement in Morocco down in black and white.

I have, &c.
W. E. GOSCHEN.

[28138] No. 87.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 17.)

(No. 103.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Paris, July 17, 1911.*

AT the request of M. de Selves, I called on his Excellency this morning for the purpose of learning the result of another interview which had taken place the day before yesterday evening between M. Jules Cambon and the German Foreign Secretary. M. Paul Cambon, who was present during the greater part of my inter-

view with M. de Selves, explained various points and made suggestions and observations.

M. de Selves read to me the report which he had received from the French Ambassador at Berlin of his conversation with M. de Kiderlen-Waechter, of which the following is a summary:—

The conversation opened by M. de Kiderlen-Waechter expatiating at length on German grievances. As a compensation for concurrence in French designs in Morocco, France had come to arrangements with Spain, England, and even with Italy, whereas nothing had been given to Germeny, who had interests in Morocco. Germany had not received her fair share in railway schemes or concessions, and the Franco-German Agreement of 1909, subsequent to the Algeciras Conference, had proved illusory to her. The French ought to have come to an understanding with the German Government before going to Fez, but they had not done so. The French Government must compensate Germany properly for any such sacrifice of interests as would be implied by the latter Power's foregoing her political interests in Morocco and withdrawing her ship from Agadir.

The French Ambassador pointed out that the French Government fully intended to observe strictly the Franco-German Agreement of 1909, to which, owing to the political condition of Morocco, they had not so far been able to give full effect; the German Government had, however, been notified of the rescue expedition to Fez. The Ambassador, after some recriminations on both sides, enquired in what manner the German Government would suggest that the Cameroons–French Congo frontier should be rectified to compensate Germany for withdrawing her ship from Agadir and for resigning her political interest in Morocco.

To this the German Foreign Secretary replied that he had, after conferring with the Minister for the Colonies, proposals to make which would serve as bases for the negotiations. He then remarked that, as a price for Germany's conceding to France some rectifications in the north of the Cameroons, renouncing political interests in Morocco, and withdrawing her ship from Agadir after German mining interests in the Sus country were guaranteed, France should cede to Germany the whole of the territory of the French Congo between the sea and the River Sangha.

The French Ambassador remarked that the remnant of the Congo left to France would be cut off from the sea, and said that he presumed that such suggestions were made by the German Government in order to ensure a failure of the negotiations. M. de Kiderlen-Waechter thereupon replied that railway access to the sea through the territory to be ceded would be guaranteed to France by Germany.

The Ambassador, at M. de Kiderlen-Waechter's request, undertook to refer these suggestions to his Government and to ask for their instructions on them, but he said that, in his opinion, they were quite inadmissible.

It is held by M. de Selves, M. Jules Cambon, and M. Paul Cambon that to obtain an Atlantic port is the great aim of the German Government. They have made these unacceptable demands because in all probability they would prefer to be established on the coast of Morocco, in order to be able to pose as the protectors of the tribes against the French, and to create a fermentation amongst them whenever it suited German policy to do so.

The French chargé d'affaires at Tangier has telegraphed that the German ship at Agadir has been landing parties in increasing numbers up to as many as forty men. These parties make expeditions into the country around, and spread agitating rumours amongst the tribes. By so doing they apparently hope to provoke incidents, which will serve as a pretext for a landing party to be established permanently and to be increased gradually.

The conversation then turned to German pretensions in Equatorial Africa. M. Paul Cambon pointed out that, if acceded to, these pretensions would injure not only French, but British interests. The possession of Libreville would give to Germany a port on the Atlantic, and that would be detrimental to British interests. To what she had taken of the French Congo Germany would soon add the Portuguese possessions at the mouth of the Congo River and in its vicinity, as well as the Spanish settlement which lies between the Cameroons and French Congo.

M. Paul Cambon stated that, in his opinion, Belgian Congo would probably before long be for disposal. In such an event Germany, as the successor to France on the lower part of the Congo River and as the riverain neighbour of Belgian Congo, would claim to substitute herself for France in the possession of rights of pre-emption over Belgian Congo.

With regard to Agadir, M. Paul Cambon observed that, in the absence of British

and French ships, it would not be possible to obtain definite information in regard to Germany's proceedings there; he thinks she is minded, if she fail to obtain excessive compensation elsewhere, to create incidents at Agadir, gradually increasing her force there, landing men permanently, and remaining without giving any guarantees in regard to the status of the port.

M. de Selves requested me to ask you to let him know as soon as possible your views on the situation which the excessive demands put forward by the German Government have brought about.

[28082] No. 88.

Mr. White to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received July* 17.)

(No. 132.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Tangier, July* 17, 1911.

KAID GILOOLI, Governor of district in which is Agadir, has informed French consul at Mogador that at first small parties of not more than fifteen used to land from German cruiser, but that now parties of forty land with their arms, and make short marches into the country beyond limits of his jurisdiction. This causes excitement among the people, and he thinks Germans desire to provoke an incident.

[27630] No. 89.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 178.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, July* 17, 1911.

YOUR telegram No. 99 of the 14th instant: Franco-German negotiations.

In conversation with Minister for Foreign Affairs you can stipulate, as regards economic concessions generally, that we should know what they are in order that we may be sure that principles of commercial equality are not infringed; as regards mining concessions, in particular, they should be consistent with provisions of article 58 of Mining Regulations signed at Paris in 1910.

[27743] No. 90.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen.

(No. 157.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, July* 17, 1911.

THE German Ambassador called at the Foreign Office on the 12th instant and talked to Sir A. Nicolson on the subject of Morocco.

After observing that the question of Agadir was "en bonne voie," his Excellency recapitulated France's action in Morocco. He referred, firstly, to her occupation of the Shawia, to which Sir A. Nicolson replied that that was ancient history. Next he alluded to the French advance on Fez. Sir A. Nicolson remarked that France was obliged to relieve Fez, which was isolated, and had been asked to do so by the Sultan. Count Metternich then said that by the 1904 agreement England was bound to leave France a free hand, but Germany was not. Sir A. Nicolson replied that by the 1909 agreement Germany also had recognised the political interests and predominance of France in Morocco. His Excellency observed that France had in the same 1909 agreement engaged to respect and maintain the sovereignty of the Sultan, but she had gone to Fez notwithstanding. Sir A. Nicolson pointed out that it was with this very object that France had gone to Fez.

Count Metternich continued by saying that Germans were in danger in the south, and that therefore a ship had been sent to Agadir. To Sir A. Nicolson's remark, that he was unaware of there being any Germans or foreigners at Agadir, his Excellency said that there were German houses in the hinterland. Sir A. Nicolson replied that it was news to him that there were any German residents in the Sus. The Ambassador admitted there were none, but there were German interests. However, conversations had now begun with France, and His Majesty's Government must not think that Germany ever intended to exclude England from any discussion in which the future of Morocco was concerned. Sir A. Nicolson replied that he understood His Majesty's

Government would maintain a reserved attitude until they knew what Germany's aims and desires were; at present they were completely ignorant of both.

Count Metternich then remarked that forty years ago Germany waged a successful war, since when she had attained her unity and developed enormously her force and power. In that time France—the vanquished country—had added greatly to her colonial possessions, and England had added hundreds of thousands of square miles to her vast Empire. Germany had merely received a few small portions practically of little value. If the matter were looked at impartially it was clear that Germany had a right to more, and if she received more, this would not mean the break-up of the British Empire.

Sir A. Nicolson replied that the British Empire would probably survive for some time longer, and that to anyone who studied the last forty years, the history of that period was interesting and instructive reading.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[27768] No. 91.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Rennie.

(No. 78.)
Foreign Office, July 17, 1911.

Sir,

THE Spanish Ambassador informed Sir A. Nicolson on the 10th instant that the French Minister for Foreign Affairs had stated to the Spanish Ambassador in Paris that the French Government must first converse with the German Government on the question of Morocco before discussing matters with Spain. The Spanish Government were in consequence much exercised in their minds and feared that France would come to some arrangement with Germany and then present Spain with a *fait accompli*. It was clear, M. de Villa Urrutia remarked, that France would have to give compensation of some kind to Germany, either in Morocco or elsewhere. By the agreement of the 16th May, 1907, respecting the maintenance of the territorial *status quo* in the Mediterranean and the East Atlantic Ocean, France was bound to communicate with Spain in regard to any change in the *status quo* in "that part of the Atlantic Ocean which washes the shores of Europe and Africa," so far as France's maritime or insular possessions were affected France was not therefore at liberty to cede any port to Germany on the African coast without discussing the matter with Spain. Should she nevertheless do so it would be open to Spain, in order to secure Germany's recognition of Spanish claims in Morocco, to offer her compensation on her own account without consultation with France; and his Excellency observed that Spain had useful cards in her hands with which to bargain.

Sir A. Nicolson told the Ambassador he had no reason whatever to believe that France would settle matters with Germany independently of Spain, and that the fears of the Spanish Government seem to him unfounded. France at present was merely endeavouring to find out what precisely it was that Germany wanted, and she could not usefully converse with Spain until she had ascertained this. The Ambassador remarked that he did not trust France.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[28233] No. 92.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen.

(No. 79.)
Foreign Office, July 17, 1911.

Sir,

THE Spanish Ambassador informed me to-day that his Government were ready to propose a *modus vivendi* with the French Government, under which his Government would agree not to send a single soldier more to Alcazar, if the French Government would undertake to make no trouble there. He was very much disturbed by hints which had been dropped that the French might order the Moorish mehalla to attack the Spaniards, and also that the French might settle the Moroccan question with the Germans and us, leaving the Spaniards altogether out of account. He asked me whether I would support with the French the *modus vivendi* which he had proposed; and whether, in the event of France coming to an arrangement with Germany that

ignored the agreements between France and Spain, we would maintain that article 8 of our convention with France still held good.

I said that I had warned him, in one of our conversations after the Spaniards had gone to Alcazar, that the result of the Spanish action might be to precipitate a crisis in Morocco, leading to conversations between France and Germany, and that then no country would be able to tell how its own interests might eventually be affected. This was the situation which had actually come about. Until we knew the outcome of the conversations between France and Germany, we ourselves could not tell how British interests were likely to be affected, or what action it might be necessary for us to take. Spain seemed to be in a similar position.

The Ambassador asked whether Spain might not still rely upon our good-will; if Spain could get no support from her old friends, she must make the best terms she could independently. I said that Spain had not been ready to take the advice of her old friends, but I was genuinely anxious that, whatever settlement was reached, it should not result in an alteration of the grouping of the Powers, and I would do my best to secure that there should be no cause for this. I should not at all like a breach between Spain and France, and I should like still less a breach between Spain and us. At the moment, however, the only thing for Spain to do was to keep as quiet as possible at Alcazar. If the rumours as to expeditions beyond her sphere had proved to be true, the situation would have become impossible.

The Ambassador said that it was out of the question that there should be such expeditions. But he urged that a settlement might be made which would not affect British interests, though it would be adverse to Spanish interests. The Spaniards were in Morocco, while we were not; and, as Germany had made it clear that she was going to insist upon a final settlement of the Moroccan question, Spanish interests were bound to be affected, though we might be able to stand aside.

I said that Spain had been in closer relations with Germany than we had, and we had not had such an expression of the German view about Morocco. The Ambassador himself had hinted, after the Germans went to Agadir, that a tripartite partition of Morocco between Germany, Spain, and France was the settlement which the Germans had in view. I could conceive such a settlement which might not be adverse to Spanish interests, but might be so to British interests; just as he could conceive a settlement which might be adverse to Spanish interests but not to ours. Until the situation had developed I could not say either what we might have to do or what we could do. Meanwhile, the best thing for Spain to do was to remain as quiet as possible, and to come to an arrangement with France if she could. The language of the French Minister for Foreign Affairs to Sir Francis Bertie had given no indication whatever that France intended to abandon the agreement she had made with Spain; nor, so far as I was aware, had anything taken place hitherto in the conversations at Berlin that was inconsistent with that agreement.

The Spanish Ambassador expressed apprehension that France might say that Spain had broken the secret agreement with France by going to Alcazar, and might on this pretext set the agreement aside.

I reminded the Ambassador that I had deprecated Spanish action at Alcazar as weakening the force of the secret agreement—this was just what I had had in mind at the time. But France had not yet taken up this position; it was not a point that we should raise, and till France did so it was unnecessary to anticipate it.

I am, &c.
E. GREY

[28124] No. 93.

Mr. White to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received July* 18.)

(No. 212.)
Tangier, July 11, 1911.

Sir,

WITH reference to my despatch No. 187 of the 29th ultimo, I have the honour to transmit herewith copies of two despatches from His Majesty's consul at Fez giving additional particulars in regard to the arrest of the courier and seizure of his letters. The former of these despatches was lost in the post, and the duplicates thereof have only just reached me.

Mr. MacLeod points out that the courier was arrested when General Moinier had reached Fez, and consequently after all danger from the rebels was passed.

I have, &c.

HERBERT E. WHITE.

Enclosure 1 in No. 93.

Consul MacLeod to Mr. Lister.

(No. 35.)

Sir, *Fez, May* 25, 1911.

ON the 22nd instant a courier of ours, Hamoo Heida, who was sent by me on the 30th ultimo to Rabat with a telegram for transmission to your Excellency, sent me word that he was in prison here, and begged me to procure his release. He stated that he arrived at Fez on the 21st instant, but was arrested by the soldiers at the Fez lines and taken to the palace.

Both to the soldiers and at the palace he affirmed, he declared, he was a British courier and was carrying letters to me, and no other letters, but, in spite of this declaration, he was deprived of his letters by the Sultan and forthwith imprisoned in irons.

I sent a message by my soldier to Sid Taib Mokri relating what had happened, and asking for the release of the courier and delivery to me of his letters.

Sid Taib Mokri said the matter would be attended to forthwith, and dismissed my messenger. Some hours having elapsed and no answer having come, I again sent to Sid Taib, reminding him in gentle terms of my request, and adding that, as I was expecting a reply from your Excellency by this courier, I would be particularly obliged by the courier and his letters being sent to me at once.

To this Sid Taib sent word that he would at once attend to the affair, but some hours elapsed, and neither the courier nor his letters were produced.

I thereupon sent the Sid Taib the note of which I enclose a copy and translation herewith.

To this, after some further delay, Sid Taib replied verbally that an enquiry would be made into the matter.

I was, of course, very dissatisfied with this answer, but making allowance for the present strain and anxiety of the Makhzen, I waited till next day in the hope that Sid Taib would give effect to my request, and I should, had he done so, readily have excused all that happened and supposed it was either a mistake or something done in haste.

No answer coming then, however, and a further enquiry eliciting only a curt repetition of the previous reply, "that there would be an investigation," I sent to Sid Taib the note enclosed herewith (Enclosure No. 3) pointing out that a request for the liberation of a courier with letters to me, as I expected, from your Excellency, and delivery to me of these letters were not matters for "enquiry," but for instant compliance and that if this were not effected before 5 o'clock that afternoon I should not repeat my request until I should receive your Excellency's directions in the matter.

To this no answer was sent.

Next day, on my sending food to the prisoner, it was found that he had been removed, no one at the prison knew where. I then went to Sid Taib Mokri and asked where the prisoner was, whereupon Sid Taib answered that the Basha of New Fez had said the man had been liberated. I replied that this was strange as he had not come for his wages. Whereupon Sid Taib rejoined that the courier might still be in prison, for the Sultan had said that since I was reporting to your Excellency on the subject nothing need be done about it.

On making further enquiries the Basha of New Fez then sent me word confidentially that this courier, and one who is stated to have carried letters for a man called Wuld Al Hamrouriya, a noted agitator against the Sultan, and who has recently been severely flogged and imprisoned, had now been removed in custody to the palace, where of course access to them is impossible.

When seeing Sid Taib last night I reminded him that I, when dispatching this courier, had told Sid Taib Mokri that, finding no other channel open, I was sending him, and should send others too, through Hadj Mohammed Mikwar, but that the courier had been given no written or verbal news to communicate, and had taken a cyphered telegram for your Excellency, and now, presumably, had brought the answer thereto, and that Sid Taib had entirely approved of my doing so. I had informed the French

consul also of the sending of this courier, and he, too, had entirely approved of my doing so.

I then called Sid Taib's attention to what had occurred in Ulad Jama, the inhumanity and unwisdom of what had been done then, and added that it was intolerable that our protégés, some of them the very people who had behaved so well financially to the Makhzen of late, should now be punished by having their farms raided, and pointed out that this was obviously the fulfilment of the Makhzen's threat (see Enclosure No. 4 in my despatch No. 30, Fez, the 17th May, 1911) to themselves punish protégés, and that I considered it most unfair that both our protégés and myself should be treated thus after all we had done to help the Makhzen.

In reply Sid Taib said that Ulad Jama was the enemy's country, and if protégés had property in a rebellious province they must bear the loss of it, and that, as regards myself, anything I had done was merely the fulfilment of the British Government's friendly policy, and if I did not act in that way the British Government would send someone else to do so!

I answered quietly that I could not possibly continue conversation in that strain, made the usual enquiries for his health, and left.

Of course I do not take too seriously what Sid Taib may say in all the present excitement, but I imagine it is right to call your Excellency's attention to the language and attitude he is inclined to adopt, and which is characteristic of the Makhzen these days to everybody except the French, in case you should be of opinion that such acts and language as are herein described should not be tolerated.

I have, &c.

J. M. MACLEOD.

Enclosure 2 in No. 93.

Consul MacLeod to Acting Vizir, Foreign Affairs.

(After compliments.) *Fez, May* 22, 1911 (*23rd Jumadi I*, 1329).

THE military guard at the trenches arrested a courier of ours carrying letters addressed to us. Though he stated also that he was a courier carrying letters to this consulate, they took the letters from him and threw him into the Dekakin prison. Wherefore, I beg you on receipt of this letter, to order the return of the said letters to me and the liberation of the courier immediately without fail, and oblige.

Enclosure 3 in No. 93.

Consul MacLeod to Acting Vizir, Foreign Affairs.

(After compliments.) *Fez, May* 23, 1911 (*24th Jumadi I*, 1329).

WITH regard to what I wrote you asking you to set free the courier who was carrying my letters, and whom you arrested and threw into prison and deprived of his letters addressed to me, and for the return of which I asked, you replied verbally that the matter was being investigated. Know, God guard you, that the liberation of a courier and the return of the letters, which I think are from his Excellency the British Minister to me, are not matters for enquiry, but for instant compliance, and therefore I beg to inform you that, if the said courier is not released and the letters returned to me before 5 o'clock this evening, I shall not repeat the demand for the same, but shall inform his Excellency the British Minister and await his instructions in the matter.

Enclosure 4 in No. 93.

Consul MacLeod to Mr. White.

(No. 60.)

Sir, *Fez, July* 7, 1911.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 35 of the 25th May, I should, perhaps, have called attention to the circumstance that the courier, Hamoo Heida, was arrested on the 21st May, late in the afternoon, that is to say on the day when the French relief column had reached Fez and when the crisis here was over.

It is difficult, therefore, to think of anything except vindictiveness and, possibly, a desire to obtain evidence against people at Mequinez or elsewhere, which might afford excuse for reprisals upon them, being the motives for the arrest of this courier, the opening and detention of the correspondence he was carrying to me, and the ill-treatment to which the courier was subjected.

I have, &c.
J. M. MacLEOD.

[28125] No. 94.

Mr. White to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received July* 18.)

(No. 213.)

Sir, *Tangier, July* 11, 1911.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 209 of the 8th instant, I have the honour to transmit herewith copy of a despatch I have just received from the consular agent at Alcazar, reporting on the incident that occurred upon the return of Colonel Silvestre. As far as I can gather from this report, and from those that have reached the French Legation, the facts appear to have been as follows:—

A building, known as Dar Ghailan (Rilan in Lieutenant Thiriet's report), and situated outside the town of Alcazar between it and the River Loukkos, has always been used as stables for the horses and mules of the Makhzen, and was occupied by some men of Raisuli's force under Kaïd Ben Dahan. On the 3rd instant a Spanish post of twenty-five men was placed there, Ben Dahan's men apparently being also left there, though this is not quite clear. On the 4th July, when Colonel Silvestre left for Arzila, taking a considerable portion of his troops, Kaïd Ben Dahan took possession of Dar Ghailan; at the same time, some men from Kaïd-el-Sherkawi's mehalla (formerly Captain Moreaux's, but now Lieutenant Thiriet's) were posted in the Fondak-el-Amad, used as barracks by the Makhzen troops under Kaïd Abd-el-Selam, and over which the Moorish flag was hoisted.

Colonel Silvestre, on hearing of what had happened, hurriedly returned to Alcazar, and on the 5th instant marched about 100 men to the Dar Ghailan and took possession of that building, disarming and turning out Kaïd Ben Dahan's men. Leaving a strong guard there he proceeded to the Fondak-el-Amad, where he found Lieutenant Thiriet with Kaïds Abd-el-Selam and Ben Dahan. He informed them that he was charged with maintaining order at Alcazar, and that all the Makhzen troops there were under his orders; they were not to continue performing any guard or patrol duties, and any Moorish soldiers found performing such duties would be arrested.

Colonel Silvestre subsequently had pickets posted all round the town with orders to allow no one to pass bearing arms. A strong picket was also posted at the ford of the Loukkos to prevent any Moorish troops from crossing the river.

M. de Billy informed me this morning that the cavalry recently arrived from Fez have no intention of crossing the river. He said that a serious incident nearly occurred on the 9th instant, when the men were taking their horses to the river to water them, and the Spanish pickets, thinking they were going to attempt to cross, deployed to oppose them, and even trained their guns on them. I have not yet, however, received any confirmation of this from Mr. Consular Agent Carleton.

The presence of these rival forces in proximity to each other cannot but be a source of danger. Colonel Silvestre, however, can hardly expect the Moorish troops to withdraw from their position south of the river. As already reported, I have impressed on M. de Billy the necessity for extreme prudence, and he assures me that the French officers have received instructions in this sense, as, indeed, is evident from Lieutenant Thiriet's letter, copy of which was enclosed in my above-mentioned despatch.

I have, &c.
HERBERT E. WHITE.

Enclosure in No. 94.

Mr. Carleton to Mr. White.

Sir, *Alcazar, July* 10, 1911.

I HAVE the honour to inform you that Colonel Silvestre did not visit Arzila as intended. From enquiries I have made, it appears that the same day

Silvestre's column arrived at Tlata Raisana (4th instant), Colonel Silvestre received news from the Spanish consular agent at Alcazar to the effect that Kaïd Ben Dahan with a number of his men had taken possession of Dar Ghailan. This buildiug is situated outside the south gate of Alcazar, and has always been used by the Makhzen for stabling horses and mules. Colonel Silvestre was also informed that the French officer in charge of the small mehalla encamped on the other side of the River Loukkos had entered Alcazar and hoisted the Moorish flag in Fondak-el-Amad, where the Alcazar garrison is quartered, and stationed therein fifty of his soldiers. The Alcazar garrison is commanded by Kaïd Abd-el-Selam-el-Jazani (a French protégé).

Colonel Silvestre returned with his column to Alcazar on the 5th instant, and the first thing he did was to disarm and drive out from Dar Ghailan Kaïd Ben Dahan's men, and place in the building a strong picket of Spanish troops. After doing this operation Colonel Silvestre called on the French officer, who was at the time in the Fondak-el-Amad, and informed the latter that he had no right to enter Alcazar and occupy with fifty soldiers Foudak-el-Amad, and held him responsible for any incident that may occur, and that if any of his soldiers are found on patrolling duties he will have them disarmed and arrested. Colonel Silvestre returned to his camp and ordered strong pickets to be stationed all round the town, and no person is allowed to enter Alcazar with fire-arms.

Colonel Silvestre left for Laraiche on the 8th instant. I have been informed that Mr. Engerer, who acts as guide and interpreter to Colonel Silvestre, was on the 5th instant sent by the latter to Arzila, and had a long interview with Kaïd Raisuli, and left on the same day for Tangier, and returned on the 6th instant to Arzila, and had another interview with Raisuli and arrived at Alcazar on the 7th instant.

The Spanish officers do not interfere with the administration of the local authorities at present, nor have assumed jurisdiction of the natives, though about a fortnight ago a murder was committed at a village about 4 miles distant from Alcazar, and when the Spaniards heard of it they sent about twenty mounted police to the village, but when they heard that the murdered native was in the employ of a British protégé they abstained from interfering in the matter.

Yesterday about 120 Spanish soldiers arrived from Laraiche; also a number of mules loaded with ammunition.

At the Loukkos ford the Spaniards have stationed a strong picket, and do not allow the mehalla soldiers which are encamped on the other side of the river to cross the river with arms.

I have, &c.
E. P. CARLETON.

[28239] No. 95.

Mr. White to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received July* 18.)

(No. 133.)

(Telegraphic.) P. *Tangier, July* 18, 1911.

I AM told that the German vice-consul at Mogador wrote to Sid Thami Glawi and informed him of the arrival at Agadir of a German cruiser, and invited him to go to that place and have an interview with the captain of the cruiser. Glawi showed this letter to the French vice-consul at Marrakesh.

From what Kaïd Guellouli wrote to Sid Guebbas, it would appear that it was for shooting that the Germans made the short expeditions referred to in my telegram No. 132. Baron de Seckendorff confirmed this in speaking to M. de Billy.

[28247] No. 96.

Mr. White to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received July* 18.)

(No. 134.)

(Telegraphic.) P. *Tangier July* 18, 1910.

SPANISH guard at Alcazar arrested M. Boisset as he was returning home with a rifle, and conducted him to their officer, passing through the town. Latter said it was a mistake, and released him.

M. de Billy is much annoyed, as M. Boisset was well known, and there could have been no doubt as to his identity as there are very few European residents there.

[28288] No. 97.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No 295.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, July* 18, 1911.

M. CAMBON informed me on the 13th instant that the German Ambassador in Paris had seen M. de Selves, and had said that, now France had agreed to discuss the question of the Congo, a settlement of the question of Morocco ought to be easy. M. de Selves had reminded the German Ambassador that it was he himself who had brought the Congo into the discussion, and that as this had been done at Germany's request, it was for Germany to make her views clear.

M. Cambon reminded me of what the view of the Admiralty had been with regard to a port at Agadir, as communicated to M. Delcassé six years ago.

I said that I was aware of what had passed then. But as in any case it was infinitely preferable on general grounds that a settlement should be made which did not give Germany a footing in Morocco, and as conversations were proceeding on the basis of a Congo settlement, it seemed unnecessary to discuss the Admiralty point of view now as to ports on the west coast of Morocco.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[28289] No. 98.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir R. Rodd.

(No. 113.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, July* 18, 1911.

THE Italian Ambassador informed me on the 13th instant that the Franco-Italian agreement made it impossible for Italy to oppose French political action in Morocco; but the Italian Government could not be disinterested in eventual consequences which might affect the equilibrium in the Mediterranean or the international situation, owing to the action of France or any other Power. Such action might cause a state of things affecting serious Italian interests, political as well as economic. Italy therefore wished to make her voice heard in time. The Ambassador added, on his own part, that if there was to be a general upset, Italy could not be left in the lurch. He then said that this attitude of the Italian Government appeared to be much the same as that of the British Government, and he invited my opinion.

I said that Germany had opened the question in the worst possible way. After giving it to be understood that her interests were only commercial, she had gone to a port which was commercially closed. She had thus made it clear that commercial interests were only a pretext. Agadir happened also to be the port most suitable for a naval base. Germany had thus at the outset mobilised the whole of British public opinion, and if she had been in any doubt as to what our attitude would be, she had by her own action removed that doubt, and made it certain that our interest would be engaged on the side of France. If Germany wished conversations to be easy, it was now for her, having charged the atmosphere with electricity, to do something to calm it

The Italian Ambassador observed that Germany would be certain to keep a ship at Agadir until a settlement was reached.

I said that it was desirable that Germany should not keep a ship there too long, as that might end in our also sending a ship.

The Ambassador asked whether we did not intend to be a party to any negotiations which might take place. He understood that negotiations were proceeding between Germany and France alone.

I told him that at present there were no negotiations, but only conversations to ascertain on what basis negotiations could take place.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[28259] No. 99.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 19.)

(No. 330.)
Sir, *Paris, July* 18, 1911.

THE arrest of the French consul at Alcazar, as reported in the two Havas telegrams, copies of which extracted from this evening's "Temps" I have the honour to enclose herein,* is commented on in very strong terms by the principal organs of the French press.

The "Temps" in a leading article calls on the Government to demand an apology from the Spanish Government, and to insist on the punishment of the officer responsible for M. Boisset's arrest. The article goes on to call attention with much bitterness to Spanish action in Morocco during the last three months, and to the systematic violation by Spain of the Treaty of 1904, the terms of which had been faithfully adhered to by France. The problem which now demanded solution was whether France should pay Germany a more or less high price in order to hand over to Spain the integrity of Morocco and the sovereignty of the Sultan. It was the duty of M. Caillaux and M. de Selves to take a firm stand in the matter, as M. Clemenceau and M. Pichon had done in 1908.

A copy of this article is enclosed herein.*

It is announced in another part of the "Temps" that at the Council of Ministers held at the Elysée to-day, M de Selves had stated that the Spanish Government had been asked for explanations in regard to the Alcazar incident, and that the French Ambassador at Madrid was returning to his post to-night.

I have, &c.
FRANCIS BERTIE.

[28385] No. 100.

Mr. Rennie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 19.)

(No. 59.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Zarauz, July* 19, 1911.

TANGIER telegram No. 134 of 18th July: Boisset incident.

I have seen French Ambassador, who returned this morning, and who informs me that he is instructed to demand an immediate apology at Paris through Spanish Ambassador, and also an apology at Alcazar from Colonel Silvestre.

(Repeated to Paris.)

[28138] No. 101.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 180.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, July* 19, 1911.

MOROCCO: Franco-German negotiations.

Your telegram No. 103 of the 18th July.

Since France considers that the demands made upon her by Germany are greater than she can consent to, it is evident that the French Government should now make counter-proposals which will embody what concessions in the French Congo she is prepared to grant. Any concession there considered reasonable by France could not be objected to by us.

I shall telegraph again as to the course developments may take in the event of a refusal by Germany to reduce her demands on French Congo.

[28138] No. 102.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 181.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, July* 19, 1911.

MOROCCO. Your telegram No. 103 of yesterday.

A breakdown of Franco-German negotiations may be foreshadowed by German demand on French Congo, and it is to be presumed that Germany would then remain at Agadir.

* Not printed.

A conference of Powers signatory to the Algeciras Act might then be proposed to Germany by His Majesty's Government acting on their own iniative, it being intimated that His Majesty's Government must take active steps to safeguard British interests should Germany refuse a conference. It is probable that Germany would stipulate in her reply that we should in the first place define the basis and scope of discussions at proposed conference.

Therefore, before His Majesty's Government intimate or propose anything of this nature to Germany, they consider it to be essential that France should say whether the proposal would be agreeable to her, and also whether she would, should a conference meet, refuse absolutely to entertain a settlement by which a foothold in Moroccan territory would be given to Germany.

If Germany would give satisfactory conditions in return, His Majesty's Government would not on their part consider that British interests would be vitally affected by Germany being admitted into Morocco. While, therefore, they would not propose that Germany should be permitted to acquire a foothold in Morocco, except after previous agreement with France and under conditions satisfactory to her, His Majesty's Government could not make such admission a *casus belli* unconditionally.

If is found to be impossible to find a settlement by compensating Germany in the French Congo, Germany can only be kept out of Morocco and France left there in possession by resorting to war. Two alternatives would then be left: either the consolidation of the French position in Morocco by Germany getting some compensation in that country, or a return to the *status quo* under the Act of Algeciras.

His Majesty's Government must know the definite and final view of the French Government as to the former alternative in principle before they take any step the consequences of which might be serious.

Cabinet meets again Friday morning, and it would be advantageous to know French view on this point beforehand.

[28519] No. 103.

Mr. Rennie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 20.)

(No. 127.)

Sir, *Zarauz, July* 18, 1911.

I COMMUNICATED to Señor Garcia Prieto the information I received from His Majesty's Ambassador at Paris, to the effect that stringent orders had been sent to the French officials in Morocco to abstain from crossing the River Luccus and to prevent the Moorish mehalla from doing so, in order to try to reassure his Excellency as to the desire of the French Government to prevent any incident such as he had seemed apprehensive might take place when I saw him on the 12th instant.

On the 16th instant I received a reply from Señor Garcia Prieto thanking me for my communication, and repeating assurances as to the efforts and desire on the part of the Spanish Government to do all in their power to prevent any untoward occurrence. He added that this task would, however, be easier if the "local factors" gave more assistance, and he made vague complaints as to the attitude and proceedings of two of the kaïds in the Alcazar district who gave out that they enjoyed the support of "other elements."

To-day when I saw his Excellency he was in a more satisfied state of mind. He had had a long talk the previous day with the French chargé d'affaires, and the general news he had received from Morocco was, he said, of a tranquillising nature. I remarked to him that much attention need not be paid to local stories such as naturally circulated under conditions like those existing in the Alcazar district. His Excellency concurred, and repeated that further orders had been sent to Alcazar to observe the utmost caution.

Señor Garcia Prieto went on to say that in order to prove the good intentions of the Spanish Government a new consul was being sent to Alcazar. This officer, I understood him to say, had been hurriedly summoned from Odessa to his present post, and was now, he stated, being employed on account of the good relations he had maintained with the French officials during the four years he had spent at Rabat, his previous post. He hoped that the presence of this officer at Alcazar would serve to promote a better understanding between the Spanish and French officials.

His Excellency professed himself pleased by the language held by you, Sir, to the Spanish Ambassador in London which he had reported to the King, and which had been received with satisfaction by His Majesty.

As regards Agadir, he told me that he had had, two days previously, a conversation with the German Ambassador, who appeared to have little information respecting the conversations taking place at Berlin; and had merely told him that there was nothing in them at present that concerned the interests of a third Power.

I have, &c.
ERNEST RENNIE.

[28392] No. 104.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 20.)

(No. 333.)

Sir, *Paris, July* 19, 1911.

IN conversation with M. de Selves this afternoon I suggested that possibly M de Kiderlen Waechter had put forward the excessive proposals in regard to the French Congo with the object of bringing the French Government to prefer that Germany should establish herself at Agadir rather than that France should have to make such extensive concessions to Germany in the Congo.

M. de Selves said that if Germany was to be allowed to remain permanently at Agadir in breach of the Act of Algeciras, there would be no reason why any other Power signatory of the Act should not, on some pretext as shallow as the one the German Government had put forward, establish itself on the coast of Morocco. The German and Spanish proceedings were as much as to say that treaty engagements were only binding so long as they suited an individual State signatory of the treaty.

M. de Selves informed me that he had sent for the Spanish Ambassador, and had called his attention to the arrest of the French consul, M. Boisset, by Spanish soldiers. He told the Ambassador that, if the facts were as they had been reported, and he had no reason to doubt the information which he had received, the matter was very serious, and required explanations and an apology from the Spanish Government. The French Ambassador had left for Madrid to place himself at once in communication with the Spanish Government on the subject.

M. Caballero said that he could not believe that the facts had been correctly reported. He admitted that if they were so they called for explanations, and on that supposition he expressed the regret which he felt and the Spanish Government would undoubtedly express.

I have, &c.
FRANCIS BERTIE.

[28509] No. 105.

Mr. White to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 20.)

(No. 135.)

(Telegraphic.) R. *Tangier, July* 20, 1911.

FRENCH chargé d'affaires has just shown me a telegram he has received from the French consul at Mogador reporting return of Kaïd of Kourima from Agadir, where he was well received by commander of German cruiser, who told him that "Germany has rights over part of Morocco comprised between Saffi and Agadir." German consul at Mogador has demanded of Kaïd M'tougi cancellation of orders depriving Kaïd of Kourima of his post, and has advised latter to resist by force any attempt to dispossess him.

French consul at Mogador has advised governors to whom portions of Kaïd of Kourima's territories have been given not to attempt to enter into possession pending further instructions from Sultan.

[28514] No. 106.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 20.)

(No. 105.)

(Telegraphic.) R. *Paris, July* 20, 1911.

I HAVE communicated to French Minister for Foreign Affairs contents of your telegram No. 181, Urgent, of yesterday evening respecting Morocco negotiations. He will see me again this evening on the subject.

His Excellency told me that Spanish Government apologised yesterday evening through French Ambassador at Madrid and their Ambassador here for treatment of French consul, M. Boisset, and have directed Spanish colonel to apologise to him.

French Minister for Foreign Affairs also told me that a delegate sent to Agadir by the French Legation in Morocco was well received by German Senior Naval Officer, and was by him informed that Germany has rights on Morocco coast from Saffi to Agadir.

[28464] No. 107.

Mr. Rennie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 20.)

(No. 60.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Zarauz, July 20, 1911.*

MY immediately preceding telegram of yesterday: Boisset incident.

I understand that French Ambassador's interview yesterday was satisfactory. Last night Spanish Ambassador at Paris expressed to French Minister for Foreign Affairs regret for occurrence, and orders were sent last night to Colonel Silvestre at Alcazar to offer apologies.

(Repeated to Paris.)

[29234] No. 108.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Cartwright.

(No. 47.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, July 20, 1911.*

AS Count Mensdorff asked me to-day about Morocco, I spoke to him in the same sense as I had previously spoken to the Italian Ambassador as to the effect of the way in which Germany had opened the question, by sending a ship to Agadir.

Count Mensdorff expressed the hope that the question would all be settled satisfactorily.

I said that a settlement depended upon Germany, and it rested with her to give things a satisfactory turn. Other people were not disposed to be unreasonable in coming to a settlement, and as Germany had put things in a bad way by her opening, it was for her to get them right.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[27199] No. 109.

Foreign Office to Mr. J. A. Malcolm.

Sir, *Foreign Office, July 20, 1911.*

WITH reference to your letter of the 10th instant, respecting mining concessions in the Sus district of Morocco, I am directed by Secretary Sir E. Grey to inform you that regulations governing the conditions under which mining enterprises can be carried on in Morocco have been drawn up, and will, it is hoped, be promulgated by the Moorish Government as soon as order has been restored. Under these regulations it will be open to claimants to mines to advance and make good their claims.

I am, &c.
W. LANGLEY.

[28529] No. 110.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 21.)

(No. 336.)
Sir, *Paris, July 20, 1911.*

WITH reference to my telegram No. 106, marked Pressing, of this evening, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith copies of the memorandum which, in consequence of the instructions contained in your telegram No. 181, Urgent, of the 19th July, I communicated to M. de Selves this morning and of the French text of the

memorandum which his Excellency gave to me this evening in reply thereto in regard to the Franco-German negotiations on the subject of Morocco.

I have, &c.
FRANCIS BERTIE.

Enclosure 1 in No. 110.

Memorandum communicated to M. de Selves by Sir F. Bertie.

SIR EDWARD GREY informs me that there will be a meeting of the Cabinet to-morrow, Friday, morning and that, before then, he would wish to know the definite views of the French Government in regard to the situation as hereunder set forth.

The demands put forward by the German Government in regard to the French Congo may foreshadow the breakdown of the negotiations with the French Government and Germany remaining at Agadir.

In such event His Majesty's Government might thereupon, on their own initiative, propose to the German Government that there should be a conference of the Powers, parties to the Algeciras Act, intimating to the Berlin Cabinet that, in the case of a refusal on their part to accept the proposal, His Majesty's Government will be obliged to take action to protect British interests. The reply of the German Government would probably be a stipulation that the basis and scope of the conference should be laid down. It is consequently essential, before any such proposal or intimation is made, that His Majesty's Government should be made acquainted with the views of the French Government, not only in regard to whether the proposal for a conference would be agreeable to them, but whether in such a conference France would, in all circumstances, exclude any solution that would give a foothold in Morocco to Germany. The British Government do not regard the exclusion of Germany from any such foothold as vital to British interests, provided always that satisfactory conditions be obtained from her. They are therefore unable to treat as an unconditional *casus belli* any such admission, though they could not, except in concert with France and on conditions satisfactory to her, suggest or deal with it.

Failing a settlement on the bases of compensation in the French Congo on such a solution being regarded as impracticable by the French Government, it will not be possible to exclude Germany and place France in possession of Morocco without a resort to war. It might be possible as an alternative to return to the *status quo* established by the Act of Algeciras, or, as an alternative, by some compensation to be awarded to Germany in Morocco in order to obtain the consolidation of the position of France in that country. It is essential that His Majesty's Government should be made acquainted with the final view in principle of the Government of the republic on the alternative just mentioned (viz., some compensation in Morocco to Germany) before any step involving serious consequences can be taken by His Majesty's Government.

Paris, July 20, 1911.

Enclosure 2 in No. 110.

Memorandum communicated to Sir F. Bertie by M. de Selves.

LES pourparlers engagés entre le Gouvernement français et le Gouvernement allemand au sujet de l'Afrique équatoriale française ne sont pas rompus, et selon toute apparence ils se prolongeront durant quelque temps.

Si ces pourparlers venaient à échouer, le Gouvernement français n'écarterait pas l'idée que le Gouvernement britannique prît, non seulement vis-à-vis du Gouvernement allemande, mais vis-à-vis de tous les Gouvernements signataires de l'Acte d'Algésiras, l'initiative d'une conférence; et, d'après lui, il serait préférable que le Gouvernement britannique, en prenant cette initiative, traçât lui-même le programme de cette conférence.

Le Gouvernement anglais, par l'accord de 1904, a reconnu à la France et à l'Espagne, seules, des sphères d'influence politique au Maroc et a, par conséquent, dénié aux autres Puissances toute prétention politique sur ce pays. Laisser aujourd'hui le Gouvernement allemand créer un établissement d'Etat sur un point quelconque du territoire marocain serait contraire à l'accord de 1904, ainsi, d'ailleurs, qu'à la déclaration officielle faite par l'Allemagne à la France au mois de février 1909. Le Gouvernement français ne

pourrait donc admettre que la conférence éventuelle puisse être appelée à envisager la concession à un titre quelconque au Gouvernement allemand d'une portion, si petite soit-elle, du territoire marocain ; mais fidèle aux principes posés dans le préambule de l'Acte d'Algésiras, comme dans ses accords particuliers avec les Puissances, il est tout prêt à reconnaître à des Puissances étrangères, et notamment à l'Allemagne, tous les avantages économiques qui seraient compatibles avec les Actes susrappelés.

Paris, le 20 *juillet*, 1911.

[28524] No. 111.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 21.)

(No. 106.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Paris, July* 20, 1911.

MOROCCO. My telegram No. 105 of this morning.

Following is translation of memorandum given to me by Minister for Foreign Affairs at 7 this evening in reply to memorandum in which I communicated to his Excellency this morning contents of your telegram No. 181, Urgent, of yesterday evening.

Minister for Foreign Affairs received this afternoon a telegram from French Ambassador reporting that Minister for Foreign Affairs at Berlin had invited him to come to him in order to renew conversations which had been suspended since Saturday last :—

"The negotiations proceeding between French and German Governments in regard to Equatorial Africa have not broken down ; and according to all appearances they will last for some time.

"In the event of these negotiations failing, French Government would not put aside the idea of His Majesty's Government taking not only *vis-à-vis* to the German Government, but also *vis-à-vis* to all Governments signatory of the Algeciras Act, the initiative of proposing a conference ; and in their opinion it would be preferable that the British Government, when taking such an initiative, should themselves indicate programme of that conference.

"British Government, by the agreement of 1904, recognised to France and Spain alone spheres of political influence in Morocco, and consequently denied to other Powers all political pretensions over that country. To allow the German Government now to create a State establishment on any point whatever of Moroccan territory would be contrary to the agreement of 1904 as well as to the official declaration made by Germany to France in February 1909. The French Government could not therefore admit that the conference which might be held could be called upon to consider the concession in any form ('à un titre quelconque') of a portion however small of Moorish territory ; but the French Government, faithful to the principles laid down in the Algeciras Act, as well as in special agreements with the Powers, are quite ready to recognise the rights of foreign Powers to all economic advantages compatible with the above-mentioned Acts."

I am sending by post to-night French text of Minister for Foreign Affairs' reply.

[28696] No. 112.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 21.)

(No. 107.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Paris, July* 21, 1911.

FRENCH Minister for Foreign Affairs has given me this morning following account of interview between French Ambassador at Berlin and German Minister for Foreign Affairs yesterday.

German Minister for Foreign Affairs said that it seemed to be impossible to have conversations ("causés") with French Government, as they were communicated to French press.

He complained specially of an article in "Écho de Paris" of yesterday's date. It is stated that it is not a question of negotiations but of bargaining ("marchandage"), and it gives account of a conversation between French Minister for Foreign Affairs and the

German Ambassador, in which former was stated to have not treated as serious the German proposals in regard to French Congo.

German Minister for Foreign Affairs appears to be much ruffled at word "marchandage," and any proposals made by him being regarded in that light. He was, he said, not in the habit of making proposals that were not serious. He would be ready to renew conversations on condition that nothing should be communicated to press that had not jointly between himself and French Ambassador been approved.

French Minister for Foreign Affairs has replied that he has not communicated nor has he authorised the communication to French press of any of the conversations referred to, and that he is quite ready, as far as he is concerned, to give undertaking for which German Minister for Foreign Affairs asks as a preliminary to further conversations.

Minister for Foreign Affairs says that there seems leakage at Berlin quite as much as at Paris, and he cannot be responsible for surmises and deductions made by newspapers on scraps of information which they somehow find means of obtaining. I am sending you article in "Écho de Paris."

[28698] No. 113.

Mr. White to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 21.)

(No. 136.)
(Telegraphic). R. *Tangier, July* 21, 1911.

MY telegram No. 135 of 20th July.

French chargé d'affaires communicated to the German Minister substance of report he had received from the French consul at Mogador. German Minister said that he had no information, as the commander of the cruiser communicated direct with Berlin. He did not, however, think that he could have made statement attributed to him. He also said that he had heard nothing from the German consul at Mogador regarding Kaïd Kourima or letter to Thami Glawi mentioned in my telegram No. 133 of 18th July.

[29130] No. 114.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen.

(No. 164.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, July* 21, 1911.

I TOLD Count Metternich to-day that, though I had no formal communication to make to him, I wished it to be understood that our silence must not be interpreted as meaning that we were not taking the interest in the Morocco question which had been indicated by our original statements.

We knew that a rectification of the frontier of the French Congo had been proposed as a basis for negotiations with France. We thought it quite possible that a settlement might be come to between Germany and France on this basis, which would not affect British interests. We should be very glad if that happened, and in the hope that it would happen we had hitherto stood aside. But I had been made anxious by the news which appeared yesterday as to the demands which the German Government had made upon France ; demands which were in effect, not a rectification of the frontier, but a cession of the French Congo, and which it was obviously impossible for France to concede. I understood that negotiations were still proceeding, and I still hoped that they might lead to a satisfactory result. But, if not, it must be understood that a very embarrassing situation would arise.

I pointed out to Count Metternich that the Germans were at Agadir, a closed port, that, according to native rumours, they were landing and negotiating with the tribes, and might be acquiring concessions there, for all that we knew. It might even be that the German flag had been hoisted at Agadir, a port which, of all those on that coast, was the most suitable for a naval base. We could not say to what extent the situation might be altered to our disadvantage, and if negotiations with France came to nothing we should be obliged to do something to watch over British interests and become a party to a discussion of the situation. The longer the Germans remained at Agadir, the more risk there was of their developing a state of affairs which would make it more difficult for them to withdraw, and more necessary for us to take some step to protect British interests.

I wished to say all this now, while we were still waiting in the hope that the negotiations with France would succeed, for if I did not say this now, and the time came when we had to assert ourselves, it would cause more resentment if Germany had been led to suppose by our previous silence that we did not take an interest in the matter.

Count Metternich was not in a position to give me any information. He deprecated my assuming that what I had sketched as the possible damage to British interests was accomplished. He was sure that Germany had no intention of acquiring commercial monopolies, and unfairly prejudicing our interests.

To this I replied that the fact that Germany remained in occupation of a closed port involved at least a monopoly of commercial opportunities.

Count Metternich then said, on the situation generally, that we had made our bargain with France about Morocco, but Germany was not under the same obligations. Her agreement with France in 1909 had been based on the independence and integrity of Morocco, which had since been destroyed by French action. Germany had the right to take steps to protect her own interests, and, as the situation in Morocco had been upset, she must take steps.

I observed that this was not really relevant to the point which I had raised, which was the way in which British interests might be affected by the change in the situation. What Count Metternich was saying was relevant to a discussion of how the situation had come to be changed, and what the conditions of the Act of Algeciras required, but that was not the point. The point was the impossibility of our standing aside, and disinteresting ourselves, if the changes in the situation developed adversely to our interests, and Germany did not come to any arrangement with France.

Count Metternich urged that what Germany had done in Morocco was infinitely less than the military operations which France had carried out.

I said that, at any rate, whatever France had done had been known to the world. She had not occupied a closed port from which she could operate without anyone else knowing what was happening. Everyone had known everything that France was doing. I still hoped that the negotiations between France and Germany would result in a settlement. I thought this might be done without affecting British interests, though, if economic arrangements in Morocco were a part of the settlement, we should have to know what they were before we could express a final opinion upon them.

I again impressed upon Count Metternich that my object in speaking to him this afternoon was to make it clear that we must join in a discussion of the situation if it continued without any settlement with France being reached; and that the fact that the Germans remained at Agadir, where no one could know besides themselves what they were doing, must result in a very embarrassing situation.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[28726] No. 115.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 22.)

(No. 337.)

Sir, *Paris, July 21, 1911.*

WITH reference to my telegram No. 107 of to-day's date, respecting the Franco-German negotiations now proceeding at Berlin, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith copy of the article in the "Écho de Paris" of yesterday's date to which exception was taken by M. de Kiderlen-Waechter.

I have, &c.
FRANCIS BERTIE.

Enclosure in No. 115.

Extract from the "Écho de Paris" of July 20, 1911.

M. de Schoen chez le Ministre des Affaires Étrangères.—Le "Marchandage" pour le Maroc.

CE n'est plus "négociations," mais "marchandage," dans le sens le plus mercantile du mot, qu'il convient de dénommer l'objet des conversations entre MM. de Kiderlen-Waechter et Jules Cambon à Berlin, et MM. de Selves et de Schoen à Paris.

On annonçait hier que l'Allemagne, par l'organe de son Secrétaire d'État aux Affaires Étrangères, réclame à la France, comme compensation à son désintéressement au Maroc rien de moins qu'une grande partie de notre colonie du Congo, histoire de "rectifier les frontières de sa colonie du Cameroun." Ces prétentions, je les ai prévues dès le jour de l'incident d'Agadir. Un ami de M. de Schoen me disait ce jour-là :—

"Voilà ce que M. de Kiderlen va vous demander. Il sait qu'il ne l'obtiendra pas, mais il espère tout de même gagner quelque chose à ce marchandage."

J'ai appris hier que le marchandage allait continuer. Nous en avons même pour quelque temps avant de tabler sur des propositions sérieuses qui feront l'objet de négociations et transactions définitives.

En haut lieu, voici ce qui m'a été confié :—

"M. de Schoen, Ambassadeur allemand, est allé, à la réception diplomatique, au Quai d'Orsay, pour s'entretenir avec M. de Selves des négociations en cours.

"L'Ambassadeur a déclaré que M. de Kiderlen-Waechter avait eu plusieurs conférences avec le Secrétaire allemand des Colonies au sujet des territoires sur lesquels l'Allemagne désirerait voir, dans le Sud-Africain, porter les négociations, en compensation de son désintéressement territorial dans l'Empire chérifien.

"M. de Selves n'a pas caché à l'Ambassadeur qu'il semblait bien difficile d'admettre autrement que comme un ballon d'essai les prétentions du Gouvernement allemand quant au Congo. Il a ajouté même que si les Puissances signataires de l'Acte d'Algésiras avaient les mêmes exigences que l'Allemagne, toutes les colonies françaises n'y suffiraient pas.

"M. de Schoen a exprimé au Ministre des Affaires Étrangères l'espoir que les bases d'un arrangement raisonnable et de nature à satisfaire la dignité de la France de même que les intérêts allemands seraient trouvées, et que c'était le réel désir de son Gouvernement de trouver une solution équitable pour les deux parties."

Voilà ce qui s'est dit hier, d'après de sérieux renseignements, au cours de la réception diplomatique du Quai d'Orsay. Attendons la suite avec sang-froid.

[28727] No. 116.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 22.)

(No. 338.)

Sir, *Paris, July 21, 1911.*

THE "Temps" of this evening publishes an article entitled "L'Erreur de l'Allemagne," in which it points out the mistakes committed by Germany, firstly, in sending a ship to Agadir and thereby making the situation one for European and not only for Franco-German discussion, and, secondly, in putting forward such preposterous claims for so-called "compensation."

M. de Kiderlen-Waechter's free and easy manner of claiming the best part of the French Congo had been considered by France to be insulting, and would, even when it was abandoned, as it would inevitably be, leave after it the memory of the wrong which had been done.

How came it that at Berlin it had not been understood that a nation which had not attained the last stage of decadence would necessarily refuse not only to give way to, but even to discuss certain demands? Military defeats were painful, but honourable. Pacific capitulations were humiliating. Those were the alternatives which Germany now, as in April 1905, offered to France.

I have, &c.
FRANCIS BERTIE.

Enclosure in No. 116.

Extract from the "Temps" of July 22, 1911.

L'Erreur de l'Allemagne.

LES journaux allemands commencent, semble-t-il, à mesurer les difficultés du bluff. A lire ceux d'hier et d'aujourd'hui, il est impossible de savoir ce qu'ils veulent.

Récriminations, insinuations, calomnies, voilà, sauf de rares exceptions, le menu du jour. De précisions sincères, de propositions acceptables, point. La presse d'outre-Rhin paraît désorientée, sans boussole, à l'aventure.

Une fois de plus apparaissent ainsi les faiblesses des méthodes allemandes, admirables à maints égards et cependant toujours incomplètes. Ce peuple puissant, ordonné, tenace, est prodigieusement dépourvu de tact et d'esprit de finesse. Le sens de l'opportunité lui manque, comme aussi celui de la mesure, et il excelle à "saboter" les occasions favorables. Si l'on voulait à Berlin "causer" avec la France, on peut dire que, pour beaucoup de raisons, M. Caillaux, secondé par M. de Selves, était un interlocuteur appréciable. Il n'y avait, dans le public, aucune hostilité contre l'Allemagne. On lui savait plutôt gré de l'attitude non point aimable, mais réservée et correcte qu'elle avait gardée pendant la marche sur Fez. La conversation pouvait s'engager dans le calme, avec des perspectives d'équitable entente.

Qu'a fait l'Allemagne de cette situation? Par l'envoi de ses bateaux à Agadir, elle a déchaîné des deux côtés de la frontière les commentaires nerveux, et justement froissé le Gouvernement français. Rouvrait-elle dans la forme brutale la question marocaine? Comme le remarque aujourd'hui le "Berliner Tageblatt," c'était un bien fâcheux calcul: "Il faut que M. de Kiderlen s'attende à être arrêté par l'appel de la France aux signataires de l'Acte d'Algésiras. . . . Le pire obstacle est toujours cet Acte d'Algésiras dont la diplomatie allemande s'est embarrassée elle-même. C'est une tunique de Nessus." Rien de plus juste. Et plus on appliquera à Berlin la manière forte, plus à Paris on sera conduit à invoquer le traité signé, imposé par l'Allemagne. Si M. de Kiderlen ne voulait pas qu'on lui répondît "Algésiras!" il ne fallait pas qu'il dit "Agadir!" En d'autres termes, la présence des bateaux allemands dans le port du Sous ne relève pas d'un dialogue franco-allemand, mais seulement d'une décision internationale.

Seconde erreur: le dialogue franco-allemand s'étant engagé sans base juridique précise, par simple bonne volonté de notre part, l'Allemagne n'a rien fait pour le faciliter. Elle a maintenu ses navires à Agadir, procédé auquel, nous l'avons dit, la France aurait pu et dû répondre par l'envoi, tout pacifique et amical d'ailleurs, dans le même port d'une division navale. Après quoi, elle nous a demandé des "compensations"—compensations à quoi? s'écriait l'autre jour M. Clemenceau—qui, singulières déjà si elles eussent été modérées, sont proprement scandaleuses dans la forme qui a été donnée à cette demande. Coup de sonde? dira-t-on. Parfaitement maladroit en tout cas. Car l'opinion française, qui a de brusques réveils, est aujourd'hui cabrée. M. de Kiderlen aura beau faire. Le sentiment général est qu'il a offensé la France en affichant des prétentions exorbitantes. Même si c'est une manière de marchandage, cette manière est mauvaise.

M. de Kiderlen-Waechter, grand travailleur, esprit vif, prompt aux boutades, est très Allemand, et comme tel, à peu près incapable de comprendre le caractère français. Il n'a pas médité le sens de l'incident de Casablanca de 1908: notre peuple, indifférent d'abord à un conflit secondaire, puis révolté et dressé en quarante-huit heures, parce qu'au delà de ce conflit il discernait une arrière-pensée blessante dans l'exigence exprimée des excuses immédiates, préalables à l'enquête arbitrale. Cette fois-ci, sans nécessité, M. de Kiderlen a créé une disposition pareille. Sa façon désinvolte de réclamer le Gabon, Libreville, toute la côte congolaise—réclamation dans laquelle il voyait sans doute une subtile habileté de négociation—a été jugée injurieuse; et même abandonnée, comme elle le sera inévitablement, cette réclamation laissera après elle le souvenir de l'offense. M. de Kiderlen a manqué de doigté, et voilà sa partie compromise par un obstacle d'ordre sentimental dont il n'avait pas tenu compte.

Comment cependant n'a-t-on pas compris à Berlin qu'un peuple qui n'est pas arrivé au dernier degré de la décadence se refusera nécessairement non pas seulement à subir, mais même à discuter certaines exigences? Nous demander une grande colonie parce que les négociants allemands trouvent que les négociants français n'ont pas fait avec eux assez d'affaires; nous demander des millions d'hectares de terres françaises en échange de quoi?—d'une vague chimère politique, du renouvellement d'une promesse non tenue, d'une seconde édition de l'accord oublié par l'Allemagne, de février 1909; en échange de l'autorisation de faire au Maroc une politique d'annexion ou de protectorat qui n'est pas la nôtre, une politique que l'Allemagne n'est, d'ailleurs, pas qualifiée pour autoriser: car c'est un traité signé de treize Puissances qui l'interdit; nous demander ceci en échange de cela, c'est en vérité une dérision.

Les défaites militaires sont pénibles, mais honorables. Les capitulations pacifiques sont humiliantes. C'est cela qu'on nous offre, cependant, comme en avril 1905. Que nos voisins pourtant se souviennent! Ils croyaient nous tenir à merci lors de la

démission de M. Delcassé. Moins de trois mois après, ils signaient l'accord du 10 juillet, 1905, qui nous permettait de défendre à la conférence tous nos droits et tous nos intérêts. En novembre 1908, nul ne doutait à Berlin que les excuses de la France ne précédassent l'arbitrage sur l'affaire des déserteurs. Quinze jours plus tard, l'arbitrage était décidé, sans excuses de notre part. C'est une magnifique situation que d'être en Europe le dernier vainqueur, de monnayer diplomatiquement des victoires militaires vieilles de presque un demi-siècle. Mais cette situation a ses risques. Elle comporte des erreurs de psychologie. L'Allemagne vient d'en commettre une, qui a irrité la France et choqué l'Europe.

Nous n'avons pas un besoin impérieux de la conversation commencée. Si elle s'annonce sans issue, il nous sera facile d'y renoncer.

[28855] No. 117.

Mr. White to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received July* 22.)

(No. 137.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Tangier, July* 22, 1911.

MY telegram No. 135 of the 20th instant.

British vice-consul at Mogador reports that statement made by commandant of German cruiser was that "he was in charge of coast-line of Southern Morocco from Sati to Agadir."

[28870] No. 118.

Mr. White to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received July* 22.)

(No. 138.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Tangier, July* 22, 1911.

A FURTHER detachment of 400 Spanish infantry landed at Laraïche on the 21st instant.

I am informed by the consular agent that a further incident of some gravity has taken place at Alcazar.

According to the statement made by Lieutenant Thiriet, he was riding alone to Alcazar to draw pay for his men; he was wearing his uniform, but was without arms. Noticing some deserters from his mehalla amongst a body of about ten native Spanish police, he rode up to them and demanded their identity numbers. These they declined to give, and Lieutenant Thiriet snatched the tarbush off the nearest deserter's head so that he might show it to Colonel Silvestre and thereby prove the man to be one of his former soldiers. He then continued his journey, but was pursued by the policemen, who attempted to get back the cap by violence. The assailants were reinforced by the arrival of two Spanish soldiers, who covered the lieutenant with their rifles, and directly afterwards a cavalry picket also joined in; the attack only ceased when M. Thirit appealed to the officer in command. He was brought before Colonel Silvestre, who accused him of trying to provoke an incident, and he refused the escort back to his camp which the colonel offered him.

Colonel Silvestre gave his version of the affair to Mr. Carleton. From his account it would appear that the sentries only covered Lieutenant Thiriet with their rifles when he had violently assaulted a policeman and hit a corporal who was sent to offer him assistance; and he visited Colonel Silvestre on the invitation of the officer in command of the cavalry picket, who, the colonel affirms, witnessed the assaults on the deserter and on the corporal.

Judging by native reports, Mr. Carleton was of opinion that Lieutenant Thiriet "had been a victim."

The Spanish sentries stopped and detained Lieutenant Thiriet and two of his men for nearly an hour when riding out of Alcazar on the morning after the above incident.

(Sent to Madrid.)

[28868] No. 119.

Mr. Rennie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 22.)

(No. 61. Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Zarauz, July 22, 1911.*

ALCAZAR incidents. My telegram No. 60 of 19th June.

At my interview to-day with the Minister for Foreign Affairs, his Excellency informed me that he considered the Boisset incident as terminated. The fresh incident just created at Alcazar by the French lieutenant, Thiriet, has, however, caused much annoyance to the Spanish Government, and the Spanish Ambassador at Paris has been instructed to represent the matter to the French Government and to suggest the desirability of removing Lieutenant Thiriet, whose conduct had on previous occasions already caused friction, from the neighbourhood of the River Luccus. Lieutenant Thiriet is reported to have assaulted, within the Spanish zone, a corporal of the Larache tabor and to have behaved in an unseemly manner in the presence of Colonel Silvestre. Señor Garcia Prieto was, however, disinclined to make capital out of this incident.

He had proposed to the French Ambassador this morning that European travellers should be provided with permits from their legation or consulate so as to obviate new incidents connected with the carrying of arms. Orders had been sent that the recruiting of natives for the Spanish tabors was henceforth to cease in the Alcazar district.

French Ambassador gives me to understand that, in the course of the above interview, Señor Garcia Prieto had broached the question of reopening the conversations at Madrid, and that they had, in a friendly informal way, made allusion to several of the points which had come up for discussion in the course of them.

I have repeated the above to His Majesty's Ambassador at Paris.

[28790] No. 120.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Rennie.

(No. 83.)
(Telegraphic.) *Decode.* *Foreign Office, July 22, 1911.*

YOU should support the representations which the French Ambassador is making in regard to travellers to and from Fez being allowed to pass through Alcazar without hindrance.

[30188] No. 121.

Extract from the "Times" of July 22, 1911.

THE Lord Mayor gave a banquet at the Mansion House last night to the Chancellor of the Exchequer, the Governor and Directors of the Bank of England, and bankers and merchants of the City of London. The references by the Chancellor of the Exchequer to the position of international affairs and to the necessity of maintaining the prestige of Great Britain among the Great Powers at all hazards were loudly cheered.

[Extract from the speech of the Chancellor of the Exchequer.]

PEACE AND BRITISH PRESTIGE.

But I am also bound to say this—that I believe it is essential in the highest interests, not merely of this country, but of the world, that Britain should at all hazards maintain her place and her prestige amongst the Great Powers of the world. (Cheers.) Her potent influence has many a time been in the past, and may yet be in the future, invaluable to the cause of human liberty. It has more than once in the past redeemed continental nations, who are sometimes too apt to forget that service, from overwhelming disaster, and even from national extinction. I would make great sacrifices to preserve peace. I conceive that nothing would justify a disturbance of international good-will except questions of the gravest national moment. But if a situation were to be forced upon us in which peace could only be preserved by the surrender of the

great and beneficent position Britain has won by centuries of heroism and achievement, by allowing Britain to be treated where her interests were vitally affected as if she were of no account in the Cabinet of nations, then I say emphatically that peace at that price would be a humiliation intolerable for a great country like ours to endure. (Cheers.) National honour is no party question. (Cheers.) The security of our great international trade is no party question; the peace of the world is much more likely to be secured if all nations realise fairly what the conditions of peace must be. And it is because I have the conviction that nations are beginning to understand each other better, to appreciate each other's points of view more thoroughly, to be more ready to discuss calmly and dispassionately their differences, that I feel assured that nothing will happen between now and next year which will render it difficult for the Chancellor of the Exchequer in this place to respond to the toast proposed by you, my Lord Mayor, of the continued prosperity of the public purse. (Cheers.)

[28861] No. 122.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 23).

(No. 108) [By Post.]
(Telegraphic.) *En clair.* *Paris, July 22, 1911.*

THE account received by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the fresh Franco-Spanish incident is that Lieutenant Thiriet went to Alcazar to draw pay for the Shereefian mehalla which he commands. He saw some men dressed in Spanish uniform, whom he recognised as deserters from his mehalla. He called upon one of them to give him his number, and, on refusal, pulled off the man's cap to see his number. The lieutenant was then hustled by the deserters and also by the Spanish troopers. The Spanish officer who intervened had his men so little in hand that he was obliged to strike them with the flat of his sword to drive them off the lieutenant. The Spanish version given to M. de Selves by the Spanish Ambassador is that Lieutenant Thiriet struck the deserter, who refused to accompany him. Another report is that Lieutenant Thiriet was detained as a prisoner for an hour.

M. de Selves has told the Spanish Ambassador that measures must be taken at once to prevent these incidents. The Spanish Government will forbid the enlistment of deserters from the Shereefian mehallas. M. de Selves has given orders that the French officers in command of mehallas are to avoid contact with the Spanish officers and troops.

[28911] No. 123.

Mr. White to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 24.)

(No. 217.)
Sir, *Tangier, July 14, 1911.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 175 of the 24th ultimo, I have the honour to transmit herewith three copies of the report of the Inspector-General of the Moorish police.*

M. de Billy, in speaking to me of this report, expressed considerable annoyance at Colonel Müller's reference on p. 9 to the part taken by the Rabat police in the fighting between Sallee and Knitra. He considered that the police were quite justified in their action on that occasion and objected very strongly to that incident being bracketed, as it were, with the action of the Laraiche police, for whom he could find no excuse. He also criticised Colonel Müller's disclaimer in regard to the financial department, on pp. 11 and 12 of the report. The French Legation have always been somewhat dissatisfied with Colonel Müller, whom they regard, unjustly, I believe, as inspired with anti-French sentiments.

On this occasion I merely observed that I felt sure that Colonel Müller had merely desired to be quite impartial in his report and had not desired to be in any way disagreeable to the French.

I have, &c.
HERBERT E. WHITE.

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* Not printed.

[28912] No. 124.

Mr. White to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received July* 24.)

(No. 218.)

Sir, *Tangier, July* 15, 1911.

OWING to the loss by the Makhzen of all authority consequent on the revolt of the Beni M'tir and other tribes, the arrangement made by Sir R. Lister with Kaïd Anfloos and ratified by the Sultan, at the request of the diplomatic body, was never carried out, the n'zalas all round Mogador being maintained as before by Kaïds Anfloos, Guillouli, and Khoubban.

The French consul at Mogador lately had an interview with Kaïds Anfloos and Guillouli and made fresh arrangements with them by which three of the n'zalas in Kaïd Anfloos's district are abolished and the tariff at the others is very greatly reduced. Kaïd Khoubban also subsequently accepted the arrangement. I beg leave to transmit herewith copies of two letters addressed to the doyen of the diplomatic body by M. de Billy acquainting him with this arrangement.

I told M. de Billy that it was very satisfactory to have obtained the immediate reduction of the dues and suppression of the n'zalas, but that I hoped that this would be regarded merely as a temporary measure of relief until the Makhzen was in a position to put in force the arrangement made by Sir R. Lister, and I made an observation to the same effect on the doyen's circular covering M. de Billy's letters. It would, I think, be a pity to allow the French consul's arrangement to abrogate that of Sir R. Lister, which is of great importance, as it distinctly establishes the principle that toll need only be paid at n'zalas at which the animals carrying the goods are put up for the night. This to my mind is of greater importance than the question of the tariff of the charges, as tariffs are always open to revision, whereas once a principle is established, it may be difficult to modify it, and Makhzen or powerful kaïds might at any time place numerous n'zalas along the main roads.

I have, &c.
HERBERT E. WHITE.

Enclosure 1 in No. 124.

M. de Billy to Doyen of Diplomatic Body.

M. le Doyen, *Tanger, le* 10 *juillet*, 1911.

J'AI l'honneur de porter à la connaissance du corps diplomatique que, profitant des démarches relatives à la suppression des n'zalas faites par M. le Ministre d'Angleterre auprès du Caïd Anflous, lors de son récent voyage à Marrakech, démarches qui ont été portées par Sir Reginald Lister à la connaissance du corps diplomatique, M. Marc, consul de France à Mogador, a de nouveau entretenu de la question les Caïds Anflous et Guellouli. Ceux-ci ont accepté de diminuer considérablement les droits prévus sur les routes qui traversent leurs territoires.

Le droit perçu par charge dans chacune des n'zalas, dont le nombre total reste provisoirement le même, est réduit à ½ peseta hassani pour les marchandises ordinaires et à ¼ peseta hassani pour les céréales. Si l'on compare ces nouveaux tarifs aux tarifs antérieurs, on voit qu'il s'agit, suivant les n'zalas, d'une réduction de ⅝, de ¾ ou de ½. Le tableau ci-joint le fait ressortir.

Cet arrangement concerne seulement les territoires des Caïds Anflous et Guellouli. Il y a lieu d'espérer toutefois que les autres caïds seront amenés à accepter également ces réductions de tarif en raison de la concurrence que leur feront les routes où les droits auront été abaissés.

Enclosure 2 in No. 124.

OLD and New N'zala Tariffs in the Districts of Anfloos and Guillouli.

Routes.	Nombre de N'zalas.	Ancien Péage par N'zala.	Nouveau Péage par N'zala.	
		Peseta hassani.	Peseta hassani.	
Mogador au Sous par le Caïdat d'Anflous	6	1·00	½ ¼	Marché ordinaire. Céréales.
Mogador au Sous par le Caïdat de Guellouli	10	1·35	½ ¼	Marché ordinaire. Céréales.
Mogador au col de Bibaoum par le Caïdat d'Anflous	6	1·00	½ ¼	Marché ordinaire. Céréales
Mogador à Marrakech par le Caïdat d'Anflous	5	1·00	½ ¼	Marché ordinaire. Céréales.
Mogador à Saffi par le Caïdat d'Anflous	2	3·00	½ ¼	Marché ordinaire. Céréales.

Enclosure 3 in No. 124.

M. de Billy to Doyen of Diplomatic Body.

M. le Doyen, *Le* 11 *juillet*, 1911.

J'AI l'honneur de porter à la connaissance de votre Excellence, pour faire suite à ma lettre en date d'hier, que, d'après des renseignements qui me sont fournis par M. Marc, consul de France à Mogador, le Caïd Anflous a supprimé trois des n'zalas installées sur son territoire : une sur la route de Marrakech et deux sur la route de Bibaoun.

Le Caïd Khoubban a également consenti le tarif minimum aux marchandises passant sur son territoire.

[28916] No. 125.

Mr. White to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received July* 24.)

(No. 222. Very Confidential.)

Sir, *Tangier, July* 16, 1911.

THE position of affairs at Alcazar remains very unsatisfactory ; the local officials, civil and military, have worked themselves up into a state of nervous tension that may lead to an unfortunate incident at any moment. Even at the French Legation there is, I fear, a tendency to assign undue importance to the various incidents which occur, and it is difficult for them, in the circumstances, to form a calm judgment on the reports they receive from their agents. I understand that the Spaniards have appointed a consul *de carrière* at Alcazar ; it would be a good thing if the French could appoint a man of tact and calm temperament in the place of M. Boisset, who is an unpaid official, and not really very suitable for the post in the present circumstances, though he did good work in assisting the military before the relief of Fez. The appointment of a French consular officer *de carrière* at Alcazar would, however, probably not be favourably regarded by Spain at the present moment.

Making due allowance for exaggeration in the reports that have been received at the French Legation, the Spanish military authorities have, I think, given both the Makhzen and the French good grounds for complaint and for uneasiness as to what further action they may take, in spite of the formal assurances they have given. The constant dispatch to Alcazar of troops of all arms seems quite unnecessary if they contemplate nothing beyond the occupation of their present positions, for the country has remained quite quiet, and no attempt whatever has been made to oppose them in any way. M. de Billy told me that he had heard from three independent sources, including several remarks dropped by Spanish officers at Alcazar, that it was intended

to march through Masmouda to a spot known as Old Fez, near Fishtala, which is a good deal more than half way to Fez, and forms the south-west point of the line of demarcation of the Spanish zone—the point at which that line turns north to pass east of Wazan. This, he said, France could not possibly allow.

It seems to me, however, almost as incredible that the Spanish Government could have any such intention as that they had desired to occupy Wazan. The continual flow of Spanish troops into Alcazar and the loose talk of Spanish officers at that place give rise to reports of this nature.

The French are also much annoyed at the desertion of men of the Makhzen troops under French instructors to join the Spanish police, and M. de Billy informs me that men have told Lieutenant Thiriet that bribes are offered them to desert with their rifles and horses.

Another grievance against the Spaniards is the practical suppression of the Moorish troops at Alcazar, including those under French instructors, and the prohibition of any Makhzen troops to pass with arms. This is carried to such a length that even the escorts of travellers are disarmed, and recently a few soldiers escorting some camels, which Lieutenant Thiriet was sending to Tangier to bring some uniforms, &c., for his men, were not allowed to proceed with their arms. It seems a somewhat high-handed proceeding on the part of Colonel Silvestre not to allow Makhzen troops on Makhzen business to pass through the district occupied without being disarmed.

I have, &c.
HERBERT E. WHITE.

[28917] No. 126.

Mr. White to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received July* 24.)

(No. 223. Confidential.)
Sir, *Tangier, July* 16, 1911.

NO further news has been received from Agadir. The correspondents of several newspapers have left Mogador for that place, some by sea and others by land, so direct news should be received before long.

The report has been spread amongst the kaïds of the south that they are to be dispossessed by Kaïd M'tougi and others appointed in their place. The vice-consul at Marrakesh expresses the opinion that if M'tougi sends a force into Sus there will probably be fighting, and that an opportunity would thus be afforded to the Germans for landing, should they desire to do so. I understand however from M. de Billy that instructions of a tranquillising nature have been sent to the southern kaïds with a view to preventing any disturbances. The kaïd of a district near Mogador informed Mr. Vice-Consul Johnstone early this month that he had been dispossessed by M'tougi and appealed for protection. This kaïd is one of the "conseillers indigènes" of the Union des Mines, and as such would receive the good offices of the French Legation. M. de Billy, however, did not know that this kaïd was a "conseiller indigène," and informed me this morning that he had heard he had appealed to the Germans for protection.

His Majesty's consul at Fez reports, in a private letter, an unconfirmed rumour that the Sultan has formally protested, through Dr. Vassel, against the action of Germany in sending a cruiser to Agadir. M. de Billy, to whom I mentioned the report, is inclined to discredit it, as he had, under instructions from Paris, advised Mulai Hafid not to make any protest. He tells me that the Sultan said to M. Gaillard that some time since a German agent, probably one of the Mannesmanns, had told him that the German Government had been given an undertaking by Mulai Hassan that if ever any cession of territory was made to another Power, Germany should receive a cession in Sus. M. de Billy supposes this undertaking, if really given, must have been obtained by Count Tattenbach on his mission to the Court in 1890, when the German treaty was negotiated. He considers, however, that this arrangement is in any case abrogated by the terms of the Act of Algeciras, and could not now be held to be binding upon Mulai Hafid.

At the time of Count von Tattenbach's mission, there were persistent rumours that some sort of a promise of a cession of territory had been obtained by Germany, but, as was the case when similar rumours were current a few years earlier, it was believed to be in the north. As however was reported in Sir W. Kirby Green's despatch

No. 56 of the 6th July, 1890, Count von Tattenbach positively denied the report. At later dates there have been rumours of a desire of Germany to obtain a footing in the Sus, but I have no recollection of any report having reached this legation of any undertaking in this respect having been given by Mulai Hassan.

I have, &c.
HERBERT E. WHITE.

[28918] No. 127.

Mr. White to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received July* 24.)

(No. 224.)
Sir, *Tangier, July* 18, 1911.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith copy of a despatch I have received from His Majesty's consul at Casa Blanca, reporting a conversation he had had with Dr. Arning, member for Hanover in the Reichstag and Prussian Diet, and apparently connected with the Mannesmann enterprise.

I have, &c.
HERBERT WHITE.

Enclosure in No. 127.

Consul Madden to Mr. White.

(No. 150.)
Sir, *Casa Blanca, July* 14, 1911.

AMONG the passengers by the French steamer "Anatolie," from Mogador to Casa Blanca, which I travelled by, was a German doctor, by name Arning, member for Hanover, in the Reichstag and in the Prussian Diet. He told me he had been interested for several years in Morocco, and has just been travelling for seven weeks in the country, visiting Marrakesh and the Atlas. He described the agricultural and mineral possibilities of Morocco as enormous, especially the latter, and said that from what he has seen he considers that the mines of this country may turn out to be even more important than those of Katanga in the Belgian Congo, which he knows, having served in the German colonies of West and East Africa.

Dr. Arning said he had come from Marrakesh to Mogador, as he had heard that the German war-ships might be at Mogador; and I remarked that I had been told the "Panther" has recently been there. The doctor replied that it was so, the object of the vessel's visit having been to ascertain through the German vice-consul why wireless messages from Agadir had not been forwarded on by the Mogador station, but I gathered he did not think the explanations given to be particularly satisfactory. He mentioned that the cruiser "Eber" (the small gun-boat which visited Casa Blanca last March) is to join the "Berlin" and "Panther" at Agadir.

The doctor is evidently interested in or connected with the Mannesmann enterprise in Morocco, as at Saffi one of their employés came on board the "Anatolie" to accompany him ashore; and Dr. Arning said he wished to meet Mr. Mannesmann at Casa Blanca.

The German action at Agadir has given a great stimulus to the sale in Mogador of deeds of properties at Agadir. A regular traffic is now going on in Mogador in these documents, but it is very doubtful whether the purchasers will ever be able to prove a good title, or even identify the plots which are being sold to them.

I have, &c.
A. M. MADDEN.

[28924] No. 128.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received July* 24.)

(No. 203.)
Sir, *Berlin, July* 21, 1911.

I HAVE the honour to report that my French colleague and Herr von Kiderlen-Waechter met yesterday for the first time since Saturday last, the 15th instant. From M. Cambon's account the conversation consisted almost entirely of complaints on the part of Herr von Kiderlen of the way everything that passed between them was given

by the French Minister of Foreign Affairs to the French press. I did not gather from M. Cambon that the conversation was very pleasant, or that any progress was made in the compensation negotiations.

I saw Herr von Kiderlen to-day for a few moments. He did not say anthing to me about either the French or English press, but he said that the negotiations were rendered very difficult by the rapacity of the Imperial Colonial Office, which made somewhat large demands, and were very disinclined to give anything in return. I asked his Excellency whether that meant that they were averse to the principle of Germany disinteresting herself from Morocco. He said that what he meant was that if France handed over to Germany a large slice of her colonial possessions in return for what already practically existed, namely, the preponderance of French influence in Morocco, something, he thought, must be done, for the sake of reconciling French colonial public opinion, in the way of giving up some small slice of German colonial territory to France. This idea, he said, the Imperial Colonial Office seemed utterly unable to grasp. His Excellency then talked about public opinion in Germany, and said that whereas before Agadir he had received nothing but eulogies from the press, he was now, though still having the confidence of the best newspapers, subjected to a perfect fire of criticisms from the pan-Germans, who threatened him with the direst consequences if he gave up the smallest fraction of what Germany considered to be her rights in Morocco.

He said that he received a pile of anonymous letters every day to that effect. He added, however, that he did not care in the least for such rhodomontades as long as he could get what he wanted, namely, a fair settlement with France, which would settle their differences over the Morocco question once for all.

What he wanted to avoid was little bits of territory here and little bits of territory there; that meant a multiplicity of frontiers, and frontiers meant friction.

The following are some of the German press comments on the present state of the Morocco question :—

The "Frankfurter Zeitung" in a long leading article in its Tuesday evening edition, says: "No one who pretends to know anything about politics can declare that Germany would regard with indifference the annexation of Morocco by the French. On the contrary, it is greatly to her interest that Morocco should not become French. Should this, however, be proposed, Germany's compensation must be proportionate. She cannot be put off with a slice of the Congo, or the swampy Lake Chad. More than this would, however, probably cause the French Government serious obstacles with the people. The 'Temps,' the principal organ of colonial policy, has already declared that there never could be any question of the diminution of French colonial possessions. This points to very unfavourable prospects for the result of the compensation negotiations. We can only imagine one possibility whereby Germany could leave Morocco to the French with small, or even no colonial compensation, and that would be if France would renounce her secret enmity against Germany, if she would accept the hand of friendship which has been offered to her for so long, and enter into genuine co-operation with Germany. French capital and German power for work would work wonders of progress, welfare, and peace, not only for the good of the two nations, but for the whole of mankind, and before this glorious future the whole of the Morocco conflict would vanish like shadows before the sun."

The "National Zeitung" of the 19th instant says that people here are astonished by the discussion of compensations in the French press. It maintains that compensations can either be given or required only if the other party is willing to renounce previous rights, and that there can be no question of Germany abandoning the rights which belong to her by treaty in Morocco.

The "Kölnische Zeitung" rebukes the "Temps" for publishing what purports to be the chief points of the conversations between M. Cambon and Herr von Kiderlen. It states that it has always drawn attention to the fact that nothing whatever is known concerning the nature of the negotiations between the two Powers, and that it is therefore superfluous for the "Temps" to try to show that these negotiations are following a definite direction, corresponding with the wishes of France.

Professor Schiemann, in his weekly article on foreign politics in the "Kreuz-Zeitung," draws attention to the fact that Herr von Kiderlen has openly shown that his endeavour is to have a definite understanding on the question of the African interests of France and Germany. The professor declares that such an understanding cannot be arrived at without sacrifice on both sides. He goes on to say that in patriotic circles it is desired that Germany should establish herself in Southern

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Morocco, but, in his opinion, this desire will never be fulfilled, if the idea is adhered to that the aim of the present negotiations must be the adjustment of German and French interests in Africa. "If we relinquish the pursuit of an alluring prospect in Southern Morocco," Professor Schiemann says, "and thus of a position which would without doubt imperil the North African Empire of France, some considerable African compensation must be found in another place, so that both Powers may be satisfied, and the African question once and for all removed from the Franco-German account-books. How this is to be accomplished, it is no task of ours to discuss, nor, in our opinion, is it the task of the newspapers at all."

The "Tageszeitung" thinks that the question of compensation should not be put aside until it is known what is going to become of Morocco.

The "Münchener Neueste Nachrichten," in quoting the English writer, Mr. Cunninghame Graham, as having said that Germany had rendered a service at Agadir both to the Moors and to the world in general, says that Germany has shouted, "Catch the thief!" with such energy that Europe has been compelled to listen. England has now an opportunity of giving up her earlier egoistical foolishness towards Germany, and to give her friendship by a similar rapprochement as that made by her with France.

The "Berliner Tageblatt" devotes a leading article, entitled, "The Nessus Shirt," to blaming the French press for its attitude, and to pointing out the advantages of compensation inside, and not outside, Morocco. It says that the silence observed by M. Cambon and Herr von Kiderlen leads to the most divergent rumours as to the progress of the Moroccan negotiations. Thus the pan-German press speaks of "Germany's splendid retreat," while a part of the French press complains as to Germany's extravagant claims, which, should they cause the failure of the present negotiations, will, according to the "Temps" of the 19th instant, necessitate the Morocco question being laid before the other signatory Powers of the Algeciras Act.

The "Berliner Tageblatt" then proceeds to contest the statement made by certain French newspapers to the effect that Germany's interference was unjustified, and that she has no more right than the other Algeciras Powers to claim compensation. It says that Germany is, on the contrary, considerably interested in such an important transfer of territory as is constituted by the incorporation of Morocco into the French Colonial Empire. History shows that the acquisition of territory by one Power has always led to claims for compensation by other interested Powers, and France recognised this standpoint in her treaty of the 8th April, 1904, with England. The policy of compensation is supported, the article says, by those in Germany who desire good relations with France, chiefly because it removes, once and for all, this bone of contention. To this somewhat remarkable view the "Berliner Tageblatt" remarks that the policy in itself is sound enough, but it should have been adopted before the Algeciras Conference.

The article proceeds to speculate and comment on the various territories which might be offered in compensation. It protests against a rectification of the Cameroon frontier on the score of the utter uselessness of the district, "which, according to an expert opinion, may be of some value after the third glacial period." It mentions, without comment, the "Matin's" statement that Germany is demanding the whole of the French Congo coast, and then says that the "virgin soil of Agadir, with a little bit of hinterland, as yet not soaked with European blood" would be the cheapest and best form of compensation, because, though it might infringe the interests of other Powers, it would, at least, not offend them from any sentimental considerations.

The writer overrules Herr Harden's suggestion that France should pay nothing, but should merely guarantee friendship to Germany. He points out that the value of such a guarantee cannot be ensured by a written undertaking, and that a proud and independent people like the French cannot be forced into a friendship. In the opinion of the "Berliner Tageblatt," the advent of better relations between the two countries can best be ensured by some such issue to the present negotiations as will leave no feeling of bitterness in France, nor of disappointment in Germany.

In conclusion, the article says that Herr von Kiderlen's already difficult task is rendered far harder by the ever-impending threat, at each step he takes, that the other signatories of the Algeciras Act will be called in. It would, perhaps, have been better, the writer says, if Germany had consulted the more important Algeciras Powers before taking action. In any case, the greatest obstacle remains, "this wretched Algeciras Act," which German diplomacy threw over its own body, as Hercules did the Nessus shirt. The negotiations may result in nothing, and, in that case, the writer says that the French newspapers will have contributed to this result on the

one side, and on the other the pan-Germans can console themselves with the thought that, by their enthusiasm about the Algeciras Conference, they helped Germany on with the Nessus shirt.

I have, &c.
W. E. GOSCHEN.

[28903] No. 129.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 24.)

(No. 340.)
Sir, *Paris, July 22, 1911.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 337 of yesterday's date, I have the honour to acquaint you that the Berlin correspondent of the "Écho de Paris" telegraphs to that journal that the negotiations between M. de Kiderlen-Waechter and M. Jules Cambon are being hindered by the press compaign in England, and by the indications on those negotiations which have been given by certain French newspapers.

"This," the correspondent adds, "is at the present moment the most important point, and I have no hesitation in declaring that, if those indications were to continue, the negotiations might suddenly be interrupted."

Meanwhile the following notice has been issued to the press by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs :—

"Certains journaux parisiens publient depuis quelques jours des informations ou des comptes rendus de conversations diplomatiques au sujet des négociations franco-allemandes.

"Nous sommes autorisés à déclarer que toutes ces informations ou comptes rendus ne reposent sur aucune communication et n'engagent que leurs auteurs."

I have, &c.
FRANCIS BERTIE.

[29384] No. 130.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen.

(No. 167.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, July 24, 1911.*

COUNT METTERNICH asked to see me to-day, and when he came informed me that he had fully reported to his Government what I had said to him on Friday, the 21st. He was now instructed to make a communication to me. It was as follows :—

From the beginning the German Government had sent a ship to Agadir in order to protect German interests, and for no other reason. The special cause was the attack of natives on a German farm.

At this point I observed that I had not, I thought, heard of this attack before. I had understood that the dispatch of the ship had been due to apprehension as to what might happen, not to what had actually happened.

Count Metternich remarked that he had not been told of it before.

He then proceeded to say that so far nothing had happened to give reason for thinking that the German intentions were changed. Not a man had been landed ; and he could inform me, though this was very confidential, that the German commander had strict orders to land men only in case of extreme necessity—when the lives of Germans were menaced.

I observed that I thought there were no Germans in this region, and that I supposed, therefore, the term German must mean German protected persons.

Count Metternich said that he had no information on this point.

He went on to say that his Government regretted the credence which was given to insinuations as to the intentions of Germany that came from hostile quarters. Germany never had thought of creating a naval port on the Moroccan coast, and never would think of it. Such ideas were hallucinations. She had no intentions on Moroccan territory, but demanded that France should keep strictly to the Act of Algeciras, or else come to explanations with Germany. The German Government thought that the latter course would be more in the interests of France, and they had proposed quite generally that Germany should be given compensation in colonial matters, in order that she might give up her right to object to French action in Morocco. Negotiations had been begun with France, and both parties had promised to keep the strictest secrecy. On the

German side this had seriously been done ; not even the allies of Germany were informed of what had passed. France, on the contrary, to Germany's regret, had given partial information to the press, and also to her friends, the information being incorrect and incomplete, and calculated to mislead as to the intentions of Germany.

Herr von Kiderlen had declared to M. Jules Cambon that he could not go on with negotiations and make positive and detailed proposals (a thing which he had not done hitherto) until secrecy was guaranteed. In order to avoid misrepresentation, he had proposed that information should be given, when mutually agreed upon, to mutual friends and to the press. M. Jules Cambon's answer to this was expected yesterday.

If the German demands were rather high, Germany was ready to make concessions in Morocco as well as in colonial matters. But the chauvinistic tone of the French and part of the British press, menacing Germany with the interference of the friends of France, did not tend towards a settlement. Should the present negotiations be wrecked, even then Germany would have no designs upon Moroccan territory ; but she would have to demand from France, with determination and emphasis, that the Algeciras Act should be fully carried out, in spirit as well as in letter. Germany could not, as one of the Great Powers, let the French presume to encroach upon her rights contrary to written treaties. Germany still hoped that things would not come to that point, and that a friendly exchange of opinions *à deux* would avoid this. If, however, France should not wish to come to an understanding on the basis proposed, Germany would have to demand a return to the *status quo ante* in Morocco, and in doing so would count on the support of the other Powers who were parties to the Algeciras Act, and especially of England.

Count Metternich told me confidentially that his Government had made no demand as to the right of pre-emption in the Belgian Congo.

I said that I would communicate this statement to the Prime Minister. But, as I was likely to be asked in Parliament what was happening at Agadir, I should like to know whether I might say that the German Government had informed me that not a man had been landed.

Count Metternich requested that I should make no public statement with regard to this conversation until he had had time to communicate with his Government.

I further observed that the question of what was the *status quo ante* was a matter of interpretation, in which I assumed that all the Powers who signed the Algeciras Act would have a say, and, if so, what Germany had said seemed to me to point to a conference in the last resort.

Count Metternich said that no doubt there were sometimes in treaties dark points which it was difficult to interpret, but there were other points which were clear. In this case it was very clear that France ought to withdraw from any occupation of Morocco extending beyond what was contemplated by the Algeciras Act, and the question was not one to be submitted to a vote, nor was it open to serious discussion. Germany, he repeated, hoped for our support.

I observed again that the question as to the *status quo ante* was a matter for interpretation, and it would have to be discussed if the time came to raise it.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[29307] No. 131.

Mr. Rennie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 25.)

(No. 62.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *San Sebastian, July 25, 1911.*

MY telegram No. 61 of 22nd July.

Minister for Foreign Affairs and the French Ambassador drafted yesterday a *modus vivendi* in Alcazar district, of which the following are the chief points :—

1. Neither French nor Spanish officers are to cross into respectively Spanish and French zones.

2. Arrangements to be come to between the French and Spanish authorities for mutual arrest and exchange of deserters.

3. Permits to carry arms to be issued by legation or consulate to European travellers passing with armed escort through Alcazar district.

Draft was telegraphed last night to the French Government, whose concurrence is awaited.

[29439] No. 132.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen.

(No. 168.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, July* 25, 1911.

THE German Ambassador came to see me to-day, and, in reply to my question of Monday as to whether I might make use in Parliament of the information which the German Government had given that no men had been landed at Agadir, he gave me the answer of the German Government.

The information was confidential, and they must request me to treat it as such. They could not consent to its being used in Parliament after the speech of the Chancellor of the Exchequer. That speech had been interpreted without contradiction as having a tone of provocation for Germany, and the German Government could not let the belief arise that, in consequence of the speech, they had made a declaration of intentions about Morocco.

I observed that I must say at once that the fact that the Chancellor of the Exchequer's speech, which seemed to me to give no cause for complaint, had created surprise was in itself a justification of the speech, as it could not have created surprise unless there had been some tendency to think that we might be disregarded.

The German Ambassador said that he had a further communication to make about the speech, but meanwhile he went on to say that, if an understanding with France fell through owing to French resistance, Germany must demand that the Treaty of Algeciras be kept, and the *status quo ante* be restored, whether that were agreeable to France or not.

The German Government did not think that a conference would be necessary. Germany, as one of the signatories of the Treaty of Algeciras, was entitled by herself to vindicate the rights of the treaty. If, in that endeavour, Germany found the support of third parties, it would be very welcome, and would facilitate her action. But if, after the many provocations from the side of France and her free-and-easy manner in Morocco, as if neither Germany nor a treaty existed, France should repel the hand which was proffered to her by Germany, German dignity as a Great Power would make it necessary to secure by all means, and, if necessary, also alone, full respect by France for German treaty rights.

This communication was read to me by Count Metternich, and he then proceeded to read to me a further communication.

The text of the speech of the Chancellor of the Exchequer had given rise, in part of the British press and in nearly the whole of the French press, to attacks on Germany. The German Foreign Secretary could not say how far this was intended by the British Government. The effect of the speech had made a bad impression in Germany, as, owing to utterances made by me to Count Metternich, the effect of the speech could not have been unforeseen.

Negotiations were in progress with France to put an end to the difficulties which had arisen owing to the free-and-easy way in which she had thought it right to disregard the obligations of Algeciras. Germany had explicitly and repeatedly declared that she would like, without recriminations on the past, to come to a peaceful and amicable understanding directly with France. France had accepted this, and had agreed to carry on negotiations for the time being secretly. Germany had made propositions to France that seemed to the German Government quite loyal and acceptable. Those propositions concerned territories in which English interests were neither directly nor indirectly engaged.

If, notwithstanding that, England thought that she ought to express some wishes, it might have been expected that these wishes would have been transmitted to Germany in the usual diplomatic channel. Instead of this, the British Government had, through one of their members, given public declarations which, to say the least, *could* have been interpreted as a warning to Germany's address, and which, as a matter of fact, had by the British and French presses been interpreted as a warning bordering on menace.

Germany could not see by what reasons the British Government had been guided. The British Government could not have been in any doubt that, by that proceeding, the friendly understanding between Germany and France could not be furthered. Considering the tone which for some time had been adopted by part of the British press and by the whole of the French press, the British Government could hardly doubt what effect the speech of the Chancellor of the Exchequer would have. If the British Government, assuming this as a hypothesis,

should have had the intention to embroil the political situation and lead towards a violent explosion, they could not have chosen a better means than the speech of the Chancellor of the Exchequer, which took so very little into account, with regard to Germany, the dignity and place of a Great Power, which the Chancellor of the Exchequer claimed for England in that speech.

I said that I could only repeat what I had already said about the speech of the Chancellor of the Exchequer. The speech had not claimed anything except that we were entitled to be considered as one of the great nations. It had claimed no pre-eminence, and it had not even indicated that there was a crisis. It had dealt in general terms with remote contingencies. The German Government had said that it was not consistent with their dignity, after the speech of the Chancellor of the Exchequer, to give explanations as to what was taking place at Agadir. I felt that the tone of their communication made it not consistent with our dignity to give explanations as to the speech of the Chancellor of the Exchequer.

This, however, I could genuinely say. It was not intended by anything that had been said, or would be said, to embroil Germany's negotiations with France. On the contrary, we sincerely desired that they should succeed. The Foreign Office Vote was to be taken in the House of Commons the day after to-morrow, and I would then make this clear. But the tone of the German communication was very unfavourable also as regards France, and made it more than ever evident that a very difficult situation would arise if the German negotiations with France did not succeed.

Further conversation of a less formal and more discursive kind took place, in the course of which I observed that the German objection appeared to be to the press comments on the speech rather than to the speech itself.

From this Count Metternich did not dissent.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[29440] No. 133.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Carnegie.

(No. 305.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, July* 25, 1911.

M. CAMBON came to see me to-day on his return from Paris.

I told him some of the substance of my conversation with Count Metternich on the 21st of this month. I explained that I had impressed upon Count Metternich that we had remained silent since our first communication to him only in the hope that a settlement would be come to with France, and that, as the German demands seemed likely to destroy this hope, for they were demands which France obviously could not concede, I thought it better to say—though without making a formal communication—that, if the conversations with France did not succeed, we should have to become a party to a discussion of the situation.

I also told M. Cambon that, in reply to what I had said on the 21st, Count Metternich had, on the 24th, made a communication to me from the German Government. There were two principal points in this communication: (1) Germany would waive her objections to French action in Morocco if she could receive compensation as the result of negotiations which must be carried on *à deux*; and (2) if these negotiations failed, Germany would have to demand from France that the Algeciras Act should be fully carried out, in spirit as well as in letter. With regard to this second point, I had observed to Count Metternich that the *status quo* was a matter of interpretation, on which all the Powers which had signed the Act were entitled to have a say, and that what Germany suggested seemed to point to a conference in the last resort. Count Metternich had expressed the opinion that some things in the interpretation of the Act were too clear to admit of serious discussion.

M. Cambon told me that the remark which I had made to Count Metternich as to a return to the *status quo* implying the need of a conference appeared to him perfectly right, and was in accordance with the views of M. de Selves. He said, however, with regard to our suggestion that we might initiate the proposal for a conference, that this was a thing on which we should fall back only in the last resort.

I said that I entirely agreed with this. It would be preferable to secure a settlement by means of the negotiations now proceeding. We had made the suggestion only because we were considering the situation which might arise if diplomacy failed

to make a settlement. We were anxious not to occupy ground diplomatically which we were not prepared to defend by measures more than diplomatic, if need be.

M. Cambon said that, if such a point as that was reached, it would be necessary for France and England to discuss it. But he himself was not pessimistic about the diplomatic situation.

M. Cambon also informed me that the French Ambassador in Berlin had had with Herr von Kiderlen a conversation too long to report by telegraph. He expected to receive a report of it to-morrow morning, and, if so, he would come to see me in the afternoon.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[29316] No. 134.

Mr. White to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 26.)

(No. 225.)

Sir, *Tangier, July 20, 1911.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 188 of the 29th ultimo, I have the honour to report that M. Villalta, who was acting Spanish vice-consul at Alcazar, and in consequence of whose reports the Spanish troops occupied that town, died at Tangier from a clot of blood on the brain. With the exception of a few lucid intervals he has been insane ever since his return from Alcazar.

I have, &c.
HERBERT E. WHITE.

[29317] No. 135.

Mr. White to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 26.)

(No. 226.)

Sir, *Tangier, July 20, 1911.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith copy of a despatch which I have received from His Majesty's consul at Fez, reporting that Dr. Vassel, the German consul at that place, has been summoned to Berlin.

I have, &c.
HERBERT E. WHITE.

Enclosure in No. 135.

Consul MacLeod to Mr. White.

(No. 62.)

Sir, *Fez, July 17, 1911.*

I HAVE the honour to report that Dr. Vassel, German consul here, called to-day to say that he has just received a telegram summoning him to Berlin in connection with the present state of affairs in Morocco, and that his assistant, Dr. Probster, who has frequently acted in that capacity, will be in charge of the consulate during his absence. Dr. Vassel is therefore leaving for Tangier and Berlin as soon as possible.

I have, &c.
J. M. MACLEOD.

[29342] No. 136.

Mr. Rennie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 26.)

(No. 130. Confidential.)

Sir, *Zarauz, July 22, 1911.*

THE two incidents that have occurred at Alcazar during the past week appear, so far, to have been taken more calmly by the Spanish Government than might have been expected.

When I saw Señor Garcia Prieto in the morning of the 18th instant, his Excellency had received no news of the arrest of M. Boisset, and he had spoken in a hopeful and generally satisfied tone of the situation in Morocco so far as the Franco-Spanish

relations were concerned. The news of the Boisset incident reached him that afternoon, and he telegraphed immediately instructions to the Spanish Ambassador at Paris to express to the French Government regret on account of this occurrence. He was thus able, to a certain extent, to anticipate the representations which the French Ambassador, who arrived at San Sebastian the morning of the 19th, was instructed to make, and that evening I was informed that, in addition to the apology at Paris, excuses were to be made to M. Boisset at Alcazar. Two days' later I saw M. Geoffray, who told me that his Government appeared to consider the incident as closed, though the reparation that had been demanded had not, he considered, been made in the exact form that had been asked for. It was in fact only to-day that M. Geoffray learnt from Señor Garcia Prieto that a written apology had been sent to M. Boisset by Colonel Silvestre. This, I understood him to say, enabled him to consider that full satisfaction for the incident had been obtained.

I had intended to see Señor Garcia Prieto to-day about some other matters, and my visit took place after the news had been published of the Thiriet incident, and after the French Ambassador had had an interview with the Minister. Señor Garcia Prieto, though regretting this fresh incident just after the Boisset affair, appeared to be in no way perturbed. He gave me the Spanish version of what had occurred, which he had communicated to M. Geoffray in a letter which I had already seen, and which was to the effect that the lieutenant had crossed the River Luccus, come up with a deserter from the Moorish mehalla, whom he had beaten; a patrol of police had then appeared; the sergeant in command had sent a corporal to enquire what was happening, whereupon Lieutenant Thiriet had assaulted the latter. Fortunately some Spanish cavalry arrived upon the scene commanded by an officer, who had invited Lieutenant Thiriet to come to Colonel Silvestre's quarters to explain what had taken place. Here, though every courtesy is said to have been shown, the lieutenant seems to have behaved in a most unseemly manner, saying that he considered himself a prisoner, and using very violent language. Accordingly, said Señor Garcia Prieto, instructions had been sent to Señor Perez Caballero to represent Lieutenant Thiriet's conduct to the French Government. His Excellency said that officer had already been the cause of some friction on previous occasions, and it was therefore to be suggested that it might be well to move him away at least from the neighbourhood of the River Luccus. His Excellency did not, however, appear to attach much importance generally to the affair, nor did he seem inclined to make much capital out of it.

In the course of our conversation he mentioned that he was not going to-day, as announced in the papers, to take leave of the King at Santander, previous to His Majesty's departure for England. The newspapers were already attributing undue importance to the recent Alcazar incidents. Señor Canalejas had already arranged to proceed to Santander, and the presence of both Ministers there together might give rise to comment and talk which he was anxious to avoid.

I said that I knew that the French were sore at the instructions which had been given to engage recruits for the Spanish contingents that were being raised at Ceuta and Melilla, the result of which was to put a premium on desertion from the Moorish mehallas in the Alcazar district. His Excellency admitted this, and said that orders had now been issued to stop recruiting in that district.

Señor Garcia Prieto then went on to tell me that he had just made to the French Ambassador a proposal, which he said he had already mooted in London, that some system should be instituted for issuing, through legations or consulates, passes to travellers in the Alcazar district, in order to prevent them having trouble with the Spanish authorities on account of carrying arms.

Subsequently I saw the French Ambassador, who gave me an account of his conversation with the Minister for Foreign Affairs, which appears to have been of a very friendly character. Only brief allusions seem to have been made to the Boisset and Thiriet incidents, the latter of which, I understood, was being dealt with at Paris. Señor Garcia Prieto had, however, touched on the general question of the Madrid conversations, and on the desirability of resuming them, and I gathered that some points which had formed the subject of discussion two months ago were again alluded to in the most informal and unofficial manner, M. Geoffray saying that he had explained the Spanish wishes to M. de Selves.

I have, &c.
ERNEST RENNIE.

[29370] No. 137.

Consul-General Sir F. Oppenheimer to Sir E. Crowe.—(Received July 26.)

(Confidential.)
Dear Sir Eyre, *Frankfort-on-the-Maine, July 25, 1911.*

AFTER my recent return from London I took an early opportunity of meeting a gentleman from whom I have already on former occasions gathered interesting information, and naturally the conversation quickly drifted to the subject of Morocco. It appears that the gentleman in question has not been in Berlin during the last ten days or so, and perhaps some of the Berlin views he expressed, and which are hereafter set out, have since been modified, yet it is hardly likely that far-reaching changes have taken place in the German attitude, because no doubt the quarters from which the original information had come would then have found it in their own interest to supplement or modify the information previously supplied.

It would appear that the port of Agadir was seized with the intention of forcing the French into making a plain, authoritative statement to Germany of their intentions in Morocco. It was seized as a guarantee of their good-will to come to a satisfactory understanding with Germany. Failing that, it was the German Emperor's intention that Germany should convert Agadir into a permanent naval base. The Emperor was, however, turned from his original intention by very strong pressure exercised by Admiral von Tirpitz and by Kiderlen-Waechter himself.

Kiderlen-Waechter made it clear from the first that he did not desire a renewal of the Act of Algeciras, though he has expressed it as his conviction that if Germany insisted she must succeed in enforcing its terms. He also let it be understood that Germany would decidedly prefer not permanently to remain at Agadir.

Kiderlen-Waechter's views were expressed in an article written under his supervision, and which appeared in the "Kölnische Zeitung." I enclose a printed reference thereto.* You will remember the stir this inspired article created also in Germany because it, for the first time, revealed the possibility that Germany would be satisfied with compensations outside Morocco. The "All-Deutschen," who seem particularly anxious that Germany should acquire some territories in Morocco, took a strong stand in opposition to the intentions expressed in the said article; but this opposition Kiderlen-Waechter is inclined to disregard.

The German demands were formulated as follows:—

1. Mining rights in Morocco must be capable of acquisition also by non-French subjects.
2. The exports of minerals from Morocco to remain absolutely free, *i.e.*, no export duty to be levied on ore from Morocco.
3. Germany to acquire territorial compensations outside Morocco.

The territory which Germany wants is the French Congo. To save the French prestige, Germany has expressed her willingness that the German acquisition should take the form of an exchange (this "concession," though I have so far found it stated in no paper, is authentic), so that Germany should acquire the French Congo and cede some territory elsewhere to France. Concerning the German cession, no definite suggestion had then been made, but, of course, it was insisted that the territorial part of the bargain was to be a make-believe exchange only; the territories which Germany would eventually cede must be much less valuable, at least from the German point of view, than the land of the French Congo which Germany strongly desires to receive. The suggestion, reprinted in several papers, that Germany is also asking for the cession by France of her right of pre-emption of the Belgian Congo was absolutely denied by my informant.

In Germany it is generally believed that the negotiations with France can be satisfactorily concluded, and that in spite of the opposition of the "All-Deutschen" against any compensation outside Morocco, Kiderlen-Waechter will eventually find a majority in the Reichstag to sanction an agreement on the above lines. It is, moreover, believed that with the ratification of such an agreement Morocco as such will cease to exist, and will become a French colony. My informant regarded the latter fact as the probable secret of the attitude taken up by Great Britain, and which he described as incomprehensible, unless indeed Great Britain realised that it had nothing to gain

* Not printed.

from a Franco-German agreement on the above lines, and that, from a strategical point of view, it preferred the permanent occupation by Germany of Agadir and Sus—the alternative to the German proposals—for the very reason which induced Tirpitz to dissuade the German Emperor from his original intention.

Yours sincerely,
FRANCIS OPPENHEIMER.

[29447] No. 138.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 26.)

(No. 52.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Berlin, July 26, 1911.*

INSTRUCTIONS have been sent to M. Cambon to inform the German Government that the exorbitance of their demands is such as to render it impossible for any French Government to entertain them. He has, he informs me, telegraphed to his Government, asking whether that was their last word, as a communication in this sense would almost certainly cause the breaking off of the conversations. He had taken this step with a view to gaining time, and because he thought that the decision might perhaps have been modified by recent discussions in London, of the purport of which he had not been informed. M. Cambon is depressed, and is of opinion that the reduction of Germany's demands has been rendered more difficult for her by the premature disclosures in the French press.

I was informed by Herr von Kiderlen this afternoon that it had become impossible for Germany to modify her demands on account of the French Government's indiscretion in communicating them to the French press before even the two Governments could fully discuss them, and on account of the threatening language of the French papers, particularly of the military ones. Mr. Lloyd George's speech had also contributed to this result, as, though doubtless it had not been meant as such, it had unfortunately both here and in France been regarded as a menace to Germany.

Herr von Kiderlen also complained that nothing appeared to have been communicated to the French papers respecting Germany's offer of territorial compensation to France, whereas they had been duly informed of the German demands.

[29448] No. 139.

Mr. Rennie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 26.)

(No. 63.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Zarauz, July 26, 1911.*

MY telegram No. 62 of 25th July.

Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs and the French Ambassador this morning exchanged verbal declarations in the sense of the draft *modus vivendi*. I understand that this form of exchange was considered preferable to written arrangement, in view of the provisional nature of the occupation of Alcazar and consequently temporary character of agreement.

(Repeated to Paris.)

[29560] No. 140.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Carnegie.

(No. 312.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, July 26, 1911.*

M. CAMBON showed me to-day what had passed between Herr von Kiderlen and the French Ambassador in Berlin.

Germany had held to a demand for such a cession of the French Congo as would bring the Cameroons to the Congo River, but she had considerably increased her offers of territorial compensation to France elsewhere in West Africa, and had promised France an absolutely free hand in Morocco.

The French Ambassador had observed that France would, in any case, be able to remain in Morocco, subject to the Algeciras Act; and that Germany could not give away Morocco, because it did not belong to her. But Herr von Kiderlen had replied that they must deal with facts, and that if Germany did not object to a free hand for

France in Morocco no other country would object. Germany would, however, require certain guarantees that no export duties would be placed on minerals, and that taxation would be kept low.

The opinion of the French Government was that all that would be left of the French Congo would be worthless if they gave Germany what she asked; and that it would be only betraying Germany if they promised to give this, because a cession of territory could not be made without the consent of the French Parliament, and this consent could never be obtained for so large a cession as Germany wished to have. Nevertheless, the French Ambassador in Berlin had been much impressed by the change of tone on the part of Herr von Kiderlen, which pointed to a genuine desire on his part to come to a settlement.

After reading the record of what had passed, I observed that it indicated a real desire to come to a settlement, and also a very strong wish to get a position on the Congo.

M. Cambon said that, amongst other objections to the cession of Libreville or any other place on the French Congo coast to Germany, it was urged in France that we would regard British interests as having been betrayed.

I assured him emphatically that, as regards any concessions which France thought it reasonable to make in the French Congo, I should be prepared to say that we had known of them when they were being made, and had informed the French Government that there was nothing in them prejudicial to British interests. This would make it clear to public opinion here that the French Government had done nothing in this respect to impair the *entente* with us.

I then showed M. Cambon the records of my last three conversations with Count Metternich about Morocco, those of the 21st, 24th, and 25th instant. I impressed on him that the fact that Germany had made a complaint about the speech of the Chancellor of the Exchequer must be kept secret; but I thought it important that the French Government should know the language which Germany had held to us about France. This indicated that, if the negotiations with France came to nothing, Germany would not be content to remain quietly at Agadir, but would present France with a demand amounting practically to an ultimatum that France should withdraw from all military occupation of Morocco, in order to restore the *status quo*. If a conference of the Powers of the Algeciras Act were suggested, Germany would refuse to entertain the proposal, and would act alone. It might be possible for us, as one of the signatory Powers of the Algeciras Act, then to make to Germany a demand that she should withdraw from Agadir, just as she had demanded that France should withdraw from military occupation in Morocco. Germany would probably reply that her withdrawal from Agadir would take place when France withdrew to the coast.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[29765] No. 141.

Extract from "Parliamentary Debates" of July 27, 1911.

FOREIGN OFFICE VOTE.

Prime Minister's Statement and Debate in House of Commons.

The Prime Minister.—I think I said two days ago, in answer to an enquiry by the right honourable gentleman opposite (Mr. Balfour), that I thought it would be more convenient, instead of answering a question across the floor of the House, that we should take the occasion of this vote to make a statement as to a question which very largely and generally, if it does not absorb, at any rate excites public attention. I mean the question which has arisen in the international sphere in regard to Morocco, and I think it will be of general interest, as well as for the convenience of the House, that I should make that statement at once before any debate or discussion has arisen. It is obvious that this Moroccan question has reached a point at which it will become increasingly difficult, embarrassing, and anxious unless a solution is found. Too close an analysis at the present moment of causes and antecedents might provoke in more

than one quarter recrimination and retorts, which it is on every ground desirable to avoid. I propose, therefore, simply to state to the House what is the actual situation to-day. Conversations are proceeding between France and Germany. We are not a party to those conversations. The subject matter of them may not affect British interests. On that point, until we know the ultimate result, we cannot express a final opinion. But it is our desire that these conversations should issue in a settlement honourable and satisfactory to both the parties, and of which His Majesty's Government can cordially say that it in no way prejudices British interests, we believe that to be quite possible; we earnestly and sincerely desire to see it accomplished. The question of Morocco itself bristles with difficulties—but outside Morocco in other parts of West Africa—we should not think of attempting to interfere with territorial arrangements considered reasonable by those who are more directly interested. Any statements that we have so interfered to prejudice negotiations between France and Germany are mischievous inventions, without the faintest foundation in fact. But we have thought it right from the beginning to make it quite clear that, failing a settlement such as I have indicated, we must become an active party to discussion of the situation. That would be our right as a signatory to the Treaty of Algeciras; it might be our obligation under the terms of our agreement of 1904 with France; it might be our duty in defence of British interests directly affected by further developments. There have been times when we were not sure how far this was fully understood. I am glad to say we are now quite satisfied that that is not the case. The statement which I made here at this table more than three weeks ago, and the speech since made elsewhere by my right honourable friend the Chancellor of the Exchequer have, I hope and believe, made it perfectly clear that we claim not any predominant or pre-eminent position, but that of one party interested in possible developments and in seeing a solution of the present difficulties. Sir, in our judgment, it would have been a grave mistake to let such a situation drift till an assertion of our interest in it might, owing to previous silence, cause surprise and resentment at the moment when this assertion became most necessary. That, I trust, we have sufficiently guarded against by the statements already made. I repeat that we earnestly desire a successful issue of the conversations now in progress, and I would venture, in the general interest, to make a strong appeal to the House, not on the present occasion to enter into further details or open up controversial ground.

Mr. Balfour.—The careful and guarded statement made by the Prime Minister requires little or nothing from me in the way of comment, and nothing whatever in the way of criticism. He has, with a full knowledge of the difficulties of the case, and of the responsibilities attaching to the conduct of foreign affairs in a crisis like this, made an appeal to the House not to drag in irritating matter, not to raise unnecessary controversies, and not to go back over the past with criticism which, as they are directed towards the past, can do no good now, whilst it is possible that, unless couched in the most cautious terms, they may act as an irritating cause rather than as a pacific cause, in the present critical situation in which Europe, not only this country, but Europe finds itself. So far as my friends and myself are concerned, that request of the Prime Minister will, I feel quite certain, be regarded in the spirit as well as in the letter; and, perhaps, I need only add this one further remark; we have often said on both sides of the House that we do not allow our party differences, however acute, to interfere with our common agreement where the interests of the country as a whole, are at stake. I suppose there never was a moment at which that doctrine, if a genuine one, as it is, is more difficult to carry into effect than at this moment when, I suppose, party differences are more profound and more acute with regard to domestic issues, than they have been in the memory of any man now present. Sir, so far as we are concerned those statements in the past were no mere fair weather enunciations of an easy morality; they were not merely doctrines stated at a time when the temperature of the party differences was low, and when the political horizon abroad was free from cloud. They were genuinely meant, and they will be faithfully carried out; and, if there be any observers or critics outside these walls, who have counted upon our differences and our absorption in the bitter home disputes of the moment, in the hope that they will make easy a policy which they under other circumstances thought this country might object to, if there are any who suppose that we are wiped out from the map of Europe because we have our own differences at home, it may be worth while saying, for the benefit of those whom it may concern, that they have utterly mistaken the temper of the British people and the patriotism of the Opposition, whether the Opposition be drawn from one side of the House or from the other side of the House.

Mr. Ramsay MacDonald.—I am sure whoever addresses the House, following the statements made by the Prime Minister and the Leader of the Opposition, must do so with an overwhelming sense of responsibility. The gravity of the Prime Minister's statement will not delude anyone in spite of the very careful phrasing in which it has been couched. This House, on all sides, knows perfectly well what the opinions of my honourable friends are; the House also knows perfectly well the forces, the organisations, the movements in Europe with which we are associated. The House knows perfectly well that so long as there is a Labour party in Germany, in France, or in England, those parties will co-operate together to the very last moment to seek peace, and pursue it earnestly. My honourable friend the member for Glamorgan has just told me that this morning, in an international conference of miners, in which every European country has been represented as well as our own, a very earnestly worded resolution, supported by the earnest speeches of representatives—of the miners at any rate—from all those countries, has been unanimously passed. I am not going to say anything further than I have said. If the path of peace is going to be wrecked at the present moment, we shall stand by it even when it has been wrecked. I hope the House will believe me that in stating that. I am in no way going against the spirit either of the statement that has been made by the Prime Minister or that made by the leader of the Opposition. We know the gravity of the situation. We know that those who work with us upon the continent cannot control continental national politics. But we also know this, that it may be very useful for rulers of all the countries that to know that there is a strong organisation that will stand for peace through fair weather and through foul weather. May I say this further word, and I say it with profound regret: I am exceedingly sorry that the Chancellor of the Exchequer made the statement he did in another place. [Honourable Members: "No, no."] I will tell you why. It is far better that we should discuss these things quite candidly and in a calm frame of mind.

If the statement had to be made, it was precisely the statement that ought to have been made through the ordinary private channels. I do not know that I agree—I do not agree—with those private negotiations which settle the lines of national policy, the results of which are only made known to the public when the public are absolutely powerless to influence the direction in which the nation is going. But so long as that is the policy, so long as that is the method of carrying on international diplomacy, it was surely a statement which ought to have been made in that way; and I will tell you why again. That statement has been the basis of a press campaign which everybody must regret. I am sorry that the Prime Minister confined his good advice to this House. This House has never hampered him. This House has not hampered the Foreign Secretary. Whatever has happened which is unfortunate, has happened, because the press has not risen to the responsibility of its position as a peacemaker and a warmaker between nations. I offer that protest, and I will say no more now. I have spoken with a great deal of feeling, with much reluctance, and with a grave sense of responsibility; but I do hope and I do pray that the negotiations which are going on will result in peace. I do hope and I do pray that no European nation will assume for a single moment that party divisions in this country will weaken the national spirit or national union. But that does not mean that there will not be sections in the country who will strive, ceaselessly strive night and day, in season and out of season, whether it is popular or unpopular, to make it impossible first of all, and to make it difficult after that, for two civilised countries, two professedly Christian countries, to resort to the arbitrament of the sword in order to settle a difficulty that could easily be settled by The Hague Court.

[29575] No. 142.

Mr. Rennie to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received July* 27.)

(No. 64.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Zarauz, July* 27, 1911.

ALCAZAR. My telegram No. 63 of yesterday.

I am informed by French Ambassador that the verbal declaration as to the *modus vivendi* at Alcazar has been approved by the French Government, who have instructed their chargé d'affaires at Tangier to take the necessary measures to put its provisions into practice.

I have also seen to-day the Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs who expressed his satisfaction with this verbal declaration, and hoped the way would now be opened to conversations of a more extended nature.

[29568] No. 143.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 386.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, July* 27, 1911.

MOROCCO. Franco-German negotiations.

I informed the Russian Ambassador yesterday that it had been clearly stated by Germany that if a settlement did not result from the present Franco-German negotiations they would require that the French military occupation of Morocco should cease entirely, and that the *status quo* created by the Algeciras Act should in future be strictly observed by France.

It might then be proposed that a conference should be held of the Powers signatory to that Act.

The German Government had, however, given us clearly to understand that they might be unable to consider the proposal of a conference, in which case she would, by herself, approach France with her demands.

I considered that the German views should be made known to Russia in advance, so that they might be prepared beforehand should a situation of this nature arise.

[29711] No. 144.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen.

(No. 172.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, July* 27, 1911.

COUNT METTERNICH made to me to-day the following communication:—

"We trust that Sir Edward Grey, by our very open and candid communication, has gathered the conviction that our pourparlers with France at the moment do not touch British interests. We trust to the Minister's great loyalty, that he has so often shown, that he will find it possible to state this fact in Parliament, without, however, giving any details of our confidential communication. We acknowledge with pleasure that the Minister has stated that he desires an agreement between Germany and France, and feel quite convinced that this will prove most helpful to the progress of the negotiations.

"But, having in view the wish expressed by Sir Edward, we cannot quite see how he can, in the present state of the pourparlers, describe our demands as obviously impossible, without knowing what we on our side have the intention to offer to France in the political and colonial territorial field. It is not possible, in regard of the formal pledge of secrecy we have given, to go into details; but as the territories to be eventually exchanged are exclusively German and French, we do not believe that special English interests could be touched, and that it seems advisable to leave it to the two parties immediately concerned to form an estimation of the value of the objects to be eventually exchanged.

"Adverse criticism from the English side must obviously render the negotiations more difficult. On the other hand, a public statement that England would be pleased to see a successful conclusion of the Franco-German pourparlers would have a most beneficial influence on an auspicious result, for which we most earnestly hope. We most seriously wish to diminish any points of friction we have with France in the colonial sphere, especially in Africa, and hope it may eventually be possible to make them disappear entirely. We could not look forward, even if this was done, to establishing intimate relations with France, but we believed that it would do away with a cause of frequently recurring tension. If the wishes of England are in the same direction, the best way to help to bring about this result would be by having a calming influence on public opinion in France, which just now, by half-truths and inaccurate statements, has been brought to considerable excitement."

I expressed appreciation of the friendly tone in which the communication was couched. I thought that perhaps I had better not make much comment upon it, at any rate until the statement on Morocco had been made by the Prime Minister this afternoon. Count Metternich would then be able to see how far what was said met the German desire that the negotiations should be facilitated.

Count Metternich began to say something as to previous utterances on our part not having had that effect.

But I expressed the hope that we might take this last German communication as a new point of departure, and not go back upon things which must lead to mutual recrimination.

Count Metternich then pressed me to say whether we should regard the cession of the part of the French Congo from the Sanga River to the sea as affecting British interests.

I said that I must leave him to infer how far this point was covered by the statement to be made in Parliament this afternoon.

He urged that, in French opinion, there was the impression that such a cession was impossible from the point of view of British interests.

I replied that it would be a mistake to suppose that my use of the words "obviously impossible," as applied to the German demands upon France as they appeared in the newspapers last week, meant that I had gone to the French and expressed the opinion that they must not make concessions in the French Congo, because of British interests. On the other hand, it must not be expected that we could suggest to France concessions which no French Government could possibly present for the approval of the French Parliament. Count Metternich said this was certainly not expected of us.

I also observed to Count Metternich that the French Government ought to be free to inform us of the course of negotiations. We could not tell what might come into these beyond the present basis of discussion, and our desire to facilitate them was so genuine, that we should certainly not make use of any information which we received in order to impede negotiations where British interests were not affected.

In the course of further informal conversation Count Metternich expressed some regret at the way in which our public opinion had misled to adverse conclusions about German action.

I asked what else could have been expected when Germany suddenly sent a ship to Agadir, a closed commercial port, but said to be the place most suited for a naval base on the west coast of Morocco? Of course, that mobilised British public opinion. And from the time of the Cabinet communication that I made to Count Metternich on the 4th July, there had been no communication to us from the German Government till the 24th July; and then what was said about a naval base was in a form that I could not use. But I suggested again that we should not pursue these points now.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[28912] No. 145.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. White.

(No. 62.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, July* 27, 1911.

I HAVE received your despatch No. 218 of the 15th instant on the subject of the N'zalas round Mogador.

I entirely concur in your views on the subject as stated in your despatch, and I approve your language to the French Minister.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[29711] No. 146.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen.

(No. 154.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, July* 28, 1911.

MOROCCO.

Franco-German negotiations.

A friendly communication was read to me yesterday by Count Metternich, in which we are asked to express in some public manner our wish that a successful issue may be reached in the present negotiations. Tone of the communication, especially so far as France is concerned, is much improved.

[30103] No. 147.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 318.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, July* 28, 1911.

M. CAMBON informed me to-day that he had sent to his Government the communication of the German attitude and intentions towards France which I had received on Monday, and that M. de Selves wished to ask me one or two questions.

In the event of the negotiations between France and Germany breaking down, would we propose a conference, even though Germany had indicated that she would not accept a conference?

I replied that I could give only a personal opinion. It could not be final as regards myself personally and it could not commit the Government; for even if the negotiations did fail, no definite decision could be come to until we knew what was the actual situation when the failure took place. The situation then might be different from what we had been led to expect. But with this reservation, and speaking personally, I thought that a conference should be proposed. It was the natural, reasonable, and justifiable proposal to make when the Act of Algeciras was broken. Germany might agree to a conference and then break it up; but there would at least be some gain of time, and in any case I thought that, if Germany refused to let a settlement be secured by a conference, the fact should be made known.

M. de Selves also wished to know whether, supposing that Germany refused to agree to a conference, and remained at Agadir and proceeded to land men, we should think that some observations should be made to Germany, and that ships should be sent to Agadir by ourselves, France, and, if possible, Spain.

I said that, in my opinion, we ought not to send a ship to Agadir unless we were prepared to regard this as possibly the first step in a war. We could not contemplate such a step without being able to take into full consideration all the circumstances which might exist at the time.

I went on to say to M. Cambon that if the Franco-German negotiations broke down the present situation could not be allowed to continue without some solution. I would suggest that, if Germany declined a conference, all the Signatory Powers of the Algeciras Act, without being invited to a conference, should be asked to express their views as to what the situation required.

I then told M. Cambon that I wished to make to him a suggestion which had occurred to me personally, but which I did not desire to go beyond himself, unless he thought that there was something in it. The difficulty in which the French Government were placed was, I understood, that any concessions of territory which they might wish to make would have to be submitted for the approval of the French Parliament. Any concession of a part of the French Congo would to some extent change the colour of the map of Africa, for a certain part, large or small, which was at present coloured French would then be coloured German. But there would be no corresponding change in the colour of Morocco on the map if all that happened was that Germany gave France a free hand in Morocco, for France would still be bound by the Algeciras Act. I thought that possibly the French Government might be able to offer larger concessions if it was arranged that their bargain with Germany was made subject to its being confirmed by a conference. This conference would be composed of the signatory Powers of the Algeciras Act, it would recognise the protectorate of France over Morocco, and Morocco would then be coloured French on the map of Africa. This would counterbalance the alteration in colour made elsewhere. The consent of the conference to the bargain could be secured in advance, for Germany could obtain the agreement of her allies, Austria and Italy, while Russia and we should agree with France, who would, of course, make her own arrangements with Spain, with whom she had special agreements. There would, therefore, be no reason why Germany should not be willing to have such a conference, into which she would go in agreement with France, and both together assured of a majority for their views; and it might then be possible for the French Government to propose larger concessions to the French Parliament. There were certain reservations which would have to be made with regard to Tangier and economic liberty, but these were details which could be considered later.

M. Cambon said that he thought the idea was a good one, and worth considering, but the proposal that France should give up the whole of the French Congo from Sanga to the sea was one that France could not accept; the district in question was

larger than the whole of Morocco; besides, all Morocco to the south of the Atlas Mountains was a desert, and it was only a comparatively small part to the north of these mountains that was really valuable.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[29783] No. 148.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 29.)

(No. 205. Confidential.)

Berlin, July 26, 1911.

Sir,

HAVING occasion to see Herr von Kiderlen on various matters, I called upon his Excellency this afternoon. Having transacted my business with him I was taking my leave when he said that he would like to say a few words to me about Morocco. He said that Count Metternich had also had some conversation with you, and had pointed out to you, by instruction, that Germany had no intention whatever of making any effort to get a foot of Moroccan territory, still less of acquiring a military or naval port on the Moroccan coast. He, Herr von Kiderlen, knew perfectly well that any attempt to acquire or establish such a port would meet with the strongest opposition on all sides. But what he did think was this: by disinteresting herself from Morocco Germany practically handed over the protectorate of Morocco to France. The latter had squared England by giving her a free hand in Egypt, Italy by an arrangement certainly of no great value, concerning Tripoli, Spain by a sphere of influence in Morocco. Neither Russia nor Austria were likely to place any difficulties in the way of France, and the only Powers left who might have something to say were Holland, Belgium, and Sweden, whom she could more or less disregard. Therefore, if Germany retired from the field France would remain all-powerful in Morocco. Surely, the acquisition of this enormous advantage was worth some considerable sacrifice on the part of France. Besides other Powers interested in Morocco had been paid for leaving France alone. Why, therefore, should not Germany also receive compensation?

I said that I had understood that France had not been unwilling to make some sacrifice, but that if what had been stated in the French press was correct the sacrifice asked from France was too big. The greater part, if not the whole, of French Congo, and that was what I understood had been asked, was a large price for Germany to ask. Practically speaking a whole French colony was asked for in return for a renunciation of certain ideas and ambitions. Herr von Kiderlen said that one of the things he complained of was that the French Government, though really bound to secrecy at the commencement of the negotiations, had communicated to their press all the German demands, and at the same time had withheld all information as to what Germany had proposed to give in exchange, namely, Togoland and a strip of territory in the Cameroons. I asked his Excellency whether he had proposed that France should hand over the whole of French Congo. He answered in the affirmative, adding that it was not all of great value to Germany, but that he disliked the idea of having bits of territory and a multiplication of frontiers. I repeated that I thought it was a great deal to ask of France to give up a whole French colony. He answered that he was prepared to do the same in giving up Togoland, and that I might be certain that if ever the bargain was made he would be reviled ("conspué") by nearly the whole German press. That contingency, however, he could have faced with comparative equanimity if he could have succeeded in making an arrangement which would remove a continual source of friction between Germany and France.

He went on to say that the extent of the compensation he demanded from France was a matter of opinion. He thought it fair and France thought it extravagant. It had been, and ought to have remained, a subject of friendly discussion; this, however, had been rendered impossible by the premature and indiscreet disclosures of the French Government; the latter had denied any indiscretion, but as a matter of fact he had seen in the French press statements which corresponded word for word with what he had said to M. Cambon. In any case these indiscretions had resulted in such threatening language in the French papers, and especially those which, like "La France Militaire," represented French military opinion, that now it was absolutely impossible for him to modify his demands. If he did so there would, he said, be an outcry through all Germany that the Imperial Government had yielded owing to menaces from France and England. "For," he said, "there can be no doubt that the language of Mr. Lloyd George, though, I am quite willing to believe, not meant as a threat to Germany, has

been regarded as such both here and in France and thus has contributed in no small degree to the inability of the Imperial Government to modify their demands." I said that I regretted very much that Mr. Lloyd George's words should have been regarded as a threat to Germany; personally I could not see how they could bear that interpretation; I knew that the Pan-German papers had adopted that point of view, but I had been glad to see that the more moderate papers had been at pains to show that there was no threat to Germany implied. I had not heard from you on the subject, but, speaking for myself, I felt pretty sure that all that was meant was that it must not be thought that, because domestic affairs were engaging the attention of His Majesty's Government, they disinterested themselves from anything which might touch their interests abroad. That, under the circumstances, appeared to me a very natural and useful observation to make. Herr von Kiderlen said that he was more concerned with the effect which Mr. Lloyd George's statement had evidently had than with the motive which had inspired it, and he could not conceal from me that it had added considerably to the difficulties of the situation. I said that notwithstanding all difficulties, I hoped that his conversations with M. Cambon would lead to some definite and satisfactory result. He said that he hoped so too, but while he had been prepared for a certain amount of bargaining, and even haggling, because naturally in negotiations everyone wished to get the best of them if possible, he had not been prepared for indiscretions, and the resulting threatening language of the French press and the violence of French public opinion had upset all idea of mutual concessions, and rendered it impossible for him to modify what he had proposed as compensation. If France refused to entertain his proposals it would be the worse for her, as the whole Morocco question would have to be reopened, and she would have to be called to account for her breaches of the Act of Algeciras, such as her expedition to Fez, her action at Casa Blanca, and other doubtful proceedings, and also for the marked manner in which she had neglected to carry out the provisions of the 1909 agreement with Germany. I said that as regards the expedition to Fez, he would remember that it had been undertaken at the request of the Sultan, and also in order to safeguard the lives and property of Frenchmen and other foreigners at Fez. Their object had been to strengthen the authority and sovereignty of the Sultan, and this on the invitation of the latter. Moreover, the French Government had informed the Powers of their contemplated action, and I had always understood that the German Government had raised no objection to that action, and had contented themselves with pointing out the difficulty France would have in doing, within a reasonable period, what she had undertaken to do. The action which the Imperial Government had thought fit to take subsequently had neither been invited by the Sultan or had any notice been given to the Powers before its completion. Without taking any notice of this remark Herr von Kiderlen observed that the idea that the French had been asked by the Sultan to restore order in Morocco was not worth a moment's discussion, and could not be taken seriously. The Sultan had merely said what the French had told him to say, and Germany could have afforded herself the same luxury had she thought it worth while to do so, and to pay for it. Times out of number the Sultan had appealed to Germany behind the backs of the other Powers to do things which might have been considered contrary to the Act of Algeciras, but she had always loyally refused to be led astray however advantageous the proposals had been. But France wanted everything. That she could not have unless Germany was cleared out of the field, and for that advantage she would have to pay. If she refused, Germany would regain full liberty of action, and the whole Morocco question would probably have to be reopened, much, as he had said before, to the disadvantage of France. I repeated that I hoped the conversations with the French Government would lead to some definite result, and that I was sure that there was nothing my Government desired more than that a settlement should be arrived at satisfactory to both countries, and by which British interests were not affected.

Whether Herr von Kiderlen intends really to refuse all abatement of his demands will be known very shortly, as I believe that my French colleague has instructions to inform his Excellency that the French Government cannot possibly negotiate on the basis of the German demands.

Both Herr von Kiderlen and M. Cambon seem to be depressed at the turn things have taken, and both are equally annoyed at the indiscretions of the French Government and the violent tone of the French press.

I have, &c.
W. E. GOSCHEN.

[29784] No. 149.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 29.)

(No. 206.)

Sir, *Berlin, July 27, 1911.*

MR. LLOYD GEORGE'S speech has aroused a certain amount of excitement in Germany. Many of the papers at first began by calling it a "warning to Germany," but refrained from any comments, but the indignant tone of the press has increased in the last few days.

The "Kölnische Zeitung," in a telegram from its Berlin correspondent on Saturday evening, thinks that in spite of its "peaceful ending," the speech is meant as a warning or even a threat addressed to Germany, but it adds that the same speech, with its statement of principles applicable to the Great Powers, could have equally well been delivered by any non-English statesman, and that similar truths have also been uttered from the tribune of the Reichstag without anyone discovering in them warlike tendencies or menaces against another country.

In its evening edition of the 24th instant, the same paper publishes a leading article suggesting that the simplest solution of the problem would seem to be that France should withdraw her troops, except the police, from Morocco, throw open the door for international trade, and give guarantees that she will not regard Morocco as a French colony. Then there would be no doubt that Germany, having secured her economic interests in the Sus, would withdraw her ships from Agadir.

The "Kölnische Zeitung" of yesterday now says that German economic interests in Morocco are, without doubt, not the chief difficulty in the Berlin negotiations. France does not dispute them, and all that has to be done is to prevent them from being subjected to the rough treatment to which, as experience has shown, foreign trade is exposed in the French colonies and spheres of interest. The chief point, however, the "Kölnische Zeitung" thinks, is what compensation Germany can claim for the increase of power which France is about to get in Morocco.

The same paper, in an article headed "Imponderabilien," points out that the actions of France and Spain in Morocco are allowed to go unchallenged, and that the French press sees in them only a safeguard of the respective interests of those two countries, while the German action in sending a ship to Agadir to protect Germans there causes paroxyms in the French press, which declares that the Act of Algeciras is violated. The article continues:—

"As matters stand at present it would be a useless work to show that Germany has from the very beginning never placed her own advantages in the Morocco question in the foreground. Many people in Germany think that our Foreign Office has not pushed German interests in Morocco enough, but Germany's action in sending a ship to Agadir has received the unreserved assent of public opinion in this country. Members of Parliament of all political opinions and newspapers have considered this step as absolutely justified, and even defended it as deliverance from a bann, and consequently the appearance of England on the scene is all the more acutely felt. It reminds us of the famous 'Hands off!' which Gladstone flung at Austria-Hungary in 1878, when she occupied Bosnia and Herzegovina. We thought the time was past when British statesmen could use such language to another country. In any case, the German people is not inclined to allow its hand to be forced by foreign Powers whose history has taught us that a State can only exist if it is ready to defend to the utmost its rights and its claims. Prince Bismarck spoke more than once of the 'doubtful factors in politics which have often a far more powerful influence than questions of material and direct interests, and the importance of which cannot be over estimated.' In London and Paris care must be taken not to interfere with the doubtful factors which are now the motives of German policy."

The "Frankfurter Zeitung" of the 24th instant also devotes a leading article to Mr. Lloyd George's speech, the language of which it thinks is most serious and almost menacing, all the more so as the Chancellor of the Exchequer is not one of those statesmen who would for choice make a patriotic appeal to the country. The paper complains that German aims and German need of expansion are not understood in England. If they were England and Germany might, it thinks, arrive at an agreement or even perhaps an alliance. The journal cannot see why England should object to Germany getting compensation outside Morocco, and cannot understand why England makes so great a distinction between Germany's recent action at Agadir and the advance

of the French to Fez and the Spaniards to Alcazar; or, again, between the German action in Morocco and the Russian action in Persia. The article continues:—

"It is really not easy to satisfy the men who rule in England to-day. England ought to realise the danger of hemming in the rapidly growing population of Germany. She must, of course, try to maintain her own position, but people in London should see that it will not do to force a great nation which possesses a larger population than England, and which increases by 1,000,000 inhabitants yearly, from all places where it seeks an opportunity for national expansion."

The "Münchener Neueste Nachrichten" says:—

"We deprecate most strongly good advice conveyed in the tone of a threat. It will be well to remain calm and see what the British Government not only has to say but thinks of doing, and that is the business not of the Chancellor of the Exchequer, but of the Prime Minister."

The "Post," the organ of the Imperial party, asserts that France never intended that the negotiations should be brought to a successful issue, and it maintains that it knows for a fact that the French Embassy in Berlin is responsible for the leakage in connection with the negotiations. Germany has been absolutely loyal in complying with the agreement that the negotiations should be secret.

The popular "Lokalanzeiger" says that it is not possible to derive from Mr. Lloyd George's words the belief that he was desirous of criticising Germany's policy. Any statesman of an independent Empire has the right to speak as Mr. Lloyd George has spoken, and it would seem absurb to remonstrate with him about it. It would, the paper continues, be hardly admissible to suggest that Mr. Lloyd George intended to interfere in the Franco-German negotiations.

The "Körsen Courier" interprets Mr. McKinnon Wood's statement in the House of Commons on Tuesday as another English threat. Germany's best reply is to be calm in the consciousness that the "Panther" was after all sent to Agadir only to protect German interests and not to violate the rights of others.

The "Hamburger Nachrichten" is convinced that neither France nor England will risk war for the sake of Morocco; France because not even the successful support of the British fleet would save her from the danger of defeat on land, and England on account of the disturbance to her commerce which must necessarily be produced by an Anglo-German naval war.

The "Berliner Tageblatt," in a leading article to-day, says:—

"Rumour has it that in the last few days the Franco-German negotiations have reached a very difficult stage, and excitable persons are already speaking of a European war. All sorts of ridiculous rumours are being spread: for example, that Herr von Kiderlen has drawn up an ultimatum, and that the British fleet is preparing for war. The German press, having itself no news, is unable to impart any information to the 60 million souls who are naturally clamouring to know how matters stand.

"While these 60 millions remain in perfect ignorance of the real state of affairs, Herr von Kiderlen and M. Cambon are negotiating behind closed doors. We do not know in what sense Herr von Kiderlen has been negotiating, and the only tangible piece of news was the statement published in the "Matin," to the effect that Germany was demanding the coast of the French Congo. Herr von Kiderlen has as yet had no opportunity of showing his metal in any action of first-class importance. Consequently criticisms of his ability are widely divergent. He is supposed to be a pupil of Bismarck's, although the Bismarckian press is loud in its denunciation of his present policy. He is also an intimate friend of the extreme Junkers. According to regulations, the Secretary of State has discussed foreign affairs with the Chancellor, whose name is Bethmann-Hollweg. We naturally presume that these two have done the cleverest and most prudent thing that was to be done, and have not rushed into an *impasse*. We presume so, but we know nothing, and the 60 millions know just as little as we do.

"When the German cruiser was sent to Agadir, we pointed out that the desire to negotiate with France about Morocco and to dismiss this problem once for all by means of compensation was sound and reasonable, but that it was better to reserve all expressions of gratification till it was seen 'how the trip continued.' To-day—three weeks later—the end of the trip is not in sight, and it looks as if, once again, the uncompromising attitude of England had come as a surprise. We say 'once again' because the situation was very similar at the beginning of 1904 before the conclusion

of the *entente cordiale*, as well as before and during the Tangier journey, when the Emperor first heard of England's true intentions during his stay at Lisbon. The situation was again similar during the Algeciras Conference when, on the 11th March, 1906, a German official organ wrote: 'France's resistance at Algeciras has isolated her and driven the more important neutral States, especially Russia, the United States, Italy, and even England over to Germany.' On this occasion, too, it seems that a little too much confidence has been placed in the friendliness of court intercourse, since the view that Lloyd George only spoke as a private individual must be regarded as a very doubtful evasion.

"We do not believe for a moment that the discussion about Congo or Agadir will end in a European war, and we do not attach the slightest importance to all the alarm rumours. There is nothing to show that the official circles in Berlin have lost their *sang froid*, and if only a few personal resentments can be overcome there will be a way out of the dilemma. The negotiations between M. Delcassé and Lord Lansdowne lasted four months, and constantly came to a deadlock, and it is the same story every time two nations negotiate as to territorial concessions. France has just as great an interest as Germany in arriving at an understanding which would give her the incalculable advantage of a free hand in Morocco. She is, moreover, interested in not appearing to the world as the protégé of England. The only possibility of any danger arising would be if the British Government, having regard to the critical nature of the internal situation, were still further to increase the severity of their utterances. But they will hardly do this, and we may look forward to Mr. Asquith's statements to-morrow being diplomatic and not warlike. Should we be disappointed in this, Germany will know how to adopt a calm attitude in face of the lamentable consequences. But cool consideration leads us to deny the possibility of any but a favourable result of Mr. Asquith's speech.

"All this excitement and these gruesome rumours would be quite impossible if the Governments would emerge from the mists in which they are hiding. It is surely wrong that the world should be again waiting for the approval of England, who already occupies rather a large part of the earth's surface, and that, in this Franco-German question the eyes of the whole of humanity should be fixed on Mr. Asquith. This mystery making has always produced a feeling of irritation, and it is not enough for Statesmen to preach confidence to grown-up nations and to say nothing of their actions or their motives. Public opinion is not very exacting, but surely it might be supplied with that to which it has a just claim. Both Herr von Kilderlen and M. Cambon are famed for their literary style, and it should not be very difficult for them to tell us as much as they can tell us. All allowances must be made for the German Government in their delicate position, but some allowance must be made for the 60 millions too."

I have, &c.
W. E. GOSCHEN.

[29785] No. 150.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 29.)

(No. 208.)
Sir,
Berlin, July 28, 1911.

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith a despatch which I have received from Colonel Russell, military attaché to this embassy, relating to the existence or absence of military preparations in Germany.

I have, &c.
W. E. GOSCHEN.

Enclosure in No. 150.

Lieutenant-Colonel Russell to Sir E. Goschen.

(No. 16. Confidential.)
Sir,
Berlin, July 27, 1911.

I THINK that it is desirable that I should record my impressions at the present juncture with regard to the existence or absence of any unusual preparations of a warlike nature in this country.

I believe that a number of alarmist reports have recently appeared in French

newspapers, chiefly referring to German military operations near the frontier, and the alleged calling out of a large number of additional reservists.

With regard to the former contention, it must be conceded that manœuvres are now in progress in the neighbourhood of Metz, but this is the season of the year in which large bodies of troops are normally brought together for purposes of training. The report regarding the calling out of additional reservists does not, in my opinion, rest on any solid foundation of fact. The orders for the calling out of reservists for their autumn training were issued in March last, were not in any sense abnormal, and have not, I am convinced, been altered since that date.

It is impossible to predict in a situation like the present what the future may bring forth, but I think it may fairly be said that no indications of any unusual military activity are observable at this moment.

The time of year, no doubt, is an eminently favourable one for a sudden mobilisation. The navy is fully armed and manned for the manœuvres. In the army the youngest soldiers have nearly completed their first year's training, and have thus been fully competent for some time past to take their places in the ranks. The reservists who are to be called for training this year are about to join their units. These are, however, quite normal phenomena.

On the other hand, I have heard indirectly that no proceedings of any unusual character are to be noted on the railways. To my knowledge a number of officers holding important appointments here, among whom, I believe, may be included the Chief of the General Staff, are absent on leave at the present time. There is less than the usual activity to be observed in and about the building of the Great General Staff, if one may judge by casual external evidence.

My French colleague, who has just returned from a tour in Eastern Prussia, assures me that he was received by his German brothers in arms with the greatest cordiality and perhaps with almost excessive conviviality.

He further states that the numerous French officers on leave in Germany, with whom he is in touch, do not inform him of any unusual proceedings.

This normal state of affairs may, however, of course, change at a moment's notice. In the German scheme for mobilisation no uncertainty exists, nor is there any need for undue haste. Everything which human forethought can provide for beforehand has already been accomplished.

I have, &c.
ALICK RUSSELL, *Military Attaché.*

[29789] No. 151.

Mr. Carnegie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 29.)

(No. 347.)
Sir,
Paris, July 28, 1911.

THE French press, which for some days past, and since the dropping of the veil over the Franco-German negotiations at Berlin, has indulged in more or less acrimonious recriminations with the German press, comments at great length, and in a very favourable manner, on the declaration made yesterday in the House of Commons by the Prime Minister.

The "Figaro" describes that declaration as a model of clearness, of diplomatic *convenance*, and of tact. Mr. Asquith had declared with the utmost precision and the utmost energy that England was not intervening in the present negotiations, which concerned France and Germany. That was the absolute truth and was fully borne out by the attitude taken up by England at the beginning of the crisis. If she had wished to intervene in the discussion and taken a leading part therein, she would certainly have acted quite differently. She would at once have dispatched one or two cruisers to Agadir in order to show her desire not to be left on one side. Instead of that, the British Government had effaced themselves. They had hastened to assure the French Government that if the latter found it to their advantage to conclude a new arrangement with Germany they would not see any objection thereto, but would, on the contrary, be glad to see it effected. The discretion of the British Government was not, however, to be interpreted as a proof of lukewarmness towards France or of indifference towards British interests. Germany had been mistaken if she had thought so for a moment. She would be still more mistaken if she were to persist in such an opinion. It was with a view to save her from falling into such an error that Mr. Lloyd George, in the first instance, and now Mr. Asquith, had spoken so clearly. The "Figaro"

goes on to point out that in the improbable event of the negotiations failing, the rights of England to join in the discussion are derived, firstly, from the Act of Algeciras, in the elaboration of which she had participated; secondly, from her agreement with France of 1904; and, thirdly, from her own interests; and it lays stress on the fact that those interests are much more important than German interests in Morocco.

The "Matin" observes that the *entente cordiale* shows itself to the world again in the most striking manner. This manifestation must be a serious disillusion to the German Emperor, Chancellor, and people, who had hoped that a rapprochement had been effected between Berlin and London, and that England would detach herself somewhat from France in favour of Germany.

The "Écho de Paris" expresses great satisfaction at Mr. Asquith's declaration, and at the energetic policy which has been adopted, but regrets that British and French ships were not sent to Agadir in the first instance.

The "Temps," in a leading article entitled "L'Unanimité britannique," renders homage to the moderation, *sang-froid*, and skill displayed by the Prime Minister in his declaration, and to the national unity in the present external crisis, as shown by the speeches of the leader of the Opposition and of Mr. Ramsay Macdonald. The article concludes as follow: "La Grande-Bretagne a une admirable tenue nationale. Dans un temps d'opinion tel que le nôtre un peuple qui sait à certaines heures donner l'impression de son cohésion est sûr d'être respecté. Il trouve en lui-même le gage de sa sûreté. Il nous plaît de rendre cet hommage à nos amis anglais, en souhaitant que pour la défense d'une politique de paix et de dignité, les deux peuples restent unis dans l'avenir comme ils l'ont été dans le passé."

The "Journal des Débats," after praising the attitude adopted by Government and Opposition, declares that England has now deliberately placed herself at the side of France. Any pressure exercised on one of the two Powers would react on the other. France had never doubted the word of Great Britain or that Power's absolute loyalty to her, but in the present circumstances a particular homage should be rendered to her. Ministers and Opposition leaders had used language which deserved the deepest gratitude on the part of France and would serve as a fine example of what the relations between nations should be. The Triple *Entente* was as united as ever, and as resolved to play the moderating part which it had assigned to itself. German opinion would become convinced that it had followed a wrong track. France was disposed to accept any honourable, equitable, and reasonable proposal, and ardently desired a friendly settlement of the difficulty. If such a settlement should unfortunately not be made, it would now be understood at Berlin that the rupture of the negotiations would place Germany in at least as bad a position as France.

I have, &c.
L. D. CARNEGIE.

[29973] No. 152.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 29.)

(No. 110. Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Paris, July 29, 1911.*

I SAW M. de Selves this morning at his request. He gave me an account of the interview between M. de Kiderlen-Waechter and the French Ambassador in Berlin which took place yesterday.

First of all, M. de Kiderlen-Waechter stated that he considered as quite insufficient the three combined offers of territory in the French Congo. (Please see map which I left with you.) He then renewed his complaints as to the communications which had apparently been made to the press in France, though, as regarded the indiscretion respecting the suggested exchange of Togoland for French territory, he was constrained to admit that it must be of German origin. He could, however, assure M. Cambon that the communication had not been made from official quarters.

M. de Kiderlen-Waechter found fault with the speech delivered by the Chancellor of the Exchequer at the Mansion House on the 21st instant, and observed that so far as he could see the French Government were not disposed to come to an arrangement with the German Government.

By the agreement of 1909, M. Jules Cambon reminded the German Foreign

Secretary, Germany had recognised the special political interests of France in Morocco, and had undertaken not to put obstacles in their way ("entraver"). The only interests which Germany had claimed in the country were economic. In spite of this, however, the French Government was offering to make considerable cessions of French territory for a fresh renunciation by Germany of a more definite character of her political interests in Morocco. The French Parliament and public opinion would certainly not consent to the cessions demanded by Germany, and the French Ministry would be severely criticised at home for what it had offered to cede. In these circumstances, could the German Government make other proposals? M. de Kiderlen-Waechter replied that public opinion had to be reckoned with in Germany just as it had in France. The French Government should have come to an understanding with the German Government before entering on the Fez expedition. Germany could not consider herself bound by agreements which France had neglected to observe. The Franco-German agreement of 1909 was dependent in its terms on the Act of Algeciras, and this Act had been infringed and entirely disregarded in some respects by the French Government. On M. Jules Cambon suggesting that the interpretation of the Act of Algeciras did not concern France and Germany alone, it was a matter which concerned all the signatories of the Act, M. de Kiderlen-Waechter said that Germany was quite competent to form her own opinion as to whether or not the Act of Algeciras had been properly observed. Suggestions for an arrangement had already been put forward by the German Government, and personally M. de Kiderlen-Waechter had no fresh suggestions to make. He said that he would see the French Ambassador again on Monday next, the 31st July, and before that he would bring the question of the utility of further discussions with his Excellency before the German Emperor and Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg. But he did not consider that it would be consistent with Germany's dignity to abate her requirements, because the pourparlers, which ought to have been kept secret between France and Germany, had become the subject of discussion in the British and French press in a manner derogatory to Germany.

M. de Selves expressed himself as most anxious to come to terms with Germany, for which purpose he would be prepared to make great sacrifices. He was, however, in a very agitated state, and declared that there are limits beyond which he cannot go, nor, he added, could any French Foreign Minister. A Ministry which yielded to the German demand for the cession of the French Congo would fall at once. M. de Selves is, moreover, convinced by enquiries which he has made in experienced quarters that the Chambers would reject any proposal for the cession of Libreville. The three combined alternatives depicted on the map which he communicated to me, and which is now in your possession, represent the maximum which France will offer to Germany in return for a free hand in Morocco. If, however, in addition to this and to the Bec du Canard in the north of the Cameroons, Germany would also cede Togoland, the French Government would increase their concessions as follows (please refer to the map which I left with you): viz., the territory comprised within a line from Fort Archambault, between 8 and 10 degrees north latitude, along the course of the Bamingui River as far as the purple conventional line, between 6 and 8 degrees north latitude, and following that conventional line to the junction of the red and green on the map. To give Germany a port near Libreville, France would agree, in the last extremity of negotiation, to add to the Cameroons the territory comprised within a straight line from Ekododo, near to and north of Libreville, to Ouesso. With perhaps the addition of an island or two, the above-mentioned cessions are the utmost that France can make. I have telegraphed to you separately on the subject of the islands. The French Government desire not to make any offer in regard to them without previously receiving the concurrence of His Majesty Government, whose views he is anxiously awaiting.

M. de Selves declared that he would be obliged to discontinue the conversations with the German Government if the latter rejected these offers and continued to press for the cession of French Congo. His Excellency concluded the conversation by saying that the aim of the Germans—or of M. de Kiderlen-Waechter, at any rate—appeared to be to humiliate France, and it seemed impossible to satisfy them. But the French Government would not submit to any humiliation, and it would be necessary to consider what measures should be taken were the conversations broken off. I will telegraph further information this evening after seeing M. de Selves again.

[29890] No. 153.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 29.)

(No. 111. Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Paris, July 29, 1911.*

THE Franco-German negotiations respecting Morocco are approaching a crisis. Yesterday M. Jules Cambon had an interview with M. de Kiderlen-Waechter which was not satisfactory. He is to have a further interview with him on Monday next, the 31st July. In these circumstances, M. de Selves begs that the definite view of His Majesty's Government in regard to the cession to Germany of French islands may be communicated to him at once.

[29900] No. 154.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 29.)

(No. 112. Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Paris, July 29, 1911.*

MY telegram No. 110 of to-day.

French Minister for Foreign Affairs, in discussing situation which might arise if conversations between German Minister for Foreign Affairs and French Ambassador were broken off, asked whether, if Germans increased their naval force at Agadir or landed men, His Majesty's Government would be prepared to join with French Government, and possibly with Spanish Government, in sending ships to Agadir to do just whatever the Germans might do, and whether, if German Government made a demand on French Government to withdraw militarily from Morocco, you would propose a conference of the Powers signatories of the Algeciras Act to consider question of its interpretation and application.

I said that you would certainly be prepared to call a conference whenever French Government had finally resolved that they could not make any further concessions to Germany with a view to obtaining a free hand in Morocco, but that to send French and British ships to Agadir would constitute a proceeding from which it might be difficult to withdraw, and might be treated as a provocation by Germany, and it therefore would require consideration if Germany rejected a proposal for a conference. I further said that personally I thought that if French Government had determined not to make further concessions to Germany than those he had indicated to me this morning it would be best that conversations should be broken off by German Minister for Foreign Affairs rather than by French Ambassador, or, if former rejected final offers but did not break off conversations, that French Ambassador should say that he must refer to Paris for further instructions. This might give time for French Government to inform His Majesty's Government of the rejection of the final French offers and for you to propose to German Government a conference before presentation of any ultimatum by German Government, from which it might be difficult for them to recede. If Germany refused to join conference she would place herself in the wrong in the public opinion of Europe, which would be an advantage to France.

French Minister for Foreign Affairs said that procedure which I had suggested might be advantageous. He then observed that having regard to view expressed by German Minister for Foreign Affairs and the exponents of German opinion on the subject of the interpretation of the agreement of 1909 and of Algeciras Act, any fresh undertakings given by Germany could not be taken as very reliable, and he had been warned by senators and deputies that France might be duped if she came to an arrangement with Germany and made cessions of French territory for a free hand in Morocco. German Government, in two or three years' time, as in case of 1909 agreement, might declare that the fresh agreement was not applicable in new circumstances and might make further claims for compensation.

Minister for Foreign Affairs says that he is by no means pessimistic, and that he hopes for successful issue to negotiations, but he wishes to be prepared for surprises

and to concert with His Majesty's Government as to what should be done. I expressed to Minister for Foreign Affairs the opinion that danger lies in German Minister for Foreign Affairs' personal position being involved. His failure to bring off his first great *coup* might bring about his dismissal, and he might therefore do his utmost by misrepresentations to persuade Emperor to insist on extreme German demands.

[29901] No. 155.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 29.)

(No. 113. Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Paris, July 29, 1911.*

MY telegram No. 112 of to-day.

I asked M. de Selves, in the course of my conversation this evening with his Excellency, reported in my telegram above mention, whether, in the event of Germany consenting to a conference, it might be possible for France to come to a preliminary understanding with her before the assembly of the conference. Such an agreement, by which France would give to Germany all she could require in Morocco, might, so far as concerned that country, be confirmed by the Powers parties to the Act of Algeciras. Germany, when she found the majority of the Signatory Powers to be against her, might become more reasonable than she now is.

The arrangement of an agreement with Spain would, I observed to M. de Selves, be a matter for France to bring about.

[29899] No. 156.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 29.)

(No. 54. Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Berlin, July 29, 1911.*

THE conversation held yesterday between the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and M. Cambon was of a very unsatisfactory nature.

The latter informed Herr von Kiderlen of the terms which the French Government were willing to use as a basis for discussion; whereupon Herr von Kiderlen held language similar to that which he had already used to me and to that which Count Metternich held to you. He said that, in face of the threatening tone of the French and English press, the dignity of the Imperial Government would not permit of any modification of their terms. M. Cambon replied that that was an imposition, on the part of the Imperial Government, of certain conditions, but not negotiation, and presumably meant the end of their conversations. Was he to understand this? "We shall see" was the only answer. Herr von Kiderlen, on being questioned as to what attitude he intended to adopt, then said that he took his stand on the Act of Algeciras, and he added to the further question as to what was his attitude towards the agreement of 1909, that that instrument was considered to be non-existent in the opinion of the Imperial Government. In conclusion, Herr von Kiderlen remarked that personally he was of opinion that the demands of the Imperial Government should be adhered to in their entirety, but that he was going to-day to Swinemünde to see the Emperor, and that he would communicate the decision of the Imperial Government on Monday to him —M. Cambon.

[29905] No. 157.

Sir F. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 29.)

(No. 83. Very Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Vienna, July 29, 1911.*

THE editor of the "Fremdenblatt," the organ of the Ballplatz, came to see me this morning. He told me that a few days ago the German Ambassador had informed him that it had been decided by the German Government to mobilise two corps d'armée in Alsace-Lorraine if the French and British Governments were to send ships to Agadir. This would be the German answer to such action. The editor, who told

me all this in strict confidence, asked M. de Tschirschky whether he might give some hint in the "Fremdenblatt" of the decision which the German Government had taken. He was begged not to do so by the Ambassador, who stated that as long as the present conversation went on between Germany and France the German Government had decided not to take any action.

I venture to recall to your memory my telegram No. 43 of 13th May last, in which I reported a declaration made to the same person by M. de Tschirschky in regard to France's action in Morocco and the dangers she was incurring thereby.

[29903] No. 158.

Mr. White to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received July* 29.)

(No. 140.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Tangier, July* 29, 1911.

ONE hundred and six deserters from Moorish troops at Alcazar who had been kept under arrest in police barracks at Laraiche, are reported by British vice-consul at that place to have been embarked, by order of the Spanish consul, on a Spanish steamer, which left on the 28th July. Its destination is not known.

With reference to my despatch No. 222 of the 16th instant, I am informed by M. de Billy that his Government see objections to the appointment of a French consul *de carrière* at Alcazar, as he had suggested. The new Spanish consul has arrived at that place.

[29907] No. 159.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received July* 30.)

(No. 168.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *St. Petersburgh, July* 30, 1911.

MOROCCO.

In a conversation which I had yesterday with the Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs on the subject of the Morocco complications, M. Nératof told me that on Friday Count Benckendorff had telegraphed to him that Mr. Asquith had informed him that the German Ambassador had made a further communication to you on Thursday, and that this subsequent communication in some degree toned down the previous ones. M. Nératof supposes that it was the tone of these previous communications which prompted you to speak to Count Benckendorff on the subject, and he was, therefore, rather vague as to how matters actually stand at the present moment.

I told him that the only information in my possession was that contained in your telegram No. 386 of the 27th July, and I gave him a summary of that telegram.

His Excellency remarked later on that in his opinion Germany would not push matters to an extremity, as she must know well enough that in these days no war could be restricted to a *tête-à-tête*. Now that the German Emperor had returned to Germany his personal influence would make itself more directly felt, and he thought we would do well, before deciding what our future attitude was to be, to await the result of M. Kiderlen-Waechter's audience of His Majesty.

M. Nératof appears to have misgivings lest, in the event of Germany securing, in exchange for renunciation of all political claims in Morocco, large compensation in the Congo or elsewhere, other Powers, such for instance as Italy or Austria, might be tempted to follow her example and make similar demands.

(Confidential.)

In conversation with the French Ambassador his Excellency said that the diplomatic support afforded him hitherto by M. Nératof had been perfectly satisfactory, but that official circles here were inclined to view Germany's intentions in too optimistic a light. M. Louis is evidently convinced that, in the event of Germany pushing matters too far, France could count on material support from Russia; his Excellency says, however, that M. Nératof cannot make any declaration as to future eventualities until the Emperor of Russia returns from Finland.

[29890] No. 160.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 187.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, July* 30, 1911.

YOUR telegram No. 111 of July 29.

Following communicated to M. Cambon last night:—

I recognise right of French Government to make what proposals they please respecting these islands. Having consulted naval authority, I find there is no *primâ facie* objection on strategic grounds to cession of any of these islands. Without further time for consultation I cannot say more, but, in view of urgent state of negotiations between France and Germany, I cannot ask for further delay; and if, in order to secure favourable issue of negotiations with Germany, French Government propose at once cession of any of these islands to Germany, I shall regard French Government as having acted with perfect loyalty to the *entente* in having consulted us.

[29976] No. 161.

Mr. White to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received July* 31.)

(No. 227.)
Sir, *Tangier, July* 21, 1911.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith copy of a despatch I have received from His Majesty's consul at Fez, reporting a conversation with Sid Taib Mokri in regard to the general situation.

I have, &c.
HERBERT E. WHITE.

Enclosure in No. 161.

Consul MacLeod to Mr. White.

(No. 64.)
Sir, *Fez, July* 18, 1911.

WHEN seeing Sid Taib Mokri to-day, I asked him a few questions in regard to the general situation around Fez. The answers he gave correspond with all one hears from other directions.

The position seems to be that General Moinier's troops have pacified the tracts lying directly between Mequinez and Rabat, and have now returned to Mequinez, General Moinier himself having, by reason of illness, gone to Rabat.

The Fez–Mequinez plain is now quite orderly, the adjacent parts of Beni M'tir having submitted, and kaïds having been appointed over them.

The Zarhon, Oudaya, Ulad Jama, Hamian, and Sheraga tribes are quiet and are now in course of paying the various levies of animals and specie which were part of the terms of their submissions. Sid Taib asserted that the governors appointed over them had paid nothing for their posts, which, however, means, I expect, no more than that they gave nothing very substantial. The present levies were the last it was intended to make, and, particularly as regards animals, were merely to partially recoup the Makhzen's losses in the revolt.

Hereafter the "tertib" would be introduced into one tribe after the other, and would, Sid Taib expected, be paid by all persons, without exception, and the governors would be paid salaries, and, the more so as they had not bought their posts, would have no reason to obtain money from the tribesmen.

In regard to whether the tribesmen had made the present peace merely to save their crops and might revolt again in the late autumn, Sid Taib said it was impossible to forecast their actions with any certainty. The Makhzen's position, however, was very weak. The total of their troops hereabouts was only about 2,500, from which garrisons had to be found for Mequinez, say 600, Kasbah-al-Hajib (Benir M'tir), say 1,000, and 600 or 700 for Sefrou. This would leave practically none for Fez itself and to keep the roads clear between Fez and the coast. The recruiting and training of sufficient further troops would take many months—perhaps even a year or two—and so it was hard to see how, with any regard to the security of all these regions, the numbers of French troops could prudently be diminished in the meantime. Very

particularly were the French troops required to garrison the military posts established on the roads between Fez and Rabat and between Mequinez and Rabat.

In regard to Sherarda, only the Ulad Delem and Tekna parts of that tribe had as yet submitted formally at Fez and had kaïds appointed over them, but Sid Taib understood those other parts, *i.e.*, Azrar and Shabanats, were quiet. (The explanation of this curious state of things, I am told, is that the Azrar and Shabanats parts of Sherarda came to terms with General Moinier, and certain of their chiefs were recommended by him to the Sultan, but were disapproved of by the latter. In the meantime they have begun their duties, and are doing them satisfactorily, but the Sultan has not yet agreed to appoint them, and the matter is still the cause of some friction between the French and the Sultan. From all the revolting areas one constantly hears the same report that the tribesmen are much more disposed to treat with the French than with the Sultan, obviously because the French are content with reasonable terms, and the tribesmen feel that the terms made with the French will be fulfilled.) I pointed out that by the establishment of wireless telegraphy here, one most important means of harassing the Makhzen and causing alarm in Europe, *i.e.*, the interrupting of communications, was now very largely lost to the tribes.

Sid Taib thought that the garrison for Sefrou would most likely be installed before the end of July, and this would imply, of course, the submission of the Ait Yusi tribe.

I then remarked that I had heard that the Sultan had made no objection to the sending of a German war-vessel to Agadir. Was this so? Sid Taib answered that this was not so. The Sultan had replied verbally to Dr. Vassel's message that he had not heard of any disorders close to Agadir, and was surprised at the sending thither of a war-vessel, and hoped that, at any rate, no forces would be landed from it. As regards the Mogador–Agadir region generally, the Sultan has instructed Kaïd M'tougi to do everything in his power to keep those tribes in good order, and had every expectation that this would be done.

Sid Taib then proceeded to complain bitterly of the Spaniards' proceedings at Laraiche, and especially at Alcazar, alleging that the soldiers went into mosques, were ill-behaved generally, and had disarmed and ejected the Makhzen's soldiers from their own quarters.

As I had no information on these points beyond what appears in the press these days as to the treatment of Moorish soldiers at Alcazar, I made no comments on those matters.

I have, &c.
J. M. MacLEOD.

P.S.—It would seem clear that any premature withdrawal of French troops from these parts, particularly after the interventions made by Spain and Germany, would be very apt to give the tribes the impression that those nations had compelled the French to withdraw their troops and to cease supporting the Sultan Mulai Hafid, and thus might encourage them to revolt afresh.

J. M. M.

[29977] No. 162.

Mr. White to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 31.)

(No. 228.)
Sir, *Tangier, July 21, 1911.*

MR. HARRIS tells me that he yesterday met the German Minister, who informed him that his Government was much annoyed with the Union des Mines, as they had treated the German engineer, M. Langenheim, shamefully: they had taken over all his mine denunciations on the understanding that he was to be employed by them, and then, after keeping him only for two years at a low salary, they had now turned him out without any compensation in order to put a Frenchman in his place, and had taken this action without giving any notice to the German group in the union. He added that he had reported the whole case to his Government, and it was one of the points to be taken up in the discussions now taking place at Berlin.

Mr. Harris replied to Baron von Seckendorff that he was entirely misinformed, and this morning he took to him all the correspondence on the subject, showing clearly that a formal contract had been entered into between the Union des Mines and M. Langenheim, by virture of which he sold to them all his denunciations (which

Mr. Harris said turned out to be of little or no value) for 2,000*l.*, and they engaged to employ him as their engineer at Tangier for two years at a salary of 1,000*l.* a-year. At the expiration of the two years it was decided to close the Tangier office as a useless expense; besides M. Langenheim, two Frenchmen and an Italian thus lost their posts, and it was not proposed to appoint anyone in their places. So far from the German group having no knowledge of the intention to dispense with M. Langenheim's services, it was they who insisted on it, whilst the French group had hesitated to do so for fear of offending German susceptibilities. Mr. Harris showed Baron von Seckendorff the letters of Krupps to the Union des Mines on the subject, and also copies of correspondence which had passed between Krupps and M. Langenheim.

Baron von Seckendorff admitted that the information given to him by Mr. Harris put an entirely different complexion on the matter, and he said he would transmit copies of the documents to Berlin; he would also send for M. Langenheim and ask for explanations as to why he had misled him by holding back the facts. He, however, made an appeal, *ad misericordiam*, to Mr. Harris to have M. Langenheim's appointment renewed, saying that otherwise a bad effect would be produced on public opinion in Germany. Mr. Harris replied that M. Langenheim had really been generously dealt with by the union, who have paid him 4,000*l.* in all and, he believes, given him a 1 per cent. share in the union, and he could certainly not recommend that his contract be renewed.

I have, &c.
HERBERT E. WHITE.

[29979] No. 163.

Mr. White to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 31.)

(No. 230.)
Sir, *Tangier, July 22, 1911.*

IN my despatch No. 222, Confidential, of the 16th instant, I expressed the fear that in the state of nervous tension existing at Alcazar a serious incident might at any time occur. Unfortunately, my fears have only too soon been shown to be well justified, and unless some effective steps are shortly taken to modify the position of affairs there, and bring about a better understanding between French and Spanish officers and officials on the spot, serious trouble may be expected at any moment.

First, there was the incident of the arrest of the French vice-consul, M. Boisset, and his conveyance through the town under guard of Spanish soldiers with fixed bayonets to the main guard, where he was released. Scarcely had this incident been satisfactorily settled, when news was received of the assault committed by Spanish soldiers on Lieutenant Thiriet, when in uniform, which will, I fear, excite public opinion in France still more against Spain.

I have the honour to transmit herewith copy of a despatch which I have received from the British consular agent at Alcazar, giving the versions of both Lieutenant Thiriet and Colonel Silvestre. These differ on important points, but it appears from Mr. Consular Agent Carleton's despatch that the evidence of natives is in favour of Lieutenant Thiriet, whose account of the incident seems the more probable one. In his detailed report to the French Legation, Lieutenant Thiriet states that the Spanish cavalry picket also attacked him, and the officer in command did not intervene until he had appealed to him to call off his men. He also states that Colonel Silvestre accused him of having struck the soldiers, and of having desired to create an incident.

It being already late when he left Colonel Silvestre, Lieutenant Thiriet spent the night at M. Boisset's house, and it was when leaving Alcazar the following morning that he was stopped and taken to the guard-house, on the grounds that he was taking back with him two men who had deserted from his mehalla; the guard stating that they had orders to prevent his taking away deserters. It seems almost incredible that the Spanish officers should not only enlist in their police deserters from the mehalla, but should even prevent repentant deserters from returning to their mehalla.

I have, &c.
HERBERT E. WHITE.

Enclosure in No. 163.

Mr. Carleton to Mr. White.

(No. 13.)

Sir, *Alcazar, July* 21, 1911.

I HAVE the honour to report an incident which occurred here yesterday.

Lieutenant Thiriet, instructor of the small mehalla which is encamped on the other side of the Loukkos River, has made to me the following statement:—

"Yesterday, at 5·30 P.M., I came to Alcazar by myself with instructions to cash a cheque, in order to pay my mehalla. I crossed the river, and on reaching the Garden of Shamesh, I saw four of my men in company of several Spanish native policemen. I went up to my men and asked them why they had deserted; one of them replied that they belonged now to the Spanish police. I then, without using violence, snatched the tarbush off the head of one of the soldiers in order to prove that the individual belonged to my mehalla, as all the tarbushes used by my men are numbered on the inside, and I continued my ride towards the town. I had scarcely proceeded fifty yards, when I was overtaken by about twenty native mounted police, and one of them, a corporal, approached me and got hold of my throat with the intention of taking from me the tarbush belonging to the deserter. I, in self-defence, struck the corporal in the face. Suddenly two Spanish sentries came up to me with fixed bayonets, and ordered me to stop. I was in a dangerous situation, surrounded by twenty native policemen, and with two Spanish sentries aiming their rifles at me; then a Spanish officer with a cavalry picket arrived, sword in hand, and intervened. I received from the native police several blows, and was treated with brutality; the Spanish officer did not talk French, but I understood from him that he desired me to go with him to the Spanish camp to visit Silvestre. I was led to the Spanish camp, and I saw Colonel Silvestre, to whom I explained the brutal treatment I had received from the native police and the two Spanish sentries on duty. The affair was interpreted to Colonel Silvestre in a different manner, and the only word I had from him was "Vous êtes libre." I asked Colonel Silvestre whether I was made a prisoner, and he merely said, "Oh, no, the Spanish officer who conducted you here asked you to come and visit me in order to clear up the matter."

The following is a statement made to me by Colonel Silvestre:—

"I have been informed by the sergeant of the first guard-post on the road to the Loukkos River that yesterday, at about 5·30 P.M., Lieutenant Thiriet approached several natives, supposed to be deserters from the mehalla encamped on the other side of the river, and while talking to them he (Thiriet) got hold of one of the men and was beating him unmercifully. The sergeant sent a corporal (native) to see, and to offer any assistance to Lieutenant Thiriet. The corporal asked Lieutenant Thiriet if he could do anything for him, and Lieutenant Thiriet replied to the corporal with a tremendous smack in the face. The Spanish sentries, seeing this, aimed their rifles at Lieutenant Thiriet and told him not to move, and after a few seconds a Spanish officer, with a cavalry picket, who happened to be passing, intervened in the matter, and consequently Lieutenant Thiriet was invited to visit Colonel Silvestre. Lieutenant Thiriet, after having unmercifully beaten a deserter in the presence of the Spanish officer and assaulted a native Spanish corporal, wanted to make Colonel Silvestre believe that as a French officer he was brutally maltreated, and that the French uniform had not been respected."

According to what I hear from natives, it appears that Lieutenant Thiriet has been a victim.

The French consular agent has just been to see me, and informs me that at 10·30 A.M. this morning Lieutenant Thiriet was riding out to his camp with two of his soldiers, and on reaching Dar Ghailan a Spanish sentry stopped him, on the grounds that he was taking with him two deserters. Lieutenant Thiriet replied that the two men accompanying him were his own soldiers, and not deserters. Lieutenant Thiriet was detained for nearly an hour, until a message came from Captain Ovilo to allow him and the two soldiers to pass.

These incidents are the talk and comment of the town, and if a stop is not put to this sort of pin-pricking, something disagreeable will happen some of these days.

I have, &c.

E. P. CARLETON.

[29980] No. 164.

Mr. White to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 31.)

(No. 231.)

Sir, *Tangier, July* 23, 1911.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 170 of the 19th ultimo, regarding the Spanish board to be appointed by the Sultan to deal with the question of purchase by foreigners of land situated outside the 10-kilom. zone, under article 60 of the Algeciras Act, I have the honour to report that Sid Guebbas has addressed a further letter to the doyen of the diplomatic body, stating that the reference to article 63 of the Algeciras Act was a slip of the pen, and that the reference was to article 65.

His Excellency does not give the information desired, but merely states that the Makhzen is engaged in drawing up the regulations for submission to the diplomatic body, and he renews the protest of the Makhzen against the unauthorised purchase in the meantime of land outside the 10-kilom. zone.

I have, &c.

HERBERT E. WHITE.

[29981] No. 165.

Mr. White to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 31.)

(No. 232.)

Sir, *Tangier, July* 23, 1911.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 224 of the 18th instant, I have the honour to report that on the 17th instant the French chargé d'affaires came to see me and stated that he had received serious news from Agadir. Kaïd Guelouli had informed the French consul at Mogador that the Germans were seeking to provoke an incident, that whereas at first not more than fifteen men landed at a time from the "Berlin" and only visited the town of Agadir, they now landed in parties of forty men "en armes" and made short marches ("exécutent des marches") into the country, causing excitement in the district. It subsequently, however, appeared from a letter received by Sid Guebbas from Kaïd Guelouli that the expeditions referred to were for purposes of sport. Baron von Seckdendorff mentioned the subject to me the other day and said the German officers have been well treated at Agadir, and are shooting in the neighbourhood of the town. I observed that at a place like Agadir, where the people are not accustomed to Christians, there was always a chance of a fanatical attack on some of the officers when out shooting, and that it would be better to run no risks. Baron von Seckendorff replied that he was not in communication with the commander of the "Berlin," who communicated direct with his Government, and he should not, therefore, interfere in the matter. If, as Kaïd Guelouli states, the Germans land in parties of about forty and all are armed, the officers must be accompanied by guards of their own men, as there are only about a dozen officers on board, and not many of them would be allowed on shore at the same time.

A few days later M. de Billy showed me a radiogram he had received from his consul at Mogador, reporting that Kaïd Kourimi's delegate had returned from Agadir on the 18th instant; he had been well received by the captain of the "Berlin," who had told him that "l'Allemagne a des droits sur la partie du Maroc comprise entre Saffi et Agadir." I subsequently received a radiogram from His Majesty's vice-consul at Mogador that he had been told by his French colleagues that the captain of the "Berlin" had said that "he was in charge of the coast-line of Morocco from Saffi to Agadir." It seems to me probable that this is the more correct version of what the captain said, but M. de Billy feels confident that the original version is the correct one, as the radiogram from his consul at Mogador is quite clear on the point, and it was only from him that Mr. Vice-Consul Johnstone received his information.

The German vice-consul at Mogador has for some time been active in extending protection to the principal men in the south. M. de Billy told me that Hadj Thami Glawi had shown the French vice-consul at Marrakesh a letter he had received from the German vice-consul at Mogador asking him to go to Agadir and have an interview with the captain of the "Berlin," from which nothing but good could come to him. Hadj Thami, however, did not go.

The Kaïd of Kourima, a powerful governor, who has always been at enmity with Kaïd M'tougi, applied a few weeks since to Mr. Vice-Consul Johnstone for British

protection, which of course, could not be granted to him. Shortly after he entered into communication with the German vice-consul, and then sent an emissary to Agadir, as stated above. On the return of this emissary, the German vice-consul at Mogador—according to the report of the French consul at that place—sent to Kaïd M'tougi insisting that he should revoke his order depriving Kaïd Kourimi of his territories, and recommended the latter to resist by force any attempt to dispossess him. In order to avoid any disturbances, the French consul advised the governors who were to receive portions of Kaïd Kourimi's territories to make no attempt to take possession of them, and to take no steps until the receipt of further orders from the Sultan.

I have, &c.
HERBERT E. WHITE.

[29982] No. 166.

Mr. White to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 31.)

(No. 233.)
Sir, *Tangier, July 23, 1911.*

HIS Majesty's vice-consul at Tetuan reports that the governor of that town has requested him to inform me that the Spaniards are continuing the Ceuta-Wad Smir road to the Tetuan side of Cape Negro. In my despatch No. 193 of the 1st instant, I reported the construction of this road as far as Wad Smir. I presume they intend to carry it right on to the town.

The governor also said that the Anjera people had complained that Roohan, of the Ouled Haddoo, was compelling them to sell their lands to the Spaniards. This surprises me, as all reports that have reached me hitherto have been to the effect that the Spaniards are gaining great popularity in that region by their fair dealings in regard to land, which they purchase at a good price, and only after full investigation as to the title of the vendors, so that no injustice should be done to others.

Mr. Vice-Consul Bewicke's letter was brought by an express courier, conveying despatches to Sid Guebbas from the governor reporting the foregoing. The governor requested Mr. Bewicke to convey the information to me by the same courier.

I have, &c.
HERBERT E. WHITE.

[29984] No. 167.

Mr. White to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 31.)

(No. 235.)
Sir, *Tangier, July 23, 1911.*

THE British consular agent at Alcazar reported that on the 19th instant he believed there were 1,800 Spanish troops there, composed as follows :—

800 marines.
200 engineers.
200 artillery.
200 bluejackets.
160 cavalry.
200 native police.
40 wireless telegraph section.
They had two complete Schneider batteries and six machine guns.

I understand that there are at Laraiche about 1,400 troops, so that the total Spanish force in that district at present is probably about 3,200 men, and the Spanish press report that more are on the point of being dispatched.

I have, &c.
HERBERT E. WHITE.

[29921] No. 168.

Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 31.)

(No. 115.)
Sir, *Posilipo, July 25, 1911.*

I OBSERVE in Sir G. Buchanan's despatch No. 200 of the 12th instant that his Excellency reports that the French Ambassador at St. Petersburgh is of opinion that there is an intimate connection between the Albanian and Moroccan questions, indicating collusion between Berlin and Vienna. Due allowance must of course be made for a natural predisposition to make such an assumption. That it should have been made, however, cannot but afford food for reflection to the representative accredited to the third Power in the Triple Alliance. After considerable reflection on the matter, I am only able to call to mind one single experience here of recent days which, following this order of ideas, might be regarded as in a measure symptomatic, though it is far too slight to justify the formation of a diagnosis. Such as it is, however, it may be worth recording.

On the last occasion on which I had an opportunity of seeing the Minister for Foreign Affairs before his departure for his summer cure, when I was endeavouring to sound him on the question of whether there was any tendency to contemplate a joint intervention by Austria-Hungary and Italy with a view to terminating the anxieties occasioned to both of them by the prolongation of the Albanian crisis, his Excellency allowed a vague phrase to escape him about the possibility of any such intervention leading to a partition of Albania. I did not at the moment attach much importance to what only appeared to be a sort of fugitive utterance, which was quickly covered by other conversation.

I have, however, had more than one assurance from him that Austria and Italy have no divergence of views on the Albanian question and keep continually in touch, together with other assurances that never for many years have the relations of the two countries been so nearly cordial as during the last six months. Practical evidence of this has also recently been furnished by the readiness with which the Austrian Government have instructed their Ambassador to offer excuses and explanations in a recent frontier incident, and by the reference, only a few days ago in a speech from the Throne to the Austrian Parliament, to the necessity for solving the problem of an Italian legal faculty in Austria. On the other hand, discussions of the Albanian question between the Austrian and Russian Governments appear to continue in an extremely platonic condition, and to remain ineffectual in results.

Italy is as regards the Morocco question tied by her obligations contracted with France, and both on that account and in view of her alliance with Germany must stand outside. On the other hand, in the event of any distinct advantage accruing to either of those countries as the result of negotiation or to one of them as the result of forcible measures, Italian public opinion would be roused to a high pitch of excitement if Italy did not secure some advantage to counterbalance the altered conditions.

The understanding hitherto existing between Italy and Austria-Hungary as regards Albania has been one of mutual disinterestedness. It is not easy to understand its becoming an object to Austria to modify such an understanding into one of a mutually interested character which would secure Italy a footing on the other side of the Adriatic, but it is not altogether inconceivable that circumstances might induce her to consent to it. In any case, Italy, notwithstanding her weakness, could never consent to an extension of Austrian territory and influence in the Adriatic without compensation. If, therefore, there is any reason to justify the presumed collusion between Berlin and Vienna and a connection between the Moroccan and Albanian questions, there would also be reason to suspect Italy's being included in the terms of the transaction. The evidence at present, however, seems very hypothetical, and only such as to justify attention being drawn to the possibilities involved.

It may be worthy of mention that the Italian Ambassador at Berlin, who had obtained leave of absence from the 28th instant, has been instructed for the present to remain at his post.

I have, &c.
RENNELL RODD.

[30008] No. 169.

Sir A. Hardinge to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 31.)

(No. 122. Africa. Confidential.)

Sir, *Brussels, July 28, 1911.*

M. DAVIGNON alluded, in conversation with me yesterday, to the anxious international situation created by the German *coup* at Agadir, and asked what was thought of it in London. I told him that I had had no opportunity of learning anything on the subject beyond what had appeared in the papers, and enquired if his Excellency had heard any particulars himself about the alleged German proposals with regard to the French right of pre-emption over the Belgian Congo. He said he had not, but his own view was that any transfer or abandonment of such right by France would require the assent of the Belgian Government. The right had been given by King Leopold in return for a consideration, and was not a proper object of barter between France and another Power without reference to Belgium. It had, moreover, no longer any *raison d'être*, as the prospect of a sale of the territory of the old Independent State, which was intelligible so long as it was the property of a single individual, had passed out of the region of practical politics now that it was administered, as an integral part of her dominions, by a solvent and progressive country such as Belgium. I am inclined on this particular point to agree with M. Davignon, and I do not know why M. Cambon imagines, as he appears to do by a recent despatch published in the confidential print, that a sale by Belgium of the Congo is likely in the near future. She might have refused to take it over from the late King, and perhaps would not have done so if a referendum of the electors could have been taken on the question two or three years ago, but, having once annexed and paid for it, she will, I think, stick to it, even at the cost of heavy financial sacrifices, unless, of course, she is ruined, or her international status modified, as the result of an European war.

M. Davignon added that the Belgian Ministers at the great European capitals were very guarded as to the probable result of the Franco-German negotiations, and was evidently himself by no means free from anxiety on the subject. The King also adverted to it in conversation with me at the evening party given yesterday at the Palace in honour of the Queen of Holland.

I have, &c.
ARTHUR H. HARDINGE.

[29900] No. 170.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 188.)

(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, July 31, 1911.*

MOROCCO. Your Excellency's language, as reported in your telegram No. 112 of the 29th July, is approved.

That France should come to an agreement with the Germans is much to be desired, as the outcome of a conference—should no preliminary Franco-German agreement be arrived at—may merely be the restoration of the *status quo* under the Algeciras Act, with which no one is now content. If, however, France and Germany come to some agreement and a conference is then summoned to meet and confirm such agreement, that conference would in all probability denounce Algeciras Act, and give France once and for all freedom of action in Morocco. Apprehensions of French Minister for Foreign Affairs, described in penultimate paragraph of your telegram, would thus be needless, and, her position once secured in Morocco, France would be justified in compensating Germany substantially in another part of the world. His Majesty's Government are prepared, however, to call a conference in event of failure of present Franco-German negotiations. But it is important that their rupture, if they are broken off, should be attributable not to France but to Germany.

[30324] No. 171.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 321.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, July 31, 1911.*

M. CAMBON came to see me this morning, and gave me the same information as was contained in your telegram No. 110 of the 29th instant. He was not sanguine as to the issue of the negotiations.

I said that there was to be a Cabinet this afternoon, and to-morrow I should be able to let him know whether, in the event of the Franco-German negotiations breaking down, we should propose to all the Powers of the Act of Algeciras a conference to decide in what respects there had been departure from the Algeciras Act and what a return to the *status quo* required, and whether the Algeciras Act should be altered.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[30364] No. 172.

Mr. Rennie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 1.)

(No. 134. Confidential.)

Sir, *Zarauz, July 27, 1911.*

AS I have already reported by telegraph, the Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs and the French Ambassador drafted on the 24th July the terms of a *modus vivendi* for the Alcazar district. Two days later M. Geoffray received from his Government their consent to the general terms of the draft, but M. de Selves was apparently averse to agreeing to any formal signed declaration, which would, it was considered, have been tantamount to a recognition on the part of France of the Spanish occupation of Alcazar. M. Geoffray was accordingly instructed to make a verbal declaration in the terms of the draft, and to receive a similar declaration from Señor Garcia Prieto, thus indicating the temporary nature of the situation and the provisional character of the measures to be applied.

Señor Garcia Prieto seems to have raised no objection, and accordingly a declaration was yesterday morning verbally exchanged, the terms of which are generally represented by the enclosure in this despatch. M. Geoffray told me to-day that he had left an unsigned copy of this paper with Señor Garcia Prieto, and that substantially the only addition that had been made was as regards that portion of paragraph 3 relating to the men accompanying travellers, which M. Geoffray had informed Señor Garcia Prieto could not be strictly limited, but might form the subject of mutual explanation should any abuse in connection with the numbers of the escorts occur.

So far the declaration has not been published, Señor Garcia Prieto merely informing the press yesterday that he had had a satisfactory interview with the French Ambassador regarding the *modus vivendi* proposed by the Spanish Government to the French Cabinet to prevent the occurrence of fresh incidents in the Spanish zone of influence.

This afternoon the French Ambassador received a telegram from Paris approving the steps taken, and informing him that the French Legation at Tangier had been instructed to take the necessary steps to carry out the declaration.

I saw Señor Garcia Prieto to-day, and his Excellency seemed much pleased at the arrangement. He said he had been greatly worried lately by the recent incidents. He hoped that these, including the Thiriet affair, were now things of the past. The tone of the press of both countries had very much improved the last few days. He trusted that these newspaper campaigns would now cease and leave the respective Governments free to resume conversations on a wider scale.

There is little doubt but that the Spanish Government are pleased with the conclusion of the *modus vivendi*, even though it has only taken the form of a verbal declaration. Ever since the beginning of the Berlin conversations they have felt anxious lest they should be left out in the cold, and arrangements affecting Spanish interests in Morocco should be come to behind their backs. So long as incidents kept on occurring at Alcazar between the Spanish and French authorities, the friction they produced prevented the resumption of the conversations with the French Cabinet, which both Señor Garcia Prieto and Señor Canalejas have during the past six weeks

declared that they wished should be resumed, and which, owing to the rebuffs the Spanish Government have received both here and at Berlin, have undoubtedly, from the Spanish point of view, lately become more than ever desirable.

There therefore seem grounds for hoping that, should the Madrid conversations be resumed in the near future, the Spanish Government will be found animated by a more reasonable and conciliatory spirit than they were two months ago.

I have, &c.
ERNEST RENNIE.

Enclosure in No. 172.

Déclaration verbale.

LES officiers et soldats de la méhalla chérifienne campée au sud du Loujkos, ainsi que les officiers français au service du Makhzen qui accompagnent cette méhalla, seront invités à ne pas entrer dans la zone espagnole. De leur côté, les officiers et soldats espagnols n'entreront pas dans la zone française.

L'autorité militaire espagnole à El Ksar et à Larache n'enrôlera, sous aucun prétexte, dans ses troupes, les déserteurs des troupes chérifiennes dont il s'agit. Des mesures seront arrêtées de concert, par les officiers français mis au service du Sultan du Maroc et par les officiers espagnols, pour assurer la remise réciproque des déserteurs marocains, ainsi que de leurs armes et équipements.

Aucune entrave ne sera apportée au transit des Français se rendant de Fez à Tanger et réciproquement, ou allant de Larache à Fez ou de Larache à Tanger et réciproquement. Toutefois, ces Français devront être munis d'une pièce émanant d'une autorité diplomatique ou consulaire de leur pays et établissant à la fois leur identité et leur destination. Ces Français conserveront par devers eux leurs armes; il en sera de même pour les hommes qui les accompagneraient.

[30374] No. 173.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 1.)

(No. 55.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Berlin, August 1, 1911.*

MOROCCO.

Herr von Kiderlen returned to-day from Swinemünde and enquired of French Ambassador what terms his Government proposed for discussion. On hearing what the French Government offered, Herr von Kiderlen then said that these proposals formed, in the opinion of the Imperial Government, an acceptable basis for discussion between the two Governments.

[30548] No. 174.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 329.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, August 1, 1911.*

IN the course of some general conversation with M. Cambon to-day I observed that, though it might not be helpful in the difficulties of the moment, I was sure that in future the German desire for expansion in Africa could be met if the Portuguese colonies or the Belgian Congo were offered for sale.

M. Cambon said he understood that we had a treaty with Germany as to the Portuguese colonies.

I replied that there was a secret treaty, and that we should therefore have no trouble with Germany as to those colonies. With regard to the Belgian Congo there was the French right of pre-emption to be considered: but I did not suppose that France would wish to purchase the whole of that State. We did not desire further expansion for ourselves in Africa, though if they were for sale we should like to purchase some comparatively small pieces of territory adjoining British possessions; we should not therefore stand in the way of German expansion. Unfortunately these colonies in Africa could not be useful at present as they were not ours to give away.

I also took this opportunity to refer to the apprehension expressed by M. de Selves

that any arrangement come to with Germany by France now might later on be put aside by Germany, as the latter had already done in the case of the Franco-German Agreement of 1909 as to Morocco; so that an arrangement with Germany would be only temporary as regards Morocco, though the concessions which France might make elsewhere to secure the arrangement would be permanent. I pointed out to M. Cambon that this apprehension would be removed if the bargain between France and Germany was confirmed by a conference which put an end to the Algeciras Act It was somewhat cynical on the part of Germany to offer to sell the Algeciras Act to France behind the backs of the other Powers; and this was in effect what Herr von Kiderlen was doing when he proposed to give France, for a consideration, a free hand in Morocco, and said that none of the other Powers would be likely to raise objections afterwards. It would, therefore, be not only politic, but also right, that a bargain between France and Germany should be confirmed by a conference of the Signatory Powers of the Algeciras Act, at which France should be freed from the provisions of that Act. France would then have a much better case to put before her Chamber, and Germany would not be able to reopen the question later on.

M. Cambon said that he had already put this view before his Government, after my previous conversation with him.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[30549] No. 175.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 330.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, August 1, 1911.*

M. CAMBON told me to-day that M. de Selves concurred in the suggestion which I had made as to the grounds on which a conference might be suggested if the conversations between France and Germany broke down.

I told M. Cambon that the Government had considered the matter, and that if the conversations did break down we should be prepared to propose a conference of the Powers that were parties to the Act of Algeciras "to decide in what respects there has been a departure from the Act of Algeciras, and what the situation requires." We thought that some general words of this kind would be best, at any rate in the first instance. But if the time came to propose a conference, I would consult with the Prime Minister as to the actual wording.

I am, &c,
E. GREY.

[30509] No. 176.

Mr. White to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 2.)

(No. 141.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Tangier, August 2, 1911.*

BRITISH vice-consul at Mogador reports that Governor of Agadir has expelled the correspondents of the "Daily Express" and "Westminster Gazette" from that place. The captain of the German cruiser courteously offered to expostulate with the governor, but they declined his offer. It appears that the reason for their expulsion was that they had not brought any letters of recommendation and refused to explain the object of their visit; but they would no doubt have been allowed to remain if they had given the usual presents.

Vice-consul is making representations to the governor on the subject.

[30306] No. 177.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 334.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, August* 2, 1911.

M. CAMBON told me to-day that the French Ambassador in Berlin had had an interview with Herr von Kiderlen yesterday.

Herr von Kiderlen had asked what the Ambassador had to propose. The Ambassador had spoken of certain French islands, as regards which France might be prepared to concede something to Germany as an element in the bargain. In reply to the statement of the French Ambassador that, at most, France could give only a very thin strip of the French Congo, reaching to the sea, Herr von Kiderlen had said that territorial access to the River Congo was essential for Germany. In return for this, Germany would concede to France access on the French Congo to the River Benue, and a free hand in Morocco. It might be difficult to mention the word "protectorate" in a document which was to receive the assent of the other Powers who were parties to the Act of Algeciras, but that was virtually what was implied, as regards Morocco, and the description of it was a question of drafting.

The matter had been referred to M. de Selves, and apparently the position now was this: Germany would admit France to access to the Benue river, while France conceded to Germany a strip of territory from the Kamerouns to the River Congo, but the strip could in no circumstances be west of the River Sanga. It looked as if a proposal of this sort might become an agreed basis of negotiation.

M. Cambon observed that, in this event, France would wish to have the same access up the Niger and Benue to the east as she now had up the Niger to the west through Nigeria.

I said that I assumed this meant free navigation of the river.

I then observed that, if what was virtually a French protectorate was to be established in Morocco, provision would have to be made for the exceptional position of Tangier, and for economic rights.

M. Cambon said that the arrangement that he contemplated was one in which the position of the Sultan in Morocco would remain, but France would have the right of police and of financial control. Economic liberty and equal rights of commerce would be preserved. The position of Spain in her sphere would be similar to that of France in hers, and a special arrangement would be made for the exceptional position of Tangier.

Herr von Kiderlen had laid great stress upon keeping any of these proposals from public knowledge at present.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[30540] No. 178.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 3.)

(No. 356.)
Sir, *Paris, August* 2, 1911.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith copy of M. de Selves' reply to the communication which I made to his Excellency in accordance with the instructions contained in your telegram No. 178 of the 17th ultimo with regard to the principles of commercial equality and to mining concessions in Morocco.

I shall be glad to learn what reply I am to make to M. de Selves.

I have, &c.
FRANCIS BERTIE.

Enclosure in No. 178.

M. de Selves to Sir F. Bertie.

EN réponse à la note de l'Ambassade britannique en date du 19 de ce mois, le Ministre des Affaires Étrangères a l'honneur de faire connaître à son Excellence Sir Francis Bertie que le Gouvernement de la république est résolu à maintenir, dans les négociations engagées avec le Gouvernement allemand, le principe de l'égalité commerciale, pour toutes les parties de l'Empire marocain.

En ce qui concerne les mines, le Gouvernement français considère toujours qu'il y aurait lieu d'appliquer l'organisation définie par le projet de règlement minier qu'ont préparé les délégués techniques des quatre Puissances principalement intéressées en cette matière. Il va faire de nouvelles démarches pour obtenir l'adhésion à ce texte du Gouvernement des Pays-Bas, qui était seul à en demander la modification, et il serait tout disposé à s'entendre avec celui-ci pour faire lever les objections du Cabinet de La Haye par un amendement transactionnel. Il serait obligé au Gouvernement anglais de lui faire connaître s'il adopte ce point de vue, et, dans ce cas, s'il veut bien appuyer ces efforts auprès du Gouvernement néerlandais.

Paris, le 31 *juillet*, 1911.

[30516] No. 179.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 3.)

[By Post.]

(No. 114.)
(Telegraphic.) *En clair.* *Paris, August* 2, 1911.

AT the interview yesterday between the French Ambassador at Berlin and the German Minister for Foreign Affairs, latter began by stating that the Emperor was greatly displeased at the insinuations in the French newspapers that he and His Ministers were not in accord. The Ambassador replied that nobody could regret the insinuations more than M. de Selves.

M. de Kiderlen-Waechter then asked whether the French Government had any fresh proposals to make. M. Jules Cambon said that the French Government could not cede the French Congo from the Sangha to the sea, but, in return for a free hand in Morocco, the Bec du Canard, and access to the River Benue, France would give some islands in Oceania and Polynesia in addition to the rectifications of frontier already offered. M. de Kiderlen-Waechter said that, in view of the offer of islands, he would not insist on the cession of the French Congo from the Sangha to the sea, but he spoke of a cession to Germany of a piece of coast north of Libreville, and he stated that Germany must insist on having a band of territory bringing her to the River Congo. The Ambassador said that he would refer M. de Kiderlen's proposals to the French Government, and with regard to Morocco and the free hand which France was to have, and with reference to the word "protectorat" which had been mentioned by M. de Kiderlen-Waechter, he enquired how the German Government proposed that the consent of the Powers parties to the Algeciras Act should be obtained. The Minister said that he thought that it would be difficult to use the word "protectorat" in any formal document, but that he would guarantee the consent of the Powers to France having the free hand which she desired, and the French Government should draft the necessary document. M. de Selves having told me that there appeared to be no longer any question of the cession of Togoland to France, I pointed out to him that M. de Kiderlen-Waechter appeared to have got wind of the readiness of the French Government in the last extremity to make the cession of territory abutting on the coast near Libreville in return for Togoland. He said that he had no idea how the German Government came to know of it, and he supposed that M. de Kiderlen's intention is to surround by German territory Spanish Guinea and to obtain its cession to Germany.

M. de Selves is more hopeful of an understanding, but he cannot say what the view of the French Government will be of the requirement of the German Government for a band of territory to the River Congo. No information has been given as to its locality or extent.

[30509] No. 180.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. White.

(No. 60.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, August* 3, 1911.

YOUR telegram No. 141 of 2nd August: Expulsion of newspaper correspondents from Agadir.

You should protest against interference with correspondents, and insist upon their being allowed to return if they wish. If, as we understand, French and Germans are allowed to land and move about freely at Agadir there can be no excuse for treating British subjects differently.

[28911] No. 181.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 328.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, August* 3, 1911.

I TRANSMIT to your Excellency herewith a copy of a despatch from His Majesty's chargé d'affaires at Tangier containing copies of the report of the Inspector-General of Moorish police, and reporting certain criticisms of M. de Billy on this report.

I have to request your Excellency to ascertain from the French Government what action in the matter they propose to take.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[30690] No. 182.

Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 4.)

(No. 116. Confidential.)
Sir, *Rome, July* 31, 1911.

I HAVE the honour to report that I saw the Minister for Foreign Affairs, for the first time for some weeks, this afternoon, as he was passing through Rome on his way from the baths to the mountains, and I took the opportunity to ask him what was actually the position of Italy in relation to the Morocco question. I knew, I said, that by an arrangement with France Italy was pledged not to oppose any action of the former in Morocco, as France was pledged not to oppose any political action of Italy in Tripoli. What, however, was her position as regards Germany, if an actual partition of Morocco should be proposed?

The Marquis di San Giuliano replied that Italy's membership of the Triple Alliance naturally connoted obligations of benevolence to her ally, but there was nothing in the alliance which compelled her to disinterest herself in Morocco in favour of Germany, or to renounce her right to be consulted as a signatory of the Treaty of Algeciras. As regards France, such an obligation existed as I had referred to, and, as far as Morocco itself was concerned, Italy would have no right to question French annexations of Moroccan territory. She would, however, have every right to consider how far her interests and the balance of power in the Mediterranean would be affected by such an annexation, and how far she might not be obliged to contemplate redressing the balance by some definite step in Tripoli. He did not know how the negotiations were going on, and what the probabilities were of a solution which would end in the handing over of a large portion of Morocco to France, and the attitude of Italy could only be guided by circumstances as they arose.

The reference to Tripoli in this portion of our conversation should, I have the honour to submit, be read in connection with the observations of his Excellency reported in my immediately following despatch.

I have, &c.
RENNELL RODD.

[30679] No. 183.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 4.)

(No. 357. Secret.)
Sir, *Paris, August* 3, 1911.

FROM the interview which I had with the Minister for Foreign Affairs yesterday, and of which I gave an account in my telegraphic message No. 114 of that day, I derived the impression that he personally would be disposed to consent to M. de Kiderlen-Waechter's demand that Germany should have territorial connection with the River Congo through the French Congo, provided that the breadth of the connecting-band be moderate and its locality be not greatly injurious to French interests, and that in other respects, and particularly in regard to a French protectorate or a free hand in Morocco, the terms of the German Government be acceptable to France and be properly secured. I think, however, that he foresees and dreads opposition from the French Colonial Department and party to the concessions required by M. de Kiderlen-Waechter, and that he is not confident of the consent to them of the majority of his colleagues. Another difficulty which will arise, supposing that the German and French Governments come to terms, will be how the acquiescence of the other Powers parties to the Algeciras Act is to be obtained, either in a conference or without one. Germany may be able to answer for Austria-Hungary and, perhaps, Sweden, and possibly, but not probably, Italy. France can make sure of Russian and British consent, but who is to answer for the United States of America, Belgium, Holland, and Portugal. Will they require compensations on the principle and example instituted by Germany, and, if so, who is to provide them. There remains the case of Spain. If Germany, as suspected by M. de Selves, is to acquire Spanish Guinea as the price of the recognition as far as she is concerned of Spanish pretensions in Morocco, the German Government will have succeeded in permanently estranging Spain and France, an estrangement which probably will not be confined to the question of Morocco.

Having derived these impressions as to the feelings and apprehensions of the Minister for Foreign Affairs, partly inspired, I have no doubt, by representations made to him by the permanent staff of his Department, I paid a visit this morning to the President of the Council, in order to ascertain his views on the state of the negotiations. M. Caillaux expressed himself as satisfied with their progress. There had, he said, been a change in the attitude of M. de Kiderlen-Waechter. He no longer demanded the cession of the French Congo down to the sea. Provided that France obtained a practical protectorate or control over the administration of Morocco, a free hand under whatever form it might be given, and that France were not required to cede Libreville or Brazzaville, he (M. Caillaux) would not reject the demand that Germany should have a band of territory to bring her to the Congo River. With regard to the acquiescence of the parties to the Algeciras Act to a French protectorate or control over Morocco, it would be for Germany to obtain their acquiescence. Germany might perhaps acquire Spanish Guinea in return for German recognition of the Spanish occupations made in Morocco, but M. Caillaux felt confident, he informed me, of being able to come to an arrangement with Spain. I asked his Excellency whether he expected opposition from the colonial party to the concessions required by Germany in return for a recognition by her of French control over Morocco. He made light of any such opposition saying that there was such a desire in France to obtain the control that the sacrifices required would be readily made.

I have, &c.
FRANCIS BERTIE.

[30827] No. 184.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 4.)

(No 57.)
(Telegraphic.) *En clair.* *Berlin, August* 4, 1911.

FOLLOWING official communiqué published this afternoon:—

"There has been a rapprochement in the conversations between French Ambassador and Herr von Kiderlen on matters of principle. The elaboration of the details requires, however, careful study, on which the competent authorities are now engaged. The result is then to be submitted by the Chancellor to the Emperor."

[30805] No. 185.

Mr. White to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 4.)

(No. 142.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Tangier, August 4, 1911.*

BRITISH vice-consul at Laraiche informs me that on the 3rd August Spanish cruiser arrived with 400 troops and 35 bandsmen, and that more troops are expected.

[30829] No. 186.

Mr. White to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 4.)

(No. 143.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Tangier, August 4, 1911.*

THE officer commanding the Sultan's troops at Alcazar was told by Colonel Silvestre that he must vacate the barracks and withdraw his force from the town; if he wished to remain at Alcazar he must place himself under his orders. A term of four days was allowed in order that the kaïd should consult Cid Guebbas, who as, I am informed by M. de Billy, instructed him not to yield except under compulsion. This would, I think, produce a bad impression on the natives, and I told M. de Billy that it would in my opinion have been better to avoid any show of force by yielding to the mere threat.

[30962] No. 187.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 5.)

(No. 115.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Paris, August 5, 1911.*

MINISTER for Foreign Affairs gave me this morning following information:—

Minister for Foreign Affairs received on evening of 3rd August despatch from French Ambassador at Berlin dated 2nd August asking for instructions as to offers to be made to Germany.

M. de Selves replied yesterday that Ambassador was to negotiate with a view to restricting as much as possible the territory to be conceded to Germany, in lieu of previous rejected offers, within extreme limits of parallels 7 and 3 north of the Equator and following the conventional line (marked purple on map in your possession) as little to the east as possible. This would bring concession down south so as to include a port on the coast near Libreville. He might also negotiate in regard to some islands, but he was to refer home for further instructions as to those islands.

French Ambassador at Berlin saw German Minister for Foreign Affairs yesterday. The latter said that Bec du Canard might be given to France but not Togoland. Germany did not want any islands except Comoro Islands, but wanted the French Congo territory from parallel 2 north-eastwards to Ubanghi, down that river to its junction with the Congo, and down that river to Alima, and up that river westward to River Ogowe, and thence to the sea at a point between Libreville and the Muni.

Minister for Foreign Affairs is determined not to concede these demands. He will not give anything below Sangha River except strip of territory referred to in my telegram No. 110, Confidential, of 29th July, namely, from Ekododo, north of Libreville, to Ouesso. He is not prepared to give up Comoro Islands.

In the course of conversation between French Ambassador at Berlin and German Minister for Foreign Affairs, the latter alluded to the possible disappearance of the Congo State, but only in a vague way and as an uncertain event. He, however, proposed to acquire by secret treaty with France the pre-emptive rights which she has by secret treaty with Spain over Spanish Guinea.

As Germans may demand an extension eastward of the territory which French Minister for Foreign Affairs is prepared to offer them between parallels 7 and 3, which would bring them into proximity to territories connected with Egyptian Soudan, he has instructed French Ambassador in London to consult you on the subject.

[30964] No. 188.

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 7.)

(No. 65.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Zarauz, August 7, 1911.*

MOROCCO. Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs has written a letter to the French Ambassador suggesting that M. Geoffray and I should arrange a date for resuming with Señor Garcia Prieto the conversations, which were discontinued early in June, concerning the relations between France and Spain in Morocco.

Spanish Ambassador in Paris states that French Minister for Foreign Affairs has no objection, but French Ambassador here has not heard this, and has applied for instructions in the matter.

M. Geoffray thinks it important to ascertain present nature of Spanish aspirations, and thinks an agreement could be reached if Señor Garcia Prieto is prepared to continue the discussions from the point reached when they were broken off.

His Excellency is therefore personally in favour of meeting the wishes of the Spanish Government in this respect without awaiting the conclusion of the negotiation at Berlin.

In the event of the French Government consenting, do you agree to my taking part in these conversations, which would be held at San Sebastian?

[31021] No. 189.

Mr. White to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 8.)

(No. 241.)
Sir, *Tangier, July 29, 1911.*

OWING to the present political situation there appears but little chance of the loan recently negotiated by Sid Mokri being issued for some time to come. The Makhzen, consequently, again finds itself in financial difficulties, for such revenues as it derives from the issue of new coinage and other sources will soon be exhausted. It is therefore, perhaps, not very surprising to see the Sultan again resorting to the old system of appointing new governors and exacting contributions from the tribes. The resort to this system, however, places the French in a false position, as they are now in great measure held responsible for the administrative action of the Sultan, over whom they are in a position to exert control.

The situation is further complicated by the presence of the Spaniards in the north and of the Germans in the south. Those who find themselves threatened immediately seek the protection of one or other of these Powers, each of whom appears to be equally ready to profit by the occasion.

I have already reported the case of the Kaïd of Kourima, whom Kaïd M'tougi had deprived of his post, and who immediately sent his agent, accompanied by an employé of the German vice-consul at Mogador, to see the captain of the "Berlin" at Agadir, and was placed in a position to defy Kaïd M'tougi.

A somewhat similar case has occurred in the north: Kaïd Krafes was deprived of the government of Arwa, which was given to Kaïd El Sherkawi, the commander of the mehalla to which Lieutenant Thiriet is attached. Kaïd Krafes at once applied to Colonel Silvestre, who, in an official letter, translation of which is enclosed herewith, practically promised him protection.

Kaïd Krafes rendered services to Major Brémond's column when it was in difficulties, and was, I understand, told that those services would not be forgotten. He must have been disagreeably surprised to see piece after piece of his district taken from him, and when at last Arwa, the district in which is his own home, was given to Sherkawi, who is at present high in the favour of the French, he appealed to the Spanish for assistance.

M. de Billy has sent instructions to M. Gaillard to point out to the Sultan the bad effect produced by this policy, and to obtain orders for the reappointment of Kaïd Krafes.

I have, &c.
HERBERT E. WHITE.

Enclosure in No. 189.

Colonel Silvestre to Kaïd Kassem-ben-Jillali-el-Arwi.

(Translation.)

(After compliments.) 7 *Rajab*, 1329 (*July* 4, 1911).

WE have received your letter stating that Kaïd Ben Sherkawi is a French protégé, and is occupied in meddlings concerning you, with others, and requesting us not to listen to what he says about you. You also say that it is his custom to meddle in matters which do not concern him, and that you have spoken to us and informed us, so that we may be aware thereof.

We have taken note of all the foregoing. May you set your mind at ease, and do not be agitated, for we bear you in mind, with eyes and ears open.

Colonel SILVESTRE.

[31022] No. 190.

Mr. White to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 8.)

(No. 242.)

Sir, *Tangier, July* 29, 1911.

WITH reference to your despatch No. 48 of the 5th instant, I have the honour to report that I have discussed with M. de Billy the possibility of obtaining from the Sultan the suppression of open slave markets in the towns of the interior as well as at the ports, as the support of the French Legation would be of great importance in pressing any demand of this nature.

M. de Billy is of opinion that it would not be possible for the present to obtain the suppression of the Marrakesh slave market, but that it might be possible to obtain from the Sultan that no slaves should be sold by auction in Fez. In this I concur, and I have written to His Majesty's consul at Fez to obtain his opinion on the subject. M. de Billy has similarly written to M. Gaillard.

I think Mr. Donald Mackenzie has made a miscalculation as to the number of slaves that cross the desert to Morocco every year. He estimates the total number of sales of slaves in all Morocco at 10,000 every year, adds 30 per cent. of this number for mortality, and arrives at 13,000 as the number of slaves brought across the desert. He forgets, however, that slaves are continually changing hands, and that but a small proportion of the sales every year are of slaves freshly brought from the Soudan.

There are, I think, few towns in the interior where slave markets are regularly held. Fez and Marrakesh are the only two of such towns where consular officers reside. It would be quite impossible to obtain the prohibition of the private sale of slaves even at the ports. Such sales take place at Tangier. So long as the people are allowed to hold slaves they must be allowed to purchase them. The public hawking of slaves about the streets of the ports, however, can, and should, be stopped, though one could not prevent a slave being quietly taken to a house to be there privately offered for sale.

With regard to Messrs. James Power and Co.'s letter of the 6th instant, I beg to observe that it was their agent at Tangier, and not at Gibraltar, who assured me that all masters of the company's ships would be warned not to receive slaves on board.

I have, &c.

HERBERT E. WHITE.

[31024] No. 191.

Mr. White to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 8.)

(No. 244. Confidential.)

Sir, *Tangier, July* 30, 1911.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 238 of the 24th instant I have the honour to inform you that when Cid Guebbas heard of armed parties landing at Agadir from the "Berlin" he made a verbal protest on the subject to the German Minister. Baron von Seckendorff went to see his Excellency yesterday and declared that it was not true that people had landed with arms from the cruiser. He took Cid Guebbas to task for having made his protest based merely upon a report that had appeared in the local French paper. Cid Guebbas replied that his information on the subject was derived

not from the French paper, but from an official report received from Kaïd Guelouli, the governor of the district, who, though not himself at Agadir, had received the information from his deputy.

Baron von Seckendorff said that in that case he must request that instructions be sent to Kaïd Guelouli to be more careful in future not to send inaccurate reports.

Cid Guebbas communicated the substance of this conversation to me in confidence. He said that at first it was carried on in a strained tone, but that at the close the German Minister adopted a more friendly attitude. He informed me that it was not clear from Kaïd Guelouli's report whether the Germans had been shooting for sport, or whether they had been engaged in rifle practice.

His Majesty's vice-consul at Mogador states in a private letter dated the 23rd instant that he had had it confirmed that the crew of the "Berlin" landed in considerably greater numbers than formerly, and that they land armed.

Mr. Vice-Consul Johnstone further states that it is reported that the Germans insist that a preference in the purchase of land be given to German subjects. From other sources I hear of Germans going to Agadir to buy land and to open commercial relations with the natives. A British subject at Tangier told me that some German merchants here had asked him to accompany them to Agadir as interpreter.

Cid Guebbas in the interview above referred to warned the German Minister that the Makhzen would not recognise purchases of land made at Agadir without the previous consent of the Makhzen.

I have, &c.

HERBERT E. WHITE.

P.S.—*July* 31. I have just received copy of a despatch addressed by His Majesty's vice-consul at Mogador to Mr. Consul Madden, reporting an interview between the chiefs of the tribes at Agadir and German naval officers, when some sort of a document appears to have been signed.

In another despatch Mr. Vice-Consul Johnstone states that European firms are sending agents to Agadir to purchase property. He states that very friendly relations are said to exist between the people of Agadir and some of the Europeans who are there.

H. E. W.

Enclosure in No. 191.

Vice-Consul Johnstone to Consul Madden.

(No. 90.)

Sir, *Mogador, July* 24, 1911.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 86 of the 21st instant relative to the presence of the German man-of-war at Agadir, I have the honour to report that Mr. G. Broome has informed me that on Saturday evening, the 22nd instant, he received a native messenger from Agadir, in whom he places confidence and who told him that during last week, probably Wednesday, the German naval officers had an interview with the chiefs of the tribes surrounding the port. Tents had been prepared for the reception on shore, and the spokesman on the German side is said to have informed the kaïds that the Germans had come as one independent people to another people equally independent in order to ascertain whether it was a fact that the inhabitants of the "Sus" country wished the Europeans to open a port on their coast. The Germans, the spokesman is said to have stated, would in no way interfere in matters of government or religion, all that was wanted was that land might be sold to Europeans ("Nasrani") from round Agadir to Wad Massa, and that the safety of the trade roads should be assured by the native chiefs. The chiefs are said to have replied that they were ready to accept the German proposals as long as they incurred no expense whatever in the matter. A paper is then said to have been drawn up and signed by the kaïds, and the German ship (presumably the "Panther") dispatched a radiogram. A feast was offered to the chiefs, and they were received on board the ship, a salute being fired upon their arrival and departure.

On Saturday I was told by natives that only one German man-of-war was at Agadir, and that was the "Panther," but to-day I hear there is a second one, so that possibly the "Ebor" has arrived.

The French consul tells me that the Germans are insisting that the local authorities give preference to German subjects in the purchase of land.

Mr. G. V. Forrest has arrived in this town from near Suk-el-Hud, in Mramar, in the north of Kerima. He reports that the tribesmen are very unsettled and excited, and that small parties of armed men are patrolling the country in case of invasion by Kaïd M'Tuggi's men. He states that the natives seem to believe that Kaïd Anflus will help Kaïd Koraimi, and that the Germans will come to his assistance against M'Tuggi. The road from Mogador to Mramar was open and peaceful when Mr. Forrest passed over it on Friday and Saturday.

I have received no confirmation of the news which Mr. Broome communicated to me yesterday.

I have, &c.
H. B. JOHNSTONE.

[31025] No. 192.

Mr. White to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received August* 8.)

(No. 245.)

Sir, *Tangier, July* 30, 1911.

THE action of the Spanish authorities in regard to the deserters from the Moorish mehalla at Alcazar has been surprising. The French declare that they have proof that the Spaniards employed agents to induce the Moorish soldiers to desert; but, be that as it may, there can, at any rate, be no doubt that they received a large number of deserters with their arms and accoutrements and horses and sent many of them to Laraiche, where they were kept confined in the police barracks.

The British vice-consul at Laraiche has now reported that, by order of the Spanish consul, 106 of these deserters were taken from the barracks and shipped on board the Spanish steamer "Quetzal," which sailed for an unknown destination at 3 A.M. on the morning of the 28th instant. In the report received by M. de Billy from the French vice-consul at Laraiche, it is added that the deserters were embarked in batches of ten, who were marched down to the waterport between files of Spanish soldiers so that they should not escape. It is believed that they have been taken to Ceuta or Melilla to be enrolled in the native regiments being formed at those places.

M. de Billy called on the Spanish Minister and asked him for information on this subject. M. de Villasinda professed total ignorance of the matter, but, on M. de Billy's reminding him that, under the *modus vivendi*, all deserters were to be given back, he said that the *modus vivendi* had no retroactive force in that respect, and that it was only future deserters who were to be restored with their arms, &c.

M. de Billy is reporting the matter to his Government and requesting instructions.

In the meantime the Spaniards are strengthening their position at Alcazar, and have thrown up entrenchments at their camp. They have also fortified a hill about 2 miles distant from their camp and mounted guns there.

The British consular agent at Alcazar also informs me that the Spanish military authorities are collecting the slaughter-house tax, and expending it in cleaning the town. They have placed two Spanish soldiers as well as native Spanish police with the lieutenant-governor of the town, and the prison is guarded by native Spanish police instead of the Makhzen guards.

I have, &c.
HERBERT E. WHITE.

[31028] No. 193.

Mr. White to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received August* 8.)

(No. 248.)

Sir, *Tangier, August* 2, 1911.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith copy of a despatch addressed by His Majesty's vice-consul at Mogador to His Majesty's consul at Casa Blanca, containing the latest news from Agadir.

I have, &c.
HERBERT E. WHITE.

Enclosure in No. 193.

Vice-Consul Johnstone to Consul Madden.

(No. 91.)

Sir, *Mogador, July* 26, 1911.

WITH reference to my immediately preceding despatch No. 90 of the 24th instant relative to the state of affairs at Agadir, I have the honour to report that Mr. Alan Ostler, correspondent of the "Daily Express," and Mr. McCullagh, correspondent of the "Westminster Gazette," have returned to Mogador, having been ejected from Agadir.

Mr. Ostler informs me that he arrived at Agadir on the 16th instant in the company of two French citizens, MM. Mattei and Blondeau. At his first interview with Hadj Hassan he was asked whether he had brought any letters, how long he intended to stay, and what he was doing. This irritated Mr. Ostler, particularly when the Hadj told him he could not offer him a room in the town, and he refrained from giving the usual present to the Khalifa. Two days later Mr. McCullagh arrived. I had advised him to take a Government soldier with him, which he did, but unfortunately dismissed him before his arrival at Agadir.

On the 21st instant both Mr. Ostler and Mr. McCullagh received notice from Hadj Hassan that they must leave on the following morning. This they refused to do, but considered it prudent to leave on the morning of the 23rd. The Khalifa gave Mr. McCullagh a patent hint that if he was given the British subjects' binoculars, they might be allowed to stay. The correspondents left without giving presents to any one in the town.

Upon arrival at Kaïd Guilooli's kasbah they were informed that the kaïd was asleep and could not receive them, and the kaïd's retainers refused to allow them to buy fodder for their animals.

Mr. Ostler assures me that he was treated in the most courteous manner by the commander of the "Berlin," who offered to expostulate with the Hadj about their expulsion. The correspondents, however, considered that this would be an undignified proceeding on their part, as their nationality should be sufficient guarantee that they should receive equal treatment to that extended to the subjects of other European nations.

Mr. Ostler also informs me that, while he was at Agadir, the commander of the "Berlin" received a letter from Kaïd Guilooli, enquiring whether he should allow subjects of Great Britain, France, and Spain to pass through his territory, as well as German subjects, and that the commander replied in the affirmative.

The German commander told Mr. Ostler that he trusted his Government would shortly send war-ships to Saffi and Mogador, but added that he hoped that the other Powers would also send ships to the same ports.

The captain of the "Agadir" reports that a large German transport passed his vessel outside Mazagan on Monday last, steaming south.

With reference to my despatch No. 86 of the 21st instant, in which I reported the disembarkation of some armed men from the "Berlin," I have the honour to report that I find the report was founded on a misconception on the part of the governor of this town of the meaning of a somewhat vague letter he had received from Kaïd Guilooli, in which it was stated that, in spite of warnings, men had landed and fired off guns outside Guilooli's jurisdiction. It now transpires that only one or two men left Agadir one day on a shooting expedition.

With reference to my despatch No. 90 of the 24th instant, in which I reported a rumour of a meeting of the notables round Agadir with the commander of the "Berlin," I have the honour to state that I have received no confirmation of the report. Mr. Ostler assures me that the meeting could not have taken place while he was at the port, as he was encamped outside the walls of the town in a position which commanded a view of all the surrounding country, and that no tents were erected while he was there. I am told, however, that Herr von Maur, in a letter written from the firm of Marx and Maur, and signed by him as representative of the firm, not German vice-consul, which letter was addressed to all the kaïds round and south of this town, expressed himself in almost identical terms to those attributed to the German spokesman in my despatch referred to.

There are still rumours in the town of a meeting of headmen of the "Sus" country to consult as to the declaration of the "Jehad." Mr. Ostler had heard similar rumours at Agadir.

It is further reported, although I cannot vouch in any way for the accuracy of the rumour, that certain country Moors, believing that Kaïd Guilooli had invited the Germans to come, out of fear for Kaïd M'Tuggi, have shown some irritation, and sent Guilooli a message, enquiring why he had given the invitation.

I have written to the governor of this town, requesting him to obtain an explanation from Kaïd Guilooli of his treatment of Mr. Ostler and his companion. I received a visit this afternoon from Si Larbi-ben-Taher, Guilooli's brother-in-law, and agent in Mogador. Si Larbi was extremely apologetic, and declared that all the fault was to be attributed to Hadj Hassan, who, although he was Kaïd Guilooli's brother, was not the Khalifa at Agadir. He further stated that he was staying at Guilooli's kasbah last Sunday, the 23rd instant, when Guilooli wrote a letter to Hadj Hassan, telling him that he was irritated at his behaviour and that he must come to him at once, otherwise he would have him brought by force. I can hardly reconcile this statement with Kaïd Guilooli's refusal to receive the travellers, or to allow them to buy fodder on Monday, the 14th instant.

Si Hamou-el-Karaimi-el-Karashi is now in Mogador, staying at the house of Mr. J. L. Ratto. I am informed that he is declaring that he has received British protection. I am contradicting this statement, as, in a despatch received yesterday from His Majesty's chargé d'affaires, Mr. White informs me that Si Hamou is not entitled to British protection.

I have, &c.
H. B. JOHNSTONE.

[31044] No. 194.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 8.)

(No. 213.)

Sir, *Berlin, August 4, 1911.*

THERE was a marked change in Herr von Kiderlen's manner and tone after his return from Swinemünde. As you are aware, before his visit to the Emperor his Excellency told M. Cambon that the dignity of the German people would not allow him to bate one jot of his demands. On his return he adopted quite a different tone. M. Cambon asked him how he had found the Emperor. His Excellency replied that His Majesty was very annoyed, and particularly so at the way in which the French press had dragged him into the Morocco discussions. M. Cambon at once assured him that both M. de Selves, the French Government, and he personally all regretted extremely that the French press had made such unjustifiable references to His Majesty. Herr von Kiderlen said that he was sure that the Emperor would be very pleased to hear that the French Government dissociate themselves from the unfortunate attitude of the French press in this particular instance, and at once asked whether M. Cambon had any proposals to make on behalf of his Government. Thereupon M. Cambon informed his Excellency of what France proposed to offer, adding that further than those offers the French Government would be unable to go. They constituted, in fact, the maximum of the sacrifices that France was ready to make. You have probably been informed by the French Government of the extent and scope of these offers, so I will not repeat them here; in any case, Herr von Kiderlen said that they appeared to him to provide an acceptable basis of discussion.

In giving me this information, M. Cambon said that, though he probably still had a hard time before him, he hoped that the worst was now over.

Herr von Kiderlen also told me that things were going better, adding that they need never have gone otherwise than well if he had not been put into such a difficult position by the French and English press. I ventured to state that the German press had not contributed very much to the tranquillity necessary for difficult negotiations. He admitted this, but said that it had remained fairly quiet until goaded into strong language by the attitude of its foreign confrères. "Anyhow," he added, "I am tired of writing *démentis* every morning, and I have given strict orders to the Press Bureau to give nothing to the press and to take no notice of what it says."

The German press is therefore supposed now to be left to its own devices, and, as it receives no information from head-quarters, it contents itself chiefly, especially that part of it which represents Pan-German opinions, with indicting violent articles against France and England and with pointing out the utter mendacity of the French press as regards the information it supplies with regard to the negotiations.

The statement in the French press that the Imperial Government is willing to cede Togoland is quoted as an instance of its mendacious inventions!

The "Hamburger Nachrichten," which has on the whole set its face against the violent language of its contemporaries, says that it is entirely out of the question that Togoland should be made the subject of barter; and the "Kölnische Zeitung," while noting with satisfaction a tendency on the part of the French Government to wring the neck of the numerous *canards* which are now on the wing in France, says. with regard to the cession of Togoland, that it would be well if the French press would exercise a little self-control and cease altogether from indulging in flights of fancy.

The "Frankfürter Zeitung," referring to the articles in the French press in which hopes were expressed that the return of the Emperor from his northern cruise would bring about a change in the situation favourable to France, points out that these hopes have not been realised, and that what passed at Swinemünde made it, on the contrary, quite clear that all attempts, "direct or indirect," to intimidate Germany must be given up once for all. It adds that if the "Swinemünde days" have brought this truth home to France, then it is possible to regard those days as having brought about a change for the better. "For recent utterances in the French press," it says, "show that it is slowly but surely dawning upon France that concessions must be made, and that the sooner she comes to an understanding with Germany the better."

There appears to me to be no doubt that the secrecy which is being observed at all events here with regard to the negotiations is tending to make public opinion rather nervous—and during the last few days all sorts of rumours have been rife as to what is going to happen. One of these rumours, for which, as far as I know, there is not the slightest foundation, is that Herr von Kiderlen, finding himself without the support he anticipated, intends to send in his resignation. Another is that the Chancellor has put off his journey to Gastein owing to the critical state of affairs. The truth of this rumour is, however, doubted by the "Tageblatt," which states that if the Chancellor has deferred his journey it is rather because the end of the negotiations is in sight, and he wishes to be in Berlin to give the finishing touches.

The papers are beginning to discuss the idea of a conference, and are doing all they know to point out to France how dire the results would be for her should one take place. One paper puts the matter thus: "Herr von Kiderlen should lose no time in placing before M. Cambon the preliminary conditions of the new conference desired by France, viz., the definite return to the stipulations of the Act of Algeciras; the removal of all French and Spanish troops from the interior and the coast towns; the complete evacuation of the Shawia district; the exact geographical delimitation of the Morocco frontiers; the reduction of the numbers of French instructors, and strict control of all matters connected with finance, customs, and public works. Herr von Kiderlen should make it clear that unless France agrees to these conditions beforehand there will be no conference." The paper adds that until this is clearly understood in Paris and London there will be no end to the campaign of bluff carried on by the colonial wirepullers in both countries.

The epitome of public opinion in Germany would not be complete without a brief reference to the constant endeavours of the Pan-German newspapers to persuade France that Great Britain will confine her assistance to words and advice only, and will in no eventuality give her military support. "England," they say, "never fights except for her own hand, and France would do well to remember this before she goes too far in her opposition to Germany's just requirements."

Professor Schiemann takes the soundest view, as he expresses the opinion that as long as the conversations continue the least said in the press the better.

Since writing the above a communiqué, the contents of which I had the honour to telegraph to you this day, has been published stating that there has been a rapprochement in the conversations between the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and M. Cambon as far as questions of principle are concerned. It added that the working out of the details is now in the hands of the competent Imperial authorities, who are giving the matter their closest attention, and that the result of their deliberations will be communicated by the Chancellor to the Emperor.

M. Cambon appeared to me to think this communication was rather premature, but Herr von Kiderlen expressed so much anxiety to have it published that M. Cambon waived his objection. Herr von Kiderlen said that the German newspapers were getting so impatient and spreading such fantastical, not to say mischievous, rumours, that he thought it best to let them know that the conversations were following a normal and not unfriendly course.

I have, &c.
W. E. GOSCHEN.

[31048] No. 195.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 8.)

(No. 217.)

Sir, *Berlin, August 3, 1911.*

I HAVE the honour to inform you that yesterday's issue of the "Hamburger Nachrichten" published a statement of the views of the German Colonial Company with regard to Germany's present position in Morocco.

The statement emphatically protests against the evacuation of Morocco by Germany and against the substitution of a part of French Congo for a footing in the Shereefian Empire.

The statement, after saying that the delayed decision in the Moroccan question gives Germany time to realise how important are her interests in that country, continues as follows:—

"We have always represented the point of view that our share in the Moroccan trade and the just claims of our economic pioneers are every bit as worthy of consideration as are those of France. It would be frivolous to give them up; we do not desire a partition of the country; on the contrary, we desire the independence of the Sultan, and are opposed to every measure calculated to impair commercial freedom in his dominions. In adopting this standpoint, we base our views on treaty rights from the earliest agreements of Bismarckian times to that of the year 1909. But if all these agreements are to lapse, if here France and there Spain are to take a bite out of the Moroccan cake, then must we, too, claim our share. We will not allow ourselves to be put off with a few thousand square kilometres in the restless country round Lake Chad, but, like the other Powers, we demand compensation in Morocco itself—in the hinterland of Agadir more especially, as there our flag is kept flying by the industry of our colonial pioneers. We do not desire the dismemberment of the country, but neither do we wish to be elbowed out of the position gained for us by the energy and activity of our compatriots.

"Firstly, because we do not wish to see the principle of international law set at naught. Secondly, on account of our position in the Mahommedan world, where we are not known as hungry 'land-snatchers,' but as a peaceful civilising influence. We must not be represented to the impressionable Oriental as a nervous and faint-hearted people, standing aside with quixotic unselfishness where others are playing an active part. This unselfishness might also injure our position in the council of nations and bring on us the contempt of the envious.

"Was it for this that the news of the sending of a war-ship to Agadir filled us with patriotic pride, in order that at the end of it all we might be put off with a few bits of virgin forest on the banks of some remote Congolese river? And what is to happen to all the interests slowly and laboriously built up in Morocco in the face of endless difficulties and obstacles?

"The German Empire has never impeded the expansion of other great Powers in foreign lands; it will therefore not be able to give up its position in Morocco, and the other Powers will scarcely be able or desirous to overlook our just claims there. The fact of chance geographical neighbourhood may give France and Spain a certain political influence in the disputed districts, but to none can we allow any claim to the possession of the hinterland of Agadir. The leaders of the German Colonial Company are agreed that it is an affair of honour for the German Empire not to allow itself to be forced out of the position which it has gained in Morocco by legal right and by its own achievements.

"The 'Temps' announced lately that there had been some question of Germany ceding Togoland and parts of the Cameroons to France in return for compensation elsewhere. We attach no importance to this communication, because we regarded it as out of the question that our Government could even dream of such a thing. But since the 'Kölnische Zeitung' regards the statements of the 'Temps' as within the realms of possibility, we must most emphatically protest against the mere thought of such a cession. The German Colonial Company must oppose such a deal with all its might, and must in general protest against any cession of German territory. The moral impression would be too humiliating and ignominious for every friend of our colonies."

The "Hamburger Nachrichten,' in commenting on the above statement, says that it quite agrees with the remark that it would be frivolous of Germany to give up her economic claims in Morocco. But it contests the justice of the colonial company's

view that, in the event of the lapse of existing treaties, Germany has as good a claim to a share in Morocco as France or Spain. "Both these countries," the "Hamburger Nachrichten" says, "were, as neighbours of the Shereefian Empire, politically engaged in Morocco long before Germany even dreamt of establishing any other than economic claims there. Moreover both Powers have, in the pursuit of their Moroccan policy, made far greater sacrifices than we have. For these reasons, it must be recognised that their claims are not only older, but better."

Nor does the "Hamburger Nachrichten" share the colonial company's estimate of the worthlessness of any compensation outside Morocco. It holds that, provided that Germany's economic interests in Morocco are not impaired, the fairness of the compensation must depend upon the size and value of the territories obtained from France.

The "Hamburger Nachrichten" adds that it would have welcomed the acquisition of a strip of Moroccan coast, which it does not doubt could have been acquired had France stood alone, and had not England, Germany's real opponent in Morocco, stood behind. But it was not worth wrecking the whole negotiations to attain this end, and still less was it worth plunging the nation into a war more costly than a hundred Moroccos. "The whole Moroccan question was in the first place a business deal, and in the second a trial of diplomatic skill. It was not a matter in which it could be said of Germany, 'Craven is the nation that will not gladly stake its all to save its honour.'"

I have ventured to give the comments of the "Hamburger Nachrichten" at some length, because, whether they were inspired or not, it is curious that such moderate and peaceful opinions should just at this moment be expressed by this Chauvinistic and Bismarckian paper.

I have, &c.
W. E. GOSCHEN.

[31140] No. 196.

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 8.)

(No. 137.)

Sir, *Zarauz, August 5, 1911.*

HAVING resumed charge of His Majesty's Embassy on the 3rd instant, I visited Señor Garcia Prieto, Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs, the following day at San Sebastian.

His Excellency was pleased to say he was glad to see me back, as he had had some talk lately with the French Ambassador with regard to a possible resumption of the conversations having in view a settlement of the differences between Spain and France in Morocco, which had been abruptly interrupted early in June as a consequence of the Spanish occupation of Laraiche and Alcazar. He hoped I should be authorised to continue taking part in these conversations. He had heard from the Spanish Ambassador in Paris that M. de Selves, French Minister for Foreign Affairs, was willing that they should be immediately resumed. M. Geoffray, however, had not yet received from his Government an intimation to that effect.

I said I had received no instructions from you on the subject, and that I was under the impression that you would perhaps think that, until the result of the Franco-German negotiation arising out of the Agadir incident should be fully known, it would be difficult to discuss questions affecting a Spanish sphere of influence in Morocco which might be more or less affected by the issue of those negotiations.

On the general question of our relations with Spain I added that I felt it would be my duty to tell his Excellency plainly that I had been able to satisfy myself while recently in England that the overt act performed by Spain in taking military occupation of the principal town on the road between Tangier and Fez at a time when France was engaged in restoring tranquillity in the Fez region had produced an unfortunate impression. I reminded his Excellency that you had repeatedly deprecated acts of force on the part of Spain, which, in the existing circumstances, you felt could only tend to complicate the situation still further. These warnings had been dictated by no unfriendly feeling towards Spain, but by the consideration that no one could foresee the result of a complete reopening of the Morocco question such as was only too likely to be the consequence of Spanish armed intervention, and that Spain herself might be placed thereby in a very difficult position. Your apprehensions, I added, had been fully justified by the event; the German descent on Agadir arose directly out of the

Spanish action at Laraiche, and it had produced the very situation you had been so anxious to guard against. It was a situation full of danger and anxiety, and it was difficult to absolve the Spanish Government from having contributed towards its occurrence. I went on to say that, while feeling strongly the responsibility of Spain for much that had happened, you were very willing to make every allowance for the embarrassment naturally created for Spain by the course the French had been compelled to take in Morocco and by political pressure at home. His Majesty's Government desired to continue to maintain an entirely friendly attitude towards her. They considered, however, that their defence of her interests had been rendered more difficult by the course she had pursued, and you had desired me to make it clear to his Excellency that any further acts of annoyance to the French Government must tend, in your opinion, to dispose the latter to call in question the rights of Spain under the 1904 conventions, and to place further difficulties in the path of His Majesty's Government, whose desire to assist Spain could never be allowed to conflict with their fundamental policy of agreement with France.

Señor Garcia Prieto took my remarks in good part, merely observing in reply that, in the Spanish view, the Germans were at Agadir not because the Spaniards were at Alcazar, but because the French were at Fez. The action of France, though perhaps inevitable and entirely justified, had induced both the action of Spain and the action of Germany. He could assure me, however, that there was every desire on the part of the Spanish Government to recover the friendship of France. The *modus vivendi* just concluded with regard to the relations at Alcazar between the Spanish occupying force and the French instructors acting with the Moorish mehallas should do much to prevent the occurrence of disagreeable incidents in future. Moreover, his Excellency had none but the most friendly interviews of late with the French Ambassador.

From Berlin he had no information. I was left under the impression that the refusal of Germany to admit Spain to any partnership in the discussions proceeding with France had opened the eyes of the Spanish Government to the improbability that, in any readjustment of the affairs of Morocco, they could look to Berlin for effective support. Señor Garcia Prieto seemed sincerely desirous of proceeding in Morocco on the basis of a renewed understanding with France and England. He more than once volunteered the positive assurance that in all that had happened there had not been the remotest understanding with Germany. Spain had yielded to an irresistible impulse, without encouragement from any foreign quarter.

I have, &c.
MAURICE DE BUNSEN.

[31033] No. 197.

Sir F. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 8.)

(No. 128.)

Sir, *Vienna, August 6, 1911.*

I HAVE the honour to report that the negotiations now proceeding between M. Cambon and Herr von Kiderlen-Waechter in regard to the Morocco question are followed with the closest interest by the Viennese press. The reports, often conflicting, from Paris and Berlin regarding the progress of these negotiations are reproduced here with appropriate comments, varying in accordance with the optimistic or pessimistic tone of the latest news. Among the articles published on the subject there have been few of sufficient note to deserve more than a passing mention; but during the last few days three have appeared, to which I venture to draw your attention as being of some interest.

The Christian Socialist "Reichspost," in an article of yesterday's date, takes England severely to task for her anti-German attitude and for her unreserved and violently expressed support of France. It warns England that Germany, though still calm, will not tolerate any dictation as to the terms acceptable to her. It assures Germany that Austria will "stand shoulder to shoulder" with her, an assurance which would carry more weight if it conveyed anything more than the "Reichspost's" own opinion.

The "Tagblatt," on the other hand, always more friendly to England, devotes a leading article to a hearty welcome of Mr. Haldane's speech on the desirability of good relations between England and Germany. This paper, unlike the "Reichspost," is able to appreciate with fairness the attitude of Great Britain in the Morocco question,

and speaks with approval of her evident desire to see the France-German negotiations reach a successful conclusion, so long as her own interests are not endangered.

The most illuminating comment is, however, that made by the London correspondent of the "Wiener Allgemeine Zeitung," who telegraphed yesterday the following communication to that paper:—

"*London, August* 5.—In political circles here general satisfaction has been felt at the announcement made yesterday by the Bureau Wolff, as the conviction is now held that the danger of an international complication on account of the Morocco question is at an end.

"It is maintained here that German policy was not correctly informed in regard to England's attitude, and that this error was the cause of Germany's latest action in the Morocco question by sending the 'Panther' to Agadir.

"The Emperor William was, during his recent visit to London, the object of marked demonstrations of popularity, and on this occasion there reappeared the strong sympathy which is felt in England for the person of the German monarch. The Emperor was persuaded by his advisers that these demonstrations of the English people were not directed at the person of the Emperor alone, but also at German policy. The Emperor was confirmed in this view by the reports of the German Ambassador in London, Count Wolff-Metternich, who stated that there was an increasing pro-German current in Great Britain, and who gave it as his opinion that the moment was now opportune for an attempt by Germany to separate England from France. It cannot indeed be denied that a feeling more friendly to Germany was actually beginning to make itself felt in England. This current was, however, not so strong as Count Metternich imagined, as was shown by later events.

"Immediately after the dispatch of the 'Panther' to Agadir a leading English statesman stated that in his view Germany's principal object in this action was to feel the pulse of England.

"The course of events shows, however, that German policy was insufficiently informed as to the feeling in England. The pro-German feeling of the English nation was not yet strong enough to separate England from France, which was very clearly shown, first, by Mr. Asquith's declaration and then still more clearly by Mr. Lloyd George's speech and the second declaration of the Premier. From that moment there could be no more doubt that England stood under all circumstances behind France.

"The most recent phase of the Morocco question is here attributed to the recognition by Germany of this fact. It is generally considered that the German Emperor desires to avoid as far as is possible a conflict with England, and, after convincing himself that German policy had not been correctly informed as to England's attitude, has entered upon a path, in agreement with the Chancellor and with Herr von Kiderlen-Waechter, which permits an agreement on the Morocco question to be regarded as almost certain."

This article should do much to enlighten Austrian readers as to the real facts of the question. It is, so far as I am aware, the first reference in any Austrian newspaper to a connection of the German Emperor's visit to England with Germany's subsequent action in Morocco.

I have, &c.
(For His Majesty's Ambassador),
MICHAEL PALAIRET.

[31059] No. 198.

Sir V. Corbett to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 8.)

(No. 40.)

Sir, *Munich, August 6, 1911.*

WITH reference to my immediately preceding despatch, I have the honour to report that the "Muenchener Neueste Nachrichten" continues to comment with anything but enthusiasm on the turn which the negotiations between France and Germany are believed to have taken.

In its article of yesterday evening it says:—

"There is still not the least cause for premature optimism. What is now in question is only an advance in the fundamental treatment of the settlement. Nothing is known as to what is being aimed at, as to what has been or what will be attained.

"It must therefore be laid down with particular emphasis that a policy of energy

has never found such resolute and determined support in the German nation as at present.

"A great quantity of correspondence addressed to us bears witness to this; all these communications express the desire that Germany should under no circumstances give way weakly. Germany must not permit France to incorporate Morocco in her colonial empire, nor must she allow herself to be put off with compensations valued on the strength of a specious appearance. And, finally, England must be given to understand that we are absolutely tired of her unblushing provocations, a matter wherein we have taken, year in, year out, the greatest trouble to prove our love of peace to the world, and not to come in the way of English interests.

"These are the feelings of the south of Germany; we not only note them, but also underline them emphatically in the interests of the continuance of the negotiations."

The same paper publishes to-day the following article by its Berlin correspondent:—

"The judgments of the press on the condition of the Morocco negotiations, as expressed in the official note of yesterday, cover the whole gamut from satisfaction to anxiety, from grotesque outbreaks of disappointment to joy at the success achieved. In this case, too, it would be well to avoid all extremes and to follow the middle path of cool common sense, at the same time reserving our judgment until the contents of the agreement are known.

"We cannot say when the appointed authorities will have finished their examination of the details; it is possible that the work may be done quickly, but at the same time many difficulties may arise. We have not crossed all the mountains yet.

"We must accept with great caution all that has been reported as to the material foundations of the future agreement. On the German side in Berlin only a few persons have accurate knowledge, and they certainly keep silence.

"There are only two points which we should like to fix most emphatically.

"All assertions that differences exist between the Emperor, the Chancellor, and the Secretary of State are pure inventions, as is also in an especial degree the implication that the Emperor had showed a more yielding spirit than the others. On the contrary, if it is possible at all to speak of a sharper tone, the Emperor was its representative. The German standpoint had already been settled in the Kiel conversations at the end of June, and the sending of the 'Panther' to Agadir at the same time established the aim of the diplomatic campaign and the line of conduct down to its extremest consequences.

"We must hold to this plan without turning aside; there is no talk of a retreat on the part of Germany.

"Paris and London are perpetually speaking of Germany's claims. We regard this as an inapposite expression. There has been far more question of France's offers. At the beginning these were insufficient; when the situation became very critical, these offers were increased. France has by its new and extended proposals created the changed basis on which the rapprochement in regard to fundamentals has been finally attained.

"Opinions will probably differ very widely whether we really have cause to look on these proposals with satisfaction. We have all along warned our readers not to set their hopes too high. There has been no official mention on the German side of naval bases or coaling stations, of harbours or territorial possessions in Morocco—in fact, of a German Mauretania. Germany will only demand security and extension of its commercial activity in the Shereefian kingdom, and any territorial compensations that it does receive will only, it is to be suspected, bring in considerable profit after a great lapse of time, by working together in some way or other with the Belgian Congo.

"It would, however, certainly be a great political gain if the areas of friction in Africa could be entirely removed out of the way of all Germano-French relations. Whether we can hope for more is to be doubted. For in Paris, too, severe disappointment will prevail in some quarters. However, the idea may perhaps win firm ground in France that it is better to come to a peaceful diplomatic agreement with Germany than to be employed by England as an advance guard against Germany on the continent in order to pull the chestnuts out of the fire.

"It would be a good result of the Morocco affair if it set the value of the much-vaunted *entente* in a clear light."

I have, &c.
VINCENT CORBETT.

[31337] No. 199.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received August* 9.)

(No. 218.)
Sir, *Berlin, August* 6, 1911.

TWO days ago an article appeared in the "Post" entitled "Crisis and Retreat" which exceeded in recklessness of statement and chauvinistic bombast all the bellicose articles to which that paper has recently treated its readers. I do not propose to trouble you with a full translation of this article, which was apparently written without any accurate knowledge of the real position of affairs in the questions pending between France and Germany, nor of the intentions of the Imperial Government. As it has, however, formed the subject of a strong protest in the semi-official "Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung," a few extracts from it will be sufficient to explain the stir it has made and the reasons for which an official protest was deemed necessary.

The immediate cause of the "Post's" outburst was the communiqué announcing that there was a rapprochement between Herr von Kiderlen-Waechter and M. Cambon as regards the questions of principle which are involved in their negotiations.

The article opens with the following statement:—

"This communiqué has come upon us like a flash of lightning in a dark sky. Oh! would that they had been spared this moment, this moment of unspeakable shame, of deep national ignominy, far deeper than that of Olmütz!"

The writer then, after the usual references to Bismarck, says that he is convinced that Herr von Kiderlen, as an honourable man and one conscious of his responsibility before the nation as director of Imperial foreign affairs, will not subscribe to this national humiliation, and, rather than give way in a vital question affecting Germany's position as a world Power, will sacrifice his own person and send in his resignation.

"Herr von Kiderlen's resignation, as well, of course, as that of the Chancellor, may therefore be counted upon with the greatest certainty, if not to-day or to-morrow, at all events at the close of the negotiations."

The writer then draws a picture of the scene after Olmütz, and relates how the King and Prince William were prostrate with grief, how the Ministers went almost mad with despair, and how Count Brandenburg actually died of a broken heart—"thus by his death he expiated his shame, which only death could expiate."

Then comes the outrageous passage against which the "Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung," and, be it said, most of the respectable papers, protest.

"And now? Has Prussia so changed? Is the old Prussian feeling dead? Have we become a nation of women—governed in the interests of a group of alien financiers? Are we dead to all feelings of national honour? Have we lost all sense of political responsibility, or political foresight? Has Germany become a mere object of ridicule for foreign nations to laugh at? What has happened to the Hohenzollerns, who count among their ancestors a Great Elector, a Frederick William I, a Frederick the Great, and an Emperor William I? Are we to regard our Emperor as the strongest support of France, a support worth more than fifty French divisions? Are we to look upon him as the hope of France? We dare not and will not believe that such is the case. Neither will we believe that the French and English papers are right when they say, as they have been saying for the last week, 'Only wait till your Emperor returns from abroad, then the retreat will be sounded and Germany will yield.' 'Guillaume le Timide, le valeureux Poltron!' Brandenburg died of a broken heart. But we! We console ourselves for the present humiliation of the Fatherland with tea parties, dinners, suppers, travels, inspections, and functions of every sort, and we earn thereby cheap praise from abroad—with contempt behind it."

The protest of the Government organ against this outburst runs as follows:—

"The 'Post,' which in this case we do not recognise as the organ of the Free Conservatives, has published an article, in which, without any knowledge whatever of the present position of the Morocco negotiations, it indulges in flights of imagination, and speaks of a moment of unspeakable shame, of the humiliation of Germany, of the retirement of the Chancellor and of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and of a new Olmütz. We should have paid no attention to these figments of an overheated brain if the 'Post' had not in the last part of its article had the presumption

to drag in the name of the Emperor and accuse His Majesty, in the cowardly form of rhetorical questions, of political weakness and of favouring foreign nations at expense of German interests. In holding this language, the 'Post' utters and makes its own thoughts, which we are only accustomed to find in abusive articles in the foreign press. Its attempt to disseminate, under the mask of patriotism, such unworthy statements in the German press deserves the sharpest rebuke and protest."

To this the "Post" replied as follows :—

"We readily admit that the 'Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung' is right in thinking that we did not write the article in question in our capacity as the organ of the Free Conservative party. But we can assure the 'Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung,' in case it is not aware of the fact, that we know ourselves to be in complete accord with the great majority of patriotic Germans.

"The Government organ would be astonished if it knew whose sentiments we were expressing in our article, written, we may admit, under intense excitement in one of the gravest moments of our internal and external political life. We honour the men who, as servants of their Sovereign, cover him with their person ; we understand their attitude, and would probably in their place not have done otherwise. We will therefore say nothing with regard to the uncivil language in which their protest is couched."

The "Tageblatt," commenting on the above, says :—

"Thus the 'Post' still clings to its determination to hold the Emperor responsible for the 'national humiliation,' which, it is not necessary to state, exists only in its own imagination."

As regards the allegations in the "Post" and other Pan-German papers respecting the retirement of Herr von Kiderlen, the "Kölnische Zeitung" publishes the following communiqué :—

"Wild reports were circulated yesterday pointing to the imminent rupture of the negotiations and the probable resignation of Herr von Kiderlen, who is represented as preferring to give up his office rather than to modify his Morocco programme. These rumours have no foundation whatever, and are pure invention. The negotiations are following a normal course, and there is no question of Herr von Kiderlen's resignation."

The "Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung" also publishes a communiqué in its issue of to-day to the following effect :—

"With regard to the progress of the Franco-German negotiations, it was stated officially on Friday last that a rapprochement had taken place with regard to the principal lines on which they should be conducted, and that the details were forming the subject of close study and mutual consultation. Therefore the two Governments must, until further notice, refuse to give publicity to their deliberations. To do so would, as the 'Westminster Gazette' aptly observes, endanger the result of the negotiations. We can heartily endorse the advice given by the English newspaper to await that result patiently. It may, however, be fairly stated that the German press, as far as the great newspapers of the non-Socialist parties are concerned, has shown calmness and confidence in spite of the numerous efforts made abroad to disturb its equanimity."

The Pan-German newspapers are naturally excluded from this official eulogy.

I have, &c.
W. E. GOSCHEN.

[31346] No. 200.

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received August* 9.)

(No. 139.)

Sir, *Zarauz, August* 6, 1911.

IN the course of conversation M. Geoffray, French Ambassador, informed me on the 4th instant that he was now on the best of terms with Señor Garcia Prieto, Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs. The recent *modus vivendi* affecting Alcazar and

its neighbourhood had been concluded in the nick of time. So great was the tension between the French instructors and the Spanish officers that shots would soon have been fired but for the new arrangements by which their relations are regulated. There were still some points of divergence. Lieutenant Thiriet, commanding the Moorish mehalla of observation near Alcazar, contends he may operate along the left bank of the Luccus from a point opposite Alcazar down to the sea. The Spanish Government maintains that the boundary is to be traced not along the River Luccus, except for a short distance, but along the limit of the Spanish zone as defined in the secret convention of October 1904. Though the River Luccus had been mentioned in the press as the line which the mehalla encamped to the south of that river would be invited not to cross, the line which the French and Spanish Governments had in mind was not that of the River Luccus, but that of the southern boundary of the Spanish sphere of influence. This latter line, as defined in the above-mentioned Franco-Spanish convention, runs due west to the sea from the point near Alcazar, where the Luccus bends northwards. There is thus a wedge-shaped piece of territory of considerable extent between the course of the river and the true boundary of the Spanish zone. Within this territory Spain claims that the Moorish mehalla should not be allowed to penetrate.

M. Geoffray supports the Spanish view, and hopes his Government will make the point clear to Lieutenant Thiriet.

Meanwhile, Mr. White's telegram from Tangier, No. 142 of the 4th August, which he had the goodness to repeat to me, shows that Spain still thinks it necessary to continue sending reinforcements to Alcazar.

M. Geoffray said he was desirous of resuming as soon as possible the conversations with Spain, in which I had taken part, with regard to the future régime of the Spanish sphere of influence. He was in communication with the French Government on the subject, and thought that, if Spain showed moderation, there was good prospect of agreement. Both M. de Selves and M. Delcassé had recently expressed themselves, in conversation with himself, as favourable to a policy of conciliation towards Spain. They both agreed that France was still bound by the convention of 1904.

I expressed doubts as to the expediency of reopening the conversations while the result of the Franco-German negotiation at Berlin was still so problematical.

Speaking of the German action at Agadir, M. Geoffray described it as aggressive, hasty, and ill-advised. In his opinion, if the Germans had only waited a little longer, it would have become clearly manifest that France was unable to retire from the region now occupied by her forces, and Germany would have been in a position to call attention to the new state of affairs in Morocco, and to claim that her voice should be heard in the new arrangements that might have to be made. No demonstration of force, such as the one to which she has now resorted, would have been needed as a preliminary to an international discussion. I remarked that I understood that Fez had already been evacuated by the French. M. Geoffray replied that the French forces were still distributed over the whole of the Fez region, and that he did not see how they could be safely withdrawn, except eventually to make way for Moorish forces under the effective control of French officers, by which means France would be equally enabled to maintain her hold on the country,

I have, &c.
MAURICE DE BUNSEN.

[31423] No. 201.

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received August* 9.)

(No. 66. Confidential.)

(Telegraphic.) P. *Zarauz, August* 9, 1911.

MOROCCO. My telegram No. 65 of the 7th August.

French Government have replied to enquiry of French Ambassador that they consider that it would be wiser to defer the resumption of the conversations with Spain until the result of the negotiation at Berlin is known, circumstances having changed since the conversations held at Madrid in May and June last.

M. Geoffray has also been consulted by his Government as to the arrangements which it will be necessary to make with the Spanish Government should the Berlin negotiation result in an agreement giving France a free hand in Morocco, and assuming the other signatory Powers of the Algeciras Act raise no objections.

In reply, French Ambassador has reported that he presumes Morocco would, in that case, have to be partitioned into spheres of influence in accordance with article 3 of the secret convention of October 1904, France and Spain directing the administration of the Makhzen in their respective spheres.

As soon as a settlement with Germany has been reached, M. Geoffray considers that the secret convention might be published, with a view to fully instructing public opinion in France.

[30964] No. 202.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen.

(No. 84.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, August* 9, 1911.

FRANCO-SPANISH negotiations.

French Government, having considered suggestion referred to in your telegram No. 65 of the 7th instant, are opposed to reopening of Madrid conversations before agreement is reached at Berlin, as no useful purpose could at present emerge. I cannot but agree.

[30540] No. 203.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 344.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, August* 9, 1911.

I HAVE received your despatch No. 356 of the 2nd instant, transmitting M. de Selves's reply to the communication made by your Excellency with regard to the principles of commercial equality and to mining concessions in Morocco.

I have to request that your Excellency will point out to M. de Selves, in reply to his Excellency's enquiry whether His Majesty's Government would be prepared to support the suggestion for a compromise which he proposes to make to the Netherlands Government, that before His Majesty's Government can reply to this enquiry it is essential that they should be informed of at least the general outline of the compromise contemplated.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[31669] No. 204.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 219.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, August* 9, 1911.

I OBSERVED to Count Benckendorff to-day that I was not quite easy as to the negotiations between France and Germany. Herr von Kiderlen was evidently not in a hurry. It might be and probably was the case that all he wished was to get time during which to move away from the extreme position which he had at first taken up. But it was just possible that he might wish to keep the conversations alive in order that he might choose his own moment for giving a brusque and unfavourable turn to the situation. If so, much would depend upon what Russia was prepared to do at such a time, and what Germany thought that Russia would do.

Count Benckendorff agreed that this was very important, especially what Germany thought that Russia might do. Owing to the terms of the Russian alliance with France, he thought it was pretty clear what Russia would do. As a matter of fact, in one of the first conversations between the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs and the German Ambassador in St. Petersburgh, the former had told the Ambassador that Germany must remember that France and Russia were allies.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[31667] No. 205.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen.

(No. 86.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, August* 9, 1911.

AT the request of the King of Spain, I went to see him yesterday at the Spanish Embassy.

After some general conversation on the constitutional question in the British Parliament, in which His Majesty took much interest, he brought forward the subject of Morocco.

He told me that, since he came to the throne, it had been his desire to work with England and France. Some years ago the prevailing feeling in Spain had been towards Germany. But in later years Spain had separated from Germany, and turned to England and France. This was the policy he wished to continue. Spain had even made sacrifices to have our support. She delayed her agreement with France about Morocco in 1904 because she wished to have our signature to it. When the agreement was eventually made, the terms of it were much less favourable to Spain than they might have been some time before. The compensation for this was that England had signed the agreement too.

I said that my recollection was that we had signed only an agreement with France in 1904 on the understanding that France would subsequently come to an agreement with Spain; this was eventually communicated to us, but not signed by us.

The King asked me whether Spain could count on our support with France respecting Morocco.

I said that it was certainly our desire to keep Spain with us and France. I should be very sorry if she left us and turned to Germany. It was true that, as long as our fleet was undoubtedly superior to the German fleet—and we intended to keep it so, we were able to look after our own interests. But for sentimental reasons, and on material grounds too, we wished to keep Spain on our side. I would therefore endeavour to secure that, whatever settlement of the Morocco question might be reached, Spain, France, and England should be kept together.

For the moment, our first object must be to prevent war between France and Germany. If there was war between them, it might involve Great Britain and Russia, though, not being a party to the Franco-Russian Alliance, we did not know its exact terms. The allies of Germany might be drawn in, and the war would be on a great scale. We wished to avoid war if possible, and the only certain way of doing so was to keep the peace between France and Germany. We were therefore facilitating in every way we could the conversations between these two countries, in the hope that a settlement might be reached on terms which France could reasonably concede. So far as I was aware, and I believed that I was well informed, there was nothing in these conversations to the prejudice of Spain.

The King asked me whether, if anything to the prejudice of Spain came into the conversations, we would intervene in them to protect Spain.

I asked in what way he supposed that there could be anything in the conversations to the prejudice of Spain in Morocco.

The King replied that Germany might wish to gain something in Morocco at the expense of Spain.

I said that this could be done only if Germany, as the price for giving France a free hand in the French sphere, demanded for herself a slice of the Spanish sphere in Morocco. This would be an immoral bargain which we, being cognisant of the arrangement between Spain and France, could not recognise. But France had never shown any disposition not to respect the Spanish sphere. If a settlement was reached between France and Germany, no doubt Germany would give France a free hand in Morocco without making any stipulations on behalf of Spain. As a matter of fact, Germany had encouraged Spain to send troops to Alcazar; but, as soon as the Spanish move had served the German purpose, and Germany had made a move on her own account, she began conversations with France, and stipulated that Spain should be no party to them.

The King assured me most emphatically that the Spanish move to Alcazar had been absolutely necessary, because of public opinion in Spain, and because of the French forward policy in Morocco. Had Spain not sent troops to Alcazar France would have sent Moorish troops with French officers to occupy Alcazar. Spain had had no communication with Germany, and had acted quite independently.

I said that I was sure, nevertheless, that Germany had been pleased to see the

Spanish move, for it had helped Germany to make a move and to claim that she should get something out of the situation. It was necessary that we should do all we could to facilitate a settlement between France and Germany, but as soon as they did come to a settlement I would do my utmost to promote a satisfactory arrangement between Spain and France, so that Spain, France, and England might be kept together.

I understood how difficult it had been for Spain. owing to internal reasons, not to make the move to Alcazar; but I had regretted the move, because I had feared it would contribute to precipitate the situation which had now come to pass, and because, if Spain made a breach in the agreement of 1904 with France, she might instigate France to say that that agreement no longer held good, or must be modified. The French Government had, however, shown no sign of intending to throw over this agreement.

In reply to a pressing request from the King of Spain for our support to uphold this agreement when the time came, I repeated that I would do my utmost to keep all three countries together.

The King asked me whether, if the negotiations between France and Germany broke down, we would suggest a conference, and whether I thought that in any case there would be a conferenee.

I answered that, if Germany came to an agreement with France, the agreement might, if necessary, be confirmed by the other signatories of the Act of Algeciras without a conference; but if no agreement was reached, and Germany complained that there had been a breach of the Act of Algeciras, then the natural course would be that a conference should meet whether we proposed it or not. If Germany persisted in acting alone in Morocco, other signatory Powers, such as ourselves, might also have to take individual action, and there would be considerable confusion.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[31437] No. 206.

Sir F. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 10.)

(No. 130.)

Sir, *Marienbad, August 6, 1911.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 128, I have the honour to report that the "Neue Freie Presse" of the 5th instant publishes a leading article on the subject of the progress of the Franco-German negotiations with regard to Morocco, as outlined by the official communiqué made to the Berlin press on the 4th instant to the effect that a rapprochement had been reached on the principal point in dispute. The article takes a high line, and argues that Germany has gained her point, and that France has acceded to her demand for compensation for what she (Germany) considers a breach of the Algeciras Act and an unwarranted attempt to extend French influence in Africa. However satisfactory it may be, says the "Neue Freie Press," to think that Germany may now expect an increase of territory and a strengthening of her colonial power, the chief importance of the Franco-German rapprochement is to be sought in the conditions which have made it possible. The first condition was the admission by France of Germany's point of view; the second, and perhaps more important condition, was that England should acquiesce in France's decision on that point. After discussing the chances of a general improvement in Franco-German relations the article proceeds to state that England must no doubt have signified her assent to the rapprochement between France and Germany, and that she has therefore recognised the German point of view. In other words, England realises that the German Empire, with its annual surplus population of a million souls, must be given the possibility of colonial expansion. England, says the "Neue Freie Press," no longer fears that her own interests will be affected if Germany's colonial power is increased and Mr. Lloyd George's threatening speech has been followed by the pacific speech made by Lord Haldane at Oxford, in which he declared that few things were more desirable than that England and Germany should learn to understand one another.

The article concludes by expressing the great satisfaction felt by Austria-Hungary at the recent turn of events, and at what it calls Germany's success. The latter has had the sympathy of her ally ever since she took action in Morocco, and the verdict of Austria-Hungary has throughout been in favour of Germany.

From the tone of this article it would appear that the German Government,

realising that they must abandon the exaggerated claims which they at first put forward and that they will have to be content with unimportant concessions, have given the *mot d'ordre* to the inspired press to make the best of a bad job and to maintain that Germany has gained her point and is obtaining all she desires.

I have, &c.
FAIRFAX L. CARTWRIGHT.

[31560] No. 207.

Note communicated by French Embassy, August 10, 1911.

PAR un mémorandum adressé le 31 juillet à l'Ambassadeur de Sa Majesté à Paris, M. de Selves a fait savoir qu'il était désireux de s'efforcer de faire lever les objections du Cabinet de La Haye en proposant un amendement transactionnel au Règlement minier marocain.

Le Ministre de France a l'honneur de communiquer ci-joint le texte d'un rapport rédigé à cet effet par M. Aguillon, Inspecteur général des Mines. Il serait heureux de savoir si le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté approuve les suggestions transactionnelles qui y sont formulées et s'il serait disposé à les appuyer auprès du Gouvernement néerlandais.

M. Daeschner serait reconnaissant si le document lui était retourné en même temps que la réponse.

Ambassade de France, Londres,
le 10 août, 1911.

Enclosure in No. 207.

L'Inspecteur général des Mines Aguillon à M. de Selves, Ministre des Affaires Étrangères.

VOUS avez bien voulu me faire demander d'examiner à nouveau les modifications proposées par le Gouvernement hollandais au projet de règlement minier pour le Maroc en vue de rechercher si, et dans quelle mesure, à défaut de pouvoir admettre intégralement les propositions de ce Gouvernement, il serait possible de trouver quelque solution transactionnelle qui pût être acceptée par lui. J'ai, dans cet ordre d'idées, repris l'étude de ces propositions au sujet desquelles je vous avais soumis, en date du 27 janvier dernier, un rapport indiquant les motifs spéciaux et généraux pour lesquels j'estimais qu'elles devraient être écartées. Après en avoir conféré avec M. Porché, qui a adhéré à mes nouvelles propositions, je viens vous les soumettre avec le présent rapport, dans lequel je suivrai les demandes hollandaises dans l'ordre tant de la dépêche de notre représentant à La Haye du 14 janvier, 1911, que de mon rapport précité du 27 janvier.

1. Il n'est pas possible d'admettre, comme le demande le Gouvernement de La Haye, que l'on stipule à l'article 49 que "d'autres redevances ou impôts, sous quelque dénomination que ce soit, ne seront pas prélevés" sur les mines. On ne peut savoir par avance si quelque impôt ne sera pas créé au Maroc qui pourra avoir une certaine répercussion sur l'industrie extractive. Dans tous pays, les mines, outre les taxes purement minières, telles que redevance annuelle fixe par hectare, ou redevance proportionnelle sur le produit brut ou le produit net, peuvent, à titre de propriétés, avoir par exemple à supporter des taxes imposées à toutes les propriétés sans distinction entre leurs natures. A la redevance proportionnelle peut se superposer en fait, quoique totalement différent et distinct en droit, un impôt général sur les revenus ou un impôt global sur le revenu. A des impôts d'État peuvent être ajoutés des impôts pour les municipalités ou les provinces.

Pour tenir compte de ces diverses idées dans leur application éventuelle au Maroc, pour ne viser que la taxe proportionnelle, sans parler des taxes fixes, et enfin ne donner à la mesure qu'une période déterminée, je proposerais, non pas d'ajouter un alinéa à l'article 49, mais d'ajouter au règlement un article 73 *bis*, qui pourrait être ainsi conçu :—

"Pendant un délai de dix ans comptés à partir de la promulgation du présent décret, les produits des mines ne pourront, en dehors des taxes prévues par le présent règlement, être assujettis au profit du Maghzen à aucune autre redevance proportionnelle que celle de l'article 49 ni à aucun droit d'exportation."

Je ne voudrais pas quitter cette question des impôts sans rappeler l'opportunité de ne faire approuver le règlement minier par le Maghzen qu'en relevant les taxes superficielles de recherche et de concession et la taxe proportionnelle qui, par suite de circonstances un peu spéciales, ont été fixées à des taux trop bas par la Conférence, comme elle l'a reconnu expressément elle-même dans son protocole. Cette élévation, nécessaire à des taux plus raisonnables que j'ai déjà eu l'occasion d'indiquer, justifierait d'ailleurs la concession que l'on pourrait accorder sur ce point au Gouvernement néerlandais.

2. Je rappelle que les bureaux spéciaux dont parle l'article 51, alinéa 3, sont une concession, de forme il est vrai plus que de fond, aux pressantes demandes du Gouvernement espagnol. On ne pourrait accepter le texte même du Gouvernement hollandais sans craindre de paraître donner "au service des mines à Tanger" une autonomie qui ne concorderait pas avec l'alinéa 1er de l'article et de soulever certainement de vives réclamations de la part de l'Espagne.

Pour donner au Gouvernement hollandais une satisfaction, qui serait de forme plus que de fond, on pourrait rédiger ainsi le dernier alinéa :—

"Des bureaux spéciaux peuvent être constitués sous l'autorité du Directeur des Travaux publics et des Mines à Tanger, dans les diverses régions. . . . ."

3. Il n'y aurait évidemment aucune objection sérieuse pour donner à peu près satisfaction au fond au Gouvernement hollandais à rédiger ainsi le 2e alinéa de l'article 59 :—

"La cour d'arbitrage aura son siège à Lausanne. Elle peut toutefois envoyer l'un ou l'autre de ses membres ou toute autre personne par elle à ce spécialement mandatée en tous endroits. . . . ."

Seulement une difficulté de procédure est à craindre qui amènerait, pour l'éviter sûrement, à remanier en la forme, assez profondément, l'article 59. Dans les penultième et antépenultième alinéas, cet article ne prévoit explicitement, en en fixant les bases, d'indemnité de voyage que pour les déplacements des arbitres eux-mêmes. On ne voit pas *a priori* comment seraient réglés ces frais pour un mandataire spécial de la cour, à moins de les faire rentrer dans "les autres frais de la cour," dont parle le penultième alinéa *in fine*. Je ne voudrais pas trop insister sur cette objection de procédure qu'il m'aura suffi d'indiquer.

4. Il me paraît impossible d'admettre, à un point de vue pratique, la modification demandée à l'article 60, § 2, alinéa 2. On a voulu marquer par ce texte, en disant notamment "s'il y a lieu," que le service des mines ne fournirait ses observations que s'il le jugeait opportun. Le service des mines ne pourrait enquêter dans un temps très court les quelque 1,100 demandes qu'il peut être exposé à recevoir en communication. Sans qu'on le mette dans le règlement, ce service pourrait toujours charger un mandataire de procéder à une enquête. Le dire explicitement l'exposera à des sollicitations pour faire procéder, quand il ne le jugerait pas utile, à de pareilles enquêtes et à y faire procéder, suivant l'occurrence par des personnes de nationalité déterminée. On risque de rendre la tâche du service des mines inextricable ; c'est ce que la Conférence avait voulu éviter par une rédaction très souple et très compréhensive qu'il faudrait se garder de toucher.

5. En ce qui concerne enfin l'article 63 relatif aux compagnies à privilèges, je ne puis que vous rappeler la difficulté que l'on a eue pour faire adopter par l'Angleterre un article qui était plus spécialement appuyé par l'Allemagne et la France. Je dois vous laisser apprécier, M. le Ministre, si, politiquement, la modification proposée, insolite en la forme, qui a pour objet d'exiger une majorité des deux tiers du corps diplomatique, peut être acceptée sans que l'on redoute qu'elle rende l'article pratiquement inapplicable.

J'ai ainsi passé en revue les cinq points sur lesquels le Gouvernement hollandais a présenté des amendements. Je vous ai soumis des textes transactionnels qui permettraient d'entrer dans ses vues pour les points 1 ("Impôts"), 2 ("Service des Mines," article 51), 3 ("Enquêtes de la Cour d'arbitrage," article 59). Je persiste à vous proposer d'écarter le point 4 ("Enquêtes du Service des Mines," article 60, § 2) et vous laisse à apprécier la proposition sur le 5e point ("Compagnies à Privilèges," article 63).

Paris, le 3 août, 1911.

[31677] No. 208.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen.

(No. 88.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, August* 10, 1911.

THE Spanish Ambassador explained to me to-day the desire of his Government to continue now the discussions with France about Morocco. France, they thought, would be easier to deal with now than after she had reached a settlement with Germany; and, in the event of the conversations between France and Germany not going well, it would be desirable for France to have Spain on her side, which she could not expect unless she came to an agreement with Spain about Morocco.

I said it appeared to me that a further agreement between Spain and France could be made only as an advance towards a partition of Morocco. I did not see how this could be negotiated when at any moment Germany might break off the conversations with France and stipulate for a strict observance of the Algeciras Act. In fact, it might impede the conversations if, at the very time when Germany was contending that Morocco must not be partitioned unless she was satisfied, France was negotiating with Spain for a partition.

The Ambassador seemed to recognise that the subject was one of some difficulty. He said that he would not ask me to press France to continue the discussions with Spain, but if France of her own accord proposed or agreed to continue the discussions, he would like me to authorise you to take part in them.

This I promised to do.

We had some further conversation about Morocco, much on the lines of that which I had already had with the King of Spain.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[31574] No. 209.

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 11.)

(No. 142.)

Sir, *Zarauz, August* 8, 1911.

AS the question of a resumption of the interrupted "conversations" respecting the relations of France and Spain in Morocco has been raised by the Spanish Government, as reported in my telegram No. 65 of yesterday, it may be as well to review summarily the points which came under discussion during the meetings between Señor Garcia Prieto, M. Geoffray, and myself which were held at the British Embassy on the 18th and 27th May and the 6th June.

The basis of these conferences "à trois" was formed by the Spanish memorandum of the 10th May, with enclosures, forwarded in my despatch No. 63 of the 14th May; the French counter-proposals of the 24th May, forwarded in my despatch No. 73 of the 26th May; the Spanish counter-proposals of the 29th May, forwarded in my despatch No. 84 of the 31st May; and the revised version of the French counter-proposals forwarded in my despatch No. 91 of the 6th June.

1. *Tangier–Alcazar Railway.*

The inclusion of this project, behind the back of Spain, in the draft financial convention between France and Morocco, signed at Paris in March 1911, gave rise to much indignation at Madrid. In the draft declaration annexed to the Spanish memorandum of the 10th May, it is proposed that the French and Spanish Governments shall come to an understanding with a view to the construction of a line from Tangier to Fez, passing through Arzila, Laraiche, and Alcazar. Señor Garcia Prieto made a great point of his claim that from Tangier to Alcazar the entire control of the railway should be Spanish. The French counter-proposals conceded a portion of the Spanish demand, and M. Geoffray stated that a revised formula of a conciliatory character was under consideration at Paris.

In view of the fact that the above-mentioned Franco-Moorish financial convention was never ratified, and is obviously inadequate to meet the new situation in Morocco, it may perhaps be assumed that the whole question of a railway extending southwards from Tangier will have to be reconsidered.

M. Geoffray informs me that he has been urging the French Government to turn their attention in the first instance to a line passing through Fez and Taza and connecting Casa Blanca with the Algerian frontier. Such a line would lie entirely within the French sphere of influence. It would tend to divert traffic to French ports, and there would be time enough later on to connect it with Tangier, Melilla and other points on the north coast of Morocco.

The French Ambassador considers that, by eliminating from the renewed discussion the Tangier railway question, in the form which it assumed under the March draft convention, the prospects of an agreement with Spain would be greatly improved.

2. *Public Works.*

Spain contended (draft declaration, article 4) that, in all public works to be executed within the Spanish sphere, including mines, Spanish agents should be preferentially appointed to assist the Makhzen.

France agreed that the Moorish Department of Public Works should be recommended to take this course at Laraiche and Tetuan, and in the neighbourhood of those places, as well as in the region occupied by Spanish troops. Thus Spaniards would be employed to direct the works on the proposed Ceuta–Tetuan road.

Spain continued to urge the employment of Spaniards throughout the entire extent of the Spanish sphere of influence.

M. Geoffray seems to think his Government will concede the point.

3. *French and Spanish Legations at Tangier to assist each other in matters affecting respectively the French and Spanish Sphere of Influence.*

The revised text of the French counter-proposals (communicated the 5th June) meets in great part the Spanish demand. It provides that the two legations be invited by their Governments to exchange views with the object of settling in harmony with the principles of the Franco-Spanish conventions of the 3rd October, 1904, all matters arising before the diplomatic body and the commissions subject to its control.

4. *Employment of Spanish Language on an equal footing with French.*

On this point an agreement was practically reached. Makhzen notices to be drawn up in Arabic, French, and Spanish. In tenders, the intererested party to select the language. In documents of the nature of "cahiers des charges," existing regulations to apply.

5. *Exclusion of French Military Instructors from Spanish Sphere of Influence.*

Spain contended (article 1 of draft protocol in memorandum of the 10th May), that, within the Spanish sphere, Moorish forces under French instructors should not be allowed to penetrate at all; order, when disturbed, being restored either by the native police under Spanish instructors, or, if necessary, by the Sultan's troops under Spanish instructors. Further (Spanish counter-proposals) that, within the Spanish sphere, French military instructors should take no part in the payment, instruction, organisation, or military operations of the Sultan's troops.

France was prepared to undertake (in the revised form of the French counter-proposals) that, within the Spanish sphere, French instructors should neither take part in organising fresh native bodies of troops, nor, in the event of their being called upon to accompany the Sultan, take part in operations which would bring them in conflict with native police under Spanish instructors or with existing conventions between Spain and Morocco. Nevertheless the rights of the French military mission shall be respected. France had no intention of increasing the number of French officers at Tangier, charged exclusively with the duty of instructing gunners to fire salutes, guard the magazines, and form convoys for munitions, &c., destined for the Moorish army.

M. Geoffray is of opinion that a formula acceptable to both Governments could be devised without much difficulty.

Besides the five points mentioned above there was much discussion on the question of the redistribution of the Morocco port police and on the Spanish proposal

to advance the date fixed in the secret convention of October 1904 for the commencement of the second period of the operation of that convention, that is to say, the period when Spain would be at liberty to act within her sphere of influence without the obligation of securing the previous concurrence of France.

On the police question, Spain at first pressed for a new arrangement in virtue of which the instructors of the Casa Blanca police should be exclusively French and those of the Tangier police exclusively Spanish. A French-instructed native police force should be set up at Azemur, and Spanish-instructed police forces at Arzila and Alcazar.

France replied by proposing (see my despatch No. 86 of the 2nd June) that the two tabors of police (French and Spanish) at Casa Blanca should be suppressed, the French tabor being transferred to Rabat and Mazagan, and the Spanish tabor to Tetuan and Laraiche.

This arrangement did not satisfy Señor Garcia Prieto, who urged that the Spanish-instructed police tabor at Casa Blanca should be assigned to Alcazar and not to Tetuan and Laraiche. He also made a great point of demanding the reversal of the existing police arrangements at Tangier, so that Spain might take over the extra-urban tabor and France the urban tabor.

M. Geoffray considers this latter demand not unreasonable, and he informs me that he found both MM. de Selves and Delcassé quite willing to take it into consideration. It is, indeed, natural that if Spain is to be entrusted with the task of maintaining order in her sphere of influence, she should be invested likewise with the control of the outside Tangier police tabor, which would be more easily available than the inside tabor for the repression of disorders among the neighbouring tribes. The proposed exchange of tabors would not affect the mixed character of the Tangier police as a whole.

As regards the advancement of the second period of the secret convention, M. Geoffray maintained to the end the refusal of his Government to accept this idea. He informed Señor Garcia Prieto, however, at our meeting of the 6th June, that when matters settled down, the French Government would be quite willing to discuss the political status of the Spanish sphere of influence. Meanwhile they desired to give full scope to the economic development of Spain within that sphere.

The Spanish Foreign Minister saw that it was useless to press the point further at that time. I do not doubt, however, that he will revert to it if the conversations are resumed, and that he will insist strongly on the Spanish view, that if Spain is to be responsible for keeping the peace in her sphere of influence, it becomes unreasonable to require of her to take no step without obtaining first the concurrence of France.

I have, &c.

MAURICE DE BUNSEN.

[31728] No. 210.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 12.)

(No. 219.)

Sir, *Berlin, August 8, 1911.*

THE "Post's" attack on the Emperor, which I had the honour to bring to your notice in my immediately preceding despatch of the 6th instant, has met with the strongest disapproval from nearly the whole of the German press. Even the pan-German papers admit that the castigation it received from the Government was richly deserved. While deploring, however, the offensive tone of the "Post's" article, they consider that some excuse for it is to be found in the neglect of the Government to take any steps to check the wild rumours which have recently been spread, both in the German and foreign press, on the subject of the negotiations.

Herr Harden, in the last number of the "Zukunft," has an article which is just as strong as that of the "Post," but being much more cleverly written it has been treated by the Government and the press with comparative leniency.

He opens fire on the Emperor for having gone off to Norway after having upset the equanimity of Europe by the dispatch of a war-ship to Agadir, and, attributing His Majesty's apparent nonchalance to the events of 1908, he put the following words into the Emperor's mouth: "The self-restraint which at that time I was desired to exercise for the future shall now be put into practice, and we will see how you will like it. I allowed Bethmann-Hollweg, after considerable pressure, to lodge a flea in his great-coat (in the shape of Kiderlen), little foreseeing that he would produce him

in such a short time as a national hero. Well, if that German formalist has more confidence in the snarling Kiderlen than in me he must work out his own salvation. I won't interfere; I will wait and see how far they get, and if things go badly they will have to make several appeals to me before I help them to drag the cart out of the mud."

He then describes how the Chancellor and Herr von Kiderlen went to Swinemünde to make their report, and how, what with tea parties and dinners, it was four-and-twenty hours before they could succeed in doing so. He then wonders whether by these proceedings His Majesty meant to show, as was believed in France and England, that Agadir was not a burning point in his policy; that he considered it an event of minor importance, and that it was far from his wish to have it regarded as a vital matter of State which might bring him within measurable distance of war with the Western Powers. If this was in His Majesty's mind, Herr Harden says, then it would have been better if he had given expression to his wishes sooner. Had he done so the Empire would have been spared much abuse and the Emperor much praise—praise which must make him wince. "Now," Herr Harden adds, "it is too late! The general who throws the flag of his country over the wall of an enemy's fortress has no choice left. He must guard that flag from ridicule and dishonour, and must follow it up. If he does not do this he loses the confidence of army and people. If William has recognised this danger, the gravest of his reign, he will act as it is his duty to act. In any case, it is the duty of the Chancellor to see that he does recognise the danger. He should say: 'That your Majesty should exercise self-restraint is praiseworthy in the extreme, but your self-restraint should not be carried to a point where it may cause misunderstanding. Your Majesty approved my intention to make up for lost opportunities, to come to an unavoidable settlement with the French without further delay, and to obtain for our increasing population an outlet on habitable territory. As the supreme power in the land you ordered that a war-ship should be sent to Agadir. That could only mean that Germany was resolved that the sword should obtain for her those legitimate rights which the tongues of others have disputed. This is how our action has been understood everywhere; nowhere has it been given another interpretation. If we now represent it as a harmless step, only meant to protect the lives and property of a few apocryphal German subjects, we shall lose the last shadow of the respect which we have hitherto enjoyed. I shrink from no responsibility either for action or for inaction, as one or the other may serve the State. But at the present moment any retreat from our standpoint, should such be decided upon, would inflict the greatest injury upon the Empire, and no feeling of loyalty could make me cover it with my responsibility. Would your Majesty not rather be reviled as a hotspur than be regarded as a timid mannikin shivering inside a coat of shining armour at the very idea of a bloody encounter? This question sounds mortifying. But I dare to put it because I am sure of the answer. Because I know that my King and Emperor could not possibly show the slightest sign of faintheartedness in a matter which is before the European court of honour. If an Emperor were so unwarlike as not to lay his hand on the sword at even an attempt to humiliate his Empire, the German people would take matters into its own hands and forge its own destiny. And the most loyal monarchist could not but applaud such a decision.'"

After a long but interesting analysis of Herr von Kiderlen's character and career, he asks what points there are in that career to justify the confidence placed in him by a large portion of public opinion. "His first unsuccessful bluff (the Russian treaty not yet signed); his crude ignorance of the laws of acoustics (*i.e.*, his refusal to listen to the British proposals for the limitation of armaments); the consolidation of the Edwardian coalition: so stands the balance which is to incline us to blind belief in his direction of affairs! Has anyone the face to maintain that Germany's affairs are to-day in a more comfortable state than they were before the arrival of this Messiah from Swabia? As a matter of fact, the reverse is the case. It is time that this fulsome adulation of the Foreign Secretary should cease. A man who does nothing and only smiles is far less dangerous to the State than a man of conspicuous ability who stirs up trouble in the hope of gaining personal prestige. Herr von Kiderlen should study the psychology, the history, and the language of Great Britain and pack away the odds and ends of a Balkan diplomat into a camphor-box; perhaps then he will learn to take wider views and to understand the ways of Western Powers."

Herr Harden then turns to the Chancellor, for it is he, he says, who is responsible to the Emperor and the nation, and not Herr von Kiderlen. After stating his disqualifications for an office which he should never have undertaken, he comes to

his handling of the present situation. He points out that at the time of Mr. Lloyd George's speech the Chancellor should have at once asked, through the German Ambassador in London, whether the British Government accepted responsibility for that speech. "He did nothing of the sort, and, on the contrary, allowed newspapers under his influence to represent that piece of international impertinence as a harmless piece of rhetoric, not in the least directed against Germany; he allowed the same thing to happen with Mr. Asquith's speech, which practically said: 'We will not suffer Germany to occupy territory in Morocco; but as far as West Africa is concerned, we will object to no settlement which does not affect British interests.' This arrogant assumption of censorial power is quite intolerable, and the nation who bows before it will be justly despised by Great Britain. The Chancellor will have to see to it that intercourse with a Government which has meddled in such an unseemly manner with German affairs is confined to what is strictly necessary, and that German princes and notables receive strict instruction to make no further bids for cousinly love on the other side of the Channel."

Herr Harden adds that the impression left by the failure of the Chancellor to take up Mr. Asquith's and Mr. Lloyd George's utterances is that there has been a gentle hint of intervention on the part of Great Britain before which Germany yielded. "No compensation," he says, "could ever wipe out such a humiliation."

After a few remarks about the "compensations," in the course of which he said that any man who suggested that Togoland should be handed over to France was nothing more or less than a traitor, and deserved to be hounded out of Germany, he concludes his article with the words: "And we read in the paper that at Swinemünde the Chancellor looked in excellent spirits!"

This article will undoubtedly be widely read, and it cannot fail to do considerable harm, and lead public opinion to regard the negotiations askance. His opinions carry some weight, and though people may, and do, find fault with the tone of his articles, his language is such that it remains in their minds. It is therefore to be feared that if he continues, as he has done now in two successive articles, to hammer away on the theme that Germany is yielding to British pressure, not only will the negotiations be rendered more difficult, but, in the event of their leading to a settlement, the relations between Germany and Great Britain will remain anything but pleasant for some time to come.

In this connection I may mention that the "Tageblatt," hitherto an ardent supporter of friendly relations with Great Britain, uses in its issue of this morning, language which would appear to show that Herr Harden's words have not fallen upon barren ground.

"If we may venture to express a wish," it says, "it is that Germany will not, after all this trouble is over, take Great Britain back into her affections too soon, nor too quickly pass the sponge of reconciliation over Mr. Lloyd George's challenge or the malicious little pin-pricks of Mr. Asquith. The most peaceful Anglophil amongst us will have this time found the English tobacco a little too strong, and it would be advisable not to show too much enthusiasm on the occasion of the unveiling of the King Edward memorial at Homburg."

I have, &c.
W. E. GOSCHEN.

[31826] No. 211.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received August* 12.)

(No. 117. Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Paris, August* 12, 1911.

NEGOTIATIONS are proceeding between the French Ambassador at Berlin and the German Minister for Foreign Affairs on bases of Germany ceding Togoland and the Bec du Canard and giving entirely free hand to France in Morocco, and France ceding to Germany strip of territory south of Spanish Guinea already mentioned, the territory marked green on the map which I left with you, and the territory north and north-east of the Sangha up to and along the conventional line marked in purple reaching to Egyptian Soudan. Matter is under consideration of the Emperor. French Minister for Foreign Affairs foresees great difficulties in arranging the questions affecting concessions to commercial companies if these bases be accepted.

[31827] No. 212.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 12.)

(No. 118.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Paris, August 12, 1911.*

MINISTER for Foreign Affairs has received a telegram dated 11th August from the French consul at Mogador, stating that he is informed by the chief Guelsuli that tribes near Tarudant, on Sus, have attacked and taken that town, kaïd of which is favourable to the Germans. Chief fears danger to Germans at Tarudant, who are, consul believes, the only Europeans there.

French Minister for Foreign Affairs has telegraphed for further information.

[31824] No. 213.

Mr. White to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 12.)

(No. 145.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Tangier, August 12, 1911.*

THE French consul at Mogador has been informed by the Governor of Agadir that tribesmen have attacked and taken town of Tarudant, as they were incensed by the governor of that place favouring Germans. There is anxiety as to the fate of some of Mannesmann's party who were there.

[31560] No. 214.

Sir Edward Grey to Count Bentinck.

Sir, *Foreign Office, August 12, 1911.*

WITH reference to Sir A. Johnstone's despatch No. 42, Very Confidential, of the 20th March respecting the amendments which the Netherlands Government desire to insert in the draft Moroccan Mining Law, I transmit to you herewith a copy of further correspondence, as noted in the margin,* which has passed between the French Government and His Majesty's Government on the subject.

His Majesty's Government see no objection to the several suggestions put forward by M. Aguillon in the report which has been communicated to me by M. Daeschner, and I have therefore to request that you will support any proposals based on that report which the French Minister at The Hague may be directed to lay before the Netherlands Government.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[31825] No. 215.

Mr. White to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 13.)

(No. 146.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Tangier, August 13, 1911.*

MY telegram No. 145 of 12th August.

Later telegram from the French consul at Mogador reports that the tribes entered Tarudant but were eventually driven out. Mannesmann's agents at Tarudant are one German and one Austrian with Algerian interpreter. Their position still causes anxiety.

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* Nos. 178, 203, and 207.

[31901] No. 216.

Mr. White to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 14.)

(No. 249.)
Sir, *Tangier, August 5, 1911.*

WITH reference to your despatch No. 53 of the 11th ultimo, I have the honour to transmit herewith copy of a despatch I have received from His Majesty's consul at Fez, containing his observations on M. Cruppi's memorandum to Sir F. Bertie of the 17th of June regarding the Lemta incident.

I have, &c.
HERBERT E. WHITE.

Enclosure 1 in No. 216.

Consul MacLeod to Mr. White.

(No. 68. Confidential.)
Sir, *Fez, July 31, 1911.*

AS requested in your despatch No. 29 of the 18th instant, I have the honour to enclose herewith my observations upon M. Cruppi's memorandum of the 17th June to Sir Francis Bertie in regard to the Lemta incident.

M. Cruppi's memorandum, consisting largely of contradictions, and not always very connected ones, a catagorical reply is so apt to be of the same nature, and thus not to afford in itself a clear narrative, that I venture to relate what actually happened.

Up till 19th May the insurgents investing Fez consisted of a large camp of Beni Mtir and other Berbers, together with contingents of Zarhon, Gerwan, and Sherarda people—in all perhaps 5,000 to 6,000—at Ras-al-Ma, some 9 miles west of Fez, of a small camp—perhaps 800—of Ait Yusi and Beni Sadin some 12 miles to the south of Fez, of a small camp of Udaya at Mulai Yakob, and of a camp of Ulad Jama and Sheraga, together with the inhabitants of Lemta, the latter almost wholly Riffians or mountain people, farm servants of Fez citizens owning farms, olive groves, vineyards, and fruit plantations and gardens there.

This camp was situated at Sidi Ahmed Bernusi, a Saint's tomb on the summit of the ridge to the west of Jebel Zalagh, and consisted of some 2,000 men. The advance of General Moinier's troops produced the greatest consternation amongst the insurgents, especially at Ras-al-Ma, where it was first and most surely known. On the evening of 19th May the Makhzen learned of this, as parties of Sherarda and Gerwan people came to the Sultan with offers of submission.

On the night of the 19th and 20th there was some fighting amongst the Ras-al-Ma insurgents, and during the 20th and the night of the 20th to 21st the assembly separated, the Berbers retiring partly to their homes and partly to Mahaduma, some 12 miles to the west of Ras-al-Ma.

The same consternation set in at the Sidi Ahmed Bernusi camp, but more slowly, as the dissensions in the Ras-al-Ma camp (which was the insurgent head-quarters) hindered the usual communications. They too began to disperse, and there remained on the morning of the 21st only the local inhabitants and some of their nearest neighbours of Ulad Jama and Sheraga at Sidi Ahmed Bernusi.

About dawn on the 21st, General Moinier signalled his near approach by firing twelve guns (he was then starting from Mikkes, some 18 miles west north-west of Fez), and the Ras-al-Ma camp having broken up, was sure to arrive at Fez unopposed in the course of the day.

There was, obviously, no need to do anything soever, but remain quietly on the defensive till General Moinier should arrive, the more so as the stock of artillery ammunition had run very low.

It will be remembered that on the 15th May the French consul, on the Mequinez situation being discussed between us, authorised me to communicate to all concerned there the pacificatory and non-retributive policy laid down by the French Government, and agreed to by the Makhzen. All the French here at that stage spoke in the same strain. Their tone changed entirely, however, as soon as it was certain that French forces would come as far as Fez, and would not merely relieve the pressure on Fez by

attacking the lands of the insurgents. One began to hear of nothing except severely punitive measures against this tribe and that.

Only two or three evenings before the 21st May the French consul, to my surprise, began excitedly to dilate in this strain, and went so far as to say that after the French troops arrived, a severe example would need to be made of the Ulad Jama and Lemta people in particular, some fifty or sixty of them should be taken out and shot, and so forth. I dissented strongly from all that, pointing out that such methods might drive the whole Moslem population to frenzy against Europeans, and foreigners should be withdrawn if such things were to be done. M. Gaillard was obviously, however, in considerable anxiety, and much excited by the prolonged strain he, in particular, had undergone, and so I supposed he was merely relieving his feelings by such talk. As related in my despatch No. 32 of the 23rd May, the Riffians of Lemta had been particularly offensive to the French as well as the Makhzen over couriers.

Shortly before the 21st May they had been saying they would pass German or English couriers, as they had Mulai Zin's order to do so, but they stipulated that all letters must be addressed in Arabic and that the outside covers must be open for inspection to ensure that no French, Spanish, or Makhzen letters were being sent. Indeed, an offer in this sense reached me, and I believe the German consul also, and I rejected it sharply pointing out how misguided and offensive it was. What the German consul answered I do not know, but it was well known that they passed at least one special courier for him through Ulad Jama about that time. The Riffians' answer to all this was that they were watched by the Beni Mtir and would be raided by the latter if French, Spanish, or Makhzen letters were discovered to be passing through Ulad Jama, from which the Makhzen were powerless to protect them.

That the Ulad Jama and Lemta people stopped, robbed, and imprisoned couriers, and sometimes beat them as well, is quite true, but I have still been unable to get any evidence of such gross cruelty by them as the killing or blinding of a courier. The case of the Ulad Jama and Lemta people in this respect was in no wise different from the rest of the revolted areas, save that their lands being those next to Fez on the north, all correspondence, to be speedy, with Alcazar, Tangier, and Laraiche, must pass through them.

To resume the narrative. At sunrise—say 5 A.M.—on the 21st May, persons with passes to Lemta were allowed to go thither as usual. An hour or more later, three bodies of Makhzen forces were dispatched to the district.

One body, to the left, marked "A" on the map herewith,* consisting of regulars with a gun and Maxims, accompanied by the Algerian Lieutenant Sedira and Sergeant Balding, who was in charge of the Maxims, went half-way up the hill. Another body, marked "B," to the front, was in charge of Captain LeGlay. It consisted of No. 1 cavalry regiment, leading, and in charge of the English instructor, Mr. Redman, some artillery and regular infantry, the non-reorganised troops of Ben Jellali, and mounted retainers (Berbers) of Mtugi and Glawi. The third body consisted of the Hiayna contingent, and it proceeded over the eastern end of Zalagh and cleared the area between the north-eastern side of Zalagh and the Sboo. The heights of Sidi Ahmed Bernusi were shelled by a long-range gun, also from close to Fez.

Body "A" had but little to do, and Sergeant Balding was back and called on me about 1 P.M., saying that they could discern very few people at Sidi Ahmed Bernusi, but they had fired a few artillery rounds to help body "B" up the hill.

Body "B" was about a third of the way up the hill when Mr. Redman received unexpectedly an order from Captain LeGlay to fall back, occupy a certain position to the left, put the Berbers of M'tugi and Glawi in the forefront, send them on supported by Ben Jellali's non-reorganised soldiers, and afterwards to follow them himself.

Captain LeGlay, in discussion with the German consul, stated that this change of arrangements was due to an order he received from Colonel Mangin after the forces had started.

Body "B" then resumed its advance, burning villages, &c., as it proceeded. Near the top of the hill there was some resistance from parties of villagers who had taken refuge on the precipitous heights there. The track is at first steep and open, but as it nears the top becomes very rocky, and the rocks and olive groves afford much cover. Nevertheless, the whole of Body "B" got up and over the hill without a single man, or even a horse, being hit.

* Not printed.

Mr. Redman, who assured me he watched the whole action thereabouts minutely, testifies to this, but even from our roofs at Fez one could (as I myself did) see that no resistance worth the name was in progress, but only the burning of villages.

This course was continued on the south side of the hill, and about 10 A.M. M'tugi's Berbers reached Hadj Mohammed-ben-Chekroun's place. The occupants had gathered their flocks and themselves within the house and its walled enclosures and locked the doors. Summoned to yield up everything, they pleaded their pass (see Enclosure 3), stated that they were loyal Fez people (which was true), but being answered with threats, they opened the main door to try to appease the Berbers. No sooner was the door opened than the Berbers rushed in firing in every direction, killing one of the Ben Chekroun lads, wounding another, severely wounding an old negro man-servant, stripping the women, and then began to loot the place. This preoccupied them sufficiently to let the occupants conceal themselves or escape, but the concealed ones were shortly afterwards discovered by Ben Jellali's soldiers who arrived and at once began a rigorous examination of the place and made prisoners of the wounded Ben Chekroun and some of the servants. These they stripped of their clothes and effects and took to town as prisoners. One of the women servants escaped, stark naked, and in this state, and in distraction over the loss of her child, was met by Mr. Redman, whose cavalry had then reached the southern slopes of the hill. He gave her a sulham to cover herself, and promised to help to trace her child. She then guided them to the house and identified the dead body there as that of one of the sons of her master.

Mr. Redman tells me that from his position he could easily have heard it had any defence of the house occurred. None of the soldiers still there even suggested there had been a defence, nor was there a killed or wounded soldier or Berber anywhere to be seen, nor were any military arms and ammunition found in the place.

The same thing occurred at the other farms, vineyards, fruit gardens, &c., in the neighbourhood, most of which belonged to foreign protected persons, or other loyal Fez citizens. Many of the inhabitants took to flight eastwards, but were caught by the Hiayna contingent (Body "C"), who had meanwhile worked round the Eastern slopes of Zalagh, and were ravaging and burning the villages between Zalagh and the River Sboo, numbers of these, not natives of the district but immigrant labouring families, have gone back to their own tribes, and these cases are unlikely therefore to be heard of again. The estimate of sixty to eighty children and women captured and sold in the whole raid was made to me by several Fez people well acquainted with the district, and I feel sure is not an exaggeration. Reference to the accompanying papers, which deal only with the cases which came to my own notice, and are from only a few of the villages, will show how fully the facts, as reported by me, are established, and how justifiable was the deep and widespread indignation which these deeds aroused.

I would call particular attention to the following facts the papers show. Neither amongst the prisoners nor amongst the killed or wounded were there any persons but Lemta villagers. Had there been any large and really resisting force at Sidi Ahmed Bernusi of Ulad Jama, Sheraga, &c., surely these would have been members of those tribes amongst the captured or fallen

The capture and public sale at Fez of women and children is shown beyond all doubt, and there is every reason to believe that many of the more well-to-do Berbers and officers of Ben Jellali's soldiers retained many of the captives for themselves. The Berbers have gone away and Ben Jellali's troops were very soon disbanded, so these cases are not traceable.

That the Sultan should resort to such methods is only to be expected from his record. What is less intelligible, however, is the circumstances of Europeans being associated with such acts. I make no accusation in the matter, and leave the French to explain the employment of European officers and regular troops to back up semi-savages like those Berbers and Ben Jellali's men in such work.

It was in breach of the agreement between the French Government and the Makhzen that, if the former officers were employed in actual fighting, only civilised usages of war should be followed. It was at variance with the policy of merely defending Fez and economising ammunition till the relief column should arrive, and there was no reason to anticipate anything from the Lemta quarter but the submission of its inhabitants following the lead of so many other insurgents at Ras-al-Ma.

Unfortunately, the Lemta incident does not stand alone, but is only the last of a series of acts in which the French, quite indefensibly, associated themselves with the

Makhzen and which raised great ill-feeling to the French amongst both tribes and townspeople. Here are the main ones :—

1. The dispersal of the bulk of the old troops last November without means to pay their way home, and the dismissal without payment of these old troops' sick and wounded.

2. The uncalled for ultra-harshness (while as yet no milder means had been tried) of the new military regulations, *e.g.*, with the death penalty for desertion with Government material even in time of peace.

3. The shooting of two men, ostensibly under these regulations, on the 27th January last. (This furnished the war-cry to all the lower classes of insurgent tribesmen.)

4. The too sudden augmentation and too ostentatious employment of foreign military officers to the alarming of the tribes.

5. The support of the Glawi exactions evinced by those military officers and the new troops being sent, with Glawi's son to repress the malcontents, instead of insistence on the Sultan's redressing their grievances.

6. The support afforded to the Sultan's wishes in regard to the Lemta people.

So long as the French are complaisant on such things, the Makhzen are deaf to the remonstrances of others about them.

When remonstrance is made with the French, they say: "Oh! we cannot impose our will on the Sultan," and an intolerable situation naturally results.

In conclusion I would remark that I have often, in the friendliest way, pointed out all this to the French consul, alluding particularly to the disastrous effect to us of French policy in Morocco becoming unpopular in our country, and the danger there was of this if the Sultan was allowed to go on unchecked. While admitting this in theory, however, M. Gaillard, whenever the issue arose, invariably set before everything else the consideration of not risking giving offence to the Sultan.

This constant humouring of the Sultan and ignoring of the fact that the Sultan, unrestrained, is himself one of the principal elements of disorder, have gained for the French the monopoly of the Sultan's ear these twelve months, with the results, apparently, of ever-increasing jealousy in Europe about Morocco, and an enormously aggravated situation in the interior.

I have, &c.
J. M. MacLEOD.

Enclosure 2 in No. 216.

Consul MacLeod's Observations upon M. Cruppi's Memorandum of June 17, 1911, *to Sir F. Bertie, regarding the Lemta Incident.*

THE Riffians of Lemta were indeed, as I pointed out at the time, peculiarly annoying as enemies during the investment of Fez. That they ill-treated couriers is also true, but, though I have made frequent enquiries, I have been unable to get any evidence of such cruelty as of blinding their captive. In that region we ourselves had at least two couriers beaten. It was their habit to secure their prisoners by tying their hands and attaching the prisoners loosely by a few feet of rope to a tree. Except that his hands were bound, such a prisoner was not in bodily constraint. Sometimes a group of prisoners would be attached by the necks to a long rope and the ends of the rope be secured to a tree. Both the above are common practices in Morocco. That they may have killed couriers is possible, but I have not been able to establish such a case in Lemta, though in Sheraga we had one courier badly mauled on the head and left for dead, but who survived and reached Fez.

About the case of the soldier, though I have made enquiries, I have found no evidence of it.

I did not say there were no combatants left in the camp at Sidi Ahmed-el-Bernusi, but that "the bulk of the insurgents at Gergeb had dispersed," and "the real offenders had nearly all fled," and to these statements I adhere.

From the roofs of houses in Fez one could see much that passed on the south side of Zalagh and the south side of the hill on which Sidi Ahmed-el-Bernusi is situated, and I myself saw from my own roof one unresisting village after another being burnt,

and as regards the south side of these hills (*i.e.*, Lemta) everything one could hear was to the effect of there being no resistance there also. Only at Sidi Ahmed-el-Bernusi itself, the insurgents' head-quarters, was there any attempt at resistance and this lasted under an hour and was of the feeblest kind, which could hardly be otherwise as that spot was shelled by a long range gun posted close to the Fez lines.

The Makhzen forces set out about 7 A.M., and by 1 o'clock began re-entering Fez. Allowing three to four hours for marching there and back, it will be seen that actual fighting lasting "several hours" could scarcely have taken place. Some of the captive children were actually on sale at Fez by about 1·30 P.M.

For these reasons I am at a loss to understand the suggestion that it was the obstinacy of the resistance which necessitated the attackers being supported by regular troops. There was no "attack" by either the Riffians of Lemta, or others, during the last few days of the siege, nothing beyond occasional snipping.

It is suggested (I infer) in M. Cruppi's memorandum that only five or six women and children were sold at Fez and these were sold clandestinely.

That such captives were in some—perhaps many—cases sold secretly is, of course, quite probable. Indeed, the likelihood is that most of them were sold in this manner to secure the purchasers from troublesome appeals to restore them. But that public sale of them did take place is shown beyond all question by the evidence adduced in my despatches and which included the testimony of eye witnesses of the sale for instance, Mr. Horace Fava, agent of the Vacuum Oil Company and of Sidi Hamza Tahry, interpreter of this consulate.

In regard to Fez citizens, including several British protégés, being sufferers by the Lemta operation, I have never had any explanation why such persons were not warned beforehand, which would have been Moorish custom; or, failing that, why steps were not taken by the military authorities, which would have been European custom, to safeguard those persons' servants and properties. In this connection I would observe that certain of the British protégés who suffered were the very persons who, during the siege, had found first, at my voluntary recommendation, 20,000 dollars, and afterwards 15,500 dollars at my further recommendation in response to an appeal to me in that sense by the Makhzen, supported by the French consul. In all, these persons found 35,000 dollars, which I was told secured payment of the troops during some fourteen acutely critical days. Notwithstanding this loyal conduct of our protégés, the Makhzen subsequently wrote alleging that they spoke seditiously and requesting me to warn them to refrain therefrom or the Makhzen themselves would punish them. I pointed out that names and proofs should have been adduced, that the protégés to my knowledge were undeserving of any reprimand, called attention to their loyal financial assistance and protested against the Makhzen's threat to themselves punish the protégés.

The French consul, in perfect fairness, admitted the injustice our protégés had suffered, but Sid Taib Mokri replied that they had no grievance, for Lemta was enemy's country and everything in it was forfeited to the Sultan.

The total number of prisoners was thirty-four, all of them servants of Fez citizens and in charge of the latter's properties. They included five who were Hadj Mohammed-ben-Chekroun's servants, and two others whose release I procured; one was about 80 years old, and the other about the same age and blind as well. With respect to Hadj Mohammed-ben-Chekroun's, though I have made minute enquiries afresh, I can find no evidence of his place having been either a centre for distribution of the rebels' ammunition or a post occupied by them. Commanded as it is by the precipitous heights of Jebel Zalagh, it would be a hopelessly untenable place. No defence was made of the house, nor did military arms and ammunition exist in it. Some six old flint-locks, such as are still used by Moors guarding places against thieves, alone were in the house, but even they were not used. It is not in the neighbourhood of the rebel head-quarters, viz., Sidi Ahmed-el-Bernusi.

Close to the latter spot are farms of at least three other persons of the name (a common one at Fez) of Ben Chekroun, viz. :—

Hadj Mohammed Fahail-ben-Chekroun, walled enclosure;
Mehdi-ben-Chekroun, no stone buildings;
Sons of Abderrazak-ben-Chekroun, no stone buildings.

In debating the Ben Chekroun case with the German consul, Sid Taib Mokri stated he had, from his own roof in Fez, seen the resistance made there, a physical impossibility if it were Hadj Mohammed-ben-Chekroun's place, which is deep down on the opposite

(*i.e.*, on the north) side of Jebel Zalagh from Fez, but could have been possible had he confused it with one of the above three Ben Chekrouns.

Hadj Mohammed-ben-Chekroun was in Fez throughout the siege, and two of his sons, Dris and Mohammed, with their servants, occupied the house on the security of a pass from the Minister of War's office. Their habit was, on hearing firing anywhere, to gather their servants and animals into the house and its walled precincts. They did so on the day of the raid (21st May), when, about 10 o'clock, Kaïd Mtugi's Berbers arrived and demanded surrender of the place, threatened to kill the inmates, and so forth. The Ben Chekrouns protested they were loyal people and held a pass, but this was not listened to and, thinking to appease the assailants, the door was opened. Thereupon the assailants rushed in firing upon everyone they met. Mohammed (the youngest son) was shot dead, Dris (the second son) was shot in the hand, but managed to hide under the bath-room, where he was discovered later by soldiers who robbed him of his clothes, &c., and took him prisoner to Fez.

Hadj Fateh, a negro servant, was severely wounded. The three female servants in the house were robbed of their clothes. One of them was robbed of her child as well (afterwards traced and returned), and was found stark naked by an European instructor. The latter gave her a "sulham" to cover herself and undertook to help to find her child. As no names are given in M. Cruppi's memorandum one cannot reply for certain on this point, but it would seem probable that the child referred to as recovered was the one above mentioned.

If reference be had to the assurances given by the French consul it will be seen that they were simply repetitions of the instructions issued to General Moinier, and of which copies were sent to the consul for his guidance, and the sense of which was contained in the proclamation issued by General Moinier and Sidi Mohammed Mrani on their respective marches to Fez.

Moreover, these were in harmony with the policy adopted at Fez, and often communicated to me by both Makhzen and French officials, viz., that of concentrating their efforts on the defence of Fez exclusively, especially in view of the scarcity of artillery ammunition.

How the raiding of the Lemta district can be reconciled with the policy of limitation to self-defence and economy of ammunition and awaiting General Moinier on the one hand, or with the policy of pacification announced publicly by General Moinier and Sidi Mohammed Mrani, I have not yet been able to understand. The real perpetration of any proved acts of gross cruelty could have been traced without difficulty and punished without remonstrance by anybody had the latter course been followed.

It has not been explained why, if an operation against Lemta were absolutely necessary on the 21st May, the regular troops exclusively were not used for it. That it was not a hazardous business is shown by the fewness of the casualties on the Makhzen's side, so few that none of the many persons of whom I enquired could tell me of any. The main body of insurgents (Beni Mtir, &c., at Ras-al-Ma) dispersed themselves on the 20th May, and by the firing of twelve guns at General Moinier's camp about dawn on the 21st all Fez was apprised of the near approach of the relief column. There was obviously no necessity for any attack on that day, but even had there been such necessity, parties of cowardly savages such as Glawi's and Mtugi's men, and undisciplined men such as the non-reorganised troops of Kaïd-ben-Jellali (both of whom had been beaten in all attacks previously attempted by them) could not have succeeded in it unless the resistance to be anticipated was of the feeblest kind. In short, the point to which critics at Fez took exception was the association of the reorganised troops and European officers with such people, combining as it did the skill and valour of the former with the unbridled savagery of the latter. I would point out further, that when in 1909 the foreign military instructors' assistance on active service, as well as for duties of instruction merely, were stipulated for, it was agreed between the French Government and the Makhzen that only the usages of civilised warfare would be followed.

How any attention to civilised usages could be expected when such savages as those men of Glawi and Mtugi, together with the non-reorganised troops of Ben Jellali and the Hiayna contingent, were not only included, but put in the forefront, at the Lemta operation, I am at a loss to understand, and I can but leave for consideration whether the circumstances were such as to justify such a departure from the said agreement forbidding the use of foreign instructors on service where the customs of civilised warfare are not likely to be followed.

It is suggested in M. Cruppi's memorandum that the facts of the Lemta affair

have been exaggerated; for instance, the sale of women and children were asserted to be only five or six. From the particulars I have forwarded, and which cover only the cases which came to my notice and which refer only to a few of the raided villages, it will be seen that there is evidence of the carrying away of 2 women, 10 girls, and 10 boys—in all, 22. Five cases (*i.e.*, 1 woman, 1 infant, 2 boys, 1 girl) reported to me are not included in this total for want of the names, lest they should be identical with some whose names were given, and for the same reason I have omitted six women and children of Ulad Hadj people.

Out of the total of thirty-four prisoners, all of them so far as I have been able to learn were merely servants or dependents of highly respectable and loyal Fez citizens. Several of them were very old men and one was blind as well as old.

From the same small area alone I have the names of fourteen men killed who, excepting Ben Chekroun junior, were mostly farm servants of Fez citizens; also of two women shot point blank, one of them fatally and the other surviving with the loss of a hand excepting the thumb and first finger.

It has to be remembered that considerable numbers of the inhabitants have gone away permanently from the district after these troubles, and so complaints from them do not reach Fez, and that the cases which have chanced to come to my notice are from but a very few of the villages whose inhabitants, being for the most part merely employés of Fez people and thinking themselves safe, did not take to flight.

I submit therefore that the estimate of sixty to eighty cannot be far from correct, and, anyhow, the cases cited prove that the general outcry at Fez and elsewhere, in regard to the Lemta affair was fully justified by the facts.

The allusion to such acts as being hitherto "current practices" in Morocco is, I think, an inadequate definition of the case so far as the Makhzen is concerned. The oldest inhabitants of Fez cannot recall some of the methods which the present Makhzen has used and inclines to resort to more and more. Such acts, however, even in the native mind, were always, until the last few months, dissociated from Europeans, and so Europeans were not, as now, exposed to reprisals for them.

If it be not improper to say more, may I add that these observations are offered in no spirit of animadversion beyond the Makhzen. Far the contrary.

I realise very fully how great are the difficulties which beset the French civil and military authorities here. For the results of the French military mission's work in regard to the troops, no person could entertain sincerer admiration, nor could anyone recognise more gratefully how much we foreigners at Fez owe to those officers' skill and courage.

J. M. MacLEOD.

Fez, July 31, 1911.

Enclosure 3 in No. 216.

M. Cruppi to Sir F. Bertie.

EN réponse à la note de son Excellence l'Ambassadeur de Grande-Bretagne en date du 15 de ce mois, le Département des Affaires Étrangères a l'honneur de préciser les indications contenues dans ses récentes notes du 3 et du 10, au sujet du combat livré, le 21 mai, par les troupes marocaines de Fez. Il a reçu, en effet, un nouveau rapport du consul de France, à Fez, ainsi que les explications verbales d'un agent de la légation qui arrive de la capitale chérifienne et s'y trouvait pendant le siège.

2. Contrairement aux suppositions du consul britannique à Fez, dont son Excellence Sir Francis Bertie a bien voulu communiquer une dépêche au département, les habitants, et particulièrement les Riffains du Lemta, se sont signalés par leur acharnement et leur cruauté au cours de l'investissement de la ville. Ils ont tué des courriers ou leur ont crevé les yeux. On a trouvé, le 21, un soldat suspendu à un arbre depuis deux jours et agonisant. Ces actes de barbarie sont bien imputables aux gens du Lemta et distincts de ceux qu'ont commis les Beni M'tir.

3. Cette population a continué ses attaques jusqu'au dernier moment, et il est inexact que, le 21 au matin, les combattants se fussent enfuis du camp de Sidi Ahmed-el-Bernoussi pour ne laisser sur place qu'un petit nombre de vieillards, d'enfants, de femmes et de gardiens inoffensifs des propriétés. Le combat a duré en réalité plusieurs

heures : il a été très vif et il a nécessité l'entrée en ligne des contingents réguliers et de l'artillerie.

4. Il est regrettable que des habitants de Fez aient été victimes de cette opération. En ce qui concerne Ben Cheroun, il a été signalé que sa maison était une des principales positions occupées par les insurgés et un des centres de distribution de munitions : il aurait pris part au combat ; on s'explique donc qu'il ait été atteint.

5. Les prisonniers ont été conduits à Fez et emprisonnés.

6. Le nombre des femmes et des enfants vendus clandestinement à Fez se réduirait à cinq ou six. Ils ont été rendus à leurs familles, sauf deux enfants : l'un n'avait pas été réclamé et on n'avait pas retrouvé ses parents ; l'autre a été recueilli provisoirement, à la demande de son père, qui, blessé dans le combat, n'était pas en état de le reprendre.

7. Il a déjà été dit que le consul de France ne pouvait donner et n'avait pas donné à son collègue britannique des assurances de la nature de celles qu'a rapportées Mr. MacLeod. Il est également inexact que les faits rapportés par le consul anglais aient été reconnus par M. le Général Moinier et par M. Gaillard.

8. En définitive, les événements qui aurait pu mettre en cause la responsabilité des agents français sont de nature à ne justifier aucune accusation contre eux. Le Gouvernement britannique a bien voulu le déclarer, en ce qui concerne les instructeurs, dans la dernière note remise par l'ambassade, et le département apprécie la haute valeur de ce témoignage. D'autre part, les faits imputables aux habitudes de la guerre marocaine, paraissent avoir été exagérés, et le département ne peut que se référer aux informations précises qu'il a eu l'honneur de communiquer à l'Ambassade britannique, d'après les rapports émanant des agents les mieux placés pour une enquête de ce genre. Le Gouvernement français désire, comme le Gouvernement anglais, la disparition des procédés inhumains qui ont été jusqu'ici de pratique courante au Maroc, et il ne cessera d'employer son influence à cet effet.

Paris, le 17 *juin*, 1911.

Enclosure 4 in No. 216.

LIST of Women and Children Captured and Sold by the Shereefian Forces employed in the Operations against Lemta District on May 21, 1911, so far as came to personal notice of Consul MacLeod.

Sex.	Name.	Approximate Age.	Observations.
Boy ..	Bernusi Wuld Alush Bazro .. (Village of Ain Seherij)	7	Presented to Sultan who made a gift of him to the "Hajib." Father repeatedly implored the Hajib to restore him, sacrificed sheep to Hajib, &c., but without avail. After some six or seven weeks, the child was, however, restored by influence of some Shereefs.
Girl ..	Aisha Bent-ali-Wuld Nakkosh	15	Captured by soldiers and sold to Mohammed-ben-el-Bokhari, a miller, whose mill is close to French consulate. Buyer first asked 40 dollars, and now asks 85 dollars for her, which her father, a poor man, cannot possibly raise. Negotiations are in progress for her restoration.
Boy ..	Not known	..	Sold publicly at Bab-al-Gisa in presence of Tahir Hlou and bought by Mohammed-ben-allal-ben-Kiran, charitably, and restored to his parents.
Girl ..	Not ascertained	..	Sold publicly at Bab-al-Gisa in presence of Tahir Hlou. Name of purchaser not known.
„ ..	„	..	Ditto.
Woman ..	Wife of Bu Median Hamiani ..	..	Has since been brought back from a Kaïd-el-Mia, one Rhmani.
„ ..	Miriam Bent Hadoo.. .. (Village of Ain Seherij. Wife of Ben Milud Hamiani)	18	Still missing.
Boy ..	Mohammed Ben-ali-ben-Fadel (Village of Ain Seherij)	6	„
„ ..	Omar Wuld Hasnowi Riffi .. (Village of Ain Seherij)	6	

Sex.	Name.	Approximate Age.	Observations.
Girl ..	Hasna Bent Messaud .. (Village of Ain Seherij)	12	Traced to Fez camp of Kaïd-ben-Jellali's regiment. Said to have been recovered lately.
Boy ..	Mohammed-ben-Messaud .. (Village of Ain Seherij)	4	Traced to Fez camp of Kaïd-ben-Jellali's regiment.
Boy or girl ..	Not remembered .. .. (Village of Ain Seherij)	..	Particulars not remembered.
„ „ ..	Not remembered	..	„ „
„ „ ..	„ „	..	„ „
„ „ ..	„ „	..	„ „
Boy ..	Wuld Mohammed-ben-Messaud (Village of Handak Sba)	2	After peace was made, and after the talk about the Lemta raid, these were found by Makhzen in house of Wuld Hadj Dris Mennou, now Governor of Marrakesh, who restored him (and girl below) without payment on the 29th May, 1911.
Girl ..	Bent Mohammed-ben-Messaud Ulad-el-Hadj .. .. (Village of Ain-al-Findass)	10 ..	Ditto. It was currently reported that some six women and children, Ulad-el-Hadj people, had been taken from village of Ain-al-Findass and sold, but I have not been able yet to get the details.
Infant ..	Not known	..	Offered for sale publicly at Bab-al-Gisa for 1 dollar.
Woman ..	Mother of above, young, and good looking	..	Offered for sale publicly at Bab-al-Gisa for 70 dollars.
Boy ..	Not known	7	Offered for sale publicly at Bab-al-Gisa for 1½ dollars. The above woman and two children were seen by Mr. Horace Fava, agent of the Vacuum Oil Company, Fez, in full course of being sold, amid quantities of other booty just arrived at Bab-al-Gisa on afternoon of 21st May, 1911. I have Mr. Fava's signed statement to that effect. (As these three cases may possibly be identical with some of the others given herein, I do not include them in the total.)
„ ..	Not known	2	Was, seen by Hamza Tahry, interpreter of British Consulate, on sale publicly by a soldier about 1.30 P.M. on 21st May, 1911, at Bab-al-Gisa.
Girl ..	„ „	12	Ditto. (These also not included in total for same reason as given *re* three cases seen by Mr. Fava.)
Boy ..	Son of Wuld Fki Ali-el-Hajji..	..	Taken away and still missing.
Girl ..	Fattima Bent Kaddor-ben-Nmeer	..	Taken away, sold in Fez, but traced and bought back in Fez.
..	Bent Ali-ben-Kaddor ..	..	Ditto.
„ ..	Bent Hamiani, of Azib Seikh. Ain Addara	..	Taken away and not yet recovered.
Boy ..	Wuld Billal .. .. (Servant of Mehdi Benshokron)	6	Taken away, sold in Fez, and recovered for 1 dollar.

Fez, July 25, 1911.

Enclosure 5 in No. 216.

Notes of Information given by Ali Nakkash, a Riffian prisoner already in Dekkakan Prison, Fez, when the Lemta Prisoners arrived on May 21, 1911.

ALL the prisoners were servants of Fez citizens owning farms, &c., at Lemta, and who were in charge of these places, and so did not take to flight.

The total of prisoners was thirty-four. They were chained together in two groups of seventeen prisoners to each chain.

They slept thus, and were taken to the palace next day and were thereafter returned to the prison. There anyone who could pay 2 dollars to the gaoler was

let off the chain, but was fettered. For payment of 1 dollar the fetters also would be removed.

Witness does not recall the names of all the prisoners, but they included, to his recollection, the following:—

Name of Prisoner.	Employer.
Bel Hashmi Hassani	Family of Mulai Ismail, deceased, who was a brother of Sultan Mulai Hassan, and so his family are cousins of the Sultan.
Shuaf	Shereef Ibrahim Dibbagh.
Mohammed-al-Yunnsi	Omar Azomai, deputy Mohtasseb of Fez.
Two sons of above	,, ,, ,, ,,
Al Hsin	Mhemed Lazarac (British Mokhalat).*
Mohammed Mizzian (very old) ..	Ex-Grand Vizier Fedol Gharnit.
Mohammed Nakkash ..	Sid Sebti, Amin of Saddlery Market, Fez.
Billal-ben-Mehdi	Hadj Mohammed-ben-Chekroun.
Billal (slave)	,, ,, ,,
Ammar	,, ,, ,,
Ayashi	,, ,, ,,
Hadj Fateh	,, ,, ,,
Hadj Mohammed Bu Khariba ..	Mulai Dris-ben-Abdelhadi.†
Hadj Mohammed Wuld Bu Figuigi ..	,, ,, ,,
Omar-al-Howlai	,, ,, ,,
Hamiani	Fahail-ben-Chekroun.
Wuld Bushaib	Abderrazak-ben-Chekroun.
Ruba (very old and blind)	Hadj Taleb Lazarac (British naturalised subject).‡
Ali-ben-Fadel (very old)	Ditto.

Notes by Consul MacLeod:

* Found 500 dollars of the money required to pay troops during the siege.

† Is one of the most respected and influential shereefs of Fez, cousin of Sultan, and the successful intermediary in bringing the Beni Warain tribe to Sultan's assistance.

‡ Found 15,000 dollars of the money required to pay troops during siege.

Fez, July 28, 1911.

Enclosure 6 in No. 216.

Permission for Sid-el-Hadj Mohammed-ben-Chekroun and his Sons to pass to their Farm at Lemta.

(Translation.)

Praise to God: He is One!

WE hereby permit Sid-el-Hadj Mohammed-ben-Chekroun and his sons to pass to their farm at Lemta at their pleasure, and to return therefrom at their pleasure, and no person serving the Makhzen—God honour it— is to interfere with them either in their going or returning.

Peace.

21 *Rabea II*, 1329 (*April* 21, 1911).

(L.S.) Seal of Ministry of War.

Enclosure 7 in No. 216.

Lemta Raid.

Notes of certain Evidence regarding Public Sale of Women and Children.

Mimi Hlou. British protégé states that his brother, Tahir Hlou, was at Bab-al-Gisa on afternoon of the raid and saw the soldiers returning, and saw at Wad-al-Mellah the soldiers selling a Rifi boy and two Rifi girls, all three were children in age. The boy was charitably bought by Sid Mohammed-ben-Allal-ben-Kiran, whose warehouse is in the Saga, a French protégé, who at once restored him to his parents. Witness does not know who bought the girls.

Mohammed-ben-Allal. British Mokhalat, states his man, Bu Median-al-Hamiani, at Lemta was killed, his wife was carried off by the plunderers, but has since been bought back from a Kaïd Ar-rma of Askar, one Rhmani.

The woman's two children, a boy and a girl, escaped with the above man's second wife, with the fugitives, and have since been found.

Mr. Horace Fava. British subject, agent of Vacuum Oil Company, states that on the afternoon of the 21st May he was outside Bab-al-Gisa, and saw a soldier take an infant from its mother, the latter crying out, and the soldier offered it, and the mother for sale, the child for 1½ dollars and the mother for 70 dollars. The mother was a good looking young woman. Mr. Fava saw also, there and then, another soldier with a boy, apparently about 6 or 7 years old, for whom the soldier asked 1½ dollars. The boy was crying, and the soldier was threatening him, to make him keep quiet. These were soldiers (askar) not irregular tribesmen. All round there were quantities of booty just arrived from Lemta, and a crowd of Fez people buying it, *i.e.*, wool, sheep, cattle, and all sort of villagers' utensils. Quite a little fair was in progress.

Hamza Tahry, interpreter of British consulate, Fez. On the 21st May, in afternoon about 1·30 or so, was at Bab-al-Gisa. Saw a girl of 12 years old or so carrying a boy child on her neck, presumably a brother of hers, and she was being dragged by the hand by a soldier in uniform. Both the girl and the child were crying. They were Rif people just arrived as captives from Lemta.

Sidi Otman Amrani and Abdselam Marrakshi told Hamza Tahry they had seen children being sold at Bab-al-Gisa.

Enclosure 8 in No. 216.

Lemta Raid.

Names certain of the Women shot point blank.

NAMES certain of the women shot point blank.

Mimona, wife of Ali Wuld Nakkush. Shot in hand while trying to keep soldiers from her daughter. Lost second, third, and fourth fingers.

Wife of Mohammed-ben-Messaud. Enciente. Village of Bandak Sba. Shot dead by soldiers on refusing to stop and give them her belongings which she was carrying away.

Enclosure 9 in No. 216.

Lemta Raid.

List of Killed as far as reported to Consul MacLeod.

Wuld Ammar Mizzian Rifi.
Mohammed-ben-Duwar Sahib Errami.
Erradi Saharowi Hassassi (Jebli).
Ali-bel-Mallim Sinhaji.
Erfas Sahib Shemi.
Fki Sid Abdelkader-al-Hassani.
Wuld Mizzian.
Wuld-al-Hermoosh.
Hadoosh.
Wuld Ammar Moosa.
Wuld Allush.
Mohammed Wuld-al-Fki Ali Hajji.
Ben Milud Hamiani.
Mohammed-ben-Hadj Mohammed-ben-Chèkron.

31902] No. 217.

Mr. White to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received August* 14.)

No. 250. Confidential.)

Sir, *Tangier, August* 5, 1911.

IN speaking to me this morning of the difficulty of his position in endeavouring to keep on good terms with the French and Spanish Legations and their civil and military officers, Raisuli spoke very bitterly of M. Boisset, the French vice-consul, who, it appears, behaves in a most overbearing way, and is detested by all the people. El Menebhi, who was present at the interview, fully confirmed what Raisuli stated. He said he had received numerous complaints of ill-treatment and injustice suffered by respectable people at the hands of M. Boisset and of the Algerian interpreter, who acts as vice-consul during his absence. He said he had always replied advising the complainants to keep quiet, as nothing could be done, the legation having complete confidence in M. Boisset.

I have reason to believe, however, that M. de Billy's eyes have lately been opened, to a certain extent at any rate, and that that partly accounts for his recommending his Government to appoint a paid consular official at Alcazar.

Raisuli confirmed what I had previously heard from several sources, that the people in the Alcazar district are delighted to have the Spaniards there. He told me that the Spanish troops behave admirably, whereas the Moorish troops under the French instructors were the terror of the town, and when complaints were made to the instructors no notice was taken of them. Several families left Alcazar for fear of these troops, who, though Mahommedans, had no regard for the sanctity of the harem.

I enquired of Raisuli whether there were many protégés in his district; he replied that there was scarcely anyone, not a pauper, who was not protected. The Spaniards have a large number of protégés, but the French have about three times as many. He declared that three-quarters of the protected persons were French and most of the rest Spanish, other nations having comparatively few. M. Boisset, who is in business, has a very large number of protégés, and amongst them many officials. This is confirmed by what I have heard from other sources. M. de Billy, in private conversations with me, has made no secret as to Kaïd Sherkawi and the commanders of the two Alcazar forces, as well as other officials, having French protection.

This wholesale extension of protection has always been the French policy; I think, however, that it is a very mistaken policy, and does the French cause no good. The protected persons are not animated by any feelings of gratitude or loyalty towards France; they are ready to throw up their French protection, and take that of Spain instead, at any moment that it may suit them to do so; many have, in fact, already done so, and numbers of French protégés are working against French interests. As an example, I may mention the case of the mysterious night attack on Alcazar, which led to the Spanish occupation of that place. Menebhi and Raisuli tell me that it is now well known who all the men were who composed the band, who carried out the manœuvre for the sum of 300 dollars, though it is not known who paid the money. The leader, a son of R'miki, was a French protégé, semsar of M. Boisset, and a number of his men were also under French protection.

I have, &c.
HERBERT E. WHITE.

[31905] No. 218.

Mr. White to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received August* 14.)

(No. 253.)

Sir, *Tangier, August* 5, 1911.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 248 of the 2nd instant, I have the honour to transmit herewith copy of a further despatch addressed to His Majesty's consul at Casa Blanca by Mr. Vice-Consul Johnstone, reporting that Mr. McCullagh, correspondent of the "New York Evening Post" and of the "Westminster Gazette," had left for England, but that Mr. Ostler was thinking of returning to Agadir.

The reasons given by Kaïd Guilooli for the treatment received by these two gentlemen was that they were travelling without an escort and had no letters of recommendation. It is a rule in Morocco that travellers should be accompanied by a

Government soldier, and it was imprudent of Mr. Ostler to have gone to Agadir without escort or letter, but that cannot be held to be sufficient excuse for the action of Guilooli's khalifa. Other foreigners were allowed to remain in Agadir, but though some of them were provided with letters of recommendation, I don't know whether they all had such letters.

Whilst not desiring in any way to excuse the khalifa, I cannot help thinking that Mr. Ostler, if he desired to remain at Agadir as a correspondent, showed considerable want of tact. In his letter to the "Daily Express," copy of which has been communicated to me by the correspondent of that paper here, he states that he declined to answer the khalifa's enquiries as to who he was, and he did not make the usual little present which he says he had up till then invariably given to the chief functionary of the small Moorish towns he had visited.

Agadir is a closed port, where during many years Europeans have scarcely ever been seen, and some who have gone there have been brought back to Mogador or Marrakeesh as prisoners. The arrival of the German cruiser, of course, altered the situation, but nevertheless a newspaper correspondent desiring to remain there might have been expected to be especially careful to provide himself, at any rate, with the Government soldier required for travelling even in the most frequented parts of Morocco. Mr. McCullagh apparently did engage such a soldier, but he imprudently dismissed him before reaching Agadir.

I beg leave to transmit herewith copy of a letter of protest addressed to me by the correspondent of the "Daily Express," and a translation of the letter I have addressed to Sid Guebbas in accordance with the instructions contained in your telegram No. 60.

I have, &c.
HERBERT E. WHITE.

Enclosure 1 in No. 218.

Vice-Consul Johnstone to Consul Madden.

(No. 92.)

Sir, *Mogador, July* 29, 1911.

WITH reference to my immediately preceding despatch of the 26th instant, relative to the presence of the Germans at Agadir, I have the honour to report that Mr. McCullagh, correspondent of the "New York Evening Post," and representing the "Westminster Gazette" in Morocco, left this port for England on the Royal Mail Steam Packet Company's steam-ship the "Agadir," on the 26th instant. Mr. McCullagh told me prior to his departure for Agadir, that he hoped to leave by that boat, if possible.

Mr. Ostler is still here, and is considering returning to Agadir, but for the moment is unwell and cannot travel.

The Governor has received a letter from Kaïd Guilooli, in answer to the letter sent at my request, demanding an explanation of the treatment received by two British subjects. Kaïd Guilooli declares that he had no idea the two correspondents were British subjects. as they passed his kasba without letters either from me or the governor of this town, and were unaccompanied by a soldier; if any British traveller arrives with proper credentials, the kaïd adds, he will be assured of an honourable welcome.

Kaïd Guilooli's explanation does not appear to me very satisfactory, as Mr. McCullagh had a soldier and Guilooli's letter, stating that a soldier was indispensable, arrived after both the correspondents had left this post. But, if Mr. McCullagh meets with a good reception on his return, I imagine this would be sufficient apology under existing conditions.

Both the French consul and a native courier who came to me from Agadir to-day confirm the report that a German gun-boat put into Agadir on the night of the 23rd, and left in the morning of the 24th, but neither can give the name or description of the vessel.

I am told that on Sunday the 16th instant a sailing-vessel flying the French flag arrived at Agadir, and that Herr Bock and Dr. Dorpinghaus, four other Germans, and four Moors landed from her. I had previously heard that this happened on the 23rd instant, but I find that my native informant was mistaken in his dates. The French consul is attemptng to ascertain what the vessel could have been.

I have received no further news of the German transport sighted by the captain of the "Agadir."

On native authority I learn that on Thursday the 27th instant the "Berlin" was the only vessel at Agadir.

I am further assured that the Germans are trying to purchase as much land as they can, but that the prices at present asked by the inhabitants are too high for them.

I am told on very good authority that much of the land has been sold two or three times over.

I have, &c.
H. B. JOHNSTONE.

Enclosure 2 in No. 218.

Mr. Sterwin to Mr. White.

Sir, *Tangier, August* 3, 1911.

WITH reference to a cabled request received by me from the London "Daily Express" newspaper to lodge an official protest against the expulsion of Mr. Alan Ostler, their special correspondent, from Agadir, and your subsequent request to furnish you with a detailed account of the incident, I now have the honour to inform you that a copy of Mr. Ostler's own despatch as it reached me will, I understand, be forwarded to you by the consulate.

I have, &c.
P. J. STERWIN.

Enclosure 3 in No. 218.

Despatch sent by Mr. Ostler to the "Daily Express."

I HAVE been turned out of Agadir.

That comes of being an Englishman in a country where the British policy consists of a careful and well regulated depreciation of British prestige.

Our Government, or our Foreign Office, has tried patiently for some years to convince the natives of Morocco that Englishmen are not really the admirable and much-to-be-respected men they believe them to be. My unceremonious expulsion of Agadir by order of the khalifa is the first tangible proof of the success of this admirable British policy. The British population of Agadir (there were two of us) has been evicted, ordered forth, kicked out by a lordly mud-coloured grandee who had the wit to realise that there was no need to propitiate Englishmen.

Might is the only manifestation of right in Morocco. Germany has a war-ship off Agadir; Germans are obsequiously respected. France has made her name a terror throughout the country; Frenchmen, much as they are detested, are obeyed and bowed down to.

But most unfortunately for Englishmen who may wish to travel in the south of Morocco, England is neither greatly feared nor (seeing that her refusal to accept Moorish offers is put down to cowardice) greatly respected. Hence it is beginning to dawn upon Moors that they may safely vent their religious antipathy to all Christians upon Englishmen.

"The khalifa says that you will go away from Agadir to-morrow morning"!

That was the message conveyed to me by a Moorish soldier on Friday night. It applied both to myself and to my fellow-countryman, the correspondent of a London newspaper (F. McCullagh, "Westminster Gazette").

The impertinence of the message is astonishing. Its original reason was almost amusing. Mr. McCullagh, my fellow-countryman, had some ten minutes previously refused to present the khalifa with binoculars.

The khalifa thereupon argued with himself thus:—

"These Englishmen give me no presents in order to conciliate me; they bring no letters imploring me to let them stay here; their Government sends neither war-ships to the coast nor soldiers to the interior. Therefore, I may safely insult them. Since there is nothing to be got out of them, out they shall go!"

It is perfectly true that, for my own part, I neither brought letters nor gave presents to the khalifa. I have spent some months in Morocco, and have visited a good many important towns; also a good many important people—such as the Sultan, and most of

his Ministers—and I have never yet been called upon to produce letters. On the contrary, I have been most honourably received—on the strength of my nationality—and invariably well treated. Now, as I said in a despatch from Agadir, the khalifa of that town did not receive me well. Neither did he treat me hospitably. He refused me a room to live in; so that I must camp in my tent, while French and German visitors, representatives of nations mighty in the eyes of the khalifa, were comfortably housed. Further he put a series of very cavalierly worded questions to me—"Who was I? What did I want? How long did I wish to be permitted to pollute the atmosphere of Agadir?" &c.

This is not the kind of treatment, I believe, usually accepted by an Englishman at the hands of Moorish, or any other officials, without resentment. My resentment took the form of withholding the present which I have hitherto invariably made to the chief functionary of any small Moorish town which I have visited.

Well, the khalifa felt himself slighted; and he saw no particular reason for accepting slights at the hands of so inconsiderable an animal as an Englishman. Hence, when he subsequently saw that Mr. McCullagh also deemed it unnecessary to repay his chill reception with rich gifts, he ordered the expulsion of the English.

And the English had to go. It is humiliating to admit it, but, beyond flatly refusing to go until two days later, there was nothing for us but to go.

To do them justice, the German residents were furious at the insult offered to us; not, of course, because it was an insult to Englishmen, but because it was an affront to white men from a representative of an inferior race. They urged us to appeal to the commander of the "Berlin" (whose hospitality on board his ship I had that day enjoyed) assuring us that he would compel the khalifa to give us permission to stay.

This he undoubtedly had the will and power to do. As an instance of the respect in which he and the country which has sent him here are held, I may say that, two days previous to my expulsion, Kaïd Guilooli, the governor of the entire district, formally applied to him to know whether Frenchmen and Englishmen were to be permitted to traval in this part of Morocco. The commander of the "Berlin" replied authorising Kaïd Guilooli to permit men of all nationalities to travel here.

And so, as I say, if we had applied to him, there is no doubt that the khalifa would have been humbled; for the word of the German commander is of greater weight than even the word of the governor of the district.

However, though deeply sensible of the generosity of the offer, both my fellow-countryman and myself decided that, if the prestige of my own flag is insufficient to protect us, we would not stay at Agadir under the protection of the German flag.

I left Agadir early in the morning. I refused to bid farewell to the khalifa—having already said all that I had to say to him in a somewhat heated interview on receiving his impolite order of eviction, and I did not ask him for the escort of soldiers which custom decrees that he should furnish to all Europeans leaving his town. Further, I refused to distribute "largesse" to the Kaïd of the Kasbah, the gate warden, and sundry other officials whose palms are generally greased by departing visitors.

On my way to Mogador, I called at the castle of Kaïd Guilooli, the governor. My fame had preceded me; and the governor evidently agrees with his deputy as to the absurdity of wasting politeness upon mere Englishmen. On requesting to see the governor, I was told that he was asleep. This is the Moorish equivalent for "not at home." Guilooli's men obviously acting under orders, refused to sell barley and fodder to the servant whom I sent to purchase provisions for my animals.

Altogether I have been most effectively made to feel that Englishmen don't count any longer in Morocco which is, of course, a thing to be thankful for, since it appears to be the end for which British diplomacy has been steadfastly working ever since the Anglo-French treaty of 1904 was signed.

ALAN OSTLER.

Mogador, July 25, 1911.

Later.—I have reopened this despatch to add that since writing it, I was requested to visit Mr. Johnstone, the British vice-consul here; Mr. Johnstone has read an account of my expulsion, and asked me for a detailed statement. I showed him this article as the plainest and fullest statement of the case which I am able to make.

Mr. Johnstone assures me that the matter will be taken up, and has written a strong letter to Guilooli.

Enclosure 4 in No. 218.

Mr. White to Sid Guebbas.

(After compliments.) *Tangier, August* 4, 1911.

I REGRET to have to inform your Excellency that two Englishmen, Mr. Ostler and Mr. McCullagh, correspondents of English newspapers, who went to Agadir, as several other foreigners have recently done, were ordered by the khalifa to leave the town at once. I understand that persons of other nationalities were not only permitted to remain at Agadir, but were provided with quarters in which to reside; it is therefore inexplicable that the only two British subjects at that place should have been refused quarters and actually ordered to leave the town.

I am instructed by His Majesty's Government to protest against this treatment of British subjects, and I have to insist upon Mr. Ostler and Mr. McCullagh being permitted to return to Agadir and remain there should they desire to do so, for it cannot be permitted that British subjects should be less favourably treated than the subjects of other countries.

I request your Excellency to furnish me with an early reply.

HERBERT E. WHITE.

[31906] No. 219.

Mr. White to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 14.)

(No. 254.)

Sir, *Tangier, August* 6, 1911.

THE British consular agent at Alcazar reported to me that he had been informed on the 3rd instant by the kaïd of the Makhzen troops at Alcazar that Colonel Silvestre had sent for him that morning and ordered him to vacate the barracks, which the troops have occupied up till now, and to leave the town. The kaïd requested that a term of four days be granted him in order that he might consult Sid Guebbas, and this was agreed to by Colonel Silvestre.

I mentioned the matter to the French chargé d'affaires, who told me that Sid Guebbas had sent his secretary to see him and had informed him of the incident, adding, however, that the kaïd had been given the alternative of placing himself entirely under the orders of Colonel Silvestre. Sid Guebbas informed M. de Billy that he had instructed the kaïd not to vacate the barracks unless turned out by force.

I told M. de Billy that these instructions appeared to me to be very rash, as they might provoke a serious incident. M. de Billy said he did not suppose that it was intended that actual force should be used, but that there should be a show of force, such, for instance, as a force of Spanish troops marching in with fixed bayonets.

I observed that it appeared to me that it would have been more dignified and better in every way that the kaïd should yield to the mere threat, without any show of force being resorted to. A body of Spanish troops marching down to the Moorish barracks and publicly turning out the Sultan's troops would have a deplorable effect upon the natives, and no advantage would be gained thereby. The little prestige left to the Makhzen in Alcazar would be destroyed, and the Spaniards would be looked upon as all-powerful. M. de Billy made no reply, but I hope he may give a hint to Sid Guebbas to be careful to avoid the occurrence of any unpleasant incident.

I have, &c.

HERBERT E. WHITE.

[31907] No. 220.

Mr. White to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 14.)

(No. 255.)

Sir, *Tangier, August* 7, 1911.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith copy of a despatch I have received from His Majesty's consul at Fez reporting the arrest of a German protégé.

The French chargé d'affaires, who had instructed M. Gaillard to strongly urge the

Makhzen to release the prisoner and make its excuses to the German consul, has just informed me that the protégé has now been released, and that the hajib will present his excuses to the acting German consul, whom he will meet for that purpose in the house of Sid Taib Mokri.

I have, &c.

HERBERT E. WHITE.

Enclosure in No. 220.

Consul MacLeod to Mr. White.

(No. 70.)

Sir, *Fez, August* 2, 1911.

THE following are the particulars, which have been given me by Sid Taib Mokri, of an affair which has arisen between the Makhzen and the acting German consul here, Dr. Pröbster:—

Amongst the palace emheznia there is one Mohammed-ben-Khadir Slawi. He holds land from the Makhzen, and in regard to this land some dispute had arisen. Slawi came to the palace yesterday in regard to this dispute, but was dressed as a civilian.

The hajib objected to his not wearing the cap and cloak of an emhazni when coming to the palace, and arrested him. Thereupon Abdelhalek Ghazi, scribe of the German consulate, came to ask for his release, and stated that Slawi was a German protégé. This the Makhzen denied, and refused to release him. Ghazi then sent for Dr. Pröbster, who explained that Slawi had been given German protection two months ago, and the Sultan's representative at Tangier, Sid Mohammed Guebbas, had been duly informed thereof.

The Sultan replied that it was not legal to protect a Makhzen employé, that no word had ever reached the Makhzen at Fez of this grant, and refused afresh to release him.

Dr. Pröbster then tried to take away Slawi by force, but, by the Sultan's order, Slawi was then and there rearrested, but is being kept in the hajib's house and would be well treated. I remarked that stories were current that Dr. Pröbster had used the butt of his riding whip to the man who rearrested Slawi. Sid Taib replied that, so far as he knew, and he was there at the time, there was no foundation for such stories, except that Dr. Pröbster had used very strong language in the course of the affair.

Sid Taib added he had done, and was still doing, his best to persuade the Sultan to release Slawi, not on the merits of the case, but merely to avoid friction at the present time.

I remarked that, whatever were the merits of the case, it was obviously not worth while making any trouble about it, and it was a great pity the Makhzen had not released the man straightaway, and availed of the chance to do a courtesy. Such incidents—and this Sid Taib entirely agreed with—only contributed to move the Governments affected to stronger courses than they might otherwise pursue. Sid Taib said that he would again try to persuade the Sultan to release Slawi at once, and by every means end the incident as soon as possible.

According to current reports, Dr. Pröbster had sent word of the affair to his legation by special courier.

I have, &c.

J. M. MacLEOD.

[31909] No. 221.

Mr. White to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 14.)

(No. 257.)

Sir, *Tangier, August* 8, 1911.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 253 of the 5th instant, I have the honour to transmit herewith copy of a despatch addressed to His Majesty's consul at Casa Blanca by His Majesty's vice-consul at Mogador, reporting that Kaïd Guilooli has addressed

a further letter of apology in regard to the expulsion of the newspaper correspondents, and has engaged that they will be well received if they return to Agadir.

Mr. Vice-Consul Johnstone also gives the latest news from Agadir, where the Germans are said to be taking possession of large quantities of land.

I have, &c.
HERBERT E. WHITE.

Enclosure in No. 221.

Vice-Consul Johnstone to Consul Madden.

(No. 96.)
Sir, *Mogador, August* 1, 1911.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 92 of the 29th ultimo, relative to the presence of the Germans at Agadir, I have the honour to state that I learn on good authority that the "Berlin" left Agadir on Friday last, the 28th instant, and has been replaced by the "Panther," arriving from the Canaries.

I have received a further letter of apology from Kaïd El-Guilooli, through his brother-in-law, Si Larbi Ben Tahar, respecting the expulsion of the two British correspondents from Agadir. El-Guilooli states that he had no idea that they were British, and assures them of a good reception if they return with a letter from me.

The French citizens at Agadir are also complaining of the bad reception which has been extended to them.

Mr. McCullagh evidently does not intend to return, but it is possible that Mr. Ostler may travel to Agadir after he has recovered sufficiently from his illness, which is due to a neglected strain. Dr. Ellison, who is attending him, hopes that he may be well in seven days.

I am told by a native courier from Agadir, who arrived here this morning, that on Thursday the 27th instant, a German gunboat put in to Agadir and left at night, but I have had no confirmation of this report.

The above-mentioned courier absolutely denies the report contained in my despatch No. 90 of the 24th ultimo, respecting the reception of the chiefs surrounding Agadir by the officers of the German man-of-war. He, however, states that in fifteen days' time the annual feast at the "Zawia" of Sidi Bibi will take place, to which come representatives of all the "Sus" tribes, and that it is intended that five representatives should be chosen from each tribe to put a question to the Haha tribesmen, whether the "Christians" come with the Sultan's authority or not. My informant assures me that Kaïd El-Guilooli has told the inhabitants of Agadir to abstain from the feast, since it was he who asked the Germans to open the port.

The courier further stated that the inhabitants of Agadir would like the port opened, but are afraid of the imposition of "Nzail," and furthermore believe that Kaïd M'Tuggi and El-Guilooli are acting in combination.

From the same source I am informed that the Germans have enclosed land which they have bought from Hadj Hassan and Si Hamed El Hut, and have taken and enclosed land in large portions, which land really belongs to the "Makhzen," and that they have decided on a locality called Bougram as the future waterport of the town. Bougram is situated immediately south of Sidi Abdallah, which is marked on the map of M. de Roquevaire, of 1904.

Dr. Dorpinghaus, of the Mannesmann venture, returned to this town from Agadir on Sunday the 30th ultimo, and has been stating that he has received news that the German Government have considerably modified their demands in case of the evacuation of Agadir.

The country round this port appears to be quiet for the present.

I have, &c.
H. B. JOHNSTONE.

[31910] No. 222.

Mr. White to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received August* 14.)

(No. 258.)
Sir, *Tangier, August* 8, 1911.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 257 of to-day's date, I have the honour to transmit herewith translation of a letter I have received from Sid Guebbas informing me that he has written very strongly to the Governor of Agadir on the subject of the expulsion of Mr. Ostler and Mr. McCullogh from that place.

Sid Guebbas requests that British subjects going to Agadir be furnished with letters of introduction from the Governor of Mogador. I have given instructions to this effect to Mr. Vice-Consul Johnstone.

I have, &c.
HERBERT E. WHITE.

Enclosure in No. 222.

Sid Guebbas to Mr. White.

(Translation.)
(After compliments.) *Tangier, August* 7, 1911 (12 *Shaban*, 1329).

WE have received your letter of the 9th Shaban in connection with the two men who went to Agadir, and have understood all you explain about them.

We have taken note thereof, and have written to the Governor of Agadir very strongly in the matter. We sent him our letter through the Governor of Mogador.

We trust you will instruct any one proceeding to Agadir to provide himself with a letter from the Governor of Mogador explaining who he is, so that no one may assert that he does not know him.

MOHAMMED-EL-GUEBBAS.

[31981] No. 223.

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received August* 14.)

(No. 143. Confidential.)
Sir *Zarauz, August* 9, 1911.

AS stated in my telegram No. 66 of to-day, M. Geoffray, French Ambassador, has been invited by his Government to favour them with his opinion as to the nature of the arrangements which will have to be made with Spain in the event of a settlement—agreeable to the remaining signatory Powers of the General Act of Algeciras—being reached between France and Germany.

His Excellency has replied that, in this eventuality, he can only suppose that it will be necessary to fall back on the Secret Franco-Spanish Convention of October 1904, the 3rd article of which is sure to be invoked by Spain as being applicable to the altered condition of affairs created by the presumed German recognition of what would amount to a French protectorate, and therefore to an undoubted alteration of the *status quo* in Morocco. In other words, his Excellency is of opinion that it will be necessary to recognise that, within the Spanish sphere as defined by article 2, Spain must be left at liberty to exercise her influence free from any restraining action on the part of France.

I gather from the conversation which I held with M. Geoffray at San Sebastian this morning that his Excellency is fully conscious of the extreme difficulty of devising a settlement with Spain which will secure her free action within the Spanish sphere consistently with the maintenance, which he considers absolutely necessary, of the unity of the Sultan's administration throughout the whole of Morocco. In his view, the Makhzen must necessarily become more and more the passive instrument of the French Government. It is to be feared that Spanish agents in the Spanish sphere will regard every action of the Makhzen as inspired by France, and that they will endeavour to thwart such action, and substitute for it their own independent authority. M. Geoffray feels, however, that unless France is prepared to repudiate her signature and incur the charge of acting in bad faith, she has no alternative but to give the régime contemplated by article 3 of the secret convention at least a trial. It would be hopeless to seek to replace that régime by a Franco-Spanish condominium at Fez. The expulsion of the Spaniards from northern Morocco without war would be also surely impracticable. To

resort to force for such a purpose would almost inevitably produce European complications. If Spain found that England no longer objected to her elimination from northern Morocco, she would be only too likely to seek support in Berlin. There remains, therefore, only a partition into spheres of influence, and the attempt must be made to assimilate, as far as possible, the administration of the French and Spanish spheres.

The French Ambassador believes that the logical result of the recognised French ascendency at Fez will be the transference of the diplomatic body from Tangier to Fez. He recognises that, whatever happens, arrangements will have to be made to preserve the special international position of Tangier.

The foregoing paragraphs state, as accurately as I am able, the personal views expressed to me in confidence by the French Ambassador this morning. His Excellency was careful to explain that they were provisional and subject to the aspect which the question would assume when the precise terms of the assumed Franco-German settlement became known.

Meanwhile M. Geoffray is instructed to intimate to the Spanish Government that the moment has not yet arrived for resuming the interrupted conversations.

I have, &c.
MAURICE DE BUNSEN.

[31970] No. 224.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 14.)

(No. 366.)
Sir, *Paris, August 12, 1911.*

I HAVE the honour to acquaint you that I am in receipt of M. de Selves's reply to the enquiry which I addressed to him in accordance with the instructions contained in your despatch No. 328 of the 3rd instant as to what action the French Government proposed to take in view of certain passages in the report of the Inspector-General of Moorish police.

His Excellency informs me that the question of the police in Moorish ports will of necessity be the subject of study on the part of the French Government, who are quite ready to come to an understanding on the subject with His Majesty's Government.

I have, &c.
FRANCIS BERTIE.

[32110] No. 225.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 14.)

(No. 120. Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Paris, August 14, 1911.*

MOROCCO.

My telegram No. 117 of 12th August.

French Ambassador at Berlin had an interview with the German Minister for Foreign Affairs yesterday. The latter, on supposition of the cession of the Bec du Canard and Togoland to France, returned to his demand described in my telegram No. 115 of 5th August for the French Congo territory from parallel 2 north-eastward to Ubanghi, down that river to the Alima, and up that river westward to the River Ogowe, and thence to the sea at a point between Libreville and the Muni.

French Ambassador at Berlin expressed surprise at the German Minister for Foreign Affairs renewing this demand, which the French Government, as he had informed the German Minister for Foreign Affairs, would not in any circumstance concede. Discussion then turned to the question of the cession to Germany of Ubanghi-Shari (see my telegram No. 117 of 12th August), and French Ambassador at Berlin desiring to preserve accession for France to the River Ubanghi, German Minister for Foreign Affairs said that territory to be ceded might stop at Banghi or Fort Possel, but in such a case Germany must have (added to the strip north of Libreville conterminous with Spanish Guinea already agreed on) the territory within a line from either Banghi or Fort Possel to navigable part of the Ogowe River.

French Minister for Foreign Affairs will consult with the Minister of the Colonies to day on these demands.

M. Cambon reports that the Chancellor and the German Minister for Foreign

Affairs are to have a consultation with the Minister concerned on 16th August, the result of which is to be submitted to the Emperor at Wilhelmshöhe on the 17th August by the Chancellor and German Minister for Foreign Affairs, who will remain there for dinner to be given on 18th August for the birthday of the Emperor of Austria. German Minister for Foreign Affairs will then go to Marienbad for five or six days' rest before returning to Berlin for the resumption of the negotiations.

[32111] No. 226.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 14.)

(No. 121. Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Paris, August 14, 1911.*

THE following information, dated the 11th instant, from Mogador has been received by M. de Selves:—

A messenger brought news to the German consul from Tarudant that an entrance had been forced into that place by men of the Haouara tribe. These men had, after a bloody fight, been repulsed. Tribes were leaguing together in order to attack the town, which was still held by the kaïd.

M. de Selves learns that a German, an Austrian, and an Algerian interpreter, all of whom are in the Mannesmanns' service, are at Tarudant. The Austrian consul at Mogador had learnt from his national that he desired the local Sultan to intervene on his behalf, as he considered that his life was in danger.

M. de Selves thinks it probable that the Germans are seeking pretexts for landing men at Agadir and for that purpose are endeavouring to establish rights and to promote disturbances in the Sus country. His Excellency considers that the procrastination of the negotiations at Berlin, to which I referred in my immediately preceding telegram of to-day, may be attributed to these intentions. M. Jules Cambon, in reply to an enquiry, reports that eventual preparations for a landing of troops at Agadir were being studied about ten days ago by the German General Staff. This information was obtained by fortuitous means.

In M. de Selves' opinion the French and British Governments should land men at Agadir if the Germans do so, and his Excellency would be glad to learn whether His Majesty's Government would be prepared to join in such action.

[32255] No. 227.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 348.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, August 14, 1911.*

M. CAMBON informed me to-day that M. de Selves was considering the basis of an agreement with Germany, under which the Germans would put France in the same position in Morocco as she had been placed by our agreement, while the French would make to Germany the concessions in the French Congo, of which I was aware. But French opinion was very sensitive about giving Germany territory which would cut the French Congo in half, and the French Government were therefore trying to get Togoland.

The French Ambassador in Berlin had had a short interview with Herr von Kiderlen on the 11th. The latter had spoken of going away soon for eight days or so, and there was to be another interview on the 16th.

M. Cambon then showed me the telegrams which had been sent to him, giving news of the trouble at Tarudant. The Austrian consul was interested in the matter, as one of the Europeans there was an Austrian; the other was a German. Both were employés of Mannesmann. The Austrian had suggested the intervention of Kaïd M'Tougi, which would probably lead to disorder on a large scale in the Sus.

He told me that it was stated that the Germans were considering the landing of troops at Agadir. He thought that such action would make it essential to send ships

to Agadir. He was therefore anxious to know what I thought should be done in the event of German troops being landed.

I said that it would be difficult to come to a decision before we knew what the circumstances were.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[32120] No. 228.

Lord Acton to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 15.)

(No. 120.)
Sir, *The Hague, August 14, 1911.*

WITH reference to your despatch No. 52 of the 12th instant, relative to the amendments which the Netherlands Government desire to insert in the draft Moroccan Mining Law and the compromise suggested by the French Government in regard to them, I have the honour to report that I am informed by the French Minister that he has been instructed to postpone a relevant communication to the Netherlands Government, pending the concurrence of the Cabinets of Berlin and Madrid in the details of the proposed compromise.

M. Marcellin Pellet will not fail to inform me of the text of his future communication to the Netherlands Government before the latter has been made in order that His Majesty's Legation may act in agreement with him upon this question.

I have, &c.
ACTON.

[32285] No. 229.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 15.)

(No. 122.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Paris, August 15, 1911.*

MOROCCO.

French Minister for Foreign Affairs gave me following information this morning:—

German Minister for Foreign Affairs sent for French Ambassador yesterday evening and told him, as a result of a consultation with the German Chancellor, that, owing to public opinion in Germany, Togoland could not be ceded, and reconsidered German requirements would be a cession of French territory to include both banks of the River Sangha and the liberty to use Brazzaville Railway for conveyance of German troops for embarkation on Congo River. All the territorial proposals hitherto made were left vague.

M. Cambon informed German Minister for Foreign Affairs that the French Government could not entertain any proposal for a cession of both banks of the Sangha River, and that as Togoland was not to be ceded great reductions must be made in proposed cessions of French territory. M. Cambon also expressed the opinion that if territorial arrangements were to come to anything they should be settled before German Minister for Foreign Affairs left Berlin, so that immediately after his return the question of arrangements regarding Morocco should be discussed.

M. Cambon is to have further interview with German Minister for Foreign Affairs to-morrow.

French Minister for Foreign Affairs suspects sinister motive for frequent changes in demands of German Government.

[32292] No. 230.

Sir V. Corbett to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 16.)

(No. 43. Confidential.)
Sir, *Munich, August 12, 1911.*

IT is becoming increasingly clear that the German public is seriously anxious as to the outcome of the Morocco negotiations. The bombastic and often facetious remarks of a section of the press have given way to a more serious tone, and even in some cases to the anticipation of a diplomatic defeat.

A fortnight ago it was generally believed in commercial circles here, and, I believe, throughout the Empire, that the Germans had gone to Agadir to stay, and that no arrangement with France that did not give them a footing in Morocco would be tolerated. It is now gradually leaking out that so far the negotiations have only turned on the question of compensations outside Morocco, and the disappointment and disillusionment are severe.

The extreme democratic papers some days ago began to clamour for the summoning of the Reichstag; that demand, however, was soon dropped in favour of one for the meeting of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Bundesrat, a proposal which also found favour with the National Liberals. Count Podewils, who was in Munich for one day this week, said the proposal to call the Reichstag together was of course ridiculous, and that there was hardly better reason at this stage for summoning the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the members of which had been kept *au courant* of the negotiations. A meeting of the committee would no doubt be held as soon as any agreement had been arrived at, but he did not anticipate that it would be necessary before September. An official communiqué in this sense has appeared in the Bavarian papers, in which it is pointed out that to summon the committee now would be tantamount to an admission that the Minister for Foreign Affairs did not enjoy the full confidence of the Federal Governments.

The Foreign Affairs Committee of the Bundesrat is an integral part of the constitution, though it was, I believe, never convoked during Prince Bismarck's tenure of office, and only materialised after the excitement caused by the Emperor's "Daily Telegraph" interview. In theory it is supposed to give the Federal Governments control over the foreign policy of the Empire; but in practice it seems to be a fifth and entirely superfluous wheel to the constitutional coach.

A pertinent, if rather unsympathetic, article in the "Frankfurter Zeitung" of the 10th says that it is not to be supposed that the committee will be summoned as long as the negotiations are still undecided. According to the rule its convocation only takes place when the Chancellor desires to give the representatives of the larger States information concerning the progress of an important phase of foreign politics. To do anything more than to receive information is hardly a matter for the committee. In most cases, however, its convocation is only a formality, and the committee has never succeeded in justifying its existence, so that if it were struck out of the constitution it would hardly make any change in the actual course of business. The Governments of the separate States can be kept directly informed by their diplomatic representatives of any important events in the sphere of foreign politics. In substance, however, the Emperor, as president of that league to which we give the name of the German Empire, is the independent international representative of the Empire, and only dependent on the Bundesrat and the Reichstag to the extent provided for by the limitations in article 11 of the Imperial constitution.

As far as can be judged from the present state of the negotiations as reported by His Majesty's representatives at Paris and Berlin, there is no likelihood of an immediate agreement, and a not improbable prospect if an agreement is arrived at of its being one which will not prove flattering to German vanity or even satisfactory to German material interests. Should this be the case, the confidence which has hitherto been felt not only in Pan-German but also in Radical circles in Herr von Kiderlen will receive a rude shock. When he became Foreign Minister it was confidently assumed that a new era had dawned in German foreign policy, in which the Empire would once more play the rôle in Europe which it did in Bismarckian days. The Potsdam interview was hailed as a new departure in this sense, and the satisfaction at what was felt to be an initial diplomatic triumph was unbounded. The dispatch of a war-ship to Agadir was only the fitting continuation of an energetic "world policy." Now that it is beginning to be seen that Germany will not get her way as easily as was expected, that the Anglo-French *Entente* shows no signs of weakening, and that the Potsdam interview has driven no wedge into the Franco-Russian Alliance, a feeling of bitter disappointment is apparent, and the confidence formerly felt in Herr von Kiderlen as the "strong man" is rapidly evaporating.

Should Herr von Kiderlen fail to achieve a satisfactory settlement, such failure must react not only on his Excellency's personal position, but indirectly also on that of the Imperial Chancellor. While a diplomatic triumph would be a valuable asset to the latter on the eve of an appeal to the electors, a defeat would no less certainly be the cause of serious embarassment. The predominance of the so-called "Black-Blue Block," on which the Government depends for a majority, already gravely imperilled, could then hardly be maintained.

The situation from the commercial, which appears to me to be the most important, point of view, since German foreign policy is above all things based on the desire of her expanding population for new and lucrative markets, is well summed up in an article which appeared yesterday in the "Deutsche Export-Revue." The writer says that Germany is following with unmistakable anxiety the progress of the Morocco negotiations, and that there is a general fear that the result will fall far short of what was expected. In spite of all the so-called compensations and guarantees it seems increasingly likely that Germany is retreating, and that she will only escape from the whole affair with one of those disagreeable diplomatic defeats of which she has already had experience. England has the whole Latin world in tow, and serious fears are felt in Germany that her bluff has been successful in high quarters here, and that Herr von Kiderlen, on whose strength so much reliance has been placed, is not possessed of the necessary authority to follow his course calmly and to insist on the well-pondered German claims demanded by the interests of the country. But concession would be something unheard of, not only disappointing, but harmful to German interests in Morocco. The Tangier correspondent of the "Morning Post" wrote recently that European speculators were buying land in the Sus district, relying on the protection of Germany, and that a retreat of Germany after it had so emphatically encouraged the undertaking of its subjects would damage the prestige of that country in Morocco for a generation. It is now plain that the "excursion" of the German ships to Agadir has become something serious: their dispatch cannot be done away with; German claims on Morocco cannot be settled by compensations elsewhere; Germany must, on the contrary, stick to her standpoint in spite of French and English threats. Do France and England desire war? Certainly not; they are far too sly, and only hope to frighten Germany by means of bombastic tirades. They know well enough that a war would bring them no advantage. France, thanks to lack of unanimity in her military head-quarters and frequent acts of *sabotage*, does not appear to be particularly ready for it, while England, who would lose her naval supremacy to America in the event of a European war, is quite aware what is at stake in case of a serious conflict. Neither country thinks of letting the sword decide, but Germany's prudent waiting encourages them to use boastful language. Germany must, however, keep undisturbed to its Moroccan demands and not offer to the world the spectacle of a pitiful retreat. If she does not at least obtain the same rights in Morocco as France and Spain, the dispatch of the German ships to Agadir will remain an inglorious campaign which will make her the laughing-stock of the nations. Further, it must not be forgotten that the humiliations which she may suffer in the sphere of diplomacy will react on her commercial relations with the whole world, and that her export will suffer perceptibly from them. The reputation enjoyed by her wares abroad must necessarily sink into pity under such a retreat, and German merchandise will in future not have the same respect as that of other "greater" Powers. This is certainly one of the worst results of the "excursion." The writer does not wish at this time, when the negotiations are said to be approaching their end, to point to the results which may be expected from a weak retreat from Morocco and the attaining of compensations elsewhere—compensations which could not make up for the Moroccan claims. The Government has the sacred duty of preserving its authority against all strangers whoever they may be. A slow retrocession in German claims can only make her opponents more and more haughty, and cause the voice of Germany, which in Bismarck's days gave the tone to the world, to be continually less and less regarded. In spite of her loyalty to Austria, Germany has not won many laurels lately, and Agadir will not bring in many if the affairs follow the course which now seems probable. To-day Germany says one thing "under the stress of necessity," and to-morrow she says another, still "under the stress of necessity." The German export trade will have in consequence to put up with hard times; Germany will have to suffer much in her commercial relations if every small nation thinks that it can treat her as it likes. In the interests of German commerce, of its importance and its reputation, there must be no retreating in the Morocco question. If Germany's reputation is to be preserved everywhere in foreign countries there is only one solution of the question: "There must be no yielding."

Efforts have been made in some quarters to drag the name of the Emperor into the discussion and to make His Majesty the advocator of a peace-at-any-price policy. It would seem that the feeling is rather that if His Majesty has been called upon to exercise a restraining influence, the blame should not be laid on him, but on those who embarked on a policy of adventure without assuring themselves that they had the means to carry it through.

I found my French colleague, whom I met yesterday, rather perturbed in his mind. He said he did not see how any arrangement satisfactory to both parties could be arrived at, and that his latest news from Paris, where his brother-in-law is Secretary-General at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, was not encouraging. He even mentioned to me in strict confidence that he had been warned not to go far from Munich, as in the case of a rupture of relations it might be necessary to withdraw the mission here. He did not pretend that there was any immediate fear of such an eventuality, but the mere fact that it should be considered even remotely possible is perhaps not without interest. He is an old colleague and intimate friend of mine, and spoke very frankly. He said that the French army was now better than it had ever been, and as good as it was ever likely to be, so that if the worst came to the worst, the present moment, with Russia still loyal to the French alliance, might not be the most unfavourable for bringing matters to a head.

I have, &c.
VINCENT CORBETT.

[32378] No. 231.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 16.)

(No 123.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Paris, August 16, 1911.*

MOROCCO.

German Minister for Foreign Affairs put off until to-morrow interview which he was to have had to-day with French Ambassador.

[32285] No. 232.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 192.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, August 16, 1911.*

MOROCCO.

Reports of conversations at Berlin, described in your telegrams Nos. 120 and 122 of the 14th and 15th August, have been shown to me by M. Cambon. The prospect of a settlement being arrived at seems more probable according to the account given of the latter of these two conversations.

As regards Agadir, I informed his Excellency that if Germany were to land troops there temporarily and on a reasonable pretext, as, for instance, the death of the German who appears to be in serious danger at Tarudant, I do not think that we should act at once.

Two alternatives, however, suggest themselves if the landing should be prolonged indefinitely: (1) we might propose a conference; or (2) we might follow the suggestion of the French Minister for Foreign Affairs and dispatch ships to Agadir.

I told M. Cambon, however, that Germany might mobilise on the French frontier should the latter course be taken, and that we should, therefore, be prepared for this eventuality before taking action at Agadir. We should also agree beforehand what we would do should such a situation arise.

I gave this as my personal opinion, as I had not yet conferred with the Prime Minister on the matter.

[32647] No. 233.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 18.)

(No. 126. Very Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Paris, August 18, 1911.*

MY telegram No. 125 of to-day respecting Franco-German negotiations.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs is inclined to think that unless the Pan-Germanists succeed in persuading the Emperor that he will be acting contrary to the traditions of the Hohenzollerns if he does not insist on the German demands, and that public opinion in Germany will adopt that view, His Majesty will remain pacific.

M. de Selves believes that M. de Kiderlen-Waechter's procrastination may be

accounted for by his desire to watch the effect of the strikes in England, in order to see whether British action in foreign affairs is likely to be hampered by the present disturbances. M. de Selves thinks that M. de Kiderlen-Waechter originally intended to establish Germany permanently in a portion of Morocco. In view, however, of the attitude of Russia and England in favour of France, which M. de Kiderlen-Waechter had not foreseen, he made up his mind to try and get such large concessions from France elsewhere as would reconcile German public opinion to getting nothing in Morocco.

[32639] No. 234.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 18.)

(No. 60.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Berlin, August* 18, 1911.

IN course of conversation with the Secretary of State about Morocco yesterday, he informed me that the negotiations were not making good progress; not only had France reduced her original offers, but she was also demanding more from Germany. Herr von Kiderlen said that any modification of German demands had been rendered most difficult by the press indiscretions of the French Government. and that, if the negotiations broke down, it would be entirely the fault of the latter. It did not for the moment seem clear how any satisfactory arrangement was to be arrived at. A rather acrimonious conversation between Herr von Schoen and M. de Selves appears to have been the cause of the Secretary of State's depression.

Herr von Kiderlen saw M. Cambon in the afternoon, and, although but little advance was made in the geographical negotiations, the discussion seems to have been more amicable. Herr von Kiderlen did not seem averse to considering M. Cambon's proposal for the cession by Germany of a strip of Togo, which they might call a rectification of frontier, but he still refused the whole of Togoland. The conversation was then diverted by M. Cambon to Morocco, and he said that the negotiations for colonial compensation might be facilitated if his Government were informed exactly what Germany understood by a free hand. During the conversation that ensued, Herr von Kiderlen accepted M. Cambon's definition of Morocco, namely, that the Sus district should be included, and agreed that a secret Act acknowledging French protectorate should be drawn up, that Germany should not interfere in any Franco-Spanish negotiations, and that the minimum period for which any mutual agreement respecting commercial liberty should be binding should be fixed at thirty years.

I found M. Cambon not dissatisfied with the result of the discussion. As the result of an arrangement with M. Cambon, who is going to Paris, Herr von Kiderlen will be absent from Berlin until the 28th instant. His Excellency left last night for Wilhelmshöhe.

[32652] No. 235.

Mr. White to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 19.)

(No. 260.)
Sir, *Tangier, August* 11, 1911.

I LEARN from the French chargé d'affaires that the Sultan is very anxious to proceed to Rabat as soon as possible, and I understand that the ladies of the harem, who were dispatched to Marrakesh some time ago in anticipation of His Majesty's move to that city, and who were recently sent for to return to Fez, have now been told to wait at Rabat.

The French are opposed to Mulai Hafid's leaving Fez until his authority has been fully established and order has been completely restored in that district.

There have been signs of unrest recently amongst certain of the tribes, and it is feared that rebellions may break out again after the harvest operations are over, unless the Sultan remains at Fez and the French are at hand to repress any incipient rising.

The Sultan has not sufficient troops of his own to enable him to march to Rabat without French support, so it is not likely His Majesty will leave Fez, whatever his own inclination may be.

Unsatisfactory rumours about the Sultan's state of health have recently been very persistent amongst the better-class Moors here—officials and others. He is said to have been indulging in one of his drinking bouts and that the effects are worse than usual, showing a tendency to lasting dementia. I have, however, received no report to this effect from Mr. Consul MacLeod, and M. de Billy tells me that M. Gaillard reports merely excessive neurasthenia.

One cannot help feeling that it would be a good thing for the country, and would considerably simplify the task of the French, were Mulai Hafid to become clearly incapable of remaining Sultan so that he could be peaceably dethroned by decree of the Ulema. The French Legation do not appear, however, to realise how much they they are handicapped by maintaining His Majesty on the throne.

I have, &c.
HERBERT E. WHITE.

[32654] No. 236.

Mr. White to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 19.)

(No. 263.)
Sir, *Tangier, August* 12, 1911.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 250 of the 5th instant, I have the honour to report that Raisuli had a long interview with the French chargé d'affaires, with the result of which they both appeared satisfied.

I understand that Raisuli spoke very plainly about M. Boisset's proceedings, and M. de Billy did not in any way resent what he said.

On the other hand, M. de Billy took Raisuli to task for the contributions he has enforced upon some village under his jurisdiction, and the latter gave explanations on the subject.

Raisuli pointed out the difficulties of his position, and M. de Billy gave him advice as to his relations with the Spanish officials.

Mr. Harris told me that in speaking to him of the meeting M. de Billy said he was very glad to have had the conversation as it had enabled him to understand points that had not been clear to him before.

Before the meeting M. de Billy had told me that he considered Raisuli to be the cause of all the trouble that had arisen with the Spaniards and said that he was going to give him a good scolding; after the meeting, however, I noticed a great change in his tone; he was evidently well pleased with the meeting and impressed by what Raisuli had said.

I have, &c.
HERBERT E. WHITE.

[32655] No. 237.

Mr. White to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 19.)

(No. 264.)
Sir, *Tangier, August* 12, 1911.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 254 of the 6th instant, I have the honour to report that on the expiration of the four days of grace the Spanish troops took possession of the barracks, which had been occupied by the Shereefian troops, without any untoward incident occurring.

M. de Billy tells me that he wrote to recommend that the troops should leave the barracks without making any difficulty, and he believes that his letter arrived just as the Spanish troops were about to take possession.

The Makhzen troops, on vacating the barracks, left Alcazar and marched to the other side of the Loukkos river, where they joined the mehalla with Lieutenant Thiriet.

I have, &c.
HERBERT E. WHITE.

[32656] No. 238.

Mr. White to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received August* 19.)

(No. 265.)

Sir, *Tangier, August* 13, 1911.

I HAVE the honour to report that General Moinier, accompanied by General Ditte with a portion of his brigade, is at present on his way to Mequinez and Fez by the new direct road through the Zemmour. He will be joined half-way by portions of the brigades of General Dalbiez and Colonel Gouraud, when General Ditte will march his troops back.

When at Fez General Moinier will discuss with the Sultan the measures to be adopted for pacifying the country, as several of the tribes are becoming restless owing in a great measure to the exactions of the Makhzen in excess of the war indemnities, which General Moinier had assured them would be all they would be called upon to pay.

The garrison at Sefroo will be increased, as the Ait Yusi are threatening trouble. Disturbances are also feared in the direction of the Ait Chegrouchen tribe, where a Shereef is preaching a holy war. Akka ben Hammu, the powerful Berber chief, who made his submission but subsequently took fright and escaped from Mequinez, is also endeavouring to raise the tribes against the Sultan, and unless steps are taken there will be trouble when the harvest is over. In the Zerhoun district there are also signs of unrest, and General Moinier will also visit that tribe. Owing to the excessive heat he will, however, take no French troops, but only Algerians and Senegalese.

After completing this programme the general proposes to return to Shawia through the Zaer country.

I have, &c.
HERBERT WHITE.

[32657] No. 239.

Mr. White to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received August* 19.)

(No. 266.)

Sir, *Tangier, August* 13, 1911.

THE French chargé d'affaires received a radiogram on the 12th instant from his consul at Mogador reporting that he had been informed by Kaïd Guellouli that the Howara and other tribes had attacked and taken Tarudant, and that the Mannesmann agents, who were at that place, were in considerable danger, as it was on account of the proceedings of the Germans and owing to the belief that the Governor of Tarudant had been bought by them that the tribes had attacked the town.

This morning M. de Billy received a further radiogram from his consul, dated the evening of the 11th instant, in which it was stated that after severe fighting inside the town the tribesmen had been driven out of Tarudant, but that the position was still critical. The Mannesmann agents there were a German and an Austrian with an Algerian interpreter. Letters had been received from them by the German and Austrian consuls at Mogador asking that Kaïd Guellouli should march a force to Tarudant to rescue them and to punish the tribes.

The French consul considered that action of that kind on the part of Kaïd Guellouli would probably cause a general rising of the Sous tribes and disturb the whole district. He had therefore recommended that the release of the men should be effected by negotiations.

M. de Billy was relieved to find that there was only one German at Tarudant, and that he was accompanied by an Austrian and a French subject. He said that if an expedition is to be sent to rescue them the French would be entitled to join in it, as one of the party is an Algerian.

I have, &c.
HERBERT WHITE.

[32658] No. 240.

Mr. White to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received August* 19.)

(No. 267.)

Sir, *Tangier, August* 14, 1911.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith copy of a despatch from His Majesty's vice-consul at Mogador reporting the visit to Agadir of the Spanish steamer "Cartagena," on board of which were the Spanish consul at Mogador and Mr. Rius, owner of the line of steamers to which the "Cartagena" belongs, and other Spanish gentlemen, including a deputy, an engineer, and the proprietor of the "Imparcial" newspaper.

His Majesty's consul at Casa Blanca informs me that he was told by one of the passengers of the "Cartagena" that the officers of the "Berlin" seldom land, and do not make any shooting expeditions into the interior.

I have, &c.
HERBERT E. WHITE.

Enclosure in No. 240.

Vice-Consul Johnstone to Consul Madden.

(No. 99.)

Sir, *Mogador, August* 7, 1911.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 96 of the 1st instant, and to my radiographic despatch of yesterday relative to the presence of Germans at Agadir, I have the honour to report that the Spanish consul and his companions returned to this port on board the Spanish steam-ship "Cartagena" this morning.

From one of the Moors who accompanied the expedition I learn that a boat was dispatched from the "Panther" to the Spanish ship to demand what the ship wanted to do at Agadir, and, on receiving the reply that the passengers only wished to see the place, they were allowed to land. M. Farache, a Mogador Jew, acted as interpreter for the German officers.

I have no means of ascertaining what actually took place between the Spanish consul and the officers, but Don Gustave de Sostoa has been constantly with the German vice-consul here since his return from Iffni.

It is reported, on good authority, that a meeting of the country kaïds is now taking place on the occasion of the feast of Si Tawli Kut, in M'Tugga. It is said that Kaïds M'Tuggi, Hajji, Khuben, and a representative of Kaïd Keraimi, as well as a Kaïd Zimzim, from Haha, have all met to discuss the present situation. The result of the meeting will not be known until the end of this week.

I have received no further news of any importance from Agadir during this week.

I have, &c.
H. B. JOHNSTONE.

[32667] No. 241.

Sir C. Spring-Rice to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received August* 19.)

(No. 138. Confidential.)

Sir, *Stockholm, August* 15, 1911.

I HAVE the honour to inform you that the Swedish Minister in Paris told me to-day that he has often spoken with M. de Schoen, his German colleague, with whom he had been well acquainted in St. Petersburgh, on the subject of the Morocco question. As you are aware, Sweden is a signatory of the Algeciras Convention, and invariably acts in conformity with the desires of Germany in everything that relates to Morocco. Count Gyldenstolpe told me that M. de Schoen had often complained of the difficulty experienced in getting M. Cruppi to take any definite steps in the direction of carrying out the engagements of 1909. The Ambassador, who was himself very strongly in favour of a peaceful solution, deplored the weakness and indecision of the French Government, which seemed quite incapable of exercising effective control over the financial magnates whose co-operation was required. On one occasion M. de Schoen had observed in a tone of impatience that it might be necessary to take some overt

step in order to call the attention of the Government and public in France to the necessity of taking a serious view of the situation. Count Gyldenstolpe thought that it was possible that the advent of the new Government in France might have appeared a suitable occasion of giving this object-lesson in the gravity of German diplomacy. He expressed a firm confidence, which he said was felt by the German Embassy, in a peaceful solution, and especially in the pacific character, tact, and firmness of M. de Selves. But he said that the almost savage tone recently adopted by both the French and German press seemed to him a bad augury for the future. It appeared to be believed in Paris that some of the most violent of the French newspaper articles were inspired by financial influences far from friendly to France. I venture to repeat Count Gyldenstolpe's observations as he has just arrived on a short leave of absence and has no doubt been consulted by his Government.

I have, &c.
CECIL SPRING-RICE.

[32646] No. 242.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 19.)

[By Post.]

(No. 125.)
(Telegraphic.) *Paris, August* 18, 1911.

AT the interview yesterday between the French Ambassador at Berlin and M. de Kiderlen-Waechter the former asked whether the latter had any fresh proposals to make in view of the fact that Germany was not prepared to cede Togoland, for without that cession France could not maintain all her offers. M. de Kiderlen-Waechter said that public opinion would not permit the cession of Togoland. He dropped the acquisition of Ubanghi-Shari, but he revived the demand for the Alima frontier. M. Cambon reminded him that the French Government had already refused to entertain that proposal. M. de Kiderlen-Waechter said that the Bec du Canard was a valuable concession, and that the French Government did not seem disposed to come to terms. M. Cambon denied this, and the conversation then turned on what Germany was to renounce in Morocco supposing that the territorial arrangements could be agreed on.

In the discussion M. Jules Cambon elicited from M. de Kiderlen-Waechter that Germany would agree to disinterest herself as regards Spain in Morocco and leave it to France to come to an arrangement with Spain; that Germany would require a recognition of the right to export minerals, but would accept the thirty years provided for in the Anglo-French agreement of 1904.

M. Jules Cambon enquired, as Togoland could not be ceded, whether there could be a rectification of frontiers which might reconcile French public opinion to some cessions of French territory elsewhere than south of the Sangha. M. de Kiderlen-Waechter replied that he did not say either yes or no; he would reflect on the suggestion. He must absent himself from Berlin for ten days if possible, as he required rest, and he suggested that the French Government should consider what offers they could make other than those already put forward, and that there should be another meeting not sooner, he hoped, than the 28th.

The French Ambassadors at Berlin and London are to come to Paris to consult with the French Government on the situation.

[32791] No. 243.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 19.)

(No. 127.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Paris, August* 19, 1911.

BERLIN telegram No. 60 of 18th August: Morocco.

French Minister for Foreign Affairs says that it is not true that French Government have not only reduced their first offers but are asking for more from Germany. As to press indiscretions, there seem to be more indiscretions at Berlin than at Paris (*vide* "Lokalanzeiger," "Cologne Gazette," and "Frankfurter Zeitung" and other German newspapers). The adjournment of discussions between German Minister for Foreign Affairs and French Ambassador is caused by desire of the former to absent himself for

ten days on the plea of ill-health; and advantage of this adjournment is to be taken by M. Cambon to come to Paris on 21st August to consult with French Government.

French Minister for Foreign Affairs says that he has not had any somewhat heated discussion with German Ambassador. He had not seen German Ambassador for a fortnight past until 16th August. Ambassador pleaded illness as reason for his absence. French Minister for Foreign Affairs expressed to him regret which he felt at small progress made in discussions, and said that withdrawal of Togoland from bargain to be made would naturally greatly modify situation, and that French Government must take that into account in offers of French territory, and that frequent changes in demands made by Germany, which he cited to the Ambassador, rendered negotiations very difficult.

German Ambassador shared regret expressed by French Minister for Foreign Affairs, and said that public opinion in Germany rendered cession of Togoland impossible. French Minister for Foreign Affairs reminded him that public opinion in France had to be considered by French Government in question of cessions of French territory. The conversation of German Ambassador was, French Minister for Foreign Affairs states, most placid ("des plus calmes"), and he does not believe that German Ambassador can have reported otherwise to German Minister for Foreign Affairs, who, having put forward impossible pretensions, is trying to save his face by misrepresenting attitude of French Government and endeavouring to throw blame for situation on them.

[32792] No. 244.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 20.)

No. 128. Secret.)
Telegraphic.) P. *Paris, August* 20, 1911.

FRANCO-GERMAN negotiations.

I went to see the Prime Minister this afternoon at his request. M. Caillaux pointed out that, in order to placate Germany, it might be necessary for France to make such concessions in the Middle Congo as would cut off the northern part of her colony from direct communication with the sea. If this were the case, M. Caillaux expressed his desire to know whether His Majesty's Government would consider proposals for an exchange of territories, by which France would acquire sufficient territory in Northern Nigeria to give her access from her Northern Congo territory to her possessions north of Nigeria through the Bec du Canard, to be acquired by her from Germany as a result of the negotiations.

As regards the situation at Agadir, M. Caillaux states that if the Germans land men or increase their naval force there for the purpose of protecting German life and property, or on some other pretext, the French Government will send ships to Mogador and Saffi to take whatever action the Germans may take at Agadir.

On the Prime Minister expressing the hope that His Majesty's Government would take similar action, I replied that this would, in my opinion, depend upon the nature of the circumstances which gave rise to possible further demonstrations at Agadir on the part of Germany.

[32841] No. 245.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 21.)

(No. 232.)
Sir, *Berlin, August* 18, 1911.

I HAD a short conversation with the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs yesterday just before he saw M. Jules Cambon. His Excellency complained very much of the manner in which the French Government continually shifted their ground, and said that now they were reducing the offers which at one time they had been ready to make, and at the same time were increasing their own demands. He pointed out to me again how the whole situation had been affected by the early French indiscretions, and how difficult it was for him to modify the German demands once they had been given to the public. He also complained bitterly of the French military press, which he said, was deliberately inciting to war. I said that I had read some articles in the German newspapers which seemed to me also to go rather far in that direction. He

said that he fully admitted it, but that they were the result of the French articles, particularly those in "La France Militaire," which were outrageous. He added that in consequence of these articles on both sides the excitement in Germany was growing, and he really could not see how a satisfactory agreement was to be reached. He then alluded to the incident at Aix-les-Bains, of which he had just heard, and said that though he did not attach much importance to it himself, it would, he feared, have a deplorable effect on public opinion. I may mention at once that later on in the day the French Ambassador called on him and explained to him, by M. de Selves's instructions, that an enquiry into the affair had shown that it had been greatly exaggerated, and that no French officers had been concerned in it. M. Cambon told me that Herr von Kiderlen had seemed intensely relieved by the explanation. His Excellency had at once ordered a communiqué to be sent at once to the papers, and had instructed the press bureau to do all in its power to prevent the false reports from being repeated. It would seem, therefore, that Herr von Kiderlen is sincerely anxious to avoid anything which might add to the difficulties of the situation.

Immediately after I had left the Imperial Foreign Office my French colleague was received by Herr von Kiderlen. M. Cambon told me that he also had found that Herr von Kiderlen depressed and not very well disposed, and he attributed this depression to his having just received the report of a somewhat acrimonious discussion between M. de Selves and the German Ambassador in Paris.

But after a little mutual recrimination they seem to have got to business, and to have made some progress, if not with the exchanges to be made in Equatorial Africa, at all events with that part of the negotiations which concern Morocco.

I have had the honour to telegraph to you what appeared to me to be the main points of the discussion, as related to me by my French colleague, and as you will doubtless receive a full account of the conversation from Paris, I will not trouble you by going into them again. I may mention, however, that M. Cambon, who had been rather anxious as to whether Herr von Kiderlen would make difficulties with regard to the Sus country, was very relieved to find that he accepted quite readily the French definition of Morocco, namely, from the Algerian frontier down to the Spanish colony of Rio de Oro. In fact, Herr von Kiderlen seems to have agreed to everything that M. Cambon suggested with a view to making it clear what France was to receive in return for her colonial sacrifices in Equatorial Africa.

As regards M. Cambon's suggestion that, if the German Government found it absolutely impossible to hold to their former offer of Togoland, a strip of that country might be ceded in the form (for the public) of a rectification of frontier, Herr von Kiderlen said that he would not say "Yes," neither would he say "No," but that it might offer a solution, and he would think over it. In any case the whole of Togoland was quite out of the question.

At the close of the conversation Herr von Kiderlen suggested that they should both go on leave and return to Berlin on the 28th instant. "When we meet then," Herr von Kiderlen said laughingly, "we will decide whether it shall be peace or war."

I have, &c.
W. E. GOSCHEN.

[32792] No. 246.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 195.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, August* 21, 1911.

YOUR telegram No. 128, Secret, of 20th August.

Proposals in first part will receive careful consideration of His Majesty's Government, but in view of the present delicate state of negotiations I trust that French Government will not take so decisive a step as the sending of ships to Mogador and Saffi without further consideration and before I have had an opportunity of discussing matter with the French Ambassador.

Such action might be open to objections pointed out in penultimate paragraph of my telegram No. 192 of 16th August.

Dispatch of French ships to two open ports would be no real set-off to presence of Germans at Agadir, while it would inevitably be considered by Germans as provocative, and must render negotiations more difficult.

[33180] No. 247.

Sir V. Corbett to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 22.)

(No. 45. Confidential.)
Sir, *Munich, August* 20, 1911.

THE feeling of profound disappointment at the course, so far as it is known to the public, of the Morocco negotiations continues to find expression in the German press of all shades.

When the "Panther" first sailed to Agadir it was taken for granted that the move would be crowned with the same decisive effect as followed the German intervention at Petersburgh in 1909. Two months have now passed and the situation has not improved. The negotiations, which it was expected would bring about the definite recognition of Germany's right to "a place in the sum" are still dragging on infructuously, and the French Government so far from giving way is understood to be stiffly maintaining its ground, with the moral support of England and Russia. That England, in the throes of a momentous constitutional struggle, to say nothing of her labour troubles, should still take an active interest in Moroccan affairs, and that Russia, despite the fair words of the Potsdam interview, should remain faithful to her ally, are facts as surprising as they are disconcerting to the German mind.

It seems to me to be ominous that both in France and Germany the eventuality of war is beginning to be spoken of as a contingency regrettable but possibly unavoidable. That some persons, and those not the least influential in France, believe that the French military and naval forces will, if not to-day, at least in a few months' time be sufficiently strong to justify the Government in risking an appeal to arms is, I believe, an open secret. The renewal of the French propaganda in Alsace-Lorraine points the same way. In Germany the colonial party and those in touch with them are profoundly dissatisfied; it would require very little to fan their discontent into a blaze.

War may not be imminent—I believe it is not—but unless the present German grievance that they have no room for expansion be removed, I feel convinced that sooner or later the force of internal interests will compel a recourse to arms. Should this unhappily be the case, domestic differences will be forgotten, and the German nation will march as one man to make a final bid for the hegemony of the world.

Illustrative of the almost universal feeling here was a lecture delivered in Munich on the 16th instant by Professor Count du Moulin Eckhart on the subject of Morocco. Its economic and natural importance to the German nation lay, the lecturer declared, in its great mineral wealth and extent of fertile agricultural land, which would ensure the prosperity of millions of German colonists, and could create a suitable home for the surplus German population. Germany needed colonies, but not only colonies in the tropics where the speculative spirit of her merchants alone could find free play. From this point of view the exchange of the French Congo would be useless to her. As regarded a war with France, the German people did not fear war, but it desired peace so long as it could be enjoyed with honour. If the question was examined from the point of view of international law, Morocco in this sense no longer existed; the country had become free through having no longer any real master. The fear of war need not deter Germany from putting out a hand to assure herself of her own share; other nations had continually done so while she looked on. But no war was necessary for that, why should it be if diplomatic skill and sound sense could find the right way out of the difficulty? The speaker closed with the words "lay your hands on it, Germans!"

The speech was enthusiastically applauded, and the following telegram was sent to the Imperial Chancellor:—

"The south of Germany is to the highest degree agitated by the report that the Imperial Government intends to give up Morocco and to make an exchange of German colonies. We beg your Excellency to declare that there can be no thought of such a bargain. Never since the existence of the Empire has the seriousness of the situation been so unanimously felt by young and old, in north and south, even to the most lonely mountain villages of Upper Bavaria. Our desires are with the Government for an honourable peace, reposing on that strength of the Empire of which both people and

Government are equally conscious. Neither weak submission nor compensation, only the fulfilment of our just claims can lead to the goal. Hence, let there be no 'Back from Agadir!' Let us remain true to your Excellency's motto: *Nunquam retrorsum.*"

I have, &c.
VINCENT CORBETT.

[33055] No. 248.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 22.)

(No. 372. Secret.)
Sir, *Paris, August* 21, 1911.

AS I had the honour to inform you by my telegram No. 128, Secret, I had an interview with the President of the Council yesterday. His Excellency began the conversation by expressing great satisfaction at the termination of the strikes in England, and at the firmness with which His Majesty's Government had met the dangerous situation which had been created by them. He then went on to say that he hoped that the cessation of internal trouble in the United Kingdom would have a good effect on the Franco-German negotiations concerning Morocco. M. de Kiderlen-Waechter had got himself into an awkward position. He had utilised the German press to excite public opinion in his support, and the pan-German public was getting out of hand, and the danger was that though the German Emperor was, M. Caillaux believed, not in favour of pressing impossible demands and of incurring the risks of war, the personal reputation of M. de Kiderlen-Waechter was involved in the question, and he might have difficulty in persuading the public that he was demanding and obtaining what he had led them to expect. The suspension of the conversations at Berlin on the pretext of M. de Kiderlen-Waechter requiring ten days' rest was for the purpose of awaiting the result of the strikes in England, so that he might judge how far the action of His Majesty's Government in matters of foreign policy would be likely to be hampered or modified thereby. Now that the danger of internal troubles in the United Kingdom had disappeared the German Government might become more reasonable, but an agitation was being got up by the pan-Germanists, and the Emperor and his Government might be forced to adopt a menacing attitude. M. Caillaux had no information that the German Government contemplated an increase of their naval force at Agadir or a landing of men there, but disturbances in the Sus district which German agents were endeavouring to promote, or the protection of German life and property, might possibly be made the pretexts for an increase of their naval force or a landing of men. The French Government had determined that in either of those events they would send ships to Mogador and Saffi to act at those ports in the same way as the German ships at Agadir. M. Caillaux said that he hoped that His Majesty's Government would join in such action by also sending ships to those ports. I reminded his Excellency of a recent conversation which you had had with the French Ambassador, who had asked you what you thought as to sending French and British ships to Agadir in the event of there being a landing of German troops there, and I expressed the opinion that His Majesty's Government would require to be acquainted with the circumstances for which the Germans had landed men at Agadir before they came to a decision in regard to sending British ships to Mogador and Saffi. M. Caillaux requested me to submit the question to you. He said that for the satisfaction of public opinion in France it would be absolutely necessary to make a demonstration at Mogador and Saffi if the Germans took further action at Agadir, and he earnestly trusted that His Majesty's Government would join in such a demonstration.

The President of the Council then turned to the territorial questions between the German and French Governments. He said that except for the strip of the Congo abutting on Spanish Guinea and running from the coast near Libreville to Ouesso, the French Government were not prepared to make any cessions of territory to Germany south of the Sangha River. How much they would cede north of that river and to the east of the German colony of the Cameroons would depend upon whether Germany gave up Togoland, or part of it, as a "rectification of the frontiers," in addition to the Bec du Canard in the Cameroons. All this M. Caillaux indicated on a map, and he requested me to enquire of you whether, in the event of it becoming necessary in order to placate the German Government and preserve peace, to make such concessions of French territory as would cut off the northern part of the French Congo from direct

access to the sea, His Majesty's Government would entertain proposals for an exchange of territories by which France would receive a cession of territory in the north of British Nigeria which would give to her Northern Congo colony access through the Bec du Canard to her possessions north of Nigeria.

M. Caillaux then spoke of the state of public opinion in France and the question of war. He said that he did not think that either the German Emperor or the majority of his people desired war, and certainly neither the French Government nor the French people desired it, but in France an opinion was gaining ground that Germany was putting upon France, and there was consequent irritation. There was not now the same fear of Germany as there was some years ago. The French army was quite different now from what it was in 1870. As was then proved, the German army was vastly superior to the French army. Now, however, the French army was in a highly efficient state and the people had confidence in it, and the men had confidence in their officers and in themselves. The result of battles was always doubtful, and he trusted that war would not ensue from the question of Morocco, but if it did come the chances in favour of France would he believed be good.

I have, &c.
FRANCIS BERTIE.

[33056] No. 249.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 22.)

(No. 373.)
Sir, *Paris, August* 21, 1911.

IT is announced in the "Temps" of this evening's issue that 250 men of the 5th Engineers are to leave Marseilles on the 24th instant for Morocco.

Their mission, so it is stated, is to build a narrow gauge railway in the neighbourhood of Fez.

I have, &c.
FRANCIS BERTIE.

[33051] No. 250.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 22.)

[By Post.]

(No. 129.)
(Telegraphic.) *Paris, August* 21, 1911.

MOROCCO.

I have communicated to the President of the Council your telegram No. 195 of to-day. He wishes me to convey to you his grateful appreciation of the willingness of His Majesty's Government to consider the question of a possible exchange of territories to give to France access from her northern Congo colony to her possessions north of Nigeria.

M. Caillaux attaches the greatest importance to your opinion, and he will do nothing in regard to sending ships to Mogador and Saffi until after the matter has been discussed with you by the French Ambassador, whom he has seen this morning on the subject.

[33202] No. 251.

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 23.)

(No. 147.)
Sir, *Zarauz, August* 16, 1911.

I NOTICE that, in the course of the conversation with you which is recorded in your despatch No. 86 of the 9th instant, King Alfonso, in pressing for British support in Morocco, claimed that Spain had made sacrifices in the past to gain such support; that she delayed her agreement with France in 1904 because she wished to have the signature of His Majesty's Government; and that the agreement, when eventually made, was less favourable to Spain than it might have been some time before.

It seems to me probable that, in making these remarks, His Majesty alluded to the abortive negotiation which took place between France and Spain in the year 1902 (see General Report on Spain for 1906, paragraphs 38, 39, and 40). France then proposed to partition Morocco into spheres of influence between herself and Spain, the line of division between the two being traced, as I have often been assured by Spanish statesmen, in such a way as to include both Fez and Taza within the Spanish sphere. The sacrifice which King Alfonso had in mind was the rejection by Spain of these advantageous proposals on the ground that England had not been consulted, and that Spain preferred not to negotiate behind the back of England concerning questions in which England was so largely interested. It is of course evident that His Majesty's Government would never have consented to an arrangement which ignored entirely the large British interests involved.

The Spanish Government showed, therefore, if the above account of the affair is correct, only common wisdom in refusing to conclude at that time the proposed convention. King Alfonso, I imagine, was making the most of the fact that the Spanish sphere of influence as marked out in the 1904 convention with France was shorn of the region in which Fez and Taza lie, and that the said convention attached to the exercise of Spanish influence within the allotted Spanish sphere some awkward restrictions from which the project of 1902 is understood to have been entirely free.

I have, &c.

MAURICE DE BUNSEN.

[33199] No. 252.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received August* 23.)

[By Post.]

(No. 130. Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) *Paris, August* 22, 1911.

M. DE SELVES sent for me this evening in order to give me an account of the situation in regard to Morocco, which is as follows:—

There was a conference this morning, at which were present the President of the Council, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, the Ministers for War, Marine, Colonies, and Justice, and the French Ambassadors at Berlin and London. M. Jules Cambon informed the conference of the state of feeling in Germany. He stated that there was great excitement in military circles incited by the Pan-German press, which had accused the Emperor of cowardice, thereby causing the entourage of His Majesty to assume an anti-French attitude.

M. Jules Cambon does not think that the Emperor is inclined for war, nor that M. de Kiderlen-Waechter is, but unless he obtain what will be regarded as a success by the German public his personal position will be seriously affected. These circumstances constitute dangers to the maintenance of peace, and it seems doubtful that M. de Kiderlen-Waechter wishes the negotiations for territorial arrangements with France to succeed. The French Ministers, after considering the situation, have resolved to make to Germany offers of territory in French Congo which are very large and adequate considering that the German Government will not cede Togoland or any part of it, and will only give France the Bec du Canard.

M. de Selves will give me a detailed description to-morrow of the territory which the French Government propose to cede in addition to the strip abutting on Spanish Guinea from near Libreville to Ouesso. From his cursory description I gather that it would be the territory north and east of the Sangha, bounded on the east by the Ubanghi to a point south of Bangi, where that river is navigable, and thence in a north-westerly direction towards the Bec du Canard, which will become French. This arrangement would place Northern French Congo in communication with the sea by the Rivers Ubanghi and Congo.

The French Government are of the opinion that if the German Government do not accept these proposals it will mean that they do not desire to come to an arrangement with the French Government.

M. de Selves asked me what I thought the German Government would do if the territorial negotiations fell through. I said that I did not think that they would summon France to evacuate Morocco as had been talked of, but they might remain at Agadir. His Excellency stated that such was the conclusion at which the French

Ministers had arrived, and if the German Government landed men at Agadir or increased their naval force there a situation would be created which would require France to take action. No Ministry could survive the acceptance of such a situation, and the French Government have resolved in either of such events at Agadir to send ships to Mogador and Saffi and to occupy other parts of Morocco territory. M. de Selves asked what would be the attitude of His Majesty's Government in such circumstances.

I suggested to M. de Selves that if there was a landing of Germans at Agadir it might be for some specified reason, such as the protection of German life and property. It might be a pretext, but if the French Government immediately thereupon occupied Mogador and Saffi and other parts of Morocco territory, it would give colour to the assertions of the German press that France was taking possession of Morocco without justification, no French lives or property being endangered, and it was most important that France should not give an opening to an accusation of bringing on a conflict.

M. de Selves replied that the French were prepared to make the great sacrifices of territory which he had mentioned to me, but it would be quite impossible for them not to take action such as he had described if there were a change in the *status quo* at Agadir increasing the position of Germany there. What, therefore, it would be most important to obviate would be any such change in the *status quo*. He had no information that the German Government were meditating a landing or an increase of naval force, but would it be possible for His Majesty's Government to convey to the German Government in some indirect manner, and not in any way as a French menace, that a landing or increase of force would inevitably complicate matters and render negotiations for an amicable arrangement impossible, as French public opinion would be such as to render it unavoidable for the French Government to take some action?

M. Paul Cambon has left this afternoon for London in order to put the situation before you and to enquire what the attitude of His Majesty's Government will be, supposing that the territorial offers of the French Government be refused by the German Government, a refusal which the French Government consider will mean that Germany does not desire to come to an arrangement with France.

[33413] No. 253.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 200.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, August* 23, 1911.

I AM told by French Ambassador that it has been decided by French Government to dispatch ships to Mogador and Saffi, and to send military force to Marakesh if Germany makes a landing at Agadir. M. Cambon asks that His Majesty's Government should also send ships to Mogador and Saffi in the event of Germany taking this step. In reply I have stated that view of His Majesty's Government is that before recourse is had to active measures, a conference should be proposed on the lines previously suggested by me. His Majesty's Government would, I added, be ready to propose a conference on these lines.

In answer to a question as to how we should proceed should Germany refuse a conference, I said that I must consult the Prime Minister and my colleagues before replying, but that my personal opinion was that our position would be much stronger for taking active steps if a conference were refused.

[33413] No. 254.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 355.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, August* 23, 1911.

THE French Ambassador came to see me to-day, and showed me the projet of a convention between France and Germany, drawn up in Paris, of which he could not give me a copy, as it was not yet definitive.

I read it, and observed that it amounted to a veiled protectorate for France over Morocco, with a guarantee for economic equality similar to that which had been put in our agreement with France. The proposed convention seemed to me to go beyond this agreement in one respect only: it contemplated a cession of consular jurisdiction on the part of Germany.

M. Cambon said that of course this would be a matter for a separate arrangement. I told him that I saw nothing to object to in the proposed convention in principle.

M. Cambon informed me that the part of French Congo offered to Germany north-east of the Sanga River was equal to the whole of France in superficial area; if Germany did not accept this she could not be satisfied. In any case, the French Ambassador at Berlin was instructed not to break off negotiations. If they were broken off it must be by Germany.

M. Cambon then told me that his Government had decided that it would be abolutely necessary for them to take some step if Germany landed troops at Agadir. In this event they would send ships to Mogador and Saffi and some troops to Marakesh, and would inform Germany that they would retire from these places when Germany left Agadir. He was charged to ask me whether we also would send ships to Mogador and Saffi. The French Government felt quite certain that if Germany thought we were going to side with France there would be no conflict; and they were most anxious to have our moral support.

I replied that it was not certain that there would be no conflict if Germany thought that we would side with France. Germany might be quite prepared to take the risk of war against a combination. I had discussed this matter with the Prime Minister and my colleagues, and we had come to the decision that we ought not to take any active step before a conference had been proposed. Therefore, if the situation which the French Government contemplated arose, we should be ready to propose a conference on the lines which I had previously suggested.

M. Cambon said that Germany would probably refuse to accept the proposal of a conference, and he asked what would happen then.

I replied that I had not discussed that contingency with the Prime Minister and my colleagues, so that I could give him only my personal opinion. It seemed to me that if Germany refused to go to a conference we should be on much stronger ground with public opinion in any step which it might then be necessary to take.

M. Cambon observed that in the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina a conference had been proposed and refused, and the matter had been allowed to go by default.

I said that the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina was no parallel to the case of Morocco. We had not actually proposed a conference, and had simply said that we could not give our consent to the alteration of an international treaty until the other Powers who were parties to it, and especially the Powers who had a more direct interest in it than we had, had also given their consent. We had let it be understood that we made no conditions of our own, and that when other people were satisfied we also would be satisfied. But if Germany remained indefinitely at Agadir, landed a force, and occupied a part of Morocco, it would amount practically to a partition of Morocco. We could not allow that to happen without having our say in the matter.

I am, &c.

E. GREY.

[33414] No. 255.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 24.)

(No. 190.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *St. Petersburgh, August* 24, 1

FRANCO-GERMAN negotiations.

Your despatch No. 219, Very Confidential, of the 19th August.

I saw French Ambassador yesterday, and his Excellency told me that quite recently a formal assurance had been given by the Russian Government to the effect that France might count not only on Russia's diplomatic, but also on her military support. M. Louis did not know, however, whether Russia had intimated this to Germany. M. Nératof, he said, had at first adopted the view that the whole thing was a mere bit of bluff on the part of Germany, but he was now not nearly so optimistic.

[33477] No. 256.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 24.)

(No. 134. Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Paris, August* 24, 1911.

YOUR telegram No. 200 of last night and my despatch No. 376, Most Confidential, of yesterday.

M. Paul Cambon's report of his conversation with you yesterday was shown to me by M. de Selves this evening. I asked him whether he could not persuade his colleagues in the Cabinet not to bring matters to a crisis by a hurried occupation of Saffi, Marakesh, and Mogador, in the event of further action being taken at Agadir by Germany. M. de Selves observed that if France did not thereupon take immediate action Germany might occupy Mogador as well as Agadir.

The question will be discussed at the Council of Ministers to-morrow, and M. de Selves will bring before his colleagues the considerations which you had mentioned to the French Ambassador.

[33424] No. 257.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 25.)

(No. 376. Most Confidential.)
Sir, *Paris, August* 23, 1911.

IN the course of the interview with the Minister for Foreign Affairs, of which I had the honour to give you an account in my telegram No. 130, Confidential, of yesterday, I pointed out to his Excellency that, if the French Government occupied Mogador, Saffi, and other parts of Morocco as a counter-stroke to a German landing at Agadir or an increase of the German naval force there, such action by the French Government might be taken by the German Government as a throwing down of the gauntlet and a defiance to Germany. It might put a stop to all further negotiations, make it certain that Germany would refuse a conference, and bring on an immediate conflict.

M. de Selves said that neither the present Ministry nor any French Ministry could survive a quiescent acceptance of such a situation as was contemplated as possible at Agadir, and the Ministry had fully and carefully considered the question before coming to the decision of which he had informed me.

To-day was M. de Selves' reception day. I found on my arrival in the ante-room the German, Russian, and Spanish Ambassadors. They were discussing the Morocco question in a general way. I took no part in the conversation. Baron de Schoen's observations were to the effect that, in his opinion, matters would be arranged; the suspension in the conversations at Berlin would give time for reflection and consideration of the questions at issue; the essential thing would be to devise a formula which, without mentioning the word "protectorat," would give to France all that she could require in Morocco and would secure Germany's economic interests. His Excellency then left, and the *huissier* announced to the Russian Ambassador that M. de Selves was ready to receive him.

I was then alone with the Spanish Ambassador, who spoke to me of the grievances of Spain and the desirability of the Spanish Government joining in the Berlin conversations; otherwise, later on when Germany and France had come to terms, Spain might have difficulties with France. No doubt Germany would be quite ready to recognise the legitimate claims of Spain, but that alone would not suffice. I asked M. Caballero whether the German Government had shown any desire to acquire Spanish Guinea or Fernando Po as a price for the recognition of Spanish claims in Morocco in the same way as they asked for cessions of territory in the French Congo for a recognition of the claims of France. The Ambassador said that no such pretensions had been advanced by the German Government. The conversation was stopped by the return to the ante-room of the Russian Ambassador, who remained with me after M. Caballero left it to see M. de Selves.

M. Isvolsky spoke to me to the effect that it would be deplorable that there should be a war on account of Morocco; that he could not see what harm the Germans at Agadir and in the Sus country could do to France, supposing that the French Government could not get them out of Agadir by compensations elsewhere. A German occupation of Agadir might affect British interests, but not those of France. I observed

that the French Government did not see things in that light and would not accept the establishment of Germany in Morocco. As to British interests, an unfortified Agadir would not injure them; but, as he knew, engagements not to fortify did not hold good long, as had been shown by Bizerta and, I added, by Batoum. This he admitted. I asked him whether if there were war he thought that Austria would take the field in support of Germany. His answer was that it was impossible to say, for the exact terms of the Triple Alliance were not known except to the parties to it. All the European alliances being so far as was known defensive in their terms, who was to decide as to which was the attacked party so as to entitle it to the armed support of its ally? If, however, war began between France and Germany it would almost certainly cause a general European war.

The language of the Russian Ambassador being strange for the representative of the ally which had, the French Minister for Foreign Affairs had informed me, given assurances to the French Government of support to the cause of France in Morocco, I asked M. de Selves when my turn to see him came whether there was any change in the attitude of the Russian Government, for M. Isvolsky's conversation had given me the impression that the Russian Government might wish the French Government to make greater sacrifices to Germany than they were prepared to do, and notably at Agadir. M. de Selves, with a smile, said he knew what the Russian Ambassador's views were, for he had expounded them not only to him but to a journalist; but they were not those of the Russian Government, as he had ascertained by inquiry at St. Petersburgh. The reply of the Russian Government, which had been kept fully informed of the discussions with the German Government, was entirely satisfactory. It was that Russia would give to France her full support as her ally. I next referred to the apprehensions of the Spanish Ambassador, and M. de Selves told me that M. Caballero had just expressed to him the desire of the Spanish Government to resume the discussions concerning Morocco and to join in the conversations at Berlin. M. de Selves had, he said, replied to the Ambassador that he would be happy to resume the discussions at the earliest opportune moment, and would give the requisite instructions to the French Ambassador at Madrid; but the time had hardly yet come, considering that it was impossible at present to foresee what the issue of the conversations at Berlin would be; and as to a Spanish participation in those conversations, it was the German Government which had declined to admit the participation in them of any other Power than France. Whenever matters had been settled between France and Germany, the French Government would be prepared to discuss with the Spanish Government the claims and wishes of Spain, with every desire to gratify them as far as might be reasonably possible.

After these references to the Russian and Spanish Ambassadors, I mentioned to M. de Selves the sanguine language of the German Ambassador, and I asked whether M. de Schoen could be taken as knowing and expressing the views of the German Government. M. de Selves said that from the conversation which he had just had with the Ambassador he discerned the possibility of a change at Berlin. He had expressed the regret which he felt that the Ambassador had not been authorised to fully discuss with him the question of Morocco, for he felt that with M. de Schoen's conciliatory disposition an agreement might soon have been come to. The Ambassador had thereupon said that he now had the requisite authority and would discuss the matter with him very shortly.

M. de Selves is inclined to think that it is possible that the German Emperor and his Chancellor, feeling that M. de Kiderlen-Waechter has been too exacting, desire to take advantage of his being absent on a holiday—a holiday which may be prolonged according to circumstances—intend to endeavour to come to an understanding with the French Government through His Majesty's Ambassador at Paris.

M. de Selves was not able to show to me in detail the cessions of territory mentioned in my despatch No. 372 of the 21st August, which the French Government are prepared to make to Germany in return for an absolutely free hand in Morocco, for he had not received from the Colonial Department the maps to illustrate them. He said that unless the formula for the renunciation by Germany of all political claims in Morocco and for her recognition of a French protectorate, if later on desired by France, be perfectly clear and be concurred in by the other parties to the Act of Algeciras, he will find great difficulty in reconciling the French Chambers to the great sacrifices of French territory which the French Government contemplate as the price of a free hand for France in Morocco.

I have, &c.

FRANCIS BERTIE.

[33451] No. 258.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 25.)

[By Post.]

(No. 132. Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Paris, August 24, 1911.*

MY despatch No. 376 of 23rd August.

Minister for Foreign Affairs has shown to me this evening on maps the several cessions of territory which the French Government would be ready to offer in succession to Germany in return for a free hand in Morocco. Firstly, from junction of Sangha with Congo River northward to Ibenga on Ubanghi and then in a north-westerly direction to north of conventional line (passing Carnot, which would remain French) to Cameroons frontier. Secondly, starting from between Ibenga and Mongumba in a north-westerly direction, and including Carnot in territory to be ceded to Germany. Thirdly, starting from same point but keeping to north-east of River Bali and crossing due north the conventional line and including a piece of Ubanghi as far as non-navigable part of River Logune. Fourthly, the same as thirdly, but reaching to Lai on navigable part of River Logune.

[33452] No. 259.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 25.)

[By Post.]

(No. 133. Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) *Paris, August 24, 1911.*

MY despatch No. 376 of yesterday.

M. de Selves gave to me this evening the following information:—

The German Ambassador called on him this morning, and after expressing his anxiety to facilitate an understanding enquired the nature of the free hand which the French Government desired in Morocco, for it would be difficult to put the word protectorate into a formal paper. M. de Selves replied that it would be immaterial to the French Government what the protectorate might be called provided that it was equivalent to one.

Baron de Schoen then asked what were the ideas of the French Government in regard to commercial and industrial matters and mines. M. de Selves answered to the effect of the draft convention which the French Ambassador communicated to you yesterday, and said that there would be no export duty on iron ore, that the construction of railways, telegraphs would, like public works and other undertakings, be by adjudication, but their working ("exploitation") must be in the hands of the Morocco Government, or in those of the companies to which the Government might grant a working concession.

M. de Schoen then said that Germans had obtained considerable mining interests in the Sus country, and it would be desirable that the working of any railways as well as their construction should be in German hands, great importance being attached in Germany to the Sus country as rich in minerals. M. de Selves told the Ambassador that he did not see how the German Government could, whilst giving a free hand in Morocco to France, expect such a reservation as M. de Schoen had suggested.

The conversation then turned to the question of territorial cessions, and M. de Selves indicated on a map the alternative cession described in my immediately preceding telegram as "firstly."

M. de Schoen, whilst disclaiming any authority from the German Government to negotiate, said that M. de Selves' offer would be quite inadequate, and he indicated a line running from the extreme point of the Bec du Canard in a south-easterly direction to the Ubanghi River as the one within which all the French territory between it and the Cameroons and down to the Sangha River had already been offered by M. Jules Cambon. M. de Schoen also said that it would be necessary that Germany should have south of the Sangha the line of the Alima.

M. de Selves reminded M. de Schoen that the French Government had already refused to concede the line of the Alima, that the offers made on behalf of the French Government by their Ambassador at Berlin had been on the supposition that Togoland,

or a part of it, would be ceded to France, which now was not the case, and that he had certainly never made the extreme offer which M. de Schoen attributed to him. M. de Selves would, however, ask M. Jules Cambon, who was waiting to see him, to come in and explain himself. M. de Schoen was very much taken aback. M. Jules Cambon came and denied *in toto* having made any such offer himself. The line described by M. de Schoen was something like one which M. de Kiderlen-Waechter had suggested and he (M. Jules Cambon) had rejected. Such a line would bring into contact French and German frontier officials, which it had been his endeavour to avoid by having as far as possible river boundaries.

M. de Schoen will telegraph to Berlin for instructions, and will see M. de Selves again to-morrow.

M. de Selves says that the German Government shift their ground so frequently that he can hardly believe that they wish negotiations for an arrangement to succeed.

[33556] No. 260.

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 25.)

(No. 67.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Zarauz, August 25, 1911.*

YESTERDAY the French Ambassador notified to the Spanish Prime Minister that the numbers of the French military mission at Fez were about to be increased, and that the French Government relied upon Spain to prevent the occurrence of any unpleasant incident at Alcazar, through which place the French officers would pass on their way to Fez, after landing at Tangier. Señor Canalejas gave the French Ambassador satisfactory assurances in this respect.

M. Geoffray considers that the decision to augment the French military mission at Fez may be interpreted as an indication that the French Government feel confident of reaching an agreement with Germany, as they would otherwise have hesitated to embark on such a step at this time.

His Excellency further informed me that a new draft Franco-Spanish convention, of which he read me out the text a few days ago, is now about to be submitted for your approval before being shown to the Spanish Government. The new convention attempts to adapt to present circumstances that of October 1904, conceding to Spain full exercise of her influence within her recognised sphere. A new point, however, is the omission of all reference to Ifni, which the French Government are anxious to retain under their own influence as some compensation for the sacrifices which will be made to Germany in exchange for a settlement, whereby Spain, as well as France, will profit in Morocco.

M. Geoffray has not yet seen the final form of this draft convention, but he has been authorised to submit the general purport to the Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs.

[33559] No. 261.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 26.)

(No. 135. Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Paris, August 25, 1911.*

THERE was a meeting of the French Cabinet this morning, at which it was decided that the President of the Council and the Minister for Foreign Affairs were authorized to use their own discretion as to whether any action, and if so what action, should be taken in the event of an alteration of the *status quo* at Agadir. In my opinion, nothing will be done without previous consultation with His Majesty's Government. I saw M. de Selves this evening, and his Excellency told me that he quite appreciated the reasons given by you to M. Paul Cambon for not taking any action pending a proposal for a conference.

[33572] No. 262.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 26.)

[By Post.]

(No. 136.)
(Telegraphic.) *En clair.* *Paris, August 25, 1911.*

M. DE SELVES informed me this evening that the German Ambassador, with whom he had an appointment for 3 o'clock, had written to him saying that, as the President of the Council had asked to see him, perhaps M. de Selves would like to fix some other time for the interview. M. de Selves, after ascertaining from M. Caillaux that there must be some misapprehension, for it was not he who had asked to see the German Ambassador but it was the Ambassador who had asked to see him, wrote to M. de Schoen to say that he did not desire to change the appointment and that he should expect him at 3 o'clock, at which hour the President of the Council would be at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs on other business than Morocco and the Ambassador could see him if he so desired.

The interview was between the three. The German Ambassador at first showed a disposition to again claim the line of the Alima, saying that he understood that the French Government might be disposed to concede it. M. Caillaux flouted the idea, and stated that the Cabinet had unanimously decided against it. There was some general but vague discussion, and without definite result. M. de Schoen's tone was, however, more moderate than at his previous interview with M. de Selves.

[33698] No. 263.

Sir F. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 26.)

(No. 85.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Vienna, August 26, 1911.*

AN article appeared on the 25th instant in the "Neue Freie Presse" on the subject of Germany's action with regard to Morocco. This article, which bore no signature, purported to give the views of an English diplomatist in an important position on the subject of the Moroccan crisis. It only advances opinions which have already been published in leading journals in England and France, and does not contain anything which is not well known. According to information which I have received the article is from the pen of Dr. Muenz, a well-known writer. I had a few moments conversation with him the day before I left Marienbad, in which place he came up and spoke to me in the street. I must decline to take any responsibility for the article, and although I may hold some of the opinions which are expressed therein, I did not communicate them to Dr. Muenz (who is deaf). The greater part of the article is mere conjecture on his part.

I am informed that the German Embassy here want to attribute the article to me, and mean to initiate a campaign against M. Crozier and myself in the German press. All the correspondents of German newspapers in Vienna were summoned to the German Embassy yesterday and given the order to make an attack on me. The "Neue Freie Presse" has incurred the chief fury of the Germans for its independent attitude in producing an article giving Anglo-French views of the Moroccan question.

[33703] No. 264.

Mr. White to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 27.)

(No. 147.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Tangier, August 27, 1911.*

A FEW days ago Sid Guebbas informed German Minister that he had heard from the Governor of Mogador that Europeans at Tarudant were in danger, and he requested that they be instructed to return to the coast under escort. German Minister, after consulting his Government, has replied that captain of cruiser at Agadir reports Tarudant quiet; that the German Government expect the Makhzen to assure safety of Germans at that town so that German Government should not be obliged themselves to take necessary steps to ensure their safety.

French chargé d'affaires thinks that this reply is intended to induce the French Government to hasten to accept German terms.

[33785] No. 265.

Mr. White to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received August* 28.)

(No. 269.)

Sir, *Tangier, August* 17, 1911.

THE action taken by Germany at Agadir has made a considerable impression on the native population throughout the country, and has in some measure brought to life the false hopes raised by the dramatic visit of the Kaiser to Tangier in 1905.

When in trouble the Moors now again turn to Germany for assistance and protection, and this is the case even at Tangier, the German Minister being sometimes embarrassed by the appeals that are made to him.

A few days ago a large deputation of Moors—over 200, I am informed—representing two districts of the town, waited upon the German Minister to expose their grievances. They stated that they paid the new house tax, but that, whilst the roads outside the town were being relaid, their own streets and drains were still in the same state as before the institution of the tax. They also complained that Moorish masons, &c., were not employed on the works in progress.

The German Minister suggested that they should address themselves to the doyen of the diplomatic body, but they replied that their appeal was to the German Minister, that they pinned their faith on the German Emperor, who had visited Tangier and had given them the fullest assurances of His Majesty's good-will and interest in their behalf, and they insisted on Baron von Seckendorff's bringing their appeal to His Majesty's notice, to which he had to assent. The deputation went away satisfied, and are now patiently awaiting the results of His Majesty's intervention on their behalf.

The house tax has as yet been only levied for one year, and half of the net proceeds is taken by the Makhzen, therefore the amount available for expenditure on the town is comparatively small; it was paid over to the "Commission d'Hygiène," and, together with the amount collected by private subscriptions, is being expended on the scavenging service, lighting and repairing the streets, &c. The works to which the deputation referred are those put up to tender by the Adjudications Committee, had paid for out of the proceeds of the special tax of 2½ per cent. on imports, to whcih the districts represented by the deputation pay nothing. The labour employed by ten contractors is principally native, though the superintendents are Europeans.

I have, &c.

HERBERT E. WHITE.

[33786] No. 266.

Mr. White to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received August* 28.)

(No. 271.)

Sir, *Tangier, August* 19, 1911.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 266 of the 13th instant, I have the honour to report that, in accordance with instructions received from Paris, the French chargé d'affaires called upon the German Minister and suggested that the Makhzen be requested to take steps to secure the return in safety of the Europeans at Tarudant to the coast.

Baron von Seckendorff told M. de Billy that he had received no report from his consul at Mogador regarding the recent attack on Tarudant, and that the captain of the "Berlin" had telegraphed quite recently to his Government reporting all quiet in the district, he thought, therefore, that the importance of the attack had been exaggerated. Baron von Seckendorff nevertheless expressed his willingness to act upon M. de Billy's suggestion, and he subsequently called upon Cid Guebbas and requested that the necessary steps be taken for the safety of the Germans at Tarudant.

Cid Guebbas sent instructions to Kaïd Guillooli to arrange for the safe return of the Europeans, and M. de Billy told me that arrangements were made for two Sus kaïds under French influence to act as intermediaries between the Governor of Tarudant and the tribes, with a view to restoring peace. The tribes, however, who are much incensed at the proceedings of the Mannesmans, insist upon the Europeans leaving Tarudant before negotiations are opened. It appears, however, that the Mannesmans have sent instructions to their agents to remain at Tarudant, so the situation has become more complicated, and there may be trouble.

The tribes in the neighbourhood of Agadir are getting impatient at the prolonged stay of the German cruiser, and the arrival of Europeans at that place, and their demeanour towards Europeans going into the country has lately changed.

M. de Billy is under the impression that the German Government and officials are anxious that tranquillity should reign in the neighbourhood of Agadir, and that no incident should arise to necessitate any further action on their part, but that the Mannesmans are anxious to provoke such an incident so as to force the Government's hand.

I have, &c.

HERBERT E. WHITE

[33787] No. 267.

Mr. White to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received August* 28.)

(No. 273.)

Sir, *Tangier, August* 19, 1911.

HAVING learnt from the British vice-consul at Rabat that sales of slaves were taking place there in a "fondak" set apart for that purpose, I addressed a letter on the subject to Cid Guebbas, requesting him to give stringent orders for the discontinuance of such sales.

His Excellency furnished me with a letter addressed to the Governor of Rabat, which I forwarded to Mr. Vice-Consul Cross for delivery. Mr. Cross now reports that the Governor of Rabat has now entirely prohibited the sale of slaves by auction under penalty of a long term of imprisonment. The "fondak" where the sales took place has been demolished, and no slaves will in future be exposed for sale.

I have, &c.

HERBERT E. WHITE.

[33789] No. 268.

Mr. White to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received August* 28.)

(No. 275.)

Sir, *Tangier, August* 21, 1911.

ACCORDING to a radiogram published in the local French paper of this morning, dated Agadir, the 16th instant, and dispatched from Mogador on the 19th, there are twelve Europeans at Tarudant, viz., one Englishman, one Spaniard, three Germans, and seven Frenchmen. I cannot say at present whether this report is correct; if so, the British subject is probably Mr. Manners-Sutton, who has been at Marrakesh for about a year, and was said to be going to visit Tarudant. I beg leave to transmit herewith copy of the radiogram in question.

His Majesty's vice-consul at Mogador reports that the Spanish consul at Mogador was very well received by the officers of the "Berlin" and dined on board that vessel.

The Spanish consul and his companions spent some time in examining some property lying outside Agadir recently purchased by Italians through the agency of the Italian vice-consul at Mogador.

The natives of the town were pleased at the arrival of the "Cartagena," taking it as a sign that the port would be opened to trade. On the other hand, a German, who had just returned from Agadir, told Mr. Vice-Consul Johnstone that, though the towns-people welcomed Christians, the members of the surrounding tribes resent their presence, and have lately shown signs of their hostility towards them.

I have, &c.

HERBERT E. WHITE.

Enclosure in No. 268.

Extract from the "Dépêche marocaine" of August 21, 1911.

LA SITUATION À AGADIR.

VOICI de nouvelles précisions sur les incidents de Taroudant dont nous avons déjà parlé :—

Le 13 août sont arrivés à Taroudant des délégués des tribus, escortés chacun d'une cinquantaine de cavaliers pour mettre en demeure le Caïd Koubba d'expulser les Européens résidant en ville et de démolir la maison qu'il leur faisait construire. Ils menaçaient de piller la ville si leurs observations restaient sans sanction de la part du Caïd Koubba.

Les Allemands qui se trouvaient à Taroudant furent prévenus "individuellement." Ils pourraient quitter Taroudant sans avoir à craindre aucune violence.

Des agités dans ces tribus parlent de venir à Agadir empêcher les Allemands de débarquer.

La population européenne de la ville comprend actuellement: un Anglais, un Espagnol, trois Allemands, et sept Français.

Le bruit court dans les milieux indigènes que l'Algérien sujet français qui se trouve au service des Mannesmann, aurait été blessé dans le dernier combat d'une balle à la joue.

[33774] No. 269.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 28.)

(No. 241. Confidential.)

Sir, *Berlin, August* 25, 1911.

I HAD to-day some conversation with Herr Zimmermann on the subject of Morocco, and particularly on the subject of the dispatch of the "Panther" to Agadir. He complained bitterly about Mr. Lloyd George's speech, which, he said, had done untold harm both with regard to German public opinion and the negotiations. I said that for what had done most harm one must go back a little further than Mr. Lloyd George's speech, namely, to the dispatch of the German war-ship to Agadir. He said that he had never understood why public opinion in England had been upset by that event. "When we informed Sir Edward Grey that we were going to send a ship to Agadir ——." I here interrupted, and said, "You mean that you had sent a ship to Agadir." He acquiesced in my interruption and, continuing, said, "When we informed Sir Edward Grey that we had sent a ship to Agadir he took the news quite quietly, and we had no idea that there was going to be all this trouble about it." I said that it was in my recollection that you had spoken strongly to Count Metternich on the subject. He said, "Well, at all events, we had no idea that public opinion would feel so strongly about it, and Mr. Lloyd George's speech came upon us like a thunderbolt." He added that the whole trouble arose from the fact that it was not recognised in England that the dispatch of a ship to Agadir, which had been the Emperor's idea, was really meant to make it easier for the French Government to defend any compensation they might be ready to give, and which they had expressed readiness to give, before the French Parliament. I could not help saying that it seemed to me to be a somewhat dubious method of facilitating the negotiations, and that I could scarcely fancy a French Minister of Foreign Affairs standing up in the French Parliament and saying that he had had to yield to German demands for compensation because Germany, as a hint that she meant business, had sent a war-ship to a closed Moroccan port. Besides, I added, I thought that the "Panther" had been sent to protect the lives and property of the employés of certain Hamburg merchants. "Ah!" said Herr Zimmermann, "that was the primary reason, and the reason for the urgency which prevented us from informing the Powers of our intention. But it was thought all the same that it would have a good effect on the negotiations in the way I have just stated." I am bound to say that even Herr Zimmermann smiled when I mentioned the Hamburg merchants. I said that I was glad to know the real reason why the ship had been sent to Agadir, but I thought, if he would allow me to say so,

that it might have been wiser if, before M. Cambon left Kissingen, he had been consulted as to whether the dispatch of the "Panther" would have the salutary effect on the negotiations which the Imperial Government anticipated. To this Herr Zimmerman replied that he was not at Berlin at the time, or perhaps ——. Here he broke off his sentence, which would seem to imply that he agreed with me.

Herr Zimmermann went over a lot of old ground, and spoke at some length as to the disappointment Germany had felt at our attitude, the growing excitement in German public opinion, the irritation of the Emperor, and many other things which you have repeatedly heard from Count Metternich, and which I have reported as having been said by the Emperor. I need not, therefore, trouble you with the rest of his observations.

The reasons, however, which he gave me for the dispatch of a ship to Agadir are, as far as I am aware, quite new, and therefore may be of some interest.

I have, &c.

W. E. GOSCHEN.

[33776] No. 270.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 28.)

(No. 243.)

Sir, *Berlin, August* 25, 1911.

IN the "Zukunft" of to-day, Herr Max Harden again deals with the Morocco question. He has also something to say about the Russo-German agreement. He alludes to the fable of the mountains and the *ridiculus mus*, and says: "Mutato nomine de Germania Theobaldi (Bethmann-Hollweg) fabula narratur." He observes that the new treaty, even if it had been signed and published within a reasonable time, would not have been worth talking about, and that any little advantageous effect that it may have on the Bagdad Railway and a few other questions is entirely outweighed by the following disadvantages: First, that Austria, through the public announcement that Germany will join no combination against Russia, has been compelled to come to an understanding with Russia herself, is again on the road to "Mürzsteg," and has already announced that she is indisposed to act as second to Germany in the new Morocco question. Secondly, it had made the Turks restless. Every Young Turk regarded Russia as the arch enemy, and was not likely to place confidence in any of her friends, particularly in that one of them who, after posing as the only Power who has no designs whatever on any land of Islam, had just sent a ship of war to a Mussulman port and given thereby the impression that she intended to stay there. Therefore since the "gesture" of Agadir the feeling in Turkey, already upset by the Potsdam conversations, had become still more bitter, and it would take Herr von Marschall all his time and ability to dissipate the clouds which have arisen. "Has no one in Berlin," Herr Harden says, "asked why the honoured General von der Goltz has been requested by Mahmoud Shevket not to be in or near Constantinople during the coming autumn? The Ambassadors of the Western Powers must be blithering idiots if they have not taken advantage of our mistakes." M. Harden then comes to the third disadvantageous consequence of the Russo-German agreement, namely, that if the Chancellor's speech had not for a short time given the impression that Russia was about to withdraw from her treaty and *entente* engagements and come into the safe fold of the Kaiserbund, M. Pichon would not have been driven from power by the French Colonial party. "If," he adds, "good M. Pichon had not been driven from office by the world-shaking Potsdam conversations, and if he was sitting now at the Quai d'Orsay, the Sus question would not have been the summer sensation and the world would not have learnt that the modest, peaceful, self-sacrificing German Empire has on five continents not one single friend. The mountains in labour had produced only a field-mouse, but it was one which bid fair to cause considerable damage to the German farmer."

He then comes again to the Morocco question. He says that Herr von Kiderlen has seen dark days and heard disagreeable words, and that he is condemned by the great majority of the nation, who call him the "Dernburg" of foreign affairs. M. Harden does not quite know why he is called thus, as the only similarity he can see between the two statesmen is that they are both opportunists, that they both had incompetent predecessors in their respective offices, and that in order to mark the difference they both were addicted to big bluffs and high-sounding talk. After a few more trenchant remarks concerning Herr von Kiderlen, who, he says, is, like M. Isvolsky

an able diplomat but a bad Minister of Foreign Affairs, he says that after all it is the Chancellor who is to blame for the fact that Herr von Kiderlen has a free hand in foreign affairs; and he attacks the Chancellor violently for leaving matters which deal with peace and war and the honour and might of the Empire in the capricious hands of a colour-blind Secretary of State. Herr Harden considers that before dealing with the Morocco question the Chancellor, who knew nothing about such questions, should have called in experts, heard their views, and upon these views built up a policy. If he had done this Herr von Kiderlen would not have made his initial mistake of calling out to the Parisians, with both hands in his pockets, "What do you want from me? I myself have no wishes at all; I am only sending a ship to Agadir and am waiting to see what proposals you have to make to me." That sort of thing went on, Herr Harden says, till Mr. Asquith said that he hoped that the two Governments would soon come to an arrangement outside the sphere of British influence so that England might not have to interfere. The word "soon" seemed to have struck Herr von Kiderlen, and he at once got to work and made all sorts of proposals unacceptable to the French, insisting at one moment, yielding at another, and finding nothing satisfactory to both sides. "The fact is," he says, "neither the Chancellor nor Herr von Kiderlen know anything either of England or Africa. Ought they, then, not to have called into their counsels people who know both countries? After consulting them they could have decided what they could legitimately ask, and, in formulating their demand, have given it clearly to be understood that it was to be accepted or refused, and that there was to be no bargaining. They did not, however, even consult the Imperial Colonial Office—not, at all events, until the cession of Togoland came into question, then that Office put its foot down with praiseworthy energy, and ever since that, when anything goes wrong, the official press is instructed to say that it is the fault of the Colonial Office." Herr Harden says that the bargaining which has taken place is derogatory to the dignity of a great country, but that if, notwithstanding the fact that the pressure for compensation is really only a contemptible demand for a *pourboire*, this bargaining is to be continued, there should, at least, be no talk, either official or semi-official, of a breach of treaty with France. "The treaty of 1909 gave France political control over Morocco; the right, according to the necessities of her political interests, to establish tranquillity and keep order. This treaty was approved by our leading statesmen of all parties" (here he quotes a long list of political speeches to that effect), "and the Chancellor caused a communiqué to be published, saying that its chief merit was that it removed once for all a source of friction which had so long hampered the relations between the two countries. The same language has been used as regards our Persian agreement with Russia. Is it to be supposed that we shall dispute the right of Russia to keep order there; that the French went to Fez on an appeal for help from the 'Sovereign' Sultan was no breach of treaty, and to put forward that fiction was the stupidest mistake in our game? There are two excellent reasons why we should retire from this untenable standpoint as soon as possible. Firstly, because the Paris Council of Four—namely, the two Cambons, Barrére and Herbette—can come forward at any time with a certificate, which all the signatory Powers of the Act of Algeciras, including Austria, will verify, to the effect that the provisions of that Act (which gave to France far less than our treaty of 1909) had not been violated by France. The next step will be a collective note from the Powers advising the directors of our foreign policy to exercise a wise moderation; a collective note, in fact, after the pattern of the 'démarches communes et immédiates' which Lord Derby proposed in 1875 against Germany, and before which Bismarck wisely gave way. We shall, if we are not careful, find ourselves faced with the unpleasant alternative of a clumsy retreat or a war under circumstances which the delays of the past months have rendered unfavourable to us.

"The second reason is that if we, who, alone of all the Powers of Europe and America, accuse France of having violated the Act of Algeciras, give up that cry, the compensations we ask will lose that evil smell which must offend the nostrils of anyone not accustomed to live in sewers. If we wish to preserve our self-respect and to be respected by others, we must stop hawking about the Sultan's sovereignty guaranteed by our Emperor, the holiness of which we have proclaimed so often. But what we can say to France is this: 'You have gone rather quicker in Morocco than was provided for by the 1909 understanding. All right. To-morrow you can have Morocco and the certainty of being a great North African Power, but we also find Germany rather close quarters for our growing population. You will have Morocco, England has got Egypt, with the Soudan and South Persia, Austria has two large Balkan provinces. And we? We must have something too. You should at least show us some good-will, and if you

ask us to help you to smooth the way, so that you can arrive at your goal at full gallop, you must, even at some sacrifice, help us to reach ours.'"

Herr Harden then goes into the question of what Germany can demand, and says that it must not be a Morocco harbour, which, according to Sir John Fisher, would only give England the wished-for opportunity to bombard a German possession, no Fernando Po, nor anything belonging to a Western Power.

"I only see," he says, "one possibility to get out of the present blind alley without loss of prestige and without war—namely, that a new African treaty should take the place of the 1904 and 1909 arrangements, which would assign Egypt to England, Morocco to France, and Abyssinia to Germany, as spheres of interest, and provide that each of the three Powers should enjoy equal commercial rights in each of the three countries. If such an arrangement could be made, even proud Germans might be satisfied."

In conclusion, Herr Harden says that the worst thing that has happened to Germany in the present imbroglio is that British Ministers have accused Germany of international shamelessness, and that a German Chancellor, the administrator of a yearly military expenditure of untold millions, has, up till now, not said a single word to meet or refute that accusation.

I have, &c.
W. E. GOSCHEN.

[33995] No. 271.

Sir F. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 29.)

(No. 145.)

Sir, *Vienna, August 26, 1911.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith a copy and translation of the leading article which appeared in the "Neue Freie Presse" of yesterday, referred to in my telegram No. 80 of to-day's date.

I have, &c.
FAIRFAX L. CARTWRIGHT.

Enclosure in No. 271.

Extract from the "Neue Freie Presse" of August 25, 1911.

(Translation.)

PROBABILITIES AND POSSIBILITIES IN THE QUESTION OF PEACE.

(By an English Diplomat in an important position.)

Introductory Remark by the Editor.

THE following statement will cause some surprise, owing to the sharpness of opinion and of the manner of expression which has in certain places even been toned down. What is here maintained does not correspond with the views of this paper or with justice and reason, but shows a feeling against German policy and German statesmen which seems to arise out of a certain bitterness. Their publication is, however, necessary, for it would be a failure of duty to keep back from publicity opinions expressed by so important an English personality. They bear a particularly high significance as coming from a quarter which is in close connection with practical policy and is in a position to judge of the probabilities and possibilities of the Moroccan question. Since the communications of the English diplomat end peacefully, their publication can only strengthen the impression that Germany and France will at length come to an understanding with each other, and that it will not be necessary to sacrifice for Morocco the bones of a Pomeranian grenadier.

"I think that the result of the whole negotiations may be summed up in the quotation from Horace: 'Parturiunt montes nasceturque ridiculus mus' (the mountains are in labour and produce a mouse)! It will be difficult for Germany to bring home large concessions from all these negotiations. Were France to agree to a cession of territory in Africa, and were the French Government to submit this cession to the French Chamber, the latter would refuse its consent. I foresee, therefore, that the German Government will return from these negotiations with a very insignificant result. If Germany does not content herself with that and attempts to force France to make concessions, it means a conflict.

"The German Government thus has the choice between the dissatisfaction of the pan-Germans or a conflict with France; and it appears to me that the lesser evil would be the merited rejection of the pan-Germans with their demands so dangerous to peace.

"You ask me what attitude England takes towards this controversy between Germany and France. England is entirely on the side of France. I think I may say that neither England nor France wish for a conflict, and both cherish the hope that it will be possible to avoid it. England too must, however, most decisively regret, not to say condemn, the attitude of Germany. Let us consider matters in a cool and unprejudiced manner. England is a signatory Power of the Act of Algeciras quite as much as Germany. This Act has not been injured by France. She was obliged to help the Sultan to restore order in Fez, which was severely disturbed. France was justified in doing what she did, not only on the ground of the Act of Algeciras, but, in particular, on the ground of the agreement with Germany of 1909. No Power criticised her action. Germany herself did not protest against it. France has not acted in contradiction with the German-French agreement of 1909. France has in no way injured or intended to injure the concession of the open door made by her to Germany. Germany then sent the 'Panther' to Agadir without any motive. That was a blow directed by Germany against the Franco-German agreement of 1909.

"I still hope that the good sense of Germany will prevail. There is, however, every reason to recommend moderation to Germany and not to France, who has in no way overstepped the bounds of moderation.

"I say it openly: one has the impression that Germany is acting in a provocative manner. This eternal provocation is beginning to become serious. Behind the dispatch of the 'Panther' to Agadir and behind the whole foreign policy of Germany (in so far as it approves of such provocation) stands—as those know who are acquainted with Germany—not the German people, but only a certain clique, which acts in the same inconsiderate manner in different European centres. Germany is much in the same position in a certain sense as France before the year 1870. At that time the Tuileries directed the policy of France and the legislative bodies were their creatures. The Tuileries made a senseless war against Germany. In Germany to-day German policy is directed from above and not by the German people. The German Imperial Government does not represent, like the English Government, the public opinion of the country. The incident of Agadir was obviously inspired by the surroundings of the Emperor. If Germany had a Government really representative of public opinion, she would not make this unfortunate Moroccan policy.

"It is hardly necessary for me to say how much England desires peace and a good understanding with Germany. Has not Mr. Asquith repeatedly expressed it? Have we not wished to believe in a serious improvement in our relations with Germany since the fall of Bülow? And then a sudden blow is struck by German diplomacy which is not supported by Germany—I mean the German people—but by an oligarchy which prevents a wise conduct of affairs and deprives real statesmen of their independence.

"It is also a misfortune to the world that a whole number of German diplomats in important and prominent positions appear to inform their Government insufficiently as to the real public opinion of the country to which they are accredited. I take leave to observe in this connection that the German Government is not well informed with regard to feeling in England. In order that this may be improved, a change would be necessary, both as regards the system and as regards persons.

"This Morocco policy has already several dangerous phases behind it. I recall to you the affair of Casa Blanca. If Germany had not then given way, a conflict might have taken place.

"We are now in a similar phase. If Germany does not show moderation, it means a conflict in which England will be on the side of France.

"It is a mistake on the part of Germany to again bring forward the Moroccan question at all at a moment so serious as the present one.

"Is not the Turkish question serious enough?

"One can never tell what will happen from one day to another in Turkey. Do you suppose that it can be agreeable to Austria-Hungary to see her intimate ally again playing with the Moroccan fire? How does Morocco interest Austria-Hungary? She is much more interested in Turkey, and the less one says of Morocco in Austria-Hungary, the more pleased will the statesmen in Vienna be."

"Or do you imagine that Italy is pleased at the possibility of the opening of the Morocco question by Germany? The Italians are also much more interested in Turkey. Do you suppose that Italy can wish for a situation in which she would be compelled to choose for the Triple Alliance against the Triple *Entente*? Supposing that Turkey were to break up, do you imagine that Italy could ever enter into the much-desired possession of Tripoli if England and France were not benevolently disposed to her?

"Let us therefore hope that in the course of September the mouse will be safely brought into the world after the German mountains have been in labour for months."

[34000] No. 272.

Sir V. Corbett to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 29.)

(No. 47.)

Sir, *Munich, August 27, 1911.*

SINCE the temporary cessation of the negotiations at Berlin, the South German papers have developed a calmer tone in their discussion of the Morocco question, latterly, indeed, their articles on the subject have consisted of little more than translations from the Paris and other foreign journals. They seem gradually to have realised that a press campaign of a bombastic and vituperative character so far from benefiting the German cause was engendering a feeling of exacerbation in France which might not improbably culminate in a definite rupture. The influence of that very large class of the community, who could only stand to lose by a European conflict, has therefore begun to make itself felt, while on their side the Social Democrat societies have been loud in their denunciation of war in general and war on account of Morocco in particular.

It is not to be supposed, however, that the failure of Herr von Kiderlen to obtain for Germany a footing in Morocco is accepted with a good grace. On the contrary, the feeling of disappointment and even of humiliation is deep and widespread. Although it may be regretfully recognised that the moment is ill-chosen for an appeal to the sword, those who are interested in the colonial expansion of the Empire are by no means prepared to renounce their ambitions. For the present and as a matter of policy it has been judged prudent, acting no doubt on a hint from Berlin, to assert that Germany has already obtained all she wanted by forcing France to admit in principle her claim for compensation; but nobody really believes that to be the case. Should the present negotiations end in the definite exclusion of Germany from Morocco without adequate compensation—and the German popular notion of what would be adequate is a comprehensive one—the unsatisfied German aspirations will remain as a permanent danger to European peace, waiting only for the favourable opportunity to reassert themselves. Sooner or later such occasion must occur, and the German pretensions are not likely to grow less with lapse of time. France, Russia, and England are not likely, it is argued, to act together for ever.

Opinions as to what should be the attitude of the Government in the immediate present differ widely. Retired generals, sometimes in print and oftener in conversation, demand that the national honour should be upheld at the point of the bayonet. Socialist orators, on the other hand, fulminate against the possibility of a war undertaken in the capitalist interest. Between these two extremes every variety of opinion may be heard. As far as I have means of judging, I am inclined to believe that the majority of the nation would prefer to see the present negotiations drag on without the definite issue until events occur in the Sus Valley, which may justify German intervention, or at least until the long-continued presence of German ships at Agadir has established something in the nature of a prescriptive right to a preponderating influence in that district.

Whether this view is in any way shared by the Imperial Government I have, of course, no means of knowing, but I may venture to repeat the conviction expressed in a former despatch that no solution of the present difficulties, even if it is accepted for a time, will be satisfactory to the nation or can aspire to be permanent which does

not in some form or other guarantee the exploitation of South Morocco to German enterprise.

The following extracts from the press may not be without interest.

The "Deutsche Export-Revue" of the 25th admits defeat, and says :—

"In view of information received by us and confirmed by other reports, it seems unfortunately to be certain that the hopes which had been entertained by wide circles in Germany will be disappointed; we shall not obtain a lasting share in the Moroccan inheritance. However hard this may hit us, we shall have to convince ourselves that we must look somewhere else in the African continent for our compensations for the political and economic interests which we are giving up. . . . We refrain here from a critical assessment of the economic value of those parts of Africa which are apparently to be offered us as a compensation. The opinions of travellers with a personal knowledge of them are in part extremely divergent. The main point is that the territories in question are such that only intensive German work can give them a future. One thing, however, we miss in this Germano-Franco-Spanish exchange: a coaling-station in the Canary Isles!"

The "Münchener Allgemeine Zeitung" of the 26th takes the prudent line which is habitual to it, and which often reminds one, especially in its relation to social democracy, of the attitude of our own "Spectator." It says :—

"The Morocco negotiations have been interrupted for a time, and the conclusion may justifiably be drawn that the work of effecting an agreement between France and Germany is far more difficult than was at first expected. No more positive value, however, should be attributed to the Stock Exchange manœuvres with their wild war scares than to the incomprehensible interruptions to which the calm discussion of the whole affair has been exposed by the hysterical propaganda of the Pan-Germanists. It is only natural that such interruptions should influence feelings on all sides, and such feelings, even if they can nowadays hardly create either war or peace, still hinder the progress of a business which can only be successfully disentangled when it is conducted with absolute calm. Tactical cleverness being absolutely imperative, it was to be anticipated that the Radical members of the German Social Democrat party would take the opportunity of committing a great blunder. One of the editors of 'Vorwärts' has told the mob in Berlin that the only way, the only commendable way of protesting against the impending war is a general strike. Thunderous applause rewarded the crator for this utterance, which has, however, aroused the disapproval of the 'Berliner Tageblatt.' This paper not only blames a general strike as an interruption to business which would be severely felt in commercial circles, but also disapproves of it apparently from the national standpoint; its irritation with the Social Democrat speaker is not due alone to his lamentable offence against the beautiful programme of the 'Grossblock,' but also to his unpatriotic point of view. To speak seriously, the leaders of the Social Democrat party have behaved up till then in the Morocco affair as was to be expected from sensible men, conscious of their political responsibility. If they should intend to abdicate in favour of terrorists who are a general danger, they would see that even this party of the masses can run its head against the rock of the national idea. Germany did not become an Empire easily, nor will the Social Democrats find it an easy task to shatter this Empire."

More directly characteristic, however, of public opinion are three articles in this morning's "Münchener Neueste Nachrichten"; the first is quoted from the "Ostdeutsche Rundschau," and purports to be an interview with a German ex-statesman. He is described as saying :—

"I am now enjoying my *otium cum dignitate*, and am in consequence no better informed than any layman who reads the newspapers of the intentions of the authorities in the Wilhelmstrasse. I do not regard an appeal to war as an impossibility; for Germany, according to my view of the situation, cannot any longer simply give up Agadir without dealing a violent blow to all national elements at home. The French Government would certainly like to give way, but the chauvinist press is working in the pay of the financial ring in Paris, which desires to turn Morocco into a French monopoly. There is no doubt that Morocco has become a delicate question of honour for us Germans; this time our Emperor must and will stand firm! . . . . At first it was no part of the plan of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs to seek for territorial acquisitions in Morocco—semi-official hints point that way—but to-day the *vox populi*

has made itself heard, and demands Morocco. We are on the eve of the elections for the Reichstag; the Government can never please the 'Berliner Tageblatt' for long together, however peaceably they may bow the knee! They must then desire to please the Nationalists. That part of the electorate which has German sentiments has never yet been so unanimous as it is over the Morocco question. If the Government yields and the flag is hauled down before Agadir a disappointment will be left behind which will bring on an absolutely fateful condition of things. I am altogether opposed to drawing the Emperor into the debate, but such a thing will happen, and no official threat or reprimand can alter the fact. 'Michael is set on a fight,' he says to himself; 'for forty-one years I have been bearing the burden of a powerful armament; I am tired of everlastingly pursing up my lips; once in a way I shall whistle in real earnest!' Michael has courage in his bones, and expects as much from his Government. There was never another moment so favourable for a pertly aggressive diplomacy as the present!"

The second article gives the opinion of Dr. von Schwerin as to the value of the French compensations. Dr. von Schwerin says :—

"It seems highly questionable whether the compensations which France is inclined to give us in Cameroon and on the Congo are really valuable. We hear that the country is partly unattractive and partly in the hands of large territorial companies. What good would it be to us to gain possession of tracts of land into which we had to import culture at great cost in money and human life, only that large territorial companies should be able to pay fat dividends? Have we then learnt nothing from the colossal blunders which we have committed over such companies, particularly in South-West Africa? If there must be talk of compensations, it is imperative to examine them most carefully, so that we may not receive a Greek gift which would bring us more harm than profit in the future. Public opinion justifiably regards the compensations with peculiar scepticism, and will not in any case allow itself to be dazzled by the prospect of a large extent of territory. Listen where you will, the impression created by the exchange of Zanzibar for Heligoland has not even yet faded in spite of the many years which have elapsed. The Government must not delude itself into believing that the feeling of mistrust exists only in chauvinistic Pan-German circles: all national circles are on the alert, anxious lest we should be a second time duped."

The third article, which is perhaps the most characteristic of all, is quoted from the "Nationalliberale Korrespondenz." It says :—

"We are advised to give France a free hand in Morocco and not to raise any objections against her protectorate there. In exchange a certain portion of the Congo is to be ceded to us. We warn German diplomacy most emphatically against thinking of assenting to a bargain of this kind. The cession of French territory to Germany is a compensation for the unscrupulous overriding of the Act of Algeciras by France, as shown in her march on Fez and her whole present conduct in Moroccan territory, which is contradictory to international agreements. The efforts of the German Empire must be directed towards protecting its economic interests there better than it has done up to now and opposing the action of the French 'bureaux arabes' towards helping to open up the economic treasures of Morocco in a manner equitable to all nations and towards protecting the commerce, property, and life of Germans there. This programme may be carried out in two ways: either by the actual re-establishment of Moroccan independence under the security of unimpeachable guarantees on the side of France or by a delimitation of the political spheres of influence, in which case the German Empire has to insist on claims proportionate to its colonial and commercial interest and to its position in the Mohammedan world. It is precisely this last-mentioned position which makes it impossible for Germany to give up her interests in Morocco. Moroccan kaïds in the south of the country have only in the last few days sought the protection of the German Empire, and we regard it as an understood thing that their claim will be granted."

I have, &c.

VINCENT CORBETT.

[34258] No. 273.

Sir F. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 31.)

(No. 146.)

Sir, *Vienna, August 29, 1911.*

IN my despatch No. 145 of the 26th instant I had the honour to transmit to you a translation of an article in the "Neue Freie Presse" purporting to give the views of an English diplomatist on the Moroccan question and which the German press attributes to me. I have the honour to submit to your notice the accompanying extracts from leading organs of the Vienna press which have appeared during the last few days. The incident has furnished the Christian-Socialist "Reichspost" with an occasion for making a violent attack on the Jewish papers, of which the "Neue Freie Presse" is the most prominent and influential.

The evening issue of the "Reichspost" of the 26th August contains a leading article headed "Hands Off," in which it protests strongly against the publication in an Austrian paper of utterances so hostile to her ally. It is true, says the "Reichspost," that the "Neue Freie Presse" dissociates itself from the views expressed in the article, but that amounts to a very little since the editor goes on to say that their publication is a necessity and a duty. The Austrian press, says the "Reichspost," has no business to act as second to English diplomacy in its attacks on Austria's ally. The article concludes by saying that German public opinion need not be disquieted, and that, although the "Neue Freie Presse" is the chief organ of the Liberal party which at the last elections managed to win a few victories, it does not represent Austrian public opinion any more than certain anti-Austrian papers in Germany represent the public opinion of that country.

The "Reichspost" publishes a further article this morning written by its Berlin correspondent, in which it says that the article in the "Neue Freie Presse" was a surprise, but that it was a still greater surprise to find that an English diplomatist had succeeded in obtaining the services of the leading organ of German freethought in Austria. Influential circles in Berlin, says the correspondent of the "Reichspost," are somewhat anxious because since the last elections the German Freethinkers have become the strongest party in the Austrian Chamber of Deputies, and it was remarkable how during the elections they joined forces with the Social Democrats against the Christian Socialists, whose loyalty to the alliance is above suspicion. The "Reichspost" adds that the statement made by the British Ambassador to the editor of the "Gesellschaftliche Korrespondenz," declining responsibility for the article, has not made the desired impression in Berlin. Moreover, it does not make such a great difference whether it is the British Ambassador himself or another highly-placed English diplomatist who is in a position to employ the chief organ of the leading Austrian party for the publication of his anti-German propaganda, and people in Berlin have reason to mistrust Sir Fairfax Cartwright. They know him from the time when he was Minister in Munich. His famous report in which he described Bavaria as "sick of the Empire" has not been forgotten. The questionable article in the "Neue Freie Presse" no doubt met with his approval and the fact that he was obliged publicly to decline responsibility for it is suspicious enough.

The "Neue Freie Presse" of the 27th August publishes an answer to the alleged interview with myself, written by Professor Hans Delbrück, a well-known historian and editor of the "Preussischen Jahrbücher." This article is written in a very moderate spirit. The writer says that he does not share the views of some people in Germany, who object to the publication by the "Neue Freie Presse" of utterances hostile to their country. On the contrary, it is a good thing for Germans to know what English diplomatists think about them. Austria has, moreover, nothing to do with the Moroccan question, and would not be involved even if it came to a war between Germany and France and England. The "English Diplomatist," says Professor Delbrück, maintains that France has not committed a breach of the Algeciras Act. That is all very well if France really leaves Fez and restores the conditions laid down by the Algeciras Act and the treaty of 1909. But there is a firm conviction in Germany that there is not the least prospect of that, but that sooner or later the "tunification" of Morocco will be accomplished. And how can Germany be expected to watch such a development with folded arms. There are various possibilities as to a settlement, and it is uncertain whether a definite solution will be arrived at or merely a temporary arrangement. If the latter prove to be the case the English diplomatist will be right in saying that the mountains are labouring to produce a mouse. If France were to

incorporate Morocco entirely she would eventually be in a position to draw from that country several army corps of black troops, and no Power but Germany would be threatened by this new access of strength. Germany is not afraid of such an eventuality, but she must under all circumstances demand suitable compensation. Professor Delbrück goes on to say that all parties and classes in Germany are unanimous in seconding her demands, and concludes by stating that France is, in his opinion, ready to come to an understanding on the basis of mutual concessions, and that the chief centre of opposition to such an agreement is to be sought not in France but in England. Cannot England, asks Professor Delbrück, be satisfied with ruling over a quarter of the population of the globe, and does she believe that she can for ever hem in a great nation like Germany within the bounds of the Continent? English diplomacy must take note of the fact that Germany will no longer allow herself to be humiliated, come what may.

I will not trouble you with all the abusive articles in German newspapers, extracts of which are published here *à titre d'information.*

I would like, however, to draw your attention to an article which appeared in the "Neue Freie Presse" about a week ago, which I have reason to believe emanates from the same pen. It was attributed to the French Ambassador, and contained an attack on the German Ambassador in Paris, Herr von Schoen. A slight press campaign was started in Germany against this article, but it seems to have fallen flat, and I have good grounds for believing that German influences thought that they might raise a campaign against myself with better success. One thing is certain, however, that directly the article appeared the correspondents of German newspapers in Vienna were summoned to the German Embassy and told to make as great a stir as possible over the article in the "Neue Freie Presse."

In conclusion, I beg to state that the editor of the semi-official organ of the Austro-Hungarian Foreign Office called upon me and said he would insert anything I liked in the "Fremdenblatt," but agreed with me that the best thing to do was to ignore the anonymous article attributed to me, and so far the "Fremdenblatt" has not alluded to the matter.

I have, &c.
FAIRFAX L. CARTWRIGHT.

[34342] No. 274.

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 31.)

(No. 70.)

(Telegraphic.) P. *Zarauz, August 31, 1911.*

MOROCCO. Draft Franco-Spanish convention.

With reference to my telegram No. 67 of the 25th instant, the full text of the draft convention concerning the Spanish sphere of influence in Morocco has now been received by the French Ambassador. It is proposed, if you concur, to submit it to the Spanish Government in the event of France being allowed a free hand in Morocco as a result of the negotiations at Berlin.

French Ambassador has already, in accordance with his instructions, spoken to the Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs in the general sense of the draft convention without awaiting the issue of the Franco-German negotiation.

Señor Garcia Prieto was greatly startled by the intimation that France would expect Spain to renounce her claim to Ifni. He informed M. Geoffray that measures for the early occupation of Ifni, jointly with a commissioner to be deputed by the Sultan, were already nearing completion. The whole question would be considered at the Cabinet Councils about to be held at Madrid.

French Ambassador is anxious that I should be instructed to support him in urging the Spanish Government to accept the proposed arrangement.

The surrender of Ifni, though it could be of little real use to Spain, will certainly be most unpopular. In other respects the draft convention appears to me to meet very fairly the demands of Spain regarding her sphere of influence in Morocco. The text was to be communicated yesterday to His Majesty's Ambassador in Paris, to whom I am repeating this telegram.

[34440] No. 275.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen.

(No. 87.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, August* 31, 1911.

THE Spanish Ambassador here has informed me that his Government intend to take possession of Ifni on the 3rd September whether the Moorish commissioner is there or not, and that they have notified the Makhzen to that effect.

[34351] No. 276.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Cartwright.

(No. 95.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, August* 31, 1911.

ARTICLE in the "Neue Freie Presse."

The statement in the "Neue Freie Presse" that it received the article in question from an English diplomatist invites a more categorical denial than your Excellency's telegram to the news agency at Berlin. I propose, therefore, to make a statement to the press that your Excellency neither communicated nor inspired the article, and that His Majesty's Government had no cognisance of it. Would you prefer to make this communication in Vienna, or shall it be done by the Foreign Office in London?

[34382] No. 277.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 1.)

(No. 384. Most Confidential.)
Sir, *Paris, August* 29, 1911

I WENT to the Quai d'Orsay this morning to see the Minister for Foreign Affairs on the subject of the recognition of the Portuguese Republic. I have reported in my despatch No. 381 of to-day the conversation which I had with his Excellency on that question.

M. de Selves informed me, with reference to the report which I mentioned to him as having been received from Tangier (see telegram from Tangier No. 147 of the 26th August) in regard to the state of affairs at Taourdant, that the latest information received went to show that matters were quieting down and that the German Government would probably not have occasion to intervene for the protection of German lives, as they announced they might have to do if the Moorish Government failed to afford protection to the Germans at Taourdant.

M. de Selves then gave me information connected with what I had the honour to report to you in my despatch No. 376, Most Confidential, of the 23rd instant. His Excellency told me that the German Ambassador asked to see him on Sunday last, the 27th instant. They had a conversation of about an hour. M. de Selves explained to M. de Schoen the cessions of territory beyond which it would be impossible for the French Government to go with any regard to public opinion in France. The Ambassador did not in any way treat them as insufficient, and M. de Selves is inclined to think that if the tone of the German representative reflects the views of the German Government they are disposed to come to terms with the French Government. They have, however, so frequently shifted their ground in the course of the discussions on the subject of Morocco that he hesitates to be confident of an arrangement.

Yesterday the Spanish Ambassador applied for and had an interview with M. de Selves. M. Caballero evinced the same anxiety of mind in regard to the position of Spain in Morocco and the same desire to join in the Berlin conversations as he did during his conversation with M. de Selves on the 22nd instant (see my despatch No. 376, Most Confidential, of the 22nd August), and he enquired whether it was true that the French Government were offering to Germany a strip of the French Congo territory adjoining Spanish Guinea and reaching to the sea coast. M. de Selves reminded the Spanish Ambassador that the German Government had declined to admit

the Spanish Government to participation in the conversations at Berlin between M. de Kiderlen-Waechter and the French Ambassador, and he observed that, as he had undertaken not to divulge those conversations, he could not give to M. Caballero any information in regard to the cession of territory which the French Government were offering. The Ambassador retorted that the British Government were being kept informed, and there could be no reason why Spain, which was more interested in the question of Morocco than England, should be kept in ignorance of the discussions at Berlin. M. de Selves asked the Ambassador whether Spain had supported France as England had in the question of Morocco, and he informed him that the French Government had reserved to themselves the liberty to make the British Government, which had important interests in Morocco, acquainted with the discussions at Berlin. If the German Government admitted the Spanish Government to participation in the Berlin conversations, Spain might be asked what she had to offer to Germany as compensation for a recognition of a privileged position for Spain in Morocco. It might be suggested by the German Government that Spanish Guinea and the Island of Fernando Po, being the one contiguous to and the other near to the Cameroons, would be suitable offers to Germany. The French Government would, as soon as the fitting time arrived in the negotiations with the German Government, discuss with the Spanish Government the arrangements which it would be desirable to make in view of the prospective alteration in the position of France as regards Morocco which might have resulted from the Franco-German negotiations. M. Caballero might rest assured that the French Government would discuss those arrangements with the Spanish Government with perfect loyalty and every desire to meet all reasonable wishes expressed by the Spanish Government. The French Ambassador would receive instructions on the subject. Meanwhile, it would be advisable for the Spanish Government to rely on the good faith and the good-will of the French Government and not press for participation in the Berlin conversations. M. Caballero appeared to be taken aback, so M. de Selves informed me, by the suggestion that the German Government might expect any cessions of Spanish territory, and he assured M. de Selves that no such question had been discussed between the German and Spanish Governments.

M. de Selves further informed me of a conversation which he had had yesterday with the Russian Ambassador, who had asked for an interview. M. Isvolsky enquired as to the state of the negotiations with Germany. Whilst M. de Selves was describing to him their position, he noticed that M. Isvolsky evidently had something which he desired to say, and yet found difficulty in saying, which M. de Selves observed to me, was not to be wondered at, for the Ambassador, after some observations as to the horrors of war and how disastrous it would be if the negotiations at Berlin failed, and a conflict became a possibility, asked whether in such a deplorable contingency the French Government would accept arbitration. M. de Selves, whilst deploring such a contingency, stated that the French Government were doing and would do everything that was reasonably possible to avoid it, and that, as to arbitration, Russia would not be likely to offer her arbitration, and the French Government would certainly not ask her to set aside her proper position as the ally of France to assume that of arbiter in a question in which the interests of France were deeply involved. M. Isvolsky admitted that in the particular circumstances Russia might not be a suitable arbitrator, but he asked whether the Emperor of Austria might not be such a one. M. de Selves observed to the Russian Ambassador that, much as he respected the great experience and impartiality of the aged Monarch, he hardly thought that His Majesty would be a suitable arbitrator in such a case, as M. Isvolsky must realise, if he would reflect on the situation. M. de Selves then went on to make some observations to his Excellency on the state of public opinion in France, which, he said, must probably have been noticed by the Ambassador when he read the newspapers, and in the course of his conversations with the many French public and private persons with whom he came in contact. France ardently desired a pacific solution of the questions at issue with Germany, and the French Government would go to the utmost limit of reasonable concessions to effect such a settlement, but France of the present day was not the France of ten years ago and of the Morocco crisis of 1905. The French people desired peace, but an honourable peace. There were limits in the way of concessions to Germany beyond which they would not permit the Government to go even if they were so disposed, which they were not. M. Isvolsky must have observed how calm and collected public opinion was. It was so because it had reliance on the determination of the Government to maintain the legitimate rights and interests of France, and confidence in the ability of the French army to defend them, if the need

arose, from the unreasonable pretensions of Germany. In such circumstances Russia would, as M. de Selves had the assurance from the Russian Government, give to her ally the support which France had the right to expect.

I have, &c.
FRANCIS BERTIE.

[34484] No. 278.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 1.)

(No. 141.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Paris, September 1, 1911.*

I HAD an interview with Minister for Foreign Affairs this evening. He had received information this morning in a private letter from French Embassy at Berlin that Herr Zimmermann, Under-Secretary at German Foreign Office, had begged Sir E. Goschen to request His Majesty's Government to use their influence at Paris with a view to prevailing on French Government to be conciliatory in conversations which were about to be resumed at Berlin for a settlement of the Morocco question. The same request had, the letter stated, been made to Russian Government.

Russian Ambassador asked for an appointment, and saw French Minister for Foreign Affairs this morning. He brought with him some notes, which he said were made from telegraphic instructions which he had received, and he consulted them during the interview from time to time. The communication which he made was, French Minister for Foreign Affairs informed me, to the following effect: Russian Government, and especially Emperor of Russia, were perturbed at state of relations between France and Germany. They trusted that cessions of territory which French Government would be ready to offer to Germany would be sufficient to satisfy her. The extent of cessions of colonial territory to be made by France could not be of importance to her when it became, as it might, a question of avoiding war. A war would be a great danger to recently established liberal institutions in Russia, and it would be difficult to make Russian people realise necessity of war for a few kilometres more or less of colonial territory. Though Russian army had been greatly improved by recent reforms, it was not yet quite perfected ("à point"). What would happen if the German Government rejected the offers of the French Government and there were a rupture of the negotiations? Could not France in such an event accept arbitration of Emperor of Austria? French Minister for Foreign Affairs told me that he did not quite make out whether an arbitration by the Emperor of Austria was a suggestion from the Russian Government or a revival of a personal one of M. Isvolsky.

French Minister for Foreign Affairs' observations to Russian Ambassador were, he informed me, that he was surprised, and he might even say "peiné," at Ambassador's communication. It led him to think that Russian Government could not have been kept accurately informed of the course of Franco-German conversations and liberal spirit of conciliation in which they had been carried on by French Government, of the very liberal proposals which, as M. Isvolsky knew, had been made, and the still greater sacrifices which they were prepared to offer to German Government when conversations were renewed, which they would be in a few days' time. German Ambassador had admitted to French Minister for Foreign Affairs that they were conceived in a most liberal spirit. As German Government were not yet fully acquainted with the extent of those sacrifices it was impossible to know whether they would satisfy German Government or not. There could therefore be no question of considering or even talking of arbitration at the present moment. He would therefore discard it altogether from conversation. If sacrifices which French Government offered to Germany did not satisfy German Government it would mean that they did not wish the negotiations to succeed. It could not be foreseen what the next step of the German Government might be. They had begun the conversations which they announced that they desired to have with the French Government by sending a ship of war to Agadir on pretext of there being there German lives and interests which required protection. If conversations, which French Government had accepted and had conducted in a most liberal and pacific spirit, failed to bring about an arrangement, and the German Government thereupon took further action, it would show that German Government desired to humiliate France in the eyes of the French people and of the world. It would mean the publication to the world that whatever Germany might demand of France or any other nation must be accorded. France could not accept such a

position. No self-respecting nation could do so. He therefore begged Russian Ambassador correctly to inform his Government of the situation, and to remind them of the assurances which they had given French Government that Russia would stand by France as her ally. French Minister for Foreign Affairs says that request made by German Government to Russian and British Governments for counsels of conciliation to French Government is obviously an endeavour to separate England and Russia from France by making out—contrary to the truth—that French offers of territory are quite insufficient for reasonable compensation to Germany, and to throw the blame for possible ulterior complications on France. He has instructed French Ambassador at St. Petersburgh fully to explain the situation to the Russian Government, to repeat to them the observations which French Minister for Foreign Affairs made to M. Isvolsky, and to ask for an audience of the Emperor of Russia in order correctly to acquaint His Majesty with the situation, and to express to him the confidence felt by French Government that Russia will adhere as in the past to her part of faithful ally of France.

French Minister for Foreign Affairs is telegraphing to French Embassy in London to inform you of the situation.

[34577] No. 279.

Sir F. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 1.)

(No. 87.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Vienna, September 1, 1911.*

YOUR telegram of the 1st September.

On the evening of the 23rd August Reuter's agent here was in the office of the "Neue Freie Presse," and was told that a sensational article would appear in the morning. On the next day he was told that it would appear later, and it did so on the 25th. I am told that during the interval the article was telegraphed to Berlin for comment.

Early on the morning of the 25th the German chargé d'affaires, who is living outside Vienna, came into the town and summoned the German newspaper correspondents here to the embassy. He is said to have then instructed them to point to me as the author of the article, and to make the greatest possible stir over it. It is certain that the German newspapers, which generally are inspired from official sources at Berlin, began to attack me without any verification of the authorship of the anonymous article.

The German chargé d'affaires has carefully avoided coming to see me, and has not attempted to enquire of me, before launching the accusation, whether I had anything to say about the article. No member of the German Embassy has since the beginning of the campaign been in contact even indirectly with any member of my staff.

[34486] No. 280.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Cartwright.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, September 1, 1911.*

I HAVE been informed by Count Metternich that, in view of the excitement caused by the statement in the German and Austrian press that you are the author of the article in the "Neue Freie Presse," the German Chancellor is of opinion that an official utterance by me would be of great value.

I have told the Ambassador that neither you nor any British diplomatist that I knew had any cognizance of the article before it appeared, and that I doubted whether much good would be done by an official denial, but that I would see him about it next week.

Have you sufficient ground to justify me in informing the Ambassador that I have reason to believe the German Embassy in Vienna inspired the attack on you?

[34494] No. 281.

Mr. White to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 2.)

(No. 281.)

Sir, *Tangier, August* 26, 1911.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 260 of the 11th instant, I have the honour to report that His Majesty's consul at Fez informs me that he has heard nothing to confirm the report that the Sultan's mind is in any way affected. His Majesty has lately attended mosque and been seen in public on other occasions, and appeared well.

I have, &c.

HERBERT E. WHITE.

[34495] No. 282.

Mr. White to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 2.)

(No. 282. Confidential.)

Sir, *Tangier, August* 26, 1911.

I HAVE recently heard from various sources that the French military authorities in Shawia, through their "Bureaux arabes," have been doing all in their power to induce the natives to sell their lands to Frenchmen, and to prevent the purchase of land by persons of other nationalities.

I have the honour to transmit herewith an extract from some statistics prepared by the "Bureau des Renseignements des Oulad Hariz,"* from which it will be seen that at the date at which it was made out, presumably last spring, it was calculated that Frenchmen held 6,300 hectares of land, valued at 850,000 fr., whilst Englishmen held only 150 hectares, valued at 2,500 fr. A leading British merchant at Casa Blanca, in speaking to me lately on the subject, observed that British subjects are just as enterprising as the French, and have plenty of capital at their disposal, some of which they would have gladly invested in land, but they found that whenever they attempted to make any purchases they met with so many obstacles and difficulties that they were forced to abandon the idea. When I enquired why they did not report the matter to Mr. Consul Madden in order to force the authorities to allow the sales to be completed, he replied that it was not worth while to do so, as it would involve much worry and loss of time, which was required for their regular business.

I have just received from His Majesty's consul a despatch copy of which I beg leave to transmit herewith.* In this despatch Mr. Madden reports fully on the subject, and relates some instances of the tortuous methods of the officers in the "Bureaux arabes." A copy of his despatch No. 73, Confidential, of the 18th April was transmitted to you in Mr. Rattigan's despatch No. 90 of the 22nd April last.

Mr. Madden mentions the extortionate fees the authorities are now claiming in connection with the execution of legal documents. Complaints on this subject have reached me unofficially, and the matter is one which should, I think, be dealt with and regulated by the diplomatic body in concert with the Moorish authorities. The most convenient time for dealing with the matter would be during the discussions on the duties and taxes to be introduced under article 65 of the Algeciras Act, but it is a question whether the matter should not be brought forward earlier, should the discussions on the new taxes be long delayed.

With reference to the action of the French authorities in regard to British mokhalata, I would observe that they do not consider protection incompatible with holding a Makhzen appointment, where the protection is French. On the contrary, they extend their protection, official or officious, on a wholesale scale to Makhzen functionaries of all categories, from viziers and governors downwards. This legation, on the other hand, has always been very careful not to grant protection to any official; but one cannot prevent the Makhzen from giving an appointment to a Moor who already holds a certificate of protection, nor withdraw the protection on that account, except with the consent of the Moor in question and of his employers.

Another matter which has caused British subjects some annoyance is the action of the "Contrôle de la Dette" in questioning their title to some of the houses and lands in

* Not printed.

their possession. The matter was reported to you in Sir R. Lister's despatch No. 14 of the 2nd February last. I have discussed the matter with M. Guiot, the head of the "contrôle," and he has explained to me his point of view, which *primâ facie* appears unanswerable. When the German loan was raised in 1905 and Makhzen properties at the ports were assigned as security, a list of these properties was drawn up and given to the loan contractors. When the German loan was taken over by the international consortium of banks in 1910 and the management of Makhzen properties was handed over to the "Contrôle de la Dette," the list in question was delivered to them. The "contrôle" therefore is responsible for all the properties included in that list. This list was drawn up in a great hurry, and, the desire of the Makhzen being to make the value of the security given appear as large as possible, they included in the list a number of properties which did not really belong to the Makhzen. On the other hand, it is notorious that in many cases Government properties have been fraudulently obtained possession of by private persons. The "contrôle" therefore is going through the whole list of properties in order to verify it and establish a properly drawn-up register of Government properties, defining the boundaries of all lands. Therefore, whenever they find any property included in the list claimed by private persons they contest the claim in order either to recover the property if it really belongs to the Makhzen, or to obtain the Makhzen's authority for striking it off the list if it is shown to be private property. The proper tribunal to decide any dispute as to the title is that of the cadi, as stipulated in article 11 of the Madrid Convention, 1880. Unfortunately no confidence can be placed in the impartiality of cadis, and there is little doubt as to what the decision would be when the Makhzen is one of the parties and presses its claim. As British subjects hold more property on the coast than subjects of other nations, it is natural that their titles have been contested in a number of cases, and, as the local agents of the "contrôle" have in some cases been wanting in tact, a considerable amount of feeling has been aroused in the matter.

Happily M. Guiot is always ready to examine all cases in an impartial and conciliatory spirit, and, by discussing the claims in a friendly manner with him, I have so far succeeded in obtaining a recognition of the titles of British subjects in all cases which we have gone into. There are still a certain number to be dealt with, but I hope to be able to effect a satisfactory settlement of all the cases which have as yet been brought to my notice.

I have, &c.

HERBERT E. WHITE.

[34498] No. 283.

Mr. White to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 2.)

(No. 285.)

Sir, *Tangier, August* 26, 1911.

THE French chargé d'affaires tells me that he lately received a telegram from his Government informing him that the Spanish Ambassador had spoken to M. de Selves about the delay that had occurred in giving effect to the provisions of the Hispano Moorish agreement in regaad to Santa Cruz de Mar Pequeña, and requesting him to furnish his views on the subject.

M. de Billy said that he replied that, as the Moorish Government had declared they would not fulfil their engagements under the agreement so long as the Spanish occupation of Laraiche and Alcazar was maintained, it was not likely that they would do anything to facilitate the occupation of Ifni by Spain. He also pointed out that the season was not a favourable one for taking possession of Ifni unless Spain was prepared to maintain a considerable force there, as the port was a bad one and from the autumn onwards would probably be frequently cut off from communication by sea with other places, and if troubles arose it might be difficult to send relief.

I have, &c.

HERBERT E. WHITE.

[34499] No. 284.

Mr. White to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 2.)

(No. 286.)

Sir, *Tangier, August 27, 1911.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 266 of the 13th instant, I have the honour to report that, so far as I have been able to ascertain, there were no British subjects at Tarudant at the time of the attack on that town. Mr. Manners Sutton has, however, gone there since in the company of two Frenchmen who are on good terms with influential Sus governors.

A few days ago the Governor of Mogador, fearing for the safety of the Christians at Tarudant, requested the Austrian and German consuls at Mogador to instruct them to return to the coast under safe conduct. Not receiving a satisfactory reply, he telegraphed to Cid Guebbas to obtain instructions from the German Minister to the Mannesmans to authorise their agents to return from Tarudant.

Cid Guebbas saw Baron von Seckendorff, who said he would consult his Government. Yesterday he communicated the reply to Cid Guebbas through the dragoman of his legation, who left an *aide-mémoire* in Arabic, translation of which I have the honour to transmit herewith. After stating that, according to the captain of the "Berlin," there is no danger to Europeans at Tarudant, it gives the Makhzen to understand that if it fails to assure the safety of Germans at Tarudant, the German Government will themselves take the necessary steps to secure their safety.

M. de Billy, who communicated to me the *aide-mémoire*, said that it is true that the danger is past, a reconciliation having been effected between the Howara tribe and the Governor of Tarudant. He is under the impression that the German reply is intended for France rather than for Morocco, its object being to make the French Government realise the danger of not promptly coming to terms with Germany.

I have, &c.

HERBERT E. WHITE.

Enclosure in No. 284.

Aide-mémoire.

LE commandant du "Berlin," qui stationne actuellement dans le port d'Agadir, a déclaré que la ville de Taroudant à la date du 21 août était calme et n'était pas sous le coup du moindre danger. Il semble donc que l'information donnée par le Gouverneur de Mogador repose sur des assertions de source étrangère. Le Ministre de l'Empire allemand a demandé au Ministre en résidence dans la légation de cette Puissance à Tanger de faire connaître au représentant du Sultan dans cette ville, Sid-el-Guebbas, que l'Empire allemand attend en toute fermeté que le Makhzen chérifien assure la protection des sujets allemands qui se trouvent à Taroudant, afin de ne pas être forcé et contraint de prendre par lui-même les mesures nécessaires pour assurer la sécurité de ceux-ci.

[34611] No. 285.

Sir F. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 2.)

(No. 147.)

Sir, *Vienna, August 31, 1911.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 146 of the 29th instant, I have the honour to report that the clerical "Reichspost" publishes this morning an alarmist article on the subject of the Morocco crisis. After drawing attention to the cancelling of the leave of German reserve officers and to the news of military preparations in Holland and Belgium as signs of the seriousness of the situation, the "Reichspost" goes on to say that Germany is tired of the everlasting bitterness shown towards her by England. She feels she has the strength to insist on her right to a "place in the sun," and to defy England's wearisome veto. Nor is she disposed to allow her French neighbour to fleece her in Africa and to cheat her of the fruits of the Moroccan agreement. The

German Social Democrats, says the "Reichspost," with their meetings and resolutions in favour of peace, are doing their best to encourage England and France in their pretentions, but this time German public opinion is against the Social Democrats, and, in fact, never since the days of Delcassé's challenge has it been so strongly on the side of the Emperor and the Government. The "Reichspost" then returns to the charge with regard to the article in the "Neue Freie Presse," and says that the poisoned arrows which "a highly placed English diplomatist" has let fly against Berlin from the stronghold of Austrian freethought have aroused the greatest indignation in Germany. Public opinion in that country, says the "Reichspost," is clamouring for satisfaction from England for this outburst of Germanophobia from a diplomatist, who, since his oracular denial, is now named by the whole world as Sir Fairfax Cartwright. Anyone who confines himself, as Sir Fairfax Cartwright and the English semi-official press bureau have done, to declining responsibility for an article because that article was anonymous, merely deprives the article of anonymity, and causes all fingers to be pointed at himself. The attacks of the English diplomatist have caused such bitterness that it has been suggested to the German Ambassador in Vienna that, until the incident has been satisfactorily settled, he should avoid the city in which an English diplomatist has been able to publish propaganda so tactless and so hostile to Austria's faithful ally.

The "Reichspost" concludes by renewing its attack on the Jewish Liberals and their organ, the "Neue Freie Presse," and notes with satisfaction the approval with which its (the "Reichspost's") previous articles on the subject have been greeted in the German press. It quotes the following passage from the "Kölnische Zeitung":—

"These manly words will not fail to make the best impression in Germany, especially as they come from a source which has a highly placed influence at its disposal. One can only wish that they might be confirmed by the semi-official organ of the Foreign Office, which has as yet taken no notice of the remarkable aberrations of the Vienna paper (namely, the 'Neue Freie Presse')"

The "Reichspost" says that the wish is natural enough, but remarks, sarcastically, that the "Neue Freie Presse" is not worthy of being chastised by the official press.

In another column of this morning's issue the "Reichspost" quotes a passage from the "Germania," the organ of the German centre, in which it is stated that there can now be no doubt as to the authorship of the article in the "Neue Freie Presse," and that the matter has ceased to be a private affair between the Ambassador and that journal. There exists a strong suspicion, says the "Germania," that His Britannic Majesty's Ambassador in Vienna has publicly insulted and scoffed at the German Emperor, German statesmen, and the German people in the most aggressive and frivolous manner. The British Government must therefore consider what they intend to do in order to clear up the matter, and eventually to give Germany ample satisfaction. If the British Government do not themselves examine the question, the German Foreign Office will have no other course but to place it politely but firmly before them. German patience is very great, but has its limits. If after Mr. Lloyd George, says the "Germania," Sir Fairfax Cartwright is let loose against us, the limit is reached. It is to be hoped that the German Government is quite clear as to the opinions and feelings of the preponderating mass of the German people, which will not stand these barefaced challenges and impertinent insults from English official quarters. This affair, says the "Germania," has nothing to do with the Moroccan crisis—it is simply a question of the insolence of a highly placed English diplomatist, and Germany, if she has any self-respect, must insist on satisfaction.

The Conservative Catholic "Vaterland" quotes a passage appearing in the "Münchener Neueste Nachrichten," which accuses me of having worked up an anti-German agitation in the Press during the time when I was Minister at Münich, and of having brought secret press agents to Münich who were patronised at the British Legation and presented at court. This, says the "Münchener Neueste Nachrichten," went on until, on the top of the previous anti-German intrigues in English papers and unfriendly utterances concerning Bavarian affairs, there appeared indiscretions which could only have emanated from the English wife of the German military attaché in Münich. The latter was transferred to The Hague, the English press agents disappeared, and Sir Fairfax was promoted to Vienna.

The "Vaterland" concludes with the following remarks:—

"Cartwright's long-standing intimacy with the Russian Isvolsky is as little forgotten in the Bavarian capital as is the long secret conference which he had on the

1st September, 1910, with Isvolsky and the French Ambassador in Vienna, M. Crozier, at the Hôtel Continental in Münich. Sir Fairfax is following in the footsteps of King Edward, and in his methods we can still trace the late King's 'hemming-in' policy.'"

I have, &c.
FAIRFAX L. CARTWRIGHT.

[34506] No. 286.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 2.)

(No. 386. Confidential.)

Sir, *Paris, September 1, 1911.*

M. DE SELVES gave to me two days ago for perusal the draft of a convention for regulating the position between France and Spain in Morocco on the supposition that the Berlin conversations result in an agreement by which, so far as the German Government are concerned, France will obtain an entirely free hand politically in Morocco.

I noticed that there is no mention in it of the Spanish sphere in which Ifni is situated, and that the stipulation in regard to Tangier is not very definite. I called M. de Selves' attention to-day to these points, remarking, however, that although the proposed convention was to take the place of the secret agreement of 1904 between France and Spain, which would consequently be abrogated, France and Spain would still be bound in regard to the non-fortification of the portion of the Moroccan coast in which Tangier was situated, mentioned in the Anglo-French declaration of 1904 respecting Morocco, which was adhered to by Spain.

As to Ifni, M. de Selves said that as Spain had allowed fifty years to elapse without entering into the occupation of the zone granted to her by the treaty of 1860 with Morocco, it was supposed that she could not attach must value to it, and he hoped that although it was recognised by the agreement of 1904 as a Spanish zone the Spanish Government might be willing to make over the rights of Spain to France in recognition of the fact (which it would be if the Berlin negotiations succeeded) that it would be France that found the compensations to Germany which had enabled the French Government to settle with the Spanish Government the position of Spain in Morocco on well-established lines.

M. de Selves has authorised me to forward to you, which I now do, the draft, but he begs me to inform you that it is by no means a definitive document, and that he would be glad to have any observations that you may wish to make on it, and particularly in regard to article 13, relating to the part of the coast of Morocco in which England is particularly interested.

I asked M. de Selves whether any communication had been made to him by the Spanish Ambassador in consequence of the French Ambassador at Madrid having mentioned to the Spanish Government the desire of the French Government to acquire Ifni. M. de Selves had not received any communication of the intention of the Spanish Government to occupy Ifni such as was made to you yesterday by the Spanish Ambassador. When I told him of it he said that he regretted that the Spanish Government should have come to such a decision.

I have, &c.
FRANCIS BERTIE.

Enclosure in No. 286.

Draft Franco-Spanish Convention.

LE Gouvernement de la République française et le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté le Roi d'Espagne, considérant en raison des modifications qui se sont produites dans la situation politique du Maroc au cours des dernières années qu'il y a lieu de préciser et de modifier, en tant que de besoin, les engagements réciproques qui y ont fait l'objet de la convention du 3 octobre, 1904, se sont mis d'accord sur les dispositions ci-après :—

ARTICLE 1er.

Le Gouvernement français et le Gouvernement espagnol déclarent garantir les droits souverains de Sa Majesté chérifienne sur le Maroc.

Le Gouvernement français, sous cette réserve, reconnaît au Gouvernement espagnol le droit d'administrer le territoire marocain compris dans les limites ci-après :—

Partant de l'embouchure de la Moulouya, la limite remontera le thalweg de ce fleuve jusqu'à l'alignement de la crête des hauteurs les plus rapprochées de la rive gauche de l'Oued Defla. De ce point, la limite gagnera directement à l'ouest, la ligne de faîte séparant le bassin de la Moulouya, puis ceux de l'Oued Inaouen et de l'Oued Sebou qui sont dans la zone française, des bassins de l'Oued Kert et de l'Oued Ouergha ; elle suivra cette ligne de faîte jusqu'au mont de Moulaï bou Chta. De là, elle remontera vers le nord en suivant, à une distance de 25 kilom. à l'est jusqu'à sa rencontre avec le Loukkos, la route orientale de Fez à El Ksar par Ouezzan, puis elle descendra le Loukkos jusqu'à une distance de kilomètres en aval du passage de cette rivière par la route occidentale d'Ouezzan à El Ksar, de manière à laisser dans la zone espagnole la route de Larache à El Ksar, et de là elle gagnera par une ligne droite la côte de l'Atlantique.

ARTICLE 2.

Dans l'étendue de leurs zones respectives et d'accord avec le Gouvernement marocain, le Gouvernement français et le Gouvernement espagnol procéderont aux occupations militaires qu'ils jugeront nécessaires au maintien de l'ordre public et à la sécurité des transactions commerciales. Ils pourront exercer dans leurs zones toute action de police sur terre et dans les eaux territoriales.

ARTICLE 3.

Le Gouvernement espagnol n'apportera aucune entrave au passage des officiers et gradés français entrés au service chérifien, qui se rendront de Tanger à Fez, ou inversement, non plus qu'au passage de leurs armes et bagages. Il n'apportera, de même, aucune entrave aux convois de ravitaillement envoyés de Tanger à Fez pour les besoins des troupes chérifiennes commandées par des instructeurs français.

ARTICLE 4.

Le Gouvernement français et le Gouvernement espagnol s'engagent à assurer, chacun dans sa zone respective, la liberté et la pratique extérieure de tous les cultes existant au Maroc.

ARTICLE 5.

Le Gouvernement français et le Gouvernement espagnol déclarent que, fermement attachés au principe de la liberté commerciale au Maroc, ils ne se prêteront à aucune inégalité pas plus dans l'établissement des droits de douane, impôts et autres taxes que dans l'établissement des tarifs de transport par chemin de fer. Le Gouvernement français s'entendra avec le Gouvernement espagnol pour que ces droits et tarifs soient les mêmes dans tout le Maroc.

ARTICLE 6.

Les revenus de toute nature des régions administrées par l'Espagne seront affectés aux besoins de ces régions, à leur administration et aux améliorations qui seront jugées nécessaires.

Toutefois, il sera prélevé annuellement dans des conditions à déterminer avec le Contrôle de la Dette marocaine une somme à déterminer qui constituera la part des régions administrées par l'Espagne dans le service et l'amortissement des emprunts de l'État marocain conclus avant le présent accord.

Une somme à déterminer sera également versée chaque année au Trésor marocain comme contribution des régions administrées par l'Espagne aux dépenses générales de l'État marocain.

L'Espagne conserve sa créance sur le Gouvernement marocain telle qu'elle résulte de l'accord du 16 novembre, 1910, mais elle renonce à sa part de 55 pour cent sur la redevance minière dans le reste du Maroc.

ARTICLE 6 *bis*.

Les Gouvernements français et espagnol conviennent que les monnaies d'argent française et espagnole seront librement introduites au Maroc et y jouiront de la même valeur libératoire que la monnaie marocaine.

ARTICLE 7.

Les Hautes Puissances contractantes veilleront à ce qu'il ne soit perçu aucun droit d'exportation sur le minerai de fer exporté des ports marocains. Les exploitations de minerai de fer ne subiront aucun impôt spécial. Elles ne seront assujetties qu'aux impôts généraux et aux redevances domaniales qui atteindront toutes les entreprises minières.

ARTICLE 8.

Le Gouvernement français s'entendra avec le Gouvernement espagnol pour faire régler par des commissions techniques nommées par moitié par le Gouvernement français et par moitié par le Gouvernement espagnol, le fonctionnement dans les régions administrées par l'Espagne des différents organismes financiers et administratifs existant aujourd'hui au Maroc.

ARTICLE 9.

Le Gouvernement français et le Gouvernement espagnol s'engagent à veiller chacun dans sa zone respective à ce que les travaux et fournitures nécessités par les constructions éventuelles de routes, chemin de fer, ports, &c., soient octroyés par le Gouvernement chérifien suivant le système de l'adjudication. Mais l'exploitation de ces grandes entreprises sera réservée à l'État ou librement concédée par lui.

ARTICLE 10.

Le Gouvernement français renonce à exercer aucun droit de protection sur des sujets marocains dans les régions administrées par l'Espagne. Le Gouvernement espagnol renonce de même à exercer aucun droit de protection sur des sujets marocains dans le reste du Maroc.

ARTICLE 11.

Le Gouvernement français et le Gouvernement espagnol s'entendront avec le Gouvernement marocain pour qu'il appartienne au Gouvernement espagnol de couvrir de sa protection dans les pays étrangers les sujets marocains originaires des régions administrées par lui.

ARTICLE 12.

Lorsque des organisations judiciaires marocaines régulières auront été créées par l'Espagne et que l'Espagne aura décidé de leur transférer la juridiction des tribunaux consulaires espagnols, le Gouvernement français transférera également à ces mêmes tribunaux la juridiction des tribunaux consulaires français, étant entendu que les ressortissants français jouiront des mêmes garanties légales et réglementaires que les ressortissants espagnols. Une entente entre les Gouvernements français et espagnol réglera l'entrée en vigueur de la nouvelle organisation.

ARTICLE 13.

La ville de Tanger avec un périmètre de 15 kilom. gardera le caractère spécial que lui donnent ses institutions municipales et sanitaires que l'Espagne s'engage à respecter. La municipalité de Tanger assurera la police dans la ville et son périmètre.

ARTICLE 14.

Les hautes Puissances contractantes sont chargées chacune dans leur zone de la surveillance et de la répression de la contrebande des armes sur terre et sur mer. Elles établiront d'un commun accord les règles à observer pour cette répression.

ARTICLE 15.

Les Français et les Espagnols continueront à jouir dans les eaux et ports marocains du droit de navigation et de pêche.

ARTICLE 16.

Le Gouvernement français s'engage à respecter dans sa zone les écoles et établissements espagnols. Le Gouvernement espagnol prend le même engagement en

ce qui concerne les écoles et établissements français dans la sienne. Il s'engage en outre à ne pas faire opposition à la cession à un clergé de nationalité française du ministère paroissial exercé aujourd'hui par le clergé espagnol dans la zone française.

ARTICLE 17.

Après avoir pris connaissance de la convention intervenue le entre la France et l'Allemagne au sujet du Maroc, l'Espagne déclare y adhérer et considère comme abrogées dans l'avenir toutes les stipulations des traités, conventions ou accords de toute nature qui seraient contraires aux précédentes stipulations.

[34659] No. 287.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 2.)

(No. 143. Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Paris, September 2, 1911.*

SEE my telegram No. 141 of yesterday.

Minister for Foreign Affairs has shown me to-day a telegram from French Ambassador at St. Petersburgh, dated yesterday. It states, with reference to some guarded remarks which the Ambassador reported as having been made to him by Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs in regard to the possibility of a threatening of war and of a Russian mediation to avert it, that he is convinced that any instructions which Russian Ambassador may have received and on which he founded his communication to French Minister for Foreign Affairs were inspired by M. Isvolsky himself, M. Nératof's late chief, and were not due to any change of attitude on the part of the Emperor, and that the considerations urged by M. Isvolsky and the arguments which he used in support of them, and suggestion that Emperor of Austria would be a fitting arbitrator, were his own.

French Ambassador at St. Petersburgh further states that from language of entourage of Emperor, of the Grand Dukes, and of the generals there can be no doubt that His Majesty intends faithfully to adhere to assurances of support of Russia as France's ally which by his orders were lately given to French Government. Having regard to these circumstances, French Ambassador proposes not to ask for a special audience to bring to Emperor's notice the strange communication made to French Minister for Foreign Affairs by Russian Ambassador, but to take an opportunity of speaking to the Emperor on the subject just before His Majesty leaves for the Crimea, when he will receive French Ambassador.

[34648] No. 288.

Mr. White to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 2.)

(No. 148.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Tangier, September 2, 1911.*

YOUR telegram No. 63, repeating telegram No. 87 of 31st August to Madrid.

Spanish representative told me a few days ago that he had no information regarding proposed occupation of Ifni. Commissioner for Foreign Affairs has just told me that no communication has been made to him on the subject.

[34658] No. 289.

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 2.)

(No. 71.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Zarauz, September 2, 1911.*

MOROCCO. My telegram No. 70 of the 31st August.

Minister for Foreign Affairs invited me late last night to resume the conversations which were broken off last June with himself and the French Ambassador. While making it clear that I was without instructions, having had no time to communicate with yourself, I consented, at the request of the French Ambassador, to meet their Excellencies this morning at San Sebastian.

M. Geoffray proceeded to read out to Señor Garcia Prieto an abstract of the new

draft convention between France and Spain, of which he is not yet authorised to communicate the full text. The French proposals seemed to satisfy the Minister for Foreign Affairs, who, however, reserved his comments till he had studied the full text. But when M. Geoffray intimated that the Ifni region would be required by France as Spain's contribution towards the enormous sacrifices demanded by Germany, Señor Garcia Prieto declared that, in his personal opinion, the Spanish Government could never give up this territory. The region in question lay opposite the Canary Islands; the Spanish people attached great importance to its possession; the date of the 3rd or 4th September had actually been fixed for its occupation.

French Ambassador urged strongly that the occupation of Ifni by Spain at this juncture would rouse great excitement in the French press, such as would endanger the continuance of the negotiation, and the Minister for Foreign Affairs accordingly said he would do his best to procure a postponement of the occupation for a few days. His Excellency admitted that Spain should make some sacrifice to France, and it is probable that he will make a counter-proposition for the cession of some smaller extent of territory.

M. Geoffray hoped that in a few days he would be authorised to communicate full text of French proposals.

[34653] No. 290.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received September* 3.)

(No. 196.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *St. Petersburgh, September* 3, 1911.

FRANCE and Germany.

Sir F. Bertie's telegram No. 141 of the 2nd September.

It seems likely that the Russian communication in Paris was inspired by M. Isvolsky, and the French Ambassador here is not greatly perturbed by it. M. Louis thinks it only natural that Russia should wish to avert war, and he also thinks that two currents of opinion may exist here as to the policy which Russia should pursue; but at the same time he is confident that in the event of a rupture of the negotiations Russia will do her duty as the ally of France.

M. Louis cites in support of his view the categorical assurances already given by Russia; the fact that the French and Russian chiefs of the staff on the very day of M. Isvolsky's communication to M. de Selves were engaged here in a consultation as to the plan of campaign in case of war; the language used by the Grand Duke Nicholas, who would probably be Russian commander-in-chief, in drinking to the army of Russia's ally at a dinner which was given here in honour of the French military delegation a few days ago.

M. Louis hopes that the Emperor will receive him within the next few days, before the court starts for the Crimea, and his Excellency appears to be in no anxiety as to the results of his audience. He tells me that information as to the course of the negotiations has been communicated to the Russian Government day by day.

At a State banquet which was given last Friday in honour of the King of Servia, and at which no other Ambassadors besides myself were present, the Emperor afforded me no chance of conversation with him, and it was only when His Majesty was on the point of leaving with the King that he shook hands with me. I cannot say whether this was done with the intention of avoiding any political conversation, but that was rather the impression which I received.

On the same evening I had a long conversation with M. Stolypin, who told me that, in his opinion, Germany was only bluffing, and there would be no war. I did not make any enquiry as to the attitude of Russia, as I did not think there could be any question about it after what M. Louis had told me (see my telegram No. 190 of the 24th August). M. Nératof has also adopted a very optimistic tone, but I am to see him to-morrow, and will sound him again.

[34786] No. 290*.

Mr. White to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received September* 4.)

(No. 287.)
Sir, *Tangier, August* 28, 1911.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 258 of the 8th instant, I have the honour to transmit herewith copy of a despatch I have received from His Majesty's vice-consul at Mogador communicating a letter addressed to him by Mr. Ostler, the "Daily Express" correspondent, who was ordered to leave Agadir, stating that he expects a personal apology from Kaïd Guellouli for having refused to see him when on his way back to Mogador, and for his men having refused to sell him fodder for his animals; he also demands the severe punishment of the kaïd's deputy at Agadir.

As I stated in my despatch No. 253 of the 5th instant, I think Mr. Ostler was imprudent in not providing himself with a letter of recommendation to the Governor of Agadir, nor even taking a soldier as escort, as required when travelling in this country, the "precautions of police" referred to in article 4 of the Anglo-Moorish Treaty of 1856 having always been interpreted as meaning that British subjects, when travelling, should be escorted by a Government soldier. Mr. Ostler was also wanting in tact when he refused to furnish any information regarding himself.

In his despatch, copy of which was enclosed in my despatch No. 257 of the 8th instant, Mr. Vice-Consul Johnstone stated that Kaïd Guellouli had sent him a further letter of apology, though he did not transmit a copy thereof. It would, I think, require considerable pressure to make Kaïd Guellouli tender a formal apology to Mr. Ostler personally.

As regards the Governor of Agadir, Sid Guebbas in his letter, translation of which accompanied my despatch No. 258 of the 8th instant, stated that he had written very strongly to him on the subject. A letter of reprimand from the Makhzen could, I presume, be obtained, but it would probably be difficult to obtain the severe punishment of that official, which could only mean his dismissal.

In the circumstances, I propose to await instructions before taking any further steps in the matter.

I have, &c.
HERBERT E. WHITE.

Enclosure 1 in No. 290*.

Vice-Consul Johnstone to Mr. White.

(No. 40.)
Sir, *Mogador, August* 22, 1911.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith, with reference to your despatch No. 25 of the 8th instant relative to the expulsion of Messrs. Ostler and McCullagh from Agadir, a copy of a letter which I have received from the former gentleman respecting the event and the reparation which he expects. Mr. Ostler omits to mention the fact that Kaïd Guellouli's letter to the Governor of Mogador, in which Guellouli demanded that every traveller should be accompanied by a soldier and carry letters, did not arrive until some days after both the travellers had departed, and no difficulty was experienced by them until they arrived at their destination.

I have informed Mr. Ostler that I fear some considerable time must elapse before he obtains satisfaction.

I have, &c.
H. W. JOHNSTONE.

Enclosure 2 in No. 290*.

Mr. Ostler to Vice-Consul Johnstone.

The Royal Hotel, Mogador,
August 21, 1911.

Dear Mr. Johnstone,

ON receiving your information that a letter has been dispatched from Sid Guebbas to Kaïd Guellouli on the subject of my expulsion from Agadir, I dispatched an article to the "Daily Express," of which the main points are as follows:—

I pointed out that it is at present too early to expect any result from Sid Guebbas's letter.

Also, I added that, unless that letter results in a personal apology to myself from Guellouli and the punishment of his subordinate at Agadir, the protest, so far as I personally am concerned, need not have been made.

I claim the apology from Guellouli for his refusal to see me, and, above all, for the fact that his men refused to sell me provisions for my animals.

As for the punishment of his khalifa, I insist that it shall be severe, as his action in expelling me was obviously prompted by disappointed greed. He had tolerated my presence in Agadir for a week, and only discovered that I must be turned out within half-an-hour of Mr. McCullagh's refusal to give him his binoculars.

Further, though I sinned in omitting to present letters, I sinned in ignorance, and was entitled to lenient treatment. It was suggested by one of the Germans, on my behalf, that I should be permitted to send for the necessary letters to Mogador, and to stay at Agadir during the few days necessary for their arrival. The khalifa, however, would not even consider this. He said that if I chose to fetch the letters myself, and present them on my return, then I might stay in Agadir, but, not having them now, I must go at once.

I do not know how much time will be spent in arguing these questions. I trust it will not be long, as I am anxious to return to England.

Sincerely yours,
ALAN OSTLER.

[34784] No. 291.

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 4.)

(No. 151.)

Sir, *Zarauz, August* 30, 1911.

M. GEOFFRAY, French Ambassador, had the goodness to read to me to-day the text of the draft convention with Spain concerning her sphere of influence in Morocco, which it is proposed to submit to the Spanish Government in the event of the Berlin negotiation leading to a satisfactory settlement between France and Germany.

The draft convention was to be communicated to-day to Sir Francis Bertie, and M. Geoffray explained the hope that, if it should meet with your concurrence, you would furnish me with instructions to support him in urging the Spanish Government to acquiesce in the proposed arrangements, which seemed to him to constitute a perfectly fair adaptation of the terms of the secret convention of October 1904 to the present condition of Morocco. Meanwhile his Excellency is authorised to speak to the Spanish Government generally in the sense of the draft convention, withholding, however, the full text until the issue of the Berlin negotiation is known.

The draft convention provides that, subject to the maintenance of the Sultan's authority throughout Morocco, Spain shall be entrusted with the task of administering her own sphere of influence in that country. The limits of her sphere of influence are those laid down in article 2 of the secret convention, except as regards the region of Wazan and Wady Lucus, where a slight modification of the line hitherto claimed by Spain is proposed. Spain is further required to abandon to France the region of Ifni, as delimited in article 4 of the secret convention. France and Spain renounce reciprocally, each in the sphere of influence of the other, the right of protection over natives. When Spain shall set up courts of justice to supersede, within her sphere, the existing ex-territorial jurisdiction, France will recognise the new courts, her nationals enjoying the same rights and privileges as those of Spain. Spain may employ troops and police for the maintenance of order. The revenues of her sphere are assigned to be spent within that sphere, except as regards a sum to be set apart annually for Imperial needs, and a further sum representing the share of the interest of existing loans which may fairly be held to fall upon the Spanish sphere. The principle of the open door is maintained in respect of adjudication for public works, as also the present special position enjoyed by Tangier (including a radius of 15 kilom. round) in virtue of her municipal and sanitary institutions. The working of existing organic institutions such as customs, State bank, &c., to be determined by means of mixed commissions appointed respectively by France and Spain.

The foregoing arrangements, which I merely quote in outline and from memory, appear to me to meet fairly enough the Spanish contention that the status of Morocco has changed, and that she is entitled therefore, under article 3 of the secret treaty, to "exercise her action freely" within her recognised sphere of influence. Scarcely any limits indeed are placed upon her freedom of action except such as necessarily arise from the maintenance of the sovereign authority of the Sultan and from the need which obviously exists to provide contributions towards the Imperial expenses of the State and towards the service of existing loans.

The surrender of Ifni to France is likely, no doubt, to prove, if granted, a very unpopular concession. Though the possession of this region would be of doubtful advantage to Spain, it represents in the mind of the people the only material achievement of the Tetuan campaign of 1860, beyond a slight expansion of the Ceuta zone. You may possibly consider, however, that from a purely British point of view its acquisition by France would offer no objection. In the hands of a strong Power it may perhaps be said that the danger of the possible development of Ifni in the interests of another nation would be largely eliminated.

M. Geoffray has already intimated verbally to the Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs that France desires to include Ifni within her sphere of influence in Morocco. He pointed out that if Spain had taken part in the Berlin negotiation she would no doubt have been required by Germany to make, as France will have to do, a large territorial concession. The Berlin negotiation, if successful, would redound to the benefit of Spain as well as France. It was only fair, then, that Spain should make good, by the small sacrifice now demanded of her, a portion of the serious loss which France is incurring in the interests of both countries.

Señor Garcia Prieto, as M. Geoffray informs me, seemed somewhat staggered by

the French demand. He informed the French Ambassador that the Spanish Government were in communication with that of Morocco, through El Mokri in Paris, and El Guebbas in Tangier, as well as through the Spanish consul at Fez, with a view to the appointment of a Moorish commissioner to meet the Spanish commissioner designated to proceed jointly with him to a delimitation of the Ifni region, as required by the convention between Spain and Morocco of the 16th November, 1910. These pourparlers were far advanced, and it was possible that El Muaz, who preceded El Mokri as Moorish Ambassador for the negotiation of the said convention at Madrid, would be shortly delegated by the Sultan to proceed to Ifni. Señor Garcia Prieto did not, however, take up an uncompromising attitude. He merely said that the matter was one of great importance to Spain, and that it would be discussed in all its bearings at the Cabinet councils due to be held this week in Madrid in the presence of the King.

I have, &c.

MAURICE DE BUNSEN.

[34703] No. 292.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 4.)

(No. 251.)

Sir, *Berlin, August 31, 1911.*

A MEETING of several thousand Pan-Germans was held in Berlin yesterday to consider the Morocco question. The main characteristics of the meeting were the comparatively friendly tone of the speakers towards France and a note of strong animosity against England.

All the speakers stated that the object of the meeting was not to protest against the action of the Government, but to claim protection for German political and commercial interests, and they all without exception demanded, for various reasons, territorial compensation, the general idea running through the various speeches being that Germany should have a piece of Morocco, but, failing that, a compensation in territory equal in value to the enormous increase of power accruing to France. In any case, whatever territory was eventually ceded to Germany, it must, in order fully to compensate her, include a strip of coast.

The resolution passed at the conclusion of the meeting and unanimously accepted was to the following effect:—

"The action of France in Morocco, by which the Algeciras Act has been infringed, affects Germany's important political and economic interests in such a way that the emphatic safeguarding of those interests becomes the duty of our Government. To guard these interests France must be required to return to the Act of Algeciras. Should this solution not be selected, Germany must ensure for herself the same rights and the same influence in West Morocco as France claims in any other part of Morocco. In no case must we allow France to increase her army from the population of Morocco, as such action would constitute a threat to Germany, and would force us to increase our armaments. We must quietly but decisively reject interferences on the part of any other State in the Franco-German Morocco dispute."

I have, &c.

W. E. GOSCHEN.

[34904] No. 293.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 4.)

(No. 67.)

(Telegraphic.) P. *Berlin, September 4, 1911.*

THE Imperial Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and the French Ambassador met to-day and resumed the negotiations. M. Cambon handed to Herr von Kiderlen the draft of a convention, which the latter said he would submit to the Chancellor, and would communicate an answer to M. Cambon at their next meeting on the 6th instant. Herr von Kiderlen took exception to articles 5 and 6 of the draft and also to the last article, which deals with the question of the position of German protégés in Morocco. His Excellency also maintained that the territorial compensations in the Congo offered by the French Government were insufficient in view of the advantages accruing to

[34702] No. 291*.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 4.)

(No. 250.)

Sir, *Berlin, August 31, 1911.*

THE German press, perhaps a little short of material of its own during the absence of M. Cambon and Herr von Kiderlen from Berlin, have fastened with the utmost avidity on the article in the "Neue Freie Presse" supposed to be inspired by a "British diplomatist of high standing." The "Vossische Zeitung" has taken the lead in the campaign, but it is closely followed by the Pan-German papers and, to say the truth, by nearly all the press with the exception of the "Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung," which has barely alluded to the subject. Their outcries are not only directed against the British diplomatist who is supposed to have furnished the material for the article, but also against the "Neue Freie Presse" for having published it. On the point, however, of the culpability of the "Neue Freie Presse" all the press is not agreed, and in some papers the view is taken that the "Neue Freie Presse" published the interview, not with the intention of exciting public opinion against Germany, but, on the contrary, in order to let there be no mistake as to the opinions held by the British diplomatist nor as to his identity. The "Vossische Zeitung" greedily seizes this point of view and gloats over the ease with which the British diplomatist fell into the trap.

Unfortunately, however absurd the deductions made from the article by the Berlin press, the utterances of the "Neue Freie Presse" have undoubtedly added fuel to the flame of indignation against Great Britain which has certainly existed ever since the dispatch of the "Panther" to Agadir and Mr. Lloyd George's speech. And I am bound to say that a diligent search through the German newspapers has not revealed a single friendly word. Leaving aside the excited and ridiculous language of the minor Pan-German and Nationalist papers, who threaten serious consequences unless His Majesty's Government at once disavow the British Ambassador at Vienna and recall him from his post, the more responsible and serious papers like the "Frankfurter Zeitung," the "Germania," and the "Kreuz-Zeitung" make very disagreeable remarks.

The "Frankfurter Zeitung" says that Sir F. Cartwright's statement to the effect that he refuses all responsibility for the article has given the "Neue Freie Presse" the opportunity, while maintaining its journalistic anonymity, to make it quite clear that as a matter of fact the article was inspired by that diplomatist.

The "Germania" says:—

"Since Sir F. Cartwright's denial of any responsibility for the article, the affair has ceased to be one which concerns him and the 'Neue Freie Presse' alone. The matter now stands thus: There is a well-founded suspicion that Sir F. Cartwright, the British Ambassador in Vienna, has insulted in a most provocative and uncalled-for manner the German Emperor, German statesmen, and the German people. The British Government have therefore to consider the question of what steps they are to take to clear the matter up and eventually to give Germany satisfaction. Should they not of their own initiative take this question into their consideration, then the Imperial Foreign Office will scarcely be able to avoid bringing it to their notice in polite but unmistakable terms. German patience is great, but it has its limits. If, besides Mr. Lloyd George, Sir F. Cartwright is to be loosed against us, then those limits are reached. It is to be hoped that the Imperial Foreign Office is in this case quite clear as to the sentiments of the great majority of the German people, who are determined not to put up with these insults and provocations from British official quarters. We maintain that this case has nothing whatever to do with the Morocco negotiations. It is simply a question of an act of insolence directed against us by a highly placed British diplomatist, and we must insist, in view of our self-respect, that we must be given proper satisfaction."

The "Frankfurter Zeitung" quotes the above remarks, and says that, though their tone is somewhat violent, they cannot be lightly passed over.

The article in the "Kreuz-Zeitung" is also very bitter, though couched, perhaps, in more moderate language. It says that the intrigues of Sir F. Cartwright and M. Crozier against Germany have long been suspected, but that now that they have been proved they cease to be dangerous. In any case, the "Kreuz-Zeitung" adds, the sole result achieved by their attempts to sow distrust of Germany in Austria and

Italy has been that their insinuations have been rejected by the entire Austrian and Italian press.

The "Kreuz-Zeitung" concludes its article with the following words :—

"Sir F. Cartwright has placed himself in complete opposition to the official British policy as described in the semi-official 'Westminster Gazette.' It remains to be seen what course will be taken by His Majesty's Government as regards a diplomatist who of set purpose has gone counter to their views, and has once more aroused feelings of deep mistrust of British policy amongst all the members of the Triple Alliance."

In a later issue the "Frankfurter Zeitung" devotes a leading article to the "Neue Freie Presse" article and its authorship. It is written in a comparatively moderate tone, and, as it has an official ring, I enclose a translation of it for your perusal.

I have, &c.
W. E. GOSCHEN.

Enclosure in No. 291[c].

Extract from the "Frankfurter Zeitung" of August 30, 1911.

(Translation.)

THE malicious utterances of an "English diplomat holding an important post" which the "Neue Freie Presse" published a few days ago, only to follow them up two days later by a statement in the contrary sense from the pen of Professor Hans Delbrück, have naturally made an unpleasant impression in Germany, and have prompted a section of the German press to violent articles, not only against the author of the statement and those who reproduced it, but also against England and the English Government. The interview was, according to the introductory remarks of the Viennese paper, attributed to the British Ambassador, Sir Fairfax Cartwright; and the latter's *démenti*, which only spoke of badly-informed persons but in no way contained the expected categorical denial of authorship, did not give the lie to this presumption. On the contrary, a remark made by the same paper in reply to this *démenti* still further strengthens the supposition that Sir Fairfax was the author. Accordingly, when the "Daily Graphic" gives vent to its pleasure at Sir Fairfax's prompt denial of the "Neue Freie Presse" interview, it is rather easily satisfied, and the statement of the Reuter Bureau that in official circles in London nothing is known of any English diplomat being responsible for the interview appears rather comic than convincing. Nevertheless, no mathematical proof against Sir Fairfax has been published. We are, moreover, of the opinion that the German press need not be so eager to tear off the ill-chosen mask. Sir Fairfax's opinions about Germany are sufficiently well known from the time of the Bosnian crisis. It was not to be expected that he should have changed them in the meantime, and there is no sort of reason for demanding satisfaction from the British Foreign Office because a British diplomat, whose name is not known, indulged in very unfriendly remarks, directed against Germany, to an interviewer. We can, we think, calmly pass over such ill-natured pin-pricks, which, in spite of their ill-nature, make next to no impression. It is, however, somewhat more difficult to answer the question how the interview will affect the interests of world-peace and the establishment of better relations between England and Germany. The British Government have lately—it is true before the beginning of the Moroccan discussions—often declared that they set great store on the improvement of the relations between the two countries, and this corresponds, in fact, with the line of policy of a Liberal Cabinet. The utterances of the "English diplomat holding an important post" are, however, not only calculated, but also probably intended, to have an unfavourable effect on the development of these improved relations, to sow discord between Germany and England, and so to frustrate the policy of the Foreign Office. They are probably intended to go even farther and to render the present situation as acute as possible in order to prevent a peaceful compromise. Consequently, whoever may be the author of these utterances, the British Government has no doubt every reason for "dealing thoroughly" with this representative who is pursuing his own policy. In any case, such incitements do not belong to an honest peace policy. That the diplomat should

have chosen for his Germanophobe remarks a paper of Germany's ally, Austria, makes the thing all the more amusing. If he meant to conceal his identity as much as possible, the result does not constitute a very brilliant testimonial to his diplomatic skill. In any case, he was successful in finding a suitable instrument for the dissemination of his personal spite. The "Neue Freie Presse" declares that it thought it its duty to publish his remarks in order clearly to define the situation. That is an ill-chosen excuse. The world would have been none the poorer had it never heard the English diplomat's malicious remarks. On the other hand, it was not difficult to foresee that their publication must have an extremely detrimental effect upon the relations of the two countries. But one must not at once assume that this was the object of the article, though it must be a matter for doubt whether some political reason of this kind or an unscrupulous craving for sensation was the real motive of the article. In any case, the "Neue Freie Presse" will not gain the merit which it seeks. But, as things are at present, public opinion in Germany would do well to distinguish between the malicious press vapourings of an unscrupulous diplomat and the attitude of the British Government, who, although they have not adopted a very friendly attitude towards us in the Moroccan affair, have yet recently given clearly to understand that an understanding with Germany, which would be welcomed by the latter, would also be very acceptable to them.

[34704] No. 292*.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received September* 4.)

(No. 252. Secret.)

Sir, *Berlin, September* 1, 1911.

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith a despatch which I have received from Colonel Russell, military attaché to this embassy, relating to a conversation with His Majesty the German Emperor.

I have, &c.
W. E. GOSCHEN.

Enclosure in No. 292*.

Lieutenant-Colonel Russell to Sir E. Goschen.

(No. 20. Secret.)

Sir, *Berlin, September* 1, 1911.

AT the conclusion of the annual autumn parade of the Guard Army Corps on the Tempelhofer Feld, which was held to-day, His Majesty the Emperor called me to his side.

His Majesty began by expressing regret that it had been found impossible to make arrangements at this late hour for the three British officers whose attendance at the manœuvres had been asked for by the British Government. The Emperor explained that the manœuvre area was only sparsely populated, and the accommodation was limited and primitive. His Majesty much regretted the matter, but hoped that the names of the British officers in question might be recorded for attendance at the German manœuvres next year.

I was at a loss to understand which three officers His Majesty was referring to, as permission had been asked, but had not yet been received, for eight British officers to attend manœuvres in various parts of Germany this year. (An unofficial affirmative had till then only been given in the case of three officers.) I therefore asked the Emperor if he did not intend to allow any British officers to attend manœuvres in Germany this year. His Majesty replied that he thought permission had already been given for the usual contingent of British officers. I assured His Majesty that, though the usual application for eight British officers had reached the German Foreign Office some time ago, no official reply had as yet been given to it. The Emperor seemed surprised at what I said, and stated that he had imagined that the three officers he had been speaking about were over and above the usual contingent of British officers. His Majesty also suggested jokingly that eight was rather a large number, but I protested that it was the same as in former years. His Majesty then said that he would attend to the matter. (A few hours after the above conversation a message was received from the German Foreign Office that permission would be given for all the eight British officers, for whom application had been made, to attend the manœuvres.)

Assuming then a distressed but by no means irate tone, His Majesty exclaimed: "What in Heaven's name does your Ambassador in Vienna mean by the dreadful statements he has made? The German people were already somewhat irritated over the Moroccan question, and Lloyd George's speech had not tended to improve matters. I had just done my best to smooth matters over, when now this comes on the top of everything. My people are furious (with great emphasis) about it: I cannot tell you how angry they are."

I assured His Majesty that the statements which had appeared in the press had been officially contradicted, and that it was of course impossible for Sir Fairfax Cartwright to have uttered the words which had been attributed to him in the newspapers. His Majesty, however, said that he was very well instructed, and was convinced that those were the views of our Ambassador in Vienna. "I know him well," the Emperor continued. "He has a dreadful hatred of Germany. No one dislikes us as he does. When he was in Munich he wrote terrible things about this country. He and Maxse are the greatest enemies Germany has. Your Ambassador in Vienna has also said insulting things about me, which are very difficult for me to get over. He knows me, too, and played as a child with members of my family. I should have thought he would have remembered that. The way he has behaved is not worthy of a responsible diplomatist."

The Emperor then promised me that he would go into the matter of the British officers attending the manœuvres, shook hands, and wished me good-bye in a cordial manner. In doing so His Majesty charged me to inform you, Sir, of what he had said to me.

The Emperor's manner during the conversation recorded above was calm and friendly. He appeared to be more distressed than angry when referring to the British Ambassador in Vienna.

I cannot vouch absolutely for the words His Majesty made use of in the cases where I have endeavoured to give them. I think, however, that I have recorded them correctly, and am convinced that I have rendered the sense at all events quite faithfully.

I have, &c.

ALICK RUSSELL,

Lieutenant-Colonel.

France in Morocco. He further refused to accept the proposed rectification of the Togoland frontier, but M. Cambon said that he could not consider this refusal as final, and requested Herr von Kiderlen to reconsider the matter.

On the whole, M. Cambon appears to be not dissatisfied with the results of this interview, the tone of which was friendly.

[35283] No. 294.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 242.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, September* 4, 1911.

THE Russian Ambassador asked me to-day what I thought of the prospects of the conversations between France and Germany.

I said that the outcome was very obscure. The Germans had changed their ground so often that it was very difficult to form an opinion. There would certainly not be war unless Germany intended to have it. If the conversations came to a deadlock, everything would depend upon what Germany did. If she took some action to rush matters, either by landing a force in Morocco or by sending to France a communication in the nature of an ultimatum about the Algeciras Act, such as Count Metternich had foreshadowed in a conversation with me some weeks ago, it would of course mean that she intended war. But otherwise some settlement would be patched up. I said that I understood the Russian Government were being kept informed of everything, and I asked whether he had any news from St. Petersburgh.

He replied that he had none.

I told him that Sir Fairfax Cartwright had not been cognisant of the article in the "Neue Freie Presse," and the attacks upon him had been worked up from German sources. There must have been some object in this. It might be that Germany intended to make a settlement with France, and to explain that this settlement was not satisfactory owing to the action of England. The German Government might intend to cover their retreat by giving this explanation to German public opinion. It might be one way of securing peace, though it would tend to an increase of naval expenditure.

I observed that the whole matter might have been settled if the Germans had gone to the French when the latter reached Fez and told them quietly that Germany must have a settlement. But when the Germans opened the proceedings by sending a war-ship to Agadir, they mobilised public opinion here, in France, and in Germany. The Germans were now hampered by the public feeling which they had themselves created.

Count Benckendorff expressed himself very decidedly to the effect that the sending of a German war-ship to Agadir was very unfortunate, and indeed immoral.

I am, &c.

E. GREY.

[35282] No. 295.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen.

(No. 93.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, September* 4, 1911.

THE Spanish Ambassador told me to-day that he had reported to his Government that he personally shared my view that no settlement could be come to between Spain and France about Morocco until the outcome of the conversations between France and Germany was known. However, the French Ambassador in Spain had opened a conversation based upon the giving up of Ifni by Spain. The Spanish Ambassador said that Spain could never give up Ifni, and, in fact, could not postpone her occupation of it for more than a few days. There was no reason why Spain should give compensation to France for a settlement with Germany.

I said that I could not agree with this principle. If the result of the negotiations between France and Germany were that France and Spain obtained a free hand to divide Morocco, subject to economic liberty, Spain could not expect to make no sacrifice herself, while France paid the whole price.

The Ambassador said he understood that France would get from Germany a free hand in her own sphere only, and Spain could not be expected to pay both France and Germany.

I said that of course Spain could not be expected to pay both. I had spoken on the assumption that Germany had asked nothing from Spain. The Germans changed their ground so often that it was impossible to say what the outcome would be of the conversations between France and Germany, and any discussion of a settlement between Spain and France seemed to me, therefore, to be academic at the present moment.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[34944] No. 296.

Sir V. Corbett to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 5.)

(No. 53.)

Sir, *Munich, September 2, 1911.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 50 of the 29th August, I have the honour to report that the same tone of somewhat sullen acquiescence in the course apparently taken by the Morocco negotiations still persists in the press, and is constantly accompanied or relieved by spiteful attacks on the supposed attitude of the English Government.

The "Münchener Neueste Nachrichten" of yesterday morning contains a long article entitled "The Official German Conception." It embodies under eleven headings the guiding lines adopted by the German Government in the negotiations on the alleged authority of a "German diplomatist occupying an important position." The interviewer is the writer from one of whose articles I quoted in my despatch No. 51 of the 31st August, and though the interview may be imaginary, the version he presents is apparently that which the Berlin Foreign Office desires should be accepted as authentic in South Germany.

According to him, the "guiding lines" of the German Government are as follows:—

1. "France has broken both the Act of Algeciras and the Germano-French Agreement of 1909; up to now no Power except Germany has raised any objections.

2. "Germany has never approved of the march on Fez; she came forward as soon as information was received of the secret treaty made at Paris between Pichon and the Shereefian Minister, El Mokri; this treaty entirely put on one side her economic interests in Morocco.

3. "The external reason for the dispatching of the 'Panther' to Agadir was actually the demand for protection on the part of the German territorial owners and merchants. By doing so Germany did not in any way break the Act of Algeciras, but only carried out its duty of protecting subjects of the Empire.

4. "The Imperial Government was from the first prepared for Great Britain's action in favour of France, and never believed that she would stand quietly aloof; they have not been surprised by her anti-German action, and were always determined not to allow her to take any part in the Germano-French negotiations. Her interference has not done France any good. But however little good we may have expected from England, we have been astonished and indignant at the mass of malice of which Cartwright's interview with Dr. Muenz is a symptom.

5. "The German position was definitely settled at the beginning of the negotiations by the Emperor, the Chancellor, and Herr von Kiderlen; no fundamental alterations have been made in it, and there is no talk of yielding.

6. "The plan of the Imperial Government never included the acquisition of any part of Morocco, or of coaling stations, naval bases, or harbours.

7. "On the contrary, Germany's plan does include complete security for her economic interests in Morocco, her share according to treaty in contracts for supplies and other undertakings, and in acquisition of land and mining rights and complete commercial freedom.

8. "Germany retires politically from Morocco; the Act of Algeciras continues, however, to subsist formally. France must come to terms on that point with the other signatory Powers; Germany has nothing more to do with the matter.

9. "In return for her political retirement from Morocco, Germany receives colonial compensations from France. Togo is a small, but flourishing, retail store; even if

Dahomey were added to it it could never become anything else. Cameroon, on the contrary, supposing it to be extended by a broad belt of French Congo down to the Rivers Ubanghi and Congo and the Belgian Congo, is a large commercial concern with a rich future. No colonial Great Power will then separate Cameroon from German East Africa. The Belgian Congo Colony, in which German capital is already working vigorously, is a connecting link between Cameroon and German East Africa.

10. "It is as yet uncertain whether Germany will also receive a district, containing a harbour in French Congo. It is to be expected, however, that France will cede to Germany her right of pre-emption over the Spanish district of Rio Muni and that Germany will either now or later on acquire the Spanish territories of Rio Muni and Fernando Po.

11. "The reports which have come through Vienna of a renewed recognition by France of the Peace of Frankfurt are pure nonsense. The Peace of Frankfurt requires no confirmation, and France would not stir itself to renew its recognition of it. This great chasm continues, though Germany hopes for the disappearance of small points of friction. The Morocco question is to be finally disposed of."

The writer then proceeds to an examination of these points. He says:—

"*Germany's Renunciations.*—She abandons politically the ranks of the signatory Powers of Algeciras and gives up Morocco politically to France. The latter Power will have to come to an understanding regarding its own supreme position there with the other signatories of the Act. Irrespective of this, Germany cedes the colony of Togo.

"*Germany's Compensations.*—In the first place, she receives full security for her economic interests in Morocco and has full commercial freedom guaranteed to her there. In the second place, she acquires from France a large piece of French Congo, perhaps with a harbour. Probably, too, the right of pre-exemption over the Spanish territory of Rio Muni, which she may hope at a later date to incorporate with the Spanish island of Fernando Po.

"If we draw a balance between the losses and gains, it will seem to us that the former preponderate.

"Wide circles of the German people will not see why the pledge made at Agadir, which seemed to point to an acquisition of the Sus district, is to be given up again without the smallest political establishment being made in South-West Morocco. That may pass, however. The danger from Great Britain under which such an exposed position would labour might become threatening in course of time.

"On the other hand, the giving up of Togo . . . . will arouse painful feelings in the German people. Important, even if imponderable, interests will thereby be unnecessarily thrust on one side.

"It may be admitted that a definitive settlement of all the questions at issue in Morocco will have an importance that must not be undervalued; it will in fact for the third time most solemnly assure to us those rights which had been as a matter of fact already guaranteed by the two treaties of 1906 and 1909, namely, complete commercial freedom and complete economic activity all over Morocco under the future protectorate of France. But the sacrifices which we are making for this are, in our opinion, too great. Further, it will be peculiarly difficult to receive such guarantees from France for the observance of article 7 as will exclude all errors in the future.

"It is obvious that we shall not obtain gratis the proposed transfer of colonies, no doubt valuable in themselves, from the proprietorship of Spain to our own, but shall have duly to pay some millions for them. In return Spain will probably attain what is denied us—a share in the possession of Moroccan territory. Perceptible sacrifices for the sake of a more or less uncertain draft on the future. That is the general impression left by the 'guiding-lines.'"

I have, &c.
VINCENT CORBETT.

P.S.—The correspondent of the "Münchener Neueste Nachrichten" in to-day's issue of the paper corrects the above-quoted article with the statement that there is now no intention of ceding Togo to France.

This correction throws considerable doubts on the reliability of his other facts.

V. C.

[34945] No. 297.

Sir V. Corbett to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 5.)

(No. 54.)
Sir, *Munich, September 2, 1911.*

THE "Münchener Zeitung" in its issue of yesterday publishes a short article on "English hatred of Germany," which is of some interest, as I have reason to believe that it embodies the views of the Bavarian Government, who are in general far less inimical to England than their colleagues at Berlin.

It is as follows:—

"That which gives the situation at the present moment its individual aspect is the open attempt of England to roll stones in the way of the German policy and to throw suspicion on it. No one in consequence can be surprised if the authorities lose their patience and begin to perceive that it is impossible to get any further with England by means of the policy of amiability hitherto pursued. It is even reported that the Imperial Chancellor has drawn the attention of the Emperor to the growing tendency of the British press to bait Germany and throw suspicion on her policy, and further, that if the agitation continues a fundamental change will be introduced into the German policy towards England. Even if it is here simply a question of rumours, they are at any rate symptomatic, and England would under any circumstances act wisely if she were to refrain from all interference when the negotiations with France begin again. Threats miss their effect on the German people; this is a point which the authorities in London ought to grasp at last These perpetual misrepresentations can only result in making those circles in Germany most friendly to England lose their patience and let it be understood that even German long-suffering has its limits."

I have, &c.
VINCENT CORBETT.

[35065] No. 298.

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 5.)

(No. 72. Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Zarauz, September 5, 1911.*

KING of Spain, whom I have just seen, is hurt by the peremptory nature of a communication made to-day to the Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs by the French Ambassador, to the effect that the favourable offers made by France to Spain regarding the Spanish sphere of influence in northern Morocco will be withdrawn if Spain refuses the French demand to surrender the whole of the territory claimed in southern Morocco and unless the custom-house at Melilla be immediately established.

These demands, especially when made in the form of an ultimatum, were very wounding to Spanish pride. Ifni, His Majesty admitted, was practically worthless, but it had long been looked upon in Spain as Spanish territory, and could not be surrendered without the consent of the Cortes.

Spain might be prepared, in His Majesty's opinion, to offer to France an area in southern Morocco very nearly equivalent to the area exacted by Germany in French Congo, but Spanish pride would require the retention of at least Ifni itself, with a radius of some 15 to 20 kilom. round.

His Majesty added that he relied greatly on your friendly offices to induce the French Government to moderate its demands. In the meantime the occupation of Ifni would be delayed.

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[35516] No. 299.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen.**

(No. 208.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, September 5, 1911.*

I ASKED Count Metternich to come to see me to-day, and said that I was now in a position to reply more fully to the message which the German Chancellor had sent me through him on the subject of the article in the "Neue Freie Presse." I was entirely convinced, not only of the German Chancellor's good faith, but also of his good-will in this matter, and of his desire to stop the mischief which had been done by the article. I therefore wished Count Metternich to tell the Chancellor himself the facts which I had ascertained.

The article was written by Dr. Münz. Dr. Münz had asked for an interview with Sir Fairfax Cartwright, but the latter had refused it. Dr. Münz had subsequently pursued him on the promenade, and had obtained a few minutes of conversation, which Sir Fairfax Cartwright could not refuse without rudeness; but I gathered that the conversation was of a perfunctory nature.

My first impression was that Dr. Münz had forced these few minutes of conversation in order that he might have a pretext for attributing his article to Sir Fairfax Cartwright's inspiration. But this impression had been dispelled by the fact that Dr. Münz had written a letter of apology to Sir Fairfax, and he therefore could not have intended the attacks which were made upon him.

Reuter's agent in Vienna had been informed on the Wednesday evening that an important article was to appear next day. The article had been kept back till Friday, and had in the interval been communicated to Berlin, I supposed to some press connection there.

So much for the facts as regards the writing of the article.

On the day when the article appeared, the German chargé d'affaires had gone to the embassy in Vienna, and had sent for the correspondents of the German newspapers. This, of course, left a strong presumption that what passed had to do with the article, and was not of a calming nature, seeing that the German press became very violent. But, as I could not know for certain what passed in the German Embassy in Vienna, I gave this only as a natural inference. The comment I wished to make upon this was that, as the German chargé d'affaires was on perfectly good personal terms with Sir Fairfax Cartwright, the natural thing would have been for him to go to Sir Fairfax, tell him about the article, and ask for a denial, which he would at once have received. He would then have been in a position to calm the German press. Even if Sir Fairfax Cartwright had not been able to deny the authorship of the article, I thought that in so serious a matter the German chargé d'affaires, before communicating with the press, should have communicated with his Government, who would no doubt have referred the matter to me.

I had read some of the articles in the German press. Their violence was such that clearly no denial from us would by itself have the least effect. Therefore, all I could suggest to the German Chancellor was that some communication should be made to the press, avowing that communications had passed between the two Governments, and that the German Government, being in possession of the facts, were satisfied that Sir Fairfax Cartwright was not cognisant of the article, and had not inspired it.

Count Metternich said that he would tell me frankly that, in the view of his Government, the important point was not whether Sir Fairfax Cartwright was responsible for the appearance of the article, but whether he might not have expressed to some prominent journalist the opinions contained in it, and thus have been indirectly responsible for the writing of the article.

I replied that some person might no doubt be found who would object to everything in the article—one to one thing, and one to another. But there were things in it which, as isolated opinions, might have been expressed by almost anyone in conversation. There was even in it one thing at least which Count Metternich himself might have said. I could not, therefore, say that Sir Fairfax Cartwright had never expressed in conversation any of the opinions in the article. But I could say, for Sir Fairfax had explicitly told me this, that he had not expressed them to Dr. Münz, who was the writer of the article, and who had admitted that he had manufactured it after talking to a number of people.

* Also to Sir F. Cartwright (No. 60).

Count Metternich then said that he thought the communication to the press that might be satisfactory would be to the effect that his Government were satisfied that Sir Fairfax Cartwright was in no way responsible for the article, and did not express to the writer of it the opinions contained in it to which exception had been taken. He told me that he would suggest to the Chancellor that this should be said by the German Government; and he asked whether, if they agreed to this, it should be said at once, or whether he should see me again first.

I replied that I intended to return to London next Thursday evening or Friday morning, and I should be glad if he would see me before the announcement was made, in order that I might see the exact terms.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[35547] No. 300.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 374.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, September 5, 1911.*

M. CAMBON showed me to-day a telegraphic summary of the conversation of yesterday between the French Ambassador and Herr von Kiderlen in Berlin.

Herr von Kiderlen had, after some discussion, accepted in principle the project for what was virtually a French protectorate over Morocco. He had made difficulties about the limitation of economic equality to thirty years, about the French protectorate over Moorish subjects abroad, and about the judicial organisation; and he had protested against the proposals about German protégés. He was, however, ready to agree to a secret understanding as to the establishment later on of a French protectorate, really and technically. He had said that the Germans could not give anything in Togoland, and that he must refer all the proposals to the Chancellor.

M. Cambon asked me what I thought of this.

I said that I expected Herr von Kiderlen would reply that what was offered in the French Congo was not enough. Personally, it seemed to me that, geographically, climatically, and generally, Morocco was of so much greater importance to France than the French Congo, that it would be a pity for France not to increase her offer of territory in the French Congo if necessary, and if she could get a clean and definitive arrangement as to Morocco. Could she not, for instance, give the triangle for which Germany asked up to the River Alima?

M. Cambon said that this was impossible. He said it must be remembered that, after the experience of the arrangement with Germany of 1909, the French Parliament would be apt to say that what was given up in the French Congo was solid, while nothing was being obtained from Germany except a bit of paper which might be worth nothing.

I remarked that any cessions of territory in the French Congo might be made dependent upon the agreement with Germany being accepted by all the other Powers who were parties to the Act of Algeciras. This would give France an assured position in Morocco.

I observed how important it was that if there was trouble it should be quite clear that it was Germany who forced it. I hoped, therefore, that the French would not break off the negotiations. M. Cambon replied that the French Ambassador at Berlin was fully aware of the importance of this.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[35067] No. 301.

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 6.)

(No. 152.)

Sir, *Zarauz, September 3, 1911.*

AS already reported in my telegram No. 71 of yesterday, I was present yesterday morning at a meeting held at San Sebastian between Señor Garcia Prieto, Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs, and M. Geoffray, French Ambassador, in continuation of the conversations *à trois* concerning Morocco which were held between us in May and June last.

Both Señor Garcia Prieto and M. Geoffray had requested me to attend the meeting, but the late hour at which I received the invitation on Friday evening precluded me from obtaining your concurrence before accepting it. I ventured to think that you would desire me to comply with the wish expressed by their Excellencies, who quite understand that I took part in the meeting without formal instructions.

M. Geoffray opened the conversation by reading to the Foreign Minister an abstract of the principal provisions of the draft convention, the text of which has, I understand, been already communicated to Sir Francis Bertie, and, doubtless, through his Excellency to yourself.

Señor Garcia Prieto said that he would reserve his observations on this important paper, but I gathered from his demeanour while it was being read to him that he was generally satisfied with its contents. I may here state that the draft convention, as it now stands, is more favourable to the demands of Spain than was the original outline of the convention, which M. Geoffray was good enough to show me some weeks ago. The latter, which was drafted by M. Herbette, of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, contained a paragraph creating within the Spanish sphere of influence a large neutral zone, extending from the meridian of Tangier to the Atlantic coast. Within this zone, which included the whole of the western portion of the Spanish sphere, Spain was to be prohibited from employing troops or interfering in any way in the administration of the neutralised territory. The intention was to eliminate Spanish authority entirely from the line of communication between Fez and the Straits of Gibraltar. This and several other provisions which the Spanish Government would have been obviously unable to accept were withdrawn by the French Government in accordance with advice tendered by M. Geoffray, and the revised text of the convention may now, I think, be said to constitute a perfectly fair offer on the part of France, and one which seeks to interpret as well as present circumstances permit the terms of article 3 of the secret convention of October 1904, conceding a free hand to Spain in certain eventualities.

M. Geoffray proceeded to make an announcement which, though it was no news to the Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs, was received by him with marks of extreme surprise. France, said the French Ambassador, was being called upon to surrender to Germany vast regions in one of the French colonies in exchange for the recognition of a new order of things in Morocco by which Spain, as well as France, would profit. It was only fair that Spain should make some corresponding sacrifice. France would expect her to cede to the French sphere of influence in Morocco the whole of the Ifni region, or, in other words, the whole of the territory defined in articles 4 and 5 of the secret convention as falling to the share of Spain. As Spain had allowed fifty years to pass since the date of the treaty with Morocco which ceded to her a fishing station at Santa Cruz de Mar Pequeña, since declared to be identical with Ifni, M. Geoffray thought it was not unfair to conclude that this territory offered no very great attraction to Spain, and that the sacrifice involved in its surrender would be light in comparison with that which would have to be made by his own country to satisfy Germany. His Excellency added that, without being able to point to some proof of the willingness of Spain to assist France in bearing the loss imposed by Germany, the French Government would never be able to persuade the Chamber of Deputies to accept the proposed convention regarding the Spanish sphere of influence.

Señor Garcia Prieto expressed his personal opinion that the Spanish Government would be unable to agree to make the required sacrifice. He admitted, however, that France might fairly expect some concession from Spain, and his language seemed to imply that he would formulate in concert with the rest of the Cabinet a counter-proposition. Meanwhile he could only say that Spain attached to the territory in question the highest importance. It lay opposite the Canary Islands, whose inhabitants would bitterly resent its possession by any other Power. Without its occupation the Rio de Oro country lying immediately to the south could never be properly developed. It was true that Spain had long neglected to occupy it in accordance with her undoubted right, but ever since the beginning of French activity in Morocco she had not ceased to press the Moorish Government to complete the stipulated cession. Arrangements for this purpose were concerted between Señor Garcia Prieto and El Mokri simultaneously with the conclusion of the convention of the 16th November, 1910, and embodied in a document since published in a Spanish Red Book (see my despatch No. 48 of the 13th April last). Negotiations with the Makhzen, with a view to the appointment of a Moorish commissioner to proceed to Ifni in order to make, in concert with the Spanish commissioner already named, the necessary delimitation on the spot, had been in progress for some time. The Makhzen was adopting its usual

dilatory tactics, and it had now become necessary for Spain to act single-handed. Orders, indeed, had already been issued for the occupation of Ifni on the 3rd or 4th September.

M. Geoffray said he could only repeat what he had said before. If Spain wished to enjoy the benefits of the draft convention, she would have to surrender Ifni to France. He begged that the question might be immediately considered in Cabinet Council, and that pending a decision no act of occupation should be allowed to take place at Ifni. Otherwise a hostile French press campaign would certainly ensue to the detriment of the present negotiations. He hoped within a few days to be able to submit the actual text of the convention. Meanwhile it would be deplorable if Spain took a step calculated to render the present situation more difficult than it already was.

Señor Garcia Prieto said that he hoped to be able to persuade the Prime Minister to order the suspension of the proposed act of the occupation of Ifni at least for a few days.

From a few words dropped by his Excellency in private conversation with myself after the departure of the French Ambassador, I gathered that the French demands, which had been already known to the Spanish Government for some days, were regarded as being exorbitant and entirely inadmissible. Spain had an indisputable treaty right to the territory in question, and when the French requisition became known it would give rise, his Excellency thought, to a burst of popular indignation which it would be extremely difficult for any Spanish Government to resist.

I have, &c.
MAURICE DE BUNSEN.

[35180] No. 302.

Mr. White to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 6.)

(No. 149.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Tangier, September 6, 1911.*

FRENCH consul at Mogador reports arrival there of Spanish sailing-vessel with three Spanish officers to take Spanish consul to Ifni. Spanish consul asked governor that Moorish delegates should accompany him as arranged in agreement. Governor applied to Commissioner of Foreign Affairs, who has telegraphed to Mokri for instructions.

(Sent to Madrid.)

[35184] No. 303.

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 6.)

(No. 73. Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Zarauz, September 6, 1911.*

MY telegram No. 72 of yesterday.

French Ambassador states that he merely read out yesterday to the Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs a telegram from French Government confirming the French demand for the establishment of a custom-house near Melilla and for the surrender of Ifni. His Excellency denies that this communication to the Spanish Government was in the nature of an ultimatum. There is nothing, he adds, to prevent the Spanish Government from formulating a counter-proposal laying down the most they are prepared to offer.

[35195] No. 304.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 7.)

(No. 144.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Paris, September 6, 1911.*

MOROCCO.

French Minister for Foreign Affairs told me to-day that he had seen Russian and German Ambassadors, and that M. Isvolsky did not revert to question of additional cessions of territory to Germany, or to suggestion of arbitration. German Ambassador,

[35317] No. 305*.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 8.)

(No. 202. Very Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) *St. Petersburgh, September 7, 1911.*

MY immediately preceding telegram of 7th September.

French Ambassador tells me he was received in audience by the Emperor this afternoon, and laid the whole situation before His Majesty. He was entirely satisfied with the result.

Emperor, while expressing natural wish that France should exercise prudence so as to avert war, never hinted that French Government could do more than they were doing. He expressed the opinion that Germany desired to treat. He also repeated the assurances already given that in case of necessity France could count on Russia's diplomatic and military support. His language on this point was quite firm, and Ambassador is convinced that His Majesty will carry out his engagements under the Franco-Russian alliance.

French Ambassador knows nothing of the reported French ultimatum to Spain, nor did the Emperor mention it to him.

whom he had questioned on economic advantages which Germany would expect to obtain in Morocco, said that some time since when he was kept informed of Morocco business there was, he knew, a memorandum on the subject which French Minister for Foreign Affairs had mentioned, but that he did not know whether German Minister for Foreign Affairs' views were now the same or not. German Ambassador appeared to be mortified at being kept in complete ignorance of views of German Government.

[35316] No. 305.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 7.)

(No. 201.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *St. Petersburgh, September 7, 1911.*

FRANCE and Germany.

Sir F. Bertie's telegram No. 141 of the 2nd September.

In a conversation which I had with M. Nératof this afternoon his Excellency told me that Germany had not invited the Russian Government to give counsels of moderation to France. The Russian Government had instructed their Ambassador in Paris to point out that if France were to come in an unconciliatory spirit to Berlin for this last stage of the negotiations very grave results would ensue. M. Nératof added that a war for the sake of Morocco would be most unpopular in Russia, and would, even if successful, tend to put public opinion in this country against the alliance with France.

I said that it seemed to me that counsels of moderation were more needed at the present moment in Berlin than in Paris, and I remarked that if Germany heard of the advice given by Russia in Paris she might think that the Russian Government were wavering in their support of their French ally and still further stiffen her demands.

M. Nératof replied that there was no danger of such a result. Russia had from the outset held very firm language in Berlin, and counsels of moderation would prove useful in both capitals. Germany was quite aware, his Excellency remarked, that any war that might result would be of a European character.

M. Nératof then spoke of the German press attacks on England, and I accordingly expressed regret that I had no opportunity last Friday of assuring the Emperor of the absolute baselessness of the German accusations. From the outset His Majesty's Government had done all in their power to facilitate a settlement, and they were deeply anxious that the Berlin negotiations should be brought to a successful conclusion. M. Nératof promised to inform the Emperor of what I had said.

His Excellency then went on to say that news had just reached him to the effect that France had addressed to Spain what amounted virtually to an ultimatum. He was unable to conceive how at the present moment France could have been so ill-advised as to do such a thing. Germany would thereby be encouraged to increase her demands, and France would be at a disadvantage in case of war. The French state of mind, he feared, was at present one of great nervousness and excitability.

[35432] No. 306.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 8.)

(No. 69.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Berlin, September 8, 1911.*

A FURTHER interview took place yesterday evening between the Imperial Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and the French Ambassador, when Herr von Kiderlen showed M. Cambon the rough draft of a German counter-proposal for a convention in regard to Morocco. M. Cambon tells me that he does not consider this draft will be acceptable to the French Government. In some points, he says, it places the two Powers on the same political plane, and he thinks Germany puts forward excessive pretensions in regard to railways and railway exploitation, which imply an intention to prevent all other Powers from participating. The question of territorial compensation was not raised in the course of the interview.

The French Government cannot receive the German draft convention, which is in a rough state, before the 10th instant at the earliest, and a week will therefore probably elapse before it is discussed here.

The Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs has told my Italian colleague that the economic guarantees provided in the French draft were very far from satisfactory, and that his Government intended to be very stiff in the matter.

[35451] No. 307.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 230.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, September* 8, 1911.

MOROCCO.

I have heard through the French Ambassador of interview which took place yesterday in Berlin between German Minister for Foreign Affairs and M. Jules Cambon. The ground of difficulty has, it appears, been entirely shifted by the German Minister for Foreign Affairs. Economic interests in Morocco, and not the French Congo, are now the object of discussion. The fact that Germany has practically accepted the first four articles of French draft, conceding the principles of French position in Morocco, was, said the French Ambassador, a reason for satisfaction. He observed, however, that to grant a privileged position to the subjects or commerce of Germany was impossible, because other Powers signatory to the Algeciras Act would have to accept the agreement concluded between France and Germany. I concurred.

The German counter-draft will, apparently, not be ready for a day or two, and it seems as if we are entering on a less dangerous, although very tedious, phase in the negotiations.

[35517] No. 308.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen.**

(No. 209.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, September* 8, 1911.

COUNT METTERNICH showed me to-day the text of the communication which the German Government would be willing to make. It was as follows:—

"The Imperial Government have received from the British Government, on enquiry, information to the effect that the British Ambassador at Vienna has neither inspired the article published in the 'Neue Freie Presse' nor has the Ambassador made the statements ascribed to him to the author of the article."

I said that this communication omitted all mention of the fact that the German Government were satisfied, of which I had made a point in my previous conversation with Count Metternich. I feared that this communication would be received as a mere perfunctory official denial on the part of the British Government, and that it would not put an end to the attacks in the German press. I suggested that the words "to the effect" should be left out after the word "information," and that the words "which has satisfied the German Government" should be inserted there.

Count Metternich proposed that, if this was done, there should be inserted after the word "that" the words "in the opinion of the British Government."

I said that this would not serve to protect Sir Fairfax Cartwright from the attacks made upon him. I very much resented those attacks, and I might have taken an even stronger line had it not been that the negotiations with France about Morocco were being resumed this week, and I did not wish to disturb the atmosphere. If a denial was published now, and the attacks were repeated, the situation would be made worse than ever.

Count Metternich said that the object of the German Government was, not to protect the British Ambassador at Vienna, but to remove the foundation for the attacks.

I agreed the objects were separate, but they would both be achieved by putting a stop to the attacks in the press, and unless this was done neither object would be accomplished.

He told me that he would refer the point to his Government, and I observed that I would like to have an opportunity of submitting the point to the Prime Minister.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

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* Also to Sir F. Cartwright (No. 61).

[35990] No. 309.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 245.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, September* 8, 1911.

THE Russian Ambassador came to see me to-day, and I again asked him whether he had any news from St. Petersburgh as to Morocco.

He told me that his Government were rather disturbed by what seemed to be the brusque attitude of the French in Madrid.

I explained that there seemed to have been some misunderstanding about this.

I then asked him whether he had heard of the suggestion which M. Isvolsky had made in Paris for arbitration by the Emperor of Austria.

He said that he had heard of it, but not from his Government. He explained how natural it was that the Russian Government, who had no interest in Morocco, though they were prepared to stand by their alliance with France, should wish to suggest every possible means of avoiding war, precisely because if war came they would be engaged in it.

I told him that I also had been suggesting everything of which I could think to keep the peace between France and Germany, but one could not expect France to submit to the arbitration of Germany's ally. This seemed to me to be out of the question. I added, however, that I thought the principle of arbitration or mediation should not be dismissed as an impossible suggestion in the last resort, though it might be difficult of application.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[35713] No. 310.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received September* 11.)

(No. 399.)
Sir, *Paris, September* 8, 1911.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith a despatch which I have received from Colonel Fairholme, military attaché to this embassy, relating to the present condition of the French army.

I have, &c.
FRANCIS BERTIE.

Enclosure in No. 310.

Colonel Fairholme to Sir F. Bertie.

Sir, *Paris, September* 7, 1911.

IT has been generally noticed that the attitude of the French public, and of nearly the whole of the French press, during the present period of strained relations with Germany is being characterised by a spirit of calm confidence such as they have not been known to exhibit in similar situations in the past.

In military circles, so far as I am able to judge, the same feelings prevail; there is no wish to pick a quarrel with Germany, but, should it come to a war, the French army is not at all afraid regarding the result.

It may not be out of place at the present juncture to consider how far, from the military point of view, the confidence of the French nation is justified, and also to what extent the present moment should prove favourable in the interests of France for embarking on the struggle which all seem convinced must come within the next few years.

I have had no opportunity of seeing anything of the German army for some years past, so that I do not feel qualified to hazard an opinion as to the relative values of the two armies at the present moment, nor to predict what would be the ultimate result were war to break out now. But I can affirm, without fear of contradiction, that the French army has never in modern times been so well trained or so ready for war as it is to-day.

The last two years have been marked by great general progress, and by the

introduction of a number of highly important military reforms, such as no corresponding period in the past could show, while the annual expenditure on the army has increased during the same period by 5,500,000*l*.

During the past three months abnormal activity has been displayed in preparing for war, organising the commands and staffs for the armies which would be formed, and in working out the plans of campaign, which, I understand, are now complete in every detail.

These measures have quite recently involved numerous changes affecting the holders of important posts, and I am in a position to state that the generals to whom the conduct of affairs has now been entrusted, as well as their chief staff officers, enjoy the fullest confidence of the army.

Amongst the new appointments I would especially name General de Castelnau, First Assistant Chief of the General Staff, who would assume the duties of chief of the staff of the principal group of armies on the outbreak of war. This officer is spoken of as "a French von Moltke."

As regards armament, the French have got and know how to use the best quick-firing field gun in existence, superior to the German gun in several respects.

The French infantry rifle is, now that the Balle S. has been adopted, practically as good as the German rifle.

In efficiency of training, the French infantry, judged by its work in peace time and measured by British standards, leaves something to be desired; but its best qualities are only brought out by war, and it is probably the equal of the German infantry in most respects and its superior in dash and in intelligence.

The French cavalry is admirably trained and horsed, and it should prove to be at least as good as the German.

The French field artillery is somewhat weaker in guns than the German—120 per army corps as against 144—but this disparity will be more than compensated by the marked superiority of the French gun itself, as well as by the better French artillery methods and training, and also by the four-gun battery organisation.

In military aviation the French have practically the monopoly of what may prove to be a very powerful auxiliary in war. Even should the actual usefulness of this new arm turn out to be less than is expected, the confidence and the enthusiasm resulting from its possession form a moral asset of no small value, especially in view of the French national character.

Of dirigibles the French army would have several available, though the Germans, in spite of very numerous casualties of late, would no doubt still hold the superiority in this respect; the value of these unwieldy and delicate structures, for war purposes, has, however, yet to be proved.

As regards numbers, France, with her stationary population, has for some time past been at a disadvantage, but it is by no means certain that, in a war on such a large scale, this difference would necessarily make itself felt to any very great extent, owing to the difficulties attendant on the application of these masses of men. I have the authority of the new Chief of the General Staff, General Joffre, for saying that the French staff is not very much preoccupied by this consideration.

With regard to the plan of campaign, it is reassuring, from the French point of view, to note that the idea of taking the offensive, the military policy of the strong, and the only one which makes for decisive victory, now finds far more favour in French military circles than was the case even quite recently. It had often been noticed by foreign military observers up to quite a short time ago, amongst others by my predecessor, Lieutenant-Colonel Lowther, that, in connection with Germany, defence, and defence only, was spoken and written about: "Sommes-nous défendus?" and the idea of carrying the war into the enemy's country did not seem to enter into the programme of the most optimistic. There has of late been a very marked change in this respect.

It does not come within my province to discuss naval matters, but it is impossible not to be struck by the enthusiasm which has been caused by the recent naval review at Toulon, which seems to mark the dawn of a new era for the French navy, a service which till quite recently had suffered from the continuous neglect of many successive administrations.

Turning now to a consideration of the opportuneness or otherwise of the present moment for the war, the following would seem to be reasons in favour of it from the French point of view:—

1. The Government has just now got the whole nation at its back, which might not by any means be the case at some future time.

2. With her stationary population France would meet Germany now on more favourable terms as regards numbers than would be the case later on, when each succeeding year must increase the disparity.

3. A substantial increase in the French field artillery was completed last year, and any further increase on a large scale of that arm would be difficult. On the other hand, the German artillery might improve as regards both armament and training.

4. France, at the expense of great sacrifices in valuable lives and in money, has got a long lead in everything connected with aviation, whereas Germany has scarcely begun to occupy herself with that service.

On the other hand, the following may perhaps be considered as reasons against the war at the present moment:—

1. The Russian army might perhaps be in a better position to afford active co-cperation beyond the Russian frontiers after it has had more time to carry out the changes of organisation and distribution recently introduced.

(But, on the other hand, it might be more preoccupied by internal troubles at some future time than now.)

2. The effects of some of the important reforms recently introduced in the French army will require some time to make themselves fully felt, and it may consequently be anticipated that in this respect that army would be still more efficient a year or even two years hence.

To sum up, it seems to me that the balance of evidence is in favour of a war at the present moment.

I have, &c.
W. E. FAIRHOLME, *Colonel*,
Military Attaché.

[35449] No. 311.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received September* 9.)

(No. 400. Confidential.)

Sir, *Paris, September* 8, 1911.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith a copy which I have procured from the French Minister for Foreign Affairs of the draft convention concerning Morocco proposed by the French Government for acceptance by the German Government.

I have, &c.
FRANCIS BERTIE.

Enclosure in No. 311.

Draft Franco-German Convention.

A LA suite des troubles qui se sont produits au Maroc et qui ont démontré la nécessité d'y poursuivre, dans l'intérêt général, l'œuvre de pacification et de progrès prévue par l'Acte d'Algésiras, le Gouvernement de la République française et le Gouvernement Impérial allemand ont jugé nécessaire de préciser et de compléter l'accord franco-allemand du 9 février, 1909. Ils sont convenus à cet effet des dispositions ci-après:—

ARTICLE 1.

Le Gouvernement Impérial allemand, dont les intérêts au Maroc ont un caractère exclusivement économique, déclare qu'il n'entravera pas l'action directrice de la France en vue de prêter son assistance au Sultan pour l'introduction de toutes les réformes administratives, économiques, financières et militaires dont il a besoin pour le bon gouvernement de son Empire, comme aussi pour tous les règlements que ces réformes comportent.

En conséquence, il donne son adhésion aux mesures de réorganisation, de contrôle et de garantie financière que, de concert avec le Gouvernement marocain, le Gouvernement français croira devoir prendre à cet effet, sous la réserve que l'action directrice de la France sauvegardera au Maroc l'égalité économique entre les nations.

Au cas où la France serait amenée à préciser et à étendre ces droits de contrôle et de protection, le Gouvernement Impérial allemand, reconnaissant au Maroc pleine liberté d'action à la France, sous la réserve que la liberté commerciale prévue par les traités antérieurs sera maintenue, n'y apportera aucun obstacle.

ARTICLE 2.

Dans cet ordre d'idées, il est entendu que le Gouvernement Impérial ne fera pas obstacle à ce que la France, d'accord avec le Gouvernement marocain, procède aux occupations militaires du territoire marocain qu'elle jugerait nécessaire au maintien de l'ordre et de la sécurité des transactions commerciales, et à ce qu'elle exerce toute action de police sur terre et dans les eaux marocaines.

ARTICLE 3.

Le Gouvernement français déclare que, fermement attaché au principe de la liberté commerciale au Maroc, il ne se prêtera à aucune inégalité pas plus dans l'établissement des droits de douane, impôts et autres taxes que dans l'établissement des tarifs de transport par chemin de fer.

Cet engagement est valable pour une période de trente ans. Faute de dénonciation expresse faite au moins une année à l'avance, cette période sera renouvelée de cinq ans en cinq ans.

ARTICLE 4

Le Gouvernement français veillera à ce qu'il ne soit perçu au Maroc aucun droit d'exportation sur le minerai de fer exporté des ports marocains. Les exploitations de minerai de fer ne subiront aucun impôt spécial. Elles ne seront assujetties qu'aux impôts généraux et aux redevances domaniales qui atteindront toutes les entreprises minières.

ARTICLE 5.

Dès à présent, si Sa Majesté le Sultan du Maroc venait à confier aux agents diplomatiques et consulaires de la France la représentation et la protection des sujets et des intérêts marocains à l'étranger, le Gouvernement Impérial déclare qu'il n'y fera pas d'objection.

Le Gouvernement Impérial déclare, d'autre part, qu'il ne contractera aucun accord quelconque avec le Gouvernement marocain sans s'être entendu au préalable avec le Gouvernement de la République française.

ARTICLE 6.

Lorsque des organisations judiciaires marocaines régulières auront été créées au Maroc et que la France aura décidé de leur transférer la juridiction des tribunaux consulaires français, le Gouvernement Impérial allemand transférera également à ces mêmes tribunaux la juridiction des tribunaux consulaires allemands, étant entendu que les ressortissants allemands jouiront des mêmes garanties l'égales et réglementaires que les ressortissants français.

ARTICLE 7.

Le Gouvernement de la République française s'engage à veiller pendant la période prévue à l'article 3 à ce que les travaux et fournitures nécessités par les constructions éventuelles de routes, chemins de fer, ports, &c., soient octroyés par le Gouvernement chérifien suivant les règles d'adjudication. Toutefois, l'exploitation de ces grandes entreprises sera réservée à l'État ou librement concédée par lui.

ARTICLE 8.

Les deux Gouvernements signataires renoncent à se prévaloir de tout accord ayant un caractère international qui serait contraire aux précédentes stipulations.

ARTICLE 9.

Le territoire marocain sur lequel s'exerceront les dispositions résultant de la présente convention comprend, à l'exception des possessions espagnoles, les régions situées entre l'Algérie, l'Afrique occidentale française et la colonie espagnole de Rio de Oro, selon les stipulations des traités et accords conclus par le Maroc.

ARTICLE 10.

Les précédents articles de la présente convention seront communiqués aux autres Puissances signataires de l'Acte d'Algésiras, près desquelles les deux Gouvernements s'engagent à se prêter mutuellement appui pour obtenir leur adhésion.

ARTICLE 11.

Comme suite et comme conséquence des dispositions ci-dessus, les deux Gouvernements contractants sont convenus de procéder aux rectifications et échanges territoriaux suivants dans leurs domaines coloniaux :—

I. *Pour l'Allemagne :*

L'Allemagne cède à la France :

1. Sur la frontière Togo–Dahomey—

(*a.*) L'Ile Bayol ;
(*b.*) Le territoire compris entre le méridien Bayol et le Mono de telle façon que la frontière suive le méridien Bayol jusqu'à son intersection avec la Rivière Mono ;
(*c.*) Entre le 7e et le 9e degré de latitude nord :

Le secteur Tohoun–Tado vers Agouma ;
Le secteur Cabolé Bédou ;
Le secteur traversé par la route Bassila–Pénésoulou tels que ces trois secteurs sont définis sur le croquis ci-joint.*

D'autre part, il est entendu qu'à partir du 10e degré de latitude nord la frontière Togo–Dahomey se dirigera directement sur un point situé dans le village de Gando appelé aussi Djé, à 30 kilom. à l'est de Sansanné-Mango et sur le parallèle passant par cette ville ; et que le territoire des différents villages formant l'agglomération de Pougno, attribuée à la France par la convention de 1897, s'étendra au sud du 11e degré de latitude nord de façon à englober les villages de Timanga, Nanison, Banangadi, Pilpodi, Sankoti, Tamfiégou et Timouri.

2. La partie de la colonie du Cameroun située au nord de la Bénoué et du Mayo-Kébi.

II. *Pour la France :*

La France cède à l'Allemagne—

1. Une bande de territoire située au sud de Cameroun et définie ainsi qu'il suit : la frontière partira du côté de l'Atlantique d'un point de la rive orientale de la baie de Monda située sur le parallèle . La frontière se dirigeant vers l'est longera la frontière de la Guinée espagnole et la frontière actuelle du Cameroun en laissant à la France les sources des Rivières N'Kan Lara et Okano, et à l'Allemagne les sources des Rivières Wollen et N'Tem. Elle coupera la Rivière Ivondo à son confluent avec la Karagoua, rejoindra de là en ligne droite le poste de Sembé, qui sera à l'Allemagne, et suivra depuis ce point les Rivières Sembé et N'Goko jusqu'au confluent de cette dernière avec la Sangha.

2. Un territoire situé à l'est du Cameroun et défini ainsi qu'il suit : la frontière partira du confluent de la N'Goko et de la Sangha et suivra le cours de cette dernière rivière jusqu'au confluent du bras le plus oriental de celle-ci avec le Congo, de manière à laisser à la France les postes de Ouesso Bongha et Loukoléla—français. Elle remontera ensuite le cours du Congo et de l'Oubanghi jusqu'à Bétou (qui sera à). De là, elle suivra le Loubagai pour rejoindre le Lobay au point où

* Not reproduced.

confluent le Bali et le Baéré; elle remontera le Bali jusqu'à hauteur de Kedé puis empruntera le cours des Rivières Lélé, Baba, Ouaham et Bahr Sara jusqu'au confluent de cette dernière avec le Bali. Elle remontera le Bali puis descendra le Som et le Logone oriental jusqu'à Lai (qui reste à la France); enfin remontera le Logone occidental et la Membéré jusqu'à la frontière actuelle du Cameroun.

Le Gouvernement Impérial cède à bail au Gouvernement français aux fins et conditions à déterminer dans un acte spécial, un terrain à choisir d'un commun accord en bordure sur l'Oubanghi entre Bétou et Desbordeville. Ce terrain d'une longueur de 400 mètres au plus aura une superficie qui ne pourra excéder 50 hectares.

Dans un délai d'un an à compter de l'échange des ratifications de la présente convention il sera procédé d'un commun accord à l'abornement des frontières décrites ci-dessus.

ARTICLE 12.

Les présents échanges de territoire sont faits dans les conditions où ces territoires se comportent, c'est-à-dire à charge par les deux Gouvernements de respecter les concessions publiques ou particulières qui ont pu être consenties.

ARTICLE 13.

Le Gouvernement allemand n'apportera aucune entrave au passage de troupes françaises et de leur matériel de ravitaillement par le Congo, l'Oubanghi, la Bénoué et le Mao-Kébi; il ne mettra aucun droit sur les marchandises françaises transitant au travers du territoire concédé à l'Allemagne à l'est de la Sangha. Un accord conclu entre les deux Gouvernements déterminera les conditions de ce transit et les points de pénétration.

ARTICLE 14.

Le Gouvernement français et le Gouvernement allemand cesseront, du jour de la ratification de la présente convention, d'exercer aucune sorte d'autorité ou de protection sur les indigènes des territoires respectivement cédés par eux. Le Gouvernement allemand renonce en outre à exercer au Maroc aucun droit de protection sur des sujets marocains.

[35515] No. 312.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 9.)

(No. 147. Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Paris, September 8, 1911.*

BERLIN telegram No. 69 of to-day.

I have seen French Minister for Foreign Affairs this evening. He says that, from French Ambassador at Berlin's telegraphic report—which he read to me—of his interview with German Minister for Foreign Affairs yesterday, there is a complete change of front on the part of the German Government, for whereas hitherto they have expressed their readiness to accord France, so far as Germany is concerned, a practical protectorate of Morocco under the guise of some other form of words, and their expectation that there would be no difficulty in negotiations provided that their economic interests were respected, and they have made a great point of obtaining large territorial concessions in French Congo, they now lay great stress on what are political matters in Morocco, and do not seem to attach the same importance to territorial compensations. Moreover, whereas they formerly said that it would be for France to settle matters with Spain, they now propose that besides Spanish possessions in Morocco being excluded from a definition of Morocco territory, the subject of proposed Franco-German convention, any parts of Morocco which may be recognised by France as within Spanish zones of influence shall likewise be excluded, thus reserving such parts for dealings between German and Spanish Governments, and enabling former to extract advantages from latter as consideration for a German recognition of special position of Spain in those parts of Morocco. French Minister for Foreign Affairs is wholly unable to appreciate whether this change of front is due to German Emperor and his Chancellor not concurring in German Minister for Foreign Affairs' line of negotiations or to a desire to cause negotiations to be fruitless.

French Minister for Foreign Affairs has given me a copy of French draft convention communicated to German Minister for Foreign Affairs last Monday (3rd September), and I have forwarded it to you by post to-day. French Ambassador at Berlin gathers from his conversation with German Minister for Foreign Affairs, and from latter's sketch of provisions of German counter-draft, which is to be communicated to French Ambassador in Berlin to-morrow or the next day, that as to French draft, German Government maintain that various administrative, economic, financial, and military reforms contemplated in article 1 must be on initiative of Moorish Government, and not on that of French Government; that, similarly, any military occupation of Morocco territory and the policing on land and in territorial waters by France provided for in article 2 must be at instance of Moorish Government. As to article 3, German Government require that period for complete equality in customs, taxation, tariffs, and railway transport shall not be limited to thirty years.

German Government do not object to French diplomatic and consular representation in Morocco and her interests abroad provided for in article 5, but they claim that, if Germany is to be precluded from entering into any engagement with Morocco without previous concurrence of France, French Government must give a like undertaking not to enter into any such engagement without German concurrence.

As to article 6, German Government require that any courts of justice to be established in Morocco in lieu of consular courts must be on model of Egyptian mixed tribunals. In regard to 7, German Government claim that in cases where construction of a railway has been adjudicated to a certain nationality, such nationality shall have a share in working ("exploitation") of such railway.

As to article 9, German Government claims to exclude from definition of Morocco territory any zones which may be recognised by France as within Spanish sphere of influence.

German Government decline to give up right, as stipulated in article 14, to grant protection in Morocco to Moorish subjects.

[35570] No. 313.

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 10.)

(No. 74.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Zarauz, September 9, 1911.*

FRENCH Ambassador and I had another conversation with Minister for Foreign Affairs at San Sebastian this morning. Minister for Foreign Affairs said that Spanish Government had carefully considered offers and demands of the French Government on the understanding that they were dependent on issue of Berlin negotiations. The proposal respecting Spanish sphere of influence, though satisfactory on the whole, would require modification on certain points. As to required surrender of the whole of the zone on which Spain had counted, Spanish Government had been glad to hear from Spanish Ambassador in Paris that this demand need not be regarded as an ultimatum, and that French Government would be open to an offer; otherwise it would have been impossible to pursue the negotiations. Spain could not cede coast lying opposite Canary Islands, including Ifni. She was, however, prepared to consider a cession of territory corresponding to cession France was about to make in French Congo.

French Ambassador invited Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs to formulate a reply to French Government on these lines. Minister for Foreign Affairs promised to do so.

(Repeated to Paris.)

[35571] No. 314.

Sir F. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 10.)

(No. 94. Very Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Vienna, September 10, 1911.*

THE French Ambassador was summoned to the Ballplatz yesterday by the Minister of Foreign Affairs. Count Aehrenthal opened the conversation by making various friendly remarks about the French Government, and then went on to say that the Austro-Hungarian Government were not interested in the purely Moroccan aspect of the crisis, for they felt sure that the French Government would adhere to their

undertaking to maintain the principle of the "open door" in that country. It seemed probable, however, that if the Moroccan question, which was becoming more complicated and extensive, were not shortly settled the relations between some of the Great Powers of Europe would become strained to a dangerous degree. Austria, said Count Aehrenthal, claimed nothing for herself in the Moroccan dispute, and was merely anxious that peace should be assured. A prompt and friendly arrangement between the French and German Governments would therefore be extremely welcome to her. He ventured to express the hope that France, like a *beau joueur*, would behave in a generous manner in satisfying the German claims in return for the free hand in Morocco which he understood the German Government were ready to give her, and which, in his opinion, would be an incalculable advantage to France.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs spoke of France in a most friendly manner throughout the conversation.

His Excellency has instructed the Austrian representative in Paris to speak to M. de Selves in the above sense, and showed M. Crozier the draft of the telegram containing his instructions.

The latter has received information to the effect that Germany is in a very critical situation financially, and is desperately anxious to reach some settlement with France which may not be looked upon as a humiliation. M. Crozier suspects that the Minister for Foreign Affairs may have spoken to him in the above manner of his own accord in order that, in the event of Germany asking for Austrian support in Paris, he may be able to say that he has already done all he can in that direction.

[35624] No. 315.

Mr. White to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received September* 11.)

(No. 291.)

Sir, *Tangier, September* 1, 1911.

IN my despatch No. 232 of the 23rd ultimo I reported that Kaïd Mtougi had issued orders depriving Kaïd Kourimi of his post of governor of his tribe, which was broken up and divided between the neighbouring governors, that Kaïd Kourimi had sent an agent to Agadir, where he was well received by the captain of the "Berlin," and that the German vice-consul had subsequently sent a message to Kaïd Mtougi insisting on the order dismissing Kaïd Kourimi being withdrawn, and had at the same time advised the latter to resist by force any attempt to dispossess him. Wishing to avoid any conflict, the French consul at Mogador had advised the governors who were to receive portions of Kaïd Kourimi's territory not to attempt to take possession, and M. de Billy had recommended the Makhzen not to interfere with Kaïd Kourimi.

Notwithstanding this advice, Kaïd Mtougi maintained the order which he had given, moved doubtless by personal feeling, for there has been a feud for several generations between his family and that of his powerful neighbour. The neighbouring tribes and apparently portions of Kourima were won over, and the dispossession of Kaïd Kourimi was eventually effected without any disturbances arising. The kaïd is a friend of Sid-el-Menebhi, and had written to him for advice. Sid Menebhi replied urging him to submit to the Sultan's orders and on no account to fight. This advice he evidently followed.

The dispossession of Kourimi has placed the Germans in an awkward position unless they are desirous of creating an incident. If nothing is done their prestige in the Mogador district will have suffered a severe blow, whilst, on the other hand, they have no good grounds for taking up a strong position. The German Minister sent his interpreter to Sid Guebbas a few days ago and made representations on behalf of Kaïd Kourimi, whom he did not, however, actually claim as a protégé, merely saying that he had sent a delegate to the captain of the "Berlin" at Agadir, and had appealed to Germany for help. He requested that Sid Guebbas should send instructions to Kaïd Mtougi not to do anything in regard to Kaïd Kourimi to create disturbances. This Sid Guebbas readily promised to do.

I have, &c.
HERBERT E. WHITE.

[35625] No. 316.

Mr. White to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received September* 11.)

(No. 292. Very Confidential.)

Sir, *Tangier, September* 2, 1911.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 285 of the 26th ultimo, I have the honour to report that I called upon the Spanish Minister some days ago and enquired whether there was any foundation for the statements that had appeared in the press to the effect that his Government were making preparations to take possession of Ifni.

M. de Villasinda replied that he had no information on the subject, and was not aware of any intention of his Government to take immediate action. I drew his attention to the precise nature of the telegrams—the actual troops to be sent and the name of the officer to take command being given; but he again said that he had no information.

This morning I called upon Cid Guebbas, and found the Spanish Minister with him on my arrival. His Excellency received me as soon as M. de Villasinda left, and I enquired whether he could give me any information regarding Ifni, mentioning that I had heard that the Spanish Government were sending troops to take possession, whether a Moorish commissioner were appointed or not.

Cid Guebbas assured me that he had heard absolutely nothing on the subject; the Spanish Minister had just been to see him in regard to the question of the Alcazar barracks, but had not then, or at any other time, mentioned the subject of Ifni. His Excellency appeared quite sincere, and, indeed, he would have had no reason for concealing the fact had he received any such communication; he is, on the contrary, ever ready to acquaint me confidentially with communications of this nature made to him by foreign Ministers. I presume that the matter has been dealt with between the Spanish Ambassador at Paris and Cid El-Mokri, who must have written direct to the Sultan.

I have spoken again on the subject with M. de Billy, and expressed the personal opinion that it would have been better for the Makhzen to have sent the commissioner, as requested by the Spanish Government, to delimit the territory to be ceded for a fishing station, instead of allowing the Spaniards to go alone and take possession of an undefined territory.

M. de Billy held a different view, and appeared to hope that Spain could eventually be jockeyed out of her rights in the south as defined in the secret treaty. He feared that, if Spanish troops are once established at Ifni, excuses would be found for extending their occupation, and that their real object in going there was to obtain a footing in their southern sphere of influence, as they had done in their northern. He considered that it would be very inconvenient for France to have Spain eventually in possession of that large district, and he appeared to think that everything possible should be done to avoid such a contingency. M. de Billy was, I believe, merely expressing his personal views; how far they are in accord with those of his Government I have no means of judging.

I have, &c.
HERBERT E. WHITE.

[35648] No. 317.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received September* 11.)

(No. 255.)

Sir, *St. Petersburgh, September* 6, 1911.

AT a dinner at court, to which I was invited last week, I sat next to the President of the Council, who spoke to me, among other matters, on the Moroccan question. He did not, he said, believe that there was any serious danger of war. Germany had from the very outset been playing a game of bluff, and, though he admitted that this was a game which exposed those who engaged in it to a considerable risk, he did not apprehend a rupture of Franco-German relations. He had never, he must confess, been able to make out what Germany really wanted; but he had been much struck by the fact that German public opinion was at present more incensed against England than against France.

I remarked that the German press was accusing us of trying to prevent an

amicable arrangement and of inciting France to resistance. There was not a word of truth in this, and I could assure him that His Majesty's Government were most anxious that the negotiations now proceeding should be brought to a speedy and satisfactory termination. The situation otherwise would become most critical. So far from creating difficulties, we had all along done everything in our power to facilitate a settlement. Germany, unfortunately, had been under the impression that we should look on as disinterested spectators while she imposed her terms on France, and now that she had discovered her mistake she was indulging in every sort of abuse of us. I personally, however, believed that the firm attitude adopted by His Majesty's Government at the outset had made for peace, as, had we shown the slightest sign of vacillation, Germany might have gone too far and we should have drifted into war. M. Stolypine agreed, adding that the recent outburst of Anglophobia in Germany was no new departure. It was but the frank expression of sentiments which Germany had long cherished. Nevertheless he did not think that she would push matters to extremities. I replied that if the German Government realised that Russia and England would, in such an eventuality, stand by France she would probably pause before she went too far. His Excellency tacitly admitted this, but did not commit himself to saying what Russia would do should the negotiations break down, and as I had already been informed by my French colleague of the categorical assurances which his Government had received on the subject I did not press his Excellency further.

On receiving Sir F. Bertie's telegram No. 141 of the 2nd instant, I called on the French Ambassador and enquired what view he took of the communication which the Russian Ambassador at Paris had just made to M. de Selves.

M. Louis replied that it had not caused him any serious preoccupation, and that, as M. Isvolsky had already spoken some ten days ago in a somewhat similar sense on his own account, the step which he had now taken under instructions from his Government had in all probability been inspired by him and need not necessarily be imputed to German instigation. It was, he thought, quite natural that Russia should wish to avert the danger of war, and it was quite possible that there were at the present moment two currents of opinion as to the course which she ought to pursue; but he believed that the Emperor, the court, and the Government were all firm supporters of the alliance with France. Russia, he remarked, knew quite well that, were she to fail France now, she would never be able to count on French support in the future, and that the whole fabric of the alliance, built up by Alexander III, would be destroyed. He was therefore confident that, were there to be a rupture of the negotiations, Russia would do her duty as France's ally.

I remarked that the Russian Court was a sealed book whose secrets it was very difficult to penetrate, but that I had always imagined that there were many German sympathisers in the immediate entourage of the Emperor. M. Louis replied that this might be the case when it was a question of an Anglo-Russian as against a Russo-German understanding, but that the French Alliance had taken a deeper root and was now generally accepted as a permanent institution. There were, moreover, specific grounds for the confidence which he placed in Russia's loyalty to her ally at the present crisis. The Russian Government, who had been kept informed day by day of the course of the negotiations, had given France the most categorical assurances of both her diplomatic and military support. On the very day, moreover, on which M. Isvolsky had made his communication to M. de Selves, the Chief of the General Staff of the French army was conferring at St. Petersburgh with the Chief of the General Staff of the Russian army on a joint plan of campaign in the event of war. It was also a significant fact that at a moment like the present, when peace and war were hanging in the balance, the Grand Duke Nicholas Nikolaievitch, who in all probability would be the commander-in-chief of the Russian forces, should, at a dinner given a few days ago to the French military delegation, have toasted the army of Russia's ally.

On my asking M. Louis whether he thought that the Russian army was a match for the Austrian, his Excellency replied in the affirmative. The Russian army had greater cohesion and tenacity than the Austrian, and it would be certainly to France's advantage that they should both take part in the war, on their respective sides, than that they should both stand aloof. The French army, he believed, could be mobilised as rapidly as the German, and, though mobilisation in this country would proceed at a slower rate, no long interval would elapse before the Russian army was in a position to take the offensive.

Owing to a series of court functions, which his Excellency was obliged to attend, it was not till this afternoon that the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs was able to

see me and that I could speak to him on the subject of Morocco. He told me that there was no truth in the report, mentioned in Sir F. Bertie's telegram No. 141 of the 2nd September, that the Russian Government had been asked by Germany to give counsels of moderation at Paris. The instructions sent to M. Isvolsky had been prompted by the desire to impress on the French Government the grave consequences which would ensue should they fail to approach this final and critical stage of the negotiations in a conciliatory spirit. France was at the present moment inclined to be too impatient and to expect an immediate and definite answer from Germany to the proposals which M. Cambon had been instructed to make. This was not at all likely to happen, and it would be contrary to German diplomatic methods. A war on account of Morocco—a country in which Russia was in no way interested—would be most unpopular in this country, and, even if successful, would predispose Russian public opinion in the future against the French Alliance.

I remarked that from all I knew of the negotiations counsels of moderation were more needed at Berlin than at Paris. I was afraid, moreover, that if Germany heard that representations were being made to the French Government she would think that Russia was wavering in her loyalty to her ally and would in consequence adopt a more *intransigeant* attitude.

M. Nératof replied that there was no danger of this, and that counsels of moderation would be useful in both capitals. Russia had throughout held a very firm language at Berlin, and Germany perfectly understood that if there was war the war would be a European one.

As his Excellency then proceeded to refer to the attacks made against England in the German press and to the strong feelings of resentment entertained for us in Berlin, I thought it well to repeat to him what I had said to M. Stolypine on the subject, and to express my regret that I had not had an opportunity of assuring the Emperor at the dinner at Peterhof last Friday how utterly unfounded were the accusations brought against us. His Excellency said that he would inform His Majesty of what I had told him, and then went on to tell me that he had just heard that France had addressed what virtually amounted to an ultimatum to Spain. He could not, he said, conceive how at a moment like the present France could have taken so rash and ill-advised a step. It would not fail to encourage Germany to raise her demands, and if war did break out it might place France at a serious disadvantage.

My French colleague, whom I have just seen, tells me that he was received in audience by the Emperor this afternoon. He was able, he said, to give His Majesty a true and succinct account of the whole history of the Moroccan question, and to assure him of the earnest desire of the French Government to come to an amicable understanding with Germany. M. Louis is entirely satisfied with the result of his audience. The Emperor, while expressing the natural wish for the exercise of prudence on the part of France in order to avert the calamity of war, did not hint that the French Government could do more than they were doing, but said that his own impression was that Germany was ready to treat. His Majesty repeated the assurances already given that, in the case of necessity, France can count on both the diplomatic and military support of Russia. His language on the point was quite firm, and M. Louis is convinced that His Majesty will never refuse to honour the signature which his father the Emperor Alexander III affixed to the Franco-Russian Alliance.

M. Louis tells me that he knows nothing of a reported French ultimatum to Spain, and says that the Emperor did not mention the subject to him.

I have, &c.

GEORGE W. BUCHANAN.

[35612] No. 318.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 11.)

(No. 263.)

Sir, *Berlin, September 8, 1911.*

THE resumption of negotiations between Herr von Kiderlen-Waechter and M. Cambon was announced in a semi-official paragraph published by the "Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung" on the afternoon of the 5th instant, which concluded by stating that, "in the circumstances, the negotiations may be expected to take a smoother course than before their interruption." The "Berliner Tageblatt" concludes from this announcement that the new French proposals have cleared the way to an agreement, and that there can be no longer any question of an emphatic "no" from the side of

Germany; at the same time, it says, it is clearly indicated that, in spite of the somewhat haughty assertions of the French press, Germany is not compelled to give a categorical reply. The negotiations would now proceed on the basis of the programme prepared in Paris and accepted in Berlin. Both Governments were determined to put an end by peaceful means to the tiresome Moroccan imbroglio which had so long embittered their mutual relations, and it should not be difficult to arrive now at an understanding as to the conditions on which this could be done.

The "Berliner Lokal-Anzeiger," which is often officially inspired, was in a recent article not quite so optimistic. It expressed the opinion that the French proposals afforded only a slight prospect of an early settlement of the Moroccan question. After stating that the German Government was preparing a set of counter-propositions, it said that the difficulties now to be surmounted appeared not to lie in the amount of territorial compensation to be accorded by France in return for a free hand in Morocco, but rather in other directions. French policy in Morocco had hitherto been dictated by a greedy oligarchy of speculators and capitalists, and German statesmen must take the greatest care to safeguard German commercial interests in the future Moroccan State. Generally speaking, the German Government appeared to start from the assumption that any settlement must be as complete as possible, and that when all other political requirements were satisfied France should be given complete liberty of action. It was to be hoped that by this was meant that with political rights France should also assume the fullest political responsibilities, and that she would not be allowed to shelter herself, as in the past, behind the Shereefian Government. In future France must be directly and personally responsible for the life and property of every German subject. Less importance need be attached to the question of the employment of Moorish troops on European soil, since such troops would in any case not be available for use outside Morocco for many years to come, and the example of France's boasted Senegalese troops was not encouraging.

The economic side of the arrangement was the most important. Precautions must be taken to ensure for all nations freedom of exploitation of the possible mineral wealth of the Sus district, and it must be provided that the ore extracted should have free access to the markets of the world without being subject to taxes or export duties. It would be folly for Germany to insist on a cession of the Sus district: firstly, because there was little room there for settlers; secondly, because there were few Germans who would make suitable colonists; and further, because of the vast sums which would be required for the development of the country.

The article concluded by stating that, though the negotiations would take time, no dangerous surprises were to be feared; the irony of the situation lay in the fact that, as at Algeciras, Germany was not taking all this trouble on her own account alone, but was working in the interests of international commerce, to set a limit to France's capitalistic greed, and to prevent the tunification of Morroco, from all of which "our English friends will derive perhaps more profit than ourselves."

The Conservative "Kreuz-Zeitung" states what it conceives to be the British point of view as to the objects to be aimed at in the negotiations, namely, that France should be granted a sort of protectorate over Morocco, and that Germany should get compensation in the Congo, and a "future in Equatorial Africa," as well as economic guarantees in Morocco similar to those enjoyed by other nations. England, however, objected to Germany gaining a foothold in Morocco, either permanent or temporary, and regarded any economic privileges accorded to Germany in any portion of Morocco—the south, for instance—as equivalent to an occupation. The pretension of England to dictate to Germany and regulate her interests as she thought fit implied not only an ineradicable hatred, but also a contempt of Germany such as she, England, had only exhibited hitherto towards small and powerless States. It would be regrettable, it says, that England should persist in such an attitude, which must inevitably lead to an estrangement with Germany. But it really would seem from the utterances of the English press that England was endeavouring to prevent the conclusion of an agreement on the basis of a reasonable settlement. As a true friend of England, the "Kreuz-Zeitung" would deeply deplore such an attitude in view of its inevitable effect on the relations between the two countries. It was to be hoped, however, that England would end by adopting a more reasonable attitude towards Germany, and that the way would thereby be opened towards a satisfactory termination of the Moroccan negotiations.

The "Kölnische Zeitung," which is often the mouthpiece of official opinions, has expressed in an article published on the 5th instant, and entitled "War or Peace," the conviction that France and Germany would not cross swords over Morocco—not because it considered that Morocco is not worth fighting for, but because it relied on

the conviction that France would not drive things to extremities, and that the French people would, in spite of the bellicose utterances of the "France militaire," be guided by the consideration that to go to Fez by way of Berlin was too dangerous a journey. The possibility of a war with Germany would not be attractive to France, in spite of the prospect of British support, which, in view of the fact that it would not be contrary to British interest that the two great continental Powers should weaken each other, would seem to be rather a doubtful contingency. No one blamed France for her policy of peaceful penetration in Morocco, and she could hardly be expected to reverse it. With England the case was different. The assurances of the English press that the British people had no desire to injure Germany for the benefit of France might be honestly meant, but it was evident to all that such was the aim of British diplomacy. This was made perfectly clear by the speeches of English Ministers and the journalistic utterances of individual diplomatists, and it might be usefully recalled with what unscrupulousness British diplomacy disregarded German claims in 1904, and, without a shadow of right, made a present to France of Morocco, an independent Sultanate, in return for advantages of great importance to England. This unscrupulous proceeding had neither been forgotten nor forgiven, and it was too much to expect that Germany should feel any great sympathy for the country who carried it out.

In another article published on the 6th, the "Kölnische Zeitung" warns the public not to be impatient, as the consideration by the German Government of the French proposals must necessarily take some time; and again on the 7th it explains that a German counter-proposal is in preparation, and that before it can be completed experts will have frequently to be consulted and reports furnished on the various questions at issue. So much preliminary work has, however, already been done, it says, not only as regards the question of the guarantees for German commercial interests in Morocco, but also as to the territorial compensations required, that with good-will on both sides an early conclusion of the negotiations may be anticipated.

The "Hamburger Nachrichten," in an article reporting the resumption of the negotiations, says that it is as little to the interest of France as of Germany to come to an open conflict. A Franco-German war solely on account of Morocco would not only be objectless, but would exactly serve the purpose of English policy. But for England, it says, the Moroccan negotiations would have long ago been terminated. She it was who had all along incited the French to be as little conciliatory as possible. For a long time past it had been the aim of English policy to checkmate Germany by the help of France. England was working with all her might to stir up strife between Germany and France, and bring about a Franco-German war, the result of which would be to reduce for many years the naval strength even of the victor. Consequently that section of the press which was trying by every means to make a *casus belli* out of the Moroccan question was merely serving the interests of its hated Albion.

Germany would only consent to go to war in defence of her position as a world Power. It was not France who either desired, or was able, to deprive Germany of elbow-room in the world; her obstinate attitude in the Moroccan question had only been adopted at the suggestion and with the backing of England.

In these circumstances, the German people should imitate the coolness shown by Herr von Kiderlen-Waechter. The position of Germany was very favourable. She could count on the support of Austria, and Italy was not so likely to stand by France now as she did at Algeciras. She was evidently inclined to look for compensations with the help of Germany, and Germany would be ready, so far as it lay in her power, to further the realisation of her pretensions in Tripoli. Spain was more inclined to side with Germany than with France, and Russia was not likely to join in a war forced upon Germany over Morocco in which she would also have to face Austria. German diplomacy must endeavour, if possible, to avoid a war with France, but should it prove unavoidable, the moral responsibility must be thrown on the opponent. A war with France solely on account of Morocco would be anything but popular in Germany; it could only become so if it entailed a fight for existence and involved the "source of all evil." "May this," it says, "be repeated in London." "We want no war with England," the article concludes, "but we demand that she should cease to place obstacles in the way of our political and economic development. There is room for both in the world, and if this point of view prevails in London, even the Morocco question will speedily find a peaceful solution."

I have thought it necessary to trouble you with these long extracts from the press in order that you may be fully acquainted with the manner in which the present situation is regarded by the various sections of public opinion represented by the more important newspapers. The most noticeable point is the unanimity with which England

is looked upon, to use the words of the "Hamburger Nachrichten," as the "source of all evil," and as being wholly responsible for the French resistance to Germany's demands.

The "Vossische Zeitung," the "Post," and a host of minor newspapers, including most of the provincial press, say the same thing, but as a rule in far more violent language. They write, however, with such wild ignorance of the points at issue, and of what is really passing between the French and German Governments, that their opinions are not worth recording.

I have, &c.
W. E. GOSCHEN.

[35614] No. 319.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received September* 11.)

(No. 265.)

Sir, *Berlin, September* 8, 1911.

AS I had the honour to state in my telegram No. 67 of the 4th instant, last Wednesday was the day fixed by Herr von Kiderlen for giving M. Cambon the reply or counter-project to the French draft convention. On that day, however, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs intimated to the French Ambassador that, as the Chancellor would not arrive in Berlin till the evening, he must defer their meeting till the next day at 11 A.M. When that hour arrived, however, Herr von Kiderlen sent a message that he was not yet ready, but that he would be glad to see the French Ambassador at 6·30 P.M. M. Cambon, who did not augur well from these delays, called upon him at that hour and was shown, and allowed to take away, for telegraphing purposes, a very rough draft of the German counter-project of convention.

There was but little time for any discussion, as Herr von Kiderlen had another engagement at 7. He promised, however, that he would have the draft corrected and typed in time for M. Cambon to transmit it to his Government on Saturday next.

M. Cambon told me in the evening that he had not been sorry that the interview was so short, as he wished to be in possession of the views of his Government before entering into any discussion respecting the German counter-project with the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. He said that his own impression was that it was quite inacceptable, and that if the demands made by Germany were acceded to there would be absolutely no reason for giving her any territorial compensation whatever.

As regards railways in Morocco, their exploitation, and the supply of material for their construction, the German project provides that Germany should participate to the extent of 30 per cent., the remaining 70 per cent. going to France. M. Cambon pointed out to Herr von Kiderlen that this provision would appear to exclude other Powers from all participation, and that that was hardly in accordance with the principle of the "open door" by which Germany set so much store. It would, moreover, have the effect of giving Germany a certain measure of the political influence for the renouncement of which she was claiming territorial compensation. Herr von Kiderlen, however, remarked that he had no time on the present occasion to go into the matter; he would explain the ideas of the Imperial Government on the subject at their next meeting.

M. Cambon also gave me to understand that the German project retained the French article with regard to diplomatic representation, but stipulated for reciprocity, namely, that if at any time France on her side contemplated making a fresh treaty with Morocco, the fact should be duly notified to the German Government. This sentence, M. Cambon maintained, appeared to place the two Governments on practically the same political plane, and it was out of the question that it should be accepted.

As far as I can see, both parties seem to think that the convention proposed by the other is quite inacceptable. In any case, there can be no further discussion on the subject here until the French Government have considered the German proposal and furnished M. Cambon with instructions. That can scarcely be, at the earliest, before the end of next week. My French colleague seems to be confident that they will eventually arrive at an arrangement, but he thinks that the discussions will extend over at least a month. He is of the opinion that Herr von Kiderlen desires a settlement, and will do what he can to facilitate matters, but that his Excellency

[34786] No. 321*.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. White.

(No. 73.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, September* 11, 1911.

I HAVE received your despatch No. 287 of the 28th ultimo, enclosing a letter in which Mr. Ostler, the newspaper correspondent who was expelled from Ajadir, informs Mr. Vice-Consul Johnstone that he expects a personal apology from Kaïd Guellouli, and that he demands the severe punishment of the kaïd's deputy at Ajadir.

I consider that the action already taken by the Makhzen in the matter is sufficient, and I do not propose to press for any further reparation or apology. The important point is that Mr. Ostler can return if he wishes, and this should be kept to the front in any communications with him. It is the point of substance which His Majesty's Government have obtained, while Mr. Ostler is contending for a point of form.

I should be glad if you would inform Mr. Johnstone to the above effect.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

is greatly hampered by the rapacity of the bureaux, and more particularly of the Colonial Department.

The Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Herr Zimmerman, in conversation with the Russian chargé d'affaires, declaimed violently against the French proposals, which, he said, scarcely offered even a basis for discussion. He used much the same language to my Italian colleague, adding that it was evidently very distasteful to the French Government to give guarantees that Germany should receive fair treatment in the field of commerce and industry in Morocco, but that the Imperial Government had fully made up their minds to be very stiff on that subject, and to make arrangements such as would not share the fate of the assurances given by France in the arrangement of 1909.

I have, &c.
W. E. GOSCHEN.

[35577] No. 320.

Mr. White to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 11.)

(No. 150.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Tangier, September* 9, 1911.

RAISULI has informed Sid Guebbas that the Moorish officials at Alcazar, including the Kaids and other Makhzen officials, such as those in charge of Government and mosque properties, have been ordered by the Spanish authorities there that their consent must be obtained before any step may be taken. The headmen of the T'lig and Khlot tribes have, further, been instructed by the Spanish authorities that, in regard to payment of taxes or otherwise, only such orders from the Makhzen as may be delivered through them are to be acted upon. These orders have, of course, roused the resentment of Raisuli, who views with the greatest indignation the loss of his jurisdiction over the most important part of his district. M. de Billy has received a letter from Raisuli asking his advice as to what he should do, and has also been consulted by Guebbas. He is giving the matter his consideration.

I have sent a repetition of this telegram to Sir M. de Bunsen.

[34506] No. 321.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 376.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, September* 11, 1911.

I HAVE given my careful consideration to the draft Franco-Spanish Convention respecting Morocco, which is enclosed in your Excellency's despatch No. 386 of the 1st instant, and I see no objection thereto from the British point of view. It appears to me indeed to be an honest attempt to remove Spanish grievances, and a great deal of friction will undoubtedly be saved when it has come into force.

I observe that you called M. de Selves' attention to the provisions of article 7 of the Anglo-French Declaration of 1904 in regard to the non-fortification of the Morocco coast opposite Gibraltar. Spain's adherence to the Anglo-French Declaration forms article 1 of the Franco-Spanish Convention of the same year; and if this latter convention is now to be superseded, it might possibly be argued that Spain's adherence to the Anglo-French Declaration has lapsed. It would be well to provide against this possibility, and the difficulty could be met by the insertion in the new convention of an article in the same terms as article 1 of the old convention, *i.e.*, "L'Espagne adhère, aux termes de la présente convention, à la Déclaration franco-anglaise du 8 avril, 1904, relative au Maroc et à l'Egypte." I should be glad if you would urge upon M. de Selves the desirability of inserting an article to the above effect in the draft convention.

I entirely agree with the provisions of article 13 of the new convention relative to Tangier, and in case any question should arise about it in future years, I desire to place on record that His Majesty's Government consider it essential that Tangier should maintain its special international position with a zone of 15 kilom.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[35850] No. 322.

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 12.)

(No. 152.)

Sir, *Zarauz, September 9, 1911.*

IN the course of the last few months, General Aldave, Governor of Melilla, appears to have extended considerably the area in the Riff country which is in Spanish military occupation, the territory held by the Spanish troops extending now to the right bank of the Wady Kert. This advance has caused some commotion among the tribes of the left bank, which had hitherto felt themselves to be unaffected by the progress of the Spanish forces. Encouraged, it would seem, by the turbulent and hitherto unsubdued tribes facing the Spanish fortress of Alhucemas, the kaïds of certain villages to the westward of the Kert organised on the 24th August an attack on a Spanish survey party on the opposite side of the river. Several of the Spanish native troopers were killed, and, since the above date, the papers have been filled with details of the punitive measures adopted by Colonel Larrea under orders from General Aldave. A considerable movement of troops, native and Spanish, took place; various engagements ensued, and several villages were destroyed in the endeavour to inflict a lesson on the Riffians which would not soon be forgotten. The success of these measures is, however, far from complete as yet. This morning's telegrams announce an extension of the hostile movement among the tribes, and the Minister for Foreign Affairs informs me that some 3,000 men, who had not long since been allowed to return to Spain, are being again shipped off to Melilla from Valencia, Malaga, and Algeciras in response to General Aldave's demands for reinforcements. Several men-of-war are also under orders to proceed to Alhucemas.

I have, &c.
(For the Ambassador),
THOMAS H. LYONS.

[34495] No. 323.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. White.

(No. 74.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, September 12, 1911.*

I HAVE received your despatch No. 282 of the 26th ultimo, reporting on the methods of the "Bureaux arabes" in the Shawia and the action of the "Contrôle de la Dette."

No doubt the French authorities in the Shawia are obstructive, and, as you are aware, His Majesty's Ambassador at Paris has been instructed to protest against the levy of a tax on seeds; but it is difficult to take action on the somewhat vague complaints reported in your despatch. If, however, you will inform me of any definite cases of injustice or obstruction on the part of the French authorities, the question of making representations at Paris will be considered.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[35951] No. 324.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 13.)

(No. 405. Confidential.)

Sir, *Paris, September 12, 1911.*

IN compliance with a request from M. de Selves, I called on him this morning. His Excellency showed to me the German counter-proposals in reply to the French projet de convention which had been communicated to M. de Kiderlen-Waechter by the French Ambassador. I sent to you a summary of the German counter-proposals as described to me by M. de Selves on the 8th instant in my telegram No. 147, Confidential, of that date. M. de Selves was good enough to allow me to send a secretary to the Quai d'Orsay this afternoon to make a copy of the German communication, as it was too detailed for me to remember its contents sufficiently from his Excellency reading it to me to enable me to report it to you as fully as I wished. I have the honour to transmit to you a copy of the document herewith.

[35953] No. 323*.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 13.)

(No. 268.)

Sir, *Berlin, September 9, 1911.*

A NOTICE appeared in the "Reichsanzeiger" yesterday to the effect that the firm Marokko Mannesmann Compagnie (Limited) was registered at Tangier on the 24th August last, with head office at Hamburg and branches at Tetuan, Mequinez, and Alcasar. The objects of the company are stated to be the import and export of goods, especially from and to Morocco. The company is further empowered to join in other undertakings intended to benefit trade and commerce from, to, and in Morocco. The working capital of the company is 500,000 M. (25,000*l.*) The managers are Moritz Schmidt and Albert Schmidt, merchants, of Heilbronn.

I have, &c.
W. E. GOSCHEN.

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The French projet de convention has been taken as a basis, but it has been completely changed in all its essential provisions from the French point of view and much to the detriment of the position which the French Government aspire to obtain in Morocco. The German Government do not admit that they have only exclusively economic interests in Morocco, and they refuse to acknowledge the "action directrice" of France in Morocco. There are provisions in regard to the construction and working of railways which I have not time to describe before the departure of the messenger with this despatch.

I have, &c.
FRANCIS BERTIE.

Enclosure in No. 324.

Franco-German Convention.

[German Text.]

A LA suite des troubles qui se sont produits au Maroc et qui ont démontré la nécessité d'y poursuivre, dans l'intérêt général, l'œuvre de pacification et de progrès prévue par l'Acte d'Algésiras, le Gouvernement de la République française et le Gouvernement Impérial allemand ont jugé nécessaire de préciser et de compléter l'accord franco-allemand du 9 février, 1909. Ils sont convenus à cet effet des dispositions ci-après :—

ARTICLE 1er.

Le Gouvernement Impérial allemand déclare qu'il n'entravera pas l'action de la France en vue de prêter son assistance au Sultan pour l'introduction de toutes les réformes administratives, économiques, financières et militaires dont il a besoin pour le bon gouvernement de son Empire, comme aussi pour tous les règlements que ces réformes comportent.

En conséquence, il donne son adhésion aux mesures de réorganisation, de contrôle et de garantie financière que, sur la demande et de concert avec le Gouvernement marocain, le Gouvernement français croira devoir prendre à cet effet, sous la réserve que l'action de la France sauvegardera au Maroc l'égalité économique entre les nations.

Au cas où la France serait amenée à préciser et à étendre son contrôle et sa protection, le Gouvernement Impérial allemand, reconnaissant au Maroc pleine liberte d'action à la France sous la réserve que la liberté commerciale prévue par les traités antérieurs sera maintenue, n'y apportera aucun obstacle.

Il est entendu qu'il ne sera apporté aucune entrave aux droits et à l'action de la Banque d'État du Maroc stipulés dans l'Acte d'Algésiras.

ARTICLE 2.

Dans cet ordre d'idées il est entendu que le Gouvernement Impérial allemand ne fera pas obstacle à ce que la France, sur la demande et d'accord avec le Gouvernement marocain, procède aux occupations militaires du territoire marocain qu'elle jugerait nécessaire au maintien de l'ordre et de la sécurité des transactions commerciales, et à ce qu'elle exerce toute action de police sur terre et dans les eaux marocaines.

ARTICLE 3.

Le Gouvernement français déclare que, fermement attaché au principe de la liberté commerciale au Maroc, il ne se prêtera à aucune inégalité pas plus dans l'établissement des droits de douane, impôts et autres taxes que dans l'établissement des tarifs de transport par voie de chemin de fer, de navigation fluviale ou toute autre voie de transport et notamment dans toutes les questions de transit.

[Paragraphe supprimé.]

Le Gouvernement français s'emploiera également auprès du Gouvernement marocain afin d'empêcher tout traitement différentiel entre les sujets des différentes nations, et, notamment, il s'opposera à toute mesure qui pourrait différencier les marchandises d'une Puissance par des ordonnances administratives sur les poids, les mesures, le jaugeage et le poinçonnage.

Le Gouvernement français s'engage à faire prévaloir son influence sur la direction de la Banque d'État afin que celle-ci confère aux membres de sa direction à Tanger à tour de rôle les postes de délégué à la Commission des Valeurs douanières et de délégué au Comité permanent des Douanes dont elle dispose (article 96 et 97 de l'Acte d'Algésiras).

ARTICLE 4.

[Same as French text.]

ARTICLE 5.

Dès à présent, si Sa Majesté le Sultan du Maroc venait à confier aux agents diplomatiques et consulaires de la France la représentation et la protection des sujets et des intérêts marocains à l'étranger, le Gouvernement Impérial déclare qu'il n'y fera pas d'objection.

Les deux Gouvernements s'engagent à se faire connaître les engagements sur lesquels ils pourraient s'entendre avec le Gouvernement marocain.

ARTICLE 6.

Lorsque des organisations judiciaires régulières auront été créées au Maroc à l'instar des tribunaux mixtes d'Égypte et que la France aura décidé de leur transférer la juridiction des tribunaux consulaires français, le Gouvernement Impérial allemand, dès que les autres Puissances signataires en feront autant, transférera également à ces mêmes tribunaux la juridiction des tribunaux consulaires allemands, étant entendu que les ressortissants allemands jouiront des mêmes garanties légales et réglementaires que les ressortissants français.

ARTICLE 7.

Le Gouvernement de la république s'engage à veiller à ce que les travaux et fournitures nécessités par les constructions éventuelles de routes, chemins de fer, ports, &c., soient octroyés par le Gouvernement chérifien suivant les règles de l'adjudication.

[Paragraphe supprimé.]

Le Gouvernement français usera également de son influence auprès de la Banque d'État afin que celle-ci confère aux membres de sa direction à Tanger, à tour de rôle, le poste de délégué à la Commission générale des Adjudications et Marchés.

De même, le Gouvernement français amènera le Gouvernement marocain à conférer un des postes de délégué chérifien au Comité spécial des Travaux publics à tour de rôle à des candidats qui seront présentés par les quatre Puissances autorisées par l'Acte d'Algésiras à nommer les censeurs auprès de la Banque d'État.

Le Gouvernement français s'engage à user de son influence auprès du Gouvernement marocain dans ce sens que, pour la nomination des fonctionnaires et ingénieurs auxquels sera confiée l'exploitation des grandes entreprises, il sera tenu compte de la nationalité des constructeurs dans la proportion de leur participation.

Les deux Gouvernements s'entendront sur la construction des chemins de fer au Maroc, selon les principes établis dans l'Acte d'Algésiras.

Annexe au dernier alinéa de l'Article 7.

Le Gouvernement Impérial allemand ne fera pas d'objection à la construction d'un chemin de fer militaire d'Oujda par Taourirt à la rive droite de la Moulouya et d'un second chemin de fer militaire de Casablanca par Settat à la rive droite de l'Oum-er-Rebia.

Le Gouvernement français, de son côté, s'engage à se mettre d'accord pour la construction de ces deux chemins de fer avec la Société marocaine de Travaux publics.

Pour ces deux lignes, il devra être employé un matériel (rails, traverses, matériel roulant, &c.) tel qu'aucune industrie ne soit exclue de la possibilité de faire des offres.

Le Gouvernement français s'engage à obliger le Gouvernement marocain de charger l'ingénieur du Makhzen à procéder immédiatement aux démarches nécessaires pour faire mettre en adjudication dans le cours d'une année un chemin de fer de Tanger par Larache à Méquinez et Fez.

L'exécution des travaux de ce chemin de fer devra nécessairement et en toutes circonstances précéder la construction de lignes quelconques dans la partie du Maroc qui se trouve au nord du Tensift.

Dans le cas où, à l'occasion de la mise en adjudication publique du chemin de fer Tanger–Larache–Méquinez et Fez, un entrepreneur français ou une société française seraient déclarés adjudicataires, le Gouvernement français userait de son autorité auprès d'eux pour qu'ils mettent à la disposition des intéressés allemands 30 pour cent du capital ainsi que des travaux.

Les certificats que les concurrents sont tenus de demander en vertu des deux règlements pour les adjudications fourniront une occasion pour prévoir cette nécessité à temps.

D'autre part, dans le cas où un entrepreneur allemand ou unesoci été allemande serait déclaré adjudicataire du chemin de fer susindiqué, le Gouvernement allemand fera valoir son influence pour qu'une participation de 70 pour cent soit offerte à des intéressés français.

De la même manière, la construction de tous les chemins de fer au nord du Tensift sera réglée.

Le Gouvernement français s'engage à obliger le Gouvernement marocain de charger l'ingénieur du Makhzen de procéder aux démarches nécessaires pour faire mettre en adjudication publique une jonction par chemin de fer de Taroudant et de Marrakech avec l'Océan Atlantique, conformément aux projets que les experts lui fourniront et dès que ces projets seront remis entre ses mains.

Dans le cas où, à l'occasion de la mise en adjudication publique de la jonction de Taroudant et Marrakech avec la côte, un entrepreneur allemand ou une société allemande serait déclaré adjudicataire, le Gouvernement allemand s'engage à faire prévaloir son autorité sur l'adjudicataire pour que celui-ci fasse participer des intéressés français à raison de 30 pour cent.

De même, dans le cas inverse, le Gouvernement français obligera les entrepreneurs ou la société française ayant été déclarés adjudicataires de la construction des chemins de fer susindiqués, à en mettre 70 pour cent à la disposition des intéressés allemands.

La même obligation s'appliquera à tous les chemins de fer qui seront à construire à l'avenir au sud du Wadi Tensift et au nord du Wadi Draa.

Article 8 of French text suppressed.

Article 9 of French text becomes article 8 of German text, with an addition after the words "possessions espagnoles" as follows: "et des districts dans lesquels l'influence espagnole sera reconnue."

Article 10 of French text becomes article 9 of German text, with omission of words "près desquelles les deux Gouvernements s'engagent à se prêter mutuellement appui pour obtenir leur adhésion."

ARTICLE 9.

Les précédents articles de la présente convention seront communiqués aux autres Puissances signataires de l'Acte d'Algésiras pour leur demander leur adhésion.

Article 11 of French text not yet examined by the German Government.

ARTICLE 10.

Le Gouvernement français s'engage à obliger le Gouvernement marocain à ajoindre à tous les services de transport des censeurs analogues à ceux qui ont été prévus pour la Banque d'Etat du Maroc par les articles 51–53 de l'Acte d'Algésiras. Chaque censeur aura le droit de veto.

ARTICLE 11.

Pour éviter autant que possible les réclamations diplomatiques, les plaintes des sujets allemands qui ne seront pas réglées par l'intermédiaire des deux consuls dans les districts où l'action réformatrice de la France remplacera de fait l'administration marocaine ou exercera sur cette dernière une influence autoritative, seront soumises à des commissions spéciales, sur la composition et la compétence desquelles les deux Gouvernements s'entendront.

ARTICLE 12.

En cas de modifications à apporter aux traités internationaux du Maroc, le Gouvernement français veillera à ce qu'il ne soit pas porté atteinte aux droits actuels des pêcheurs des États signataires de faire la pêche le long de la côte marocaine et de profiter des occasions qu'elle leur offre pour la navigation, la pêche et leurs besoins professionnels.

ARTICLE 13.

Dès la mise en vigueur du présent traité, les Gouvernements allemands et français demanderont simultanément au Gouvernement marocain l'ouverture du port d'Agadir. Ils procéderont de même si plus tard l'ouverture d'autres ports de la côte atlantique du Maroc paraissaient désirable. Quant aux ports situés entre le Tensift et le Draa, le Gouvernement français se conformera aux désirs du Gouvernement allemand, qui, de son côté, soutiendra les désirs français relatifs aux ports situés au nord du Tensift.

ARTICLE 14 [French text, Article 11.]

Not yet examined by the German Government.

ARTICLE 15 [French Article 12].

Les présents échanges de territoire sont faits dans les conditions où ces territoires se comportent, c'est-à-dire à charge par les deux Gouvernements de respecter les concessions publiques ou particulières qui ont pu être consenties, et que les Gouvernements se communiqueront.

ARTICLE 16 [see Article 13 of French text].

Le Gouvernement allemand n'apportera aucune entrave au passage des troupes françaises et de leur matériel de ravitaillement par le Congo, &c.

La France également n'apportera aucune entrave, &c., par la colonie du Gabon (*sic*).

ARTICLE 17.

Le Gouvernement français et le Gouvernement allemand cesseront du jour de la ratification de la présente convention d'exercer aucune sorte d'autorité ou de protection sur les indigènes des territoires respectivement cédés par eux.

[36049] No. 325.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 14.)

(No. 207.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *St. Petersburgh, September 13, 1911*

THIS morning's papers state that the German reservists residing at Riga have received orders to join their regiments. This announcement has caused considerable uneasiness here.

In conversation with M. Nératof the German chargé d'affaires explained that this step had nothing unusual in it. It was customary to recall every year for military training from one country or another a certain number of the German reservists residing abroad, and it had been decided this year to recall the reservists from Holland and Russia.

M. Nératof, in the course of a conversation which I had with his Excellency, expressed the opinion that Germany's latest demands for a privileged economical position in Morocco were quite indefensible, and that it would be impossible for France to concede them without first obtaining the consent of the other Powers which had signed the Algeciras Act. In his opinion, Germany would not insist upon them and so inevitably push matters to a rupture. It was possible, he thought, that the wording of the proposals handed to M. Cambon by M. Kiderlen-Waechter might be clumsy, and that they might eventually be explained away altogether, or at any rate put in a milder form.

[36153] No. 326.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 14.)

(No. 70.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Berlin, September 14, 1911.*

THE following communiqué is published in the "North German Gazette" to-night:—

"The Imperial Government have been informed by the British Government, in reply to an enquiry, that the British Ambassador in Vienna neither inspired the well-known article in the 'Neue Freie Presse,' nor did he make the statements attributed to him by the author of the article. The incident is thus satisfactorily closed as far as the Imperial Government are concerned."

[36169] No. 327.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 15.)

(No. 408.)
Sir, *Paris, September 14, 1911.*

I HAVE the honour to report to you, with reference to your despatch No. 376 of the 11th instant, that I informed M. de Selves yesterday that His Majesty's Government entirely agree with the provisions of article 13 of the draft convention which his Excellency proposes to negotiate with the Spanish Government in regard to Morocco on the supposition that the French and German Governments come to terms in their present discussions on the subject of that country, for His Majesty's Government consider it essential that Tangier should maintain its special international position with a zone of 15 kilom.

I further informed M. de Selves that the convention appears to you to be a genuine endeavour to remove Spanish grievances, and a great deal of friction would undoubtedly be avoided if it came into force, and from the British point of view you see no objection to the convention; but that, if it is to supersede the Franco-Spanish convention of 1904, it might possibly be argued that the adherence of Spain therein given to the Anglo-French declaration of that year concerning Morocco has consequently lapsed. It would therefore be well to provide against this possibility in regard to the non-fortification of the Morocco coast opposite Gibraltar, which was provided for by article 7 of the Anglo-French declaration, and the doubt might be met by inserting in the new convention an article in the same terms as article 1 of the superseded convention, viz.: "L'Espagne adhère, aux termes de la présente convention, à la Déclaration franco-anglaise du 8 avril, 1904, relative au Maroc et à l'Égypte."

M. de Selves, with whom I left a memorandum, of which a copy is herein enclosed,* reminded me that the draft convention which he had communicated to me confidentially for your consideration was only a sketch and had not been submitted to the French Cabinet. His Excellency said that he was glad that you had formed a favourable opinion of its terms, and that he would certainly insert in it an article to make provision for the non-fortification of the coast referred to in the Anglo-French declaration of 1904.

I have, &c.
FRANCIS BERTIE.

[36940] No. 328.

M. de Selves to M. Jules Cambon.—(Communicated by M. Cambon, September 16.)

Paris, le 13 septembre, 1911.

LE Gouvernement français a examiné avec le plus grand désir d'entente le contre-projet que vous a remis vendredi M. de Kiderlen, et qui représente les vues du Gouvernement allemand touchant le règlement de nos situations respectives au Maroc.

Malheureusement, ce contre-projet s'écarte sur de trop nombreux points du principe même que nous croyions accepté par l'Allemagne comme devant dominer toute négocia-

* Not printed.

tion. L'Allemagne, avions-nous dit, et M. de Kiderlen depuis le début de vos entretiens n'y avait jamais contredit, n'a à faire valoir au Maroc aucun intérêt politique et, d'autre part, la France, libre d'agir sur le Gouvernement marocain pour l'introduction des réformes dont celui-ci a besoin, s'engage à respecter et à faire respecter par ce Gouvernement la double condition de la liberté et de l'égalité commerciale. Nous nous inspirions, en parlant ainsi, des intérêts de toutes les autres Puissances signataires de l'Acte d'Algésiras qui ont le droit indiscutable de demander que, au Maroc, la porte soit ouverte au commerce de tous, sans restrictions, comme sans privilèges.

Le projet que, par ordre du Gouvernement français, vous aviez été chargé de soumettre au Gouvernement Impérial avait été rédigé d'après ces principes. Mais le Gouvernement Impérial a jugé que notre texte ne donnait pas de garanties suffisantes pour mettre hors de toute atteinte la liberté et l'égalité commerciale et il a détaillé un certain nombre de conditions nouvelles qui lui paraissent nécessaires pour la sauvegarde de ses intérêts. Toutes celles de ces conditions qui sont de nature commerciale nous les acceptons volontiers, afin que personne ne puisse douter de notre ferme et sincère propos de tenir nos engagements.

Ainsi, à l'article 1er, nous consentons à spécifier que la Banque d'État continuera d'exister et de fonctionner selon les conditions fixées par l'Acte d'Algésiras. A l'article 3, nous augmentons les garanties que nous avions déjà offertes contre l'établissement d'un régime différentiel quelconque, et nous supprimons, bien que M. de Kiderlen l'eût accepté vis-à-vis de vous, la limitation à une période de trente ans du régime de l'égalité. Nous insérons un article nouveau qui reconnaît aux ressortissants étrangers le maintien de leurs droits de pêche dans les eaux et les ports du Maroc. Nous promettons enfin à l'article 12 l'ouverture au commerce international de nouveaux ports marocains.

Ces amendements que nous apportons sur le désir d'Allemagne à notre projet montrent éloquemment avec quelle sollicitude nous entendons exécuter dans la pratique notre engagement de respecter la liberté et l'égalité commerciale. Mais nous avons le regret de voir que, en face de notre bon vouloir, le Gouvernement Impérial paraît disposé à se départir de ses déclarations et à revendiquer un droit d'action politique au Maroc.

Ainsi, nous notons que, dans son contre-projet, il biffe à l'article 1er l'affirmation qu'il nous avait pourtant donnée dès 1909 que l'Allemagne ne possède au Maroc que des intérêts exclusivement économiques, et dans la suite des articles il réclame des droits qui sont de nature essentiellement politique et dont l'exercice lui permettrait une ingérence continuelle dans l'administration, sinon dans le Gouvernement même du pays. C'est ainsi qu'à l'article 5 il prétend obliger le Gouvernement français à lui donner communication des "engagements que la France pourrait conclure avec le Gouvernement marocain"; à l'article 7, il s'attribue le droit de participer à l'établissement du plan général des voies ferrées au Maroc; à l'article 10, il se donne un droit de veto sur l'exploitation de ces voies ferrées et de tous les autres services de transport; à l'article 13, il prétend intervenir dans les ouvertures futures de ports marocains; et, enfin, surtout, dans ce même article 13, comme dans l'article 7, il se taille dans le sud du Maroc toute une zone où son influence politique prévaudrait sur celle de la France aussi bien dans l'exploitation des chemins de fer que dans les questions d'ouverture de ports.

Le Gouvernement français considère que toutes ces conditions d'ordre purement politique sont inadmissibles; leur insertion dans le texte de notre accord altérerait profondément la nature de celui-ci, la situation qui devait nous être faite au Maroc constituant un avantage que des compensations territoriales auraient balancé; il faut donc que l'avantage promis ne disparaisse pas, que même il ne soit pas diminué.

Mais le Gouvernement allemand ne se borne pas à rechercher des bénéfices politiques; dans l'article 7 et l'annexe à cet article, il réclame catégoriquement, à l'exclusion des autres Puissances, un privilège que la France, fidèle au principe des engagements internationaux, ne saurait consentir.

Le texte revisé que je vous envoie vous montrera que nous avons encore quelques objections, d'un caractère, il est vrai, plus particulier, à formuler contre certaines stipulations proposées par le Gouvernement allemand. Il nous avait dit qu'il nous appartiendrait de régler avec l'Espagne la situation de celle-ci au Maroc. Pourquoi, dès lors, mentionne-t-il dans son article 8 les districts où l'influence espagnole sera reconnue?

Pourquoi aussi, à son article 10, supprime-t-il la clause relative à l'appui mutuel que devaient se prêter les deux Gouvernements pour faire approuver leur accord par les

[36437] No. 330*.

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 16.)

(No. 75.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Madrid, September 16, 1911.*

THE French Ambassador and I saw the Minister for Foreign Affairs again on Thursday, when the latter informed us that the Spanish Government must have an assurance, before they would be willing to give up any part of their claims to territory in South Morocco, that if they fell in with the French demand by making this sacrifice they would be guaranteed against a demand by Germany or any other Power for compensation for the recognition of the sphere of influence to be received by Spain in Northern Morocco. The French Ambassador is asking for instructions on the point.

(Repeated to Paris.)

Puissances étrangères intéressées au Maroc ? Il importe, à ces deux articles, de rétablir notre texte.

Le Gouvernement français, au contraire, consent à laisser tomber l'article qu'il avait proposé pour la réforme judiciaire, il consent, en outre, en ce qui touche la protection sur les indigènes, à une rédaction transactionnelle. Il y a là de notre part une marque nouvelle de notre désir d'entente, car personne n'ignore les embarras que la multiplicité des protégés étrangers et leur qualité de justiciables des tribunaux consulaires causent sans cesse aux autorités marocaines. Depuis longtemps, je vous avais prié de signaler à M. de Kiderlen cette source d'embarras.

Je vous serai obligé de faire part le plus tôt possible de ces considérations au Secrétaire d'État en les recommandant à son esprit d'équité ; il me paraît impossible que le Gouvernement Impérial persiste à réclamer de nous au Maroc des stipulations qui porteraient atteinte aux droits des Puissances dont nous devons tous être également soucieux et qui, d'autre part, constituerait pour lui un droit de constante intervention politique en contradiction avec le principe même qui a présidé à l'ouverture de la présente négociation.

[36270] No. 329.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 16.)

(No. 71.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Berlin, September 15, 1911.*

THE French reply to the German counter-project respecting Morocco was handed this afternoon to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. Herr von Kiderlen promised to give French Ambassador on Monday the German reply to his communication.

M. Cambon said that Herr von Kiderlen's attitude this afternoon had been fairly reasonable, and he seemed to regard his interview as having been of a satisfactory nature.

[36269] No. 330.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 16.)

(No. 213.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *St. Petersburgh, September 15, 1911.*

FRANCE and Germany.

In a conversation which I had with M. Nératof to-day his Excellency told me that an official communication had been made to him yesterday by the German chargé d'affaires, who had declared that his Government were not asking for any economic privileges in Morocco, and that Germany's only request was for equal treatment and for guarantees which would ensure such treatment.

M. Nératof thinks that after making this official declaration of the interpretation which she places on the demands put forward in her counter-project Germany can scarcely refuse to introduce such modifications into the text of that document as would bring it into harmony with that official declaration. He has accordingly instructed M. Isvolsky to inform the French Government of the communication made to him by the German chargé d'affaires.

At the same time M. Nératof received from the German chargé d'affaires further explanations with regard to the recall to the colours of German reservists resident in Russia. The chargé d'affaires stated that reservists of one particular class only were being recalled from all foreign countries in which they might be resident, and not all the German reservists of every class resident in Holland and Russia only, as I reported in my telegram No. 207 of the 13th September to you.

[36494] No. 331.

Mr. White to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 18.)

(No. 296.)

Sir, *Tangier, September 9, 1911.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith copy of a despatch which I have received from His Majesty's vice-consul at Mogador relative to the arrival in that port of the Mannesmann Brothers with a party of engineers *en route* for Agadir.

I have, &c.
HERBERT E. WHITE.

Enclosure in No. 331.

Vice-Consul Johnstone to Mr. White.

(No 43.)

Sir, *Mogador, September 4, 1911.*

WITH reference to my immediately preceding despatch, relative to the presence of Germans at Agadir and the consequent state of the country, I have the honour to report that yesterday, the 3rd instant, ten Germans arrived in this port off the "Oldenburg" liner. They include, I am assured, two of the Mannesmann Brothers, named Robert and Joseph, the eight others being in their employ. They have brought a light covered carriage with them, and are said to intend proceeding as soon as possible to Agadir, but it will be impossible for them to use the carriage for the journey.

I hear that the French at Agadir imagine that the German Government is planning another stroke in landing troops considerably south of Agadir.

I am told that at present the Germans land at Agadir in much less numbers than formerly, and that the crews of the cruisers hardly land at all.

Mr. R. Grey and Mr. Cecil Broome left here on Saturday, the 2nd instant, on a friendly visit to Kaïd M'Tuggi at his kasba. They expected to return to-morrow, and will probably furnish me with some interesting news respecting the condition of the country.

There is at present in the harbour a Spanish sailing-vessel which is stated to have been chartered by a Spanish company for the conveyance of Moorish workmen to Iffni.

I have, &c.
H. B. JOHNSTONE.

[36497] No. 332.

Mr. White to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 18.)

(No. 299.)

Sir, *Tangier, September 9, 1911.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 292 of the 2nd instant, I have the honour to report that I enquired of Sid Guebbas this morning what reply he had made to the Governor of Mogador in regard to the enquiry of the Spanish consul whether the Moorish delegate was ready to proceed with him to Ifni, so that the Spanish Government might take possession of that place as arranged.

Sid Guebbas told me that he had, in accordance with instructions received from Sid Mokri, told the Governor of Mogador to inform the Spanish consul that he had applied to the Sultan for instructions.

I have, &c.
HERBERT E. WHITE.

[36498] No. 333.

Mr. White to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 18.)

(No. 300. Confidential.)

Sir, *Tangier, September 9, 1911.*

I HAVE the honour to report that Sid Guebbas, who came to see me this morning, informed me that he had received a letter from Raisuli complaining of the action of the Spanish military authorities at Alcazar, who had practically assumed the government of the district. He stated that they had given orders to the lieutenant-governor of the town, the cadi, the administrator of Government properties, the administrator of Makhzen properties, and the surveyor of markets—in fact, to all the local officials—that nothing whatsoever was to be done without the previous consent of the Spanish military authorities. They had also summoned the headmen of the large Khlot and Tlig districts, and given them orders that they were to have no dealings with the Makhzen except through the Spanish authorities.

Raisuli is naturally much incensed at seeing himself thus deprived of all authority over the most important and richest portion of his district; he told Sid Guebbas that if such a state of affairs is to be allowed to continue he would leave Arzila and withdraw to the mountains, establishing his residence amongst the hill tribes under his jurisdiction.

Sid Guebbas told me that Raisuli had enclosed a letter for the French chargé d'affaires, which he had delivered through his confidential secretary, asking, at the same time, for advice as to the steps to be adopted.

His Excellency regarded the situation as very serious, as the Spanish authorities had practically taken over the entire government of the district. Sid Guebbas did not ask me for any advice, but merely said that M. de Billy would doubtless speak to me on the matter. I was careful not to express any opinion on the subject.

Shortly after his Excellency's departure I received a visit from M. de Billy, who said he had not yet had time to have Raisuli's letter translated, but that it appeared to be very similar to that received by Sid Guebbas. He told me that he had replied to Sid Guebbas's secretary that he would like to have twenty-four hours to think over the matter before giving any advice, and he had come to consult me on the matter. He appeared to be uncertain whether to merely recommend a protest to the diplomatic body or to suggest that Raisuli should be given a hint to raise the hill tribes against the Spaniards.

I said that I thought it would be a suicidal policy to attack the Spanish troops, who could easily hold their own against any force that Raisuli could bring against them; the result would merely be a considerable increase in the Spanish troops and a consolidation and extension of their occupation. With regard to the protest, I observed that, in my opinion, it would be preferable that it should, in the first instance at any rate, be addressed to the Spanish Minister and not to the diplomatic body. The previous protest to that body had had no effect, and it was not likely that a new one would be more successful, whilst on the other hand, a protest to the diplomatic body would make it more difficult for Spain to withdraw from the position taken up. It was possible that the military authorities at Alcazar had acted without instructions, and a protest addressed only to the Spanish Government might have some effect.

M. de Billy appeared to see the force of my arguments, and I expect he will advise Sid Guebbas at first at any rate to confine himself to making a protest at the Spanish Legation. He subsequently sent me a translation of Raisuli's letter, copy of which I beg leave to transmit herewith.*

I have, &c.
HERBERT E. WHITE.

[36499] No. 334.

Mr. White to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 18.)

(No. 301.)

Sir, *Tangier, September 9, 1911.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 294 of the 3rd instant,* I have the honour to transmit herewith copy of a despatch I have received from His Majesty's consul at

* Not printed.

Fez, reporting that Sid Taib Mokri had made a formal verbal apology to him for the arrest and ill-treatment of the courier and the retention and opening of Mr. MacLeod's letters.

I have, &c.
HERBERT E. WHITE.

Enclosure in No. 334.

Consul MacLeod to Mr. White.

(No. 90.)

Sir, *Fez, September* 5, 1911.

WITH reference to your despatches No. 34 of the 9th August, No. 37 of the 19th August, and No. 42 of the 31st August, I have the honour to report that Sid Taib Mokri said the Makhzen were appreciative of the consideration shown by His Majesty's Government in regard to the incident of the courier Hamo Heida, as detailed in your letter of the 31st August to Sid Taib Mokri.

To-day therefore, by arrangement, accompanied by Mr. Consular Assistant Selous and Sid Hemza Tahry (interpreter to this consulate), I called upon Sid Taib Mokri. The latter thereupon said that the Makhzen sincerely regretted what had occurred, that they hoped I would avail of my passing through Tangier presently to express this fully to you, as also to convey their earnest hope that nothing would ever again occur to cause any friction between His Majesty's Government and the Makhzen, the latter desiring, like the former, to maintain the most pleasant relations. I thanked Sid Taib for these expressions, which I promised to convey to you as desired.

I have, &c.
J. M. MACLEOD.

[36458] No. 335.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 18.)

(No. 275.)

Sir, *Berlin, September* 16, 1911.

AS I was not able to have more than a few minutes' conversation with M. Jules Cambon yesterday evening, I am not in a position for the moment to give you any further information with regard to the conversation between his Excellency and Herr von Kiderlen-Waechter beyond that contained in the telegram which I had the honour to address to you last night; namely that Herr von Kiderlen-Waechter's tone had been more conciliatory than had hitherto been the case, that he had shown himself ready to give way on certain not unimportant points, and that M. Cambon considered the conversation to be fairly satisfactory and to promise well for the future course of the negotiations.

M. Cambon also told me that he considered that, unless something totally unexpected should occur, there was no likelihood of any grave complications arising out of the present situation.

The "Lokal-Anzeiger" publishes the following statement this morning:—

"Herr von Kiderlen-Waechter received yesterday afternoon at 5 o'clock at his private residence the visit of M. Cambon, the French Ambassador. We understand that as a result of their conversation, which lasted till 6·30, it was found that on some important points the French Government have adopted the views of the German Government. In regard to a few other points, only some questions of wording remain to be settled, and it appeared that there exists a difference of opinion merely in regard to certain questions and guarantees. In view of the good-will with which both diplomatists have been and are still animated in their discussions, it is to be hoped that an agreement may be reached without difficulty even in regard to these last differences. It has further resulted that certain indiscretions committed in Paris, such as those which have found their way into the French press, have not facilitated the negotiations, and the principle has again been enunciated by the negotiators of the two Governments that no further communication in regard to the details of the negotiations shall be made to the press under any circumstances until the negotiations have been completely terminated."

As this statement gives it to be understood that M. Cambon expressed his readiness to accept some of the German counter-proposals, and as Herr von Kiderlen-Waechter, on his side, according to M. Cambon's account, showed a disposition to drop some of his demands, it would seem as if the negotiations had entered upon a more satisfactory phase.

The only point on which Herr von Kiderlen-Waechter showed some annoyance was the action of the French Government in imparting to the press matters which should, until settled, remain strictly between the two Governments. These continued indiscretions, he said, placed him in an embarrassing situation, and he hoped that M. Cambon would urge upon his Government the necessity of being more reticent. M. Cambon, who shares Herr von Kiderlen's views on this subject, replied that he would not fail to telegraph to his Government in the sense desired.

I have, &c.
W. E. GOSCHEN.

[36565] No. 336.

French and German Draft Conventions, September 1911.

[Italics and portions with a black line at side denote the differences.]

French Text.

A LA suite des troubles qui se sont produits au Maroc et qui ont démontré la nécessité d'y poursuivre, dans l'intérêt général, l'œuvre de pacification et de progrès prévue par l'Acte d'Algésiras, le Gouvernement de la République française et le Gouvernement Impérial allemand ont jugé nécessaire de préciser et de compléter l'accord franco-allemand du 9 février, 1909. Ils sont convenus à cet effet des dispositions ci-après :—

ARTICLE 1er.

Le Gouvernement Impérial allemand, *dont les intérêts au Maroc ont un caractère exclusivement économique*, déclare qu'il n'entravera pas l'action *directrice* de la France en vue de prêter son assistance au Sultan pour l'introduction de toutes les réformes administratives, économiques, financières et militaires dont il a besoin pour le bon gouvernement de son Empire, comme aussi pour tous les règlements que ces réformes comportent.

En conséquence, il donne son adhésion aux mesures de réorganisation, de contrôle et de garantie financière que, de concert avec le Gouvernement marocain, le Gouvernement français croira devoir prendre à cet effet, sous la réserve que l'action *directrice* de la France sauvegardera au Maroc l'égalité économique entre les nations.

Au cas où la France serait amenée à préciser et à étendre ces droits de contrôle et de protection, le Gouvernement Impérial allemand, reconnaissant au Maroc pleine

German Text.

A LA suite des troubles qui se sont produits au Maroc et qui ont démontré la nécessité d'y poursuivre, dans l'intérêt général, l'œuvre de pacification et de progrès prévue par l'Acte d'Algésiras, le Gouvernement de la République française et le Gouvernement Impérial allemand ont jugé nécessaire de préciser et de compléter l'accord franco-allemand du 9 février, 1909. Ils sont convenus à cet effet des dispositions ci-après :—

ARTICLE 1er.

Le Gouvernement Impérial allemand déclare qu'il n'entravera pas l'action de la France en vue de prêter son assistance au Sultan pour l'introduction de toutes les réformes administratives, économiques, financières et militaires dont il a besoin pour le bon gouvernement de son Empire, comme aussi pour tous les règlements que ces réformes comportent.

En conséquence, il donne son adhésion aux mesures de réorganisation, de contrôle et de garantie financière que, *sur la demande et* de concert avec le Gouvernement marocain, le Gouvernement français croira devoir prendre à cet effet, sous la réserve que l'action de la France sauvegardera au Maroc l'égalité économique entre les nations.

Au cas où la France serait amenée à préciser et à étendre son contrôle et sa protection, le Gouvernement Impérial allemand, reconnaissant au Maroc pleine liberté d'action à la France sous la réserve que la liberté commerciale prévue par les

French Text.

liberté d'action à la France, sous la réserve que la liberté commerciale prévue par les traités antérieurs sera maintenue, n'y apportera aucun obstacle.

ARTICLE 2.

Dans cet ordre d'idées, il est entendu que le Gouvernement Impérial ne fera pas obstacle à ce que la France, d'accord avec le Gouvernement marocain, procède aux occupations militaires du territoire marocain qu'elle jugerait nécessaire au maintien de l'ordre et de la sécurité des transactions commerciales, et à ce qu'elle exerce toute action de police sur terre et dans les eaux marocaines.

ARTICLE 3.

Le Gouvernement français déclare que, fermement attaché au principe de la liberté commerciale au Maroc, il ne se prêtera à aucune inégalité pas plus dans l'établissement des droits de douane, impôts et autres taxes que dans l'établissement des tarifs de transport par chemin de fer.

Cet engagement est valable pour une période de trente ans. Faute de dénonciation expresse faite au moins une année à l'avance, cette période sera renouvelée de cinq ans en cinq ans.

ARTICLE 4.

Le Gouvernement français veillera à ce qu'il ne soit perçu au Maroc aucun droit d'exportation sur le minerai de fer exporté des ports marocains. Les exploitations de minerai de fer ne subiront aucun impôt spécial. Elles ne seront assujetties qu'aux impôts généraux et aux redevances domaniales qui atteindront toutes les entreprises minières.

German Text.

traités antérieurs sera maintenue, n'y apportera aucun obstacle.

Il est entendu qu'il ne sera apporté aucune entrave aux droits et à l'action de la Banque d'État du Maroc stipulés dans l'Acte d'Algésiras.

ARTICLE 2.

Dans cet ordre d'idées, il est entendu que le Gouvernement Impérial allemand ne fera pas obstacle à ce que la France, *sur la demande et* d'accord avec le Gouvernement marocain, procède aux occupations militaires du territoire marocain qu'elle jugerait nécessaire au maintien de l'ordre et de la sécurité des transactions commerciales, et à ce qu'elle exerce toute action de police sur terre et dans les eaux marocaines.

ARTICLE 3.

Le Gouvernement français déclare que, fermement attaché au principe de la liberté commerciale au Maroc, il ne se prêtera à aucune inégalité pas plus dans l'établissement des droits de douane, impôts et autres taxes que dans d'établissement des tarifs de transport par voie de chemin de fer, *de navigation fluviale ou toute autre voie de transport et notamment dans toutes les questions de transit.*

Le Gouvernement français s'emploiera également auprès du Gouvernement marocain afin d'empêcher tout traitement différentiel entre les sujets des différentes nations, et, notamment, il s'opposera à toute mesure qui pourrait différencier les marchandises d'une Puissance par des ordonnances administratives sur les poids, les mesures, le jaugeage et le poinçonnage.

Le Gouvernement français s'engage à faire prévaloir son influence sur la direction de la Banque d'État afin que celle-ci confère aux membres de sa direction à Tanger à tour de rôle les postes de délégué à la Commission des Valeurs douanières et de délégué au Comité permanent des Douanes dont elle dispose (articles 96 et 97 de l'Acte d'Algésiras).

ARTICLE 4.

Le Gouvernement français veillera à ce qu'il ne soit perçu au Maroc aucun droit d'exportation sur le minerai de fer exporté des ports marocains. Les exploitations de minerai de fer ne subiront aucun impôt spécial. Elles ne seront assujetties qu'aux impôts généraux et aux redevances domaniales qui atteindront toutes les entreprises minières.

French Text.

ARTICLE 5.

Dès à présent, si Sa Majesté le Sultan du Maroc venait à confier aux agents diplomatiques et consulaires de la France la représentation et la protection des sujets et des intérêts marocains à l'étranger, le Gouvernement Impérial déclare qu'il n'y fera pas d'objection.

Le Gouvernement Impérial déclare, d'autre part, qu'il ne contractera aucun accord quelconque avec le Gouvernement marocain sans s'être entendu au préalable avec le Gouvernement de la République française.

ARTICLE 6.

Lorsque des organisations judiciaires *marocaines* régulières auront été créées au Maroc et que la France aura décidé de leur transférer la juridiction des tribunaux consulaires français, le Gouvernement Impérial allemand transférera également à ces mêmes tribunaux la juridiction des tribunaux consulaires allemands, étant entendu que les ressortissants allemands jouiront des mêmes garanties légales et réglementaires que les ressortissants français.

ARTICLE 7.

Le Gouvernement de la République française s'engage à veiller *pendant la période prévue à l'article* 3 à ce que les travaux et fournitures nécessités par les constructions éventuelles de routes, chemins de fer, ports, &c., soient octroyés par le Gouvernement chérifien suivant les règles d'adjudication. *Toutefois, l'exploitation de ces grandes entreprises sera réservée à l'Etat ou librement concédée par lui.*

German Text.

ARTICLE 5.

Dès à présent, si Sa Majesté le Sultan du Maroc venait à confier aux agents diplomatiques et consulaires de la France la représentation et la protection des sujets et des intérêts marocains à l'étranger, le Gouvernement Impérial déclare qu'il n'y fera pas d'objection.

Les deux Gouvernements s'engagent à se faire connaître les engagements sur lesquels ils pourraient s'entendre avec le Gouvernement marocain.

ARTICLE 6

Lorsque des organisations judiciaires régulières auront été créées au Maroc *à l'instar des tribunaux mixtes d'Égypte* et que la France aura décidé de leur transférer la juridiction des tribunaux consulaires français, le Gouvernement Impérial allemand, *dès que les autres Puissances signataires en feront autant*, transférera également à ces mêmes tribunaux la juridiction des tribunaux consulaires allemands, étant entendu que les ressortissants allemands jouiront des mêmes garanties légales et réglementaires que les ressortissants français.

ARTICLE 7.

Le Gouvernement de la république s'engage à veiller à ce que les travaux et fournitures nécessités par les constructions éventuelles de routes, chemins de fer, ports, &c., soient octroyés par le Gouvernement chérifien suivant les règles de l'adjudication.

Le Gouvernement français usera également de son influence auprès de la Banque d'Etat afin que celle-ci confère aux membres de sa direction à Tangier, à tour de rôle, le poste de délégué à la Commission générale des Adjudications et Marchés.

De même, le Gouvernement français amènera le Gouvernement marocain à conférer un des postes de délégué chérifien au Comité spécial des Travaux publics à tour de rôle à des candidats qui seront présentés par les quatre Puissances autorisées par l'Acte d'Algésiras à nommer les censeurs auprès de la Banque d'Etat.

Le Gouvernement français s'engage à user de son influence auprès du Gouvernement marocain dans ce sens que, pour la nomination des fonctionnaires et ingénieurs auxquels sera confiée l'exploitation des grandes entreprises, il sera tenu

French Text.

German Text.

compte de la nationalité des constructeurs dans la proportion de leur participation.

Les deux Gouvernements s'entendront sur la construction des chemins de fer au Maroc, selon les principes établis dans l'Acte d'Algésiras.

Annexe au dernier alinéa de l'Article 7.

Le Gouvernement Impérial allemand ne fera pas d'objection à la construction d'un chemin de fer militaire d'Oujda par Taourirt à la rive droite de la Moulouya et d'un second chemin de fer militaire de Casablanca par Settat à la rive droite de l'Oum-er-Rebia.

Le Gouvernement français, de son côté, s'engage à se mettre d'accord pour la construction de ces deux chemins de fer avec la Société marocaine de Travaux publics.

Pour ces deux lignes, il devra être employé un matériel (rails, traverses, matériel roulant, &c.) tel qu'aucune industrie ne soit exclue de la possibilité de faire des offres.

Le Gouvernement français s'engage à obliger le Gouvernement marocain de charger l'ingénieur du Makhzen à procéder immédiatement aux démarches nécessaires pour faire mettre en adjudication dans le cours d'une année un chemin de fer de Tanger par Larache à Méquinez et Fez.

L'exécution des travaux de ce chemin de fer devra nécessairement et en toutes circonstances précéder la construction de lignes quelconques dans la partie du Maroc qui se trouve au nord du Tensift.

Dans le cas où, à l'occasion de la mise en adjudication publique du chemin de fer Tanger–Larache–Méquinez et Fez, un entrepreneur français ou une société française seraient déclarés adjudicataires, le Gouvernement français userait de son autorité auprès d'eux pour qu'ils mettent à la disposition des intéressés allemands 30 pour cent du capital ainsi que des travaux.

Les certificats que les concurrents sont tenus de demander en vertu des deux règlements pour les adjudications fourniront une occasion pour prévoir cette nécessité à temps.

D'autre part, dans le cas où un entrepreneur allemand ou une société allemande serait déclaré adjudicataire du chemin de fer susindiqué, le Gouvernement allemand fera valoir son influence pour qu'une participation de 70 pour cent soit offerte à des intéressés français.

De la même manière, la construction de

French Text.

German Text.

tous les chemins de fer au nord du Tensift sera réglée.

Le Gouvernement français s'engage à obliger le Gouvernement marocain de charger l'ingénieur du Makhzen de procéder aux démarches nécessaires pour faire mettre en adjudication publique une jonction par chemin de fer de Taroudant et de Marrakech avec l'Océan Atlantique, conformément aux projets que les experts lui fourniront et dès que ces projets seront remis entre ses mains.

Dans le cas où, à l'occasion de la mise en adjudication publique de la jonction de Taroudant et Marrakech avec la côte, un entrepreneur allemand ou une société allemande serait déclaré adjudicataire, le Gouvernement allemand s'engage à faire prévaloir son autorité sur l'adjudicataire pour que celui-ci fasse participer des intéressés français à raison de 30 pour cent.

De même, dans le cas inverse, le Gouvernement français obligera les entrepreneurs ou la société française ayant été déclarés adjudicataires de la construction des chemins de fer susindiqués, à en mettre 70 pour cent à la disposition des intéressés allemands.

La même obligation s'appliquera à tous les chemins de fer qui seront à construire à l'avenir au sud du Wadi Tensift et au nord du Wadi Draa.

ARTICLE 8.

Les deux Gouvernements signataires renoncent à se prévaloir de tout accord ayant un caractère international qui serait contraire aux précédentes stipulations.

[Suppressed.]

ARTICLE 9.

Le territoire marocain sur lequel s'exerceront les dispositions résultant de la présente convention comprend, à l'exception des possessions espagnoles, les régions situées entre l'Algérie, l'Afrique occidentale française et la colonie espagnole de Rio de Oro, selon les stipulations des traités et accords conclus par le Maroc.

ARTICLE 8.

Le territoire marocain sur lequel s'exerceront les dispositions résultant de la présente convention comprend, à l'exception des possessions espagnoles *et des districts dans lesquels l'influence espagnole sera reconnue*, les régions situées entre l'Algérie, l'Afrique occidentale française et la colonie espagnole de Rio de Oro, selon les stipulations des traités et accords conclus par le Maroc.

ARTICLE 10.

Les précédents articles de la présente convention seront communiqués aux autres Puissances signataires de l'Acte d'Algésiras, *près desquelles les deux*

ARTICLE 9.

Les précédents articles de la présente convention seront communiqués aux autres Puissances signataires le l'Acte de Algésiras.

French Text.

Gouvernements s'engagent à se prêter mutuellement appui pour obtenir leur adhésion.

ARTICLE 11.

Comme suite et comme conséquence des dispositions ci-dessus, les deux Gouvernements contractants sont convenus de procéder aux rectifications et échanges territoriaux suivants dans leurs domaines coloniaux :—

I. *Pour l'Allemagne :*

L'Allemagne cède à la France :

1. Sur la frontière Togo-Dahomey—

(*a.*) L'Ile Bayol ;

(*b.*) Le territoire compris entre le méridien Bayol et le Mono de telle façon que la frontière suive le méridien Bayol jusqu'à son intersection avec la Rivière Mono ;

(*c.*) Entre le 7e et le 9e degré de latitude nord :

Le secteur Tohoun–Tado vers Agouma ;

Le secteur Cabolé Bédou ;

Le secteur traversé par la route Bassila–Pénésoulou tels que ces trois secteurs sont définis sur le croquis ci-joint.*

D'autre part, il est entendu qu'à partir du 10e degré de latitude nord la frontière Togo–Dahomey se dirigera directement sur un point situé dans le village de Gando appelé aussi Djé, à 30 kilom. à l'est de Sansanné-Mango et sur le parallèle passant par cette ville ; et que le territoire des différents villages formant l'agglomération de Pougno, attribuée à la France par la convention de 1897, s'étendra au sud du 11e degré de latitude nord de façon à englober les villages de Timanga, Nanison, Banangadi, Pilpodi, Sankoti, Tamfiégou et Timouri.

2. La partie de la colonie du Cameroun située au nord de la Bénoué et du Mayo-Kébi.

II. *Pour la France :*

La France cède à l'Allemagne—

1. Une bande de territoire située au sud de Cameroun et définie ainsi qu'il suit : la frontière partira du côté de l'Atlantique d'un point de la rive orientale de la baie de Monda située sur le parallèle . La frontière se dirigeant vers l'est longera la frontière de la Guinée espagnole et la

* Not reproduced.

German Text.

[Article 11 of French text not yet examined by the German Government.]

French Text.

frontière actuelle du Cameroun en laissant à la France les sources des Rivières N'Kan Lara et Okano, et à l'Allemagne les sources des Rivières Wollen et N'Tem. Elle coupera la Rivière Ivondo à son confluent avec la Karagoua, rejoindra de là en ligne droite le poste de Sembé, qui sera à l'Allemagne, et suivra depuis ce point les Rivières Sembé et N'Koko jusqu'au confluent de cette dernière avec la Sangha.

2. Un territoire situé à l'est du Cameroun et défini ainsi qu'il suit : la frontière partira du confluent de la N'Goko et de la Sangha et suivra le cours de cette dernière rivière jusqu'au confluent du bras le plus oriental de celle-ci avec le Congo, de manière à laisser à la France les postes de Ouesso Bongha et Loukoléla—français. Elle remontera ensuite le cours du Congo et de l'Oubanghi jusqu'à Bétou (qui sera à). De là, elle suivra le Loubagai pour rejoindre le Lobay au point où confluent le Bali et le Baéré ; elle remontera le Bali jusqu'à hauteur de Kedé puis empruntera le cours des Rivières Lélé, Baba, Ouaham et Bahr Sara jusqu'au confluent de cette dernière avec le Bali. Elle remontera le Bali puis descendra le Som et le Logone oriental jusqu'à Lai (qui reste à la France) ; enfin remontera le Logane occidental et la Membéré jusqu'à la frontière actuelle du Cameroun.

Le Gouvernement Impérial cède à bail au Gouvernement français aux fins et conditions à déterminer dans un acte spécial, un terrain à choisir d'un commun accord en bordure sur l'Oubanghi entre Bétou et Desbordeville. Ce terrain d'une longueur de 400 mètres au plus aura une superficie qui ne pourra excéder 50 hectares.

Dans un délai d'un an à compter de l'échange des ratifications de la présente convention il sera procédé d'un commun accord à l'abornement des frontières décrites ci-dessus.

ARTICLE 12.

Les présents échanges de territoire sont faits dans les conditions où ces territoires se comportent, c'est-à-dire à charge par les deux Gouvernements de respecter les concessions publiques ou particulières qui ont pu être consenties.

ARTICLE 13.

Le Gouvernement allemand n'apportera aucune entrave au passage de troupes françaises et de leur matériel de ravitaillement par le Congo, l'Oubanghi, le Bénoué

German Text.

[See article 15 of German text.]

[See article 16 of German text.]

French Text.

et le Mao-Kébi ; il ne mettra aucun droit sur les marchandises françaises transitant au travers du territoire concédé à l'Allemagne à l'est de la Sangha. Un accord conclu entre les deux Gouvernements déterminera les conditions de ce transit et les points de pénétration.

ARTICLE 14.

Le Gouvernement français et le Gouvernement allemand cesseront, du jour de la ratification de la présente convention, d'exercer aucune sorte d'autorité ou le protection sur les indigènes des territoires respectivement cédés par eux. *Le Gouvernement allemand renonce en outre à exercer au Maroc aucun droit de protection sur des sujets marocains.*

German Text.

[See article 17 of German text.]

ARTICLE 10.

Le Gouvernement français s'engage à obliger le Gouvernement marocain à adjoindre à tous les services de transport des censeurs analogues à ceux qui ont été prévus pour la Banque d'État du Maroc par les articles 51–53 de l'Acte d'Algésiras. Chaque censeur aura le droit de veto.

ARTICLE 11.

Pour éviter autant que possible les réclamations diplomatiques, les plaintes des sujets allemands qui ne seront pas réglées par l'intermédiaire des deux consuls dans les districts où l'action réformatrice de la France remplacera de fait l'administration marocaine ou exercera sur cette dernière une influence autoritative, seront soumises à des commissions spéciales, sur la composition et la compétence desquelles les deux Gouvernements s'entendront.

ARTICLE 12.

En cas de modifications à apporter aux traités internationaux de Maroc, le Gouvernement français veillera à ce qu'il ne soit pas porté atteinte aux droits actuels des pêcheurs des Etats signataires de faire la pêche de long de la côte marocaine et de profiter des occasions qu'elle leur offre pour la navigation, la pêche et leurs besoins professionnels.

ARTICLE 13.

Dès la mise en vigueur du présent traité, les Gouvernements allemands et français

French Text.

[See Article 11 of French text.]

[See Article 12 of French text.]

[See Article 13 of French text.]

[See Article 14 of French text.]

German Text.

demanderont simultanément au Gouvernement marocain l'ouverture du port d'Agadir. Ils procéderont de même si plus tard l'ouverture d'autres ports de la côte atlantique du Maroc paraissaient désirable. Quant aux ports situés entre le Tensift et le Draa, le Gouvernement français se conformera aux désirs du Gouvernement allemand, qui, de son côté, soutiendra les désirs français relatifs aux ports situés au nord du Tensift.

ARTICLE 14 [French text, Article 11.]

(Not yet examined by the German Government.)

ARTICLE 15.

Les présents échanges de territoire sont faits dans les conditions où ces territoires se comportent, c'est-à-dire à charge par les deux Gouvernements de respecter les concessions publiques ou particulières qui ont pu être consenties, *et que les Gouvernements se communiqueront.*

ARTICLE 16.

Le Gouvernement allemand n'apportera aucune entrave au passage des troupes françaises et de leur matériel de ravitaillement par le Congo, l'Oubanghi, la Bénoué et le Mao-Kébi ; il ne mettra aucun droit sur les marchandises françaises transitant au travers du territoire concédé à l'Allemagne à l'est de la Sangha.

La France également n'apportera aucune entrave au passage des troupes allemandes et de leur matériel de ravitaillement par la colonie du Gabon. Un accord conclu entre les deux Gouvernements déterminera les conditions de ce transit et les points de pénétration.

ARTICLE 17.

Le Gouvernement français et le Gouvernement allemand cesseront du jour de la ratification de la présente convention d'exercer aucune sorte d'autorité ou de protection sur les indigènes des territoires respectivement cédés par eux.

[36867] No. 337.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 20.)

[By Post.]

(No. 153.)
(Telegraphic.) *En clair.* *Paris, September 19, 1911.*

M. DE SELVES has shown to me this evening a telegram from the French Ambassador at Berlin, stating that he has derived a favourable impression as to the disposition of M. de Kiderlen-Waechter from a conversation of two hours with him. The reply of the German Government, prepared by M. de Kiderlen-Waechter, will not be given to M. Jules Cambon until to-morrow, for it has to be submitted to the Chancellor and the Emperor.

If M. de Kiderlen's recommendations, as described by him to the French Ambassador, be confirmed, the German Government will modify article 1 of the French draft in a way not to change the sense of it desired by the French Government. The German Government renounces any share in the working ("exploitation") of railways and commercial undertakings ("entreprises"); consents to withdraw the German article 7 regarding the nomination of engineers and functionaries for railways and other undertakings; withdraws demand (article 10) for censors; withdraws the addition to article 7 in regard to the 30 per cent. and 70 per cent. participations in railways; asks for a secret engagement promising that the construction of a railway from Tangier to Fez shall be the first to be undertaken; and, further, asks that the owners of mines and industrial concessions shall be allowed to construct railways to connect their works with the main railway lines.

M. de Kiderlen-Waechter wishes, out of regard for Spain, not to refer in the public agreement to the limits of Morocco, and proposes to have an exchange of secret notes with the French Government on the subject. He also wants a secret agreement in regard to the early opening of the port of Agadir in lieu of the undertaking required by the German article 13 as to that and other ports. Instead of German amendment to French article 14, M. de Kiderlen wants a secret note undertaking to revise, in concert with the Powers, the question of foreign-protected Moors.

M. de Kiderlen-Waechter also wishes for a promise that the Moorish Government will view with favour French and German tenders.

M. Jules Cambon's telegraphic report has not yet been submitted to the Cabinet. M. de Selves is opposed to secret agreements and secret notes because, he says, their existence becomes known and their purport frequently leaks out, or if it does not it is misrepresented to the public. Personally, he sees no objection to the Tangier–Fez railway being one of the first to be constructed, nor to the connecting lines for mines and commercial works. He cannot consent to the Spanish zones being excluded from the definition of Morocco which must appear in the public agreement. He has no objection to the early opening of Agadir, nor to the revision of the question of foreign-protected Moors in concert with the Powers. He will refuse to comply with the suggestion that there shall be a promise to view with favour French and German tenders, as it would mean to regard with disfavour the tenders of other nationalities, which would be contrary to equality of treatment.

M. de Selves expects M. Jules Cambon's report by despatch to-morrow night. He will receive me on Thursday evening, by which time he hopes to know whether the German answer is in conformity with M. de Kiderlen's conversation.

[36866] No. 338.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 20.)

(No. 72.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Berlin, September 19, 1911.*

THE French Ambassador came to see me this afternoon, and informed me that Herr von Kiderlen had abandoned the principal proposals put forward in his counter-project, such as a 30 per cent. participation in railway construction and a share in the exploitation of public works, which tended to create for Germany a special position in Morocco. M. Cambon thinks that France has thus practically obtained all that she can require so far as Morocco is concerned, and that only questions of details now remain to be settled.

M. Cambon considers that the only point of danger ahead lies in the very violent

campaign now being conducted in the French press against the concessions in the Congo demanded by Germany, and even against concessions fully equivalent in value to the advantages which France is to gain in Morocco. He thinks it would be most unfortunate were these advantages to be lost through any unwillingness on the part of France to make the sacrifices in the Congo necessary for their realisation.

I hear that Herr von Kiderlen has spoken strongly to another of my colleagues in regard to the attitude of the French press. He fears that if it continues to use such violent language as that recently employed it will inevitably bring about a counter-campaign in the German press, which would be very embarrassing to him personally and would have a detrimental effect upon the negotiations.

[37068] No. 339.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 22.)

(No. 414.)
Sir, *Paris, September 19, 1911.*

I THOUGHT that it would be well that Sir Reginald Lister, who is in Paris, should see the Minister for Foreign Affairs. I therefore suggested to M. de Selves that it might be interesting to him to have some conversation with His Majesty's Minister at Tangier. His Excellency readily accepted the suggestion. M. de Selves received him this morning.

I recommended Sir Reginald Lister to speak very frankly to M. de Selves regarding the differential treatment of British enterprise in Morocco. I have the honour to transmit to you herewith a copy of a memorandum by him on his interview with his Excellency.

I have, &c.
FRANCIS BERTIE.

Enclosure in No. 339.

Memorandum by Sir R. Lister.

I SAW the French Minister for Foreign Affairs this morning, and had a long conversation with him on the subject of Morocco.

In discussing the various proposals and counter-proposals, M. de Selves alluded to the German demand that no less than 70 per cent. should be granted to German capital in certain enterprises. The demand, he said, was outrageous; it was not in the power of France to grant it at all, and it was hardly likely that she would grant to the Germans, especially after their recent behaviour, what she would be obliged to refuse to the English, her friends. This gave me the opportunity which I desired. I said that the one point on which I sometimes experienced difficulty at Tangier was the commercial question. As he knew, British commerce in Morocco was very considerable and very old-established. In the past the relations between our two countries had been very different, and the British merchants in Morocco, many of whom had been born and bred in the country, had been brought up to look upon France as the rival, and to suspect her of always seeking to injure their trade. After the conclusion of the *entente* there was a good deal of grumbling, and the old feeling undoubtedly subsisted. During the three years that I had been at Tangier I had done all in my power to overcome or at all events to diminish it, and I could fairly say that I had been in a great measure successful. I recognised that I had been much assisted in my efforts by the attitude of the French officials in the *contrôle* of the Customs, whose impartiality and courtesy had won the respect and praise of the most recalcitrant. At the same time cases cropped up from time to time which gave colour to the view of the British commercial community that the French intended to oust them where they could, and to open trade routes and start commercial enterprises from which they might be excluded, or in which at all events they would only be allowed to participate to a very small extent. I could not but deplore this, and, if weighed in the balance, the maintenance of the friendly spirit appeared to me so far more important than the petty advantages which French commerce might thus obtain.

M. de Selves said that he absolutely agreed in my view; that, as he had told His Majesty's Ambassador, he was prepared to give every guarantee that might be asked

to ensure the maintenance of complete commercial equality, and that, as I had no doubt observed, he was insisting upon all works, &c., being put up to adjudication. If ever I had reason to believe that British commercial interests were being in any way sacrificed to French, he begged me to speak at once on the matter to the French representative at Tangier, and that, knowing his views, I might be certain that my representations would receive the most favourable consideration. I thanked M. de Selves, and told him that I had always spoken quite openly on such matters to M. Regnault, with whom I was on the best and friendliest terms, and should always continue to do so. I was, however, much pleased to have received his assurances which gave me an extra guarantee for the future.

M. de Selves asked me, as one who had been in Morocco at the time, what my real opinion was with regard to the situation at Fez at the time of the dispatch of the French relief column. I said that I considered that the situation was one which could not possibly be allowed to continue; the capital was practically blockaded, all ordinary communication with the coast was cut, and the lives of Europeans were in danger. It could not possibly have been allowed to continue. People who said the contrary were merely misinformed or wilfully blind.

He alluded to his proposals for an arrangement with Spain, and asked me what I had thought of them. I gave him the gist of the minute I had written at the Foreign Office on the 2nd September. He said that he was prepared to make as large concessions as were possible to Spanish *amour-propre*, though he shared my view as to the sad prospect for the zones to be placed under Spanish influence; all that he must have was some sort of apparent concession on the part of Spain ("une concession de façade") which he could present to French public opinion, and thus obtain its acquiescence in the very real concessions which France was making to Germany.

Paris, September 19, 1911.

[37069] No. 340.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 22.)

(No. 415.)

Sir, *Paris, September* 19, 1911.

BY my telegram No. 129 of the 21st ultimo I had the honour to inform you that I had communicated to the President of the Council the contents of your telegram No. 195 of the same date, stating that His Majesty's Government were prepared to consider proposals from the French Government for an exchange of territories by which France would obtain a cession of part of Northern Nigeria, which would give her access direct from North French Congo through the Bec du Canard to her possessions north of Nigeria, instead of by the circuitous route which would otherwise be necessary.

When I saw M. de Selves this evening he handed me a memorandum, of which I enclose a copy, containing alternative proposals for the cession to France of certain portions of Nigeria and the Gold Coast Colony, and stating the compensation which the French Government were prepared to give in return. His Excellency informed me that the only portion of British territory the acquisition of which he desires is the north-eastern part of Nigeria, which would give direct communication between Zinder, where there was a military post, and North French Congo. The territories mentioned in the memorandum are marked in the enclosed map,* which M. de Selves gave me.

I have, &c.

FRANCIS BERTIE.

Enclosure in No. 340.

Note.

L'ANGLETERRE céderait—

(*a.*) Un secteur de la Nigéria déterminé par la ligne idéale Porto-Novo–Zinder;
(*b.*) Un secteur de la Nigéria déterminé par la ligne idéale Zinder–Yola.

Ces cessions présenteraient, pour la France, les avantages suivants:—

(*a.*) La cession du secteur ouest élargirait le bas Dahomey, région riche en palmiers à huile, très peuplée et très commerçante. Elle nous donnerait, en outre, l'accès du

* Not reproduced.

bief inférieur du Niger, c'est-à-dire au sud des rapides de Boussa qui marquent la limite de navigabilité du fleuve; enfin, en troisième lieu, cette opération nous donnerait le Sokoto, dont la valeur est comparable à celles des autres parties de la bouche du Niger.

(*b.*) La cession du secteur est nous donnerait des territoires dont la valeur économique est négligeable, sous réserve, cependant, des richesses minérales, dont l'existence a été affirmée. Mais cette cession aurait l'inappréciable avantage de souder nos territoires militaires de Zinder et du Tchad, de coordonner par suite notre politique du centre africain et de faciliter les mouvements de troupe de l'Afrique occidentale française vers le Kanem, le Ouadai et éventuellement le Borkou-Tibesti.

Pour compenser ces cessions, la France pourrait abandonner toute la partie du Haut-Oubanghi comprise, d'une part, entre la frontière actuelle franco-anglaise, et, d'autre part, la Rivière Kotto. Ce territoire est concédé en entier à la Société franco-belge des Sultanats du Haut-Oubanghi. La valeur économique de ces territoires est négligeable, leur valeur politique est à peu près nulle, enfin il ne faut point se dissimuler que dans un avenir peu lointain la voie d'accès normale de cette partie de notre possession de l'Afrique équatoriale française sera le Haut-Nil.

Au cas où ce premier accord serait trop difficile à négocier, on pourrait se borner à demander à l'Angleterre la cession du secteur est de la Nigéria.

En échange de ce secteur, on pourrait abandonner—

(*a.*) Nos prétentions sur Cheikh-Saïd.
(*b.*) Nos prétentions sur Mascate.

Ces compensations semblent devoir être suffisantes, puisque Yola, qui constitue le seul centre important de la région dont la cession est à envisager, resterait à l'Angleterre.

Au cas cependant où il faudrait envisager des compensations complémentaires, on pourrait céder soit quelques îles de l'Océan Indien (Kerguelen, Saint-Paul, Amsterdam), soit la cession de quelques îles de la Polynésie (notamment Mangareva, dans l'archipel des Gambier).

Il convient de remarquer cependant que si la cession de l'île Mangareva était décidée, nous ne pourrions considérer comme suffisante la cession du secteur Yola-Zinder et nous devrions demander en outre la cession de la Gambie, exception faite pour Bathurst. D'après les renseignements que possède d'ailleurs le Ministère des Colonies, l'Angleterre aurait suggéré, en 1906, la cession de la Gambie (exception faite de Bathurst) contre l'île Mangareva.

Enfin, une troisième solution pourrait être étudiée sur les bases suivantes:—

L'Angleterre céderait—

(*a.*) Le secteur Yola-Zinder de la Nigéria;
(*b.*) La partie de la Gold Coast au nord de la Volta Noire.

La France céderait—

(*a.*) Ses prétensions sur Cheikh Saïd;
(*b.*) Ses prétentions sur Mascate.
(*c.*) L'île Mangareva, dans le groupe des Gambier, ou le Haut-Oubanghi jusqu'à le Kotto.

[37077] No. 341.

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 22.)

(No. 155.)

Sir, *Zarauz, September* 19, 1911.

IN my telegrams Nos. 74 and 75 of the 9th and 16th instants respectively, I have recorded briefly the result of the two last meetings held at San Sebastian between the Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs, the French Ambassador, and myself, with a view to the settlement of the questions at issue between France and Spain in Morocco. M. Geoffray and I attended both these meetings at the written request of Señor Garcia Prieto. M. Geoffray is instructed generally that, although it would, perhaps, be preferable to suspend these conversations until the conclusion of the Berlin negotiation, there is no objection to his hearing what Señor Garcia Prieto has to say and reporting the same to Paris.

At the meeting held on the 8th instant, the Foreign Minister began by laying stress on the enormity of the sacrifice which the French Government was inviting Spain to make. He said that the proposals relating to the Spanish sphere of influence in Northern Morocco, which M. Geoffray had outlined at the previous meeting, already contained serious limitations of the absolutely free hand which Spain considered she would have a right to claim in that region as a set-off to the virtual French protectorate in the south of Morocco. Thus, Spain was to be deprived in her sphere of the right to levy an export tax on the produce of the mines. She was to be compelled to permit at all times the passage across her sphere of troops and stores destined for the use of the Sultan at Fez. Her independent action would be hampered in many other ways which his Excellency did not precisely specify. It had come therefore as a surprise that France should have demanded, in addition to these restrictions, the abandonment by Spain of an enormous extent of territory in Southern Morocco. The zone claimed by Spain in that portion of Morocco extended from the Wady Mesa in the north to the southern boundary of Morocco, as fixed in article 6 of the Secret Convention of October 1904, namely, to latitude 27·40 north. The limits of the zone inland were also fixed by the secret convention. No Spanish Government, his Excellency said, would be likely to consent to the relinquishment of the whole of this zone. Ifni itself and the coast-line opposite the Canary Islands must in any case be retained. As to the rest, his Excellency did not despair of inducing the Cabinet to consent to the surrender of a piece of territory corresponding to the region which it was understood that France would yield to Germany in the French Congo. Señor Garcia Prieto promised to lay the matter fully before the Cabinet Council which he was about to attend in Madrid, and to communicate the result to M. Geoffray and myself immediately after his return to San Sebastian.

M. Geoffray contested Señor Garcia Prieto's opening argument to the effect that a sacrifice was already involved in the limitations sought to be imposed upon the exercise of Spanish authority in Northern Morocco, and that, therefore, to call for an additional sacrifice of a territorial character was a very exacting demand. He dwelt on the benefits which must accrue to Spain as well as to France as the result of the Berlin negotiations, and he argued that it was only right that Spain should contribute something to make good the loss which France was about to incur. Moreover, M. de Selves had clearly intimated that he would be unable to secure the consent of the French Cabinet to the favourable settlement which he had offered with regard to the Spanish sphere of influence in Northern Morocco unless he could inform them that Spain was prepared to make a large territorial concession to France.

Señor Garcia Prieto admitted in the end that the French demand was not unreasonable in principle. He thought it, however, very excessive in extent.

After an absence of only two whole days in Madrid, his Excellency returned to San Sebastian on the morning of the 14th September. We met again the same afternoon. Señor Garcia Prieto was not yet prepared to make a counter-proposition. The Cabinet, he said, had found difficulty in formulating an offer to France. Before doing so, they felt that it was only fair to themselves to ask for information on two essential points :—

1. What was the extent of the sacrifice about to be made by France to Germany in the French Congo? and

2. What guarantee could be given to Spain that, after making a corresponding cession in her South Morocco zone for the benefit of France, she would not subsequently be called upon by Germany or some other Power or Powers to make a further territorial sacrifice elsewhere in exchange for the recognition of her sphere of influence in Northern Morocco?

M. Geoffray said he would submit these questions to his Government.

Señor Garcia Prieto has since confided to me that he had in mind more particularly the case of Spanish Guinea. This colony, according to forecasts freely made by the press, was likely before long, as the result of French concessions, to be enclosed on all its land sides by German territory. The Spanish Government felt that, by consent or under compulsion, Spanish Guinea was only too likely to be absorbed eventually into the German colony of the Cameroons. If this happened, Spain would have had to pay a heavy price, first to France and then to Germany, for the enjoyment of a position in Morocco to which she had a clear treaty right. She preferred to know the worst at once, and this was her reason for hesitating to make a deal with France on the lines suggested by M. de Selves.

His Excellency speaks with some bitterness of the exclusion of Spain from the

Berlin negotiation which affected so largely her own interests. He is particularly upset by a telegram received a few days ago from the Spanish Ambassador at Berlin. Señor Polo de Bernabé reported that M. Jules Cambon had obtained from the German Foreign Minister an agreement that Morocco should be held to extend southwards as far as the northern line of the Spanish territory of Rio de Oro. But article 6, paragraph 3 of the Secret Convention of 1904 had clearly laid down that the territory south of latitude 27·40 was to be regarded by France and Spain as lying outside the limits of Morocco, and that Spain was to enjoy complete freedom of action in the territory intervening between that latitude and the Rio de Oro region. Thus, without consulting Spain, France was endeavouring to shift the southern boundary of Morocco in a manner restrictive of the conventional rights of Spain.

M. Geoffray has pointed out to Señor Garcia Prieto that the object of France is no doubt mainly to exclude Germany from any portion of the Atlantic coast of Morocco. M. Jules Cambon is therefore pressing very naturally for German recognition of the most southerly boundary-line obtainable for Morocco. But any arrangement which France may have come to with Germany in this respect would be powerless to affect the existing agreement between France and Spain as to the complete freedom of action of Spain in the region in question. In M. Geoffray's opinion that region is not included in the Spanish South Morocco zone, the surrender of which by Spain has been demanded by his Government.

I have, &c.
MAURICE DE BUNSEN.

[37201] No. 342.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 22.)

(No. 154.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Paris, September 22, 1911.*

MOROCCO.

Last paragraph of my telegram No. 153 of 19th September.

French Minister for Foreign Affairs, having to be at Rambouillet, was not able to receive me yesterday. He tells me this morning that the situation is as follows :—

German Chancellor has concurred in German Minister for Foreign Affairs' views as expressed to French Ambassador.

French Minister for Foreign Affairs has instructed French Ambassador at Berlin not to mention French territorial compensations to German Minister for Foreign Affairs until there is complete agreement between the two Governments regarding question of Morocco. He recognises that the German Government cannot be expected to consent to Germans being in a less advantageous position than other foreigners as regards tribunals, and he admits that the question of foreign-protected Moors, regarding which there have been great abuses, must be reconsidered by all the Powers interested. What he requires is an assurance from German Government that whenever courts shall have been established giving guarantees of justice analogous to those in France they will join with French Government in applying to other Governments concerned for their consent to abolish their rights of consular jurisdiction. He will not accept any system of mixed tribunals such as exists in Egypt. German Minister for Foreign Affairs represented to French Ambassador that ~~the German~~ Government would be opposed to any other system than that of mixed courts. German Government must also undertake to support French Government in bringing about a reconsideration of the question of protection. Means must also be devised for including in an agreement with Germany the Spanish zones in Morocco, leaving it to France to come to an agreement with Spain on the subject. His Majesty's

French Minister for Foreign Affairs will submit to Cabinet to-morrow a project to embody his views for communication to the German Minister for Foreign Affairs. He will give me information on the subject on 25th September.

[37203] No. 343.

Mr. White to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 23.)

(No. 151.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Tangier, September 22, 1911.*

I HAVE been told by Mr. Carleton that, according to information which has reached him privately from Spanish officials, a military railway is to be constructed between Alcazar and Laraiche. The Spanish Minister, with whom I had a conversation on the subject, stated that he had heard nothing officially, but added that a railway between Alcazar and Laraiche was certainly necessary for the Spanish troops: a precedent existed in the case of the line between Casa Blanca and Rabat, which the French are about to make.

Sir M. de Bunsen has been furnished with a repetition of this telegram.

[37374] No. 344.

Mr. White to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 25.)

(No. 303.)
Sir, *Tangier, September 16, 1911.*

MR. ROBIN GREY, an English traveller, who has just returned from Agadir, informs me that Kaïd Guellouli, his subordinate the Lieutenant-Governor of Agadir, and the officials and notables of that place, are entirely in the hands of the Germans, and are doing what they can to exclude all other foreigners, deeping a close watch on the few who are there, and reporting all their movements to the captain of the "Berlin."

Mr. Grey found four Frenchmen at Agadir, but they were practically prisoners, and were not allowed to go into the country on the plea that it was not safe. No quarters had been given them, the lieutenant-governor having refused to let them have a house previously occupied by four Germans, who had moved to Fonti.

Of these Germans, one was correspondent of the "Cologne Gazette" and the other three Mannesmann agents, who arrived soon after the "Panther." Mr. Grey tells me that they had previous knowledge of the intentions of the German Government, and had arranged to arrive at Agadir at the same time as the "Panther" so as to buy up land. Two of them went to the Canary Islands and intended to cross from there to Agadir, but got into trouble with the Spanish authorities over some arms to be embarked in their ship, and were detained several days. The consequence was that the best lands were brought up before their arrival by resident Jews on commission for French and other merchants at Mogador.

Mr. Grey informed me that the Germans at Agadir and Mogador stated that they had received a hint to purchase land and push their interests as much as possible in the Sûs, and they refused to believe that their Government could seriously entertain the idea of relinquishing that district.

Two of the Mannesmanns and eight other Germans have lately proceeded south from Tangier.

I have, &c.
HERBERT E. WHITE.

[37375] No. 345.

Mr. White to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 25.)

(No. 304.)
Sir, *Tangier, September 16, 1911.*

The French chargé d'affaires tells me that some Spaniards, acting on behalf of their Government, have purchased a large tract of land bordering on the shore of the main-land opposite Alhucemas. He does not know the size of the land in question, but thinks it must be very large, as the value of land is small in those regions, and the Spaniards paid 20,000 dollars. M. de Billy thinks that a good port could be made at Alhucemas, and he believes that it is with that object in view that the Spanish Government is anxious to establish itself on the main-land there.

Amongst the owners of the land in question are two Moors under French protection who object to the sale, and have complained at the French Legation. M. de Billy mentioned the matter to the Spanish Minister, who said he knew nothing of the matter, and M. de Billy has consequently reported on the subject to his Government.

I have, &c.
HERBERT E. WHITE.

[37377] No. 346.

Mr. White to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 25.)

(No. 306.)
Sir, *Tangier, September 16, 1911.*

I HAVE the honour to report that the French chargé d'affaires informs me that he has this day dispatched his reply to Raisuli's letter, translation of which was enclosed in my despatch No. 300 of the 9th instant. In his reply, M. de Billy has confined himself to advising Raisuli to take no steps in regard to the action of the Spanish military officers, but to leave the matter in the hands of Sid Guebbas.

Sid Guebbas informs me that he is awaiting reports from Alcazar before addressing a protest to the Spanish Minister, as his Excellency thinks it advisable to obtain confirmation of Raisuli's statemeut from the Moorish officials on the spot before taking action.

In the meantime, Raisuli has arrested several sheikhs and others who have refused to pay taxes. The Spanish military authorities have, however, apparently taken no notice of these arrests.

The serious fighting in the neighbourhood of Melilla will probably make the Spanish Government desire to avoid any trouble in other districts. It is difficult to obtain reliable reports of the fighting, as all news from those parts comes through Spain, with the exception of rumours from native sources which are not very reliable. The French vice-consul at Tetuan hears from native sources that the Riffians captured a good supply of Mauser rifles and cartridges in the fighting, the price of Mauser cartridges in that district having fallen greatly since that date.

I have, &c.
HERBERT E. WHITE.

P.S. *September* 17.—The Spanish Minister, whom I met at dinner last night, enquired of me whether I had any news of Raisuli's intentions, referring to a recent article in the "Temps," the substance of which had been telegraphed to the local French paper to the effect that the action of the Spanish military authorities had given rise to a protest on the part of the Makhzen, and was likely to cause disturbances in the Gharb. M. de Villa Sinda said he had heard nothing from Alcazar to confirm the reports as to the action of Colonel Silvestre, and no protest had been received. He feared, however, that an effort was being made to cause trouble to Spain by inciting the natives to attack their troops at Alcazar. I replied that I had heard the report in regard to Colonel Silvestre's action, but that so far as I knew there was no desire anywhere to create disturbances. I could assure him that the French Legation at any rate desired quiet to be maintained, and I understood that a warning in that sense had been conveyed to Raisuli.

H. E. W.

[37504] No. 347.

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 25.)

(No. 158.)
Sir, *Zaraus, September 22, 1911.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 155 of the 19th instant, I have the honour to state that the conversations between the French Ambassador and the Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs concerning Morocco in which I have recently taken part have not been renewed since our interview on the 14th instant. Señor Garcia Prieto informs me in a private letter that, having received as yet no reply from M. Geoffray with regard to the points which he thought it necessary to raise on that occasion, and

as the French Government seem to be in no hurry to continue the discussion, he does not propose to summon M. Geoffray and myself to another meeting before leaving for Madrid to-morrow evening.

I intend following the Minister for Foreign Affairs to Madrid in the course of next week. The French Ambassador is also returning to the capital within a few days. Meanwhile, M. Geoffray informs me that he has received no answer from Paris on the subject of the enquiries made by the Spanish Government with regard to the extent of the territorial concessions about to be made by France to Germany and to the guarantee required by Spain that she will not have to pay twice over for recognition of her sphere of influence in Northern Morocco. His Excellency is under the impression that, in the present state of the negotiations at Berlin, the guarantee in question is not one which it would be easy for France to give.

I have, &c.

MAURICE DE BUNSEN.

[37635] No. 348.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 26.)

(No. 417. Confidential.)

Sir, *Paris, September 25, 1911.*

I HAD an interview with M. de Selves this morning, and he showed to me the amended French projet which, after it had been approved by the Cabinet and the President of the republic, was sent on the 23rd instant to the French Ambassador at Berlin for communication to-day to M. de Kiderlen-Waechter.

M. de Selves was good enough to allow me to send a secretary of the embassy to take a copy of the projet, and I have the honour to transmit it to you herewith.

M. de Selves informed me that it is proposed that there shall be an exchange of notes with the German Government, leaving it to the French Government to come to an understanding with the Spanish Government in regard to the future position of Spain in the parts of Morocco reserved to her as Spanish zones.

I have, &c.

FRANCIS BERTIE.

Enclosure in No 348.

Third French Text.

A LA suite des troubles qui se sont produits au Maroc et qui ont démontré la nécessité d'y poursuivre, dans l'intérêt général, l'œuvre de pacification et de progrès prévue par l'Acte d'Algésiras, le Gouvernement de la République française et le Gouvernement Impérial allemand ont jugé nécessaire de préciser et de compléter l'accord franco-allemand du 9 février, 1909. Ils sont convenus, à cet effet, des dispositions ci-après :—

ARTICLE 1er.

Le Gouvernement Impérial allemand déclare que, ne poursuivant au Maroc que des intérêts économiques, il n'entravera pas l'action de la France en vue de prêter son assistance au Gouvernement marocain pour l'introduction de toutes les réformes administratives, judiciaires, économiques, financières et militaires dont il a besoin pour le bon gouvernement de l'Empire, comme aussi pour tous les règlements nouveaux et les modifications aux règlements existants, que ces réformes comportent. En conséquence, il donne son adhésion aux mesures de réorganisation, de contrôle et de garantie financière que, après accord avec le Gouvernement marocain, le Gouvernement français croira devoir prendre à cet effet sous la seule réserve que l'action de la France sauvegardera au Maroc l'égalité économique entre les nations.

Au cas où la France serait amenée à préciser et à étendre son contrôle et sa protection, le Gouvernement Impérial allemand, reconnaissant au Maroc pleine liberté d'action à la France, et sous la réserve que la liberté commerciale prévue par les traités antérieurs sera maintenue, n'y apportera aucun obstacle.

Il est entendu qu'il ne sera porté aucune entrave aux droits et action de la Banque d'État du Maroc tels qu'ils ont été définis par l'Acte d'Algésiras.

ARTICLE 2.

Dans cet ordre d'idées, il est entendu que le Gouvernement Impérial ne fera pas obstacle à ce que la France, après accord avec le Gouvernement marocain, procède aux occupations militaires du territoire marocain qu'elle jugerait nécessaire au maintien de l'ordre et de la sécurité des transactions commerciales, et à ce qu'elle exerce toute action de police sur terre et dans les eaux marocaines.

ARTICLE 3.

Le Gouvernement français déclare que, fermement attaché au principe de la liberté commerciale au Maroc, il ne se prêtera à aucune inégalité pas plus dans l'établissement des droits de douane, impôts et autres taxes que dans l'établissement des tarifs de transport par voie ferrée, voie de navigation fluviale ou toute autre voie, et notamment dans toutes les questions de transit.

Le Gouvernement français s'emploiera également auprès du Gouvernement marocain afin d'empêcher tout traitement différentiel entre les ressortissants des différentes Puissances ; il s'opposera notamment à toute mesure, par exemple, à la promulgation d'ordonnances administratives sur les poids et mesures, de jaugeage, de poinçonnage, &c., qui pourrait mettre en état d'infériorité les marchandises d'une Puissance.

Le Gouvernement français s'engage à user de son influence sur la Banque d'État pour que celle-ci confère à tour de rôle aux membres de sa direction à Tanger les postes de délégué dont elle dispose à la Commission des Valeurs douanières et au Comité permanent des Douanes.

ARTICLE 4.

Le Gouvernement français veillera à ce qu'il ne soit perçu au Maroc aucun droit d'exportation sur le minerai de fer exporté des ports marocains. Les exploitations de minerai de fer ne subiront aucun impôt spécial. Elles ne seront assujetties qu'aux impôts généraux et aux redevances domaniales qui atteindront toutes les entreprises minières.

ARTICLE 5.

Dès à présent, si Sa Majesté le Sultan du Maroc venait à confier aux agents diplomatiques et consulaires de la France la représentation et la protection des sujets et des intérêts marocains à l'étranger, le Gouvernement Impérial déclare qu'il n'y fera pas d'objection.

Il ne fera, d'autre part, pas d'objection à ce que les représentants de la France auprès du Gouvernement marocain soient chargés par celui-ci d'être son intermédiaire auprès des représentants au Maroc des Puissances étrangères.

ARTICLE 6.

Le Gouvernement de la République française s'engage à veiller à ce que les travaux et fournitures nécessités par les constructions éventuelles de routes, chemins de fer, ports, télégraphes, &c., soient octroyés par le Gouvernement chérifien suivant les règles de l'adjudication.

Il s'engage également à veiller à ce que les conditions de ces adjudications, particulièrement ce qui concerne les fournitures de matériel et les délais impartis pour soumissionner, ne placent les ressortissants d'aucune Puissance dans une situation d'infériorité.

L'exploitation des grandes entreprises mentionnées ci-dessus sera réservée à l'État marocain ou librement concédée par lui à des tiers, qui pourront être chargés de fournir les fonds nécessaires à cet effet. Le Gouvernement français veillera, cependant, à ce que, dans l'exploitation des chemins de fer et autres moyens de transport comme dans l'application des règlements destinés à assurer celle-ci, aucune différence de traitement ne soit faite entre les ressortissants des diverses Puissances qui useraient de ces moyens de transport.

Le Gouvernement de la république usera de son influence sur la Banque d'État afin que celle-ci confère à tour de rôle aux membres de sa direction à Tanger le poste dont elle dispose de délégué à la Commission générale des Adjudications et Marchés.

ARTICLE 7.

Le Gouvernement français s'emploiera auprès du Gouvernement marocain pour que les propriétaires de mines et d'autres exploitations industrielles, sans distinction de nationalité et en conformité des règlements qui seront édictés en s'inspirant des principes de la législation française sur la matière, puissent être autorisés à céder des chemins de fer d'exploitation industrielle destinés à relier leur centre de production aux lignes d'intérêt général ou aux ports.

ARTICLE 8.

Il sera présenté tous les ans un rapport sur l'exploitation des chemins de fer au Maroc, qui sera établi dans les mêmes formes et conditions que les rapports présentés aux assemblées d'actionnaires des sociétés de chemins de fer françaises. Le Gouvernement de la république chargera un des administrateurs de la Banque d'Etat de l'établissement de ce rapport, qui sera communiqué aux censeurs, puis rendu public, avec, s'il y a lieu, les observations de ces derniers.

ARTICLE 9.

Pour éviter autant que possible les réclamations diplomatiques, le Gouvernement français s'emploiera auprès du Gouvernement marocain afin que celui-ci défère à un arbitre désigné d'un commun accord par le Gouvernement français et le Gouvernement intéressé les plaintes portées par des ressortissants étrangers contre les autorités marocaines et qui n'auraient pu être réglées par l'intermédiaire du consul français et du consul du Gouvernement intéressé.

Cette procédure restera en vigueur jusqu'au jour où aura été institué un régime judiciaire s'inspirant des règles générales de l'organisation de la justice française et permettant ainsi la suppression des tribunaux consulaires, suppression dont les deux Gouvernements acceptent d'ores et déjà le principe.

Il est d'ailleurs expressément entendu que les ressortissants étrangers seront régis sous ce nouveau régime par les mêmes règles de procédure et bénéficieront des mêmes garanties légales que les ressortissants français.

ARTICLE 10.

Le Gouvernement français veillera à ce que les ressortissants étrangers continuent à jouir du droit de pêche dans les eaux et ports marocains.

ARTICLE 11.

Le Gouvernement français s'emploiera auprès du Gouvernement marocain pour que celui-ci ouvre au commerce étranger de nouveaux ports au fur et à mesure des besoins de ce commerce.

ARTICLE 12.

Pour répondre à une demande du Gouvernement marocain, les deux Gouvernements s'engagent à procéder à la revision, sur la base de la Convention de Madrid, de la situation des protégés étrangers et des associés agricoles au Maroc.

Ils sont également d'accord pour poursuivre auprès des Puissances signataires l'abrogation de cette convention, étant entendu, toutefois, que celle-ci continuera à produire ses effets jusqu'au jour où fonctionnera l'organisation judiciaire prévue à l'article 9.

ARTICLE 13.

Les deux Gouvernements signataires renoncent à se prévaloir de toute clause d'accord, convention, traité ou règlement qui serait contraire aux précédentes stipulations.

ARTICLE 14.

Les précédents articles du présent accord seront communiqués aux autres Puissances signataires de l'Acte d'Algésiras près desquels les deux Gouvernements s'engagent à se prêter mutuellement appui pour obtenir leur adhésion.

[37970] No. 349.

Papers communicated by French Embassy, September 28, 1911.

(1.)

Le Ministre des Affaires Étrangères à M. Jules Cambon, Ambassadeur de la République française à Berlin.

(Très Confidentiel.) *Paris, le 22 septembre*, 1911.

IL a été très agréable au Gouvernement de la république de constater, d'après vos dernières communications, qu'il est à peu près d'accord avec le Gouvernement Impérial sur le futur statut du Maroc. Il est désormais acquis que le Gouvernement Impérial nous reconnaît le droit d'exercer dans ce pays une influence politique prépondérante, en acceptant toutes les conséquences qui écoulent logiquement de ce droit ; et nous, de notre côté, nous affirmons notre ferme volonté de maintenir au Maroc la liberté et l'égalité économique la plus entière.

Aussi bien toute notre discussion s'est, dès le début inspirée de ce double principe, et je suis heureux de voir que le Gouvernement allemand, appréciant nos efforts de conciliation, n'est plus divisé avec nous que sur quelques points. Nous consentons, d'ailleurs, bien volontiers à réduire de nous-mêmes le nombre de ceux-ci, ainsi nous acceptons, conformément au désir du Gouvernement allemand, de stipuler dans la lettre qui sera jointe à notre futur accord (1) que le chemin de fer de Tanger à Fez sera un des premiers chemins de fer dont la construction sera poursuivie par le Gouvernement marocain, et (2) que le port d'Agadir sera ouvert au commerce international.

Nous acceptons de même d'insérer à l'article 6 de notre projet d'accord toutes les dispositions que désire le Gouvernement allemand pour mieux préciser en matière d'adjudication et de transport l'égalité de droits établie entre les ressortissants des diverses Puissances ; et nous ajoutons un article spécial prévoyant l'établissement de chemins de fer d'exploitation industrielle.

Enfin, tenant compte des motifs que nous a présentés M. de Kiderlen pour écarter du corps de l'accord une délimitation explicite du territoire marocain, le Gouvernement français reporte à la lettre-annexe l'indication de cette délimitation.

La dernière demande de l'Allemagne a été présentée au nom de M. le Chancelier de l'Empire ; M. de Bethmann-Hollweg voudrait que les quatre censeurs de la Banque d'État fussent chargés de rédiger à tour de rôle un rapport annuel sur l'exploitation des services de transport et sur les observations auxquelles elle aurait donné lieu de la part des divers intéressés. Je ferai observer au sujet de cet amendement que les censeurs de la Banque d'État appartiennent à quatre nationalités déterminées et que chacun d'eux est nommé par une banque privilégiée avec l'agrément de son Gouvernement ; il y aurait donc, si la proposition de M. de Bethmann-Hollweg est adoptée, un léger avantage économique à consentir à quatre Puissances à l'exclusion des autres. Toutefois, le Gouvernement français, tenant compte du désir du Chancelier, consent à substituer au texte qu'il avait présenté un texte que vous trouverez à l'article 8. Je me plais à espérer que le Gouvernement allemand verra dans cette substitution une preuve nouvelle de nos sentiments de conciliation.

La rédaction que nous avions soumise au Gouvernement allemand en vue du règlement des rapports futurs du Gouvernement marocain avec les Puissances étrangères pouvait paraître trop rigoureuse ; nous avons adouci notre formule et nous espérons que dans sa teneur actuelle elle ne contient plus rien qui puisse froisser les sentiments d'un grand pays.

De même, nous ne méconnaissons pas que le texte proposé par nous au sujet des protégés pouvait être interprété comme plaçant l'Allemagne et nous-mêmes à un certain point de vue d'ordre économique, dans une situation d'inégalité vis-à vis des autres Puissances. La rédaction nouvelle que nous apportons ne peut pas encourir cette critique, puisqu'elle vise une convention internationale dont la modification ou l'abrogation ne peut être obtenue que par l'accord de toutes les Puissances signataires.

La réforme judiciaire est une des réformes qui s'imposent le plus fortement dans l'Empire marocain ; elle est d'ordre essentiellement politique, car il faut dans un pays bien organisé que le pouvoir exécutif soit assuré de trouver à côté de lui un pouvoir judiciaire qui réprime les infractions à la loi. Le Gouvernement Impérial ne saurait se montrer insensible à cette considération, et puisqu'il nous reconnaît sans réserve le droit d'exécuter au Maroc les réformes politiques nécessaires, il ne peut nous refuser celui d'y exécuter les réformes judiciaires qui en sont le corollaire obligatoire.

Le Gouvernement allemand nous a suggéré l'idée de l'établissement de tribunaux mixtes au Maroc. Cette idée ne saurait être accueillie par nous, elle tend, en effet, à l'internationalisation d'un grand rouage politique, et un tel résultat serait en discordance avec le principe accepté par l'Allemagne de l'influence politique prépondérante de la France au Maroc. Nous offrons de doter ce pays d'une organisation judiciaire, constituée sur le mode de celle de France; une telle organisation, dont on voit l'analogue en Tunisie, assure toutes les garanties de bonne justice et exclut d'avance les appréhensions qui auraient pu faire hésiter les Puissances à supprimer leurs juridictions consulaires.

Je ne doute pas que, lorsque vous aurez fait valoir ces raisons auprès de M. de Kiderlen, il n'en reconnaisse le bien-fondé et que le Gouvernement allemand ne consente volontiers à nos demandes. Nous aurions alors à rechercher sans retard et d'un commun accord l'adhésion des autres Puissances.

(2.)

Projet de Lettre de l'Ambassadeur.

(Très Confidentiel.)
Mon cher Secrétaire d'État,

J'ai l'honneur d'accuser réception à votre Excellence et de prendre note de la lettre de ce jour par laquelle elle veut bien me faire connaître que, dans l'hypothèse où le Gouvernement français croirait devoir assumer le protectorat du Maroc, le Gouvernement Impérial n'y apporterait aucun obstacle et donne cette portée à la nouvelle convention du , 1911.

Vous voulez bien ajouter que l'adhésion du Gouvernement allemand accordée d'une manière générale au Gouvernement français par l'article 1er de ladite convention s'applique notamment à toutes les questions donnant matière à réglementation visées dans l'Acte d'Algésiras.

D'autre part, je suis autorisé par mon Gouvernement à vous donner l'assurance que dans le cas où l'Allemagne désirerait acquérir de l'Espagne la Guinée espagnole, l'île Corisco et les îles Elobey la France renoncerait en sa faveur à exercer les droits de préférence qu'elle tient du traité du 27 juin, 1900, entre la France et l'Espagne. Il est entendu d'autre part que l'Allemagne n'interviendra en aucune façon dans les accords particuliers que la France et l'Espagne croiront devoir faire entre elles au sujet du Maroc, étant convenu que le Maroc comprend toute la partie de l'Afrique du nord s'étendant entre l'Algérie, l'Afrique occidentale française et la colonie espagnole du Rio de Oro.

Le Gouvernement allemand renonçant à demander la détermination de parts à faire à l'industrie allemande dans la construction des chemins de fer, je puis vous assurer que le Gouvernement français verra toujours volontiers des associations d'intérêt se produire entre les nationaux de nos deux pays.

La construction du chemin de fer de Tanger à Fez devra être l'une des premières entreprises poursuivie par le Gouvernement marocain. L'ouverture du port d'Agadir au commerce international sera demandée.

(3.)

Projet de Lettre de M. de Kiderlen-Waechter.

(Très Confidentiel.)
Mon cher Ambassadeur,

Pour bien préciser l'accord qui vient d'être signé en vue de définir la portée de notre déclaration du 9 février, 1909, je crois devoir faire connaître à votre Excellence que dans l'hypothèse où le Gouvernement français croirait devoir assurer le protectorat du Maroc, le Gouvernement Impérial n'y apporterait aucun obstacle et donne cette portée à la nouvelle convention du , 1911.

J'ajoute que l'adhésion du Gouvernement allemand accordée d'une manière générale au Gouvernement français par l'article 1er de ladite convention s'applique à toutes les questions donnant matière à réglementation visées dans l'Acte d'Algésiras.

Vous avez bien voulu me faire connaître, d'autre part, que, dans le cas où l'Allemagne désirerait acquérir de l'Espagne la Guinée espagnole, l'île Corisco et les

îles Elobey, la France serait disposée à renoncer en sa faveur à exercer les droits de préférence qu'elle tient du traité du 27 juin, 1900, entre la France et l'Espagne. Je suis heureux de prendre acte de cette assurance et d'ajouter que l'Allemagne n'interviendra en aucune façon dans les accords particuliers que la France et l'Espagne croiront devoir faire entre elles au sujet du Maroc, étant convenu que le Maroc comprend toute la partie de l'Afrique du nord s'étendant entre l'Algérie, l'Afrique occidentale française et la colonie espagnole du Rio de Oro.

Le Gouvernement allemand renonce, ainsi que nous l'avons dit, à demander la détermination préalable de parts à faire à l'industrie allemande dans la construction des chemins de fer, mais il espère que le Gouvernement français verra toujours volontiers des associations d'intérêt se produire entre les nationaux des deux pays.

Il compte également que le chemin de fer de Tanger à Fez, qui intéresse toutes les nations, sera l'un des premiers dont la construction sera poursuivie par le Gouvernement marocain et que le port d'Agadir sera ouvert au commerce international.

[37969] No. 350.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen.

(No. 99.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, September* 28, 1911.

THE Spanish Ambassador called at the Foreign Office on the 25th instant and observed that he had noticed in the French press, and in some telegrams from Paris to English newspapers, an inclination on the part of some sections of the French public to maintain that the Franco-Spanish Treaty of 1904 had lapsed owing to the creation of a new situation, and that it was asserted that the rights of Spain should be limited to her actual possessions in Morocco. His Excellency enquired whether His Majesty's Government considered that Spain was entitled to the exercise of the rights accorded to her under the treaty of 1904, and whether they would so inform the French Government.

Sir A. Nicolson replied that His Majesty's Government had no indication that the French Government desired in any way to depart from the provisions of the treaty which His Majesty's Government certainly considered as existing and in force.

In the above reply Sir A. Nicolson correctly expressed my view, subject to the reservation that if, owing to French concessions to Germany, the Powers signatory to the Algeciras Act disinterest themselves politically in Morocco, Spain must give France some reasonable compensation, or the latter will have paid the whole price of acquiring liberty of action for Spain in the Spanish sphere.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[38006] No. 351.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 29.)

(No. 422. Confidential.)
Sir, *Paris, September* 28, 1911.

An the naval advisers of His Majesty's Government would see great objection to the establishment of a German fortified naval base on the Atlantic coast of Morocco, and the friends of to-day may be the enemies of to-morrow, I conclude that they would also see objection to a French fortified naval base on that coast.

The restriction in regard to fortifications contained in article 7 of the Anglo-French Declaration of the 8th April, 1904, respecting Egypt and Morocco, and later on adhered to by Spain, as provided for in one of the secret articles (1) attached to the declaration, applies only to the portion of the coast of Morocco comprised between, but not including, Melilla and the heights which command the right bank of the river Sebou, and not to the places then in the occupation of Spain. In the negotiations preliminary to the declaration of 1904, the Marquess of Lansdowne endeavoured to include the whole coast of Morocco as far south as Mazaghan, and at all events to and inclusive of Rabat. To this the French Government, with obvious ulterior intention, but not on any plausible plea, objected, and Lord Lansdowne ultimately desisted from

pressing the point. His Lordship, in a letter to M. Cambon, dated the 1st October 1903, wrote—

"A second condition which His Majesty's Government regard as essential is, we understand, also readily accepted by the French Government. It has reference to the greater portion of the Moorish littoral, upon which both Governments desire that no Power should be allowed to establish itself or to erect fortifications or strategical works of any kind. That portion ought, in the view of His Majesty's Government, to comprise the whole seaboard now in the possession of Morocco from the Algerian frontier to Mazaghan including that seaport."

In the record of a conversation which took place a few days later (see to Sir E. Monson, No. 503, Secret, of the 7th October, 1903, Lord Lansdowne stated that—

"M. Cambon expressed general agreement with regard to our proposals as to Spain, but told me that we had assigned to that country far too extensive a proportion of the Moorish coast-line. Should the 'liquidation' of Morocco ever take place, it would never do for France to find herself enveloped by a strip of Spanish territory reaching from Mazaghan to the Algerian frontier. I said that I should be prepared to discuss the geographical question with him whenever he was ready to do it, but that there seemed to me to be great advantages in neutralising as much of the Moorish seaboard as possible. Moreover, there were scarcely any important ports between the points named."

The French Ambassador, in a letter of the 26th October, 1903, proposed to Lord Lansdowne that in order to guarantee the free passage of the Straits of Gibraltar the two Governments should undertake not to fortify or allow the fortification of any part of the coast of Morocco between Melilla and the heights commanding the right bank of the Sebou (an arrangement subsequently provided for by the declaration of the 8th April, 1904). Lord Lansdowne in reply to this suggestion stated (to M. Cambon the 19th November, 1903), that—

"In order to meet M. Delcassé's wishes we are prepared to consent to a modification of our original proposal, and to agree that the portion of the Atlantic coast thus neutralized shall extend from Melilla as far as Rabat, including the port of that name which is about 20 miles south of the Sebou River.

On the 20th November, 1903, M. Cambon informed Lord Lansdowne (see to Sir E. Monson, No. 586, Confidential), that he thought that His Majesty's Government might as well not have insisted on neutralising the Moorish coast-line beyond the mouth of the Sebou. Lord Lansdowne in a despatch to Sir E. Monson of the 9th December, 1903, stated that the French Ambassador had informed him that—

"M. Delcassé saw serious objections to extending the neutral strip beyond the heights bordering the mouth of the Sebou on its right bank. The difference in point of extent was not great, but Rabat was a port where it was of importance that French action should have a free hand, being the outlet of a plain which would probably be crossed later on by a railway. Rabat must, therefore, remain open to French influence."

M. Cambon on a subsequent occasion (see Lord Lansdowne to Sir E. Monson No. 626 A, Secret, of the 11th December, 1903) again objected to the inclusion of Rabat in the portion of Moorish territory which was not to be fortified on the ground that "should a 'liquidation' of Morocco ever become inevitable the neutralised area would probably fall to Spain, and it would be most inconvenient that a French line should have its terminus in Spanish territory." His Excellency added that "France had certainly no idea of fortifying Rabat."

The question which I desire to submit to the consideration of His Majesty's Government is whether advantage might not now be taken of the proposals made by the French Government for the exchange of French and British territories in Africa (reported to you in my despatch No. 415 of the 19th instant) in consequence of the contemplated change in the position of France in Morocco, as a result of the Berlin negotiations, in order to obtain from the French Government a formal undertaking that no part of the Atlantic coast of Morocco south of the River Sebou shall ever be fortified. Such a statement as the one made to Lord Lansdowne by M. Cambon that France had certainly no idea of fortifying Rabat cannot be regarded as an engagement followed as it was by a withdrawal by Lord Lansdowne of his insistence on its inclusion in the coast not to be fortified, and any more formal but voluntary assurance given now might not

be lastingly observed as has been exemplified by the cases of Batoum and Bizerta, but an engagement not to fortify in consideration of some concession would give His Majesty's Government the right to make representations to the French Government if any preparations to fortify were made later on, and such preparations would be evidence that the French Government no longer attached value to the now existing *entente* between France and England, and would justify His Majesty's Government in taking overtly precautions in consequence.

M. Paul Cambon suggested to Lord Lansdowne on the 26th October, 1903, that "les deux Gouvernements s'engageront à maintenir sauf les conséquences du présent accord, le *statu quo* territorial dans un rayon de 500 milles autour dudit détroit" (viz., the Straits of Gibraltar). Lord Lansdowne declined to enter into such an engagement on the ground that such an area would include the greater part of Spain and part of the desert of Sahara as well as the Balearic Islands, and that an arrangement of that sort seemed to His Majesty's Government to be altogether outside the scope of the proposed agreement, which was intended to be limited to questions at issue or likely to be at issue between Great Britain and France (see Lord Lansdowne to Sir E. Monson, No. 626 A, Secret, of the 11th December, 1903). However, three years later, by the so-called Spanish notes, the British, French, and Spanish Governments declared their policy to be directed to the maintenance of the territorial *status quo* in the Mediterranean and in that part of the Atlantic Ocean which washes the shores of Europe and Africa, and they declared that in pursuance of that policy they were firmly resolved to preserve intact their rights over their insular and maritime possessions in those regions.

I beg leave to submit for your consideration that an opportunity should be taken to remind the French Government of the policy declared by France, England, and Spain in the notes of 1907, and that it should be suggested that the same policy should be adopted in respect to any parts of the coast of Morocco coming under the protectorate or authority of either France or Spain as a result of the negotiations now being carried on at Berlin between the French and German Governments; and further, that it should be intimated to the French Government that His Majesty's Government consider that the fortification of any part of the coast of Morocco would create a material change in the *status quo* and in the relative naval position of the three Powers parties to the agreement of 1907.

I have, &c.
FRANCIS BERTIE.

[38007] No. 352.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received September* 29.)

(No. 423. Confidential.)
Sir, *Paris, September* 28, 1911.

WITH reference to my telegram No. 159 of to-day's date, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith a copy of a memorandum which has been drawn up this afternoon at the Quai d'Orsay by one of the secretaries to His Majesty's Embassy, showing the modifications which the French Ambassador at Berlin has reported that the German Government desire to introduce into the latest French proposals respecting Morocco, a copy of which was enclosed in my despatch No. 417, Confidential, of the 25th instant.

I have, &c.
FRANCIS BERTIE.

Enclosure in No. 352.

Memorandum.

PREAMBLE accepted by German Government.

Article I accepted by the German Government, with the omission of the words "au Maroc" in the second paragraph. Second paragraph therefore runs as follows:—

"Au cas où la France serait amenée à préciser et à étendre son contrôle et sa protection, le Gouvernement Impérial allemand, reconnaissant pleine liberté d'action à la France," &c.

Article 2 accepted by the German Government.
Article 3 accepted by the German Government.
Article 4 to be as follows :—

"Le Gouvernement français veillera à ce qu'il ne soit perçu au Maroc aucun droit d'exportation sur le minerai de fer exporté des ports marocains. Les exploitations de minerai de fer ne subiront aucun impôt spécial, ni sur leur production, ni sur leurs moyens de travail. Elles ne seront assujetties qu'aux impôts généraux et aux redevances domaniales qui atteindront toutes les entreprises minières et sont prévus par le projet de firman minier.

"Le Gouvernement français veillera à ce que la taxe superficiaire prévue à l'article 35 du projet de firman minier soit régulièrement perçue et il ne tolérera pas que remise soit faite sous un prétexte quelconque du total ou d'une partie de cette taxe."

Article 5.—First paragraph accepted by the German Government. Following to be substituted for second paragraph :—

"Si, d'autre part, Sa Majesté le Sultan du Maroc confiait au représentant de la France près du Gouvernement marocain le soin d'être son intermédiaire auprès des représentants étrangers, le Gouvernement allemand n'y ferait pas d objection"

Article 6 accepted by the German Government, with the following addition :—

"De même, le Gouvernement français amènera le Gouvernement marocain à conférer un des postes de délégué chérifien au Comité spécial des Travaux publics à des candidats qui seront présentés, à tour de rôle, par les quatre Puissances autorisées par l'Acte d'Algésiras à nommer les censeurs auprès de la Banque d'État."

Article 7 to be modified as follows :—

"Le Gouvernement français s'emploiera auprès du Gouvernement marocain pour que les propriétaires de mines et d'autres exploitations industrielles ou agricoles sans distinction de nationalité soient autorisés à céder des chemins de fer d'exploitation industrielle destinés à relier leur centre de production aux lignes d'intérêt général ou aux ports."

Article 8 accepted, with the following addition :—

". . . . sur les rapports et sur les demandes ou plaintes qui leur seraient adressées par les ressortissants des différentes Puissances."

German Government proposes following text for article 9 :—

"Pour éviter autant que possible les réclamations diplomatiques le Gouvernement français s'emploiera auprès du Gouvernement marocain afin que celui-ci défère à un arbitre désigné *ad hoc* pour chaque affaire d'un commun accord par le consul de France et le consul intéressé et, à leur défaut, par leurs deux Gouvernements, les plaintes portées par des ressortissants étrangers contre les autorités, et qui n'auraient pas été réglées par l'intermédiaire du consul de France et du consul du Gouvernement intéressé. Cette procédure restera en vigueur jusqu'au jour où aura été institué, avec le consentement des Puissances, un régime judiciaire destiné à remplacer les tribunaux consulaires."

Articles 10 and 11 accepted by the German Government.
German Government proposes that article 12 should run as follows :—

"Pour répondre à une demande du Gouvernement marocain, les deux Gouvernements s'engagent à provoquer d'accord avec les autres Puissances, sur la base de la Convention de Madrid et par application des articles 8 et 16 de cette convention la revision de la situation des protégés étrangers et des associés agricoles au Maroc.

"Ils sont également d'accord pour poursuivre, le moment venu, auprès des autres Puissances des modifications à apporter à ladite convention."

German Government proposes following text for article 13 :—

"Les dispositions des traités antérieurs contraires à la présente convention sont et demeurent abrogées."

Article 14 accepted by the German Government.

[38190] No. 353.

Mr. White to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 30.)

(No. 310.)
Sir, *Tangier, September 23, 1911.*

MR. CARLETON, consular agent at Alcazar, who is here for a few days on urgent private affairs, informed me that Colonel Silvestre had told him some little time since that it was proposed to lay a military railway from Laraiche to Alcazar. Mr. Carleton is on very good terms with the Spaniards, as he has shown them civility in various ways—allowing them to use his land at Alcazar for their camp, giving them a house to use as a church, &c. It was consequently desired to confer a Spanish decoration upon him, and the first secretary of the legation enquired of me privately whether he would be allowed to accept it. Since his arrival here he has met some of the younger members of the staff of the Spanish Legation at the Casino, and they also told him that the railway was to be built, and that engineers had been sent to draw up the plans.

I took an opportunity of mentioning the matter to the Spanish Minister as a report I had heard, without letting him know the source of my information. M. de Villasinda at first said he knew nothing of such a project; he, however, subsequently modified this by saying he had no official knowledge of the matter, and he went on to say that it would be natural that the Spanish military authorities should desire to make such a railway, as it would be very convenient to them, and he referred to the precedent afforded by the railway to be made by the French from Rabat to Casa Blanca. The impression left upon my mind by the conversation was that the Spanish Government is certainly contemplating laying such a line, which would, I believe, present little difficulty from the engineering point of view. They have already commenced making a road from Alcazar to Laraiche, and Mr. Carleton tells me that two bridges—pontoon bridges, he believes—have been landed at Laraiche. From what I hear, however, the road is not being made with sufficient foundation to support a railway line.

I have thought it better not to mention the matter to the French chargé d'affaires, as it is possible that the project may come to nothing, or may at any rate be postponed, as the rainy season is approaching. Moreover, it is improbable that the Spanish Government would care to incur the risk of troubles in this district whilst their troops are being so hard pressed at Melilla.

I have, &c.
HERBERT E. WHITE.

[37769] No. 354.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 404.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, September 30, 1911.*

I HAVE received your Excellency's telegram No. 157 of the 27th ultimo, calling attention to the error in your telegram No. 154, as printed in the telegram sections of the 22nd and 23rd September.

I should be glad if you would inform the French Government that the German Minister for Foreign Affairs had no authority for the statement that His Majesty's Government would be opposed to any judicial system in Morocco other than that of mixed courts, but that, of course, if consular jurisdiction were abolished in Morocco His Majesty's Government would expect some revision of the existing state of things in Egypt.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[38601] No. 355.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 3.)

(No. 162.)
(Telegraphic.) *En clair.* *Paris, October 2, 1911.*

MOROCCO.

My telegram No. 159 of 28th September and projet in my despatch No. 423, Confidential, of same date.

M. de Selves has informed me this evening that the questions at issue in regard to Morocco are in a fair way of settlement.

Article 4. M. de Kiderlen-Waechter, confronted with the fact that at a conference on the mining laws the German delegate had adhered to proposals for a surface tax and output tax on mines, explains that he has been misunderstood, and meant to refer to exportation tax.

M. de Kiderlen-Waechter gives way on article 5 in regard to French representatives being the medium of communication between the foreign representatives and the Moorish Government.

Article 7. M. de Kiderlen-Waechter withdraws his amendment, the French Government agreeing to add agricultural undertakings on a large scale to the permission to be given to mines and industrial undertakings to link themselves up with railways or ports.

M. de Kiderlen-Waechter withdraws the stipulation in article 9, that "cette procédure restera en vigueur jusqu'au jour où aura été institué, avec le consentement des Puissances, un régime judiciaire destiné à remplacer les tribunaux consulaires"; and the French Government substitute European in the place of French system of justice in their article 9.

The questions on which there is not yet agreement are those of protégés and "associés agricoles" and the Madrid Convention.

[38770] No. 356.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 4.)

(No. 429.)

Sir, *Paris, October 3, 1911.*

IT is generally known in Paris that the Franco-German negotiations are about to turn from Morocco to the Congo, and as the moment approaches for a discussion of the compensation to be given to Germany in that quarter, endeavours are being made to arouse public opinion on the subject and to bring pressure to bear on the French Government to curtail the extent of the territory to be ceded to Germany.

The sentimental and patriotic chord has been touched by a public letter addressed to the President of the Republic by Madame de Brazza, the widow of the African explorer who planted the French flag in the Congo hinterland.

M. Hanotaux has written a long article in the "Revue hebdomadaire," which is widely quoted in the press, and in which he strongly opposes what are believed to be the concessions which the French Government are ready to make in the Congo. In this article he goes beyond the questions actually at issue, and throws doubt on the wisdom of the French line of policy which was inaugurated by the agreements of 1904 with England and Spain.

M. Joseph Reinach, the well-known and influential republican deputy, writes an article in the "Figaro" of to-day's date, in which he declares that a concession, such as has been proposed, of the middle French Congo as far as the Ubangi and the frontier of Belgian Congo, is entirely inadmissible. He states that he himself will vote against such an arrangement were it brought before the Chamber, and that the deputies who take his view are numerous. Public opinion, he declares, is daily becoming more resolutely hostile to the idea.

The above are instances of the attitude which is being taken in certain influential quarters respecting the further course of the negotiations. As was to be expected, still more energetic protests are being raised by extremists, who see an occasion for damaging the Ministry on the score of weakness in defending French interests. The French Ambassador at Berlin comes in for a large share of criticism, and is accused of being too pliant in respect of the German demands. I enclose herein copies of M. Hanotaux's article extracted from the "Revue hebdomadaire" and of that of M. Reinach from the "Figaro."*

I have, &c.
FRANCIS BERTIE.

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* Not printed.

[37970] No. 357.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 409.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, October 4, 1911.*

THE French Ambassador in London has communicated to me confidentially a copy of the despatch which the French Minister for Foreign Affairs addressed to M. Jules Cambon on the 22nd ultimo on the subject of the Franco-German negotiations respecting Morocco. Annexed to the despatch are draft notes to be exchanged between the German Minister for Foreign Affairs and the French Ambassador in Berlin dealing with certain points not specified in the proposed Franco-German Convention. Copies of these papers will reach your Excellency in the Morocco print sections.

In the draft note from M. Jules Cambon to Herr von Kiderlen the following passage occurs:—

"Le Gouvernement allemand renonçant à demander la détermination des parts à faire à l'industrie allemande dans la construction des chemins de fer, je puis vous assurer que le Gouvernement français verra toujours volontiers des associations d'intérêt se produire entre les nationaux de nos deux pays."

As this passage may possibly give rise to misunderstandings in the future, I should be glad if your Excellency would inform M. de Selves that His Majesty's Government understand that, by the new Franco-German Convention, all the Powers will be on the same footing as regards industrial enterprises in Morocco, and that the words "verra toujours volontiers des associations d'intérêt se produire entre les nationaux de nos deux pays" should be so construed.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[38931] No. 358.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 5.)

(No. 430.)

Sir, *Paris, October 4, 1911.*

I HAD the honour in my despatch No. 429 of yesterday's date to report to you the declaration of M. Hanotaux against the cession of a large portion of the French Congo colony reaching to the Ubangi River and the frontier of the Belgian Congo, and a similar declaration on the part of M. Reinach, coupled with the statement that he and numerous other deputies would vote against the ratification of a treaty containing provision for such a cession. It is of interest to note in this connection that M. Marcel Sembat, one of the authorised spokesman of the unified Socialist party in the Chamber, has written an article in the "Humanité" to the effect that his party intends to vote in favour of an agreement to be come to by the French Government, in order to put an end as soon as possible to the existing state of tension between France and Germany.

As the unified Socialist party numbers seventy-five members, its support, should the Ministry encounter serious opposition from certain other quarters in the Chamber, as is anticipated, may be of considerable value from the ministerial point of view.

The Socialist leader, M. Jaures, is not yet back from South America, whither he went to give a series of lectures.

I have, &c.
FRANCIS BERTIE.

[38932] No. 359.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 5.)

(No. 431.)

Sir, *Paris, October 4, 1911.*

I HAD the honour to receive last night your despatch No. 404 of the 30th ultimo, instructing me to inform M. de Selves that M. de Kiderlen-Waechter had no authority for the statement that His Majesty's Government would be opposed to any judicial

system in Morocco other than that of mixed courts, but that of course, if consular jurisdiction were abolished in Morocco, His Majesty's Government would expect some revision of the existing state of things in Egypt.

I saw M. de Selves this afternoon, and I reminded him of the statement made by M. de Kiderlen-Waechter. I spoke to his Excellency in the above sense and I gave him the memorandum in French of which a copy is enclosed herein.

M. de Selves said that the view of His Majesty's Government appeared to him to be quite reasonable.

I have, &c.
FRANCIS BERTIE.

Enclosure in No. 359.

Sir F. Bertie to M. de Selves.

LE 22 septembre M. de Selves a informé Sir Francis Bertie que M. de Kiderlen-Waechter avait représenté à l'Ambassadeur de France, à propos des Capitulations au Maroc, que le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté britannique serait opposé à l'établissement par le Gouvernement français de tribunaux qui n'auraient pas le caractère de tribunaux mixtes.

Sir Francis Bertie a été invité par Sir Edward Grey de déclarer à M. de Selves que le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères allemand n'était nullement autorisé à faire une représentation pareille des vues du Gouvernement britannique.

Dans le cas où la juridiction consulaire au Maroc serait abolie, le Gouvernement britannique se regarderait en droit à un changement dans le système judiciaire actuel en Égypte analogue à celui adopté au Maroc, et compte sur le concours et l'appui du Gouvernement français à cette fin.

Paris, le 4 octobre, 1911.

[39205] No. 360.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 417.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, October 6*, 1911.

THE French Ambassador told me that the fifth draft agreement with Germany about Morocco had now been drawn up, and he promised to send me a copy confidentially. It was expected that Herr von Kiderlen would accept it. I said that would dispose then of all the difficulties about the Morocco portion of the negotiations. M. Cambon assented, but said there would remain the Congo question, and a very strong feeling was growing up in France against large concessions to Germany and against anything that would cut the French Congo in two. This was rather embarrassing to the French Government, but they hoped when it was made clear that they had got a good bargain in Morocco French public opinion would be calmed. I said I was sure public opinion here would be surprised if, when the French Government had virtually acquired a protectorate over Morocco, they were to refuse a considerable concession in the Congo. The general impression was that it was Germany who had got the worst of the negotiations and had been foiled in her object. Germany had made it appear as if she had aimed at a slice of Morocco. If the upshot of the negotiations was not only that Germany was excluded from Morocco, but that France got beyond the Act of Algeciras and gained control over Morocco, it would appear that Germany came second best out of the negotiations even if France did make a considerable concession in the French Congo; but I added that of course if Germany were now to spring upon France the demand for all the French Congo from the Sanga to the sea, which had been rejected long ago, everyone would suppose that Germany had repented of the Morocco part of the bargain now concluded and wished to upset it. The impression that Germany was getting less than she had expected was increased by the irritation and anger of the German press against England, who were all writing as if Germany would have got much more from France had it not been for the attitude of England; indeed, the idea was fostered in Germany that at the moment of the Chancellor of the Exchequer's speech Germany was on the point of concluding a bargain with France,

though this was absolutely untrue. M. Cambon said it would appear from what I had said that people thought Morocco worth more than the Congo. I said I thought, in the public mind, it was something like that.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[38006] No. 361.

*Foreign Office to Admiralty.**

Sir, *Foreign Office, October 6*, 1911.

IN article 7 of the Anglo-French Declaration of April 8, 1904, to which Spain subsequently adhered, it is laid down that "in order to secure the free passage of the Straits of Gibraltar the two Governments agree not to permit the erection of any fortifications or strategic works on that portion of the coast of Morocco comprised between, but not including, Melilla and the heights which command the right bank of the River Sebou. This condition does not however apply to the places at present in the occupation of Spain on the Moorish coast of the Mediterranean."

The Franco-German negotiations now being conducted at Berlin will probably modify the existing state of things in Morocco, and it has been suggested to Sir E. Grey that it might be advisable, in connection with these negotiations, to endeavour to obtain from the French Government a formal undertaking that no part of the Atlantic coast of Morocco south of the Sebou River shall ever be fortified.

Before taking a definite decision in the matter, Sir E. Grey requests that he may be favoured with the reasoned opinion of the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty on the value and importance to this country of any such undertaking on the part of France.

A similar letter has been addressed to the War Office.

I am, &c.
F. A. CAMPBELL.

[39276] No. 362.

Mr. White to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 7.)

(No. 312.)

Sir, *Tangier, September 30*, 1911.

WITH reference to your despatch No. 75 of the 15th instant, I have the honour to report that, so far as I have been able to ascertain, the Marokko Mannesmann Company has been established for general and trading purposes, the Mannesmanns being anxious to engage in all the various branches of business in Morocco. They have now four separate concerns in this country—

1. Mining;
2. Land purchase and farming;
3. Steam mills; and
4. General trade.

The initial capital in this last business is small, but I understand that it will be increased as the business grows. I presume the Mannesmanns, not having themselves experience of this class of business, considered it wiser to appoint business men as managers. They have, I understand, a large share in this business, but there are others associated with them. In a subsequent notice, dated the 6th instant, it was stated that the company had established branches at Tarudant, Agadir, and Mehedia.

The Mannesmanns are by no means popular with the older established German houses in Morocco, who look upon them with much suspicion as dangerous rivals. They are credited with the desire to establish a predominating position, and thus acquire a practical control of German trade with this country.

The Mannesmann Brothers are reported to be very active in the south. Mr. Vice-Consul Lennox reports that two of the brothers had arrived at Marrakesh, bringing a

* Also to War Office, *mutatis mutandis*.

large quantity of presents for distribution amongst the natives, consisting of rifles, watches, samovars, &c., to the value, it was said, of 15,000 dollars (2,500*l.*). They left for the Sus on the 23rd instant.

I have, &c.
HERBERT E. WHITE.

[39277] No. 363.

Mr. White to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 7.)

(No. 313 Very Confidential.)

Sir, *Tangier, September* 30, 1911.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith decypher of a radiogram received this morning from the acting consul at Casa Blanca, communicating a message from the British merchants of that place, expressing great alarm at the reports that have appeared in the press as to the contemplated abolition of consular jurisdiction and begging for its retention, as otherwise British trade will, in their opinion, be ruined. The message is signed by Messrs. Lamb, Fernau, Murdoch, and Butler, who are by far the most important British merchants in Morocco, representing old-established houses with branches at several ports. Their opinion must carry the more weight, as they are fair-minded men who have not been among those who have sought for grievances against the French.

There can be no doubt that the surrender of British consular jurisdiction would give rise to a great outcry amongst all the British subjects in this country, and there would be very strong feeling on the subject, as, unfortunately, there is a general conviction amongst British subjects and persons of other nationalities that non-French applicants to French officials and consular tribunals have great difficulty in establishing their rights against Frenchmen. I fear that it cannot be denied that many French officials are unwilling to decide against their nationals in favour of a foreigner, and frequently find some pretext for avoiding doing so. There are, of course, honourable exceptions, but in many Frenchmen the national feeling appears to be stronger than the feeling of justice.

I have, &c.
HERBERT E. WHITE.

[39279] No. 364.

Mr. White to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 7.)

(No. 315.)

Sir, *Tangier, October* 1, 1911.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 311 of the 24th ultimo, I have the honour to transmit herewith copy of a despatch I have received from the acting consul at Fez reporting the submission of fractions of the Ait Yusi tribe.

M. Gaillard, who arrived here a few days ago, tells me that all the Arab tribes near Fez are now quiet, but that the situation amongst the Berber tribes was not satisfactory, only the fractions in the immediate neighbourhood of Sefrou having made their submission. General Dalbiez has taken his column back to Mequinez, but they will have to remain there for some time, as their withdrawal would probably be the signal for another rising, the Makhzen forces not yet being sufficiently strong to cope with the situation.

The troops recruited under the French instructors are turning out very well and are good fighting material. The men are contented, being well equipped and receiving pay at a much higher rate than formerly, and, what is more important, they now receive it regularly, whereas formerly they got it at uncertain intervals, if at all. The force cannot, however, be much further increased by recruiting locally as only picked men of suitable age and good physique are accepted, and the supply appears to be nearly exhausted in those districts. This force is quite distinct from the native "Goums" raised by the French in Shawia.

In answer to an enquiry as to the present disposition of the Sultan, M. Gaillard said that His Majesty was not perhaps quite so tractable as he was in the moment of danger, when the French first came to his rescue. Mulai Hafid was, however, quite aware of his great unpopularity with his people, and realised that he was entirely

dependent on French support; he was therefore constrained to accept their guidance and consult their wishes, at the same time, in matters touching his own personal interests he resorted to subterfuge. Thus, after agreeing that the contribution from a tribe should not exceed a certain sum, His Majesty would send secret orders to the governor to collect an additional amount to be remitted to himself personally.

Mr. Selous informs me that there was a very small attendance at the feast parade at Fez, which fell a day earlier than had been expected, the new moon having been seen on the 23rd ultimo. This made the attendance of country people even smaller than it would have been, and on the second day, when it is customary for the tribes to present gifts to the Sultan, one horse and two mule loads of gifts was all that was forthcoming. It is said that Mulai Hafid has been very nervous about the reception of the tribal contingents, and was at heart much relieved at their non-appearance.

The French aeroplane, which it was hoped could carry out some evolutions at the feast, was unable to fly. The airman stated that the motor was damaged on arrival at Fez. In any case, no further flights were made, to the great disappointment of the Sultan, and also of the French at Fez.

Mulai-el-Amrani, the old shereef, who acted as figure-head for General Moinier's column when it marched to the relief of Fez, returned to Casa Blanca on the 28th ultimo, being received by the French consul and the military authorities; the French-instructed urban police acting as a guard of honour. He was in bad health, having had an attack of fever at Rabat on his way back.

I have, &c.
HERBERT E. WHITE.

Enclosure in No. 364.

Consul Selous to Mr. White.

(No. 103.)

Sir, *Fez, September* 22, 1911.

I HAVE the honour to report that M. Martin, acting French consul, informed me to-day that he has learnt from Major Brémond that the Berber tribes in the neighbourhood of Sefrou are now showing signs of desiring to submit to the Makhzen's authority. About half the Ait Yusi, including the Ait Freego and the Ait Halli fractions, have come in to sacrifice to General Dalbiez, who, however, does not intend withdrawing until he has received full submission from the whole Ait Yusi and Ait Tserôshen tribes.

In the course of the past week Major Brémond, in concert with General Dalbiez, has blown up some twenty casbas in the Ait Yusi territory, and this has doubtless been the cause of the pacificatory spirit now discernable.

M. Martin also informed me that Major Brémond intends to return with part of his troops to Fez in time for the approaching feast, which will fall on the 24th or 25th instant. This force will constitute a much-needed addition to the scanty number of men at present available for lining the route followed by the Sultan to the Emsallah.

I have, &c.
GERALD H. SELOUS.

[39281] No. 365.

Mr. White to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 7.)

(No. 317.)

Sir, *Tangier, October* 1, 1911.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith copy of a despatch I have received from His Majesty's vice-consul at Mogador, reporting the arrival at that place of an Ottoman subject of the name of Edhem Bey, who was proceeding to the Sus.

Edhem Bey came to Fez during the reign of Sultan Abdul Hamid, and was said to be a secret agent of His Majesty. He was well received by Mulai Hafid, and remained at the court for some time. He used to make translations for His Majesty the articles of interest that appeared in the European press.

I have, &c.
HERBERT E. WHITE.

Enclosure in No. 365.

Vice-Consul Johnstone to Mr. White.

(No. 51.)

Sir, *Mogador, September* 25, 1911.

WITH reference to my immediately preceding despatch relative to the presence of Germans at Agadir and the consequent state of the country, I have the honour to state that an Ottoman subject, a Moslem, speaking good English, arrived here a few days ago, and has expressed his intention of proceeding through the Sus country, as far as Tiznit, if possible. The Ottoman subject has not as yet come to visit me, but I met him to-day in the street, and was introduced to him by Mr. G. V. Forrest, a British subject, who was with him. He was introduced to me as Edhem Bey, and told me that he had spent four years at Cambridge giving instruction in Oriental languages. He can, I am told, speak Spanish and French as fluently as he can English. The French consul has now informed me that he has received warning that a pan-Islamite missionary is being sent here to visit the Sus country and stir up the tribes against Europeans. The missionary was to be an Egyptian, and M. Marc imagines that Edhem Bey must be the man referred to. As the Ottoman subject has not shown me any papers, I do not know whether he is Egyptian or not, but he told me that he had spent some time at Fez and knew Kaïd Anfluss, and that he was bringing letters of introduction to the various Sus kaïds from the Sultan.

M. Marc is now making enquiries respecting him of the governor.

I have, &c.

H. B. JOHNSTONE.

[39275] No. 366.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 7.)

(No. 166.) [By Post.]

(Telegraphic.) *En clair.* *Paris, October* 6, 1911.

MOROCCO.

My telegram No. 162 of 2nd October.

M. de Selves, whom I have seen this morning, informs me that there are still divergences between the German and French Government on the following subjects: Madrid Convention; protégés; and taxes on minerals. The French Government desire the abrogation with the concurrence of the Powers interested as incompatible with the status of a protectorate of those parts of the Madrid Convention which relate to protégés and "associés agricoles." M. de Kiderlen-Waechter wishes to limit the projet de convention with France to a stipulation for a modification of those provisions which M. de Selves argues would be an admission that the system is to be continued in some form.

M. de Kiderlen-Waechter desires in the case of iron ore to limit the tax on it to 3 per cent. *ad valorem.* M. de Selves points out that though article 49 of the projet de règlement agreed on by the delegates at Paris in 1910 fixed the tax or royalty at that rate, the protocol of the conference signed by the German delegate expressed the opinion that such tax might be increased for certain purposes therein indicated, inclusive of providing means for the development and security of the country, in which the mining industry is specially interested (see Confidential Print, "Affairs of Morocco," part 41, 1910, p. 181, article 35, p. 184, article 49, and protocol of conference, p. 175, Roman number III, observation No. 3).

M. de Kiderlen-Waechter finds fault with the indiscretions and tone of the French press, which, he says, make it difficult for the German Government to make concessions to French views, and he complains that the French Government are always starting fresh hares, and have produced five successive projets de convention. M. de Selves has replied that there have been indiscretions in the German press which are embarrassing to the French Government, that the hares are hunted ones, and that if the German Government had acted up to their original attitude, viz., that in regard to Morocco they would accept a French protectorate in all but a name, provided that there were economic equality for all nations and free exportation of iron ore, there would only have been one French projet, viz., the first one, and

that the four subsequent versions have been necessitated by the endeavours of the French Government to satisfy so far as possible the objections, observations, and demands from time to time made by M. de Kiderlen-Waechter in the course of the conversations at Berlin.

There was not time at yesterday's Cabinet Council to consider the last German objections. M. de Selves will submit them to his colleagues to-morrow.

[39557] No. 367.

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 9.)

(No. 165.)

Sir, *Madrid, October* 5, 1911.

I REPORTED briefly in my despatch No. 93 of the 9th ultimo the hostile movement of the Moorish tribes living to the west and south of the River Kert against the Spanish positions on the right bank of the river. The initial attack on a Spanish surveying party, which took place on the 24th August, appears to have developed since into a rising of the inhabitants of the entire region between the Kert and Alhucemas. Numerous engagements have been reported, and, though the Spanish forces have no doubt inflicted punishment on many native villages, they have been compelled apparently, after each advance, to fall back on their original positions, the river forming still the boundary between the contending parties. The conflict is meanwhile assuming the proportions of another little war. I am informed on good authority that the Spanish troops in the Melilla region now number between 40,000 and 50,000 men. In Ceuta there are said to be 19,000 men, and in Larache and Alcazar 4,000 or 5,000 more. If these figures are even approximately correct, it is not too much to say that half the full peace establishment of the Spanish army must be away in Africa.

The situation is evidently regarded as serious, for General Luque, the Minister for War, has himself proceeded to Melilla, in order to encourage by his presence the severely tried troops, who, without effective shelter and exposed to every hardship, are bearing the brunt of the fighting. It is generally expected that a supreme effort to dislodge and disperse the enemy will shortly be made, taking the form possibly of a combined movement from Alhucemas and the Kert, designed to envelop and overpower the Beni Urriagel tribe, which is regarded as the chief centre of disturbance.

I have, &c.

MAURICE DE BUNSEN.

[39452] No. 368.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 9.)

(No. 309. Secret.)

Sir, *Berlin, October* 6, 1911.

ON Tuesday last the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs received the Ambassadors for the second time in the last two months. M. Cambon attended the reception, and, after conversing with Herr von Kiderlen on the subject of the Italo-Turkish war, said that he hoped to see his Excellency again in a day or two, when he would be in a position to communicate to him the result of the latest deliberations of the French Government on the subject of Morocco. Herr von Kiderlen replied that M. Cambon need hardly trouble himself to come for that purpose, as he (Herr von Kiderlen) had already read the latest proposals of the French Government in the French press. Upon this, he handed to M. Cambon a number of French newspapers, and the latter had to admit that, as a matter of fact, the statements in the newspapers corresponded exactly with the telegraphic summary which he had received, but which had not yet been confirmed in writing. Herr von Kiderlen said that these were the strangest negotiations in which he had ever been concerned, and that it was an unheard-of thing that proposals should have been given to the French press some days before they had been communicated to the Government to whom they were addressed, and before even their full text had reached the hands of the French representative who was conducting the negotiations.

In telling me of this, my French colleague admitted that he had nothing to say in reply, and that he had had nothing to do but beat a retreat as soon as he conveniently

could, stating that in any case he would bring the text of the French answer as soon as it reached him, and that he hoped it might, notwithstanding what Herr von Kiderlen had said, meet with a favourable reception.

M. Cambon received his written instructions on the 4th instant and immediately communicated them to Herr von Kiderlen. He came to see me on the following day, yesterday, and told me that Herr von Kiderlen had rejected the proposals contained in the French answer, saying that, even if he had felt inclined to accept them, he could not do so, as they had already been unfavourably discussed in the German press. If he now accepted them he would be accused on all sides of sacrificing German interests and yielding to foreign pressure. "I have," he said to M. Cambon, "as I am sure you will admit, given way on many points, and every time I make a concession you come back to me with some further demand. Several times we have both thought that everything was arranged, and that only minor points and questions of *rédaction* remained, only to find that your Government was not yet satisfied. This cannot go on for ever, and the negotiations have already lasted far too long."

The result of the conversation was that Herr von Kiderlen refused to accept the latest proposals, and even, in one case, so M. Cambon said, withdrew a concession which he had already made.

M. Cambon, in giving me this account of the conversation, said that he could not help feeling that there was a certain amount of justice in Herr von Kiderlen's remarks, and he added that he had reported in that sense to his Government.

My French colleague was rather depressed, but he seemed to have no doubts in his own mind but that an arrangement would finally be effected.

I asked M. Cambon whether he thought that the Tripoli question had in any way reacted unfavourably on the negotiations and contributed to Herr von Kiderlen's stiffness with regard to the latest French proposals. He said he thought not, as Herr von Kiderlen was too intelligent a man to be influenced by foolish press talk to the effect that Italy's Tripoli undertaking had been instigated by England and France. His idea was that Herr von Kiderlen did not like the latest proposals, and that their premature publication in the French press had given him an opportunity to plead their unfavourable reception by German public opinion as a reason for rejecting them.

The report of the conversation, as telegraphed to Paris by M. Cambon, would seem to have had some effect, as to-day the Berlin newspapers, who have all along complained of Herr von Kiderlen's reticence with regard to the negotiations, are making it a grievance that the French press has published nothing with regard to the outcome of the latest conversation between the two negotiators.

I have, &c.
W. E. GOSCHEN.

[39688] No. 369.

Earl Granville to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received October* 9.)

(No. 82.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Berlin, October* 9, 1911.

FRANCO-GERMAN negotiations regarding Morocco.

Yesterday M. Cambon had two conversations with Herr von Kiderlen. His Excellency considers that the part of the agreement concerning Morocco is concluded, provided that a very slight modification is accepted by the French Government, and he thinks that this will certainly be the case. He expects that to-morrow his Government will send him their answer on the subject.

[39707] No. 370.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received October* 10.)

(No. 437.)
Sir, *Paris, October* 8, 1911.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith, with reference to my despatch No. 431 of the 4th instant, copy of a communication from M. de Selves, in which his Excellency states that, in accordance with article 2 of the Secret Anglo-French Agreement of 1904, the French Government will, when consular jurisdiction shall

have been abolished in Morocco, give their support to His Majesty's Government for the adoption of a similar reform in Egypt.

I have, &c.
FRANCIS BERTIE.

Enclosure in No. 370.

Note communicated to Sir F. Bertie by M. de Selves.

LE Ministre des Affaires Étrangères remercie son Excellence Sir Francis Bertie de la communication qu'il a bien voulu lui faire le 4 de ce mois et aux termes de laquelle le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté britannique n'est pas opposé à l'établissement au Maroc par le Gouvernement français de tribunaux qui n'auraient pas le caractère de tribunaux mixtes, mais réclame le concours du Gouvernement français pour opérer, quand la juridiction consulaire aurait été abolie au Maroc, un changement analogue en Égypte.

En réponse à cette communication, M. de Selves a l'honneur de faire savoir à son Excellence l'Ambassadeur de Grande-Bretagne que, conformément au deuxième des articles secrets de la Convention franco-anglaise du 8 avril, 1904, le Gouvernement français, le jour où la juridiction consulaire serait abolie au Maroc, prêterait son concours au Gouvernement britannique pour l'introduction en Égypte d'une réforme semblable.

Paris, le 7 octobre, 1911.

[39882] No. 371.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received October* 11.)

[By Post.]

(No. 168.)
(Telegraphic.) *En clair.* *Paris, October* 10, 1911.

MY telegram No. 166 of the 6th instant.

M. de Selves has informed me this evening that the French Ambassador at Berlin reports that M. de Kiderlen-Waechter is prepared to state, in a note with regard to the "modification of the Madrid Convention," that the German Government will not oppose its abrogation if the Powers are in favour of such abrogation. M. de Kiderlen-Waechter further consents to a revision of the lists of protégés and "associés agricoles," and he gives way on the other points at issue.

M. de Selves has instructed M. Jules Cambon to obtain written confirmation of M. de Kiderlen-Waechter's assurances, and if they be forthcoming they will be submitted to the French Cabinet, and he hopes that the controversy in regard to the Morocco part of the negotiations may be considered as at an end.

[39277] No. 372.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir R. Lister.

(No. 80.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, October* 11, 1911.

I HAVE received Mr. White's despatch No. 313 of the 30th ultimo, reporting the receipt of a message from the British merchants at Casablanca, in which they express great alarm at the rumours in regard to the abolition of consular jurisdiction in Morocco and beg for its retention.

You may inform the signatories of the message that, as far as British subjects are concerned, the abolition of consular jurisdiction cannot take place without the consent of His Majesty's Government, and that, should the latter be approached on the subject, due consideration will be given to the proper security of British interests.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[40002] No. 373.

Earl Granville to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 12.)

(No. 86.)
(Telegraphic.) P.
MOROCCO.

Berlin, October 11, 1911.

The French Ambassador and the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs signed this morning *ne varietur* the final draft of the Morocco Convention, which the French Ambassador assures me amounts to giving France the protectorate.

(Secret.)

M. Cambon asked me not to report more regarding the convention itself than I have done above, but he showed me in strict confidence the actual text which was signed to-day. He was, however, very anxious that it should not reach the ears of the French Government that he had showed me this, as he had not received any instructions to do so. I read through the text once, and, as far as I could judge, the changes which had been made from the form which was communicated to you in Sir F. Bertie's despatch No. 417 of September 23rd are but few in number and unimportant in character.

The form of the secret notes which are to be exchanged by the two parties, and which will deal with the reference of questions which may arise to the Permanent Court of Arbitration at The Hague, "and with other points," is now being drafted by the French Ambassador, who expressed entire satisfaction with the text of the convention as finally adopted.

[40164] No. 374.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 13.)

(No. 439.)
Sir,

Paris, October 12, 1911.

M. PIOU, deputy for the Lozère, during a sitting of the Budget Commission of the Chamber of Deputies yesterday, put forward a motion to the effect that the commission should abstain from a further examination of the estimated expenditure for 1912 of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, and that it should call upon M. de Selves to give the commission particulars of the Berlin negotiations.

The "Matin" states that his Excellency will to-day appear before the commission to answer questions concerning his department, but will declare that he is not in a position to give the desired particulars of the negotiations now in progress.

The President of the Council has received from several quarters demands for the convocation of the Chamber forthwith, but his reply, if one were sent, is not published. The semi-official press throws cold water on M. Piou's initiative, and M. Gaston Calmette, editor of the "Figaro," has written two leading articles strongly disapproving of any parliamentary interference in the negotiations at this stage.

M. Récouly, foreign editor of the "Figaro," writes an article in that paper to-day giving a résumé of the history of the negotiations about Morocco, and observing that little by little the German Government have been induced to abandon their demands, and have ended by accepting on the whole what France sought to obtain. The French Government, he continues, engaged three months ago to pay for Germany's disinterestedness in Morocco, and no one thought of going back on that engagement. The moment had now come to examine the extent of the concessions to be made. Those who imagined that a Ministerial crisis would help matters were mistaken. It would arrange nothing; on the contrary, it would have the opposite effect.

The fact remains that, in many quarters, attempts are being made to rouse public opinion against a cession of territory in the Congo of such a kind as to give Germany access to the Ubangi and Congo Rivers, and that, if the Cabinet refuse to pay attention to what is being said in these quarters, violent attacks will be made on it, and, even if opposition be not sufficient to prevent the ratification of an agreement with Germany, capital for party purposes will be made out of the alleged weakness of the French negotiators in order to damage M. Caillaux.

I have, &c.
FRANCIS BERTIE.

[40316] No. 375.

Mr. White to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 14.)

(No. 319.)
Sir,

Tangier, October 4, 1911.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 306 of the 16th ultimo, I have the honour to inform you that Sid Guebbas tells me that the Moorish officials at Alcazar appear to have been gained over by the Spanish authorities, as only two of them have replied, and that in very vague terms, in regard to the complaint of Raisuli that orders had been given by the Spanish authorities that nothing should be done without previous reference to them. The other officials had merely informed him that they had written to the court on the subject.

In these circumstances Sid Guebbas does not propose to make any communication to the Spanish Minister on the subject.

I have, &c.
HERBERT E. WHITE.

[40614] No. 376.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 16.)

(No. 444. Confidential.)
Sir,

Paris, October 15, 1911.

I HAD an interview with M. de Selves yesterday afternoon in order to carry out the instructions contained in your despatch No. 409 of the 4th instant, which I had the honour to receive on the evening of the 6th. I deferred acting on those instructions until yesterday, as the papers referred to in them did not reach me until the evening of the 13th.

I said to his Excellency that I knew it to be the intention of the French Government that there should be complete commercial equality in Morocco, but there was a passage in the note which it was proposed that the French Ambassador at Berlin should address to the German Minister for Foreign Affairs, and which had been communicated to you by the French Embassy, which might give rise to misunderstandings in the future. I then showed to M. de Selves the passage in question, viz.: "Le Gouvernement allemand renonçant à demander la détermination de parts à faire à l'industrie allemande dans la construction des chemins de fer, je puis vous assurer que le Gouvernement français verra toujours volontiers des associations d'intérêt se produire entre les nationaux de nos deux pays." The French Government of course meant thereby to convey what His Majesty's Government understand the new Franco-German convention to intend, viz., that all the Powers shall be on the same footing as regards industrial enterprises in Morocco, but it would be well that there should be no doubt about it.

M. de Selves reminded me that M. de Kiderlen-Waechter had endeavoured to obtain from the French Government acquiescence in a species of Franco-German condominium. He had refused. M. de Kiderlen had then proposed that in the exchange of notes there should be a declaration that "les deux Gouvernements s'accorderont pour qu'il y aient des associations d'intérêt entre les nationaux des deux pays." M. de Selves had regarded this formula as an obligation for the two Governments to combine for the establishment of such association, and he had rejected it. He had informed the French Ambassador that the French Government would offer no opposition to such combinations if French financiers desired to form them, but the Government would not take upon itself to establish them or bring them about. It must be left to the financiers to do as they might deem advisable. The passage to which I had called his attention had been drafted with the view of carrying out that intention. There was no purpose of favouring German enterprise in preference to that of any other nationality.

I suggested to M. de Selves that the best way of obviating any question in the future as to the proper interpretation of the passage would be for him to address to me an explanatory note in reply to the memorandum which I gave to him, and of which I enclose a copy herein. This his Excellency said he would willingly do, and I have the satisfaction of transmitting to you herewith a copy of the note which M. de Selves has, in accordance with his promise, addressed to me to-day.

I have, &c.
FRANCIS BERTIE.

Enclosure 1 in No. 376.

Memorandum.

THE French Ambassador in London communicated confidentially to Sir Edward Grey a copy of the despatch which M. de Selves addressed to M. Jules Cambon on the 22nd ultimo on the subject of the Franco-German negotiations respecting Morocco. Annexed to this despatch are draft notes to be exchanged between M. de Kiderlen-Waechter and M. Jules Cambon dealing with certain points not specified in the proposed Franco-German convention.

In the draft note from M. Jules Cambon to M. de Kiderlen-Waechter the following passage occurs :—

" Le Gouvernement allemand renonçant à demander la détermination de parts à faire à l'industrie allemande dans la construction des chemins de fer, je puis vous assurer que le Gouvernement français verra toujours volontiers des associations d'intérêt se produire entre les nationaux des deux pays."

Sir Edward Grey has instructed Sir Francis Bertie to inform M. de Selves that, as the passage quoted above may possibly give rise to misunderstandings in the future, His Majesty's Government understand that, by the new Franco-German convention, all the Powers will be on the same footing as regards industrial enterprises in Morocco, and that the words " verra toujours volontiers des associations d intérêt se produire entre les nationaux de nos deux pays " are to be so construed.

British Embassy, Paris, October 14, 1911.

Enclosure 2 in No. 376.

M. de Selves to Sir F. Bertie.

M. l'Ambassadeur, *Paris, le* 15 *octobre,* 1911.

EN réponse à la note de votre Excellence en date d'hier, j'ai l'honneur de vous faire savoir que le texte communiqué à Sir Edward Grey par M. Paul Cambon ne doit pas être interprété comme impliquant une inégalité quelconque dans la situation des ressortissants des diverses Puissances au regard des entreprises industrielles au Maroc.

Les lettres échangées entre M. de Kiderlen et M. l'Ambassadeur de France à Berlin ne comportent de la part du Gouvernement français, en ce qui concerne la construction des chemins de fer au Maroc, aucun autre engagement que celui de ne point mettre obstacle aux projets des entrepreneurs ou concessionnaires français qui désireraient prendre pour associés des sujets allemands. La liberté pour ces mêmes entrepreneurs ou concessionnaires de choisir des associés de toute autre nationalité reste entière.

Je m'empresse de vous donner cette assurance, en vous priant de la transmettre à votre Gouvernement.

Agréez, &c.
J. DE SELVES.

[40798] No. 377.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 17.)

(No. 449. Confidential.)

Sir, *Paris, October* 16, 1911.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith a copy, which M. de Selves allowed to be taken by a secretary of this embassy, of the latest—the sixth—edition of the portion of the Franco-German convention which relates to Morocco, now in course of negotiation at Berlin between the French Ambassador and the German Foreign Secretary.

I have, &c.
FRANCIS BERTIE.

Enclosure in No. 377.

Sixth French Text of Portion of Franco-German Convention.

A LA suite des troubles qui se sont produits au Maroc et qui ont démontré la nécessité d'y poursuivre, dans l'intérêt général, l'œuvre de pacification et de progrès prévue par l'Acte d'Algésiras, le Gouvernement de la République française et le Gouvernement Impérial allemand ont jugé nécessaire de préciser et de compléter l'accord franco-allemand du 9 février, 1909. Ils sont convenus, à cet effet, des dispositions ci-après :—

ARTICLE 1er.

Le Gouvernement Impérial allemand déclare que, ne poursuivant au Maroc que des intérêts économiques, il n'entravera pas l'action de la France en vue de prêter son assistance au Gouvernement marocain pour l'introduction de toutes les réformes administratives, judiciaires, économiques, financières et militaires dont il a besoin pour le bon gouvernement de l'Empire, comme aussi pour tous les règlements nouveaux et les modifications aux règlements existants, que ces réformes comportent. En conséquence, il donne son adhésion aux mesures de réorganisation, de contrôle et de garantie financière que, après accord avec le Gouvernement marocain, le Gouvernement français croira devoir prendre à cet effet sous la réserve que l'action de la France sauvegardera au Maroc l'égalité économique entre les nations.

Au cas où la France serait amenée à préciser et à étendre son contrôle et sa protection, le Gouvernement Impérial allemand reconnaissant pleine liberté d'action à la France, et sous la réserve que la liberté commerciale prévue par les traités antérieurs sera maintenue, n'y apportera aucun obstacle.

Il est entendu qu'il ne sera porté aucune entrave aux droits et à l'actions de la Banque d'État du Maroc tels qu'ils ont été définis par l'Acte d'Algésiras.

ARTICLE 2.

Dans cet ordre d'idées, il est entendu que le Gouvernement Impérial ne fera pas obstacle à ce que la France, après accord avec le Gouvernement marocain, procède aux occupations militaires du territoire marocain qu'elle jugera nécessaires au maintien de l'ordre et de la sécurité des transactions commerciales, et à ce qu'elle exerce toute action de police sur terre et dans les eaux marocaines.

ARTICLE 3.

Dès à présent, si Sa Majesté le Sultan du Maroc venait à confier aux agents diplomatiques et consulaires de la France la représentation et la protection des sujets et des intérêts marocains à l'étranger, le Gouvernement Impérial déclare qu'il n'y fera pas d'objection.

Si, d'autre part, Sa Majesté le Sultan du Maroc confiait au représentant de la France près du Gouvernement marocain le soin d'être son intermédiaire auprès des représentants étrangers, le Gouvernement allemand n'y ferait pas d'objection.

ARTICLE 4.

Le Gouvernement français déclare que, fermement attaché au principe de la liberté commerciale au Maroc, il ne se prêtera à aucune inégalité pas plus dans l'établissement des droits de douane, impôts et autres taxes, que dans l'établissement des tarifs de transport par voie ferrée, voie de navigation fluviale ou toute autre voie, et notamment dans toutes les questions de transit.

Le Gouvernement français s'emploiera également auprès du Gouvernement marocain afin d'empêcher tout traitement différentiel entre les ressortissants des différentes Puissances ; il s'opposera notamment à toute mesure, par exemple, à la promulgation d'ordonnances administratives sur les poids et mesures, de jaugeage, de poinçonnage, &c., qui pourrait mettre en état d'infériorité les marchandises d'une Puissance.

Le Gouvernement français s'engage à user de son influence sur la Banque d'État pour que celle-ci confère à tour de rôle aux membres de sa direction à Tanger les postes de délégué dont elle dispose à la Commission des Valeurs douanières et au Comité permanent des Douanes.

ARTICLE 5.

Le Gouvernement français veillera à ce qu'il ne soit perçu au Maroc aucun droit d'exportation sur le minerai de fer exporté des ports marocains. Les exploitations de minerai de fer ne subiront ni sur leur production ni sur leurs moyens de travail aucun impôt spécial. Elles ne supporteront en dehors des impôts généraux qu'une redevance fixe, calculée par hectare et par an, et une redevance proportionnée au produit brut de l'extraction. Ces redevances, qui seront assises conformément aux articles 35 et 49 du projet de règlement minier annexé au protocole du 7 juin, 1910, de la conférence de Paris, seront également supportées par toutes les entreprises minières.

Le Gouvernement français veillera à ce que les taxes minières soient régulièrement perçues sans que des remises individuelles du total ou d'une partie de ces taxes puissent être consenties sous quelque prétexte que ce soit.

ARTICLE 6.

Le Gouvernement de la République française s'engage à veiller à ce que les travaux et fournitures nécessités par les concessions éventuelles de routes, chemins de fer, ports, télégraphes, &c., soient octroyés par le Gouvernement marocain suivant les règles de l'adjudication.

Il s'engage également à veiller à ce que les conditions de ces adjudications, particulièrement en ce qui concerne les fournitures de matériel et les délais impartis pour soumissionner, ne placent les ressortissants d'aucune Puissance dans une situation d'infériorité.

L'exploitation des grandes entreprises mentionnées ci-dessus sera réservée à l'État marocain ou librement concédée par lui à des tiers qui pourront être chargés de fournir les fonds nécessaires à cet effet. Le Gouvernement français veillera à ce que, dans l'exploitation des chemins de fer et autres moyens de transport comme dans l'application des règlements destinés à assurer celle-ci, aucune différence de traitement ne soit faite entre les ressortissants des diverses Puissances qui useraient de ces moyens de transport.

Le Gouvernement de la république usera de son influence sur la Banque d'État afin que celle-ci confère à tour de rôle aux membres de sa direction à Tanger le poste dont elle dispose de délégué à la Commission générale des Adjudications et Marchés.

De même, le Gouvernement français s'emploiera auprès du Gouvernement marocain pour que, tant que restera en vigueur l'article 66 de l'Acte d'Algésiras, il confie à un ressortissant d'une des Puissances représentées au Maroc un des trois postes de délégués chérifiens au Comité spécial des Travaux publics.

ARTICLE 7.

Le Gouvernement français s'emploiera auprès du Gouvernement marocain pour que les propriétaires de mines et d'autres exploitations industrielles ou agricoles, sans distinction de nationalité, et en conformité des règlements qui seront édictés en s'inspirant de la législation française sur la matière, puissent être autorisés à créer des chemins de fer d'exploitation destinés à relier leur centre de production aux lignes d'intérêt général et aux ports.

ARTICLE 8.

Il sera présenté tous les ans un rapport sur l'exploitation des chemins de fer au Maroc, qui sera établi dans les mêmes formes et conditions que les rapports présentés aux assemblées d'actionnaires des sociétés de chemins de fer françaises.

Le Gouvernement de la république chargera un des administrateurs de la Banque d'État de l'établissement de ce rapport, qui sera, avec les éléments qui en seront la base, communiqué aux censeurs, puis rendu public avec, s'il y a lieu, les observations que ces derniers croiront devoir y joindre d'après leurs propres renseignements.

ARTICLE 9.

Pour éviter, autant que possible, les réclamations diplomatiques, le Gouvernement français s'emploiera auprès du Gouvernement marocain afin que celui-ci défère à un arbitre désigné *ad hoc* pour chaque affaire, d'un commun accord, par le consul de France et par celui de la Puissance intéressée ou, à leur défaut, par les deux Gouvernements, les plaintes portées par des ressortissants étrangers contre les autorités

marocaines ou les personnes agissant en tant qu'autorités marocaines, et qui n'auraient pu être réglées par l'intermédiaire du consul français et du consul du Gouvernement intéressé.

Cette procédure restera en vigueur jusqu'au jour où aura été institué un régime judiciaire inspiré des règles générales de législation des Puissances intéressées et destiné à remplacer, après entente avec elles, les tribunaux consulaires.

ARTICLE 10.

Le Gouvernement français veillera à ce que les ressortissants étrangers continuent à jouir du droit de pêche dans les eaux et ports marocains.

ARTICLE 11.

Le Gouvernement français s'emploiera auprès du Gouvernement marocain pour que celui-ci ouvre au commerce étranger de nouveaux ports au fur et à mesure des besoins de ce commerce.

ARTICLE 12.

Pour répondre à une demande du Gouvernement marocain, les deux Gouvernements s'engagent à provoquer la revision, d'accord avec les autres Puissances et sur la base de la Convention de Madrid, des listes et de la situation des protégés étrangers et des associés agricoles au Maroc dont parlent les articles 8 et 16 de cette convention.

Ils conviennent également de poursuivre auprès des Puissances signataires toutes les modifications de la Convention de Madrid que comporterait, le moment venu, le changement du régime des protégés et associés agricoles.

ARTICLE 13.

Toutes clauses d'accord, convention, traité ou règlement qui seraient contraires aux précédentes stipulations sont et demeurent abrogées.

ARTICLE 14.

Le présent accord sera communiqué aux autres Puissances signataires de l'Acte d'Algésiras, près desquelles les deux Gouvernements s'engagent à se prêter mutuellement appui pour obtenir leur adhésion.

[41801] No. 378.

Minute by Sir A. Nicolson.

Sir Edward Grey,

M. CAMBON called this afternoon. He said that the opposition in France in regard to the Congo question was very considerable, but, nevertheless, he thought that an arrangement with Germany would be reached in two or three weeks time.

He told me that M. de Selves had spoken to him as to the arrangement which would have to be subsequently made with Spain. It seemed to M. de Selves that a curious and unprecedented situation would be created by the Sultan being nominally overlord of Morocco, two portions of which would be under the protectorate of two different foreign countries. He foresaw that there would be great difficulty in arranging so that there should be no friction and overlapping between the French and Spanish administrations of the respective spheres. M. de Selves thought that the simplest plan would be to hand over entirely to Spain in absolute tenure her sphere—in short let her annex it. M. Cambon thought that the Sultan would never consent to such a cession. What did I think?

I told him that it was difficult to give a reply without reflection, but I had *a priori* some doubts as to whether the Sultan would be quite intractable on the point. He would, I thought, not very clearly distinguish between a protectorate and an abandonment of a portion of his country, his sovereignty would, he might consider, in reality suffer almost as much in the one case as in the other. Moreover, the Spanish zone was situated in great part in a portion of Morocco over which the authority of the Sultan was rather shadowy. But I could not answer his enquiry off-hand, there

were the tribes to consider and also other Powers. At the same time I could quite see the inconveniences of two foreign protectorates in one country and under one nominal sovereign.

A. N.

Foreign Office, October 18, 1911.

[41081] No. 379.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 19.)

[By Post.]

(No. 175.)
(Telegraphic.) *En clair.* *Paris, October* 18, 1911.

M. DE SELVES informs me this evening that the negotiations at Berlin have not made much progress. M. de Kiderlen-Waechter is very uncompromising. He says that owing to public opinion in Germany he cannot cede the whole of the Bec du Canard, and he presses for the "coupure" in the French Congo, which was offered only on the supposition that the French Government were to obtain the Bec du Canard and a rectification of frontier at the expense of German Togoland; and that France was to have the free hand in Morocco contemplated in the early edition of the French projet de convention, from which there have since been derogations at the instance of the German Government.

[41224] No. 380.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 20.)

(No. 451. Confidential.)
Sir, *Paris, October* 19, 1911.

AFTER M. de Selves had given me the information in regard to the negotiations at Berlin concerning the cessions to be made to Germany in the French Congo which I reported to you in my telegram No. 175 of yesterday evening, his Excellency said that he had thought much over the arrangements to be made with Spain after the conclusion of the French negotiations with the German Government supposing that they had a successful issue, which he earnestly hoped. If lines defining the limits of the Spanish zones in Morocco were negotiated, what would be the position of the Spanish Government in relation to the Sultan? If Morocco came under the protectorate of France it would be for the French Government to advise him; and in matters relating to the parts of his dominions within the Spanish zones the advice tendered to His Majesty by the French Government might, in the opinion of the Spanish Government, not be in accordance with Spanish interests, and in any case, for the Spanish authorities to have to carry out measures suggested to the Sultan by French advisers might be hurtful to Spanish *amour-propre*. It had been suggested that a Spanish commissioner might be appointed to advise the Sultan on matters concerning the Spanish zones, but this would hardly be consistent with the position of Morocco under the protectorate of France, and her consequent responsibility to foreign Powers. These were only instances of the many difficulties which would be caused by Spain occupying the position of a species of *succursale* in the French protectorate of Morocco. It had, therefore, M. de Selves said, occurred to him that a solution of these difficulties might be that Spain should have the absolute cession of and sovereignty over certain portions of Morocco to be defined by convention, supposing the Sultan could be persuaded to consent to such an arrangement. M. de Selves said that he would not propose it if His Majesty's Government would object, but he would be glad if I could ascertain their views on the subject.

I told M. de Selves that I had no idea what His Majesty's Government might think of such a solution of the undoubted difficulties in a definition of the position in relation to the Sultan of a Spanish occupation and administration of portions of Morocco, but I had noticed that in the draft convention to be discussed with the Spanish Government which he had been good enough to communicate to me there was no stipulation, as there had been in the Franco-Spanish Convention of 1904, that no part of the Spanish zones were to be in any way alienated to a foreign Power. M. de Selves replied that this was an omission of which he had been made aware, and which would be corrected. The draft convention had been sent to the French Ambassador for his information

only. It had not been communicated to the Spanish Government. His Excellency asked me to receive M. Regnault to explain what his ideas were in regard to possible and satisfactory arrangements with Spain. I am to see M. Regnault to-day.

I have, &c.
FRANCIS BERTIE.

[41209] No. 381.

Earl Granville to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 20.)

(No. 90. Confidential.)
Telegraphic.) P. *Berlin, October* 19, 1911.

FRANCO-GERMAN negotiations regarding Morocco.

Yesterday morning the French Ambassador proposed an arrangement whereby Germany would gain points of contact on the Congo and Ubanghi rivers. M. Cambon put forward this proposal on his own initiative as a personal suggestion after four days had been spent in negotiations which appeared to be quite hopeless. This suggestion was accepted late last night by Herr von Kiderlen, who had meanwhile consulted the Imperial Chancellor on the subject. The suggestion was also communicated to the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, who replied by telegraph to-day that he will submit the point to the Cabinet to-morrow, and that it seems to form a possible basis for conducting the negotiations. M. Cambon hopes that it will prove possible to come to an agreement on the basis thus formed, but he expects that considerable further negotiations will be required in the first place.

[41371] No. 382.

Sir R. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 21.)

(No. 323.)
Sir, *Tangier, October* 14, 1911.

AS I had the honour to report by telegraph, I returned to Tangier on the 10th instant and resumed charge of His Majesty's Legation. I was struck by the general calm which prevailed; the bickerings over local matters between the French and Spaniards appear to have ceased, and the personal relations between the Marquis de Villa Sinda and M. de Billy, which at one moment were strained, have become quite normal and pleasant again. M. de Billy told me that he had latterly given up going to see M. de Villa Sinda as the military authorities appeared to leave him in ignorance of their proceedings and paid but scant attention to any recommendations which he might make. He added that he had complete confidence in M. de Villa Sinda's loyalty. The German Minister went on leave the day I arrived, and the Italian Minister left yesterday.

Considerable uneasiness exists in commercial circles as to the future of Tangier under the new régime, whenever it comes into force. M. Pariente and others have spoken to me on the subject. They maintain that if Tangier is to be internationalised, its commercial prosperity must inevitably suffer. France will do all in her power to push commercial enterprises in the French zone; Spain will do the same in the Spanish zone; no one will make any special efforts with regard to the interests of Tangier, and the situation would further be complicated by international rivalry and jealousies. I had never thought of this point of view, having always imagined that Tangier, by its geographical situation, tradition, &c., must remain the principal port of Morocco, and would be the first to be connected with Fez by a railway; but I must say that, on reading the remarks made by M. Geoffray to Sir M. de Bunsen (see his despatch No. 142 of the 8th August, I begin to think that the inhabitants of Tangier may have some ground for apprehension. I have no idea whether the French Government have fallen in with M. Geoffray's project of building in the first instance a line from Casa Blanca through Fez and Taza to the Algerian frontier. If it were carried out, a heavy blow would undoubtedly be dealt to Tangier, and I cannot think that the Spaniards would be particularly pleased if they came to realise the reason for which the question of the Tangier railway was to be eliminated from the discussion of the Franco-Moorish Financial Convention, whenever it be reopened.

I have, &c.
REGINALD LISTER.

[41526] No. 383.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 22.)

[By Post.]

(No. 177. Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) *En clair.* *Paris, October* 21, 1911.

M. DE SELVES informs me that an arrangement to get round the difficulty of the "coupure" is probable. A band of territory 4 kilom. wide would be conceded to Germany across French territory to the navigable part of the Ubanghi, in the vicinity of Bangui. This is to enable Germany to construct a railway from the Cameroons to the river, and the French could keep up communication between the two parts of French Congo by the river. It is thought that the German aim is to build a railway through the northern part of Belgian Congo to German East Africa.

A give-and-take arrangement, involving exchanges of territory, is probable in regard to the Bec du Canard.

The Germans are to have both banks of the Sangha, and a small piece of territory south of it at one point.

All these questions are to be further discussed between the French Ambassador at Berlin and M. de Kiderlen-Waechter this evening.

[41711] No. 384.

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 23.)

(No. 173. Confidential.)
Sir, *Madrid, October* 19, 1911.

THE French Ambassador received a few days ago a telegram from Paris instructing him to inform the Spanish Government that, as the negotiations at Berlin are still proceeding, the French Government do not consider that the time has yet come to resume negotiations with Spain. This communication will no doubt cause disappointment to Señor Garcia Prieto, who was encouraged by reports received from the Spanish Ambassador in Paris to hope that negotiations would be opened at Madrid as soon as M. Jules Cambon and Herr Kiderlen-Waechter had come to terms concerning Morocco, and without waiting for the signature of the complete arrangements between France and Germany.

M. Geoffray is inclined to think that the hesitation of the French Government to embark on fresh negotiations with Spain is due, to a great extent, to the existence of divided counsels at Paris as to the nature of the arrangements to be made with this Government. M. de Selves himself is believed by his Excellency to be still disposed to offer a settlement on the lines of the draft convention, a copy of which was forwarded to you by Sir Francis Bertie in his despatch No. 386, Confidential, of the 1st ultimo. On the other hand, the French Ambassador gives me to understand that certain members of the French Cabinet have been won over to the views of the French colonial party, which desires to reduce the Spanish sphere of influence in Northern Morocco to much narrower limits than those marked out in the 1904 convention. The French Minister of War is said to go as far as to advocate the complete exclusion of Spanish influence from Morocco, except within the limits of the ancient Spanish "Presidios."

A new draft convention seeking apparently to conciliate the views of the anti-Spanish group in the French Cabinet with those which were tentatively put forward by M. de Selves in the earlier draft has now been received by M. Geoffray from the French Ministry for Foreign Affairs. It is, however, unaccompanied by any despatch, and his Excellency is left in doubt as to its paternity, and as to the amount of support which it is likely to receive from the French Cabinet as a whole.

His Excellency had the goodness to allow me to read the document in question, which is to the following effect:—

France and Spain, each within her zone, will assist the Moorish Government in the introduction of all necessary reforms, whether administrative, judicial, economic, financial, and military. But the regulations relating to such reforms are to be drawn up by the Makhzen itself. They will be of a general character, applicable to the whole of Morocco; no special arrangements relating to one or the other zone can be made without the previous consent of the Power exercising influence in that zone. The regulations will be applied by the authorities of the Makhzen, under the control of

French or Spanish agents according to the zone. The foregoing does not apply to the region adjoining the Algerian frontier, or to those near Melilla or Ceuta, in all of which the existing conventions between Morocco, France, and Spain respectively hold good. The line dividing the French and Spanish zones is drawn as in the secret convention of 1904, with a few unimportant variations. South of this line the whole of Morocco falls within the French zone. With the consent of the Makhzen either Power may send troops or police to any point within its zone, to maintain order and protect commerce. There are articles prohibiting new fortifications in the Spanish zone, and preserving the international character of Tangier. Existing French and Spanish schools, consulates, and other establishments are to be reciprocally respected. Freedom of worship is guaranteed, as is also free passage between Tangier and Fez for all Moorish troops and convoys, for Moorish and foreign officials, and for all travellers bearing proper papers of identification. French and Spanish protection, diplomatic and consular, is accorded abroad to Moors hailing respectively from the French or Spanish zone. Neither Power will issue any fresh papers of protection to Moors. They agree to revise their lists of protected Moors in the spirit of the Madrid convention of 1880. Eventually consular jurisdiction will be surrendered in favour of a new Moorish judicial organisation. There shall be no interference with the service of control over the collection of revenues assigned to the 1904 and 1910 loans. Taxes and customs surplus, after paying service of debt and annuity due to the French Treasury, are assigned by the Moorish Minister of Finance to the separate budgets of the two zones, under the following headings:—

1. Sum for the maintenance of the Sultan's Court and the central administration of the Makhzen, fixed at 6,000,000 Hassani pesetas, 30 per cent. falling on the Spanish zone.
2. Sum for payment of the administrative and judicial personnel, as fixed by the Central Moorish Finance Department, on reports sent in by the local administrations.
3. Military expenses.
4. Public works. Credits fixed by the Moorish Minister of Public Works, according to the existing regulations.

All French and Spanish agents are selected and appointed by the Makhzen from lists of candidates submitted by the French and Spanish Governments respectively.

The $2\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. supplementary customs duty remains in the hands of the French chief engineer, who will delegate the Spanish assistant engineer to supervise public works in the Spanish sphere.

Customs and fiscal unity to be preserved throughout the Empire, with complete economic liberty and adherence to articles 4, 5, 6, and 7 of the new Franco-German convention. Railways and telegraphs are to be under the Minister of Public Works, the Tangier-Fez Railway having the first claim to be constructed.

The present agreement supersedes all others.

Comparing this draft with the former one, it is clear that the new draft seeks to invest the Central Government at Fez with full powers of administration over both the French and Spanish zones. The detailed financial arrangements are evidently designed to place the final decision with regard to public expenditure in either zone in the hands of the Moorish Minister of Finance, who will be in a position to accept or reject any of the proposals made to him by the local French or Spanish authorities. Obviously the result must be that the French Government, which will exercise its protectorate over the Sultan, would dictate to the latter the reply he should give to all representations emanating from the Spanish zone. Although, therefore, there is in these new proposals an appearance of equality between the administrative and controlling powers to be exercised by France and Spain in their respective zones, it is more than probable that in practice Spain would find herself within her own zone to be as much under the protection of France as the French officials in the French zone would be.

This, at all events, is the light in which the anonymous project which he has received from the Quai d'Orsay strikes M. Geoffray, and he has reported accordingly to his Government. I agree with him in thinking that it would be rejected by the Spanish Government, whereas the earlier draft, of which, subject to an addition regarding fortifications, you have expressed your approval to the French Government, would very likely commend itself to the Spanish Government as forming a possible basis of the future relations between the French and Spanish zones in Morocco.

The question is, however, one of extraordinary difficulty. If the unity of Morocco is to be maintained, the action of the Central Government at Fez must necessarily extend to all parts of the Empire. But the Central Government cannot be exercised independently of the protecting influence of France. Thus, French protection must

indirectly pervade the whole country—the Spanish portion as well as the French portion. But no Spanish Government could recommend to the Cortes an arrangement by which there would be even an appearance of the Spanish zone in Morocco forming part of the French protectorate. Señor Garcia Prieto expressed to me his opinion a few days ago that the problem could only be solved by placing at Fez a Spanish agent, whose advice concerning all matters in the Spanish zone the Sultan would be as much bound to take as the Khedive is bound to take the advice offered by the British agent at Cairo. Or, he added, the Spanish agent could be placed at Tangier on the understanding that the Sultan's representative at that port should be completely under his control. In either case, it seems to me that the Spanish and French zones would be under separate administrations; there would be two distinct protectorates in Morocco, and the unity of the Empire would practically cease to exist.

I lately had some conversation on these questions with Señor Moret, the predecessor as Prime Minister of Señor Canalejas.

Señor Moret thinks it will be impossible to devise an arrangement under which France and Spain could get on peacefully side by side in Morocco, under the Franco-Moorish administration such as seems to be contemplated. He feels also that the Spanish sphere as defined in the 1904 convention is much too large to be administered by Spain without an expenditure of money and energy which is beyond the resources of this country. He disapproves therefore of the Spanish occupation of Laraiche and Alcazar, and would prefer to restrict the Spanish zone to a strip extending along the coast from Ceuta to the Muluya. But, as he can see no way of satisfactorily adjusting the relations between a zone of Spanish influence and a zone of French influence, he is convinced that the only practicable solution of the difficulty would be for Spain to occupy her restricted zone in full possession and to govern it as a Spanish province, as France governs Algeria. By including Tetuan in the Spanish strip, his Excellency thinks that the bitterness of the withdrawal of the Spanish troops from Laraiche and Alcazar, which he holds to be necessary, would be to some extent counteracted. Tangier and its neighbourhood would, of course, remain internationalised.

Señor Moret's scheme in short is to extend over the whole of the said strip of coast the Spanish sovereignty, which has been exercised for centuries over certain strategic points within that strip. It should not be difficult, in his opinion, to draw a line inland which would give to Spain a reasonable amount of hinterland.

His Excellency has also spoken to the French Ambassador in this sense. To both of us, however, he added that his opinion could now be of no value, as his influence with the present Government is too slight to enable him even to put his views before them. In this I think his Excellency is right. Though there is wisdom in his suggestions, it is, I am afraid, out of the question that the Government of Señor Canalejas, which is so deeply committed to the occupation of Alcazar and Laraiche, should entertain proposals for the evacuation of those places, or for any material limitation of the long-accepted limits of the Spanish zone.

Since writing the above, I have seen, by the courtesy of M. Geoffray, a telegram addressed yesterday to his Excellency by M. de Selves, stating that the French Government will now shortly send him instructions to resume negotiations with Spain, but that, before doing so, they propose to consult with His Majesty's Government as to the precise proposals which, under present circumstances, it would be expedient to make to the Spanish Government, the opinion of the French Government being that a proposal framed on the lines of the solution favoured by Señor Moret would best meet the existing situation. I have briefly reported the upshot of M. Geoffray's instructions in my telegram No. 79 of to-day.

M. Geoffray has, I believe, replied that Señor Moret's scheme would certainly be rejected by Señor Canalejas; that neither the King nor the Spanish army could accept it; that it would provoke, if put forward, a burst of indignation throughout the country; and that its immediate effect would probably be to cause Spain to appeal to Germany for protection against what she wuuld describe as an act of spoliation. His Excellency still thinks that the wiser course is to concede to Spain the stipulated zone of influence; to submit to her a *modus vivendi* more or less in the terms of the draft convention first proposed by M. de Selves, and accepted by you; and to leave it to time and experience to demonstrate to Spain the expediency of gradually restricting her action beyond the Straits of Gibraltar within narrower limits than those laid down in the convention of 1904.

Meanwhile the failure, which is becoming more and more apparent, of the recent military operations on the Kert, has placed the Government of Señor Canalejas in a difficult position, and the blow which Spanish prestige has sustained in the Riff region

is likely to make it more difficult than ever for the Prime Minister to consent to what he would regard as the further humiliation of a retreat from Alcazar and Laraiche.

The question of the proposals which should now be made by France to Spain is complicated by the fact that nothing definite is yet known as to the extent of territory in Southern Morocco, to which Spain would consent to abandon her claims in consideration of a free hand in Northern Morocco. On this point, Señor Garcia Prieto has only confided to me that, while accepting the principle of making some territorial sacrifice to France, the Spanish Government could not, in his opinion, surrender their treaty right to Ifni and the adjoining coast-line.

I have, &c.
MAURICE DE BUNSEN.

[41581] No. 385.

Earl Granville to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 23.)

(No. 331. Confidential.)

Sir, *Berlin, October 20, 1911.*

AS I had the honour to report in my telegram No. 90 of yesterday, the French Ambassador informed me that the first four days' negotiations on the question of compensation for Germany in the French Congo had seemed absolutely hopeless; he and Herr von Kiderlen had stood *nez à nez*, and there did not appear to be any means of reconciling the views of the two Governments. At last, on Wednesday morning, M. Cambon, on his own initiative, took a pencil and sketched on the map a rough outline which would give Germany a narrow strip running down to the Ubanghi and another to the Congo. Herr von Kiderlen agreed to submit this to the Imperial Chancellor, and, when he again received M. Cambon late on Wednesday evening, he expressed his willingness to accept this solution. M. Cambon, of course, had to emphasise again the fact that the suggestion had only been his own, and that his Government had not even seen it. His Excellency telegraphed it to M. de Selves that night, and received an answer in the course of yesterday to the effect that his suggestion would be submitted to the Conseil des Ministres to-day, and that it seemed to form a possible basis for negotiations. M. Cambon considers that the possession by Germany of a few kilometres of the shores of the Ubanghi and Congo can hardly be looked upon, even by the extreme colonial chauvinists, as cutting off the upper part of the French possessions from the lower part and the sea. He is full of hope that the basis thus found will enable him to bring the negotiations to a successful conclusion, but he expects that his Government will hesitate a good deal and make further proposals before finally agreeing to this one.

There is very little worth reporting in the German press. Rumours are printed as to the progress, or rather want of progress, of the negotiations; a few quotations are given from French newspapers, aud the fact is insisted on that Germany cannot accept anything but very extensive compensation in the Congo. The Pan-German "Post" prints a fiery article maintaining that the Government are making a bad bargain in any case, as no territory in tropical Africa, however extensive, is worth a share of Morocco; but if Morocco is to be given up entirely Germany ought to demand the whole of the French Congo, Dahomey, and Madagascar; short of that, the only solution which could be considered acceptable would be that Germany should receive from France the whole Congo colony, including the Lake Chad and Ubanghi districts, together with France's right of pre-emption of Belgian Congo, and that she should at once arrange with Belgium for the purchase of the country north and east of the Congo, and that she should also at last obtain from Portugal the execution of the Delagoa treaty. Otherwise the Reichstag should refuse the whole thing, and Germany should return to the standpoint of insisting either on the withdrawal of all French and Spanish troops from Morocco or on the division of that country between France, Spain, and Germany.

I have, &c.
GRANVILLE.

(41549] No. 386.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 23.)

(No. 455. Confidential.)

Sir, *Paris, October 21, 1911.*

I HAVE the honour to inform you, with reference to my despatch No. 451, Confidential, of the 19th instant, that M. Regnault, the French Minister in Morocco, came to see me on that day, in order to describe to me a scheme which M. de Selves thought might be a satisfactory solution of the problem of settling the respective positions of France and Spain in Morocco, supposing that Morocco later on as a result of the present negotiations with Germany became a French protectorate.

M. Regnault brought with him two documents, of which I enclose copies herein. The first of these is entitled "Projet d'Accord hispano-marocain," and the other "Déclaration française." Some of the articles in the Hispano-Moorish Agreement are only in outline, but their general object is that Spain should have the absolute cession of and sovereignty over certain portions of Morocco, in return for which she would consent to renounce any pretensions to exert her influence over any other portion of the Sultan's dominions. M. Regnault left with me two maps illustrating the French proposals, which I have the honour to forward to you herewith.* These proposals are based on the idea that the Spanish possessions in Morocco should be delimited not by conventional lines, such as were laid down for the Spanish zones by the Franco-Spanish Agreement of 1904, but by the natural lines of the water-parting between the Mediterranean and Atlantic. Roughly speaking, under the new proposals the basins of the rivers which flow into the Mediterranean, with the exception of the upper valleys of the Moulouya, which are to remain under the sovereignty of the Sultan, will belong to Spain, while the Moorish Government, or, in other words, the French Government, will have exclusive control over the basins of all rivers flowing into the Atlantic. The effect of this would be that the north-west corner of Morocco, which has hitherto been in the Spanish zone, from a point south of Laraiche to Cape Al Kazar, east of Tangier on the Straits of Gibraltar, would come under the protectorate of France.

Article 1 of the draft Hispano-Moorish Agreement defines the territory of the Mediterranean coast which the Sultan of Morocco is to cede to Spain. The frontier is to follow the left bank of the Moulouya from its mouth to the ford of Mechra-Sefa. From that point, the want of geographical knowledge of the mountainous Riff region and the insecure state of the country prevent an exact frontier line being laid down at the present time. The two Governments therefore adhere to the principle that the frontier shall follow the line of the water-parting in a westerly direction between the Mediterranean and Atlantic basins. After reaching the Fondak of Ain-Djedida the frontier line turns northward, and follows the watershed between the Oued-Khemis (which flows into the Mediterranean) and the Oued-el-Kebir (which flows into the Atlantic), and continuing along the watershed between the basins of the Oued Kazar and the Oued Lien reaches the shores of the Straits of Gibraltar at Cape Al Kazar.

Article 2 stipulates that the town and territory of Tetuan shall remain subject to the sovereignty of the Sultan. They are to be administered jointly by a Spanish High Commissioner and a Shereefian High Commissioner whose powers are to be settled in accordance with the general principles of the Hispano-Moorish Treaty of the 17th November, 1910 (see confidential print "Affairs of Morocco," Part XLI, p. 328). The territory in question is indicated in green on the map (A) accompanying this despatch.*

By article 3 the Sultan of Morocco cedes territory, to Spain to be delimited subsequently, consisting of a strip of coast between Oued Bou Cedra and Oued Kchich. This territory is indicated in red on map (B) which accompanies this despatch.*

By article 4 Spain engages neither to alienate nor to cede in any form, or even temporarily, her rights over the whole of or in any portion of the territories mentioned in the preceding articles.

Article 6. In order to ensure the free passage of the Straits of Gibraltar, Spain agrees not to allow any fortifications or strategical works of any kind, other than those already existing,, to be erected on the part of the coast of Morocco between Melilla and Cape Al Kazar. The zone in question begins from a point on the coast 30 kilom. south-east of Melilla.

The "Déclaration française" deals primarily with the question of Tangier. The first article lays down that the city of Tangier, in accordance with the Franco-Spanish

* Not reproduced.

Convention of 1904, shall be administered under the sovereignty of the Sultan by a municipal body having an international character. The Sultan's delegate at Tangier will be president of the body *ex officio*.

Articles 2, 3, and 4 deal with the question of the police in Tangier and in the surrounding zone, the extent of which is to be determined by the firman by which the municipal organisation will be established.

Article 5 provides for the free passage through the district of Tangier of convoys destined for the Makhzen or for the Shereefian troops, and of all foreigners who are provided with papers of identity.

By article 6 the French Government undertakes, in order to ensure the free passage of the Straits of Gibraltar, to see that neither fortifications nor strategical works of any kind shall be constructed between Cape Al Kazar and the heights which dominate the right bank of the River Sebou.

M. Regnault, after enlarging on the difficulty of carrying out in their entirety the arrangements contemplated in the Franco-Spanish Convention of 1904, gave me a summary description of the proposals set forth in the enclosed documents.

When I asked him what he thought would be the view taken by the Spanish Government of the scheme, he replied that Spain must be expected to make sacrifices to France in return for the improved position which she would occupy in Morocco through the territorial compensations to be given to Germany by France.

M. Regnault then enquired what I thought would be the view taken by His Majesty's Government of the proposals which he had described. I told him that I could not say what view His Majesty's Government would take of them, but, in my personal opinion, they would not be likely to concur in the substitution of France for Spain on the Atlantic coast of Morocco. In reply to his enquiry as to my reason for the opinion which I had expressed, I observed that France was a first class naval Power, which Spain was not. He thereupon suggested that the Atlantic coast in the occupation of Spain might be detrimental to British interests if Spain were in alliance with Germany. I replied that the British fleet came between Germany and Spain. M. Regnault did not pursue the subject. I told him that I would, as I had undertaken to M. de Selves, communicate the suggestions to you for your consideration.

This morning I saw M. de Selves for a few minutes on the subject of the Congo negotiations. He mentioned to me M. Regnault's communication, and asked me what I thought of it and what I thought you would think of it. I said that I supposed that the suggestions were rather the ideas of M. Regnault than his own proposals and that they seemed to me to be a very great departure from the intentions of the 1904 arrangements, which would be a large pill for His Majesty's Government to swallow. M. de Selves, without admitting that the suggestions were M. Regnault's ideas, said that the proposals were only a sketch for your consideration. He would not put them forward without your concurrence, for he desired to act entirely in unison with His Majesty's Government.

I have, &c.
FRANCIS BERTIE.

Enclosure 1 in No. 386.

Draft of Hispano-Moroccan Agreement.

ARTICLE 1er.

LE Sultan du Maroc cède à l'Espagne, sous la réserve indiquée à l'article 2, les territoires du littoral de la Méditerranée limités par la ligne indiquée ci-après :—

La frontière suit la rive gauche de la Moulouya depuis son embouchure jusqu'au gué de Mechra-Sefa. A partir de ce point, l'absence de connaissances géographiques sur la région montagneuse du Rif et l'état d'insécurité du pays ne permettant pas de préciser, dès maintenant, un tracé, les deux Gouvernements s'en tiennent à ce principe, que la frontière gagnera par le parallèle du point et suivra la ligne de partage des eaux entre le bassin de la Méditerranée d'une part, et d'autre part, les vallées de la Moulouya, de l'Oued Msoum, de l'Oued Innaouen, du Sebou, du Lokkos, de leurs affluents et des bassins côtiers de l'Atlantique. Cette ligne aboutit au Fondak d'Aïn-Djedida.

Elle se dirige ensuite vers le nord en suivant la ligne de faîte entre les bassins de l'Oued Khemis, sur le versant Méditerranée, et celui de l'Oued-el-Kébir sur le

versant Atlantique; puis elle se continue par la ligne de faîte entre le bassin de l'Oued Kazar d'une part, et celui de l'Oued Lian d'autre part, pour aboutir à la pointe Al-Kazar sur le littoral du détroit de Gibraltar.

ARTICLE 2.

La ville et le territoire de Tétouan resteront soumis à la souveraineté du Sultan. Ils seront administrés par un Haut Commissaire espagnol et un Haut Commissaire chérifien. Leurs pouvoirs seront déterminés d'après les principes généraux du traité hispano-marocain du 17 novembre, 1910.

Ce territoire est délimité au nord par une ligne partant du Cap Negro suivant la ligne de faîte des Montagnes Coudia-Taïfou, Coudia-bou-Zeguelet, pour aboutir au point le plus méridional du cours de l'Oued Smir et gagner par le parallèle de ce point le cours supérieur de l'Oued-el-Khemis.

Elle descendra ensuite le thalweg de cette rivière jusqu'à son confluent avec l'Oued Martil ou rivière de Tétouan. De ce point, elle remontera le thalweg de l'Oued-el-Hayra jusqu'à son confluent avec l'Oued-el-Nahla ou des Beni-Hassan.

Elle suivra ensuite jusqu'à la mer la ligne indiquée sur la carte ci-annexée,* de l'état-major espagnol, comme étant la limite méridionale de la tribu des Beni-Hozmar.

ARTICLE 3.

Le Sultan du Maroc cède, en outre à l'Espagne un territoire qui sera délimité ultérieurement et qui comprendra une partie du littoral entre l'Oued-bou-Cedra et l'Oued Kchich. A l'intérieur du pays, cette possession s'étendra jusqu'au cours supérieur de l'Oued Moul-el-Achar et de l'Oued Asif-N'baga. Elle rejoindra de là le cours supérieur de l'Oued-bou-Cedra, conformément à la carte ci-annexée du service géographique de l'armée française.*

ARTICLE 4.

L'Espagne s'engage à n'aliéner ni à céder sous aucune forme, même à titre temporaire, ses droits dans tout ou partie des territoires indiqués aux articles précédents.

ARTICLE 5.

Afin d'assurer le libre passage du détroit de Gibraltar, l'Espagne convient de ne pas laisser s'élever de fortifications ou d'ouvrages stratégiques quelconques, autres que ceux déjà existants sur la partie de la côte marocaine comprise entre Melilla et la pointe Al-Kazar. La zone visée ci-dessus commence sur la côte à 30 kilom. au sud-est de Melilla.

ARTICLE 6.

Il ne sera apporté aucune entrave sur la partie du territoire espagnol entre Tanger et Tétouan à la libre circulation des convois destinés au Maghzen, des fonctionnaires chérifiens ou des voyageurs de toute nationalité, avec leurs armes et bagages et munis de pièces d'identité, à la condition pour eux de se conformer au règlement chérifien sur le permis de port d'armes. Ils pourront être accompagnés d'escortes et de domestiques.

ARTICLE 7.

Le Gouvernement espagnol adhère pour ce qui concerne les territoires visés aux articles 1er et 3 du présent accord, aux dispositions des articles 4, 5, 6, 7 et 12 du projet d'accord franco-allemand.

ARTICLE 8.

Disposition à rédiger relative aux tarifs de douane qui, dans les territoires visés au présent accord, devront rester fixés à 10 pour cent *ad valorem* et temporairement à 2½ pour cent pour la Caisse spéciale.

ARTICLE 9.

Dispositions à rédiger relative à l'affectation du produit des douanes, des droits miniers, et des impôts perçus dans les territoires visés au présent accord, à l'amortissement de l'indemnité prévue par les articles 13 et 14 de l'accord hispano-marocain de 1910.

* Not reproduced.

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ARTICLE 10.

Disposition à rédiger relative à la répression réciproque de la contrebande douanière et de la contrebande des armes ou marchandises prohibées.

ARTICLE 11.

Les crédits ouverts par l'article 6 de l'Acte d'Algésiras pour la police des ports devant être épuisés au 1er janvier, 1912, le Gouvernement marocain sera tenu d'assurer à partir de cette date, par ses propres moyens, la protection des ports. Il s'entendra avec l'Espagne en ce qui touche Tétouan et le territoire de cette ville pour l'organisation d'un corps de police marocain, conformément aux principes généraux de la police des ports. L'effectif de cette troupe sera fixé à 300 hommes. Les frais d'armement, d'équipement, et d'entretien en seront imputés sur le produit des impôts perçus dans le territoire soumis à l'action de la police.

ARTICLE 12.

Disposition à rédiger abrogeant les clauses contraires des traités, conventions et accords antérieurs.

Enclosure 2 in No. 386.

French Declaration.

LA ville de Tanger, conformément à l'article de l'accord franco-espagnol de 1904, sera administrée, sous la souveraineté du Sultan, par une municipalité ayant un caractère international. Le délégué du Sultan à Tanger en sera de droit le président.

2. Il appartiendra à la municipalité de Tanger d'exercer la police de la ville et de l'agglomération urbaine, dont le périmètre sera déterminé par le firman constitutif de l'organisation municipale.

3. Quant à la région extérieure comprise entre les limites du périmètre municipal et une ligne passant au sud par Arzila, Souk-el-Had-Rarbia, Fondak-el-Ihoudi, l'Oued-el-Hericha, le Fondak d'Aïn-Djedida, et à l'est par la frontière du nouveau territoire espagnol, et aboutissant au Cap d'El-Kçar-el-Skrir, sur le détroit de Gibraltar, la police continuera à en être assurée par les contingents marocains et les cadres qui composent le tabor extra-urbain de Tanger.

Cette force, dont l'effectif sera porté à 600 hommes, sera administrée, instruite et commandée suivant les principes actuellement en vigueur. Les frais d'armement, d'équipement, de casernement et d'entretien de cette force seront à la charge du Trésor chérifien.

4. Si, dans la région indiquée à l'article précédent, il venait à se produire des troubles qui ne pourraient être réprimés par la police, le Gouvernement marocain serait tenu de lui prêter main-forte, mais il ne pourrait intervenir qu'avec les troupes de l'armée chérifienne, et sans recourir à des forces étrangères. Des garnisons de l'armée chérifienne seront, exclusivement de toutes autres, installées à Larache et à El-Kçar-el-Kébir.

5. Les convois de ravitaillement destinés au Maghzen et aux troupes chérifiennes circuleront sans entrave sur le territoire municipal de Tanger et dans la région déterminée à l'article 3. Il en sera de même des fonctionnaires étrangers ou chérifiens, ou des voyageurs de toute nationalité munis de pièces d'identité, qui se rendront à Fez, ou inversement avec leurs domestiques, armes et bagages, à la condition, toutefois, pour eux, de conformer au règlement chérifien sur le permis de port d'armes.

6. Afin d'assurer le libre passage du détroit de Gibraltar le Gouvernement français veillera à ce que des fortifications ou des ouvrages stratégiques quelconques ne soient pas élevés entre la pointe d'El-Kçar-el-Skrir et les hauteurs qui dominent la rive droite du Sebou exclusivement.

7. Il ne sera apporté à Tanger et dans le détroit de Gibraltar, sans l'assentiment préalable des Puissances signataires de la convention du 31 mai, 1865, aucune modification au régime des phares et des feux intéressant la navigation.

[42095] No. 387.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Carnegie.

Sir, *Foreign Office, October* 23, 1911.

M. CAMBON informed me to-day that the negotiations with Germany about Morocco would very soon be finished, and it was very happy that it was so.

I replied that I was exceedingly glad to hear this. If a settlement had not been reached the consequences would have been enormous, and no one could foresee what the end of them would have been.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[41525] No. 388.

Earl Granville to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 23.)

(No. 92.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Berlin, October* 22, 1911.

FRANCO-GERMAN negotiations regarding Morocco.

My telegram No. 90 of 19th October.

Yesterday morning instructions arrived for the French Ambassador, and accordingly, in the evening, he saw the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. I am informed that, with the exception of the Duck's Beak, everything may now be regarded as settled. Herr von Kiderlen has promised to give his final answer on the subject to-morrow, but at present the Germans refuse to cede anything lying beyond the line of the Logone, while the French demand that the country to the west, which is rich and mountainous, should also be given to them.

(Confidential.)

I gather that, if the final answer of the German Government is in the negative, it is probable that the French Government may give up the extra demands they have made, as they are very anxious to finish the whole negotiations.

[41847] No. 389.

Sir R. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 24.)

(No. 154.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Tangier, October* 23, 1911.

MENEBHI has received a letter from Raisuli, who is in great agitation at the action of Colonel Sylvestre. It appears that the latter visited Raisuli at Arzila a few days ago, and told him that for the future the troops under his command would be placed under a Spanish instructor, from whom they will receive their pay, and that he should therefore hand them over to the Spanish authorities. In spite of Raisuli's protest Colonel Sylvestre maintained his demand, and stated that his action was the result of orders from his superiors. Raisuli thereupon replied that his forces were scattered throughout the district and would thus take time to collect, and by this pretext succeeded in obtaining a respite of twelve days. He at once wrote to inform M. de Billy and Si Guebbas, and requested Menebhi to put me in possession of the facts. This afternoon I received a visit from M. de Billy, who took a very serious view of the situation caused by this attempt on the part of the Spaniards to modify the *status quo* on the very eve of the Franco-Spanish negotiations. He added that it might be necessary for the French to take some strong counter-move, such as the dispatch of a war-ship to Arzila, should the Spaniards persist in their action.

The situation is rendered more dangerous by the fact that if Raisuli is deprived of the command of the troops, his prestige amongst the mountain tribes will be very much diminished: it is then quite likely that they might get out of hand and come down and attack the Spaniards. M. de Billy thinks that this possibility may have inspired the action of the Spaniards, as it would afford them a pretext for action of an even more energetic nature. It appears to me more than likely that Raisuli may throw up his appointment altogether. He is disgusted at the way he has been treated, and

his loyal efforts to maintain order have earned the gratitude of no one. It is to be hoped that the Spanish Government may be induced, during the twelve days which have fortunately been granted, to withdraw their present instructions to Colonel Sylvestre, as Raisuli's resignation might add very greatly to the difficulties of the situation for French, Spaniards, and Makhzen alike.

[42001] No. 390.

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 24.)

(No. 80.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Madrid, October* 24, 1911.

SIR R. LISTER'S telegram No. 154 to the Foreign Office.

Nothing is known by the French Ambassador as to the demands which Colonel Silvestre made of Raisuli on his recent visit. A French protest would, in his opinion, have no effect, and he thinks that to leave Spain unimpeded in her own sphere would be the best course. He believes that the contention of the French Government as to the illegality of the presence of the Spanish troops in the Alcazar district will only be confirmed by the alleged Spanish action.

[41371] No. 391.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir R. Lister.

(No. 82. Confidential.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, October* 24, 1911.

I HAVE received your despatch No. 323 of the 14th instant, calling attention to the uneasiness which exists in commercial circles as to the future of Tangier whenever the new Franco-Spanish régime in Morocco comes into force.

It may no doubt be argued that if in the first instance a railway were built from Casa Blanca through Fez and Taza to the Algerian frontier the trade of Tangier would be disadvantageously affected; but this possibility seems to be excluded by the provision in the notes to be exchanged between the French and German Governments in connection with the proposed convention respecting Morocco, that "la construction du chemin de fer de Tanger à Fez devra être l'une des premières entreprises poursuivies par le Gouvernement marocain."

The above-mentioned notes are printed in the Morocco sections of the 28th September, but I need hardly remind you that their contents must at present be treated as strictly confidential.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[42207] No. 392.

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 25.)

(No. 82.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Madrid, October* 25, 1911.

M. GEOFFRAY has to-day, in accordance with instructions from his Government, addressed a stiff letter of protest to the Spanish Government against Colonel Silvestre's attitude on question of how the troops under Raisuli's command are to be paid. The letter adds that the French Government decline all responsibility as to the serious results which may arise from the Spanish action at Arzila, if it is approved by the Spanish Government.

I propose, with your approval, supporting the French warning by pointing out the inopportuneness at the present time of Colonel Silvestre's demands, and that if persisted in they will render it very difficult for His Majesty's Government to give Spain her support regarding the latter's sphere of influence.

[42208] No. 393.

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 25.)

(No. 83. Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Madrid, October 25, 1911.*

IN the course of conversation to-day Señor Garcia Prieto made a very categorical declaration to me to the effect that Spain would only be induced by overwhelming force to relinquish her position at Laraiche and Alcazar. The Spanish Government had, in view of the threatening tone which the French press had lately assumed, submitted the question once more to the King, the Council of Ministers, and the Conservative Opposition leader, all of whom they had found unanimous in this view.

[42266] No. 394.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen.

(No. 108.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, October 25, 1911.*

THE Spanish Ambassador complained to me to-day that the French Government had not kept their word with the Spanish Government about the negotiations concerning Morocco. The French Government had promised that, as soon as the Morocco part of the bargain was concluded with Germany, they would continue negotiations with the Spanish Government. The Morocco part had long been concluded with Germany, and now all the Spanish Ambassador knew was that the French Ambassador informed him that the draft submitted some time ago by France to Spain existed no longer.

I remarked that the Congo part of the negotiations between France and Germany had been very delicate, and had entailed great responsibility upon the French Government, who would have to recommend to the French Chamber the bargain which they made. They had, no doubt, felt it to be impossible to conduct at the same time delicate negotiations with the Spanish Government, entailing a further responsibility.

The Ambassador expressed his apprehension that the French Government would take the view that the agreements with Spain had been torn up and superseded, and that Spain should have in Morocco only what France considered that she could spare her. Some of the French press had already taken this view. The Ambassador pressed me to say whether I would support the view that the Franco-Spanish agreements must be carried out.

I said that, after France had paid the whole price of buying off the German claims in Morocco, it was only reasonable that Spain should concede something to France. The important question was whether the French proposals on this point would be reasonable.

The Ambassador said that Spain could not pay both Germany and France.

I agreed entirely, but pointed out that I assumed that Germany was being paid by France for the whole of Morocco, and could not ask to be paid twice over for part of it. I could not say anything about French proposals until they were made; but meanwhile I took note of the views which the Spanish Ambassador had expressed to me, and I asked him not to think that, because I said little at the moment, I did not realise the importance of the question.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[42275] No. 395.

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 26.)

(No. 84.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Madrid, October 26, 1911.*

MY telegram No. 82 of 25th October.

Reply of Spanish Government to French Ambassador's letter denies altogether French version of facts. Colonel Silvestre's conversation with Raisuli had no other [?] than that of securing tranquillity in region, and although question of providing for regular payment of native troops was discussed, Colonel Silvestre made no demand to pay them himself, nor did he require troops to be assembled for that purpose as stated.

Minister for Foreign Affairs declares, in short, that Colonel Silvestre's language and intentions have been entirely misrepresented, and that it never entered into plans of Spanish Government to occupy Arzila.

I propose, nevertheless, to warn Minister for Foreign Affairs against danger of any action being taken at present which might cause unnecessary irritation in Paris.

Correspondence follows by post.

(Repeated to Paris and Tangier.)

[42207] No. 396.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen.

(No. 95.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, October 26, 1911.*

YOUR telegrams Nos. 82 and 84 of 25th and 26th October: Raisuli.

It is unnecessary that we should associate ourselves with any threats as to what may be consequences of Spanish action, but you are authorised to support your French colleague by pointing out to Spanish Government in friendly way that it would be clearly inadvisable, in the general interest of harmony between France and Spain in Morocco, if Spain should proceed to make a material change in the *status quo* just at the moment when negotiations for a friendly settlement are to begin.

[42294] No. 397.

Mr. Carnegie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 27.)

(No. 468.)
Sir, *Paris, October 26, 1911.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 462 of the 22nd instant respecting the arrest of certain French civil officials at Oudjda by General Toutée, I have the honour to inform you that great attention is being paid to the incident in Paris, and sides are being taken in the press both for and against General Toutée.

The "Écho de Paris" published in connection with this incident a report from its special correspondent at Port-Say respecting the local conditions round Oudjda. It appears from this account that a strong colonising movement has been of late proceeding in all the eastern half of the Moulouya River basin. French colonists, mostly from Algiers, have been pouring into this part of Morocco, with the object of purchasing and exploiting properties there. They bring with them American agricultural implements for agricultural operations on a large scale.

One of these colonists, M. Joinville, has, so the correspondent of the "Écho de Paris" states, an agricultural outfit in the plain of Triffas of the value of 150,000 fr. (6,000*l.*). The excellent quality of the soil in that district has encouraged the establishment of large farms near the seaboard, and the creation of Port-Say has offered means for shipping cheaply and rapidly the agricultural products of the district.

The correspondent of the "Écho de Paris" then explains the *modus operandi* adopted by Europeans in buying land from the Moors. A "man of straw" in the person of an Algerian Mussulman usually is employed to buy the land, which is in turn purchased from him by the European colonist. Owing to the obscurity and complications respecting the original titles to land, M. Destailleur seems to have centralised the functions of verifying and authenticating them in the hands of the Moorish cadi at Oudjda, and when a transaction had the latter's visa it was considered valid. Owing to the carelessness and corruption of the Moorish authorities, this system gave rise to constant abuses.

The correspondent of the "Écho de Paris" states that an inhabitant of Oudjda informed him that a scandal was bound to occur sooner or later. The natives were being spoliated in the most shameful fashion, and certain officials were making money wherever they could. The customs officials were extremely severe on the unfortunate native, and equally lax when a merchant appeared on the scene who was ready to bribe.

I have, &c.
L. D. CARNEGIE.

[42494] No. 398.

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 28.)

(No. 175. Confidential.)

Sir, *Madrid, October 19, 1911.*

AS the future arrangements concerning the status of Tangier are a matter of such great importance to His Majesty's Government, I have kept a copy of the articles relating to Tangier contained in the new draft Franco-Spanish convention, which forms the principal subject of my despatch No. 173, Confidential, of to-day.

I have already reported that the French Ambassador was good enough to give me an opportunity of examining the document in question, which reached him without a covering despatch, but which his Excellency is disposed to regard as representing the views of at least a portion of the French Cabinet.

I have the honour to forward herewith copy of the articles in point.

I have, &c.

MAURICE DE BUNSEN.

Enclosure in No. 398.

Articles relating to Tangier contained in new Draft Franco-Spanish Convention

ARTICLE 6.

NE se trouve comprise dans aucune des deux zones la ville de Tanger, qui conformément aux principes posés dans les accords de 1904 et 1905, sera administrée par une municipalité ayant un caractère international. Le territoire compris entre la mer, Sidi Kassem, Gouerch, Zinet, Merbon-el-Aich et la pointe Altarès sera déclaré territoire municipal de Tanger et placé également en dehors des deux zones.

La loi municipale de Tanger sera établie par le Makhzen d'accord avec les représentants des Puissances étrangères au Maroc.

Le délégué du Sultan à Tanger sera de droit le président de la municipalité. La police de la ville et du territoire municipal sera assurée par les forces actuelles de la police chérifienne, qui resteront composées instruites et administrées d'après le règlement du , établi d'accord avec le Makhzen et le corps diplomatique.

Les frais d'armement, d'équipement et d'entretien de cette force et des officiers qui l'instruisent seront prélevés sur le produit des impôts perçus à Tanger et sur le territoire municipal; le surplus sera partagé entre le budget municipal de Tanger et le Makhzen suivant les prescriptions du firman constituant la municipalité. Au cas où ces ressources se trouveraient insuffisantes pour pourvoir à l'entretien de la police, le déficit constaté serait imputé en fin d'exercice sur les disponibilités générales du Makhzen, et, à défaut, avancé par la Banque de l'État du Maroc, sur le reliquat des perceptions douanières du port de Tanger, après toutefois que le service de la dette marocaine aura été assuré.

ARTICLE 7.

La ville et le territoire municipal sont déclarés neutralisés et placés sous la garantie des deux Puissances signataires, qui, dès à présent, acceptent que cette garantie de neutralité soit partagée par l'Angleterre.

Il ne sera apporté à Tanger et dans les limites du territoire municipal sans l'assentiment préalable des Puissances signataires de la convention du 31 mai, 1865, aucune modification au régime des phares et des feux intéressant la navigation.

[42508] No. 399.

Sir R. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 28.)

No. 329.)

Sir, *Tangier, October 22, 1911.*

ON my arrival here I found Hadj Thami, the ex-Basha of Marrakesh, established at Menebhi's. He had had various interviews with Mr. White and with the French chargé d'affaires, and appeared very much pleased at the attitude adopted towards him by the latter. M. de Billy had proposed an arrangement to the Makhzen by which

Hadj Thami should pay them a sum of 120,000 dollars (about 20,000*l.*) and retain absolute possession of his house in Marrakesh and his properties in the country. This arrangement, I understand, has now been accepted by the Sultan, and Hadj Thami is leaving to-morrow for Fez.

In the meantime, the conduct of the notorious Dris Woold Mennou, who succeeded Hadj Thami as basha, is growing daily more unsatisfactory, and I gather that there is a general feeling in the south in favour of the reinstatement of Hadj Thami. He no doubt had faults, but he was vastly superior to his successor, whose appointment I consider little short of an insult to the European Powers, which should never have been tolerated. M. de Billy did, I believe, protest against it at the time, and he assures me now that it is only temporary. His idea is that Hadj Thami should be reappointed Basha of Marrakesh and the Glawa district of the Atlas, and that El Ayadi should be appointed kaïd of the Rehamna; he has established very good relations with the French military authorities, and has behaved well to us since the very severe talking to which I gave him on the occasion of my journey to the south this time last year. Gundaffi would be appointed kaïd of the district of the Atlas inhabited by his tribe.

This arrangement appeared to be a good one, and I urged M. de Billy to have it carried out with as little delay as possible, as the existing state of affairs, as reported by Mr. Vice-Consul Lennox, was unbearable.

We may feel perfectly assured that Hadj Thami, with whom I established and have since maintained the most friendly relations, will do all in his power to further British interests. He appears to me to have learned a great deal during his months of adversity, and is evidently much relieved at the turn which events have taken. The arrangement is more favourable than he probably anticipated; 120,000 dollars is a trifling sum for him, and he will no doubt insist on his brothers helping him to find the money in return for the countless opportunities afforded to them of enriching themselves during the Glawi ascendency in the south.

I have, &c.

REGINALD LISTER.

[42510] No. 400.

Sir R. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 28.)

(No. 331.)

Sir, *Tangier, October 22, 1911.*

THE first letter written by Dr. Verdon since his arrival at Fez reached Tangier a few days ago.

He states that at Alcazar he met Colonel Sylvestre, who appeared full of plans for the development of the town and neighbourhood. He said that he had strict orders not to allow his soldiers to pass the river.

At Fez Dr. Verdon writes that he noted great changes; all the old heaps of refuse, &c., have disappeared, and many of the streets have been repaired and are now clean and well kept; the groups of wretched huts which formerly poisoned the open spaces in the town have been swept away. The Oriental and picturesque side has of course suffered in consequence, but the health of the town will no doubt improve. Dr. Verdon was received with great kindness by the viziers, especially the Mokri family, and also by Sid Madani Glawi, the ex-Grand Vizier. He states that the latter is now on good terms with the Sultan, partly because his daughter, who was married to His Majesty a year ago, has presented him with a son, partly because he has retained a very large part of the fortune which he amassed during his period of power, and money has an irresistible effect upon the Sultan. The town, Dr. Verdon writes, is full of French instructors, and many more are coming. He learns from the Moors that the soldiers are happy under the present régime, and those whom he has seen look well.

A number of Moors, he says, have called upon him; they all seem very sore and dislike the French. Mokri's brothers, with whom he is very intimate, are no exception, but the people are quite orderly, and no one dares say anything against the French or the Sultan except to his intimate friends and in the strictest privacy.

I gather generally that the Sultan is more unpopular than ever, and this will certainly not facilitate the task which the French have before them.

I have, &c.

REGINALD LISTER.

[43246] No. 401.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Carnegie.

(No. 457. Confidential.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, October* 28, 1911.

M. CAMBON informed Sir Arthur Nicolson this afternoon that he had just received a telegram from M. de Selves announcing that at the last moment Herr von Kiderlen had requested that M. Jules Cambon should address him a secret letter declaring that if in certain eventualities the question of taking over the Belgian Congo were to arise, the French Government would take no steps without first consulting with the German Government.

M. de Selves held this demand to be quite inadmissible, and said that the signature of the Morocco agreement would consequently be postponed, and that the request of he German Government might lead to a rupture of the negotiations.

M. Cambon asked that this information might be treated as quite confidential.

I am, &c.

E. GREY.

[42687] No. 402.

Earl Granville to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 30.)

(No. 334. Confidential.)

Sir, *Berlin, October* 22, 1911.

I HAD an interesting conversation yesterday with the Netherlands Minister, who only returned from leave a few days ago. We walked away together from the funeral of the late Herr Stemrich, and he at once began to tell me of a long talk he had had with Herr von Kiderlen, who is an old friend and colleague of his. Herr von Kiderlen told him that his own views were and always had been absolutely pacific. People said he had, at the beginning of the Morocco business at least, been very warlike and "intransigeant" till he was pulled up short by the Emperor, but the facts were really almost the reverse. Of course, in the early stages, he had had to take a strong and perhaps warlike attitude *vis-à-vis* of the French Ambassador, but he had never really meant it, and considered it would have been both foolish and criminal to fight for Morocco. He was being severely blamed for his alleged weakness, and he received letters by every post from every part of Germany abusing him for his concessionary attitude, and urging him to be firm. But he did not care; he was doing what he considered to be his duty and what he thought right, and his shoulders were broad enough to stand the abuse. But there were people in higher positions who thought otherwise. The Crown Prince had spoken to him the other day, and said that the "Fürst" (Bismarck) would never have given in to the French as he had done and so on, to which Herr von Kiderlen had merely replied that he would never, out of respect for the memory of all the "Fürsten" in the world, make a "lieutenants' war." Baron Gevers said Herr von Kiderlen had not referred to the Chancellor at all, and I was not able to make out whether the "people in higher positions" included the Emperor as well as the Crown Prince.

In the course of conversation, I remarked tentatively that I presumed no other country, such as the Netherlands for instance, would make any difficulties when the Franco-German Agreement was concluded and published. Baron Gevers replied that he thought probably not. In the annual Orange Book on foreign affairs this year there had only been a few lines about Morocco, in which M. de Swinderen mentioned that negotiations in regard to Morocco were in progress between France and Germany, that the Dutch Government had not been allowed to take part in the negotiations and were not cognisant of their terms, and that when an agreement between those two countries was concluded the Dutch Government would have to examine it carefully and make sure that Dutch interests were properly safeguarded. I said I supposed that referred to the open door and equal treatment for all nations, and Baron Gevers said he supposed so.

We agreed that public opinion both in France and Germany might probably show some disapproval of the agreement, and I said the worst of it was, from our point of view, that the Germans appeared to be convinced, and I feared honestly convinced, that our influence in the matter had been injurious to the negotiations, and that we had urged on the French to take an unyielding attitude; whereas I believed,

in so far as we had interfered at all, we had used our influence in the direction of moderation. Baron Gevers preserved a chilly silence, and obviously did not believe me; but, on the other hand, when I made the same remark to the Austrian Ambassador this afternoon, he said he thought the serious and well-informed Germans now realised that that was the case.

I have, &c.

GRANVILLE.

[42790] No. 403.

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 30.)

(No. 179.)

Sir, *Madrid, October* 26, 1911.

M. GEOFFRAY, the French Ambassador, has had the goodness to communicate to me the enclosed copy of the letter which, as reported in my telegram No. 82 of yesterday, he has addressed, under instructions from Paris, to the Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs, protesting against the demands recently put forward by Colonel Sylvestre at Arzila.

These demands, as related by Raisuli himself in letters addressed to the British Minister and the French chargé d'affaires at Tangier and also to El Menebhi, amounted to the assumption of a certain control by Spain over the Imperial Moorish forces under Raisuli's command, in virtue of which those forces should henceforward receive payment through a Spanish instead of, as now, through a French instructor. The French Government, indeed, seem to have interpreted the claims of Colonel Sylvestre as equivalent to the destitution of Raisuli from his post as Governor of Arzila and to the announcement of a Spanish occupation of that place.

In his prompt reply, of which I am likewise enabled by M. Geoffray to forward herewith a copy, Señor Garcia Prieto disputes the facts as alleged, and declares that Colonel Sylvestre's language and intentions have been entirely misrepresented on the authority evidently of native sources of information. Arzila has always attracted the attention and interest of the Spanish authorities in Morocco, and all the more so, since the military occupation of Alcazar and Laraiche by Spanish forces. It was natural, therefore, that Colonel Sylvestre, commanding those forces, should concert measures with Raisuli, the governor of the region appointed by the Sultan, with a view to the maintenance of the peace among the tribes. One of those measures related to the question of the payment of the Imperial troops, which, as Raisuli had previously pointed out, had been effected in the past in an irregular manner. There was, however, no Spanish claim to substitute a Spanish for the present French instructor as paymaster, nor was it true that Colonel Sylvestre had required all the Imperial troops of the district to be assembled within a given time to receive payment. The Minister concludes by denying that there is any intention on the part of the Spanish Government to occupy Arzila.

In view of these explanations, the French Ambassador is inclined to think that Raisuli, who, as remarked by Sir Reginald Lister in his telegram No. 154 of the 23rd instant, has not succeeded in pleasing anybody, has, perhaps, assumed in this matter a double attitude. Raisuli, no doubt, shares the prevailing uncertainty as to who will eventually administer his present district, and it would not be unnatural that he should endeavour to keep in with both sides in this dispute.

However this may be, the Spanish press has represented the visit of Colonel Sylvestre to Raisuli as having passed off in all harmony, and Señor Garcia Prieto has himself informed me that Colonel Sylvestre acted with Raisuli's full concurrence in leaving on his return march to Alcazar a post of native police formed by a small body of foot and mounted troops belonging to the Laraiche police, at a halt-way place called the Zoco-el-Tesnin de Sidi Yamani.

It is, of course, unfortunate that Colonel Sylvestre should have chosen the present moment, when delicate negotiations with France are impending, to extend the sphere of his activity beyond the immediate neighbourhood of the places in Spanish occupation. It may be doubted whether such action will really promote the desired object of keeping the native tribes quiet, and whether it is not much more likely to encourage and intensify the hostile campaign of the Paris press against the realisation of Spanish aspirations in Northern Morocco.

I have, &c.

MAURICE DE BUNSEN.

Enclosure 1 in No. 403.

M. Geoffray to Señor Prieto.

(Particulière.)
Mon cher Ministre, *Madrid, le 25 octobre*, 1911.

D'APRÈS une plainte reçue par notre chargé d'affaires à Tanger, le Colonel Sylvestre aurait récemment demandé à Raissouli combien il ayait de soldats sous ses ordres et qui payait leur solde. Raissouli lui ayant répondu que le Makhzen lui faisait parvenir la somme nécessaire par l'entremise de l'instructeur, le colonel aurait invité à réunir ses hommes pour que lui-même distribuât ladite solde. Le fonctionnnaire chérifien répliqua qu'il ne le ferait que si le colonel lui présentait un ordre du Makhzen. Ce dernier insista et déclara qu'il agissait d'après l'ordre de ses supérieurs lui prescrivant de payer la solde des soldats marocains d'Arzila comme il le faisait pour ceux d'El Ksar. Il aurait ajouté qu'il n'avait, du reste, à tenir compte que des instructions de ces chefs. Comme les soldats en question étaient dispersés à ce moment, l'officier supérieur espagnol lui aurait donné douze jours pour réunir ses hommes et annonça qu'il reviendrait à l'expiration de ce délai pour payer la solde et installer un instructeur.

Avisé de ces faits, mon Gouvernement estime que l'occupation d'Arzila par des troupes royales, effectuée dans les circonstances présentes, risquerait de provoquer un soulèvement dans toutes des tribus indigènes de la région. Cette opération produirait en outre, inévitablement, dans l'opinion française un très fâcheuse impression, fait dont la gravité ne saurait certainement vous échapper.

Dans ces conditions je suis chargé par M. de Selves d'appeler de la façon la plus sérieuse toute l'attention du Gouvernement Royal sur la nouvelle attitude adoptée par le Colonel Sylvestre, attitude que rien ne justifie et qui peut avoir une répercussion très fâcheuse au moment où les Cabinets de Paris et de Madrid sont à la veille d'entrer en négociations au sujet du Maroc. Le Gouvernement de la république ne saurait trop déplorer, si elle était, par impossible, approuvé par le Gouvernement Royal, une action aussi inattendue et des conséquences de laquelle il ne pourrait que décliner la responsabilité.

Croyez, &c.

Enclosure 2 in No. 403.

Señor Prieto to M. Geoffray.

Mon cher Ambassadeur, *Madrid, le 25 octobre*, 1911.

LES renseignements que la Légation de France à Tanger a reçu au sujet de la garnison d'Arzila et dont vous avez eu l'obligeance de m'entretenir dans votre lettre particulière de cette même date, sont évidemment de source indigène et ne présentent pas les faits tels qu'il se sont passés.

Vous n'ignorez pas que le Gouvernement Royal s'est toujours préoccupé de la situation à Arzila; l'installation des troupes espagnoles à Larache et El Ksar n'a qu'ajouté à l'intérêt tout légitime que cette situation nous inspire.

Nos conseils à Raissouli se sont exercés dans le sens de faire tout son possible pour retenir les tribus dans le calme. C'est à la suite de ces conseils que Raissouli a exposé, il y a déjà quelque temps, l'utilité de parer aux inconvénients de l'irrégularité dans le payement de la solde de ses hommes.

Dans la visite que le lieutenant-colonel vient de lui faire pour traiter des questions concernant la tranquillité à El Ksar, on a eu à nouveau l'occasion d'échanger des idées générales à ce sujet-là; mais ni le chef espagnol n'a intimé à Raissouli de réunir ses hommes sur-le-champ ou dans un certain délai pour leur distribuer lui-même la solde, ni Raissouli n'a eu à lui faire les réponses successives que l'on affirme, ni, en somme, la version de l'entretien et des intentions du lieutenant-colonel qu'a été présentée à la Légation de France à Tanger, n'est conforme à la réalité. Dans aucun cas, d'ailleurs, le lieutenant-colonel n'aurait pas pris de décision, devant se borner à en saisir la Légation d'Espagne et le Gouvernement.

D'autre part, j'ignore les raisons qu'on ait pu avoir à Tanger pour s'attendre à l'occupation d'Arzila par les troupes royales.

J'ai la certitude que rien, ni dans les paroles, ni dans les actes du Lieutenant-Colonel Fernandez Sylvestre, n'a justifié, jusqu'à présent, une semblable appréhension.

Veuillez, &c.

M. GARCIA PRIETO.

[42697] No. 404.

Earl Granville to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 30.)

(No. 345. Confidential.)
Sir, *Berlin, October 27*, 1911.

WHEN I dispatched my telegram No. 92 to you on the 22nd instant on the strength of information given to me by the Councillor of the French Embassy, I hoped to be able to report before this the final settlement of the Morocco and Congo negotiations. These are, however, still dragging on, and the French Ambassador told me the night before last that he rather fancied Herr von Kiderlen was purposely delaying matters in order to avoid the conclusion of the agreement before the Reichstag's adjournment this evening. I saw Herr von Kiderlen on Tuesday immediately after he had had a meeting with M Cambon, and his Excellency told me with some amusement that he had succeeded with enormous difficulty in squeezing a piece of territory out of the Colonial Office only to find that there had been a misunderstanding, and that it was an entirely different piece which the French demanded. When I repeated this to M. Cambon he said that one had to be extremely careful in negotiating with Herr von Kiderlen, as, whether intentionally or through carelessness, the latter was very apt to make little mistakes of this sort, and to repudiate one day what he had agreed to the day before.

I have not thought it necessary to trouble you with any press comments on the negotiations—there have been plenty of them, abusing the Government, defending the Government, attacking the French, stating the minimum of what Germany could possibly accept, &c.—but there has been nothing very new, and premature comments on an agreement which we may hope will very soon be published do not seem to present much interest.

The "Cologne Gazette" of yesterday published a telegram from Berlin, stating that, according to English reports at least, there was some anxiety in Belgium in connection with the access to the Congo to be granted by France to Germany, lest Germany might cherish designs on the Congo State. These English reporters had suggested, as a means of warding off such a danger, that Great Britain should recognise the annexation of the Congo, and the telegram remarks that England's action in that regard was a matter of supreme indifference to Germany, who had herself recognised the annexation, and thereby bound herself to respect Belgian territory.

I have, &c.
GRANVILLE.

[43089] No. 405.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Carnegie.

(No. 455.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, October 30*, 1911.

I TOLD M. Cambon to-day that, when the negotiations with Germany were concluded, we should not be able to support any negotiations between France and Spain unless they were based on the agreements of 1904. We were parties to those agreements. To treat them as if they had no existence would be to drag the *entente* in the mud, and would have the most disastrous effect on public opinion here. I was instructing Sir Francis Bertie, who was returning to Paris the day after to-morrow, to speak very strongly on this point to M. de Selves and M. Caillaux.

I am, &c.
E. GREY

[43247] No. 406.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Carnegie.

(No. 458. Confidential.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, October 30*, 1911.

REFERRING to what he had told Sir Arthur Nicolson of Herr von Kiderlen's demand at the last moment for a secret assurance that France would discuss with

Germany the right of pre-emption over the Belgian Congo if ever it came to be exercised, M. Cambon informed me to-day that M. de Selves was thinking of suggesting the following formula :—

"Dans le cas où le status territorial du bassin conventionnel du Congo viendrait à être modifié du fait de l'une ou l'autre des Puissances contractantes, celles-ci devront en conférer entre elles comme aussi avec les autres Puissances signatrices de l'Acte de Berlin du 26 février, 1885."

I said that I could see no objection to this.

M. Cambon said that it went without saying that, if the Congo was ever for disposal, there would have to be conversations between the Powers interested, and he did not see that this formula took things further forward. He discussed whether a more explicit formula could not be given which would make an actual mention of the right of pre-emption and of the Belgian Congo.

I observed that any actual mention of these things at this moment might arouse apprehensions in Belgium that France, Germany, and perhaps England were dividing her colony between them, and intended to force her to sell it. This would have a very undesirable political effect. I felt, however, that it was perfectly reasonable that, if ever Belgium voluntarily disposed of her colony, Germany should have an opportunity of acquiring some considerable portion of it, and the matter might then on its merits become a fair subject of negotiation.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[42947] No. 407.

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received October* 31.)

(No. 182.)

Sir, *Madrid, October* 28, 1911.

THE continued insistence of certain organs of the French press, on the contention that the evacuation of Alcazar and Laraiche by the Spanish forces is the necessary preliminary to any satisfactory settlement of outstanding questions in Morocco between France and Spain, has considerably alarmed the Spanish Government, and Señor Garcia Prieto, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, loses no opportunity of repeating both to the French Ambassador and to myself that this demand is one which, if really supported by the French Government, would meet in Madrid with the most determined resistance. His Excellency again spoke to me on the subject yesterday. He assured me that no conceivable Spanish Government could peacefully surrender a position deliberately occupied by Spain on the strength of the decision adopted by the conference of Algeciras that the native police force at Laraiche should receive its organisation and instruction from Spanish officers. In the same way as France had assumed responsibility for the peace of the Shawia region on the strength of the similar duty which had been assigned to her, jointly with Spain, at Casablanca, so Spain had been much more justified by the task confided exclusively to her in respect of the Laraiche police in taking the measures which appeared to her necessary in view of securing the peace and tranquillity of Alcazar and the surrounding country which lay behind Laraiche. Señor Garcia Prieto disputed the argument put forward in some of the French newspapers that the Spanish occupation of Alcazar constituted a breach of the secret convention with France of 1904. If there had been any infraction of the latter of that convention, it would be easy, he said, to point to many worse infractions on the part of France. Moreover, France had not denounced the convention when the alleged infraction took place. On the contrary, she had signed with Spain, at the end of July, a *modus vivendi* implying a recognition of the continued existence of the secret treaty.

After remarking that as the French Government had as yet put forward no demand of the kind apprehended by his Excellency, it seemed premature to discuss these questions in detail, I asked him what was the real value of the Alcazar country to Spain, and whether it was a rich district, capable of being profitably developed by Spanish enterprise. He replied that this was a point which did not at present enter into his calculations. In adopting the very determined resolution to hold fast to the occupied region, the Spanish Government had in view the entirely disastrous effect which evacuation would inevitably produce on public opinion in Spain. The national sentiment would be thereby profoundly humiliated; the loyalty of the army would be

subjected to a severe strain; and an internal situation would be created in Spain which would not be without dangers to the stability of the existing institutions.

Señor Garcia Prieto added that Señor Maura, the Opposition leader, was animated by sentiments which, on these points, were not a whit less resolute than those entertained by the Government of Señor Canalejas. Indeed, Señor Maura was strongly opposed to any concession whatever being made to France by ceding a portion of the Southern Spanish zone in Morocco. In this particular Señor Garcia Prieto, as already reported, is disposed to meet, as far as possible, the French demand.

Señor Canalejas's special organ in the press, the "Diario Universal," published last night a statement to the following effect :—

Commenting on an article in the "Figaro," it remarks that the new Franco-German treaty will affect Spanish interests in Morocco much more than those of Germany, and that the treaty cannot become operative without the consent of Spain as one of the signatory Powers of the General Act of Algeciras. The establishment of a French protectorate at Fez implies a change in the *status quo* of Morocco, by which full effect will be given to the Franco-Spanish Agreement of 1904. That agreement gives Spain full liberty of action in certain regions, which include Alcazar and Laraiche, as well as the Riff and the southern zone. On the strength, then, of the 1904 agreement, and of her concurrence in the modification of the Algeciras Act, Spain will be entitled to exercise her action freely, not only in the Riff, at Tetuan, and in the extreme south, but also at Laraiche and Alcazar. To offer her the former districts in exchange for her abandonment of the latter is to evade openly the observance of the agreement. Irresponsible persons—an allusion, no doubt, to Señor Moret, who was recently quoted by the "Times" as advocating a restricted Spanish zone in Northern Morocco—may put forward a suggestion to that effect, but no responsible Spanish Government could place itself in such a position. Laraiche and Alcazar are not necessary to France to enable her to keep up communications between Fez and the Mediterranean, or between Fez and the Atlantic. If France had a great interest in holding Laraiche and Alcazar, Spain has a still greater one, as a glance at the map will show. France admitted this when she signed the agreement of 1904. Spanish public opinion is quite clear on this point. Even if Spain had never occupied those places the country would demand their retention by all the means at its command. But Spanish troops being actually in possession, the claim founded on interest and treaty rights becomes one in which the prestige and honour of the nation are involved.

I have, &c.
MAURICE DE BUNSEN.

[43272] No. 408.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen.

(No. 252.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, October* 31, 1911.

COUNT METTERNICH spoke to me to-day very confidentially about the prospect of negotiations between France and Spain respecting Morocco.

Information had reached him through a friend of M. Caillaux that the latter was disposed to press Spain very hard, and that he would not negotiate with her on the basis of the agreement of 1904, but wished her to be content with the Riff, and to renounce her claims in Southern Morocco. M. Caillaux had observed that Spain had better be conciliatory or else she would have internal difficulties. He had said that the revolt of the Kabyles was not a pure hazard, and might spread in such a way as to endanger the Spanish Throne. M. Caillaux's view was that, in order to avoid a shared protectorate between France and Spain, Spain should annex the Riff and give compensation to France, including, perhaps, the Canary Islands, though it was not clear whether the suggestion as to the Canary Islands had been made by M. Caillaux or only by his friend.

The German Government felt that, if France treated Spain in this way, the Spanish Monarchy would be endangered, and this was their only reason for calling my attention very confidentially to the information which had reached them.

I replied that I had always assumed that the negotiations between France and Spain would be on the basis of the 1904 agreement. I knew, however, through the Spanish Ambassador, that the Spaniards had been very restless and apprehensive

owing to the delay in beginning the negotiations. When the Spanish Ambassador had approached me on the subject I had pointed out to him how difficult it was for France to carry on negotiations with Spain before the negotiations with Germany were concluded, and I had said that, till the negotiations with Germany reached a conclusion, I could not press France to make definite proposals to Spain. It seemed to me impossible that the proposals of France to Spain should take any definite form before the end of the negotiations with Germany, but my assumption had always been that the negotiations with Spain would be conducted on the basis of the agreement of 1904.

As to the communication which Count Metternich had made to me, I could only observe that either M. Caillaux had been very indiscreet, or he had a very indiscreet friend.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[43093] No. 409.

Earl Granville to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 1.)

(No. 350.)

Sir, *Berlin, October 30, 1911.*

AT a meeting of the "Senioren-Konvent" of the Reichstag last week the National Liberals proposed a resolution demanding that the Franco-German agreement regarding Morocco and the Congo should be submitted to the Reichstag for its approval before being finally concluded; the representatives of the centre and of the Conservatives resisted the proposal, which was thereupon withdrawn, as its authors considered that such a resolution could only be of value if passed unanimously, or, at least, by a very large majority. The "North German Gazette," in its weekly summary of internal events last Saturday evening, described this proposal as an unusual parliamentary incident, as the Moroccan agreement was outside the province of the Reichstag, and that body did not possess the right of deciding on cessions or acquisitions of territory in the colonies. "We consider it out of the question that the Imperial Chancellor would lend his hand to such an infringement of the constitutional rights of the Emperor."

In Sunday morning's edition the "North German Gazette" publishes an obviously official communiqué on the subject of the agreement, of which I have the honour to enclose a translation. You will observe the reference to the part played by Great Britain, which seems to imply a denial of the accusations constantly made against us by Germans.

It further states that "the question, whether a treaty for the cession or the acquisition of colonial territory requires for its legal validity the consent of the Federal Council and of the Reichstag, has been examined by the competent Imperial authorities and has been answered in the negative."

In a third paragraph of the same edition it is announced that a rumour which had been started in Berlin, to the effect that serious differences had arisen between the Imperial Chancellor and the Secretary of State for the Foreign Office on the one hand, and the Secretary of State for the Colonial Office on the other, with regard to the Congo agreement, which would lead to the resignation of the Colonial Secretary, is without foundation.

The decision of the Government that the Morocco and Congo agreements are no concern of the Reichstag, and that they will be merely communicated to that body for its information, has come as a surprise to most people, and is meeting with a certain amount of criticism on the part of the press; most of the papers, however, while regretting the decision and blaming the Government for this further sign of its contempt for public opinion, admit the strictly legal correctness of the opinion given by the Ministry of Justice. It appears that the constitution lays down that any alteration of the boundaries of the federal territory must be approved by an Act of Parliament, and likewise any treaty which affects the budget; thus, the acquisition of the Carolines had to be approved by the Reichstag because of the sum of money which was paid to Spain for them. But the present case is not provided for, as colonial territory is not considered as being "federal territory," and there is no question of money payment, although, as the "Tageblatt" points out, the acquisition of the "Congo swamps" is likely to cost the German taxpayer many millions in the future.

A story, ascribed to the Dutch Socialist, M. Troelstra, was going the round of the press last week to the effect that both the French and German Governments had

approached the International Socialist Bureau unofficially during the late crisis to ask its help in avoiding war. The German papers expressed their indignant disbelief in this legend, and, when the "Temps" published a semi-official denial so far as the French Government was concerned, began to clamour for an official German denial. On Saturday evening, accordingly, the "North German Gazette" quoted the allegation and the French *démenti*, and added, "Naturally, no step of the sort was taken either directly or indirectly by Germany."

I have, &c.
GRANVILLE.

Enclosure in No. 409.

Extract from the "North German Gazette" of October 29, 1911.

(Translation.)

"THE Franco-German agreement is, according to all accounts, approaching its conclusion, and it is to be hoped that, when passions have once subsided, the utility of these arrangements for both parties will be recognised. Occasion will be afforded for speaking of the previous history and course of the negotiations when the agreement comes up for discussion. This is all the more desirable, not to say necessary, since the most remarkable myths are still being circulated in regard thereto. The part played by England, and its influence on the attitude of Germany, is, in particular, still falsely represented. It will be seen, moreover, how untenable is the assertion that Germany has given way before the protest of a third party either at the beginning or in the course of the negotiations with France. Germany expressed the desire from the very first to negotiate with France alone, and she has maintained this attitude."

[43241] No. 410.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen.

(No. 114.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, November 2, 1911.*

THE Spanish Ambassador called at the Foreign Office on the 28th ultimo and said that the Spanish Government understood that the French Government would lay down as a preliminary basis of their approaching negotiations with Spain that Alcazar and Laraiche should be evacuated. The Ambassador stated that it would be impossible for any Spanish Government to take such a step, and if the French Government maintained this demand it would be quite useless to commence any discussions. The Spanish Government wished that His Majesty's Government should inform the French Government accordingly. His Excellency also said that his Government had "reason to believe" that the German Government would require some concessions from Spain, and though Spain was disposed to give some compensation to France she could not be expected to pay twice over.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[43639] No. 411.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen.

(No. 115.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, November 2, 1911.*

I RECALLED to-day, in conversation with the Spanish Ambassador, the apprehension which he had expressed to me a short time ago in connection with the line taken by the French press, to the effect that the agreement of 1904 between France and Spain must be treated as non-existent.

I said that I adhered to the view that it was unreasonable to press the French Government to define their proposals to Spain before their negotiations with Germany were concluded. I had therefore not pressed the French Government. But I had discussed the matter with Sir Francis Bertie, who was shortly returning to Paris, and in the conversations which I had here with M. Cambon, and in such official conversations as Sir Francis Bertie had in Paris, it had been assumed, and would continue to be assumed, that the agreements of 1904 would be the basis and starting-point for

negotiations between Spain and France as to Morocco. I asked the Ambassador whether he had noticed the line taken by the "Journal des Débats," as reported in yesterday's "Times."

He replied that he had noticed it. It was satisfactory, and all that he could wish.

I said that I thought it significant that this line had been taken in a paper of some importance.

The Ambassador thanked me for what I had told him. He again impressed upon me the impossibility of a Spanish withdrawal from Alcazar and Laraiche as a preliminary to negotiations with France. Even if these places were subsequently restored to Spain, the withdrawal would leave a bad feeling. He said that the Spanish press was showing a moderate and conciliatory spirit.

I observed that I hoped the Spaniards would do all they could during the present interval to avoid incidents in Morocco that might disturb French feeling.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[42508] No. 412.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir R. Lister.

(No. 84.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, November* 2, 1911.

I HAVE received your despatch No. 329 of the 22nd ultimo, and I approve the language which you held to M. de Billy with regard to the reappointment of Hadj Thami as Basha of Marrakesh.

If a suitable opportunity occurs and no change has been made in the meantime, I should be glad if you would discuss the subject again with M. de Billy.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[43388] No. 413.

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 3.)

(No. 183.)
Sir, *Madrid, October* 31, 1911.

IN my despatch No. 68 of the 21st May last, I gave some account of the action taken here by the German Embassy in support of the claims put forward by Herr Natter to the possession of a piece of ground believed to contain iron ore, in the mining district lying behind Melilla. The ground in question was also claimed by the Spanish Riff Mining Company, and it formed a portion of the territory in respect of which the Spanish company had already come to an arrangement with the rival French company ("Norte Africano"), on the basis of a 15 per cent. participation of the latter in the value of all the ore exported by the Spanish company.

My above-mentioned despatch contained an outline of the proposals made by the Spanish Government to that of Germany with a view to settling the ownership of the disputed piece of land. I now learn from Mr. MacPherson, principal shareholder of the Spanish company, that these proposals were rejected by the German Government, and that, as a consequence of further negotiations, it was agreed to submit the question to a mixed commission composed of delegates of the two parties.

The mixed commission met at Melilla early in the month of August last. Herr O. Gumprecht and Señor L. Lopez Ferrer represented respectively the interests of Herr Natter's company and those of the "Compañía Española de Minas del Rif." By a convention signed on the 16th August, 1911, it was agreed to draw on a detailed chart a line running approximately north and south, which should separate the possessions of the rival companies, those of Herr Natter lying to the east and those of the Spanish company to the west of the line. In view of heavy disbursements alleged to have been already made by Herr Natter in respect of the land falling to the share of the Spanish company, the latter will hand over to Herr Natter, free on board at Melilla, the first 20,000 tons of ore extracted from that piece of land. Herr Natter remains liable for any export tax which may be eventually payable on the ore.

The result of this agreement, as explained to me by Mr. MacPherson, is that, subject to the "blackmail" successfully imposed, first by the French and now by the German rivals of the Spanish company, the latter has secured an undisputed right to work its mines without interruption within a certain fixed boundary.

I have, &c.
MAURICE DE BUNSEN.

[43554] No. 414.

Sir R. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 4.)

(No. 332. Confidential.)
Sir, *Tangier, October* 29, 1911.

ABOUT ten days ago Colonel Sylvestre, the very active officer in command of the Spanish troops at Alcazar, went over to Arzila. Raisuli wrote to Menebhi to say that he was coming, and that he shonld provide him with Mouna, and show him every civility; he at the same time expressed some apprehension as to the motive of his visit. Two days later he wrote again, as I had the honour to report in my telegram No. 154, evidently in a state of considerable agitation, and told Menebhi that Colonel Sylvestre had called upon him to hand over all the soldiers under his command, as henceforward they were to be placed under a Spanish instructor, and to receive their pay from him. Raisuli said that he had protested, and that he had declared himself unable to give effect to Colonel Sylvestre's demands without special orders from the Makhzen. Colonel Sylvestre had insisted, saying that he was acting upon the orders of his superiors, and finally it had been arranged that a delay of twelve days should be granted to give Raisuli time to collect the force, which was scattered throughout the region. Raisuli asked Menebhi to let me know what had occurred, and added that he had himself written to Cid Guebbas and to the French chargé d'affaires. He said that he proposed to come in at once to Tangier. Menebhi sent down his confidential man of business to see me, and I told him that I would come up and see Menebhi in the afternoon; in my opinion, Raisuli should throw all responsibility on the Makhzen, who would have to see the matter settled between the French and the Spaniards. In the meanwhile, I could not help thinking that it would be far better for Raisuli to remain quietly at Arzila until we had time to see what turn things were taking.

In the afternoon the French chargé d'affaires came to see me. He said that he considered it quite inadmissible that the Spaniards should take a step which altered the *status quo* in Morocco to so important an extent on the very eve of the reopening of the negotiations between the two Governments for the settlement of the whole question. He had telegraphed, he said, in that sense to his Government, and had stated the opinion that, should the Spanish persist, it would be advisable for France to make a strong counter-move, such as the dispatch of a man-of-war to Arzila. What added greatly to the danger of the situation was that, if Raisuli were deprived of the command of the troops, he would lose prestige with the mountain tribes, he would no longer be able to keep them in hand, and it was quite on the cards that they would come down and attack the Spaniards. M. de Billy said that one hardly liked to say such a thing, but he had a pretty shrewd suspicion that this probability was in the minds of the Spanish authorities when they decided to take the step; if a few Spaniards were killed, it would enable them to appeal to public opinion, and say that it was impossible for them to retire from ground where Spanish blood had been shed, at all events without exacting the fullest compensation.

What I think more than likely is, that Raisuli, who is already thoroughly disgusted at the way he has been treated by Spaniards and French alike, and has received no thanks from anyone, notwithstanding his loyal and successful efforts to keep the country quiet, may throw up his appointment; were he to do this, a situation might very possibly arise which would add enormously to the difficulties of the Spaniards, the French, and the Makhzen alike. The whole of the district might be overrun by the mountain tribes, the communications with Fez might be cut, and a state of anarchy might be created which it would be most difficult to repress.

M. de Billy has seen Menebhi, and begged him to ask Raisuli to remain quiet for the present, and at all events not to come to Tangier for eight days.

His Majesty's Ambassador at Madrid has been kind enough to send me his telegrams to you, Nos. 80, 82, 83, and 84, from the latter of which I see that the Spanish

Government now deny that Colonel Sylvestre ever made the demands reported by Raisuli. I personally believe that Raisuli's is the true version, as I see no object for him in inventing the story; moreover, I was to some extent prepared for what has occurred, by a remark which the Spanish Minister let fall a few days before to the effect that his Government were dissatisfied with Raisuli, and that they might be obliged, though very much against their will, to put pressure upon him at Arzila. I imagine that they have now come to realise the extreme folly of their action in exasperating the French at a moment when the latter, having practically settled their accounts with Germany, may make themselves uncommonly unpleasant in the negotiations to be opened with Spain. I have had occasion during my three years residence in Morocco to notice that Spanish officials are apt to take refuge in a flat denial when they find themselves in at all a tight place.

I have, &c.
REGINALD LISTER.

[43587] No. 415.

M. Daeschner to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received November* 4.)

Ambassade de France, Londres,
le 3 novembre, 1911.

M. le Secrétaire d'État,

J'AI l'honneur de transmettre ci-joint à votre Excellence le texte de la convention récemment conclue entre mon Gouvernement et celui de Berlin au sujet du Maroc.

En notifiant cet accord au Gouvernement de Sa Majesté le Roi, je suis chargé de lui demander son adhésion aux stipulations de ladite convention et je serais heureux si votre Excellence voulait bien me faire parvenir sa réponse dans le plus bref délai possible.

Veuillez, &c.
E. DAESCHNER.

Enclosure in No. 415.

Franco-German Convention respecting Morocco.

A LA suite des troubles qui se sont produits au Maroc et qui ont démontré la nécessité d'y poursuivre, dans l'intérêt général, l'œuvre de pacification et de progrès prévue par l'Acte d'Algésiras, le Gouvernement de la République française et le Gouvernement Impérial allemand ont jugé nécessaire de préciser et de compléter l'accord franco-allemand du 9 février, 1909. Ils sont convenus, à cet effet, des dispositions ci-après :—

ARTICLE 1er.

Le Gouvernement Impérial allemand déclare que, ne poursuivant au Maroc que des intérêts économiques, il n'entravera pas l'action de la France en vue de prêter son assistance au Gouvernement marocain pour l'introduction de toutes les réformes administratives, judiciaires, économiques, financières et militaires dont il a besoin pour le bon gouvernement de l'Empire, comme aussi pour tous les règlements nouveaux et les modifications aux règlements existants que ces réformes comportent. En conséquence, il donne son adhésion aux mesures de réorganisation, de contrôle et de garantie financière que, après accord avec le Gouvernement marocain, le Gouvernement français croira devoir prendre à cet effet sous la réserve que l'action de la France sauvegardera au Maroc l'égalité économique entre les deux nations.*

Au cas où la France serait amenée à préciser et à étendre son contrôle et sa protection, le Gouvernement Impérial allemand, reconnaissant pleine liberté d'action à la France, et sous la réserve que la liberté commerciale prévue par les traités antérieurs sera maintenue, n'y apportera aucun obstacle.

Il est entendu qu'il ne sera porté aucune entrave aux droits et actions de la Banque d'État du Maroc tels qu'ils ont été définis par l'Acte d'Algésiras.

* In the text received from the German Embassy (see despatch to Sir E. Goschen, No. 263 of the 6th November) the word "deux" is omitted.

ARTICLE 2.

Dans cet ordre d'idées, il est entendu que le Gouvernement Impérial ne fera pas obstacle à ce que la France, après accord avec le Gouvernement marocain, procède aux occupations militaires du territoire marocain qu'elle jugera nécessaires au maintien de l'ordre et de la sécurité des transactions commerciales, et à ce qu'elle exerce toute action de police sur terre et dans les eaux marocaines.

ARTICLE 3.

Dès à présent, si Sa Majesté le Sultan du Maroc venait à confier aux agents diplomatiques et consulaires de la France la représentation et la protection des sujets et des intérêts marocains à l'étranger, le Gouvernement Impérial déclare qu'il n'y fera pas d'objection.

Si, d'autre part, Sa Majesté le Sultan du Maroc confiait au représentant de la France près du Gouvernement marocain le soin d'être son intermédiaire auprès des représentants étrangers, le Gouvernement allemand n'y ferait pas d'objection.

ARTICLE 4.

Le Gouvernement français déclare que, fermement attaché au principe de la liberté commerciale au Maroc, il ne se prêtera à aucune inégalité pas plus dans l'établissement des droits de douane, impôts et autres taxes, que dans l'établissement des tarifs de transport par voie ferrée, voie de navigation fluviale ou toute autre voie, et notamment dans toutes les questions de transit.

Le Gouvernement français s'emploiera également auprès du Gouvernement marocain afin d'empêcher tout traitement différentiel entre les ressortissants des différentes Puissances; il s'opposera notamment à toute mesure, par exemple, à la promulgation d'ordonnances administratives sur les poids et mesures, le jaugeage, le poinçonnage, &c., qui pourrait mettre en état d'infériorité les marchandises d'une Puissance.

Le Gouvernement français s'engage à user de son influence sur la Banque d'État pour que celle-ci confère à tour de rôle aux membres de sa direction à Tanger les postes de délégué dont elle dispose à la Commission des Valeurs douanières et au Comité permanent des Douanes.

ARTICLE 5.

Le Gouvernement français veillera à ce qu'il ne soit perçu au Maroc aucun droit d'exportation sur le minerai de fer exporté des ports marocains. Les exploitations de minerai de fer ne subiront sur leur production ou sur leurs moyens de travail aucun impôt spécial. Elles ne supporteront en dehors des impôts généraux qu'une redevance fixe, calculée par hectare et par an, et une redevance proportionnée au produit brut de l'extraction. Ces redevances, qui seront assises conformément aux articles 35 et 49 du projet de règlement minier annexé au protocole du 7 juin, 1910, de la conférence de Paris, seront également supportées par toutes les entreprises minières.

Le Gouvernement français veillera à ce que les taxes minières soient régulièrement perçues sans que des remises individuelles du total ou d'une partie de ces taxes puissent être consenties sous quelque prétexte que ce soit.

ARTICLE 6.

Le Gouvernement de la République française s'engage à veiller à ce que les travaux et fournitures nécessités par les concessions éventuelles de routes, chemins de fer, ports, télégraphes, &c., soient octroyés par le Gouvernement marocain suivant les règles de l'adjudication.

Il s'engage également à veiller à ce que les conditions des adjudications, particulièrement en ce qui concerne les fournitures de matériel et les délais impartis pour soumissionner, ne placent les ressortissants d'aucune Puissance dans une situation d'infériorité.

L'exploitation des grandes entreprises mentionnées ci-dessus sera réservée à l'État marocain ou librement concédée par lui à des tiers qui pourront être chargés de fournir les fonds nécessaires à cet effet. Le Gouvernement français veillera à ce que, dans l'exploitation des chemins de fer et autres moyens de transport comme dans l'application des règlements destinés à assurer celle-ci, aucune différence de traitement ne soit faite entre les ressortissants des diverses Puissances qui useraient de ces moyens de transport.

Le Gouvernement de la République usera de son influence sur la Banque d'État afin que celle-ci confère à tour de rôle aux membres de sa direction à Tanger le poste dont elle dispose de délégué à la Commission générale des Adjudications et Marchés.

De même, le Gouvernement français s'emploiera auprès du Gouvernement marocain pour que, durant la période où restera en vigueur l'article 66 de l'Acte d'Algésiras, il confie à un ressortissant d'une des Puissances représentées au Maroc un des trois postes de délégué chérifien au Comité spécial des Travaux publics.

ARTICLE 7.

Le Gouvernement français s'emploiera auprès du Gouvernement marocain pour que les propriétaires de mines et d'autres exploitations industrielles ou agricoles, sans distinction de nationalité, et en conformité des règlements qui seront édictés en s'inspirant de la législation française sur la matière, puissent être autorisés à créer des chemins de fer d'exploitation destinés à relier leurs centres de production aux lignes d'intérêt général et aux ports.

ARTICLE 8.

Il sera présenté tous les ans un rapport sur l'exploitation des chemins de fer au Maroc, qui sera établi dans les mêmes formes et conditions que les rapports présentés aux assemblées d'actionnaires des sociétés de chemins de fer françaises.

Le Gouvernement de la République chargera un des administrateurs de la Banque l'État de l'établissement de ce rapport, qui sera, avec les éléments qui en seront la base, communiqué aux censeurs, puis rendu public avec, s'il y a lieu, les observations que ces derniers croiront devoir y joindre d'après leurs propres renseignements.

ARTICLE 9.

Pour éviter, autant que possible, les réclamations diplomatiques, le Gouvernement français s'emploiera auprès du Gouvernement marocain afin que celui-ci défère à un arbitre désigné *ad hoc* pour chaque affaire, d'un commun accord, par le consul de France et par celui de la Puissance intéressée ou, à leur défaut, par les deux Gouvernements, les plaintes portées par des ressortissants étrangers contre les autorités marocaines ou les agents agissant en tant qu'autorités marocaines, et qui n'auraient pu être réglées par l'intermédiaire du consul français et du consul du Gouvernement intéressé.

Cette procédure restera en vigueur jusqu'au jour où aura été institué un régime judiciaire inspiré des règles générales de législation des Puissances intéressées et destiné à remplacer, après entente avec elles, les tribunaux consulaires.

ARTICLE 10.

Le Gouvernement français veillera à ce que les ressortissants étrangers continuent à jouir du droit de pêche dans les eaux et ports marocains.

ARTICLE 11.

Le Gouvernement français s'emploiera auprès du Gouvernement marocain pour que celui-ci ouvre au commerce étranger de nouveaux ports au fur et à mesure des besoins de ce commerce.

ARTICLE 12.

Pour répondre à une demande du Gouvernement marocain, les deux Gouvernements s'engagent à provoquer la revision, d'accord avec les autres Puissances et sur la base de la Convention de Madrid, des listes et de la situation des protégés étrangers et des associés agricoles au Maroc dont parlent les articles 8 et 16 de cette convention.

Ils conviennent également de poursuivre auprès des Puissances signataires toutes les modifications de la Convention de Madrid que comporterait, le moment venu, le changement du régime des protégés et associés agricoles.

ARTICLE 13.

Toute clause d'accord, convention, traité ou règlement qui seraient contraires aux précédentes stipulations sont et demeurent abrogées.

ARTICLE 14.

Le présent accord sera communiqué aux autres Puissances signataires de l'Acte d'Algésiras, près desquelles les deux Gouvernements s'engagent à se prêter mutuellement appui pour obtenir leur adhésion.

[43515] No. 416.

War Office to Foreign Office.—(*Received November* 4.)

Sir, *Whitehall, November* 3, 1911.

I AM commanded by the Army Council to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, dated the 6th October, 1911, requesting an opinion on the value and importance to this country of obtaining from the French Government a formal undertaking that no part of the Atlantic coast of Morocco, south of the Sebou River, shall ever be fortified.

In reply, I am to say that in view of the facilities possessed by France for interrupting our communications with the East by way of the Mediterranean and the Suez Canal, the Army Council think that an arrangement which would limit her possibilities for offensive action against our alternative route by the Cape might be advantageous.

Moreover, the predominant position which France has acquired in West and Equatorial Africa, and the numerical superiority of her local forces over those of our neighbouring colonies and protectorates, increase the importance of our maintaining uninterrupted over-sea communication with the latter.

In these circumstances, although the council are not disposed to anticipate that the Moroccan littoral south of the Sebou River will prove a valuable acquisition from a naval standpoint, they are of opinion that, as a precautionary measure, it might be desirable to obtain from the French Government a formal undertaking that no part of the coast under reference should be fortified.

While this is the conclusion of the Army Council on the question in its military aspect, they are inclined to doubt whether such an undertaking would be of sufficient military value as to outweigh possible objections to it which might arise from another point of view.

I am, &c.
E. W. D. WARD.

[43660] No. 417.

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received November* 4.)

(No. 85.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Madrid, November* 4, 1911.

THE Franco-German agreement relating to Morocco was communicated last night to the Spanish Government by the French Ambassador, who, in making the communication, expressed the hope that the Spanish Government would see their way to signify their adherence. The French Government, his Excellency added, of course understood that, though the agreement related to the whole of Morocco, in view of the acknowledged claims of Spain in Morocco special arrangements would have to be made by them with the Spanish Government.

Instructions to communicate the agreement had, up to last night, not been received by the German Ambassador, who, however, told M. Geoffray that he was expecting them to reach him at any moment.

[43658] No. 418.

Sir F Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 4.)

(No. 119. Very Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Vienna, November 4, 1911.*

TO-DAY the text of the Moroccan Agreement was communicated by the French Ambassador, who said he hoped that the Government of the Dual Monarchy would as soon as possible recognise it. The Minister for Foreign Affairs answered that he would place the text before the two Governments, but seemed to hint that there might be some delay before a decision could be reached. His Excellency added that he hoped that France would show the friendly feeling, the lack of which he was sorry he had noticed for the last two or three years towards Austria-Hungary, in return for her adhesion to the new agreement, for, if this were given, it must be regarded as a friendly act towards France. The agreement seemed to him at first sight to cancel entirely the Act of Algeciras. To this M. Crozier made no reply, as he was not prepared to discuss at the present with Count Aehrenthal the suggestion, which he feared the latter might make, that the French Government should pave the way in Paris for the raising of an Austro-Hungarian loan.

German Ambassador, of whom M. Crozier this morning enquired whether he was in a position to communicate the text of the agreement, said that he had had no instructions, and seemed to hint that there was no particular hurry. As a matter of fact he preceded the French Ambassador, for M. Crozier discovered on his arrival a few hours later at the Ministry that M. Tschirsky had been closeted with Count Aehrenthal for an hour. It would seem that Germany does not wish to press for the Austro-Hungarian Government's immediate adhesion to the agreement, their intention apparently being to enable Austria-Hungary to squeeze a loan out of France; this, at any rate, M. Crozier concludes from what German Ambassador said to him on leaving Count Aehrenthal.

[44063] No. 419.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen.

(No. 116.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, November 4, 1911.*

THE Spanish Ambassador called at the Foreign Office to-day and stated that the Moroccan agreement had been communicated to the Spanish Government, and that the latter had been informed that the German Government had treated Morocco as a whole, but that the French Government had not lost sight of the fact that they must come to a special arrangement with Spain as to the position which the latter should hold in Morocco.

The Ambassador said that his Government did not like this wording, as no allusion was made to special treaties or to the position which Spain already held in Morocco.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[43769] No. 420.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 6.)

(No. 490. Confidential.)
Sir, *Paris, November 2, 1911.*

I RETURNED to Paris last night, and I had an interview with M. de Selves this evening. After some general conversation he asked me what opinion you had expressed to me when I was in London on the projet de convention for settling the respective positions of France and Spain in Morocco, communicated to me by M. Regnault, copy of which was enclosed in my despatch No. 455, Confidential, of the 21st ultimo.

I replied that you and the Prime Minister were preoccupied at the situation which would be created between Spain and France if the projet in question were communicated

to the Spanish Government, who were in a state of irritation and alarm at reports which had reached them of demands which were likely to be made by the French Government depriving them of parts of the advantages which the Franco-Spanish agreement of 1904 had promised them, and to which they attached very great importance. His Majesty's Government admitted that some sacrifice was due to France for the improved position which Spain would naturally occupy in Morocco through the compensations in the French Congo, which were to be given to Germany in return for her recognition of a French protectorate of Morocco; but to convert a Spanish zone on the Mediterranean coast of Morocco into full possession and sovereignty would probably raise questions with Germany and perhaps other Powers. Germany might demand compensation for a recognition of Spanish sovereignty. To substitute France for Spain in the zone on the western coast of Morocco, which had been allotted to Spain by the 1904 arrangements, would be a very great and serious departure from those arrangements to which England had been a party. Such substitution would not be consistent with the protection of British interests which Lord Lansdowne had had in view when he negotiated the 1904 agreement. I had pointed this out to M. Regnault when he communicated to me the projet, but I had heard that he had described me as thinking that it might be acceptable to His Majesty's Government, though I had not, he is alleged to have stated, expressed any decided opinion on it myself. M. de Selves interposed that when, on M. Regnault's return from his interview with me, he had asked him what I thought of the projet, M. Regnault had stated that I had said that I would refer it to His Majesty's Government, and that I appeared to be in doubt as to my own opinion in regard to the view which would be taken of it by His Majesty's Government.

M. de Selves indicated with his hand the hovering of the hawk before making up its mind. I observed that M. Regnault must have an odd idea of interpreting the "jamais" which I had said to him in regard to the acceptability of the projet, for I had given him my reasons for considering the substitution of France for Spain on the Atlantic coast of Morocco as inacceptable to His Majesty's Government, viz., that it would be the substitution of a first-class naval Power for one that was not so, and when M. Regnault had suggested to me that it would be contrary to British interests that Spain, who might be in alliance with Germany, should be in occupation of the Atlantic coast of Morocco, I had pointed out to him that Great Britain and the British fleet came between Germany and Spain.

M. de Selves reminded me that when asking me the day after my interview with M. Regnault what I thought of the projet, he had stated on my expressing great doubt of it being acceptable to His Majesty's Government, that it was only a projet for your consideration, and that he would not put it forward without your concurrence, for he desired to act in unison with His Majesty's Government. I told him that I had so reported to you, but when in London I learnt that it had been represented to the Prime Minister that M. Caillaux had adopted the proposals contained in the projet and meant to press them on the Spanish Government. I had, consequently, been instructed by the Prime Minister and yourself to inform the French Government that not only would any such proceeding have a detrimental effect on public opinion in England in regard to the *entente*, but that His Majesty's Government could not give such a policy support at Madrid. Their view was that the negotiations with the Spanish Government must be on the basis of the 1904 agreements with such deviations as might be required for reasonable compensation to France for the improved position which Spain was entitled to expect from a recognition by the Powers of a French protectorate over Morocco. To put pressure on Spain to accept the drastic proposals of the projet would be to throw her into the arms of Germany, which would be injurious to the interests of England and France. Spain would never willingly consent to give up her zone on the west coast. M. Regnault and some of the colonial party including, perhaps, some of the members of the French Cabinet, had persuaded M. Caillaux of the advantages and feasibility of M. Regnault's scheme, for, I had no doubt, that it was his projet and not one that could recommend itself to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, for it contained elements of danger to the foreign policy of France if the *entente* was intended to continue its task of preserving peace whilst protecting the solid interests of France and England.

M. de Selves admitted the reality of the dangers which I had indicated, and it was because he felt from his conversations with me that His Majesty's Government might object to the projet that he had sent it to me for your consideration, as he desired to act in unison with His Majesty's Government in the questions which must arise with Spain in Morocco.

At my suggestion M. de Selves undertook to prepare M. Caillaux, whom he was to

see to-morrow morning at a meeting of the Cabinet for the communication which I am to make to him, of the views of His Majesty's Government.

M. de Selves then discussed with me the arrangements to be made with Spain on the basis that the questions of the annexation to Spain of the Mediterranean zone and the substitution of France for Spain in the western zone from the vicinity of Tangier southward and westward to the Atlantic coast shall be dropped. He said that the report which I mentioned to him as being current in London, that the French Government were meditating a demand on the Spanish Government to withdraw from Larache and Alcazar, was a myth. He thought, however, that Spain might well be asked to waive her rights on Alcazar so that French communications might be kept up through there, as a French-protected place, with Tangier and Fez, compensations to France must be sought elsewhere than on the coast between Tangier and Larache. The Spanish Government held to the retention of Ifni on account of the Canaries, and he recognised the validity of their objection to a European Power being established opposite to those Spanish islands. M. de Selves then enquired where I thought that compensation could be sought to which Spain might not make strong objection, and to which England would recommend Spain to consent. I said that I thought that such compensation might be found in the south of Morocco, where Spain had something that she might give up, and I recommended M. de Selves to abandon altogether M. Regnault's projet, and to revert to the scheme which he had communicated to me at the end of August for the consideration of His Majesty's Government, and to insert in it a prohibition to Spain to alienate in any form her rights in the territories comprised in her zones in Morocco. There was such a prohibition in the Regnault projet. It had been forgotten or omitted when the earlier projet was drafted at the Quai d'Orsay. M. de Selves said that he would confer with the President of the Council and point out to him the objections of His Majesty's Government to the Regnault scheme. M. de Selves further stated that, though the Spanish Government had, in his opinion, acted impetuously and unwisely in Morocco, he made allowance for the excitable temperament and touchiness of the Spanish people, and he desired to avoid, so far as might be possible, hurting their susceptibilities. He admitted that it would be a mistaken policy to run the risk of throwing Spain into the arms of Germany in this particular case, or of treating her in a manner to alienate her from co-operation with her neighbour France in general questions.

I have, &c.
FRANCIS BERTIE.

[43770] No. 421.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 6.)

(No. 495. Confidential.)

Sir, *Paris, November 3, 1911.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 490 of yesterday, I have the honour to inform you that I had an interview with the President of the Council this evening on the subject of the arrangements to be made to settle the respective positions of France and Spain in Morocco. I urged on him all the considerations which I had put to the Minister for Foreign Affairs as reported in my despatch of yesterday.

M. Caillaux showed no signs of any intention to adopt a conciliatory attitude in the matter. He mentioned a series of grievances with France had against Spain, many of them, as I observed to him, not being pertinent to the question of Morocco. He said that the Spanish Government had intrigued with the German Government, and relying on German support they had bearded France in every way, and their conduct had been intolerable.

Spain had broken her engagements by the occupation of Alcazar and other such acts in Morocco, and the French Government would have been justified in denouncing the convention of 1904. France had by great sacrifices in the Congo Colony obtained from Germany a recognition of the claims of France in Morocco. Was Spain not to compensate France for the position which the French Government were ready to concede to Spain in Morocco? There was a public opinion in France as well as England, and there were no public men of any prominence, except M. Clemenceau, who did not insist with him that the compensation to be required from Spain should be ample, and such as to be in proportion to the French sacrifices. I observed to him that His Majesty's Government did not question the claim of France for some

concessions from Spain for the improved position which she had a right to expect from the terms of the convention of 1904, but they must not be exaggerated. M. Caillaux replied that the compensation he asked for was set forth in the Regnault projet. I said that His Majesty's Government could not support such a claim at Madrid, and the possession by France of the zone in the north-west of Morocco which had been allotted in certain contingencies to Spain by M. Delcassé's convention of 1904, and marked out on the map accompanying that convention, would not be consistent with British interests. M. Caillaux asked where I suggested that compensation should be sought. I said in the south of Morocco. M. Caillaux rejected such an idea. That part of Morocco was worthless, and Spain would be as unwilling to part with any portion of her so-called possession of Rio del Oro, which she had never occupied, as she would no doubt object to waiving any of her claims under the 1904 convention. The Spaniards were quite unfit properly to govern or administer anything. They had already made themselves hated in the districts which they had occupied in Morocco by their conduct there. They even stabled their horses in the mosques.

I admitted that the Spaniards had acted impetuously and foolishly in proceeding to the occupation of portions of Morocco, but that was not a good reason for carrying resentment to the point of estranging Spain and throwing her into the arms of Germany. It would be a serious matter in case of war with Germany for France to have a hostile Spain in her rear. I reminded him that the late King of Spain had promised the German Emperor that if war broke out between Germany and France he would place 100,000 men on the Franco-Spanish frontier. The present King had refused to renew this promise. Was it not important to encourage His Majesty to maintain his good disposition towards France?

M. Caillaux ridiculed the value of problematical Spanish support to France. The Spaniards had a violent hatred of France, but their army was worth nothing. The French military authorities calculated that 25,000 French troops would be sufficient to restrain Spanish demonstrations.

He believed that a much less force would suffice.

I then put it to him that in the event of a war with Germany, in which Italy, Austria, and Turkey were allied with her, it would be a serious drawback to France and England, if those two Powers were acting together, to have a hostile Spain, with her ports closed to their ships.

M. Caillaux did not discuss this point. He continued to inveigh against Spain, finally saying that if Spain were allowed to have what she expected in Morocco, it could not be for long, for there would be constant rebellions; her troops would be incapable of restoring or maintaining order, and the French Government would have to undertake the task.

I asked M. Caillaux why he desired to withdraw from Spain one of the zones promised to her by the Delcassé convention? France would, thanks to the support of England, have a magnificent domain without it. Why was he bent on offending Spain and public opinion in England by making exaggerated claims?

M. Caillaux answered that if His Majesty's Government supported Spain in refusing satisfaction to the French claims, French public opinion would be greatly irritated and there would be a danger of France and England falling out ("et il y aurait danger que la France et l'Angleterre se brouillent").

To this I said that Frenchmen were much less excitable than formerly, and had shown great common sense in all the difficulties with Germany, and I did not suppose that they would be foolish enough to quarrel with England on account of the question of what compensation would be reasonable for Spain to give to France in Morocco.

M. Caillaux said that it might not be a quarrel, but that there would not be the same French good-will to England in all parts of the world and on all questions as now.

The conversation then turned again to the question of the Atlantic zone in Morocco. I asked him what he regarded as essential for French interests. He said that he must have railway communication from Tangier viâ Alcazar to Fez free of all possibility of Spanish authority or interference, and this could only be ensured by carrying out the "Regnault projet." He knew nothing of any other earlier scheme such as I had mentioned to him as having the concurrence of His Majesty's Government. One projet only had been communicated to him by M. de Selves, who was then accompanied by M. Regnault, and he had approved that projet.

M. Caillaux observed during our interview that France, as regarded the so-called Spanish zone in the north-west of Morocco, was only under treaty obligation to England for the non-fortification of the coast. I disputed this view, for, as I reminded him, the Delcassé convention of 1904, with the accompanying maps on which the Spanish zones

were delineated, had been officially communicated by the French Government to His Majesty's Government, who had accepted them as a satisfactory settlement.

I requested M. Caillaux to reflect on all that I had said, and I observed that I would renew our conversation to-morrow at the President's shooting party at Rambouillet where he and I were to meet.

M. Caillaux said that he would reflect but that he could not change his mind.

I have, &c.
FRANCIS BERTIE.

[43880] No. 422.

Admiralty to Foreign Office.—(Received November 6.)

(Confidential.)

Sir, *Admiralty, November 3, 1911.*

IN reply to your letter of the 6th ultimo respecting article 7 of the Anglo-French declaration of April 1904, I am commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to acquaint you, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, that it is considered desirable that the formal undertaking suggested in your letter that no part of the Atlantic coast of Morocco south of the Sebou River should ever be fortified, should be obtained from the French Government if possible.

2. If the Franco-German negotiations result in France being given a free hand in Morocco, the responsibility for making suitable arrangements for the development and opening up of the country will devolve upon her. The want of a port on the west coast will sooner or later be felt, and the construction of a harbour will then be a question of money only. It will undoubtedly be to the advantage of this country if such a port be of a purely commercial nature and not fortified.

I am, &c.
O. MURRAY.

[43771] No. 423.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 6.)

(No. 496.)

Sir, *Paris, November 4, 1911.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith an article from the "Figaro" of to-day's date, written by M. Gaston Calmette, editor of that paper, on the question of a prospective settlement with Spain of her zone in Morocco.

M. Gaston Calmette pronounces himself in favour of keeping engagements with Spain. If the French Government are able, he says, in a perfectly cordial spirit, to obtain from Spain some territory in the south of Morocco which is of no use to her, or facilities for the future Tangier-Fez railway, so much the better. Former arrangements with Spain, however, should not be called in question.

M. Gaston Calmette mentions the fact that the "famous secret treaty" with Spain was communicated officially to England, and placed under her guarantee. This factor in the situation cannot be unknown to the present French Ministry. It is an important one at this moment.

I have, &c.
FRANCIS BERTIE.

Enclosure in No. 423.

Extract from the "Figaro" of November 4, 1911.

L'ENTENTE NÉCESSAIRE.

L'ACCORD allemand étant enfin signé, nous devons apporter tous nos soins au règlement de nos difficultés avec l'Espagne dans cette interminable question du Maroc qui nous aura réservé tant de désagréables surprises.

Et il nous semble à ce sujet que certains Ministres français aient déjà créé un

courant d'opinions fâcheux, car l'entente avec ce valeureux pays est, quoi qu'ils en disent, nécessaire plus que jamais.

Non, quels que soient nos regrets de voir la plus belle partie du Maroc nous échapper en vertu du traité secret de 1904, nous ne pouvons pas demander à l'Espagne d'évacuer demain Larache et El Ksar, en échange des sacrifices congolais que nous venons de faire à l'Allemagne comme prix de notre liberté d'action au Maroc.

C'est pour nous assurer cette même liberté d'action que nous avons cédé à l'Angleterre Terre-Neuve, nos droits sur l'Égypte et nos intérêts au Siam; que nous avons abandonné la Tripolitaine et la Cyrénaïque à l'Italie; que nous avons reconnu la zone de Tanger, de Larache, d'El Ksar et d'Ifni à l'Espagne; c'est pour acquérir plus tard, trop tard, cette même liberté, qu'ayant naïvement isolé l'Allemagne, nous avons été contraints finalement de lui donner une étendue de Congo supérieure à la moitié de la France.

Cette liberté, nous l'avons, paraît-il, désormais (quelques sages en doutent encore). Mais quels sont les hommes d'État qui, au lendemain du jour où le douloureux accord allemand est signé, voudront s'en servir comme d'une arme contre l'Espagne et imposer à leur tour un sacrifice quelconque à une nation moins préparée pour la défense et moins armée pour le refus?

Ce sont là des attitudes qui nous couvriraient de confusion à l'étranger.

Tenons nos engagements avec l'Espagne comme nous les avons tenus avec l'Angleterre et l'Italie, comme nous les tiendrons avec l'Allemagne; et évitons, à l'égard du Cabinet de Madrid, des différences de traitement qui ne seraient pas à notre honneur.

Notre pays veut la paix, la paix complète, rapide, absolue, la reprise du travail, des vastes projets, des longs espoirs. Il ne veut plus de contestations, de discussions ni d'à-coups.

Si notre Gouvernement peut, sur le terrain de la plus absolue cordialité, obtenir l'abandon de quelque enclave du sud marocain inutile à l'Espagne; s'il peut rendre plus faciles l'établissement et l'exploitation du futur chemin de fer de Fez à Tanger dont les trois quarts du parcours appartiennent à l'Espagne, notre Gouvernement aura fait œuvre utile et bonne.

Mais ne demandons pas au Cabinet de Madrid la remise en discussion des accords spéciaux conclus au nom de la France par un Ministre français, si faible ou si aveugle que ce Ministre ait été.

D'ailleurs, ce fameux traité secret, dissimulé au Parlement français, longtemps insoupçonné des Ministres eux-mêmes, caché jusqu'à ce jour à tous les Gouvernements de l'Europe, a été placé sous les auspices de l'Angleterre, qui en est la garante, et communiqué officiellement au Foreign Office par la France et par l'Espagne au moment où il fut signé.

Le Cabinet actuel, dont fait partie M. Delcassé, ne doit pas ignorer ce détail: il ne doit pas l'oublier non plus, car il a son importance en ce moment.—GASTON CALMETTE.

[43702] No. 424.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 6.)

(No. 360.)

Sir, *Berlin, November 4, 1911.*

WITH reference to my telegram No. 98 of yesterday's date, I have the honour to report the announcement in the press this morning that the Emperor has accepted Herr von Lindequist's resignation, and that Dr. Solf, ex-Governor of Samoa, has been appointed to take temporary charge of the Colonial Office.

The "Lokal-Anzeiger," which has often been used of late for semi-official utterances, and may therefore be presumed in this case to be reproducing the views of the Foreign Office and the Imperial Chancery, blames Herr von Lindequist severely for his behaviour during the negotiations and for his resignation at the very moment of their conclusion; the paper describes him as a subordinate official, and insinuates that it is monstrous for a person in that position to oppose the wishes of the Imperial Chancellor and to put difficulties in the way of negotiations conducted by him or under his auspices; it also hints pretty broadly that Herr von Lindequist is responsible for the indiscretions which have emanated from the Colonial Office, both in regard to the course of the negotiations and to his own desire to resign, although it actually says that he is not personally responsible for them.

The "Tageblatt," on the other hand, the paper which published the indiscretions referred to, declares that it is in the best position to know that Herr von Lindequist is is in no way responsible for them; it is indignant at the description of the Secretary of State for the Colonial Office as a subordinate official, and points out that, though by the constitution the Chancellor is alone responsible for all the Imperial offices and the various Secretaries of State are nominally subordinate to him, it is quite absurd that they should be so, and it greets with delight the attitude of one man who has at last been found with independent views and with sufficient strength of character to resign rather than give a false official approval to things of which he disapproves.

I have, &c.
W. E. GOSCHEN.

No. 425.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 6.)

(No. 499. Confidential.)

Sir, *Paris, November 5, 1911.*

I HAVE the honour to inform you with reference to my despatch No. 495 of the 3rd instant, that I had a further conversation with the President of the Council yesterday morning, but I did not succeed in moving him from his declared intention to press on the Spanish Government the Regnault *projet*. He maintains that, in view of the opinions in favour of obtaining large compensations from Spain in Morocco which are held by prominent political persons of all parties, and are urged on him by them, he must maintain his views, which are those set forth in the *projet* which M. de Selves, he says, submitted to him and he approved. He argues that the 1904 agreements have been broken by Spain, and that France cannot be expected to make them the basis for negotiations with the Spanish Government. I am, however, under the impression that on further reflection, and when he finds that unless he accepts that basis His Majesty's Government will not give any assistance at Madrid to the French negotiations there, M. Caillaux will reconsider his position, for his colleagues in the French Cabinet are, I understand, not by any means all agreed that his present attitude is good policy.

I have, &c.
FRANCIS BERTIE.

[43929] No. 426.

Sir F. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 6.)

(No. 121.)

(Telegraphic.) P. *Vienna, November 6, 1911*

REFERRING to my telegram No. 119 of Morocco Agreement:

The Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs, whom I saw this afternoon, informed me that the text of the new agreement had just been communicated to him by the German Ambassador. I asked whether the consent of the Austro-Hungarian Government would soon be given to it, and Count Aehrenthal answered that there must necessarily be some delay before the assent of the two Parliaments could be obtained. I also enquired of his Excellency (with whom the Spanish Ambassador had just had an interview before my arrival) whether he intended to delay giving his assent until an understanding as regards Morocco had been reached between France and Spain. To this Count Aehrenthal answered that he could not on that ground withhold his consent. At the same time, he took the opportunity of expressing to me his earnest hope that the influence of His Majesty's Government would be used in order to persuade the French Government to treat the claims of Spain in regard to Morocco with as favourable a consideration as possible. In his Excellency's opinion the Monarchy's prestige in Spain ought to be strengthened, and it was at the present time most important that every effort should be made in that direction. The present Government in Spain had acted in a very foolish way in Morocco and had got into difficulties, out of which, however, he considered it incumbent on the Monarchical Powers to help them.

[43364] No. 426*.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen.

(No. 215.)

(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, November 6, 1911.*

YOUR telegrams Nos. 95 and 96 of 2nd November.

The following question will be put in House of Commons to-morrow by a private member:—

"Whether communications have passed between the Foreign Office and German Government relative to an alleged interview granted by a British Ambassador to an Austrian newspaper; and, if so, what was the purport or conclusion of those communications."

The following is the answer I propose to give:—

"Two incidents have lately formed the subject of communications between His Majesty's Government and the German Government. One is the article published in an Austrian newspaper and referred to in the question, the other is the report in the German press of a speech delivered by my right honourable friend who is now Home Secretary. The communications between the Governments have been of a more or less informal character, and it is unnecessary, and perhaps would not be suitable, to publish them; but I may say that they were not of a nature to cause any difficulty between the two Governments.

"I think, however, that it is desirable to state the facts. It was alleged, and in some quarters believed, that the British Ambassador at Vienna had been—through an interview or in some other way—a party to the publication of an article criticising German policy; it was reported that my right honourable friend, then First Lord of the Admiralty, had in a public speech used language attacking German policy. Both these incidents were construed in Germany as a direct public and intentional affront to Germany on the part of a British Minister and a British Ambassador, and they have given rise to great resentment.

"The facts are that the British Ambassador in Vienna was not in any way a party to the publication of the article complained of, nor had he any knowledge of it before its publication. My right honourable friend did not use the language complained of in his speech; the passage in question was interpolated into the report of his speech from some entirely foreign source, and nothing of the kind was said by my right honourable friend.

"I would express the hope, after these incidents, that public opinion will be on its guard against being carried away by false statements. There are, of course, difficulties and friction from time to time between this country and others arising from a real divergence of policy at a particular moment. I believe that the Governments concerned will be able to overcome all such difficulties if facts are not exaggerated or distorted, but, if false news is to be reported and believed, public excitement and resentment will some day get beyond what it is possible for Governments to control.

"There has been a tendency in individual organs of the press, sometimes in Great Britain, sometimes in Germany, to put a sinister construction upon action taken, or supposed to be taken, by the German or the British Government respectively in different parts of the world. I trust that, with the happy conclusion of negotiations between France and Germany on the subject of Morocco, the tension that has given rise to suspicion and misconstruction in the British and German press will disappear."

You should let Chancellor or Minister for Foreign Affairs have a copy, stating that I send it for information only, but with the desire to suit the convenience of the Chancellor by letting him know it before he makes his own speech in Reichstag on Wednesday. You should add that I have drafted the reply and have specially inserted the last paragraph with a desire to avoid giving any embarrassment to the Chancellor.

[44277] No. 427.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen.

(No. 263.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, November* 6, 1911.

COUNT METTERNICH communicated to me to-day the text of the agreement between Germany and France as to Morocco, and said that his Government asked for our support of it.

I replied that I would examine the agreement, which I had not yet studied as a whole since it was signed, though the French had kept us informed as to it during the progress of the negotiations with regard to it. I would, however, at once express my great satisfaction at the conclusion of the negotiations. Count Metternich would remember that, when the agreement of 1909 between Germany and France as to Morocco had been made, I had expressed great satisfaction, on the assumption that difficulties about Morocco were over, because difficulties about Morocco were sure to throw Germany and ourselves into opposite diplomatic camps. If, as I hoped, and as must apparently be the case, the present agreement between Germany and France was a permanent settlement of the difficulties as to Morocco, it would be most satisfactory to us. It might be a little time before public opinion had calmed down sufficiently to realise the full consequences of it, but its effect must be to relax the tension and to remove a great obstacle from the path of European diplomacy.

Count Metternich said very cordially that he would certainly transmit what I had said to his Government.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[44082] No. 428.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 7.)

(No. 364.)

Sir, *Berlin, November* 4, 1911.

I HAVE the honour to inform you that the Franco-German agreement regarding Morocco and the Congo was signed this afternoon at 5 o'clock by M. Cambon and Herr von Kiderlen-Waechter. It is announced that the text intended for the French Government will be dispatched to-night to Paris, and that after its arrival there the agreement will be published simultaneously by the two Governments.

I have, &c.
W. E. GOSCHEN.

[44083] No. 429.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 7.)

(No. 365.)

Sir, *Berlin, November* 5, 1911.

THE "Deutsche Tageszeitung" published on the 3rd instant an article signed "E.R." (*i.e.*, Count Reventlow, the well-known Pan-German publicist), entitled "The part played by Great Britain during the Moroccan negotiations." In this article an attempt is made to show that though England endeavoured to interfere in the negotiations her action had no effect on their result. Germany, it says, had never any intention of obtaining a footing in Morocco and had made an announcement to this effect previous to Mr. Asquith's famous speech. It was equally well-known that France was ready to treat and to give compensations in the Congo, and it was, accordingly, evident that Germany had not, as alleged, given way before England.

In the course of this article the following paragraph occurs:—

"As regards the actual intentions of the British Government we believe that they cannot be described as of an absolutely uniform character. Sir Edward Grey acted throughout in a loyal and upright manner. On the other hand, it can hardly be doubted that other persons with recognised anti-German aims and feelings did all they could to bring about a rupture of the Franco-German negotiations. Mention has already been frequently made of the British Ambassador in Paris, Bertie, who did everything imaginable to induce the French Government to put forward inacceptabl

demands and to introduce as hostile a tone as possible into the Franco-German negotiations. Mention must also be made of Sir Arthur Nicolson, the successor to the well-known and equally Germanophobe Sir Charles Hardinge, the Permanent Secretary of State and constant attendant on as well as adviser of the King. Sir Arthur Nicolson has long been known as a Germanophobe, he was previously Ambassador at St. Petersburgh, and it is chiefly to be ascribed to his efforts that the 'isolation policy' succeeded, at least theoretically, at the time of King Edward's visit to Reval. It is obvious that men like Nicolson and Bertie, supported by the anti-German current of opinion in England, exercise a very considerable influence especially on the British Government. We are inclined to attribute to a great extent the speeches of English Ministers to this influence. The English Government clearly thought that they were bound to take this influence into consideration, and that they owed it to their position as a Government to adopt a tone of boundless arrogance before the English people and before the whole world. It is to be observed that, as we already showed at the time, the speeches of Ministers contained no tangible point of view. They harped rather on the alleged decisive rôle of England in all world matters, and were to the effect that only peace with honour could be allowed, &c., whilst the Prime Minister pointed to the possibility of a development which, in point of fact, was entirely baseless in view of the previous declarations of Germany in regard to her action in Morocco. These speeches were, therefore, based upon a pure fabrication. They rested upon a political and diplomatic foundation which was non-existent, and *which the speakers knew to be non-existent.* They employed this fiction notwithstanding to make the British people and the opinion of other Powers believe that England was defending once again with success and authority her rights and those of France and also the needs of a peace-craving world against the pretensions of the German Empire."

I enclose herein the text of the article in question.*

I have, &c.
W. E. GOSCHEN.

[44251] No. 430.

Note Verbale communicated by Señor Villa Urrutia, November 7, 1911.

(Translation.)

THE German and French Governments have asked for the adherence as soon as possible of the Madrid Cabinet to the Franco-German agreement. The Spanish Government have replied that their political and particular interests in Morocco [? not] having been recognised, they are not in a position to give the said adherence before obtaining the necessary securities for the same. The Spanish Government consider that they ought to inform the London Cabinet of this as they have the other signatories of the Act of Algeciras.

Spanish Embassy, London, November, 7, 1911.

[44120] No. 431.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 7.)

(No. 99.)

(Telegraphic.) R. *Berlin, November 7, 1911.*

YOUR telegram No. 215 of 6th November.

Chancellor is very grateful for text of your answere and specially for last paragraph. Nothing you propose to say will cause him any embarrassment, and he intends in his speech to call attention to your warning addressed to press of both countries, and to say that he entirely associates himself with that warning. There is one point in ante-penultimate paragraph of your telegram which rather disturbs him, namely, that you say "there *are* of course difficulties, &c." He fears this may give a handle to German press for again calling attention to divergence between two Governments on Morocco question, and that it may weaken his proposed statement that His Majesty's Government have all along declared that they have no wish to hamper negotiations. He would like you to say "difficulties *may* of course arise." I said that

* Not printed.

[43936] No. 429*.

Admiralty to Foreign Office.—(Received November 7.)

(Secret.)

Sir, *Admiralty, November 6, 1911.*

WITH reference to your letter of the 26th ultimo, forwarding copies of despatches from His Majesty's Ambassadors at Madrid and Paris relative to the proposals with regard to Morocco which the French Government contemplate laying before the Spanish Government, I am commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to acquaint you, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, that it is immaterial from the Admiralty point of view how the coast line is divided, provided that a stipulation is insisted upon that neither Power shall fortify any port on the Mediterranean or Atlantic seaboards. Existing defences need not be demolished, but they should not be added to, so as to alter the character of the defence.

I am, &c.
O. MURRAY.

[44169] No. 432*.

Sir A. Hardinge to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 8.)

(No. 49.)
(Telegraphic.) *Lisbon, November 7, 1911.*

PORTUGUESE Government ask for our advice in following circumstances :—

French chargé d'affaires, in communicating Morocco agreement with Germany, has pressed for early reply : Spanish representative has urged them to delay it. They would be glad to oblige France, but for reasons connected with their internal situation wish to avoid displeasing Spain. They have told latter that they propose consulting us.

If in deference to our advice they disregard Spanish request and increase strain with Madrid they will, I think, again claim our support there in matter of loyalist conspiracies. About these they are still anxious and are instructing their Minister in London to warn us that two ships for Royalist cause are believed to be fitting out in English waters.

Sent to Madrid.

I would inform you of his observations, but that I thought subsequent words "from time to time" covered his objection. He said that he was perhaps over-particular, but that he was afraid of sense that your words might convey in German translation. His Excellency told me he would not be able to avoid allusion to Chancellor of the Exchequer's speech. He did not propose to criticise Chancellor's speech itself, but to refer to natural irritation caused in Germany by interpretation given to it by the British, and especially the French, press.

[46028] No. 432.

Extract from "Parliamentary Debates" of November 7, 1911.

GREAT BRITAIN AND GERMANY.

Mr. King asked whether communications had passed between the Foreign Office and German Government relative to an alleged interview granted by a British Ambassador to an Austrian newspaper, and, if so, what was the purport or conclusion of those communications ?

Sir Edward Grey.—Two incidents have lately formed the subject of communications between His Majesty's Government and the German Government. One is the article published in an Austrian newspaper and referred to in the question ; the other is the report in the German press of a speech delivered by my right honourable friend, who is now Home Secretary. The communications between the Governments have been of a more or less informal character, and it is unnecessary, and perhaps would not be suitable, to publish them ; but I may say that they were not of a nature to cause any difficulty between the two Governments. I think, however, that it is desirable to state the facts. It was alleged, and in some quarters believed, that the British Ambassador at Vienna had been—through an interview or in some other way—a party to the publication of an article criticising German policy ; it was reported that my right honourable friend, then First Lord of the Admiralty, had in a public speech used language attacking German policy. Both these incidents were construed in Germany as a direct public and intentional affront to Germany on the part of a British Minister and a British Ambassador, and have given rise to great resentment. The facts are that the British Ambassador in Vienna was not in any way a party to the publication of the article complained of, nor had he any knowledge of it before its publication. My right honourable friend did not use the language complained of in his speech ; the passage in question was interpolated into the report of his speech from some entirely foreign source, and nothing of the kind was said by my right honourable friend. I would express the hope, after these incidents, that public opinion will be on its guard against being carried away by false statements. Difficulties may, of course, arise from time to time between this country and others from a real divergence of policy at a particular moment. I believe that the Governments concerned will be able to overcome all such difficulties if facts are not exaggerated or distorted. But if false news is to be reported and believed, public excitement and resentment will some day get beyond what it is possible for Governments to control. There has been a tendency in individual organs of the press, sometimes in Great Britain, sometimes in Germany, to put a sinister construction upon action taken, or supposed to be taken, by the German or British Governments respectively in different parts of the world. I trust that, with the conclusion of negotiations now happily arrived at between France and Germany on the subject of Morocco, the tension that has given rise to suspicion and misconstruction in the British press and the German press will disappear. As has already been stated on behalf of the Government, both here and in another place, there will be an opportunity later on for a statement and discussion of foreign policy, and I shall hope then to deal more fully with this and other matters. It is impossible to deal with them adequately within the limits of a reply to a question.

Mr. King.—Arising out of that reply, for which I feel sure the whole House will be grateful, may I ask the right honourable gentleman if the assurances and explanations were cordially and quickly accepted by the German Government ?

Sir Edward Grey.—I do not think, after the full and considered statement I have given, my honourable friend ought to ask me further questions. I would refer him to what I have already said in my answer, that any communications which passed were not of a nature to cause any difficulty between the two Governments.

[44288] No. 433.

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 8.)

(No. 86.)
Telegraphic.) P. *Madrid, November 8, 1911.*

THE Spanish reply to the French note communicating the Franco-German agreement regarding Morocco has now been received, and the French Ambassador informs me that it is to the effect that, subject to the conclusion of satisfactory arrangements in accordance with the terms of the secret treaty of 1904, the Spanish Government are prepared to accept the new arrangement.

As regards the reply of the Spanish Government to the German note, I understand that the assent of Spain is made conditional on the conclusion of arrangements satisfactory to Spain which shall replace those articles of the General Act of Algeciras under which Spain obtained a special position in Morocco.

[44306] No. 434.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 9.)

(No. 368.)
Sir, *Berlin, November 6, 1911.*

WITH the Reichstag elections so near at hand, and with their influence bearing heavily on all questions concerning both internal and foreign policy, it is difficult to come to any exact conclusion respecting the real feeling of German public opinion with regard to the arrangement just concluded between France and Germany. The portion of the press which is unfavourable to the Government, such as that representing Pan-German ideas, describes it as a national shame and a final nail in the coffin of German prestige. The language of the Radical papers is less violent, but not much less hostile, and the Conservative press is reserved. It is, in fact, only the newspapers who are habitually used by the Government for semi-official communications which point out the advantages of this arrangement, which, while removing a continual source of friction between France and Germany, gains for the latter Power a very valuable addition to her colonial possessions.

I should say that, as yet at all events, the balance of public opinion is unfavourable to the arrangement. But an effort is being made by some of the more independent papers to point out that it is undesirable, from a German national point of view, that, for electioneering purposes, such violent language should be used against the arrangement, as it cannot fail to give the world outside the idea that Germany has suffered a diplomatic defeat. The "Kölnische Zeitung" takes this line. It certainly does not itself show any particular enthusiasm for the arrangement, but it does point out that those who abuse it unreservedly, and refuse to acknowledge that it has its good points, are rendering a bad service to their country. The "Kölnische" says that for those who think that the position gained by France in Morocco is in no way counterbalanced by the concessions obntained in French Congo, and for those who had set their hearts on a slice of Morocco, it saves trouble to abuse the whole arrangement without going into the question of whether it countains any counterbalancing advantages. But that the quiet observer, whose mind is free from prejudice and sentiment, and who will take the trouble to go into the matter, will find no difficulty in coming to the conclusion that the Morocco question has been solved in a manner which sufficiently safeguards German dignity and which offers certain practical advantages. The paper adds that in any case the idea that Germany has given up something that she possessed in Morocco must be swept from people's minds. It puts the case thus: we never had a foot of ground in Morocco; what we had was what the Algeciras Act gave us, namely, the open door for our commerce and industry, and a claim, in common with other Powers, to exercise a certain influence on the political development of Morocco. We have continually declared that we only claim economic rights in Morocco; any efforts, therefore, to obtain political rights would have been contradictory to our declarations, and, moreover, could only have been realised by a war, and a war for that object, even if successful, would have been too high a price to pay.

Finally, the paper says that the protracted nature of the negotiations is the best proof of the firmness with which German interests were defended, and shows "that what there was to be got out of the affair was got." "Whether," it adds, "anything

more could have been obtained is a question which can only be decided by those acquainted with the details of the negotiations. The German press is not in this position, so that those who consider that more might have been obtained will remain of that opinion, while those who shared the idea of the Government with regard to compensation outside of Morocco lack material to disprove the contention of their opponents."

The "Kölnische Zeitung" tempers this very doubtful defence of the arrangement with a reservation to the effect that if, as the French press maintains, Germany has to take over all the obligations of the French Government towards French concessionary companies in the territory now acquired, and that France is, accordingly, not bound to buy out the rights of those companies, then, even those who have hitherto been disposed to regard the compensation in the Congo as an acceptable addition to German colonial possessions, will have to admit that the compensations, if saddled with such a burden, are worthless.

Other papers which are not wholly against the arrangement, such as the "Hamburger Nachrichten," also say that, perhaps, the Government have obtained all that under the circumstances was obtainable, but point out that the worst part of the settlement is that while Germany's renunciation of all political interest in Morocco is definitive, the French assurances with regard to the open door, commercial equality, mines, &c., exist only on paper.

On this point the "Tägliche Rundschau" observes:—

"If France holds to her assurances, well and good; but if she does not, what then? A new ground for disputes will have arisen, the result of which, in view of the paramount position of France in Morocco and the prejudices of other countries against us, can be easily foreseen."

There is almost as much controversy over the resignation of Herr von Lindequist, the late Secretary of State for the Colonies, as over the arrangement itself. Those who regard the latter with even half-hearted favour decry Herr von Lindequist's capabilities as a statesman, and complain of the manner in which, though subordinate in authority to the Foreign Office, he all along hampered and delayed the negotiations, and particularly of the moment which he chose for deserting his colleagues. They, moreover, follow the example of an irritated Government in making both Herr von Lindequist and Herr von Danckelmann responsible for the indiscretions by which the public was informed of the divergence of opinion between the Colonial Office and the Foreign Office. On the other hand, the out and out opponents of the arrangement maintain that Herr von Lindequist is head and shoulders above any other German statesman in knowledge of colonial affairs, and they hold up both him and Herr von Danckelmann as martyrs to duty, who preferred rather to give up their posts than to have any part in an arrangement so damaging to German interests and so fatal to the reputation of German diplomacy.

Since I began to write this despatch, the opinion on the Franco-German arrangement seems to be growing rather more favourable, particularly in the more weighty and reputable organs of the German press. The "Frankfurter Zeitung," and papers of that stamp, in their latest issues, state that now that the whole text is before them, their first impression of the arrangement has changed for the better, and that they do not consider that it deserves the violent abuse that has been lavished upon it from so many quarters; they, moreover, point out that it is to the fact that Germany and France have come to an agreement on a difficult question of such paramount importance that weight should be attached, rather than to the question as to whether a few points in the arrangement might not have been settled in a manner more favourable to Germany. All these papers are a little sceptical, however, as to whether the arrangement will lead to a permanent improvement of Franco-German relations, and they all agree that the Imperial Chancellor and Herr von Kiderlen have a heavy task before them when they have to stand up to defend their Moroccan policy in the Reichstag and before the people.

The Imperial Chancellor himself told me that he anticipated hard times, but he maintains that the violent language which is directed against the arrangement in a certain portion of the Berlin and provincial press is due more to political hostility against himself than to any deep-rooted dissatisfaction with the result of the Morocco and Congo negotiations. He commented somewhat severely upon the action of Herr von Lindequist in resigning his office at such an inopportune moment, but said that it was due probably to loss of nerve through illness and overwork.

To sum up, I consider that the nearness of the elections and internal political

considerations are chiefly responsible for the abuse lavished on the Franco-German arrangement, and I have the impression, confirmed from many sources, that the German people at large are not really very dissatisfied with the result of the negotiations.

I have, &c.
W. E. GOSCHEN.

[44314] No. 435.

Sir V. Corbett to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 9.)

(No. 77.)

Sir, *Munich, November 7, 1911.*

THE Morocco convention, the full text of which is published here to-day, has been generally ill-received by the press. The "Frankfurter Zeitung" indeed welcomes the conclusion of the long-protracted negotiations without an appeal to the *ultima ratio regum* with satisfaction, but without enthusiasm for the actual results attained. The "Schwäbischer Merkur," an independent National Liberal paper, remarks that it is perhaps a good sign that the agreement has been received without enthusiasm on either side, and expresses approval of the acquisitions in the Congo.

With these two exceptions the newspapers universally lament a German diplomatic defeat and condemn the policy of the Government which led to it. The comments even of the clerical "Bayerischer Kurier" are unfavourable.

The line generally taken is to blame the policy of Prince Bülow rather than that of the present Chancellor or Herr von Kiderlen for what has occurred, but the action of the latter is not uncriticised. It is asked what was the object of sending a ship to Agadir if the only object of the German Government was to acquire a few thousand square miles of pestilential swamp in Central Africa.

It would be a waste of time to give you the press criticisms in detail. Suffice it to say that they are tinged throughout with party bias, and, if they at all accurately interpret the public sentiment, point to a grave dissatisfaction with the present system of government and a general desire that the Imperial Ministry should be directly responsible to Parliament. This desire, if the Liberal and Socialist parties have their way, will largely influence the coming electoral struggle.

In many quarters, though in sufficiently guarded language, dissatisfaction is expressed with the influence of the Emperor, whose impulsive visit to Tangier is represented as the first of the series of events which have culminated in the definite exclusion of Germany from Morocco.

A sinister note is struck by some of the Nationalist papers which ask whether the milliards spent on the army have been spent in vain, and whether the military power of the Empire might not have been employed to prevent the present humiliation. The hope is expressed that it will be so employed in future.

The fiction of British intrigues during the course of the negotiations figures prominently in almost all the papers.

I have, &c.
VINCENT CORBETT.

[43587] No. 436.

Foreign Office to Board of Trade.

Sir, *Foreign Office, November 9, 1911.*

I AM directed by Secretary Sir E. Grey to inform you that he has received from the French chargé d'affaires a copy of the convention as regards Morocco which has recently been concluded between the French and the German Governments.

The chargé d'affaires stated at the same time that the French Government would be glad to receive at an early date a notification of the adherence of His Majesty's Government to the convention.

Sir Edward Grey is anxious for political reasons that the assent of His Majesty's Government to the convention should not be unduly delayed, but before notifying to the French Government the adherence of His Majesty's Government, he would be glad if Mr. Buxton would cause the articles of agreement to be examined with a view to

[44169] No. 437*.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir A. Hardinge.

(No. 50.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, November* 10, 1911.

YOUR telegram No. 49 of the 7th November: Franco-German agreement.

At present moment His Majesty's Government themselves have the agreement under consideration. They are considering whether British interests are affected, and, if so, how. On this account they are not in a position to advise other Governments to accept it immediately. It is clear that Portuguese Government will be justified in making a similar examination of the agreement, and it might be possible for them to explain to Spanish Government that a certain amount of time will be necessary for such an examination, but that it would be difficult for them, in case the agreement has been found to be in no way harmful to Portuguese interests, to justify any unreasonably extended delay in the transmission of a reply to the signatories, who have pressed for an early acceptance of the agreement.

ascertain whether the commercial rights and economic equality in Morocco of Britis subjects are fully safeguarded under them.

I am to add that Sir Edward Grey proposes to call the attention of the French Government to the text of article 1 of the new convention, in which the words "l'égalité économique entre les deux nations" occur, and to ask for an assurance that it is not intended by this article that any preferential economic rights should be conferred on the subjects of the two signatory Powers, and that British subjects in Morocco will not receive less favourable economic treatment than that accorded to the subjects of any other Power.

In view of the urgency of the matter, Sir Edward Grey would be grateful if he could be favoured with the views of Mr. Buxton on these points at the earliest possible moment. A copy of the convention is enclosed herewith.*

I am, &c.
F. A. CAMPBELL.

[44453] No. 437.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 10).

(No. 507.)
Sir, *Paris, November* 9, 1911.

THE publication by the "Matin" of the secret Franco-Spanish Treaty of 1904 seems to have created a great stir in parliamentary circles.

Various papers give accounts of the views expressed by prominent deputies in the lobbies on the subject.

I transmit to you herewith, as an instance of these accounts, an extract from the "Figaro" of to-day's date.† As I have reported to you before, this paper nourished a particular animosity against M. Delcassé, which is apt to colour its opinions.

It would seem, however, that the statement made by the "Figaro," that the current opinion in parliamentary circles is that the value of the Franco-German Treaty is greatly diminished by the provisions of the secret Franco-Spanish Treaty, represents the case.

The majority of the French papers publish maps to illustrate the latter treaty with the Spanish zones clearly marked. The phrase currently used is that France is to receive, by the terms of the treaty, a Morocco *sans façade* on the Mediterranean, and the view is generally expressed that the negotiations with Spain must alter the situation in France's favour.

The "Figaro," which has expressed itself against the policy of pressing Spain unduly, considers, nevertheless, that Spain can reasonably be expected to agree to a band of territory in her zone being neutralised for the purpose of serving for a French railway from Tangier to Fez.

I have, &c.
FRANCIS BERTIE.

[44637] No. 438.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 11.)

(No. 511.)
Sir, *Paris, November* 9, 1911.

THE "Temps" publishes this evening an article, obviously by its foreign editor, M. Tardieu, in which various arguments are put forward to prove that Spain is bound not to insist on the provisions of the secret Franco-Spanish Treaty of 1904 remaining intact, but must consider what compensation she is to give to France for the sacrifices which the latter has made in order to alter the international status of Morocco.

The article then asserts that England is in duty bound to bring home to the Spanish Government the necessities of the situation. England was the witness to the signature of the Franco-Spanish Treaty of 1904, and also advised the French Government to conclude the recent Franco-German Agreement. The article then reproduces reproaches which have been made against the sterility of the Anglo-French *Entente* notably in the Near East in the past, and expresses the hope that this sterility will not show itself again during the next few weeks.

* See Enclosure to No. 415.

† Not printed.

The article alludes to the fact that those who like M. Hanotaux and M. Judet, who have never fully accepted the *entente*, have not hesitated of late to call its value to France into question. The "Temps," which has shown its invariable fidelity to the friendship between France and England, is therefore in a position to insist that it should now show its practical effects.

The article is evidently written with a view to exercising pressure on His Majesty's Government to support French claims as against those of Spain in the forthcoming negotiations concerning Morocco.

I have, &c.
FRANCIS BERTIE.

[44640] No. 439.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 11.)

(No. 514.)

Sir, *Paris, November* 10, 1911.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith, extracted from the "Matin" of to-day's date, an account of the proceedings yesterday before the Commission for Foreign and Colonial Affairs of the Chamber of Deputies, at which the Minister for Foreign Affairs attended in order to give explanations respecting the recent Franco-German agreement.

It will be noticed that, according to this account, one of the members of the commission enquired of M. de Selves whether the negotiations with Spain had already begun, and that his Excellency replied in the negative, adding that it was important that an agreement with England should first be reached with regard to the matter.

I have, &c.
FRANCIS BERTIE.

Enclosure in No. 439.

Extract from the "Matin" of November 10, 1911.

IMPORTANTES DÉCLARATIONS DE M. DE SELVES À LA CHAMBRE.

LE projet de loi portant ratification du traité franco-allemand signé le 4 novembre dernier à Berlin a été renvoyé, on le sait, à la Commission parlementaire des Affaires extérieures et coloniales.

Cette commission, réunie hier sous la présidence de M. Paul Deschanel, a tenu une très longue séance, au cours de laquelle elle a entendu M. de Selves, Ministre des Affaires Étrangères.

M. de Selves, au début de ses observations, a déclaré que l'accord franco-allemand que le Gouvernement présente au Parlement est le maximum des concessions que la France pouvait obtenir sans compromettre la cause de la paix. Il a ajouté que le Gouvernement demandait formellement que ce traité fût ratifié le plus tôt possible de façon à se trouver en bonne posture pour engager d'autres négociations, notamment avec l'Espagne.

Ici le Ministre des Affaires Étrangères a été interrompu. Un membre de la commission lui a demandé :

"Le texte du traité secret franco-espagnol publié par le 'Matin' est-il authentique ?"

"Oui," a répondu M. de Selves. "C'est son texte intégral."

Une autre question est aussitôt posée au Ministre. Elle est d'ailleurs sur toutes les lèvres des membres de la commission :

"Les négociations avec l'Espagne sont-elles entamées ?"

"Aucuns pourparlers ne sont encore engagés," répond M. de Selves. "Il importe d'ailleurs, avant de ce faire, que nous nous entendions avec l'Angleterre."

Revenant au traité franco-allemand, le Ministre des Affaires Étrangères a annoncé à la commission qu'il lui remettrait tous les documents qui pourraient lui être nécessaires,

et pour commencer, M. de Selves a tiré de sa serviette deux lettres encore secrètes, annexées l'une au traité relatif au Maroc, l'autre à la convention congolaise. Les termes de ces deux lettres ont été approuvés par les deux Gouvernements.

Dans la première, qui est très longue, les deux Gouvernements contractants indiquent les bases sur lesquelles le protectorat de la France sera exercé au Maroc.

Les membres de la commission n'ont pas été sans remarquer que ce mot de protectorat, qui ne figure pas dans le traité proprement dit, se trouve dans un document diplomatique revêtu de la signature du Gouvernement Impérial allemand.

Cette lettre contient d'autre part tout une série de précisions au sujet des différends qui pourraient surgir entre la France et l'Allemagne dans l'exécution des clauses du traité marocain. D'un commun accord—nous l'avons dit—les deux Gouvernements s'engagent à soumettre ces différends éventuels au Tribunal de La Haye.

Poursuivant ses déclarations, M. de Selves a fait l'analyse complète de l'accord congolais au point de vue politique et économique.

Puis il a répondu à de nombreuses questions qui lui ont été posées.

Elles portent sur l'accord de 1904 conclu avec l'Espagne, sur les articles de la convention congolaise relatifs au droit de préemption de la France sur le Congo belge, sur les clauses économiques de l'accord franco-allemand, sur la construction de chemins de fer et la création de tribunaux au Maroc, sur les limites de la zone d'influence de l'Espagne dans le Rif et sur les échanges territoriaux projetés dans la région du Tchad entre la France et l'Angleterre.

Une déclaration de M. de Selves a produit une profonde émotion sur la commission. Un des membres de celle-ci, M. Marcel Ribière, député de l'Yonne, lui a en effet demandé :

"Pourriez-vous nous dire, M. le Ministre, si l'Espagne a avisé le Gouvernement français lors de l'occupation de Larache et d'El Kasr ?"

Prenant un temps, M. de Selves, à côté de qui se tenait M. Bapst, Directeur des Affaires politiques au Quai d'Orsay, interrogé celui-ci des yeux, et répond :

"Oui."

"Pourriez-vous nous dire maintenant," a ajouté M. Marcel Ribière," si le Gouvernement français, en recevant l'avis de l'occupation de Larache et d'El Kasr, a protesté, a fait des réserves ?"

M. de Selves interroge à nouveau du regard son collaborateur M. Bapst, et, après quelques secondes de réflexion, dit :

"Messieurs, je n'étais pas membre du précédent Cabinet, mais je puis cependant renseigner la commission : Non ! à ma connaissance."

Notons encore quelques questions et quelques réponses.

M. Métin demande quelle est notre attitude vis-à-vis de la Belgique.

"Il a toujours été tenu compte des droits et des intérêts belges," répond M. de Selves, "et la Belgique sait que notre attitude a toujours été amicale."

M. Franklin-Bouillon à son tour s'exprime ainsi :

"Conviendrait-il d'attendre la fin des négociations avec l'Espagne pour ratifier le traité franco-allemand ?"

"Ratifiez d'abord," s'écrie M. de Selves, "donnez-moi cette arme afin que je puisse négocier avec l'Espagne et limiter la part qu'elle prétend avoir du Maroc."

Et très énergiquement, le Ministre des Affaires Étrangères a conclu :

"Je peux vous affirmer une chose : c'est qu'il n'y aura qu'un seul représentant auprès du Sultan du Maroc et que ce représentant sera un Français."

Il convient de noter que les déclarations de M. de Selves à la commission ont produit une impression très favorable.

Nous avons dit plus haut que M. de Selves avait remis à la commission les deux lettres annexées au traité franco-allemand. La commission les recevra à la condition que le Gouvernement en autorise la publication dans le rapport.

M. de Selves n'a pu prendre aucun engagement à ce sujet : il consultera le Conseil des Ministres.

Avons-nous protesté ?

Dans la soirée, d'après une enquête à laquelle nous nous sommes livrés, il ressort que le Département des Affaires Étrangères aurait élevé des protestations contre l'occupation de Larache et d'El Kasr par des Espagnols. On nous affirme notamment qu'une dépêche fut envoyée à M. Geoffray, notre Ambassadeur à Madrid, pour l'inviter à faire des représentations au Gouvernement espagnol. De son côté, le Ministre des Affaires Étrangères a verbalement, et à plusieurs reprises, déclaré à l'Ambassadeur d'Espagne à Paris que la France ne donnait pas son assentiment à l'opération militaire espagnole.

[44787] No. 440.

Sir C. Spring-Rice to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received November* 11.)

(No. 18.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Stockholm, November* 11, 1911.

MOROCCO Agreement.

Swedish Minister for Foreign Affairs tells me Swedish Ministers at Paris and Berlin have been instructed to express adherence of Swedish Government.

[44773] No. 441.

Mr. O'Beirne to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received November* 12.)

(No. 273.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *St. Petersburgh, November* 12, 1911.

MOROCCO.

The Russian Government, I hear, is strongly supporting Spain in her negotiations with France, Instructions have been sent to the Russian Ambassador in Paris that he should keep in touch with his Spanish colleague, and, if required, should afford him support. The Russian Government, moreover, have appealed to France to observe her treaty obligations in dealing with the Spanish Government.

[44841] No. 442.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received November* 13.)

(No. 369.)
Sir, *Berlin, November* 7, 1911.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith translation of a telegram published by the "Berliner Tageblatt" reproducing a statement contained in the "Fränkische Kurier" in regard to reports alleged to have been made to the Emperor by the Minister for War and the Secretary of State for the Navy as to Germany's readiness for war.

I have, &c.
W. E. GOSCHEN.

Enclosure in No. 442.

Translation of Telegram in "Berliner Tageblatt" of November 6, 1911, *from its Munich correspondent.*

THE "Fränkische Kurier" states that it has learnt from a most reliable source that it is supposed to have long been known in high military circles that, when three months ago the danger of war had reached its acutest stage, the Emperor summoned the Minister of War and the Secretary of State for the Navy in order to enquire of them whether Germany was really ready for action. While the Minister of War answered definitely in the affirmative, Herr von Tirpitz declared that he would engage upon a war with some qualms: firstly, because the Kaiser Wilhelm Canal was temporarily unfit for use; secondly, because our line of defence at Cuxhaven was not ready for action (it is alleged to be mounted with out-of-date guns); thirdly, because four

submarines were not on a par with those of the enemy either numerically or in point of technique; and finally, on account of the fact that our high seas fleet was equipped only with 28-centim. (11-inch) guns, while the English ships were armed with 30-centim. (12-inch) and 34-centim. (13·5-inch) guns. (If these statements are confirmed, it would in this instance be a case of a real indiscretion on the part of "subordinate officials," the serious results of which do not require to be pointed out. —EDITOR.)

[44946] No. 443.

Sir A. Hardinge to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received November* 13.)

(No. 130. Confidential.)
Sir, *Lisbon, November* 7, 1911.

MY telegram No. 49 of to-day's date will have apprised you of the embarrassing position in which Senhor Vasconcellos finds himself in presence of the conflicting demands of the French and Spanish Legations respecting the formal acceptance by Portugal of the Franco-German agreement about Morocco, and his desire to be guided by our example and advice. He was, he said, naturally anxious to please France, which was the first of the great European Powers to recognise the Portuguese Republic, but he felt also most anxious to do nothing which could increase the present tension between Madrid and Lisbon; and it was evident that he hoped to be able to make use of Portuguese deference to Spanish wishes in this matter of the Morocco agreement (in regard to which the formal assent of Portugal could not, he thought, be of vital interest to France) as a lever for obtaining from the Spanish Government a real, and not, as he maintained was now the case, a sham disarmament of the King's partisans in Galicia. The present moment is not a very opportune one for vigorous diplomatic representations on this latter subject at Madrid, as a deputation of Spanish republicans is now being fêted at Lisbon, and though the Government cannot be blamed for this, since they have stood severely aloof from the demonstrations, which in the present state of parties they are not strong enough to prohibit altogether, it affords Spain a good pretext for a *tu quoque*. If, however, they could oblige her in the matter of Morocco, they might not unreasonably ask her to agree to a draft convention for dealing with the political exiles, which they have promised to show me and which they are anxious to conclude with her. At present they still complain bitterly of her attitude. They have, Senhor Vasconcellos says, repeatedly told the Spanish Government where Captain Couceiro is residing just across the Spanish frontier, giving the fullest details respecting his proceedings, and have asked that he should be made to move on; and now the Spanish Government's last reply is that it has ordered a special delegate to proceed to the locality indicated in order to verify these statements, who will of course find the bird flown when he arrives.

Senhor Vasconcellos referred, in connection with this subject, to Mr. Acland's reply to questions put on it in the House of Commons, and still seemed to be trying to persuade himself that that reply did not exclude the possibility of a friendly mediation by you with respect to it as between Spain and Portugal. I, of course, did not encourage this idea, but I feel pretty certain that if we advise him to comply with the French request, he will assume that we are morally bound to support him against the consequences of his action in the shape of still unfriendlier proceedings on the part of Spain. It would, I should think, be quite easy to explain to the French the special reasons arising out of the internal situation in Portugal, which may lead him to pursue, in the matter of the Morocco agreement, a more dilatory policy than he would himself personally favour.

I have, &c.
ARTHUR H. HARDINGE.

[44842] No. 444.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 13.)

(No. 370.)

Sir, *Berlin, November 9, 1911.*

I ASKED a distinguished German Free Conservative statesman yesterday what form the debate on the Morocco arrangement would take in the Reichstag. He replied: "Electioneering speeches and attacks on Prince Bülow." He added that an attempt would be made to refer the Franco-German arrangement to a committee. I asked him with what object. "Heaven only knows," he replied, "because no resolutions can be moved, and nothing more can be said or done by a committee than can be said or done by individual members. They can criticise and abuse the Chancellor and the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, but the arrangement will remain unaffected."

This statement is of course quite correct. The criticism may be so sharp, and the general opposition to the arrangement may be so clearly defined, that the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs may ultimately find himself compelled to resign, though personally I do not consider this at all likely, but, according to the constitution, the Reichstag is only in a position to take act of the arrangement, and, of course, discuss it. This is at all events the generally accepted view, and it is that adopted by the president of the Reichstag, who places on the order of to-day's proceedings in the Reichstag: "The discussion of the Franco-German arrangement," without any mention of its "acceptance," a point to which the Liberal press calls due attention.

That the power of the Government to change the frontiers of their protectorates without the consent of Parliament is occupying the attention of politicians is shown by the number of resolutions to be moved in the Reichstag urging a revision of the articles of the constitution dealing with this point. Resolutions to that effect will be moved by the Centre, the National Liberal party, and the "Freisinnige Volkspartei." The Socialist party goes further, and will demand that a Bill should be introduced during this session providing for an article in the constitution to the effect that no treaty with foreign States should become valid until sanctioned by the Reichstag.

The Liberal papers have much to say on the alleged intention of the Chancellor's Conservative followers to attack Prince Bülow, or rather, I presume, to defend the present Morocco arrangement by stating that, owing to Prince Bülow's Morocco policy, nothing better could be effected. They claim for the Liberals and Radicals alone the monopoly of the right to abuse that policy. They state that the Conservatives and their press, particularly the "Kreuz-Zeitung," which is now leading the campaign against Prince Bülow, approved of his policy at the time, and stated that Germany's position in the East would have been hopelessly compromised if, immediately after the Emperor's solemn promise of protection to Morocco, the German Government had come to an understanding with France for its oppression, and that, therefore, it was best to safeguard its integrity by an international compact. It is, the Liberals assert, the very acme of opportunism for the Conservatives now to turn round and abuse that policy for their own ends.

The "Tageblatt," which has a long article on this subject, reminds the "Kreuz" that at the time of the Algeciras Conference it said that Bülow's policy was supported by the whole nation, and that no wonder England and France disapproved of it, as Prince Bülow was acting in support of German and not foreign interests.

At the conclusion of its article the "Tageblatt" asks:—

"Is there an atom of excuse for the ill-conceived and disastrous Congo treaty, which the Chancellor and Herr von Kiderlen have just presented to us, to be found in the fact that Prince Bülow went to Algeciras? What has the Congo treaty to do with Algeciras or with the fact that Prince Bülow placed Morocco under the guarantee of the Powers? And was this a good reason for giving France a road right through the Cameroons, and for cutting off the whole of the northern part of that colony? Was it necessary to go into the business utterly unprepared, without even any knowledge of England's standpoint, just because a former Chancellor had shown a similar want of reflection in dealing with such matters; and was it necessary to take such a high ground and reject all advice from Ambassadors, experts, and people with local knowledge just because on former occasions such precautions had also not been taken? We were, as we have said, against Prince Bülow's Morocco policy, but if comparisons are to be made we declare, without hesitation, that they are greatly in favour of Prince

Bülow. His policy was, at all events, dictated by considerations which were open to argument. Herr von Bethmann Hollweg, unlike Prince Bülow, can produce no intelligible excuse for his policy, unless, indeed, he pleads his own incompetency."

I have, &c.
W. E. GOSCHEN.

[44843] No. 445.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 13.)

(No. 371.)

Sir, *Berlin, November 10, 1911.*

THE answer you gave to the questions in the House of Commons with regard to the article in the "Neue Freie Presse," attributed by the German press to Sir F. Cartwright's inspiration, has been reproduced in all the newspapers here, including the semi-official "Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung," but so far without much comment. Still, from what I hear, it has had a good effect here, and is regarded as denoting a desire on your part to improve the somewhat murky atmosphere which has recently hung over Anglo-German relations.

The "Frankfurter Zeitung," noticing that you introduced in your answer the incident of the falsification of Mr. McKenna's speech, said that that gross misrepresentation, due to the stupidity of an undisciplined press bureau, and which you could easily disprove, stood on a rather different plane from the utterances of a British Ambassador, unless these utterances could also be proved to have been entirely fabricated. Such proof was, the "Frankfurter Zeitung" states, not to be found in your answer, as you had only said very diplomatically that Sir F. Cartwright was not a party to the publication of the article, and had no knowledge that it was going to be published. Sir F. Cartwright's innocence was therefore not proved as clearly as that of Mr. McKenna, which you were able to make as clear as daylight. On the other hand, politically speaking, Sir F. Cartwright might now regard himself as sufficiently cleared by your declarations.

By the terms of your warning to the press, the paper says that you have clearly shown that it is the wish of the whole British Cabinet that the tension of the past summer should relax in favour of better relations with Germany, although it might be perhaps a little too early for any positive step in that direction.

The "Vossische Zeitung" intersperses a few remarks upon your answer in a homily addressed to England, on the text that Germany will not suffer dictation of any sort, neither with regard to her dealings with other Powers, nor to the number of ships she wishes to build, nor anything else. It refers to your answer concerning the "Neue Freie Presse" article in much the same terms as the "Frankfurter Zeitung." But, it adds, that the point is not whether Sir F. Cartwright was responsible for the publication of the article, but whether he had spoken as the article made him speak. "That he had done so there is no possible doubt. Not only had he done so, but the language he had used had been of a far more provocative and uncivil nature than the 'Neue Freie Presse' had allowed to appear. Nevertheless, Sir F. Cartwright is still British Ambassador at Vienna."

Finally, the "Vossische" does justice to the sincerity of your desire and that of His Majesty's Government to improve Anglo-German relations; and makes a sympathetic allusion to the recent speeches at the meeting of the Anglo-German Friendship Society at the Mansion House. But, it says, that there must be no more threats, no more lecturing, and that Germany's friendship is only to be had on that condition.

"Therefore," it says, "if England so desires it, we can be friends, the best of friends, and be mutually of the greatest help to one another. If this is not England's wish, we can confine ourselves to 'correct relations,' or perhaps, become 'incorrect.' But, if Sir E. Grey, and England with him, sincerely desires to be friends with us, then we will draw a line through the past, and say, 'Soyons amis, Cinna!'"

The "Berliner Tageblatt," after reproducing your answer, says, it is not very clear why, though no question was asked on the subject, you felt called upon to refer to the falsification of Mr. McKenna's speech, a matter which had been at once satisfactorily cleared up and explained; and it supposes that you took this course in order to detract attention from the more important case of Sir F. Cartwright, which had only received an official, but never a real explanation. The paper also says that your subsequent words give the impression that you wished to make the press

responsible for the failure of diplomacy to deal with a difficult situation. In conclusion, the "Tageblatt" says, that it heartily sympathises with your wish that the tension which has arisen between the two countries during the Morocco crisis may disappear, but that it does not think that that happy result can be attained by the simple assertion that the British Ambassador in Vienna was no party to the publication of the anti-German "interview" in the "Neue Freie Presse."

The wounds caused to German self-esteem by the interpretation given to Mr. Lloyd George's speech, and by Dr. Münz's concoctions are, as you will have seen from these comments, and as you will see from some of the speeches just delivered in the Reichstag, still sensitive to the gentlest touch, and will still take some little time to heal. But, I think it may be stated that the conciliatory words at the close of your answer have been well received, and that they have set sensible people thinking whether the time has not nearly arrived when, as the "Kreuz-Zeitung" puts it, a line should be drawn through the happenings of the last few months, and a fresh start made in the direction of more satisfactory relations between the two countries.

I have, &c.

W. E. GOSCHEN.

[44845] No. 446.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 13.)

(No. 373.)

Sir, *Berlin, November 10, 1911.*

YESTERDAY, before a full house, the Imperial Chancellor made his anxiously looked-for statement on the subject of the Franco-German Morocco Agreement. His Excellency's speech is criticised and commented on in the Press strictly on party lines. The Conservative organs consider that he made as good a speech as could be expected under the circumstances; Liberal papers say that he made a poor defence of a poor arrangement, and the small band of semi-official papers maintain exactly the contrary, namely that the speech left nothing to be desired and supported an excellent arrangement with admirably reasoned arguments. As a matter of fact the Chancellor's speech seems to have been worthy of the occasion, but it must be admitted that the cold, and to a certain extent, hostile atmosphere in which his Excellency spoke, had the effect of leaving upon his hearers a rather dismal impression.

A full translation of the speech is enclosed in this despatch.

In speaking of the despatch of the "Panther" to Agadir, the object of which, he said, was communicated to the Powers before the ship reached its destination, he stated that it had been represented in the foreign Press as a provocative and menacing act. This was a gross misrepresentation. "We threaten no one, but we protect our rights and we allow no one to prevent us from doing so."

As regards the resignation of Herr von Lindequist, on which his views were awaited with the greatest eagerness, he said, amidst almost continual interruption, that that Minister had from the first been opposed to the acquisition by Germany of a larger addition to her colonial possessions, and desired a smaller territory than that which had been obtained, one more advanced in cultivation and easier and cheaper to administrate.

He had more especially been against any cession of territory on the part of Germany. He had sent in his resignation in the summer, but it had not been accepted. On the 28th October the newspapers had reported that he was about to resign, but with his consent this had been officially denied. He had, however, then announced his intention of retiring in the spring, and using the interval for a tour through the colonies. A few days afterwards he had renewed his request to be relieved from his office, accompanying it with a very sharp criticism against the text of the arrangement. He had at the same time stated that he was not ready to take any departmental responsibility for the arrangement in the Reichstag, and had refused in fact to support the Government policy in any way. This had further been all communicated to the press. His resignation had on this occasion been at once accepted, in order that the business of the Colonial Office might be carried on in such a manner as not to disturb the unanimity and solidarity necessary for the Government to carry on the affairs of the country.

The Chancellor then came to the accusations of timidity and subservience which had been made against the Government. He said that their programme had been all along to give to France an increase of political influence in Morocco, to obtain for

Germany increased security for her economic interests, and to see that the negotiations were carried on without any outside interference. This programme had been carried out to the letter. All reproaches for weakness were totally undeserved. This programme had been settled in May and the Emperor had commanded that it should be strictly carried out, in full consciousness that every political action of a great Power contains within itself the fateful question: "peace or war." After alluding to the press rumours that Admiral Tirpitz had reported to the Emperor that the navy was not ready for war, which he characterised as absolutely devoid of foundation, he came to Mr. Lloyd George's speech.

With regard to his remarks on this subject you have already noticed that in his efforts to defend the Imperial Government from the charge so freely brought against them of having yielded to intimidation and of having drawn back in the face of threats from a third Power, he gave a somewhat one-sided account of what had passed between the two Governments on the subject of the speech in question, and conveyed the impression, whether purposely or not, I do not know, that it was in consequence of a communication made to you by Count Metternich on the subject that "the British Government gave up their desire to interfere in the negotiations."

His exact words as given in the official report of his speech are as follows:—

"After that, the British Government expressed no further wish to interfere in the negotiations."

As regards the "Neue Freie Presse" article, he repeated your observations, and said that the Government regarded the matter as closed.

The rest of the speech was taken up with the defence of the arrangement. He claimed that the Government deserved all praise for not having pursued the "utopia of land-grabbing." Personally he regarded it as his duty so to conduct the affairs of the nation as to avoid any war that might be avoided and in which the honour of Germany was not at stake. Morocco had been a festering sore in German relations with England and France. That sore had now been cicatrised, and the fact that Germany and France had been able to come to an understanding in such a delicate question was of far greater value than discussions of arbitration treaties and of arrangements for the limitation of armaments. That understanding might well become the corner-stone of their future relations with England and France. In conclusion he said that, in the interest of the prestige of Germany, who could not possibly allow an international Act like that of Algeciras to be set aside to her disadvantage, the Government had acted as they had done, and would, if necessary, have acted with the sword. "We expect no praise and we fear no blame."

After a speech from the leader of the party of the Centre, of no great importance from an international point of view, the Conservative leader, Herr von Heydebrand, addressed the House. This gentleman has distinguished himself lately by sundry very anti-English speeches, and particularly by his denunciation of the Chancellor of the Exchequer; it was therefore to be anticipated, even if he did not attack the Franco-German arrangement, that he would certainly take advantage of the opportunity to attack England. He was not long in getting to work; he said that the Chancellor had alluded to Mr. Lloyd George's speech as an after-dinner speech. Such after-dinner speeches were not to the taste of the German people. It might suit the English to forget what had been said after they had failed in their attempt to involve Germany and France in a war; but Germans had not forgotten it, and it was that after-dinner speech, and Sir F. Cartwright's interview which had brought the flush of shame to every German cheek, and shown Germany where her enemy lay. Germany now knew who it was that thwarted all her natural desires for expansion, and refused her a place in the sun. He did not know what answer the Imperial Government had given to these provocations, but he knew the sort of answer the German people would give. It was a matter which concerned Germany's very existence, and no country could stand such proceedings, least of all Germany. It was both the right and the duty of the Government to decide what was to be done, but we expect their decision to be compatible with the honour of the country. "I declare that we Germans are ready to make the necessary sacrifices ('Out of the pockets of the workmen,' from the Socialists). I repeat that in the name of my political friends I declare that when the hour, the country, and our honour require it, we are ready to sacrifice both our lives and our property. It is not by yielding to threats, but by the German sword, that we can maintain our position in the world."

Herr von Heydebrand, considering that he is the leader of the party on whom the Chancellor has chiefly to rely, was not very amiable as regards the arrangement itself, but he tempered his somewhat severe criticisms by stating that the patience, self-

sacrifice, and hard work which the Government had brought to bear on the arrangement, was at all events worthy of praise. He added that the path chosen by the Government had not been the right one, but still they had not been entirely to blame as the right path had been practically closed to them by the policy of a former Government.

As Herr von Heydebrand had alluded to the article in the "Neue Freie Presse" in terms which implied disbelief of your statements on the subject, Herr von Kiderlen rose and spoke as follows :—

"I must at once answer one point in the speech which we have just heard. An article appeared in the 'Neue Freie Presse,' which was attributed to the British Ambassador in Vienna. We at once addressed a communication to the British Government on the subject, and that the Government stated to us officially, and authorised us to publish this statement, that the Ambassador had been in no respect a party to the publication of that article, and that the article had been in no way influenced by the embassy." Here the speaker was interrupted by cries from the Right, "Who knows whether that is true?"

"It is surely," Herr von Kiderlen continued, "the least that can be expected from international courtesy, that when a Government gives an official explanation, we should attach credence to it, and no one has the right to demand that we should receive such an explanation with mistrust."

Herr von Kiderlen was followed by Herr Bebel, the Socialist leader, and later by Herr Bassermann, but owing to want of time I must reserve an analysis of their speeches and of those of any subsequent speakers of importance for a later despatch.

I have, &c.

W. E. GOSCHEN.

Enclosure in No. 446.

Translation of Speech delivered by Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg in the Reichstag, November 9, 1911.

FOR the consideration of the agreements laid before you it will first of all be of value to inform you as to the latest phase of the Morocco question, and as to the important points of the agreements concluded. The Act of Algeciras was intended to maintain the independence of Morocco with a view to the economic development of the country for the benefit of the trade of all the Powers parties to it. It was soon evident that one of the essential conditions was lacking, namely, a Sultan who was actual ruler of the country, and was in a position to carry out the reforms provided for. Even Sultan Mulai Hafid could not do so in spite of his personal qualities. He fell more and more under foreign influence, and came into constantly increasing conflict with the tribes of his own country in consequence. This led to ever-growing influence on the part of France, for, of the four Powers which since the seventies possessed treaty rights to maintain military missions at the Sultan's Court, only the French mission had succeeded in establishing itself. In the same way France had for long supplied Morocco with money. The position of the Sultan, surrounded by hostile tribes and shut up in Fez, became eventually so precarious that France informed the Powers that grave apprehensions must be felt for the lives and property of her officers at the Sultan's Court and of the European colony.

France accordingly declared that she proposed to send troops to Fez, and to conduct the Europeans back to the coast. We had received no such threatening reports from Fez and, therefore, declared that our colony did not require foreign assistance. Since, however, we could naturally assume no responsibility for the lives of the French citizens who were alleged to be threatened, we raised no objection to the advance to Fez to bring back the threatened French citizens to the coast. We added the explicit reserve, however, which we also announced publicly that we retained our liberty of action, should the French expedition go beyond its alleged object, even should such action be merely the result of circumstances arising out of the expedition. This occurred, as was to be expected. France exerted practically unlimited sway over the Sultan in virtue of her influence, which had gradually become absolute. The independence of the Sultan assumed by the Act of Algeciras thus ceased to exist. It has, indeed, been urged that the Sultan himself summoned the French to his assistance, but a ruler who summons foreign troops to his assistance and who relies solely upon

the support of foreign bayonets, is no longer the independent ruler on whose existence the Act of Algeciras was based. We let this be known and suggested to France an understanding leaving, of course, the initiative to her. We indicated the general outlines only of our programme to the effect that we would be ready to take into account the altered position of France necessitated by the changed conditions, but that in return me must demand more precise guarantees for the equality assured to us in the domain of commerce and industry, especially in regard to public works, besides compensations for those rights assumed by France without previous understanding with us and contrary to the letter and spirit of the Algeciras Act. At first we received no positive proposals from Paris, whilst the French military power continued to spread in Morocco, and the fiction began gradually to become established not only in France but also in other countries that France was acting in pursuance of a European mandate. When, therefore, German interests appeared to be threatened in consequence of the events in Morocco, we sent a war-ship to Agadir. The despatch of this ship was primarily intended for the protection of the lives and property of our subjects. (Cries from the Social Democrats: "Subjects!") It represented at the same time a clear intimation of our right and our intention to defend our subjects (loud shouts from the Social Democrats: "There are no subjects") just as independently as France protected hers, so long as the latter came to no understanding with us. This object for the despatch of our war-ship and its limitation to this object was announced, immediately before the arrival of the ship, to the Powers through our Ambassadors and Ministers accredited to them. It is, accordingly, an untrue assertion if the despatch of a ship to Agadir was represented in the press—in the foreign press—as a provocation and a threat. We provoke and threaten no one; but we protect our rights and we shall not allow ourselves to be deterred or hindered by anyone.

The discussion with France then began. From a purely formal standpoint we might have demanded the restoration of the *status quo ante*, that is to say, the *status quo* before 1906; theoretically that would have been the correct thing to do, in practice it was impossible. It was hardly possible to clear Morocco again of foreign troops without incurring the danger of internal disturbances. The *restitutio in integrum* would further have been highly incomplete, since the lasting impression produced by the action of France would have continued to prevail even after the withdrawal of her troops. Finally we would have returned to a point, under unfavourable circumstances for us, which had resulted in constant friction to which both Governments desired equally to put an end. The assertion that the "Panther" was sent to Agadir with the object of acquiring territory in Morocco is incorrect. By the agreement of February 1909 the acquisition of territory in Morocco was already put out of the question. Our programme, which was drawn up long before the dispatch of the "Panther," was conceived on the same lines. The incorrectness of the assertion is also established by the declarations which we made to the foreign Powers immediately before the arrival of the ship at Agadir. It is also made evident by the declarations which the Imperial Government issued through the organs of the press simultaneously with the arrival of the ship at Agadir. It is highly regrettable that this incorrect assertion should have been unpatriotically made use of even at home as a basis for the belief in a retreat of the Imperial Government and a humiliation of Germany.

In the negotiations with France the leading idea was that it had been shown to be impossible for the Moors to re-establish and maintain order in their country by their own efforts, and that the intervention of a foreign Power was required. As regards the greater part of Morocco, this Power could only be France. The greater the freedom which France obtained therefore, the easier it was for her to guarantee and assume responsibility for such order. In return we have obtained far-reaching and detailed guarantees for the equal treatment of non-French trade and for the rights of non-French nationals resident in Morocco. The details may be seen in the treaty laid before you.

After explaining the details in question the Chancellor went on to say :—

I come to the question of the compensations. In connection therewith I will speak first of all of the resignation of Herr von Lindequist. The Secretary of State for the colonies opposed from the very beginning the acquisition of a colonial possession of the extent of that which we have now obtained. He desired instead smaller but more cultivated territories, which would consequently be more easily and cheaply administered. Since it was found that this object was not attainable, he advocated mere roundings off of our colonial possessions and rectifications of frontier. I could not concur in this

opinion, since I held the acquisition of a larger piece of colonial territory to be necessary for our activities. In regard to the Congo, which had years ago been mentioned in connection with previous informal discussions with France, there was also no longer any question of a *res integra*. These differences of opinion, and the belief that the Colonial Office was not permitted to exercise sufficient and decisive influence on the course of the negotiations, led Herr von Lindequist to decide as long ago as this summer to tender his resignation. His Majesty refused, however, at my request, to accept his resignation whilst the negotiations were still pending. The desires of the Colonial Office have been so far met in the course of the negotiations that the territory accruing includes all those portions on the frontier of the Cameroons which were indicated to me by the Colonial Office as being desirable. Herr von Lindequist was opposed in principle to the cession of German territory, though he told me that if no agreement could be reached without such cession, he considered the cession of the territory now made over to France to be acceptable. On the 28th October a rumour appeared in the press of the approaching resignation of Herr von Lindequist. This rumour was denied with the consent of Herr von Lindequist; the text of the *démenti* was submitted to him. In order, however, to refute any further press assertions, I would observe that Herr von Lindequist certainly spoke to me of the probability of his retirement next spring. But at the same time he definitely announced his desire to proceed to South-West Africa on a tour of inspection on the termination of the proceedings in the Reichstag, A few days latter Herr von Lindequist again sent in his resignation. Shortly before, after the text of the projected agreement had been submitted to him, he had addressed to me an official minute in which great stress was laid on the disadvantages of our new acquisition, and which arrived at the conclusion that the 275,000 square kilom. of territory to be acquired would not even approximately counterbalance the loss which would be sustained by our colonial possessions through the cession to France of 12,000 square kilom. between the Logone and Shari rivers, and through the collateral agreements contained in the draft treaty. It was found possible to modify some of these collateral agreements, in accordance with the proposals of Herr von Lindequist, by negotiations with France. The position taken up by the Secretary of State in his minute compelled me, however, to ask him what attitude he proposed to adopt when the question came up for discussion in the Reichstag. It transpired that Herr von Lindequist was not prepared to undertake the defence of the agreements in the Reichstag as far as his department was concerned. This implied—with all personal respect—a misconception of the situation. Herr von Lindequist was not expected to assume personal responsibility for the Congo agreement. That agreement forms only a part of the whole political arrangement with France, and for that I am responsible. Herr von Lindequist was also not expected to defend the work before the Reichstag in all its bearings or even to praise it. I only asked of him an objective appreciation of the agreement from the colonial standpoint, in which the drawbacks of the agreement, especially the disadvantage of the cession of the Shari triangle, the concessionary companies, the sleeping sickness, and the partially unfavourable configuration of the land would be clearly set forth, and only the possibility, the hope of a favourable future development would not be disputed. Herr von Lindequist refused, however, to support my policy even to this very limited extent, and therefore again tendered his resignation as I have already stated. Even more painful than the resignation of an official who had been tried by many years of colonial service, precisely at this moment, was the circumstance that the press learnt almost simultaneously with the Chancellor of the attitude adopted by Herr von Lindequist in the above-mentioned written minute in opposition to the Congo compensation. Though this certainly occurred without the concurrence and against the will of Herr von Lindequist, there was no other course open to me but to provide, by dealing rapidly with his resignation, for the conduct of the business of the Colonial Office in such a way as not to disturb the necessary continuity and uniformity of the Imperial Government.

This brings me back to the real point. I have just told you in detail why our claims for compensation were directed towards a compact enlargement of the Cameroons in Congo territory. I have further explained to you that the territory which has come to us includes those tracts of land, which those who know our colonies told us were worth striving after. Their acquisition is of value for the present, and at the same time it rounds off the Cameroons in the way we wished. But we also had to think of the value to us of gaining access to Africa's greatest river, the Congo, and to its tributary, the Ubangi. We also succeeded on that point. I do not contest the fact that in doing so we had also to take over countries of insignificant value, the

administration of which will give us a good deal of trouble. I need not tell you it was just as hard for me as for the colonial administration to cede the territory on the Logone. ("Why did you do it then?" from the Left.) But we could never have achieved what we wanted without some sort of an exchange of territory. I admit that the new boundaries are to a certain extent inconvenient and difficult for the administration to deal with. Similar difficulties have also existed on the old southern boundary of the Cameroons and on the "Duck's Beak." In order to lessen these difficulties a wide scope of action has been afforded to the commission appointed for the delimitation of the frontiers. They are to pay particular attention to the natural boundaries and to the homogeneousness of the natives. For this purpose the commission is to have the right to deviate from the boundary laid down in general lines by treaty, sometimes in favour of one of the parties, sometimes in favour of the other. They have only to be careful to see that the net result of the deviations is the same for both parties. Far-reaching conditions have been laid down for the transit traffic of both countries. We have given one another mutual assurances respecting the extension and the linking up of the railways, and we are thereby now in a position to gain access by railway to the great rivers in case we should find it necessary. We guarantee the French a military road to the Benue for their North-East Congo territory similar to that granted to them by England in the Niger basin, which has led to no difficulties on either side.

The concluding article of the agreement has no present meaning, but it may acquire one in the event of territorial changes taking place in the Congo basin, to which we might then have something to say.

Gentlemen, a regular storm of indignation has now been raised against these acquisitions in the Congo by a large section of public opinion. No expression is strong enough to condemn the work done by the Government and to discredit it abroad. A correct opinion can only be found by not passing over the bad sides of the question, but also by not passing over the good side. There certainly exist among these new acquisitions tracts of little value, perhaps of no value at all, but this is also the case in our other colonies. The concessions are a heavy burden, but they are limited in point of time, and they will be under the sovereignty of German law and administration, which protects us against a misuse of the concessions. The sleeping-sickness which prevails in some districts is a doubtful blessing.

On the other hand, we receive valuable strips of country, country which is conveniently situated as regards the Cameroons. No one can deny that, not even the gentlemen who wish to disturb me with their interruptions. We gain access to the Congo and the Ubangi. The value of this access will only be realised in the future. But that it will be realised no one can deny. We get on the whole a most important new colonial territory. You should not reproach us with trying to get what we can, because Germany has only now, unfortunately much too late, joined the ranks of colonial nations.

I am firmly convinced that the favourable manner in which the Cameroons have developed, thanks to the activity of our merchants and the energy of our governors and Protectorate troops, will also find its echo in the newly acquired territory. Those who want to carry on a colonial policy with a definite aim in view should not forget the future possibilities in considering the present value. From a mere sand-box, to what has South-West Africa grown? Who saw furthest into the future: those who laughed at Rhodesia or the energy of the man who gave that country his name?

All the successes attained by the great colonial nations have only been won by the fact that these nations knew how to deal not with short but with very long periods of time, and by the courage with which they made light of the difficulties of the present for the sake of successes to be awaited in the often far-distant future.

Gentlemen, it is also not true that the French are glad to be rid of a part of the Congo territory. French statesmen have assessed at a high figure—and with reason—the advantages they have gained in Morocco, but with no light heart did they give up for it wide stretches of a territory for which for a generation so many experienced and distinguished French explorers and officers had sacrificed their strength and their lives.

Such is the sequence of events and such is the result.

From the outset our programme was as follows:—Recognition of increased political rights for France—in return only for an increased guarantee of our economic interests in Morocco—and in return for the acquisition of land in the Colonies. We never for a moment attempted to acquire land in Morocco. Negotiations between ourselves and France alone, not before an international congress and not in consultation with a

third Power. We drew up this programme and we have adhered to it, nor have we allowed ourselves to be turned aside one single step from following it either by external or internal influences. All the reproaches of weakness which have been cast in our teeth during these last months, reproaches of weakness and of yielding, the talk of a second Olmütz and what not, all fall to the ground before the facts as they are. The negotiations between ourselves and France have been carried on without interruption on both sides in the endeavour to come to a working agreement acceptable to both parties. From neither party and at no stage of the negotiations was any language used, any idea mooted, which would have been incompatible with the honour of one of the two parties. There was never any occasion for the "banging on the table with the fist," which was recommended to us. Moreover, I do not hold with this sort of threatening gesture. We no longer live in the Homeric days when threatening and bragging was part of a soldier's outfit. Germany is strong enough to do without that sort of armour. (Applause.) She will know how to draw her sword if need be. Foreign policy is only possible on such a basis. I must here make it quite clear, in order to contradict the misleading statements of the foreign and also of our own press that His Majesty the Emperor commanded that the programme, which was already drawn up in May last, should be adhered to in all phases of the negotiations, in the full knowledge that every political action of a great Power can evoke the fateful question of war or peace, and fully prepared at any time to draw the sword in defence of the nation's honour. Thus did the Emperor show himself to be at one with the nation, which during this whole time and in all its ranks has been imbued and inspired with the firm determination to defend its vital interests and its honour against all the world. There has also naturally never for a moment existed the slightest doubt as to the complete readiness for war of the army and navy. The reports, which are now being spread abroad to the effect that during a confidential discussion it was asserted that there were flaws in our readiness for war, especially in the navy, are pure inventions. They are in direct contradiction to the facts.

Now it has been asserted—and this assertion has eaten deep into the people—that we retreated before England. A speech made at a banquet by the British Minister, Lloyd George, has specially served in this connection. (Laughter and cheers on the Left.)—Gentlemen, I am speaking of a grave matter, and I beg you to allow me to finish my speech without interruption.—One of our Conservative papers, indeed, by substituting "Germany" for "England" right through the speech, brought out clearly that the speech, taken by itself, might equally have been made by a German statesman without giving occasion for criticism. What gave significance to the speech was the fact that the whole of the French press and a great portion of the English press interpreted it in a chauvinistic sense and in a manner spiteful towards Germany, and that this interpretation was in no way repudiated from the English side. I found myself constrained to instruct the Imperial Ambassador in London to speak about the matter. My representation was to the effect that we were discussing the Morocco question with France; that England's interests were not so far affected thereby; and that if England should consider her interests to be affected by the result of the discussions, we expected the British Government to urge those interests upon the two contracting Governments only through the usual diplomatic channel. The British Government, after this, intimated no more desire of any kind to take part in our negotiations with France.

For all that, the ill-effects of that after-dinner speech remained. Owing to the interpretation given to it by the French and English press, it especially produced in wide German circles a very bitter feeling, which naturally found expression in a more or less forcible manner in our press. The effect of this speech was therefore not such as to further a good understanding with England. However sincerely I regret it, I must distinctly protest against the speech having been used as a handle for reproaching the Government with a weak and hesitating policy. Our programme of a reasonable settlement with France without interference on the part of a third Power and uninfluenced by irresponsible press intrigues has in fact been carried out.

The English Minister, Sir Edward Grey, in an appeal to the press of both countries, gave utterance to serious words in the House of Commons the day before yesterday, and especially warned the press against spreading false news. I can only associate myself with this warning in order that ideas do not become established in the public opinion of both countries which would in the long run embitter the relations between the two great countries to their mutual disadvantage, and, I may add, to the disadvantage of the whole world.

I have pointed out to you that we have accomplished what we intended. In

everyday life that is not usually called weakness, but reproaches were levelled at us from another point of view; that we ought to have tried for something else, but, above all things, for something more. What the honour and prestige of Germany demanded was either Southern Morocco or the restitution of the Act of Algeciras. In fact, one thing or another. Yes, gentlemen, he who considers the possession of Southern Morocco to be a vital interest for Germany, he who sees in the fact that this possession was not claimed a loss of prestige to Germany, for him there must be no alternative; he must demand that we go to war in order to conquer Southern Morocco. For him the restitution of the Act of Algeciras can be no real equivalent. There is nothing to be done with this formula, from the standpoint of Germany's honour and prestige or from the standpoint of practical politics.

Southern Morocco was not a desirable country for us as its protection and defence would have entailed constant sacrifices out of all proportion to the value of the land. That has been till the middle of last summer the general opinion. I will not speak of Bismarck, who expressed the desire that France might annex Morocco. You will reply that times have changed since then, but even since Bismarck the opinion has been steadfastly adhered to that we had no political interests to pursue in Morocco. This opinion was formally recognised by the treaty of February 1909, and all parties in the Reichstag agreed to this recognition on the discussion of the agreement. How has all this suddenly changed? Southern Morocco is doubtless a fine country (laughter); it is said to be very rich in ore, to have a fruitful soil on which German emigrants could settle. I will not argue this point, although there are many remarks which might be made with regard to a policy of colonisation in Morocco. I assume, therefore, that it is in itself a very desirable piece of land. But I must say that for those who recognise it as Germany's task to conquer desirable countries by war, they would do just as well, in fact, perhaps, still better, if they were to attack some other countries than Morocco. Such things have, indeed, been done even in regard to European countries!

These are mere phantasies, and I am astonished that people can be found abroad who attach importance to them in connection with German policy. Germany can only pursue a strong policy, in the sense of a *Weltpolitik* if she keeps herself strong on the continent. It is only the weight which we exert as a continental Power which makes world commerce and colonial policy possible. Both must collapse if we do not maintain our power at home; if we acquire outlying possessions, the safeguarding of which can only be secured by frittering away and weakening our continental power, then we should be sawing at the branch on which we sit. Our policy in the last decades was therefore right in not pursuing political aims in Morocco, and therefore our present policy is also right in having excluded from the very beginning all thought of the acquisition of land in Morocco. I claim it as being particularly creditable to our policy that we did not pursue the utopia of the acquisition of land in Morocco. The complaints of a bad policy do not emanate only from those who wished to acquire a portion of Morocco. They have been raised from much wider circles. Should these complaints have any other aim than to put difficulties in the way of the Government's conduct of foreign affairs, then they must have a tangible aim. I am not speaking of those who were simply bent on war this summer. There were such people. And their number was not so big as the words they used. I will not waste words on the reprehensibility of their conduct. Others wanted a war of prevention, either against France, or against England, or against both. You all know what Bismarck thought of wars of prevention. He has said that his advice would never have been to go to war because a war was sooner or later inevitable. He regarded even a successful war as an evil which it should be the aim of the statecraft of nations to prevent. These are the principles on which we have acted. No one can tell whether Germany will not be fated to go to war with her neighbours. But on me who have now to bear the responsibility, it is incumbent so to conduct affairs that a war which is avoidable, and which is not demanded by the honour of the country, shall be avoided. Such have been the principles on which the last phase of Moroccan policy has been based.

Morocco was like a continually festering wound in our relations not only with France but also with England. The French advance to Fez led to an acute stage which rendered an operation necessary. We have performed this operation in order to heal the wound. We could never have reached the result achieved by the negotiations now before you, if both Governments had not had this same end in view. I consider it a great gain that it should have been possible for Germany and France to arrive at a peaceful understanding on such a delicate question as that of Morocco, involving as it did so many open and concealed dangers. This fact is worth more than all discussions

on disarmament and arbitration treaties. It can become the foundation for the development and consolidation of relations in harmony with the true needs and progress of the two great nations. It is true that only the future can build on this foundation; but the present would have been guilty of a sin of omission had it cast aside the corner-stone instead of putting it in place.

I said just now that the Moroccan question also affected our relations with England. I would say one word more in regard thereto. In virtue of treaty stipulations, England stood ever on the side of France, at least diplomatically, in all Moroccan differences between us and France. Our understanding with France accordingly also cleans the slate in respect to our relations to England.

I return to the consideration from which I started. The depression and pessimism evinced by our people, which sought to urge the Government to other deeds, ought to indicate tangible aims, aims which could have been achieved simultaneously with the solution of the Morocco question. I have explained why we did not attempt to secure a piece of Morocco. It was especially strongly urged that we ought then at least to have broken off the negotiations with France, that we ought to have insisted on the restoration of the Act of Algeciras. It would have been easy enough to break off the negotiations, still easier perhaps not to begin them. But the restoration of the Act of Algeciras would have in no way benefited us. I see no advantage for Germany in the restoration of a situation which suffered from the no longer tenable fiction of the sovereignty of the Sultan of Morocco and the independence of the Shereefian Empire. We are sufficiently acquainted with this situation since 1906. It was materially and morally unsatisfactory for us. The desire for the Algeciras Act was also partially inspired by another motive. If we would not, or could not, have Southern Morocco, then, France must not have it. This was to be read often throughout this summer. In my opinion, the value of a policy does not consist in the injury done to others, but in the advantages gained for one's own country. A policy which aims at injuring another without considering whether it benefits the author is a shortsighted one. The animosity which it engenders must be paid for sooner or later. He, however, who sees in the increase of power accruing to France from her protectorate over Morocco a danger to Germany's existence, becomes an advocate of the war of prevention.

Hence, gentlemen, why this yearning for the Act of Algeciras? Did the prestige of Germany in any way demand it? No, gentlemen, our prestige as a Great Power demands that we should not suffer an international treaty, like the Act of Algeciras, which bears our signature, to be altered for the benefit of one party without our assent, to our disadvantage. For this we must fight, if necessary with the sword. For this we negotiated and the negotiation has been successful.

In conclusion, let me sum up. How did things stand before Fez and Agadir? Nominally Morocco was independent; *de facto* it has fallen under French influence. After Tangier and Algeciras this complicated and obscure situation was a standing menace to our relations with France. The "open door" existed indeed on paper, but it lacked the special guarantees which the obscurity of the internal situation rendered doubly urgent. We had renounced political aspirations in Morocco.

And now: we have given up nothing in Morocco which we had not already given up. In return we have obtained the economic guarantes which were lacking. We have besides acquired a considerable colonial possession, which will bear fruit under our colonial administration. We have achieved this by means of a peaceful understanding with France. It has for the first time been found possible to solve by agreement with our western neighbour a great and difficult political question which contained the germ of great evil.

Such is the result. It is now for you, gentlemen, to weigh the pros and cons of a policy which has led to this agreement. We do not expect praise, but we also fear no reproach.

[44930] No. 447.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 13.)

(No. 515.)

Sir, *Paris, November* 11, 1911.

I HAD the honour to report to you the publication by the "Matin" on the 8th instant of the secret Franco-Spanish Treaty of 1904.

The "Figaro," of yesterday's date, published the secret treaty negotiated, but not signed, between France and Spain in 1902 concerning Morocco.

The "Temps," of to-day's date, publishes the secret Franco-Spanish Treaty of the 1st September, 1905, respecting Morocco, and also makes public what it believes to be the contents of two secret clauses of the Anglo-French Convention of 1904.

I have the honour to transmit to you herewith extracts from the papers mentioned in which these treaties are given, or alluded to.

No explanation is forthcoming as to how these secret agreements have found their way into the hands of journalists.

I have, &c.
FRANCIS BERTIE.

Enclosure 1 in No. 447.

Extract from the "Figaro" of November 10, 1911.

UN AUTRE TRAITÉ SECRET DE M. DELCASSÉ AVEC L'ESPAGNE.

AVANT de signer le traité secret du 3 octobre, 1904, qui a été fait sous les auspices de l'Angleterre, garante de nos accords espagnols, M. Delcassé avait, en 1902, conclu avec l'Espagne, à l'insu de l'Angleterre et contre elle, un traité secret que M. Sagasta avait accepté, mais que son successeur, M. Silvela, refusa de signer en arrivant au pouvoir.

C'était le partage du Maroc en deux moitiés : M. Silvela fut effrayé des responsabilités financières et militaires qui incomberaient à son pays, des jalousies qu'il éveillerait en Europe, au Foreign Office en particulier, il eut le courage de dénoncer ces périls à ses collègues et le texte de cet accord fut communiqué au Cabinet de Londres, dont les intérêts étaient si méconnus, puisque le partage était fait en dehors de lui. C'était pendant notre période de mésintelligence avec l'Angleterre (pour employer l'expression de Lord Lansdowne d'après le Livre jaune anglais).

C'est à partir du jour où le traité de 1902 fut déchiré qu'un rapprochement s'opéra entre la Grande-Bretagne et la France, et c'est en raison même de ce rapprochement, dû tout entier à l'attitude de l'Espagne, que l'Angleterre, dans son accord du 8 avril, 1904, avec la France, exigea "l'entente avec l'Espagne comme un élément essentiel de l'accord."

Il est utile et habile de ne pas l'oublier en ce moment.

C'est donc pour avoir ébauché en 1902 contre l'Angleterre un premier traité avec l'Espagne que M. Delcassé fut amené à signer avec l'Angleterre l'accord du 8 avril, 1904, puis avec l'Espagne le traité secret du 3 octobre, 1904. Par le seul fait d'un changement de Ministère à Madrid et de l'accession au pouvoir de M. Silvela déchirant le traité Sagasta-Delcassé, toute la politique française se trouva par conséquent dirigée vers l'entente anglaise.

On voit les effets considérables de ce petit événement. C'est l'histoire du verre d'eau de Scribe!

Quant au traité de partage de 1902, traité secret lui aussi comme tout ce que faisait M. Delcassé, il donnait non seulement Tanger, Tétouan, Larache, El Ksar à l'Espagne, mais Taza, toute la région de Fez et la capitale même du Maroc.

En voici le texte, qui était ignoré jusqu'à ce jour de nos Ministres, de nos diplomates, et de notre Parlement.

Nous sommes heureux de donner à nos lecteurs la primeur d'un tel document.

Texte du Traité de 1902.

"Le Gouvernement de la République française et le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté le Roi d'Espagne, heureux de constater les relations cordiales qui existent entre la France et l'Espagne, et voulant les fortifier encore dans l'avenir, pour le bien commun des deux pays, sont convenus des dispositions suivantes :—

"Article 1er. La France, par la communauté des frontières, l'Espagne, par la possession des présides et ses divers intérêts en relation avec le territoire du Maroc, ont un intérêt prééminent au maintien de l'indépendance territoriale, politique, économique, administrative, militaire et financière du Maroc.

"Elles ne concluront donc, avec une Puissance quelconque, aucune convention

d'aucune sorte ni ne s'associeront, soit directement, soit indirectement, à aucun acte qui devrait avoir pour effet, soit d'y favoriser l'établissement d'une influence étrangère, soit d'y nuire à l'action légitime et aux intérêts de l'une d'elles et sans son consentement préalable.

"Art. 2. Si par la faiblesse du Gouvernement marocain, par son impuissance à assurer l'ordre et la sécurité, ou pour toute autre cause, le maintien du *statu quo* devenait impossible, le Gouvernement de la République française et le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté le Roi d'Espagne déterminent comme il suit les limites, à l'intérieur desquelles chacun d'eux aurait le droit exclusif de rétablir la tranquillité, de protéger la vie et les biens des personnes, et de garantir la liberté des transactions commerciales.

"Art. 3. D'une part: la ligne de démarcation entre les sphères d'influence française et espagnole partira de l'intersection du méridien 14° 20′ ouest de Paris (12° ouest de Greenwich) visé par la convention du 27 juin, 1900, avec le 26e degré de latitude nord qu'elle suivra vers l'est jusqu'à son intersection avec la route tracée en pointillé sur la carte formant l'annexe No. 1* à la présente convention, et y reliant Bir-el-Abbas, à Mader Ym Ougadir en passant par Tindouf. De ce point de rencontre, elle remontera dans la direction du nord-ouest et jusqu'à son intersection avec l'oued Merkala ladite route, dont l'usage sera commun dans cette section aux ressortissants français et espagnols, le sol de la route ainsi que celui de Tindouf et de sa banlieue restant toutefois dans la sphère d'influence française; à partir de ce point d'intersection, la ligne de démarcation remontera le thalweg de l'oued Merkala jusqu'à sa source, pour gagner de là, directement, par le parallèle passant par ladite source, le 10e degré de longitude ouest de Paris (7° 40′ ouest de Greenwich) qu'elle suivra vers le nord jusqu'à sa rencontre avec l'oued Draa. Elle remontera ensuite, par leur thalweg, l'oued Draa jusqu'à Bounou remontant par l'affluent du Draa qui le rejoint près de Beni Smigin vers le nord, et le suivant jusqu'à Taghbalt; de là elle rejoindra Tirzin Ourkan et passant entre Ymitez et Tulit vers la source du oued Dades pour remonter les crêtes de l'Atlas qu'elle suivra en descendant jusqu'au cap Ghir, passant par Tizi ou Rijint, Ait Ymi, Telouet, Tagherat, Touchka, Bibana et Bibaouan. Bien entendu qu'en cas de doute on s'en tiendra toujours pour l'exactitude de cette délimitation au principe de: que la ligne de démarcation sera celle qui divise les eaux.

"Il est aussi entendu que, pour le commerce de caravanes du Sous, le Gouvernement espagnol pourra établir des entrepôts à Tindouf où lesdites caravanes auront également droit à l'usage de l'eau.

"D'autre part, la ligne de démarcation entre les sphères de l'influence française et espagnole partira sur la côte de l'océan Atlantique de l'embouchure de l'oued Sebou, dont elle remontera le thalweg depuis la mer jusqu'à son confluent avec l'oued Mikkes. Elle remontera ensuite, par leur thalweg, cette rivière et celle de ses branches qui passe par Medhouma. De la source de cet dernier cours d'eau, la ligne de démarcation gagnera directement la crête du djébel Beni Mtiz, qu'elle suivra ainsi que la crête du djébel Ait Youssi jusqu'à l'oued Sebou, dont elle remontera ensuite le thalweg et celui de son premier affluent de droite. De la source de ce dernier cours d'eau elle gagnera aussi directement que possible la source, de l'affluent le plus proche de l'oued Bou Zennelan, et descendra le thalweg de ces deux cours d'eau jusqu'à l'oued Ynaouen, elle suivra ensuite le thalweg de cette rivière jusqu'à sa source puis rejoindra par Taza et Riata, suivant la crête de la montagne Rejida, et suivant ensuite le cours de la Moulouïa jusqu'à Medouhar et son débouché dans la Méditerranée.

"Art. 4. Les deux hautes parties contractantes, reconnaissant l'importance de la position de Tanger par rapport à la liberté nécessaire du détroit de Gibraltar, ne s'opposeraient pas éventuellement à la neutralisation de cette ville.

"Art. 5. En affirmant le caractère absolument pacifique de la présente convention, les deux hautes parties contractantes décident que si l'une d'elles, pour la protection de ses intérêts dans sa sphère d'influence, devait recourir à la force, elle ferait connaître préalablement à l'autre la nécessité où elle se trouve.

"Si, pendant la période du *statu quo*, l'une des deux hautes parties contractantes, par suite d'une injure, d'un dommage, d'une menace à ses intérêts, se voyait réduite, pour obtenir satisfaction, à exercer une action coercitive temporaire sur un point quelconque du territoire marocain, elle ferait préalablement connaître à l'autre la nécessité où elle se trouve.

"Art. 6. Dans les questions qui pourraient être soulevées à propos de la présente convention, les deux hautes parties contractantes se prêteront l'une à l'autre l'appui de leur diplomatie.

* Not reproduced.

"Art. 7. Les navires français jouiront pour l'accès par mer de l'oued Sous, de l'oued Sebou et de la Moulouïa, dans les eaux territoriales espagnoles, de toutes les facilités dont pourront bénéficier les navires espagnols. Il en sera de même, à titre de réciprocité, pour les navires espagnols dans les eaux territoriales françaises et l'accès, par mer, des fleuves compris dans sa zone d'influence.

"La navigation et la pêche seront libres pour les ressortissants français et espagnols dans les rivières ou dans les parties de rivières communes.

"La police de la navigation et de la pêche dans ces rivières ou dans ces parties de rivières, dans les eaux territoriales françaises et espagnoles aux abords de l'oued Sous, de l'oued Sebou et de la Moulouïa et les autres compris dans cette convention, ainsi que les autres questions relatives à l'éclairage, au balisage, à l'aménagement et à la jouissance des eaux feront l'objet d'arrangements concertés entre les deux Gouvernements.

"Les droits et avantages qui découlent du présent article étant stipulés à raison du caractère commun ou limitrophe des baies, embouchures ou rivières susmentionnées seront exclusivement réservées aux ressortissants des deux hautes parties contractantes et ne pourront en aucune façon être transmis ou concédés aux ressortissants d'autres nations sans l'accord commun des deux hautes parties aujourd'hui contractantes.

"Art. 8. Aucun droit différentiel en matière de navigation, de douanes, de transports par chemin de fer et généralement aucun privilège d'ordre commercial ne sera établi dans les sphères d'influence délimitées par la présente convention. Toutes facilités de transit et de circulation seront données, pour le commerce venant de l'intérieur ou s'y dirigeant, dans et par les territoires reconnus comme faisant partie des sphères d'influence espagnole et française telles qu'elles sont délimitées dans l'article 3 de la présente convention.

"Art. 9. Aucune des deux hautes parties contractantes ne pourra, sans le consentement de l'autre, aliéner tout ou partie des territoires placés dans sa sphère d'influence.

"Art. 10. Les lignes de démarcation déterminées par l'article 3 de la présente convention sont tracées sur les cartes ci-jointes (Annexes Nos. 1 et 2).* Au cas où il y aurait lieu d'en faire l'application sur le terrain, il est convenu qu'il sera tenu compte, dans sa mesure du possible, de la position des tribus limitrophes.

"Art. 11. La présente convention, étant destinée à rester secrète, ne pourra être divulguée, communiquée, ni publiée, en tout ou en partie, sans un accord préalable entre les deux hautes parties contractantes."

Enclosure 2 in No. 447.

Extract from the "Temps" of November 11, 1911.

ACCORD SECRET FRANCO-ESPAGNOL DU 1er SEPTEMBRE, 1905.

NOUS publions ci-dessous le texte d'un accord franco-espagnol signé le 1er septembre, 1905, et destiné à régler le fonctionnement du traité secret de 1904:—

I.—*Police des Ports.*

"Les corps de police militaire qui devront être organisés le plus tôt possible dans les ports de l'Empire chérifien devant être formés de troupes indigènes, la France, d'accord avec l'Espagne, admet que tous les chefs, officiers et sous-officiers qui seront chargés de l'instruction et du commandement desdites troupes dans les ports de Tétouan et de Larache, devront appartenir à la nationalité espagnole; de son côté, l'Espagne, d'accord avec la France, admet que tous les chefs, officiers et sous-officiers qui seront chargés de l'instruction et du commandement des troupes de police dans les ports de Rabat et de Casablanca, devront être de nationalité française.

"En ce qui concerne le port de Tanger, en raison des stipulations de l'article 9 du traité du 3 octobre, 1904, il est convenu que la police de cette ville sera confiée à un corps franco-espagnol commandé par un Français. Ce régime sera soumis à revision, à l'expiration de la période de quinze ans, prévue à la convention du 3 octobre, 1904.

* Not reproduced.

II.—*Surveillance et Répression de la Contrebande des Armes.*

"Conformément à l'esprit de l'article 18 dudit traité, et en vue d'assurer son exécution, il est entendu que sur terre, la surveillance et la répression de la contrebande des armes demeurent à la charge de la France dans la sphère de sa frontière algérienne, et à la charge de l'Espagne, dans la sphère de toutes ses places et possessions africaines.

"La surveillance et la répression de cette contrebande sur mer seront confiées à une division de navires de guerre des deux Puissances, qui en fixeront les types. Cette division sera commandée alternativement, pendant un an, par un officier de la marine de l'une des deux Puissances, et l'année suivante par un officier de la marine de l'autre Puissance, le commandement devant être exercé la première année par un officier de la marine française.

"Les deux Gouvernements établiront d'un commun accord les règles à observer pour la répression de cette contrebande, lorsqu'il s'agira de l'exercice du droit de visite, dans les cas où l'exercice de ce droit serait indispensable à l'efficacité de la répression.

III.—*Intérêts économiques et financiers.*

"En vue d'assurer de part et d'autre dans le sens le plus amical l'exacte interprétation des articles 10, 11 et 12 de la convention du 3 octobre, 1904, il demeure entendu :—

"1. Que les entreprises de travaux publics, de chemins de fer, de routes et canaux, d'exploitation de mines et carrières, et toutes autres de caractère commercial et industriel, sur le territoire du Maroc, pourront être exécutées par des groupes constitués par des Espagnols et des Français ; les deux Gouvernements s'obligent mutuellement à favoriser par les moyens dont ils disposeront la création de ces entreprises mixtes, sur la base de l'égalité des droits des associés, dans la proportion du capital engagé.

"A l'expiration du délai de quinze ans, prévu par la convention du 3 octobre, 1904, les deux hautes parties contractantes pourront exécuter les travaux auxquels se réfère le paragraphe précédent, conformément aux règles qu'il indique, dans leurs zones d'influence respectives.

"2. Les Espagnols et les Français, ainsi que leurs établissements et écoles actuellement existants dans l'Empire marocain, seront respectés ; en tout cas, ils jouiront pour toujours au Maroc, dans l'exercice de leurs professions, et la réalisation de leurs opérations commerciales et industrielles en cours ou projetées, des mêmes droits et privilèges, de manière que l'état juridique des sujets et ressortissants des deux nations, soit constamment le même. Les marchandises des deux pays jouiront pour leur introduction, circulation et vente dans l'Empire, d'un traitement identique. Les deux hautes parties contractantes emploieront tous les moyens pacifiques en leur pouvoir et se prêteront mutuellement leur concours auprès du Sultan et du Makhzen en vue d'empêcher que présentement, comme dans l'avenir, cette clause ne vienne à être modifiée par l'autorité marocaine par suite de l'établissement de règles différentes en ce qui concerne l'état juridique des personnes et les conditions auxquelles seront soumises les marchandises des deux nations.

"3. La monnaie d'argent espagnole continuera à être librement introduite comme elle l'a été jusqu'ici dans l'Empire, sans que directement ou indirectement, ou à la suite d'une mesure quelconque prise ou à prendre, il puisse être porté atteinte à la liberté de l'introduction et de la circulation ainsi qu'à la valeur libératrice de ladite monnaie.

"Les deux Gouvernements s'obligent respectivement à ne pas laisser créer d'obstacles directs ou indirects à ce qui se trouve énoncé au paragraphe précédent, par les institutions commerciales ou industrielles organisées dans l'Empire marocain par leurs sujets respectifs et à employer tous les moyens pacifiques dont chacun d'eux dispose pour que des participations dans le capital et les travaux de toutes les entreprises publiques soient offertes aux sujets des deux nations.

"4. Les Gouvernements espagnol et français étant d'accord sur la nécessité de créer au Maroc un établissement de crédit sous la dénomination de Banque d'État ou toute autre, établissement dont la présidence sera réservée à la France en raison du plus grand nombre d'actions souscrites par elle, s'entendent également sur les points suivants :—

"(*a.*) La participation en actions de toutes espèces et les parts de bénéfice à réserver à l'Espagne seront supérieures à la part de chacune des autres Puissances prises séparément, la France exceptée ;

"(*b.*) Le personnel espagnol de l'administration de cet établissement et de celle de ses dépendances, sera proportionnel à la part de capital souscrit par l'Espagne ;

"(*c.*) Cet établissement pourra se charger de travaux et de services publics dans l'Empire du Maroc, avec l'assentiment ou en vertu d'un accord avec le Sultan. Il pourra soit les exécuter directement, soit les transférer à d'autres groupes ou entreprises. Toutefois, pour l'exécution de tous ces travaux et services publics, les stipulations des paragraphes ci-dessus (*a*) et (*b*) devront être observées.

"5. Les deux Gouvernements espagnol et français augmenteront d'un commun accord le nombre actuel des sujets espagnols délégués dans le service des douanes des l'Empire, réorganisé en garantie de l'emprunt contracté en dernier lieu par le Sultan auprès des banques françaises, emprunt dans lequel se trouve englobé l'emprunt contracté antérieurement par Sa Majesté chérifienne auprès des banques espagnoles.

IV.

"Les deux Puissances s'engagent à observer cet accord, même dans le cas où les stipulations de l'article 17 de la Convention de Madrid de 1880 viendraient à être étendues à toutes les questions d'ordre économique et financier. Elles s'efforceront par leur action pacifique constante auprès du Sultan et du Makhzen d'assurer l'accomplissement loyal de tout ce que stipule le présent accord.

"En outre, l'Espagne étant fermement décidée à marcher complètement d'accord avec la France, au cours des délibérations de la conférence projetée, et la France se proposant d'agir de même avec l'Espagne, il demeure convenu entre les deux Gouvernements qu'ils s'aideront mutuellement et procéderont d'un commun accord dans lesdites délibérations, en ce qui concerne les stipulations de la convention du 3 octobre, 1904, dans son interprétation la plus large et la plus amicale, comme en ce qui concerne les différents objets du présent accord.

"Ils s'engagent enfin à se prêter réciproquement le concours pacifique le plus entier sur toutes les questions d'ordre général concernant le Maroc, ainsi que le comporte la cordiale et amicale entente qui existe entre eux par rapport aux affaires de l'Empire chérifien."

Enclosure 3 in No. 447.

Extract from the "Temps" of November 11, 1911.

DEUX CLAUSES SECRÈTES DU TRAITÉ FRANCO-ANGLAIS DE 1904.

DIVERS journaux ont parlé des clauses secrètes du traité franco-anglais de 1904.

Nous croyons savoir que l'une de ces clauses enregistrait l'adhésion de la France à la suppression des Capitulations en Égypte le jour où l'Angleterre négocierait en ce sens avec les Puissances.

La seconde clause avait pour objet de déterminer dans le nord du Maroc, même sur sa côte Atlantique et jusqu'au sud de Larache, une zone dans laquelle l'action de la France devait être soumise à des restrictions du même ordre que celles exigées par l'Angleterre pour la rive méditerranéenne qui fait face à Gibraltar.

[44931] No. 448.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received November* 13.)

(No. 516.)

Paris, November 11, 1911.

Sir,

THE Paris press comments very unfavourably on the explanations given yesterday by M. de Selves to the Commission for Foreign and Colonial Affairs of the Chamber of Deputies as to the statement made by his Excellency the previous day (see the enclosure in my despatch No. 514 of yesterday's date) to the effect that the French Government had neither protested nor made any reservations on learning of the Spanish occupation of Larache and Alcazar. M. Cruppi, who was Minister for Foreign Affairs at that time, and who is Minister of Justice in the present Cabinet, addressed a letter—so the "Matin" declares—to M. de Selves expressing his surprise that the

latter should have been kept in ignorance of an important *dossier* at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs containing the texts of the French protests against the occupation in question.

Yesterday M. de Selves, at the request of M. Caillaux, made the following statement to the commission:—

"En sortant hier soir du Palais Bourbon je fus assailli par un doute: je me demandais si je ne m'étais pas trompé en affirmant à la commission que mon prédécesseur n'avait fait aucune objection au Gouvernement espagnol au mois de juin dernier. Je consultai M. Bapst, directeur des affaires politiques, qui m'avait assisté devant la commission. Lui aussi n'était pas sans inquiétude. Rentré au Ministère, je fis faire des recherches, et j'appris bientôt l'existence d'un dossier qui contenait les protestations du Gouvernement français auprès du Cabinet de Madrid. Ce matin je demandai à votre president, M. Paul Deschanel, de bien vouloir convoquer la commission. Je tiens en effet à ne pas retarder plus longtemps une explication. Je viens ici dire très loyalement que j'étais insuffisamment informé quand j'ai répondu à un de vos collègues, M. Marcel Ribière. Voici en effet les protestations qui furent adressées au Gouvernement espagnol. Il y a trois dépêches du Ministre des Affaires Étrangères à notre Ambassadeur à Madrid, M. Geoffray; elles sont datées: la première du 8 juin, la seconde du 10 juin, et enfin la troisième du 13 juin, 1911."

M. de Selves added that the protests of his predecessor, M. Cruppi, had been couched in very decided terms, and that it was therein stipulated most strongly that France would not give her assent to any occupation other than that of the Ceuta zone.

This explanation is stated to have elicited numerous protests on the part of the commission, and M. Ribière declared that it was a proof of the disorder and anarchy reigning in one of the most important departments of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. M. de Selves thereupon stated that M. de Bapst was at Biarritz on leave of absence when the French protests were made. This further explanation, however, failed to satisfy the commission, two of whose members enquired how it was possible that M. Bapst on returning from leave did not make himself acquainted with what had occurred during his absence.

I have, &c.
FRANCIS BERTIE.

No. 449.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 13.)

(No. 374.)

Sir, *Berlin, November* 11, 1911.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith a translation of a speech which the Chancellor made in the Reichstag yesterday, in which he made an energetic protest against the violently chauvinistic language of Herr von Heydebrand and the unjustifiable manner in which he had spoken of a country whose relations with Germany were of a normal character. Herr von Heydebrand's utterances might be made by an excited hustings orator, but they were utterly unworthy of an orderly deliberative assembly.

The Chancellor's speech, which the "Vossische Zeitung" describes as the Chancellor's first real political success, has created great excitement in all political circles. Never, the papers say, have such words been addressed to the Conservative party by a Chancellor since the days of Bismarck, and it remains to be seen what the ultimate effect upon the present grouping of parties will be.

People are at a loss to understand the difference between the studied and somewhat monotonous tone of his first speech and the fiery and energetic language of the second. I learn from a confidential source that the tone and language of the speech was arranged between the Emperor and the Chancellor on the evening of the first debate in the Reichstag, that is, immediately after Herr von Heydebrand had spoken. I do not know whether this is a fact, but if it is true it would certainly account for the energy of the speech.

I have, &c.
W. E. GOSCHEN.

Enclosure in No. 449.

Speech delivered by Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg in the Reichstag, November 10, 1911.

(Translation.)

Gentlemen.

I HAVE heard it said the Government have suffered a severe defeat, Tripoli is the result of Agadir, we have inaugurated a mistaken policy of fraternisation, we ought not to have sent the "Panther" to Agadir; in short, that we have done everything wrong. Gentlemen, let me deal with two points.

Herr Bassermann has said that Tripoli was a result of Agadir. Gentlemen, if the Italian expedition to Tripoli had had any connection with the events in Morocco, it would have been connected not with Agadir but with the French advance to Fez. It was not we who raised the Moroccan question. It was the French who did so with their advance to Fez. This advance compelled us to open negotiations, and how can you then assert that the advance of the Italians to Tripoli was the result of Agadir?

Gentlemen, I have frequently seen the same view expressed in the foreign press, especially in that portion of the foreign press which is particularly ill-disposed towards Germany, which, when trouble arises anywhere in the world, says: "Of course, Germany was the cause of it." Gentlemen, I must say quite openly that I was surprised that the leader of the National Liberal party should have associated himself with these views in contradiction to the facts.

Gentlemen, Herr Bassermann went on to make the following further criticism of our action. He said that when M. Rouvier was in office no offer was made to us in regard to Morocco; and that if such offer had been made, according to Herr Bassermann, we ought not to have accepted it in view of our whole Eastern policy. Herr Bassermann, indeed, maintained that our present foreign policy, which is in his opinion extraordinarily bad in comparison with that formerly pursued, has destroyed the entire results of the Eastern policy which we have so carefully pursued during the last twenty years. Herr Bassermann, however, said not only that we ought not to have accepted an offer on the part of M. Rouvier, on account of our Eastern policy, but also because the England of King Edward VIIth's time would not have allowed it. Herr Bassermann therefore praises the policy of the past by having conformed in advance to the probable opposition of England, and he cannot sufficiently blame our present policy for weakness and cringing on account of an alleged yielding to England which has not occurred. I explained this to you yesterday.

Thirdly, Herr Bassermann considers that we have undone the whole of our good Eastern policy. Our former policy was to avoid doing anything to offend Islam. But now Herr Bassermann has himself proposed that we might indeed have sacrificed the sovereignty of the Sultan of Morocco in the north, and given over the protectorate to France, but that we ought to have maintained that sovereignty in the south. Gentlemen, how does that tally with an undoing of our Eastern policy?

Herr Bassermann has continued to speak—as did also other members—of the sovereignty of the Sultan, and said that we had made untold sacrifices in Morocco. Herr von Heydebrand made a like observation. Gentlemen, I ventured to explain to you yesterday—and everyone who has studied the facts must admit it—that the sovereignty of the Sultan of Morocco had long been a fiction; it existed no more. This was the case before we concluded our Morocco agreement. All these reproaches as to sacrifices are therefore baseless. Herr Schultz said just now that we had retired from Morocco. But, Gentlemen, we were never there. All these reproaches fall to the ground.

I began by saying that I would have been glad to hear positive proposals from you, as to how I ought to have acted. I have not heard very many, but some have indeed been made. Herr Bassermann said that we ought not to have sent a ship to Agadir, but that we ought to have taken measures on our western frontier. Yes, Gentlemen, but what sort of measures? Does he mean movements of troops? But, Gentlemen, movements of troops on our western frontier at a moment of tension are the beginning of mobilisation, and mobilisation at a critical time means war. I do not know whether such a measure would have been an appropriate intimation to France to sit down with us to negotiate a deal. I return once more to the proposal of Herr Bassermann to sacrifice the independence of the Sultan in Northern Morocco, and to recognise the French protectorate, but to keep Southern Morocco free from it, in order that we could live there under better conditions. I cannot imagine how this idea could have been carried out. One and the same ruler is to be under the protectorate of France in the

orth, but Sovereign in the south of Morocco, which is, however, not so sharply divided from the north. That is not possible. Then again, our economic interests and our trade can only flourish in a safe country, where order prevails—not police order, but internal order—where the Government is undivided. That is the necessary condition for the conduct of commercial and industrial undertakings. That you must admit. I see no possibility of it, however, if in Southern Morocco twenty different tribes under twenty different chiefs are held together by no undivided force. I see really no advantage in Herr Bassermann's proposal; and if we had achieved this result—Northern Morocco under a French protectorate and Southern Morocco under a so-called Sovereign Sultan—Gentlemen, Herr Bassermann would have had still worse things to say of me.

I come now to Herr von Heydebrand. He is, so far as I know, with the member already mentioned, the only one who has made positive suggestions to us. Herr von Heydebrand has admitted that it is easy to criticise but difficult to do better. But he added :—

"But we think that if we had retained an entirely free hand for our future demands, and had possessed the will and determination to assert them at the proper time and in the proper circumstances, it would have been more sensible than that which is now laid before us." ("Quite right," from the National Liberals.)

You cry, "Quite right," Gentlemen. I have carefully weighed this suggestion of Herr von Heydebrand, as I do all his words, but I must admit that I am still not clear what I ought to have done according to Herr von Heydebrand's idea. Wait for the proper time and circumstances! To do nothing then on the advance of the French to Fez, to sit still with folded arms, Gentlemen, that would have been a mistake. That would have been a policy of weakness which would have always been thrown in my teeth. There are times when one must act at once, and even in certain circumstances take risks, and that we did. I can really make nothing of a proposal to wait and do something at the proper time.

I take more seriously what Herr von Heydebrand said about England. He, too, has again referred to the well-known article in the "Neue Freie Presse" which has been attributed to the British Ambassador at Vienna, and, although the Secretary of State made a declaration yesterday with regard thereto, Herr Wiener has also again returned to the subject.

Gentlemen, the matter is perfectly clear. I called the attention of the British Government to the justifiable indignation ("Erregung") aroused in Germany by this article in the "Neue Freie Presse." I at the same time gave the British Government to understand that I would be glad to receive an explanation. To this the British Government replied that the British Ambassador at Vienna had neither inspired the well-known article in the "Neue Freie Presse" nor had he made the observations attributed to him by the author of the article. For me, therefore, the incident is thus closed. (Contradiction and cries of "diplomatically.") No, Gentlemen, also for the Reichstag. (Contradiction.) I beg, Gentlemen, that before you give such loud expression to your contradiction you will permit me to finish what I have to say. A great responsibility rests also with the Reichstag in this connection. And no doubt must be expressed in responsible quarters with regard to an official declaration on the part of a foreign Power.

Herr von Heydebrand prefaced his remarks on England with the observation that he had no intention of overthrowing the Government. He however stated, almost in the same breath, that he had heard language used in a speech resting on the responsibility of the whole British Cabinet, which must be described as a humiliation of, and a warlike challenge to, the German people, and which I had lightly passed over with the expression "after-dinner speech!" If Herr von Heydebrand meant by this that I had intended to dismiss a humiliating challenge to the German nation as it were with a paltry perversion of words, I must leave it to Herr von Heydebrand to say how he would reconcile this public aspersion on his own Government with his alleged intention not to overthrow the Government and with his own conscience as a patriot.

Gentlemen, I must further deplore that language should have been used in this House in regard to our relations with a foreign country with which we are in normal relations which might be suitable to electoral meetings, but which is not customary in a Parliament conscious of its responsibility. When I, in the full consciousness of my responsibility, make use of carefully chosen words in regard to the speeches of

foreign statesmen, this can and should lead to an improvement of our international relations. Passionate and extravagant language such as that used by Herr von Heydebrand may serve party purposes, but for the German Empire it is injurious. It would be to me a matter of regret if it should become the custom in this House to speak in this tone of our foreign relations. A strong man needs not to carry his sword in his mouth.

[After expressing to the House his appreciation of the patriotism which after all inspired their criticism, the Chancellor made a short reference to a statement by one of the previous speakers to the effect that the attitude adopted towards England by the Chancellor had given the first signal for the adverse criticisms.]

Gentlemen, I have explained to you, and I hope I have convinced you, that I have in no way sacrificed the honour of my country, the honour of the nation to which I belong, in our relations with England.

Gentlemen, there have been forces everywhere at work—I must say it openly—which have more to do with the impending elections than with Morocco and the Congo. But if, Gentlemen, matters are so represented in the newspapers and in the press as to make it appear that the Fatherland is in need, that we stand on the verge of a national disaster, this is not borne out by the facts. To inflame the national passions to fever heat for the sake of utopian schemes of conquest and party aims is to compromise patriotism and to squander a valuable asset.

[44933] No. 450.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received November* 13.)

(No. 518.)

Sir, *Paris, November* 12, 1911.

THE incident of the wrong information given to the Commission for Foreign and Colonial Affairs of the Chamber by M. de Selves respecting the French protest against the Spanish action at Laraiche and Alcazar, which I had the honour to report to you in my despatch No. 516 of yesterday's date, and the removal of M. Bapst from the post of political director at the Quai d'Orsay, form the subject of abundant comment in the press.

There is a tendency to blame M. de Selves as much as or more than M. Bapst for his ignorance as to the actual facts of the case.

I enclose herein an extract from a strongly worded article in the "Figaro" criticising M. de Selves. It is signed by M. Calmette, the editor of the paper.

I have, &c.

FRANCIS BERTIE.

Enclosure in No. 450.

Extract from the "Figaro" of November 12, 1911.

NE TOUCHEZ PAS AUX BUREAUX.

DE toutes les combinaisons que le Cabinet pouvait choisir pour essayer de sortir du ridicule incident de la Commission des Affaires extérieures à la suite des dépositions contradictoires de M. de Selves, la moins noble et la plus détestable a été choisis.

On a sacrifié M. Edmond Bapst, directeur des affaires politiques.

C'est la réédition de la faute déjà commise à propos de la "Joconde" : que M. de Selves me pardonne ce rapprochement.

On vole le chef-d'œuvre de Vinci, et le Gouvernement révoque M. Homolle, comme si le directeur du Louvre était responsable des gardiens recrutés par le Ministère.

M. de Selves ne connaît pas un mot des négociations de la France avec l'Espagne, négociations que le monde entier, sauf lui, commente et discute, et on frappe M. Bapst, comme si le directeur des affaires politiques était responsable du choix des Ministres.

Singuliers chirurgiens qui se réunissent pour amputer un doigt quand le mal est au cerveau.

On pourra d'ailleurs révoquer tout le personnel du Quai d'Orsay, changer, frapper tous ceux qui gravitent autour des Ministres, personne n'excusera le grand chef :

personne ne comprendra que, dans l'état de tension de nos rapports diplomatiques avec le Cabinet de Madrid, M. de Selves ne se soit pas renseigné, non pas auprès de M. Bapst, mais auprès de M. Cruppi lui-même, son prédécesseur et son collègue. Et le public, qui commence à s'affoler en voyant de pareils dossiers en de pareilles mains, se demande, avec une surprise voisine de l'indignation, de quoi peuvent donc parler nos Ministres en conseil s'ils restent ignorants de faits aussi graves pour le pays.

[45130] No. 451.

Sir F. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received November* 14.)

(No. 189.)

Sir, *Vienna, November* 11, 1911.

I HAVE the honour to submit a résumé of the comments of the principal Viennese journals on the debate which took place in the German Reichstag the day before yesterday on the Moroccan question.

The "Fremdenblatt" says the new agreement must be regarded from the point of view of an honourable and not disadvantageous settlement of the whole question. The German Chancellor set this aim before him, and if he has obtained, without disturbance of the peace, all that was obtainable, his success has been all the greater. It is, however, of greater importance to the world that an agreement should have been reached, by direct negotiation, between France and Germany in so difficult a matter, and they have rendered a great service to the cause of peace. Naturally, a compromise never gives complete satisfaction, but the Chancellor may well be content in spite of all criticisms raised against his policy.

The "Neue Freie Presse" refers particularly to the extraordinary attitude of the German Crown Prince during the debate, and the remarkable and undoubted evidence of His Imperial Highness's approval of the violent criticisms directed against the policy of the Kaiser's Minister and of the language used by Herr von Heydebrandt against England; such a thing has never before been experienced by Germany. Germany and France have now come to an understanding, and the Morocco affair is ended, but with the result that England has to reckon with a very bad feeling in Germany. The estrangement between these two appears, unfortunately, to be worse than it was before. Germany has suddenly recognised where the enemy is. "The enemy is England."

The "Zeit" believes the German Government's Morocco policy has suffered a severe defeat. When German diplomacy, after six years' struggle, gains no material advantage worth speaking of, and arrives only at an evident relapse of relations with England, the dissatisfaction of the German people is not surprising. Austrians are sorry to see how German policy, once so masterly, has fallen into weak hands; but the outspoken and uncompromising criticism now shown in Germany gives hope that her political prestige will soon recover what it has lost.

The "Neue Wiener Tagblatt" considers that the Chancellor, in his speech, destroyed the notion that the sending of the "Panther" was a surprise to the German Ambassadors in Paris and London, and to the Governments to which they are accredited. The Chancellor took great trouble to point out that no territorial acquisition in Morocco was aimed at, and he was able to show how superfluous were the British warnings and threats in regard to German intentions which never really existed.

The "Reichspost" approves the boldness with which delicate matters of German policy were debated in the Reichstag as a sign of national pride and conscious strength. The Chancellor's position must be considered as seriously weakened.

I have, &c.
FAIRFAX L. CARTWRIGHT.

[45131] No. 452.

Sir F. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received November* 14.)

(No. 190.)

Sir, *Vienna, November* 11, 1911.

WITH reference to my immediately preceding despatch on the attitude of the Austrian press towards the Morocco debate in the German Reichstag, I have the honour to append herewith translation of a telegram, dated from Berlin, which appeared in this morning's edition of the "Zeit":—

"It is a pity that so little has so far been said in the Morocco debate with regard to diplomatic relations between England and Germany in the last few months. On the English side it is always maintained that Mr. Lloyd George was perfectly justified in making his sharp and sensational speech. Your correspondent learns from the circles of the British Embassy here that the German Government omitted to inform the British Government sufficiently with regard to the dispatch of the 'Panther' to Agadir. As has been previously announced, the explanations given by Count Metternich, the German Ambassador in London, were most inadequate. The London Cabinet asked, therefore, for an explanation through its Ambassador in Berlin. A second attempt was made a fortnight later. The London Cabinet declared that, as signatory to the Algeciras Act, it was entitled to be acquainted with the intentions of Germany in Morocco. In the Berlin Foreign Office, however, silence was maintained, and England was left without a reply. An extremely bad impression was created in London by this attitude. The situation became more and more critical, and the possibility of an ultimatum to Germany was considered. The King of England and the Czar addressed letters to the Emperor William, in which it was stated that the situation was critical. Finally, the idea of an ultimatum was rejected, and Mr. Lloyd George was authorised to make his well-known speech, which, perhaps, sounded rather sharper than was intended. It was only then that Berlin decided on a reply, which was sent twenty-four hours after the speech was delivered. It was announced that Germany did not aim at the acquisition of territory in Morocco, but merely desired to negotiate with France. Thereupon the feeling in London became calmer, but in the subsequent speech of Mr. Asquith the fact was emphasised that Germany's action in sending a ship to Agadir had been undertaken with the intention of creating a new phase in her Morocco policy. The British Government was equally interested in this affair, and did not desire only to be consulted when the *fait accompli* was laid before her."

Though I do not for a moment believe that the above emanated from any British Embassy circles, it shows traces of coming from some authoritative source, and I therefore venture to trouble you with it as being the first attempt that has been made in the Austrian press to explain the situation existing between England and Germany before the conclusion of the Morocco Agreement in a sense more or less exculpating the policy of His Majesty's Government. It will very likely lead to further correspondence.

I have, &c.
FAIRFAX L. CARTWRIGHT.

[45121] No. 453.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received November* 14.)

(No. 519.)

Sir, *Paris, November* 12, 1911.

THE "Matin" continues to represent the extreme claim of France to obtain compensation from Spain in the north-west of Morocco.

I have the honour to transmit to you herewith an article on the subject in that paper in which the continued occupation of Alcazar and Larache by Spain is declared to be impossible. France, the article says, cannot consent, after all her sacrifices, to leave "la tête du pays" in the hands of Spain.

The "Matin" points out the objections to two protectorates existing side by side in Morocco, and suggests that Spain should be allowed to annex outright the Riff region, including Tetuan and Ifni.

It declares that its view is that of the majority of people in France, including parliamentary and diplomatic circles.

There is reason to believe that the "Matin" is directly inspired by the President of the Council.

I have, &c.
FRANCIS BERTIE.

Enclosure in No. 453.

Extract from the "Matin" of November 12, 1911.

L'ENTENTE AVEC LES ESPAGNOLS : COMMENT ELLE EST POSSIBLE.

NOUS avons exposé avant-hier pourquoi le traité franco-espagnol de 1904, même si l'Espagne avait tenu ses engagements, était inapplicable aujourd'hui.

L'obstacle à l'exécution de la convention réside dans ce fait : il est impossible d'avoir deux protectorats dans le même pays, deux résidents généraux auprès du Sultan.

Il y a un autre obstacle : même si, au lieu d'établir un protectorat, l'Espagne et la France annexaient purement et simplement leur part du Maroc, la présence des Espagnols à Larache et à El Ksar causerait inévitablement des conflits, malgré toute la bonne volonté des deux Gouvernements.

La partie du Maroc comprise entre Larache et El Ksar doit naturellement être sous l'influence de la Puissance qui sera la Puissance dominante à Fez, la capitale, la Puissance qui aura à administrer les neuf dixièmes du Maroc.

Toute autre solution que celle-là est impossible.

Tel est le sentiment de la majorité de l'opinion publique française, tel est l'avis qui prédomine dans les milieux parlementaires, telle est l'opinion que nous avons recueillie dans les milieux diplomatiques à Paris.

Nous avons pu nous entretenir ces jours-ci avec plusieurs membres du corps diplomatique, et tous nous ont tenu ce raisonnement :—

"Il est clair que la France, après toutes les difficultés qu'elle a dû surmonter pour obtenir le protectorat sur le Maroc, ne peut pas laisser à l'Espagne la tête du pays ; mais que la France soit généreuse envers l'Espagne, qu'elle la récompense d'une façon large pour son départ d'El Kasr et de Larache."

Nous croyons que cette opinion prévaut dans les milieux gouvernementaux à Paris.

Les négociations avec l'Espagne ne sont possibles que sur cette base : renonciation par l'Espagne à ses droits, réels ou prétendus, sur la région comprise entre El Kasr et Larache ; annexion pure et simple, par l'Espagne, de la région du Rif, y compris Tétouan, et d'Ifni.

Les Espagnols seraient alors seuls maîtres dans ces deux régions, et l'entente avec la France serait féconde et durable. Mais si le Gouvernement de Madrid veut, coûte que coûte, rester à El Ksar et à Larache, toutes négociations seront inutiles et superflues. Dans ce cas, établissons notre protectorat sans l'adhésion de l'Espagne, et que les Espagnols restent où ils sont.

Mais s'ils y restent, il est certain que des différends graves s'élèveront inévitablement.

[45122] No. 454.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 14.)

(No. 521.)

Sir, *Paris, November* 13, 1911.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 518 of yesterday's date respecting the incident of the wrong information given by M. de Selves to the Parliamentary Commission for Foreign and Colonial Affairs and the removal of M. Bapst from his post of political director at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, I have the honour to inform you that the "Temps" published an article last night accusing M. Maurice Herbette, "chef du Cabinet" to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, of usurping functions at the Quai d'Orsay in such a manner as to prevent M. Bapst from being fully and accurately informed. The Moroccan affairs especially were, according to this account, dealt with by M. Herbette and M. Regnault, French Minister at Tangier, without passing through the hands of M. Bapst. The "Temps" also declared that M. Jules Cambon had complained that modifications had been introduced in the instructions to him in the course of the Franco-German negotiations by M. Herbette after these instructions had been settled at Ministerial conferences at which M. Jules Cambon had been present. Other charges of a minor nature were also brought against M. Herbette by the "Temps."

A communiqué from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs has appeared in the press this morning to the effect that M. Herbette denies the allegations made by the "Temps," and has requested M. de Selves to institute an enquiry to prove that this denial is true.

The Havas Agency also publishes a reply from M. Herbette, in which he refutes point by point the charges made by the "Temps."

The reactionary and opposition papers avail themselves of this new incident to emphasise the point that the departments of State are in a condition of disorder, and to renew their attacks on the methods of administration under the republic.

(Confidential.)

There has existed for some time past, especially since the discovery of the Maimon scandal (reported in my despatch No. 153, Secret, of the 6th April last), a personal animosity between M. Herbette and M. Tardieu, foreign editor of the "Temps." The attacks now made in that paper on the former are doubtless written by the latter, and are in the nature of vengeance for M. Herbette's proceedings in the past.

There appears to be some foundation of truth in the statement made by the "Temps" that Moroccan affairs have been dealt with by MM. Herbette and Regnault to the exclusion of M. Bapst. M. Regnault has been on leave in Paris for a considerable time, and is understood to have been largely instrumental in inspiring the developments of French policy in Morocco.

I have, &c.
FRANCIS BERTIE.

[45365] No. 455.

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 14.)

(No. 91. Confidential.)

(Telegraphic.) P. *Madrid, November* 14, 1911.

THE Spanish Government has received from the French chargé d'affaires an official note asking for the grant to the Government of Morocco of facilities for the coaling at a Spanish port of three small coastguard vessels, purchased by the Makhzen, on their way to Tangier. The usual custom of a communication addressed to the Spanish Minister at Tangier by the Sultan's representatives would in the opinion of the Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs have been the correct course, and he considers that France is acting prematurely in exercising her protectorate before the Powers have recognised it, and his reply will probably be to that effect.

[43587] No. 456.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 475. Confidential.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, November* 14, 1911.

ON receipt of your Excellency's despatch No. 422 of the 28th September, which I read with great interest, I immediately requested the Admiralty and the War Office to furnish me with their views as to the advisability of His Majesty's Government obtaining an assurance from the French Government that no part of the Moroccan coast should ever be fortified.

Both these departments have now informed me that they consider that it would be advantageous for His Majesty's Government to secure, if possible, such an assurance from the French Government.

I have meanwhile received from the French Minister at this Court a copy of the recently concluded Franco-German convention. In transmitting this document, M. Daeschner stated that the French Government would be glad to receive at an early date a notification of the adherence to it of His Majesty's Government.

As your Excellency is aware, His Majesty's Government are bound by their treaty engagements not to refuse their assent to the establishment of a French protectorate in Morocco, and not to attach to such assent any conditions involving fresh engagements on the part of the French Government.

That a request for an assurance as regards the neutralisation of the whole of the

Moroccan coast-line would be so regarded by the French Government is shown by the history of the 1904 negotiations between Great Britain and France.

After careful consideration of the opinions of the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty and of the Army Council, I have come to the conclusion that, in view of all the circumstances, it would not be politic to attach such a condition to the adherence of His Majesty's Government to the convention.

In acquainting the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty and the Army Council with this decision, I have informed them that I will endeavour to give effect to their wishes, should a suitable opportunity occur during the course of any future negotiations with the French Government.

I have thought it desirable, in reply to M. Daeschner's communication, to inform the French Government that the adherence of His Majesty's Government to the declaration is given subject to the understanding that the provisions of articles 4 and 7 of the Anglo-French declaration of 1904 are in no way affected by the present convention, that British subjects in Morocco will receive no less favourable treatment than that accorded to the subjects of any other Power, and that definite arrangements will be made for the internationalisation of the town of Tangier.

Your Excellency will note that His Majesty's Government are putting forward no new demands, but are merely putting on record what I believe to be the avowed policy of the French Government.

A copy of M. Daeschner's note and my reply are enclosed herewith, for your Excellency's information.*

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[43587] No. 457.

Sir A. Nicolson to M. Daeschner.

My dear Minister, *Foreign Office, November* 14, 1911.

A NOTE is being sent to you to-day announcing that, subject to certain observations, His Majesty's Government have much pleasure in giving their adherence to the recently concluded Franco-German convention with regard to Morocco.

We shall delay our reply to the German Government, who have also communicated to us the text of the convention, till we receive the answer of your Government to our note, and we should therefore be grateful if they were able to give it early consideration and to let us have their views as soon as may be convenient.

I have, &c.
A. NICOLSON.

[43587] No. 458.

Sir Edward Grey to M. Daeschner.

Sir, *Foreign Office, November* 14, 1911.

IT was with much satisfaction that His Majesty's Government learnt of the definite conclusion of the negotiations which have been proceeding between the French and German Governments on the subject of Morocco.

His Majesty's Government have, as you are aware, in no way endeavoured to influence the course of these negotiations, as they felt assured that the French Government would not set their hand to any agreement under which the legitimate and acknowledged interests of Great Britain in Morocco would be unfavourably affected.

You were good enough to transmit to me in your note of the 3rd instant a copy of the convention which has now been signed between the French and German Governments, and at the same time you informed me that the French Government would be glad to receive at an early date a notification of the adherence to it of His Majesty's Government.

His Majesty's Government have given their careful consideration to the articles of the convention, and in doing so they have assumed that the engagements taken by the French Government towards His Majesty's Government as regards Morocco under

* Nos. 415 and 458.

articles 4 and 7 of the Anglo-French Declaration of 1904 will not in any way be affected by the present agreement.

His Majesty's Government note that in the articles of the present agreement renewed provision is made for the economic equality in Morocco of the subjects of all Powers. They observe, however, that under article I the German Government gives its assent to such measures of reorganisation of control and of financial guarantees as the French Government may, in agreement with the Moorish Government, think fit to take, provided that the action of the French Government safeguards in Morocco economic equality between the *two* nations.

His Majesty's Government presume it is not intended by the use of these words to establish in favour of German nationals any superior claim to equality of treatment than is, under existing conditions, enjoyed by the subjects of all the Powers, as such a construction would conflict with the general spirit of the agreement itself, and they understand that British subjects will continue to receive in Morocco as favourable economic treatment as those of any other State.

In view of the freedom of action now conceded to France under the new Franco-German Convention, His Majesty's Government take this opportunity to remind the French Government of the importance attached by both of them equally to the preservation of the exceptional character which the town of Tangier derives from the presence of the diplomatic body and from its municipal and sanitary institutions. His Majesty's Government feel confident that the French Government will accordingly concur in adequate arrangements being made for placing the town and municipal district of Tangier definitely under international control.

Subject to the above observations and in the belief that they are in harmony with the views and intentions of the French Government, His Majesty's Government have much pleasure in giving their adherence to the Franco-German Convention.

I have, &c.
E. GREY.

[43587] No. 459.

Sir Edward Grey to M. Daeschner.

Sir, *Foreign Office, November* 14, 1911.

IN the note which I had the honour to address to you to-day I informed you that, subject to certain observations, His Majesty's Government had much pleasure in giving their adherence to the recently concluded Franco-German convention with regard to Morocco.

His Majesty's Government have not yet received the text of the notes relevant to the convention which they understood have been exchanged between the French and German Governments.

The notification of their adherence is, in these circumstances, necessarily limited to the actual convention, the text of which you were good enough to enclose in your note of the 3rd instant.

I have, &c.
E. GREY.

[43587] No. 460.

*Foreign Office to Admiralty.**

(Confidential.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, November* 14, 1911.

IN your letter of the 3rd instant you informed me that the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty considered it desirable that a formal undertaking should, if possible, be obtained from the French Government that no part of the Atlantic coast of Morocco south of the Sebou River should ever be fortified.

Sir Edward Grey has now received from the French Minister at this Court a copy of the recently concluded Franco-German convention, and the French Government have intimated through him that they would be glad to receive at an early date a notification of adherence to it on the part of His Majesty's Government.

* Also to War Office, *mutatis mutandis.*

On receipt of this communication the question arose as to whether the assent of His Majesty's Government to the convention should be made conditional on the obtaining of an assurance from the French Government as to the non-fortification of any part of the Moroccan coast.

Careful and full consideration was given to the observations put forward on this subject by the Lords Commissioners and by the Army Council, but, in view of all the circumstances of the case, Sir Edward Grey decided that it would not be politic to attach such a condition to the adherence of His Majesty's Government to the convention.

What has chiefly weighed with him in arriving at this conclusion is that His Majesty's Government are bound by their treaty engagements not to refuse their assent to the establishment of a French protectorate in Morocco, and not to attach to such assent any conditions involving engagements on the part of the French Government additional to those embodied in the Anglo-French declaration of 1904.

That a request for an assurance as regards the non-fortification of the whole of the Moroccan coast-line would be so regarded by the French Government is shown by the fact that, at the time of the negotiations which led to the conclusion of that declaration, His Majesty's Government endeavoured to obtain from the French Government the assurance in question, but were unable to secure their assent, and ultimately desisted from pressing the point.

His Majesty's Government obtained, however, from the French Government the engagement recorded in article 7 of the declaration of 1904 (see my letter of 6th October), and Sir E. Grey has now informed the French Government that he would be glad to receive an assurance that this article is in no way affected by the present Franco-German convention.

Although Sir E. Grey does not see his way to put forward the request for the non-fortification of the whole of the Moorish coast in connection with the present agreement, he will not fail to bear in mind the wishes of the Lords Commissioners on this point, and he will endeavour to give effect to them should a suitable opportunity occur during the course of any future negotiations with the French Government.

I am, &c.
W. LANGLEY.

[45377] No. 461.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 15.)

(No. 522.)
Sir, *Paris, November 14, 1911.*

I HAD the honour to report to you by my despatch No. 515 of the 11th instant the indiscriminate publication in the French press of secret agreements concerning Morocco. I stated that the public were left without any indication as to how these agreements had found their way into the hands of journalists.

The "Journal des Débats" of to-day's date protests against such publication in the following words:—

"Au cours de la crise franco-allemande, tout le monde a pu remarquer que les pièces réputées les plus confidentielles étaient livrées morceau par morceau tantôt à un journal, tantôt à un autre. Les indiscrétions ne venaient point du Quai d'Orsay. Hier matin encore, "l'Action" publiait le texte de la convention spéciale sur la prise en bail par la France des enclaves sur la Bénoué prévues par la convention du 4 novembre. Le document n'avait pas été communiqué par le Quai d'Orsay. Comment se fait-il qu'un journal en ait reçu le texte? De qui l'a-t-il reçu? Les journaux sont dans leurs rôles en profitant des complaisances des Ministres, mais les Ministres sont inexcusables de détourner un document dont la publication a un intérêt général, national, pour en confier la publication à un journal ami. De deux choses, l'une: ou le document doit être tenu secret et sa communication est un abus de confiance, c'est-à-dire un crime prévu et réprimé par les lois; ou bien il est destiné à être publié, et il doit l'être officiellement par les moyens ordinaires."

The "Journal des Débats" adds that such indiscretions as it alludes to create in the realm of foreign affairs an intolerable situation calculated to compromise the vital interests of the country.

If it be true, as the "Journal des Débats" suggests, that the indiscretions are to

be laid to the door, not of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, but of Ministers at the head of other departments, they are all the more reprehensible from the fact that the consent of the other party signatory of the secret agreement thus published cannot have been previously obtained.

I have the honour to transmit to you herewith an extract from the "Action" containing the text of the convention concerning the enclaves on the Benue River.*

I have, &c.
FRANCIS BERTIE.

[45365] No. 462.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen.

(No. 97.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, November 15, 1911.*

YOUR telegram No. 91 of 14th November.

The proper procedure would undoubtedly have been that the request should have been addressed through the Spanish representative at Tangier. But, unless the Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs has already replied, you might suggest to him that the Spanish Government might point out the irregularity of the procedure, but agree on this occasion to request on condition that it should not be cited as a precedent, and that any future requests from the Moorish Government should be communicated through the Spanish representative in Morocco till France and Spain have settled their negotiations

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[44434] No. 463.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 476.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, November 15, 1911.*

THE French Minister called at the Foreign Office on the 8th instant and stated that on several occasions the French Government had, as His Majesty's Government were aware, refused to agree to the Spanish proposal to publish the secret Franco-Spanish Agreement respecting Morocco of 1904. The French Government had feared that publication of the agreement might compromise their negotiations with Germany, but now that these negotiations were concluded, the objection held good no longer. Moreover, the existence of the secret agreement seemed to be pretty generally known.

The French Government in these circumstances intended to give the document to the commission of the Chamber which deals with foreign affairs, and M. Daeschner enquired whether His Majesty's Government had any remarks to make or objections to offer to this course, which implied publication of the agreement in the press.

M. Daeschner was informed that His Majesty's Government had no objection.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[45540] No. 464.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 16.)

(No. 377.)
Sir, *Berlin, November 13, 1911.*

IN continuance of my despatch No. 373 of the 10th instant, I have the honour to continue the analysis of the speeches made by leading politicians in the Reichstag debate on the Franco-German arrangement.

Herr von Heydebrand's violent speech was followed by a very long and rather depressing one from the Socialist leader, Herr Bebel. Like nearly all the other speeches delivered, it was more an electioneering address and a manifesto against war than a speech upon an important arrangement with a foreign country. A subsequent speaker said that the only person who had supported the arrangement was Herr Bebel, but I can find little trace of that support in his speech, except that he gave his opinion that

* Not printed.

any pacific arrangement was preferable to war. He deprecated the prevailing idea that Socialists opposed everything, and reminded the House that they had saved the Russian commercial treaty for the Government, and had done so because it was an instrument of public utility. But the arrangement by which Germany had practically handed over to France a country over which she had no rights, and the integrity of which the Emperor had formerly promised to defend, was in a very different category, and was on a par with Italy's piratical attack upon Tripoli. He then described the gradual change which had come over their Morocco policy since the Emperor's visit to Tangier, a change which had culminated in the announcement, made in the early part of this year, that the maintenance of the integrity of the Shereefian Empire was an impossibility, and that a portion of it must fall to Germany's share. Then came Agadir, general jubilation, and subsequently resentment at England's interference. He himself could not see how England could have acted differently, as both in her view and in the view of a considerable portion of the German public, an important change in the balance and distribution of naval strength was contemplated. In any case, there was a feeling in the air at that time that the dispatch of a ship to Agadir was a preliminary step to the acquisition of territory in Morocco. War was talked of freely, and when the Emperor put his foot down at Swinemünde, and said that he would not hear of a war on the Morocco question, he was attacked by the Pan-German press in a manner which would have cost Social Democratic editors, had they so written, years of imprisonment.

He also alluded to the statements in the press to the effect that the Secretary of State had called together a large meeting of political leaders and journalists, and caused them to be informed that the dispatch of a ship to Agadir had no other meaning than that a territorial footing in Morocco was to be secured. Herr Bebel gave a sort of negative defence of the arrangement, by pointing out that it was of very little advantage to France, and that it would be a drag on French policy rather than otherwise. It was nonsense to talk of the 60,000 African soldiers who were to reinforce the French Army.

On the contrary, France would have to send 60,000 French soldiers to keep the Morocco tribes in order. As regards the Congo arrangement, he said that it was unnecessary for him to waste any words upon it. Its condemnation was to be found in the action and words of Herr von Lindequist, than whom no greater expert in colonial affairs existed in Germany. In a tremendous peroration he fell on the Conservatives and Pan-Germans, predicted increase of armaments on all sides, resulting in war and national bankruptcy.

Herr Bebel was followed by Herr Bassermann, the National Liberal leader.

He complained of the lack of material supplied by the Government for the debate, and said for that reason he would support the resolution that the arrangement should be referred to the budget committee. He defended Prince Bülow's policy, and said that the reason it had not met with the success it merited was that the French had violated the Act of Algeciras. It was French action which had placed the Morocco question on a fresh basis, and which prepared the public mind for a radical change from Prince Bülow's peaceful policy. It was owing to that anticipated change which, under the circumstances, was welcomed by public opinion, that the despatch of the "Panther" to Agadir had caused such excitement and such hopes. Then came the speeches of British Ministers, and the jubilation of the public gave place to a feeling of intense resentment at England's interference and her cry of "hands off."

His following remarks seem to have been prompted by the suspicion that the original idea of the Government in sending a ship to Agadir had actually been to effect a footing in Southern Morocco. He is not clear on the subject, but this was what he said:—

"England's interference would seem to be utterly inexplicable except under the supposition that it was our intention to occupy Moorish territory. All the outbursts in the English press were grounded on that idea. Now, what are the real facts of the case? Were we certain that in sending a ship to Agadir we had the assent of the British Government, as asserted by our Ambassador in London?—or were we completely taken by surprise by the ill-temper shown in England when the 'Panther' arrived at her destination?—the only thing which is certain is that our people expected great things from the dispatch of the 'Panther,' and that when the news came out that she had only gone to Agadir temporarily to look after the lives and property of shadowy German subjects, and that the German Government were seeking compensation, not in Morocco, but in the Congo, a storm of indignation and disgust swept through the whole country."

He then also asked the Foreign Secretary whether it was true that at a meeting of politicians and journalists encouragement had been given by his department to the idea of a German sphere of interest in Morocco.

As regards the arrangement itself, he said that his party objected to it strongly. France got a province, and in that province German interests were not sufficiently guarded. "Without political influence commercial interests could not be maintained." And it was that influence which Germany had given up. In his opinion, as regards the Congo compensations, he like Herr Bebel, referred the House to the action of Herr von Lindequist.

Returning to the subject of Agadir, he said that the dispatch of the "Panther" was from every point of view a huge mistake. If it had never been the idea of the Government either to occupy Moorish territory or to defend the integrity of the Shereefian Empire, then it was a useless proceeding, and one, as it turned out, not at all favourable to German policy. If the ship was sent as a warning to France that Germany would not suffer her to turn a deaf ear to German remonstrances, that was also an error, as there were other and better ways of making a demonstration against France, ways which, while more efficacious, would not have brought England on to their backs.

He did not agree with the Chancellor that the arrangement would put a stop to all friction between the two Governments, and considered that its effect would be equally disappointing with that of the Potsdam agreement. Personally he thought that friction would be increased by the arrangement, and in any case it would require more than such an arrangement to wipe out the memory of Alsace and Lorraine.

He then said that the warlike feeling of the last few months had directed general attention to the German army and navy. He and his political friends felt sure that both services were in a condition to meet any serious situation. But they wished to take this opportunity of expressing the hope that if there should be any deficiencies in the army and the navy they would be promptly made good. He said this especially of the navy, about which remarks had been made, and his party hoped that those in authority would have both the will and the courage to do what was necessary, without any thought for the impression which an increase of German naval strength might make abroad.

His peroration reminds one of something one has heard before, and was as follows:—

"The last months have caused us many sad reflections; but the fact remains that throughout Germany a strong national feeling, a readiness for war if necessary, has been brought to light, which shows that every German is prepared to give up his life for the sake of the Fatherland. Foreigners may be certain that if any attempt is made to trample our national honour under foot they will find a united Germany ready for its defence."

I should mention that the Chancellor was evidently excessively annoyed at the continued references to Sir F. Cartwright in connection with the "Neue Freie Presse" article, after he had said that the matter must be regarded as closed, and his Excellency instructed Herr von Kiderlen-Waechter to say a few words to the House on the subject. Herr von Kiderlen rose and repeated the Chancellor's previous remarks, adding that international courtesy, if nothing else, demanded that credence should be attached to the statements of foreign Governments.

That did not, however, prevent the next speaker, Herr Wiemer, leader of the Progressive National party, from again referring to the alleged "interview," and observing that neither that matter nor the communications with the British Government before and after the despatch of the "Panther" had been adequately cleared up by either the Chancellor or the Secretary of State. Herr Wiemer's speech was on the whole moderate. As regards England he said that as an advocate of friendly relations between the two countries, he had regretted Mr. Lloyd George's speech, but still more the effect it had produced. He had no objection to the statement that England must maintain at all costs her position and her prestige among the nations, but England must also recognise that other nations had the right to do the same. He criticised Heydebrand severely for his chauvinistic and bellicose language, and said that it had been most inopportune, coming, as it did, just after the friendly words which had been spoken in England by leading politicians and men of influence. It was equalled in irresponsible tactlessness by M. Bassermann's proposal to increase the German navy just after the British First Lord had expressed the hope that the British Naval Estimates might next year be reduced, or at all events not increased.

He reminded Herr Bassermann that to any increase in German naval construction, Great Britain could and would have only one answer.

As regards the Franco-German arrangement, he said that he could not agree with the Chancellor's statement to the effect that the great thing was that Germany and France had been able to come to an agreement at all on such a delicate question, and observed that it would have been a greater thing if Germany had got what she wanted, and not given France the lion share of the advantages exchanged. The arrangement might on the whole be considered fairly satisfactory, and he bore France no grudge for getting the best of it. Everything, however, would depend upon whether the latter Power kept her engagements.

Herr Wiemer also complained of the German diplomatic service, and of the class from which it was recruited; but his severest language was reserved for the manner in which the Crown Prince had chosen to display his chauvinistic tendencies in a serious assembly, and during a debate on a peaceful arrangement.

Herr Schultz, the Vice-President of the Reichstag, then made a short and moderate speech upon the advantages and disadvantages of the Franco-German arrangement. Of those who took part in the debate he was one of the very few speakers who kept to the point under discussion, and avoided reference either to Mr. Lloyd George or Sir F. Cartwright.

The Chancellor then rose and addressed the House for the second time, in the speech of which I had the honour to transmit a translation in my despatch No. 374 of the 11th instant.

After his Excellency had raised the House to a great state of excitement by the violence with which he had reproved Herr von Heydebrand, there were a few more speeches made, but they were of no special interest from an international point of view, and, as a matter of fact, the Chancellor had given the House something else to think of than arguments for or against a treaty which, as far as Germany was concerned, was an accomplished fact, and which had already been under discussion for three days.

I must mention, however, that before the close of the day's session Herr Bassermann explained that he had not advocated any increase in the German naval programme, he had only said that if, as some people averred, there were deficiencies they ought to be at once made good. That was a very different thing.

Herr von Kiderlen made no speech during the debate, but he gave one or two sharp answers which amused the House. In reply to the charge brought by Herr Bassermann and Herr Wiemer that German diplomats were ill-informed, his Excellency said:—

"I must say a word in defence of our representatives abroad. It has been stated in the press and also just now in the Reichstag that they are ill-informed. This statement is devoid of all foundation, and those who make it have no knowledge of the subject and have been misinformed. It is a most remarkable thing that those who repeat this fiction that our diplomatists are worth nothing, get their information, and regard it as gospel, from young gentlemen who after a short period of service left our diplomatic service, well!—not exactly because they were well-informed!"

With regard to the question asked by Herr Bassermann and others as to whether it was true that at a meeting of politicians and journalists the Imperial Foreign Office had authorised or made a statement to the effect that the dispatch of the "Panther" to Agadir meant that Germany intended to have a foothold in Morocco and nothing else, Herr von Kiderlen replied that it was true that fifty or sixty people had met together and decided upon the annexation of Morocco. He had caused them to be informed that if they wished to annex Morocco, they must do it themselves as the Government would not stand behind them.

Herr von Kiderlen protested strongly against the language of Herr Bebel and others, who had described the "Tripoli" campaign as an act of piracy. He said that they might all regret that the war had taken place, but that it was not for Italy's allies to cast aspersions on Italian action. He must protest in the name of the Government against such language respecting an allied nation being used in the Reichstag.

On the conclusion of the debate it was unanimously resolved to refer the conventions to the Budget Commission of the Reichstag.

I have, &c.
W. E. GOSCHEN.

[45544] No. 465.

Sir F. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received November* 16.)

(No 191.)
Sir, *Vienna, November* 13, 1911.

IN continuation of my despatch No. 189 of the 11th instant, I have the honour to report that an interesting leading article, under which stands the well known *nom de plume* "Austriacus," appears in this morning's edition of the "Wiener Sonn- und Montags-Zeitung," on the subject of German policy and the Morocco agreement.

The writer is evidently much disturbed by the dangers to the peace of Europe which he sees in the present agitation in Germany against the Morocco agreement, and particularly in the violent and warlike attitude of the Conservatives evinced in the recent debate in the Reichstag and the extraordinary signs of approval on the part of the Crown Prince. He says a breach has been made in the wall of diplomatic secrecy, and the outlook for international policy as now opened to the world is not a pleasant one. The leader of the Conservatives in the Reichstag seems prepared to let Germany embark on warlike adventures, and the Crown Prince seems to give his approval. It is this attitude which troubles and astonishes Austria, and indeed the whole of Europe. For the highest merit of the Triple Alliance has been that it is a peace alliance, concluded and subsequently renewed for the purpose of protecting European peace. This was Bismarck's and Andrassy's aim in joining hands, and this was the object of the inclusion of Italy. Austria never made this alliance with a bellicose Germany. The latter owes much to the alliance. Have its traditions now lost their force? Reading the Chancellor's words, which bear the mark of the Kaiser's approval, one would say, no; but reading the warlike speeches in the Reichstag, adorned by the ostentatious approval of the Crown Prince, one hardly dares to say no. It is the Pan-German press which is exciting these warlike sentiments, supported by some Court influences and by the German "Gross-Industrie." They point to England, moreover, as "the enemy." Now, the German Chancellor has declared that England never interfered to disturb the negotiations between Germany and France, but this does not appear to be believed. The uncertainty as to the real relations between the two Powers is the bad result of the by no means unobjectionable manner in which German official policy conducted the Morocco affair and of the sending of the "Panther" to Agadir. The severe remarks of English statesmen arose out of the misunderstanding of German intentions, which deceived them and apparently deceived also the German people. The mass of that people as well as their Kaiser desire peace. Austria is true to her ally and will support her in any war for the defence of her national honour, but not in a war for the satisfaction of pan-German ambitions.

I may mention that the newspaper in which the above article appears is a Jewish organ, occasionally inspired by official circles; and I understand that the Jewish world in Austria is greatly perturbed by the signs of a warlike feeling among pan-Germans.

I have, &c.
(For His Majesty's Ambassador),
THEO RUSSELL.

[45541] No. 466.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received November* 16.)

(No. 379.)
Sir, *Berlin, November* 14, 1911.

A TELEGRAM has been issued to the press by Wolff's Bureau, dated from Paris, stating that an agreement has been signed between the Morocco Mining Syndicate (Mannesmann) and the French Union des Mines for the fusion of their commercial interests in Morocco on a basis of equality, and that this agreement will cover all the mining rights and claims belonging to the two companies. The Mannesmann Brothers and the Union des Mines will each participate in the new company to the extent of 40 per cent. The remaining 20 per cent. will be taken over by French banks. By a special agreement German consumers are guaranteed a prior right to 40 per cent. of the iron ore extracted.

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs announced the conclusion of this agreement to the Budget Commission of the Reichstag to-day in the course of a sitting devoted to the discussion of the Franco-German conventions.

I have, &c.
W. E. GOSCHEN.

[45675] No. 467.

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 16.)

(No. 92.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Madrid, November 16, 1911.*

YOUR telegram No. 97 of 15th November: Coast-guard vessels for Moorish Government.

Spanish Government have replied to French note that Spanish Ambassador in Paris or Spanish representative at Tangier are instructed to settle the matter directly with new Grand Vizier and with Sultan's representative at Tangier.

(Sent to Paris and Tangier.)

[45683] No. 468.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 17.)

(No. 528.)
Sir, *Paris, November 15, 1911.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith a leading article from the "Temps" entitled "La Route de Tanger à Fez," in which this paper emphasises again in the strongest manner the absolute necessity for France to have complete territorial control of this route to Fez.

The "Temps" argues that by the recent Franco-German agreement no railway can be built before the Tangier–Fez line, although the Oudja–Fez and Casa Blanca–Fez lines could be simultaneously constructed. It then proceeds to point out that the Tangier–Fez railway is impossible if the Spaniards are to have territory across its line, or to be associated in its control, for disputes would continually arise.

The "Temps" comments on the exceptional position of Tangier, on its admirable geographical situation, and on its being the "Mediterranean door of Morocco" and the natural link with France. Tangier, it says, is a natural port, well situated at the end of a half-closed bay, protected against the influence of tempests and capable of being completely equipped at the cost of less than 20,000,000 fr. (800,000*l.*) Were it not for the agreements with Spain and England dealing with its international character, Morocco ought to be governed from Tangier rather than from Fez.

The end of the article in the "Temps" is a summons to England to support France against Spain in this matter. It quotes and praises a recent article in the "Standard" advocating the French view of the question at issue between France and Spain, and expresses the hope that the *entente* between France and England will be "égale à sa tâche et consciente de son rôle."

The imperative necessity for France to obtain control of the route from Tangier to Fez is mentioned in various French papers and undoubtedly reflects the views largely held in certain responsible quarters.

I have, &c.
FRANCIS BERTIE.

Enclosure in No. 468.

Extract from the "Temps" of November 16, 1911.

LA ROUTE DE TANGER À FEZ.

LE "Temps" a montré hier sommairement, après avoir rappelé les raisons de droit qui autorisent et même qui exigent une revision équitable du traité franco-espagnol de 1904, les raisons de fait qui indiquent dans quel sens cette revision doit être poursuivie. Il convient de revenir sur cette démonstration.

Nous l'avons dit et nous le répétons, la France, appelée à organiser, et à organiser de Fez, le protectorat du Maroc, doit disposer pour cela des moyens nécessaires, et d'abord de la liberté complète des communications entre Fez d'une part, l'Algérie, Tanger et Casablanca d'autre part. De ces trois routes, la dernière est en nos mains depuis l'expédition du Général Moinier. La première n'est pas encore ouverte, mais elle peut l'être rapidement, comme l'a déclaré, dès avril dernier, le Général Lyautey à feu M. Berteaux, si l'on emploie les méthodes de politique indigène appliquées depuis sept ans aux confins algéro-marocains. La seconde au contraire, la route de Tanger à Fez, nous échappe pour un tiers de son parcours, et l'occupation espagnole de Larache et d'El Ksar coupe la capitale chérifienne de son port méditerranéen.

Or, par l'accord franco-allemand, la France s'est engagée à ne construire aucun chemin de fer avant celui de Fez à Tanger. Elle peut construire simultanément les trois voies ferrées Fez–Oudjda, Fez–Casablanca, Fez–Tanger. Mais si elle ne construit pas la troisième, elle n'a pas le droit de construire les deux autres. Il est donc de toute nécessité que nous puissions construire le Fez–Tanger. Or, nous ne le pourrons pas tant que la zone espagnole restera ce qu'elle est. Car après les incidents des derniers mois, on ne saurait douter de l'impossibilité qu'il y aurait soit à faire passer dans la zone espagnole un chemin de fer français soit à créer un chemin de fer mi-français mi-espagnol. L'une ou l'autre de ces combinaisons serait le principe de conflits certains. La France et l'Espagne, désireuses de les éviter, doivent trouver une autre formule.

L'engagement pris par le Gouvernement français à l'égard du Gouvernement allemand n'est point d'ailleurs la seule raison qui nous oblige à nous assurer la liberté complète, absolue, territoriale de la route Tanger–Fez. Même si cet engagement ne faisait pas de l'ouverture de cette route la condition nécessaire de l'ouverture de toutes les autres, elle aurait, par sa valeur propre, une importance qui nous dicterait la même attitude. Tanger est dans une situation géographique admirable, à l'intersection de deux grandes routes maritimes. C'est la porte méditerranéenne du Maroc, son trait d'union naturel avec la France, un port naturel, bien situé au fond d'une baie à demi fermée, protégé contre la houle et qu'on pourrait aménager complètement pour moins de 20 millions. Si les accords franco-anglais et franco-espagnols n'en avaient fait une ville internationale, c'est de Tanger, plutôt que de Fez, que le Maroc eût dû être gouverné.

Puisque la question est tranchée et que Fez s'impose comme capitale, il faut se rappeler du moins que Tanger est le port normal de Fez. Casablanca est appelé à un très bel avenir et il faut sans retard y commencer les travaux nécessaires. Mais le grand rôle auquel ce port aspire légitimement n'est pas le même que celui de Tanger. Rien n'est plus vain que d'opposer l'un à l'autre les deux ports. Leurs fonctions sont distinctes. Ils ne peuvent ni se supplanter, ni même se concurrencer. Casablanca sera le débouché de la Chaouïa et de tout le versant atlantique, c'est-à-dire un port de trafic local. Tanger sera le point de contact et de l'Europe et de l'Afrique—la tête de ligne des voies ferrées qui plus tard rejoindront l'Afrique française du nord à l'Afrique occidentale, mettant le nouveau monde, par Dakar et Pernambuco, à soixante heures de mer de l'ancien.

Donc tous les arguments concordent et il faut qu'au plus tôt—en même temps qu'elle reliera à Fez Casablanca et l'Algérie—la France construise le chemin de fer Fez–Tanger. Ne pas le construire, c'est, par suite du traité franco-allemand, nous interdire de construire les deux autres. C'est aussi rendre irréalisable la tâche qui s'impose à nous d'administrer de Fez le Maroc. Dans ces conditions, juridiquement qualifiés pour demander à l'Espagne une revision du traité de 1904, nous sommes en fait obligés de l'obtenir, afin que nous ayons libre, absolument libre, matériellement et moralement, la voie dont l'ouverture est à tant de titres urgente. Pour avoir cette liberté, il faut de toute nécessité que la France prépare, d'accord avec l'Espagne, une rectification de la frontière des deux zones.

On a lu l'intéressante interview d'un diplomate espagnol publiée par la "Correspondencia de España," et que le "Temps" a reproduite. Tout le monde à Madrid sait que l'auteur de ces déclarations est M. González Hontoria, ancien chef de cabinet, et depuis quelques semaines Sous-Secrétaire d'État de M. Garcia Prieto. Personne à Paris n'a perdu le souvenir de l'activité, de l'intelligence et da l'ingéniosité de M. Hontoria, qui fut secrétaire de l'Ambassade d'Espagne sous M. de León y Castillo, et joua ensuite à Algésiras un rôle remarqué. On a noté avec regret au cours de l'été que son action s'est rarement exercée dans le sens de l'apaisement. Nous enregistrons d'autant plus volontiers la conclusion de son interview, où nous lisons que l'Espagne serait "disposée à examiner toutes les propositions françaises dans un esprit de

bienveillance et de conciliation." Il ne reste qu'à traduire en actes ces dispositions, qui sont les bienvenues. Ces actes, nous venons d'indiquer quels ils doivent être.

Aucune Puissance plus que l'Angleterre n'est désignée pour donner en ce sens à l'Espagne des conseils cordiaux, mais précis. Nous ignorons quelles sont les dispositions actuelles du Gouvernement britannique. Mais nous enregistrons avec une vive satisfaction les manifestations de la presse anglaise. Nous avons cité hier un extrait du "Standard." Le texte intégral, que nous avons aujourd'hui sous les yeux, est à lire en entier. La situation de l'Espagne et de la France y est définie avec une parfaite justesse. Les changements de fait apportés par la politique allemande à la situation que visait l'accord de 1904, les droits nouveaux qui en résultent pour la France, l'obligation d'équité qui s'impose à l'Espagne de nous dédommager partiellement des frais d'une opération onéreuse dont elle bénéficie, l'intérêt qu'a l'Angleterre à hâter cet accord et à prévenir ainsi un choc franco-espagnol—tout est dans cet article, qui exprime dans la forme la plus nette des vérités d'évidence. C'est le meilleur commentaire anglais que nous pussions souhaiter au vœu que nous formions récemment de voir l'entente cordiale égale à sa tâche et consciente de son rôle.

[45686] No. 469.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 17.)

(No. 531.)

Sir, *Paris, November 16, 1911.*

THE press reports that certain members of the Commission for Foreign and Colonial Affairs of the Chamber of Deputies took up at its sittings two days ago the line that no decision as to the recent Franco-German Treaty should be come to by that body until the result of the negotiations between France and Spain are known.

M. de Selves is reported as having strongly insisted that Parliament should ratify the treaty as soon as possible, both from the point of view of the higher interests of the country and from that of a successful negotiation of the matter at issue with Spain.

I met yesterday M. Denys Cochin, the Conservative deputy, who is a recognised authority on the Right of the House on matters of foreign policy.

He informed me that the Commission for Foreign Affairs was inclined to delay its approval of the Franco-German Treaty until the negotiations with Spain had shown whether the sacrifices which the French Government had undertaken to make to Germany in the French Congo would be compensated by what France really secured in Morocco.

I have, &c.
FRANCIS BERTIE.

[45806] No. 470.

Board of Trade to Foreign Office.—(Received November 17.)

Sir, *Whitehall, November 16, 1911.*

I AM directed by the Board of Trade to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 9th November, enclosing copy of the convention as regards Morocco which has recently been concluded between the French and German Governments.

In reply, I am to say that, having carefully examined this convention, and having had the opportunity of informal communications with the Foreign Office upon the subject, the Board do not find it necessary to offer any observations upon the text submitted. They note that Sir E. Grey is proposing to ask for an assurance that it is not intended by article 1 to confer any preferential economic rights on the subjects of the two signatory Powers, and that British subjects in Morocco will not receive less favourable economic treatment than that accorded to the subjects of any other Power. The Board assume that the assurance sought will be conveyed in such a form as to admit of its being made public.

I am, &c.
GEO. J. STANLEY.

[45870] No. 471.

M. Daeschner to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 17.)

D'ORDRE de son Gouvernement, le Ministre de France a l'honneur de communiquer officiellement, ci-joint, au Secrétaire d'État pour les Affaires Étrangères, le texte des lettres explicatives qui ont été échangées entre l'Ambassadeur de la République à Berlin et le Secrétaire d'État allemand pour les Affaires Étrangères à la suite de la conclusion de l'Accord du 4 novembre relatif au Maroc.

M. Daeschner est chargé de faire observer à cette occasion que les documents en question ne sont communiqués aux Parlements français et allemand que sous la forme verbale et à titre confidentiel.

Ambassade de France, Londres,
le 17 novembre, 1911.

Enclosure 1 in No. 471.

Herr von Kiderlen-Waechter to M. Jules Cambon.

Mon cher Ambassadeur, *Berlin, le 4 novembre*, 1911.

POUR bien préciser l'Accord du 4 novembre, 1911, relatif au Maroc et en définir la portée, j'ai l'honneur de faire connaître à votre Excellence que dans l'hypothèse où le Gouvernement français croirait devoir assumer le protectorat du Maroc, le Gouvernement Impérial n'y apporterait aucun obstacle.

L'adhésion du Gouvernement allemand, accordée d'une manière générale au Gouvernement français par l'article 1er de ladite convention, s'applique naturellement à toutes les questions donnant matière à réglementation et visées dans l'Acte d'Algésiras.

Vous avez bien voulu me faire connaître, d'autre part, que, dans le cas où l'Allemagne désirerait acquérir de l'Espagne la Guinée espagnole, l'île Corisco et les îles Elobey, la France serait disposée à renoncer en sa faveur à exercer les droits de préférence qu'elle tient du traité du 27 juin, 1900, entre la France et l'Espagne. Je suis heureux de prendre acte de cette assurance, et d'ajouter que l'Allemagne restera étrangère aux accords particuliers que la France et l'Espagne croiront devoir faire entre elles au sujet du Maroc, étant convenu que le Maroc comprend toute la partie de l'Afrique du Nord s'étendant entre l'Algérie, l'Afrique occidentale française et la colonie espagnole du Rio de Oro.

Le Gouvernement allemand, en renonçant à démander la détermination préalable de parts à faire à l'industrie allemande dans la construction des chemins de fer, compte que le Gouvernement français sera toujours heureux de voir des associations d'intérêt se produire entre les ressortissants des deux pays pour les affaires dont ils pourront respectivement obtenir l'entreprise.

Il compte également que la mise en adjudication du Chemin de Fer de Tanger à Fez, qui intéresse toutes les nations, ne sera primée par la mise en adjudication des travaux d'un autre chemin de fer marocain et que le Gouvernement français proposera au Gouvernement marocain l'ouverture du port d'Agadir au commerce international.

Enfin, lorsque le réseau des voies ferrées d'intérêt général sera mis à l'étude, le Gouvernement allemand demande au Gouvernement français de veiller à ce que l'administration marocaine ait le plus réel souci des intérêts économiques du Maroc, et à ce que, notamment, la détermination du tracé des lignes d'intérêt général facilite dans la mesure du possible la jonction des régions minières avec les lignes d'intérêt général ou avec les ports appelés à les desservir.

Votre Excellence a bien voulu m'assurer que, le jour où aura été institué le régime judiciaire prévu par l'article 9 de la convention précitée et où les tribunaux consulaires auront été remplacés, le Gouvernement français aura soin que les ressortissants allemands soient placés sous la juridiction nouvelle exactement dans les mêmes conditions que les ressortissants français. Je suis heureux d'en prendre acte et de faire connaître en même temps à votre Excellence que, au jour de l'entrée en vigueur de ce régime judiciaire, après entente avec les Puissances, le Gouvernement allemand consentira à la suppression, en même temps que pour les autres Puissances, de ses tribunaux consulaires. J'ajoute que, dans ma pensée, l'expression "les changements du régime des protégés" portée à l'article 12 de la convention du 4 novembre, 1911,

relative au Maroc, implique l'abrogation, si elle est jugée nécessaire, de la partie de la Convention de Madrid qui concerne les protégés et les associés agricoles.

Enfin, désireux de donner à ladite convention le caractère d'un acte destiné non seulement à écarter toute cause de conflit entre nos deux pays, mais encore à aider à leurs bons rapports, nous sommes d'accord pour déclarer que les différends qui viendraient à s'élever entre les parties contractantes au sujet de l'interprétation et de l'application des dispositions de la convention du 4 novembre et qui n'auraient pas été réglés par la voie diplomatique, seront soumis à un tribunal arbitral constitué dans les termes de la Convention de La Haye du 18 octobre, 1907. Un compromis devra être dressé, et il sera procédé suivant les règles de la même convention, en tant qu'il n'y serait pas dérogé par un accord exprès au moment du litige.

Veuillez, &c.

VON KIDERLEN-WAECHTER.

Enclosure 2 in No. 471.

M. Jules Cambon à Herr von Kiderlen-Waechter.

Mon cher Secrétaire d'Etat, *Berlin, novembre* 4, 1911.

J'AI l'honneur de prendre acte de la déclaration que votre Excellence a bien voulu me faire que, dans l'hypothèse où le Gouvernement français croirait devoir assumer le protectorat du Maroc, le Gouvernement Impérial n'y apporterait aucun obstacle, et que l'adhésion du Gouvernement allemand, accordée d'une manière générale au Gouvernement français par l'article 1er de l'Accord du 4 novembre, 1911, relatif au Maroc, s'applique naturellement à toutes les questions donnant matière à réglementation visées dans l'Acte d'Algésiras.

D'autre part, j'ai l'honneur de vous confirmer que, dans le cas où l'Allemagne désirerait acquérir de l'Espagne la Guinée espagnole, l'île Corisco et les îles Elobey, la France est disposée à renoncer en sa faveur à exercer les droits de préférence qu'elle tient du traité du 27 juin, 1900, entre la France et l'Espagne. Je suis heureux par ailleurs de recevoir l'assurance que l'Allemagne restera étrangère aux accords particuliers que la France et l'Espagne croiront devoir faire entre elles au sujet du Maroc, étant convenu que le Maroc comprend toute la partie de l'Afrique du Nord s'étendant entre l'Algérie, l'Afrique occidentale française et la colonie espagnole du Rio de Oro.

Je me plais aussi à vous informer que, le Gouvernement allemand renonçant à demander la détermination préalable de parts à faire dans l'industrie allemande dans la construction des chemins de fer, le Gouvernement français sera toujours heureux de voir des associations d'intérêt se produire entre les ressortissants des deux pays pour les affaires dont ils pourront respectivement obtenir l'entreprise.

Vous pouvez également tenir pour certain que la mise en adjudication du Chemin de Fer de Tanger à Fez, qui intéresse toutes les nations, ne sera primée par la mise en adjudication des travaux d'aucun autre chemin de fer marocain et que le Gouvernement français proposera au Gouvernement marocain l'ouverture du port d'Agadir au commerce international.

Enfin, lorsque le réseau des voies ferrées d'intérêt général sera mis à l'étude, le Gouvernement français veillera à ce que l'administration marocaine ait le plus réel souci des intérêts économiques du Maroc et à ce que, notamment, la détermination du tracé des lignes d'intérêt général facilite dans la mesure du possible la jonction des régions minières avec les lignes d'intérêt général ou avec les ports appelés à les desservir. Votre Excellence peut également compter que le jour où aura été institué le régime judiciaire prévu par l'article 9 de la convention du 4 novembre, 1911, relative au Maroc, et où les tribunaux consulaires auront été remplacés, le Gouvernement français aura soin que les ressortissants allemands soient placés sous la juridiction nouvelle exactement dans les mêmes conditions que les ressortissants français.

Je suis heureux d'autre part de prendre acte qu'au jour de l'entrée en vigueur du nouveau régime judiciaire après entente avec les Puissances le Gouvernement allemand consentira à la suppression, en même temps que pour les autres Puissances, de ses tribunaux consulaires. Je prends acte également que, dans la pensée de votre Excellence, l'expression "le changement du régime des protégés" portée à l'article 12 de la convention précitée implique l'abrogation, si elle est jugée nécessaire, de la partie de la convention de Madrid qui concerne les protégés et associés agricoles.

Enfin. désireux de donner à la convention du 4 novembre, 1911, relative au Maroc le caractère d'un acte destiné non seulement à écarter toute cause de conflit entre nos deux pays, mais encore à aider à leurs bons rapports, nous sommes d'accord pour déclarer que les différends qui viendraient à s'élever entre les parties contractantes au sujet de l'interprétation et de l'application des dispositions de ladite convention et qui n'auraient pu être réglés par la voie diplomatique, seront soumis à un tribunal arbitral constitué dans les termes de la convention de La Haye du 18 octobre 1907. Un compromis devra être dressé et il sera procédé suivant les règles de la même convention en tant qu'il n'y serait pas dérogé par un accord exprès au moment du litige.

Veuillez, &c.

JULES CAMBON.

[44930] No. 472.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 481. Confidential.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, November* 17, 1911.

IN your despatch No. 515 of the 11th instant your Excellency informed me that the "Temps" of that date had published what it believed to be the contents of two secret clauses of the Anglo-French declaration of 1904.

From an examination of the extract from the paper which your Excellency enclosed, it is clear that the secret articles 2 and 3 of the declaration are those alluded to, though the version published by the "Temps" corresponds but little either in text or in substance with the articles themselves.

The indiscretion in the "Temps" has, however, given rise to questions in this country, which will make it difficult for me to refuse publication of the secret articles of the declaration of 1904.

I am not aware that any objection now exists to their publication, in view of the changed conditions prevailing with regard to Morocco, and of the publication o the secret agreement of 1904 between France and Spain.

I should therefore be glad if your Excellency would enquire whether the French Government agree to their publication.

I am, &c.

E. GREY

[46325] No. 473.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen.

(No. 281.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, November* 17, 1911.

I OBSERVED to Count Metternich to-day that, though I had not yet studied the official report, I had observed only one point in Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg's first speech, on the agreement made with France, that would cause me any difficulty in my statement in the House of Commons.

The Imperial Chancellor had repelled in the Reichstag an attack which had been made upon him, to the effect that he had been menaced by the speech of the Chancellor of the Exchequer, and had recoiled before it. In repelling this attack, he had used words which had given the impression in some quarters that the German Government had made to us a menacing communication as to the speech of the Chancellor of the Exchequer, and that we had recoiled before their communication. I should have to defend us against this impression.

Count Metternich said that he did not remember a passage of this sort in the speech of the Imperial Chancellor.

I then told him what the passage was. But I explained to him that I was sure it had not been the intention of the Imperial Chancellor to give the impression to which I had referred; and, therefore, though I must deal with the point, I would do this in a way which would show that our feelings were not hurt by his speech.

I went on to tell Count Metternich that I had found a most helpful passage in the speech of the Imperial Chancellor, to the effect that the settlement reached with regard to Morocco ought to improve the relations of Germany with both France and England. I intended to respond most cordially to this.

I admired very much the second speech of the Chancellor in the Reichstag, and I would endeavour to reciprocate the tone and spirit of it.

I said that of course I was speaking quite unofficially, and I had not yet prepared a statement for the House of Commons; but I did not wish Count Metternich to think that the speeches of the Imperial Chancellor had not been appreciated.

There was another speech, made by some one else in the Reichstag, that contained a very violent attack upon England; but I had not yet read it carefully, or considered whether anything would have to be said about it.

Count Metternich thanked me for what I had told him as to the speeches of the Imperial Chancellor. He said that he thought Britain and Germany were now at the parting of the ways, and that relations between them might now get either much better or much worse. He did not suggest that anything very striking could be done very soon, but he thought it was very helpful to have speeches such as Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg had just made, and as, he gathered, I intended to make.

He then, at some length, described to me what he thought was the feeling in England with regard to Germany; what German feeling now was towards England; and how it had seemed to public opinion in Germany that England had been anxious to get up a quarrel between Germany and France, in which she would join: while, on the other hand, English people had been convinced that Germany intended to make war upon England. Both these impressions were, of course, wrong.

I said that in France, during the early stages of the negotiations as to Morocco, the impression had been that Germany was making upon France demands which would force her to choose between humiliation and war. Of course, the fact the negotiations had now come to the settlement should remove this impression.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[45905] No. 474.

Sir R. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 18.)

(No. 336.)

Sir, *Tangier, November 12, 1911.*

I HAVE the honour to report that the Spanish cruiser "Cataluña" arrived at Tangier on the 10th instant, having been dispatched, according to the terms of an official notice in the Spanish papers, "on account of the excitement which has been created by the sanitary measures which had been adopted."

I understand that the captain, when calling upon the French admiral, stated that this was the reason for his arrival, and that he had everything ready to land, and, if necessary, protect the town. Admiral Senès was, I believe, far from pleased at this communication, and orders have been received from Paris for the "Du Chayla," which was leaving Tangier in the middle of the week, to remain as long as the Spanish cruiser remains.

M. de Billy hints darkly that the scuffle outside the mosque referred to in my despatch No. 52, Commercial, of the 12th instant, was engineered by Spanish semsars, and I see that he thinks that the Spaniards hoped to have or make an excuse for landing at Tangier.

In my opinion there was never a moment of danger to Europeans, and my view was borne out by Menebhi, who, at my request, came to see me on Monday morning, when there was some anxiety felt in the town. Certainly by Thursday night, when the "Cataluña" must have started, there was absolutely nothing to necessitate her presence at Tangier.

I have, &c.
REGINALD LISTER.

P.S.—The constable of our consulate informs me that one of the ringleaders in the scuffle was undoubtedly a Tunisian employed in the custom-house.

R. L.

[45906] No. 475.

Sir R. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 18.)

(No. 337.)

Sir, *Tangier, November 12, 1911.*

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge receipt of your despatch No. 84 of the 2nd instant with regard to the reappointment of Hadj Thami as Basha at Marrakesh.

I received letters last week from Mr. Selous and Dr. Verdon at Fez, both of whom have seen Hadj Thami. He appeared most anxious that the French might be moved again to speak in his favour. When I saw M. de Billy I mentioned this to him, and he said that nothing would alter his view of the desirability of Hadj Thami's reappointment, but that, for the moment, the main thing was for the Glawi brothers to finally settle their accounts with the Sultan. Once this was done, Hadj Thami's position would be much stronger, and the French would then put forward his candidature. I had understood that the arrangement had been concluded, but M. de Billy seems to think there are still some small questions of detail outstanding. He has written to Fez to instruct his consul to push the matter forward. Once it is finally arranged, I will once more press for Hadj Thami's reappointment.

I have, &c.
REGINALD LISTER.

[45907] No. 476.

Sir R. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 18.)

(No. 338.)

Sir, *Tangier, November 12, 1911.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith copy of a letter which I have received from Mr. Harris complaining of the action of the Spanish authorities with regard to the properties of the Union des Mines near Ceuta.

M. de Billy informs me that Mr. Harris has correctly stated the position of affairs and the view held by the Union des Mines, and adds that in the absence of any sort of reply from the Spanish Government to the representations made by the French Legation on behalf of the syndicate, he believes it to be justified. His personal opinion is that such a very unusual mode of treating business as that adopted by the Spanish Government should not be allowed to pass without protest, and I imagine that he is reporting in this sense to his Government. The behaviour of the Spanish Government throughout their negotiations with the Union des Mines has been most slippery, to say the least of it.

I have, &c.
REGINALD LISTER.

Enclosure in No. 476.

Mr. Harris to Sir R. Lister.

Dear Lister, *Tangier, November 12, 1911.*

IT might interest the Foreign Office to know, if you are writing by the bag, that the Spanish authorities remain in possession of the Union des Mines properties near Ceuta. You will remember that the Spanish Government asked us not to take possession ourselves until the local situation was a little more settled with the natives. We agreed out of courtesy. They then took possession themselves. Since our protests commenced they have actually worked the mine and still keep it and our land in their possession! The French Legation sent its latest protest to the Spanish Legation early in October, but, as usual, have received absolutely no reply of any kind.

The Union des Mines, through the French Legation, has stated its readiness to have its claims contested before the competent tribunals—the Shraa and the court of Lausanne—and does not in any way desire to shirk its responsibilities.

It might be as well for the Foreign Office to bear in mind this treatment of inter-

national industry when they are giving their attention to the question of the zones, so as to obtain some sort of guarantee from the Spanish Government for British interests.

I would be much obliged if you would mention the matter if you are writing, as British capital is concerned, and it is a precedent that would be most dangerous to allow to pass unchallenged.

Yours, &c.
W. B. HARRIS.

[45897] No. 477.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 18.)

(No. 533.)

Sir, *Paris, November 16, 1911.*

I HAVE the honour to inform you, with reference to my despatch No. 521 of the 13th instant, that MM. Barrère, Louis, and Gérard, respectively, French Ambassadors at Rome, St. Petersburgh, and Tokyo, were appointed to act as a committee of enquiry into the charges brought by the "Temps" against M. Herbette, "chef du cabinet" of the Minister for Foreign Affairs.

They have reported that the allegations were unfounded, and that M. Herbette has not ceased to carry out his functions in such a way as to justify the full confidence of his superiors.

I have, &c.
FRANCIS BERTIE.

[44930] No. 478.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 303.)

(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, November 18, 1911.*

YOUR despatch No. 515 of 11th November.

Indiscretion in "Temps" has given rise to question in Parliament on Monday.

Enquire whether French Government agree to publication of secret articles of Anglo-French declaration of 1904, as, in view of changed conditions in Morocco and publication of secret agreement between France and Spain, there seems no objection to their publication.

[46520] No. 479.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen.

(No. 282.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, November 18, 1911.*

COUNT METTERNICH gave me to-day the substance of a communication from the German Chancellor respecting his speeches.

Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg said that he had informed me, before he spoke, that he did not propose to criticise the speech of the Chancellor of the Exchequer, but only the press comments upon it and the interpretation which had been given to it. I had replied that we could not object to criticism of press comments on the speech, but that I hoped he would not criticise the speech itself, as that would impose on us the necessity of defending it. Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg hoped that I was satisfied with what he had said. He had endeavoured in his speech to remove the tension which had existed between the two countries in the summer, and he wished me to know that Herr von Kiderlen, in the Reichstag Committee, had also carefully refrained from saying anything that would reflect upon England.

The plenary sittings of the Reichstag had yet to come, and the interpellations to be made then would oblige Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg to refer again to the speech of the Chancellor of the Exchequer. He would therefore like to have, if possible, some clue that would guide him in his remarks, and it would be helpful if he could be informed of what I intended to say in Parliament about the speech.

Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg had seen a question, which had been put in Parliament by Mr. Goldman, attributing to him something which he had not said as to communications which had passed between the two Governments on the subject of

[45859] No. 477*.

M. Daeschner to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 18.)

Ambassade de France, Londres,
le 17 novembre, 1911.

M. le Secrétaire d'État,

MON Gouvernement a été heureux de prendre connaissance de la communication en date du 14 de ce mois, par laquelle votre Excellence a bien voulu me faire savoir que le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté donne son adhésion à la convention récemment conclue entre la France et l'Allemagne au sujet du Maroc. Il voit dans cet assentiment une nouvelle manifestation des sentiments d'amitié et de bonne entente qui unissent nos deux pays.

En me faisant part de cette décision du Gouvernement britannique, votre Excellence formulait diverses observations destinées à préciser, en vue de leur interprétation éventuelle, la portée possible de quelques clauses de cet accord. Je suis chargé par mon Gouvernement de donner à votre Excellence l'assurance que le bénéfice des clauses économiques insérées dans la convention précitée s'étend à toutes les Puissances, et de lui confirmer également que l'accord dont il s'agit n'implique aucune dérogation aux articles 4 et 7 de la Déclaration franco-anglaise du 8 avril, 1904, relative à l'Égypte et au Maroc.

Veuillez, &c.
E. DAESCHNER.

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the speech of the Chancellor of the Exchequer. What Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg really had said was that he had made a communication to us on the subject of the speech and that after this the British Government expressed no desire to take part in the negotiations with France. He had said this in reply to attacks in ill-informed quarters of the German press to show that we had not intruded unfairly into the negotiations.

I asked Count Metternich whether the German Chancellor had sent this communication after learning what I had said yesterday about his speeches.

Count Metternich replied in the negative.

I then observed that what I had said yesterday had to a great extent anticipated what the German Chancellor said in this communication. I could not say exactly how much might have to be said about the speech of the Chancellor of the Exchequer, but I would discuss the question with the Prime Minister and the Chancellor of the Exchequer, as we were all three cognisant of the speech. If the plenary sittings of the Reichstag were not to take place for some time, the German Chancellor would have a report of what was said here before they were held.

Count Metternich promised to let me know when the plenary sittings of the Reichstag were to take place. He himself had been unaware that there was to be a further debate in Berlin.

I am, &c
E. GREY.

[46057] No. 480.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 19.)

(No. 186.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Paris, November 19, 1911.*

YOUR telegram No. 303 of 18th November.

French Government have no objection to the publication of the secret articles in the Anglo-French declaration of 1904.

[46163] No. 481.

Sir F. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 19.)

(No. 123. Secret.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Vienna, November 19, 1911.*

AUSTRIA and France.

Yesterday the French Ambassador was sent for by the Minister for Foreign Affairs, who handed to him a communication couched in somewhat curious terms. The general sense of the document, which was read to me yesterday evening by M. Crozier, is that questions of formality necessarily delay the assent of Austria-Hungary to the Morocco agreement, for it must be seen how all the economic and judicial advantages which Germany obtains in Morocco are to be assured also to this country; but that in principle the Austro-Hungarian Government are ready to recognise the agreement.

Reference is then made to the excellence of the present political relations between France and Austria-Hungary. The hope is expressed that this should be extended to their economic relations, and the suggestion is made that it would be to the advantage of both parties to use French and Austrian capital jointly in Morocco, the Near East and other parts of the world. The document then concludes with a request that the raising of a loan of 1,000,000,000 fr. in Paris by Austria-Hungary may be facilitated by the French Government.

It will be a week before this document reaches Paris by messenger. Count Aehrenthal told M. Crozier he had not sent a copy of it to the Ambassador in Paris because he was afraid the latter in communicating it to the French Government might not explain it quite correctly, and thus misunderstandings might arise.

My French colleague infers, from the language used by the Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs in this conversation, that a change of direction in the lines of Austrian policy is not far off, and that Count Aehrenthal, who begins to realise that France may at any moment be attacked by Germany and hopes to dissociate Austria by degrees from the latter, is now holding out a friendly hand to the Triple *entente*.

In the opinion of M. Crozier, the suggestion that so huge an amount of money

should be raised in France would not have been made unless Count Aehrenthal had mentally prepared himself to offer some substantial *quid pro quo*. Although it is now impossible to say what this would be, M. Crozier says the French would have to insist on being positively assured in regard to the following point—that Austria should remain neutral in the event of a Franco-German war, even if France were to receive the help of Russia. Austria might perhaps mobilise, but so long as there was no danger to Germany of being overwhelmed, she would not join in the war.

The above is very confidential.

[46067] No. 482.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 20.)

(No. 381.)

Sir, *Berlin, November 16, 1911.*

YESTERDAY'S edition of the "Lokal-Anzeiger," a paper which has recently occasionally been inspired by the Government, publishes the text of that part of Mr. Lloyd George's speech of the 22nd July which deals with England's interests abroad. The paper states that the Chancellor tried in vain in the Reichstag to point out that there was nothing in the speech to justify the reproach which had been brought against him that he had silently swallowed a humiliation.

The paper goes on to say that people reading the speech without prejudice would not be able to close their eyes to the fact that the Chancellor's opinion respecting it was absolutely right. Lloyd George could not, however, be absolved from the reproach that he chose a very inauspicious moment for making this speech, and that he did not rightly gauge what effects it might have. The German nation was quite rightly sensitive about and irritated at different events which had occurred in England, and in particular about the utterances of the jingo press, and therefore Mr. Lloyd George, whose whole past showed that he belonged to the English "peace idealists," must have said to himself that his words, most carefully chosen though they were, must have awakened a most unfriendly echo in Germany just because they were spoken in a moment so critical to Germany.

The article concludes by saying that it is unjust to reproach the German Government with not having made this speech the motive for an "energetic" diplomatic intervention in England.

I have, &c.
W. E. GOSCHEN.

[46069] No. 483.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 20.)

(No. 383. Confidential.)

Sir, *Berlin, November 16, 1911.*

THE debate in the Reichstag upon the Franco-German agreement was, owing to the circumstances that the Reichstag elections are near at hand, not of a nature to reveal the true sentiments of the political parties who took part in it. As a matter of fact, there was scarcely a good word said for the arrangement from first to last, but I am assured by several of the political leaders themselves that if it had been put to the vote it would have been passed by a very large majority, and that that verdict would have been ratified by the public at large.

But even if the debate was thus, as far as the Franco-German arrangement was concerned, a purely academic discussion, such as gave the leaders of parties an opportunity to lay their views and sentiments before the electorate, there are certain circumstances which render the debate interesting and in some respects memorable.

These circumstances were the violent chauvinistic language of Herr von Heydebrand, the part played by the Crown Prince, and the vigorous onslaught upon Herr von Heydebrand by the Imperial Chancellor.

The first idea of the Conservatives was that their chief speaker should be Count Kanitz, a man of moderate views and with a certain knowledge of foreign affairs. It was decided, however, that the occasion required someone with more "tempérament," so Herr von Heydebrand was elected, and certainly in that respect he may be said to

have fully justified the choice. It is a pity that Herr von Heydebrand's temperamental language was so obviously directed against England; for it has caused the Crown Prince to be represented in many quarters in England as having deliberately applauded anti-English sentiments. I do not think for a moment that His Imperial Highness had any such idea. I think that he regards the Franco-German arrangement, or rather the fact that an arrangement was come to at all, with considerable dislike, and, like most young officers of his age, would have liked a war. Most of his friends would, so I hear, prefer a war with England, but I have every reason for believing that a war with France would be more to His Imperial Highness's taste. However that may be, a lot of young officers seem to have got it into their heads that by the Franco-German arrangement Germany had knuckled down to France and England, and it was thought by these wiseacres a most excellent plan that the Crown Prince should go to the Reichstag, and, by signifying pronounced assent every time the sabre was rattled, show what the Young Military party thought of the Chancellor's (and the Emperor's) policy. The Crown Prince is plucky and impulsive, but not much given to reflection, and I do not believe that he dreamt for a moment that his little manifesto would be regarded as an anti-English demonstration. This is the generally accepted view in grown-up circles, even in those where his conduct was most blamed and against whom it was most directed.

The Chancellor's speech in answer to Herr von Heydebrand has created widespread interest, and everyone is asking what it meant, and how it will affect the political situation. For his Excellency it was a personal triumph, in so far that everyone was surprised that the Chancellor, whom people persist in regarding as a calm and detached philosopher, could show so much energy and courage. There is no doubt about his courage in facing difficulties, and he has shown it on more than one occasion; but what is really surprising is that, from his seat as Chancellor, and amidst the cheers of the Radicals and Socialists, he should have administered such a sharp public reproof to the leader of a party on whose support he has, in ordinary times, chiefly to depend. For the parties of the Left only cheered his Excellency because he rebuked the war-like language of Herr von Heydebrand, and they will oppose his domestic policy as much as ever. If therefore on account of the speech the Conservatives fall away from him, it is difficult to see how he can get through any Government legislation at all. This will be so much the case if the Conservatives take the Chancellor's speech amiss and desert him, that many people say that Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg, who if no great statesman is at all events a capable politician, would never have allowed himself to fall into this position through inadvertence or impulse, and that therefore he must have spoken with his eyes open to the consequences: this could only mean that he had made up his mind to resign in the near future.

I do not see any particular reason why the Chancellor should resign at the present moment, at all events on the Morocco question. His arrangement with France was certainly not well received in the Reichstag, but it was not seriously attacked; day by day public opinion seems to be getting more favourable to it, particularly in the commercial and financial centres, and he has, I believe, the Emperor's esteem and support. The outlook for the elections is, from his point of view, bad, and he himself told me that he thought there would be at least 120 Socialists in the next Reichstag, but I do not think he is the man to desert on the eve of a battle. However, if the Government of the country is to be carried on upon the lines hitherto in use, either some new arrangement of parties must be made, which it is difficult to foresee, or the Chancellor will resign, or the Conservatives must tell Herr von Heydebrand that he had as a matter of fact gone a little far in his speech, and that it would be contrary to the interests of the party to separate from the Chancellor's Bloc. From what I see in the press the last seems to be the most likely solution.

I have, &c.
W. E. GOSCHEN.

[46057] No. 484.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 304.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, November* 20, 1911.

YOUR telegram No. 186 of 19th November.

Debate in German Parliament has given rise to so many questions here that we must have debate on foreign affairs in House of Commons on Monday next. I propose to lay secret articles before Parliament on Friday. If French Government intend to publish I would suggest that they do simultaneously.

[45859] No. 485.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 485. Confidential.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, November* 20, 1911.

IN my despatch No. 475 of the 14th November, I transmitted to your Excellency a copy of the note from the French Minister requesting the adherence of His Majesty's Government to the recently concluded Franco-German convention. Your Excellency is aware from my despatch No. 479 of the 16th instant that, in reply, I informed M. Daeschner that His Majesty's Government had much pleasure in giving their adherence to the convention, subject to the following assumptions :—

Firstly, that articles 4 and 7 of the Anglo-French declaration of 1904 were not in any way affected by the recently concluded convention;

Secondly, that British subjects would continue to receive in Morocco as favourable economic treatment as those of any other State—the attention of the French Government being specially directed in this connection to the use of the words "the *two* nations" in the text of the convention; and

Thirdly, that adequate arrangements would be made for placing the town and municipal district of Tangier definitely under international control.

M. Daeschner was at the same time informed semi-officially that I should be grateful if the French Government could furnish me with their views on these points at an early date, as it was necessary for me to communicate with the German Government, who had asked for the support of His Majesty's Government on behalf of the convention.

I now transmit to your Excellency a copy of a note from the French Minister, containing the reply of his Government to these observations. The assurances of the French Government are satisfactory with regard to the first point, viz., articles 4 and 7 of the Anglo-French declaration of 1904.

As regards the second point, while the French Government assure His Majesty's Government that the economic clauses of the convention apply equally to the subjects of all Powers, no mention is made of the phrase "equality between the two nations," as to the meaning of which His Majesty's Government specifically enquired. In the version of the convention communicated to me by the German Government and laid by them before the Reichstag the word "two" does not occur, and the first paragraph of article 1 of the convention ends with the words "l'égalité économique entre les nations."

In these circumstances it is necessary for His Majesty's Government to ascertain which is the authoritative text. I shall be glad if your Excellency will accordingly make the necessary enquiries of the French Government.

Finally, the French Government in their reply omit all reference to the question of the internationalisation of the town and municipal district of Tangier. His Majesty's Government are much embarrassed by this omission, and, assuming it to be intentional, they feel constrained to renew the statement that in adhering to the Franco-German convention they expect the French Government to carry out their engagements towards Spain as to the internationalisation of Tangier: engagements which were, in accordance with article 8 of the Anglo-French declaration of 1904, communicated by the French Government to His Majesty's Government and taken note of by them, and to which they are therefore practically parties. If the French Government actually contemplate a departure from the policy defined in that agreement, His Majesty's Government would

reluctantly be compelled to reconsider their position, and would in particular be obliged to take such steps at Madrid as would prevent the Spanish Government from agreeing to any modification of their agreement with France of 1904 which would not provide adequate safeguards for securing the international status of Tangier.

I should be glad if your Excellency would take an opportunity of explaining the attitude of His Majesty's Government in regard to the above-mentioned matters to the French Government. I leave to your discretion the manner and form of such a communication, but your Excellency will bear in mind that some formal record will be necessary either on the part of the French Government to the effect that the reservation of His Majesty's Government with regard to Tangier is understood and will be satisfactorily met by them, or on the part of His Majesty's Government to the effect that their adherence to the Franco-German convention is subject to a satisfactory settlement of the international status of Tangier.

In my opinion, the substitution of an amplified note for that sent to me by M. Daeschner would be the best solution of the difficulty; but your Excellency may not consider it advisable to put forward such a suggestion, in which case I do not in any way desire to press the proposal.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

Enclosure in No. 485.

M. Daeschner to Sir Edward Grey.

Ambassade de France, Londres,
M. le Secrétaire d'Etat, *le 17 novembre*, 1911.

MON Gouvernement a été heureux de prendre connaissance de la communication en date du 14 de ce mois, par laquelle votre Excellence a bien voulu me faire savoir que le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté donne son adhésion à la convention récemment conclue entre la France et l'Allemagne au sujet du Maroc. Il voit dans cette assentiment une nouvelle manifestation des sentiments d'amitié et de bonne entente qui unissent nos deux pays.

En me faisant part de cette décision du Gouvernement britannique, votre Excellence formulait diverses observations destinées à préciser, en vue de leur interprétation éventuelle, la portée possible de quelques clauses de cet accord. Je suis chargé par mon Gouvernement de donner à votre Excellence l'assurance que le bénéfice des clauses économiques insérées dans la convention précitée s'étend à toutes les Puissances, et de lui confirmer également que l'accord dont il s'agit n'implique aucune dérogation aux articles 4 et 7 de la Déclaration franco-anglaise du 8 avril, 1904, relative à l'Égypte et au Maroc.

Veuillez, &c.
E. DAESCHNER.

[46402] No. 486.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 21.)

(No. 387.)
Sir, *Berlin, November* 19, 1911.

I HAVE the honour to report that the following telegram from Berlin, which appears to be of semi-official origin, was printed in the "Kölnische Zeitung" of the 17th instant :—

"The confidential *exposé* made by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in the Morocco Commission of the Reichstag, so far as it dealt with the exchange of views with England, afforded proof that this portion of the criticism passed on German diplomatic action was not justified. Even the representatives of those sections which were strongly opposed to the Government were convinced that the language of the Foreign Office did not lack that emphasis which public opinion held to be required."

The truth of this latter assertion is denied by the Conservative "Kreuz-Zeitung" which states that it has made enquiries on the subject of all the sections concerned. The confidential communications made by the Secretary of State in regard to the attitude of

Germany towards England contained nothing which was not already known and nothing which was calculated to alter the views entertained by the members of the Budget Commission.

The "Tageblatt" yesterday quoted articles from the Socialist "Vorwärts" criticising the alleged delay of the German Government in returning a reply to an enquiry from His Majesty's Government in regard to the despatch of the "Panther" to Agadir and stating that Mr. Lloyd George's speech was the result of this delay. To-day it quotes a further statement to the effect that Herr von Kiderlin did indeed assert before the Budget Commission that a reply had been made but that his Excellency was forced to admit that the answer was a verbal one. The instructions on the subject only reached the German Ambassador on the day on which Mr. Lloyd George delivered his speech; it was therefore probably not possible for him to deliver the message in time.

The "Tageblatt" states that Herr von Kiderlen is expected shortly to publish a statement on all points on which he does not desire to maintain secrecy, and it adds that it understands that a unanimous wish has been expressed by the commission that this statement will deal as fully as possible with the facts connected with Mr. Lloyd George's speech.

I have, &c.
W. E. GOSCHEN.

Enclosure in No. 486.

Extract from the "Times" of Wednesday, November 22, 1911.

STATEMENT BY THE GERMAN FOREIGN SECRETARY.

A LONG extract from Herr von Kiderlen-Waechter's confidential speech to the Budget Committee of the Reichstag on Friday last is officially published this evening. According to this excerpt the Secretary for Foreign Affairs stated that a telegram was sent on the 30th June to all the German representatives accredited to the Powers signatory to the Algeciras Act, announcing the dispatch of the "Panther" to Agadir, and explaining the reasons for the step. In addition, instructions were sent to the German Ambassador in London simultaneously directing him to make the following communication to the British Government:—

"Although our information in regard to the situation of the Europeans at Fez did not accord with the French information, we raised no objection to the French advance to Fez. Meanwhile a situation has gradually arisen which has rendered the provisions of the Act of Algeciras illusory. In consequence of a situation created by the force of circumstances, we have found ourselves compelled to comply with the appeal of a number of well-known business houses, and undertake ourselves the protection of the lives and property of German subjects and protégés in Southern Morocco until orderly conditions are restored in the country, but we have had no intention whatever of expostulating with France on account of her action. In view of the position of affairs it might seem doubtful whether France will be able to return to the *status quo* of 1906. We are, therefore, eventually prepared, in common with France, to look for a way which may lead to a final understanding on the Morocco question, and which will also be in accordance with the interests of the other signatory Powers. The method of direct negotiations could hardly encounter insuperable obstacles in view of the existing good relations between France and ourselves.

"The British Government was therefore informed as to the German intentions before the arrival of the ship at Agadir, the above communication having been made on the 10th July."

Interview with Sir Edward Grey.

During the course of the negotiations with France, Herr von Kiderlen-Waechter continued, it came to explanations with the British Government. No enquiry was made by England either of the German Ambassador in London or of the Government in Berlin with regard to the foregoing communication. The Foreign Secretary continued:—

"It was not till the 21st July, the day of Mr. Lloyd George's speech, that an

interview took place between Sir Edward Grey and the German Ambassador at the instance of the British Foreign Secretary. The opinion that Sir E. Grey had formed of our attitude, in spite of the explanations made by the Ambassador at the time of the dispatch of the 'Panther,' was again manifested at this interview. This opinion was the result of charges which the French and a section of the British press and, indeed, some officials had consistently brought against our policy. Sir E. Grey expressed a wish to discuss the Morocco question unofficially with the Ambassador. He had from the first placed it beyond doubt that, in view of her great economic interests there, England must participate in any settlement of the Morocco question. He had been waiting, he said, in the hope of an agreement between France and Germany. Now, however, that the German demands, as he had learned, were of such a far-reaching character that it was obvious the French could not accept them, there was a danger that the negotiations would come to an end without a result and then the question would again come into the foreground, 'What is Germany doing in the closed harbour of Agadir and its Hinterland?' He knew nothing of what was going on there. Agadir, Sir Edward pointed out, was suited for the construction of a war port. No one knew what Germany intended there. He must expect questions of this kind in Parliament and was not in a position to give an explanatory answer. If the Franco-German negotiations came to nothing, which, in view of the German demands might easily occur, the Agadir question, in which British interests were involved, would immediately arise. Sir E. Grey, therefore, believed the time had come when England should participate in the negotiations. He had held aloof so long as there was reason to hope for a Franco-German agreement outside Morocco as British policy was not affected if France and Germany sought to reach a colonial agreement by means of the regulation of the frontier of the Cameroons as had been suggested at first. As, however, France could not accept the German demands, it was probable that the actual Morocco question in which British interests were involved to a high degree would come into the forefront of politics and therefore the question of German intentions in regard to the closed harbour of Agadir and its Hinterland had again become acute. He wished again to emphasise that he was animated in bringing about the meeting solely by the desire not to find himself confronted by facts which would compel him to take up an attitude and as a consequence of which the political situation, already sufficiently complicated, would assume a decidedly more difficult and serious form."

The German Standpoint.

"The German Ambassador said he had not been informed concerning the details of the German negotiations with France and could not admit that the German demands were obviously unacceptable as Sir E. Grey had said. In that case Germany would not have presented them. Sir E. Grey had asserted, even if unofficially, that the time had come to negotiate *à trois*. This contention was apparently based on the suggestion that Germany might build a naval station at Agadir and close the Hinterland. These were suppositions of which the Ambassador knew nothing. If, the Ambassador continued, any English interests were injured by Germany's action, let Sir E. Grey name them. As he (Sir E. Grey) could not do that, it would be more correct, the Ambassador said, to wait till he was able to prove that any British interest or right was affected. Germany had not the slightest intention of injuring British rights or interests. The course of events had brought about a moment when Germany found herself face to face with the necessity of coming to an understanding with France over the Morocco business. If, as Sir E. Grey assumed, the German proposals in another field were considered unacceptable, that only proved that France did not set as much value upon the free exercise of her claims in Morocco as might have been expected. She must, therefore, put up with the presence of a foreign war-ship in a Moroccan harbour as part of the bargain. A North African Empire from the Tripoli frontier to Senegambia, with a predominant position in Morocco, was no small matter. England, the Ambassador pointed out, had been compensated in Egypt, which also was no trifling matter, but Germany had not been compensated with anything. If France wished that Germany, like England, while preserving her commercial interests, should retire into the background in Morocco, she must offer an equivalent approximately corresponding in value to the great aims she sought herself. The Ambassador could not hide from the Minister that he (Sir E. Grey) seemed to have one measure for France and another for Germany. If he laid such stress on the inviolability of Moroccan territory, he ought, before all, to request explanations from France.

"Sir E. Grey replied that he would in no way oppose the extension of Germany's colonial possessions in the heart of Africa. He could not conceal from himself, however, that English interests might be most seriously affected by the Morocco question itself. He had, therefore, sincerely hoped for an agreement between France and Germany, and only in the undesired event of the failure to reach such an agreement had he been obliged to say plainly that the *démarche* at Agadir would lead to explanations ('eine Aussprache') between England and Germany. He believed the situation would lose its acuteness if such a discussion took place between the two Governments before events occurred at Agadir in respect of which England would be obliged to take up a position."

Protection of German Interests.

Herr von Kiderlen-Waechter, continuing, pointed out that the foregoing conversation showed that Sir E. Grey openly assumed that Germany meant to establish herself in Morocco in spite of the communication made to him at the time of the dispatch of the "Panther." The Ambassador's despatch reporting the conversation with Sir E. Grey was received in Berlin on the 22nd July. "An answer," the Foreign Secretary proceeded, "was immediately dispatched from Berlin":—

"The Ambassador was therein instructed to tell Sir E. Grey that we had from the first declared that our ship was merely to protect German interests at Agadir. A native attack on a German farm among other reasons gave special occasion for her presence there with that object. Up to the present nothing had occurred which justified the inference that there had been a change in our intentions. Not a man had yet been landed. We regretted that in England faith seemed to be placed in insinuations in regard to our intentions which obviously emanated from a source hostile to us. We had never thought of the establishment of a naval port on the Moroccan coast, and would never think of such a thing. That was an hallucination. Also, we had no designs upon Moroccan territory, but we must demand that France should either adhere strictly to the Algeciras treaty or, if she believed herself unable to do so, that she should enter into explanations with us. Negotiations had been begun on both sides, and were guaranteed the strictest secrecy. We had taken the obligation seriously, and had not even informed our ailles. France had adopted another procedure, and had supplied not only the press, but, as appeared also, her friends with information which was incomplete and inexact and calculated to cast suspicion on our intentions. We, therefore, for the time ceased to negotiate until the secrecy of the negotiations was guaranteed. If the negotiations failed, we had no designs upon Moroccan territory, but we must then demand from France, with all emphasis a decision for the execution of the Algeciras Act in its letter and spirit and in its entirety. We counted on the support of the other Powers; especially of England, if France did not wish for an understanding on the basis proposed by us, and in that case we demanded the restoration of the *status quo ante* in Morocco."

Mr. Lloyd George's Speech.

Herr von Kiderlen-Waechter declared that the assertion that Germany had not answered an enquiry of the British Government for fourteen days thus fell to the ground. He continued:—

"As the answer to the questions raised by Sir E. Grey in his interview with the German Ambassador was dispatched the text of the speech delivered by Mr. Lloyd George on the evening of the 21st July became known in Berlin. It was sent on the very day, therefore, that the Ambassador and Sir E. Grey had their conversation. It was not necessary to comply with the suggestion of the British Minister which we afterwards received that he should be authorised to make use in Parliament of our declaration that we had no designs upon Moroccan territory. To have done so would have given rise to the impression that that declaration was a consequence of Mr. Lloyd George's speech.

"On the 24th July our Ambassador in London was instructed to point out that Mr. Lloyd George's speech had furnished a large part of the British and the entire French press with an occasion for violent attacks upon Germany. The question how far this effect was intended by the English Minister need not be gone into. The British Government, however, could not fail to perceive that this effect of a speech made by one of its members must give rise to dissatisfaction in Germany to a high

degree. Germany had made proposals to France which appeared entirely loyal and acceptable. They referred to regions in which British interests were neither directly nor indirectly concerned. If in spite of that, England believed she ought to declare her wishes, she could make these known through the ordinary diplomatic channel; if instead of doing this the British Government caused public declarations to be made by one of its members which could, at least, be interpreted as a warning intended for ourselves, and which actually were interpreted by the British and French newspapers as a warning bordering upon a threat, it was difficult to find grounds for that procedure. The British Government, the Ambassador was directed to point out, could not be in doubt that the friendly agreement between Germany and France which the British Government itself declared it desired would not be promoted thereby. In view of the tone adopted towards Germany by a part of the British and almost the entire French press, the British Government could not have been in any uncertainty as to the effect that was to be expected from Mr. Lloyd George's speech. If the British Government had had the intention of complicating and confusing the political situation, and bringing things to a violent outburst ('Entladung'), it could have chosen no better means of doing so than the Chancellor of the Exchequer's speech.

"In reply the Ambassador reported that Sir E. Grey consented not to make Parliamentary use of the information concerning Germany's intention not to acquire territory in Morocco, but remarked that in that case he had no means of allaying public disquiet in regard to our alleged designs upon Agadir. Sir E. Grey defended Mr. Lloyd George's speech as moderate, and declared that it was quite right to deliver the speech."

British Interests.

"The Ambassador then again drew the Minister's attention to the fact that the Anglo-French (*sic*) press represented the speech as a threat against Germany. Sir E. Grey declared that Germany's eventual intention to undertake the restoration of the *status quo* in Morocco was alone calculated to lend the Morocco problem a still graver significance. He protested against the idea that the British Government did not desire a Franco-German agreement. He must, however, point out that in the event of British interests being touched in the course of the Morocco question, the British Government must defend them.

"The Ambassador thereupon said that nobody denied England that right. We never intended to dispose of English interests and rights. That intention existed only in the English imagination. The British Government had no ground for that suspicion, which had also been heard in Mr. Lloyd George's speech, in consequence of which the speech had a provocative effect. If occasion arose, Germany would welcome the co-operation of the other signatory Powers for the purpose of restoring the *status quo* in Morocco. Only if that co-operation were wanting would she assert her right herself. Menacing warnings, the Ambassador added, would only encourage Germany to hold fast to her right.

"Fresh instructions were sent to the Ambassador on the 26th July in reply to Sir Edward Grey that he must have perceived from the official communications that British interests were not affected by the negotiations with France. We expected, therefore, from his tried loyalty that he would give expression to this fact in Parliament without entering upon the confidential portions of our communication. The Ambassador was further instructed gladly to take note of Sir E. Grey's assurance that a Franco-German understanding was desired by him to express the conviction that this would be in a high degree helpful to the progress of the negotiations.

"That wish it was difficult to reconcile with the English assertion that our demands in the colonial sphere could not be fulfilled, an assertion made without knowledge of the equivalent we were offering in the political sphere. It was Germany's earnest wish to diminish or entirely to remove causes of friction with France in the colonial sphere, especially in Africa. If Great Britain shared that wish, then she could only promote its attainment by endeavouring to assuage the present highly excited state of feeling in France, which had been produced by false rumours and semi-indiscretions."

Herr von Kiderlen-Waechter then gave a summary of a statement issued by Reuter's Agency on the 22nd July, which is described as obviously inspired, and added: "From this point on our negotiations with France made better progress."—REUTER.

Berlin, November 21, 1911.

Minutes.

The official report of Herr von Kiderlen's statement before the secret committee of the Reichstag has appeared in the press, and is given in translation in to-day's "Times" (annexed hereto).

The statement in the "Tageblatt" referred to in the last paragraph of the present despatch indicates that the published account contains only so much as the German Government do not think it necessary to keep secret, and that in fact he said much more—which is *primâ facie* probable.

Herr von Kiderlen's statement to the committee and its publication involves a breach of the well-established diplomatic rule that communications exchanged with foreign Governments shall not be published without the latter's consent. The breach seems all the more flagrant, as the recent communications from Count Metternich, embodied in the despatches to Sir E. Goschen, conveyed, if not a request, certainly a suggestion that, in view of the very short and restrained reference made by the Chancellor in his recent speeches in the Reichstag to what passed between the British and German Governments, Sir E. Grey should on his part say as little as possible on the subject. The fact that an elaborate and in many respects misleading statement had been made, or was on the point of being made, to the Reichstag in secret session by Herr von Kiderlen was suppressed. This does not seem quite straightforward. If the publication in the German press had been made a day later, and if the Morocco debate in the House of Commons had, as previously intended and announced, been held to-morrow, Sir E. Grey would have found himself placed in an embarrassing position.

As the German Government have, without consulting His Majesty's Government, thought fit to publish their version of what passed between Count Metternich and Sir Edward Grey, Sir Edward is now free either to lay his record of the communications before Parliament without further reference to Berlin, or to quote it in detail when speaking in the forthcoming debate.

E. A. C.

Foreign Office, November 22, 1911.

This performance on their part has certainly freed our hands.

W. L.
A. N.

It has freed my hands or rather my mouth considerably.

E. G.
F. D. A.

[46537] No. 487.

M. Daeschner to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 21.)

Ambassade de France, Londres,
le 21 *novembre*, 1911.

M. le Secrétaire d'État,

DANS l'avant-dernier paragraphe de la note qu'elle a bien voulu m'adresser le 14 de ce mois, au sujet de l'adhésion du Gouvernement Royal à l'accord franco-allemand du 4 novembre, votre Excellence m'avait signalé l'intérêt qu'elle attachait à la situation spéciale de Tanger.

Je suis autorisé à donner officiellement à votre Excellence, pour faire suite à ma note du 17 courant, l'assurance que le Gouvernement de la République ne se prévaudra pas de ses accords avec l'Allemagne pour revenir sur la clause de la convention franco-espagnole de 1904 relative à la situation spéciale de la ville et de la région de Tanger.

Veuillez, &c.
E. DAESCHNER.

[46373] No. 488.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 21.)

[By Bag.]

(No. 188.)
(Telegraphic.) *En clair.* *Paris, November* 20, 1911.

M. DE SELVES, whom I saw by appointment this evening, wishes me to inform you that proposals have been drawn up by the President of the Council for an arrangement with Spain in regard to Morocco. He will communicate them to me in the next few days for your consideration.

[46431] No. 489.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 21.)

(No. 189.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Paris, November* 21, 1911.

A PROJECT is being devised by a Paris financier and Dr. Schwabach, the late British consul-general at Berlin, for the formation of a syndicate of French, German, and British financiers for undertakings of a commercial nature in Morocco, such as railways and works of all kinds. I am assured by the Paris financier that M. de Kiderlen and M. Caillaux approve of this project, and he inquires whether a British participation in a syndicate of this kind would be viewed with satisfaction by His Majesty's Government. In such case he would take steps to arrange for such participation being obtained, and he states that the French Government would support it.

[46450] No. 490.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 21.)

(No. 190.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Paris, November* 21, 1911.

I HAVE received from a private source, which I consider reliable, the following confidential information:—

The question of the withdrawal from Agadir of the German war-vessel has been discussed between the French and German Governments.

On M. de Kiderlen demurring to its immediate withdrawal and saying that he could not recall it until the Franco-German convention had been ratified, M. Caillaux declared that he was prepared to guarantee the approval of the convention by the French Chamber. M. de Kiderlen-Waechter has consented to withdraw the ship as soon as the Chamber has approved the convention. He will not insist on the formal ratification by the President of the Republic being awaited before giving orders to the ship to come away.

[46556] No. 491.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 22.)

(No. 545.)
Sir, *Paris, November* 21, 1911.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith an extract from the "Temps," in which an account is given of the questions put by M. Millerand at a recent sitting of the Commission for Foreign Affairs of the Chamber of Deputies respecting certain points connected with the Franco-German Treaty and the future position of Spain in Morocco.

M. Millerand desired to receive information with respect to: (1) the question of France's right of pre-emption of the Belgian Congo; (2) the retention by Germany of post-offices in Morocco; and (3) to what extent the responsibility of France would be engaged if Germany, after having recognised a French protectorate over the whole of Morocco, had complaints to make as to occurrences in the Spanish zone.

M. Millerand received explanations from M. de Selves on the first two of the above-mentioned points.

I have, &c.
FRANCIS BERTIE.

Enclosure in No. 491.

Extract from the "Temps" of November 22, 1911.

A PROPOS DU TRAITÉ FRANCO-ALLEMAND.—CONVERSATION AVEC M. MILLERAND.

NOUS avons eu l'occasion de nous entretenir avec M. Millerand de son intervention à la Commission des Affaires extérieures au sujet du Traité franco-allemand, intervention très sommairement résumée par les communiqués officieux.

"Je me suis borné," nous a dit M. Millerand, "à formuler non point des objections, mais de simples observations—des observations d'un caractère pratique, inspirées seulement du désir de faciliter et d'améliorer l'application du traité.

"Ce traité, il n'appartient pas, vous le savez, à la commission de le modifier. Elle ne peut que l'approuver ou le rejeter. Il m'apparaît, d'ailleurs, ainsi que le 'Temps' le montrait hier, comme la conséquence logique et nécessaire de la politique antérieure. Il était impossible de ne pas le négocier et il est impossible de ne pas le ratifier, même si l'on pense que certaines de ses clauses auraient gagné peut-être à être autrement rédigées.

"Cela dit pour préciser l'esprit dans lequel je suis intervenu, résolu à approuver le traité et soucieux seulement d'aider le Gouvernement à l'appliquer dans les meilleures conditions possibles. D'où les trois questions que j'ai posées.

"J'ai demandé d'abord si l'article 16 de l'Accord congolais portait atteinte au droit de préemption de la France au sujet du Congo belge. M. de Selves m'a répondu que non. La France s'engage, comme l'Allemagne, à conférer avec les signataires de l'Acte de Berlin, si le statut territorial du bassin conventionnel du Congo venait à être modifié, par achat ou autrement. Mais s'il est question de conversation préalable, il n'est pas question, a ajouté le Ministre, d'adhésion nécessaire. Le droit de la France subsiste donc.

"J'ai demandé ensuite des éclaircissements sur la déclaration de M. de Kiderlen, annonçant que les postes allemandes subsisteraient dans l'Empire chérifien. J'estime en effet qu'elles doivent disparaître quand nous aurons créé une organisation nouvelle. L'Allemagne s'est engagée, selon moi, à cette suppression, en acceptant par avance, dans la première lettre explicative, le protectorat français. J'ai constaté que le Gouvernement était de mon avis.

"Je me suis inquiété enfin—ici encore en vue de l'avenir et dans un esprit tout pratique—de la situation créée à la France par la coexistence de ses engagements vis-à-vis de l'Allemagne et de l'Europe d'une part, vis-à-vis de l'Espagne d'autre part. A ce sujet, voici ce que j'ai dit :—

"Le document explicatif dont les journaux ont signalé l'existence qui n'a pas été publié, mais qui a été lu à la commission, définit les limites du Maroc, Algérie, Afrique occidentale, Rio-de-Oro. C'est pour tout cet Empire que la France a traité avec l'Allemagne. Mais de cet Empire, l'Espagne gardera une partie. Et enfin, par le même document, l'Allemagne s'engage à ne pas intervenir dans nos négociations avec l'Espagne.

"Cela étant, j'ai envisagé l'hypothèse suivante : Supposons qu'ultérieurement une Puissance, l'Allemagne par exemple, ait à se plaindre en matière économique, adjudication ou autre, de l'attitude de l'Espagne dans sa zone. Quels seraient en présence d'une plainte semblable les droits et les devoirs de la France, si l'Allemagne, en vertu de l'engagement pris par elle de ne pas se mêler des négociations franco-espagnoles, prétend ignorer cet accord et ne connaître au Maroc qu'une responsabilité : la nôtre ?

"J'ai indiqué qu'à mon sens il y aurait lieu de conjurer ce risque en prenant soin d'informer exactement les Puissances de la nature et de l'étendue de nos engagements avec l'Espagne, tels qu'ils sortiront de la négociation prochaine. C'est une précaution désirable et possible.

"Voilà à quoi s'est bornée mon intervention, qui avait, vous le voyez, pour seul objet d'éclaircir certaines éventualités, et ne s'inspirait à aucun degré d'un sentiment d'hostilité, soit à l'égard du traité négocié, soit à l'égard de ses négociateurs."

[46537] No. 492.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No 487.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, November 22, 1911.*

IN my telegram No. 306 of the 21st instant I requested your Excellency to suspend action on my despatch No. 485 of the 20th instant, as I had received a further note from the French Minister.

I now transmit to your Excellency a copy of this communication,* from which you will see that the French Government assure His Majesty's Government that they will not avail themselves of the recent convention with Germany to depart from article 9 of the Franco-Spanish agreement of 1904 relative to the special position of the town and district of Tangier.

His Majesty's Government have received this assurance with much satisfaction, and they are confident that the French Government intend to ensure that adequate arrangements will be made for placing the town and municipal district of Tangier definitely under international control. They are confirmed in this belief by the wording of the draft French declaration communicated to you by M. Regnault (see your Excellency's despatch No. 455, Confidential, of the 21st October) in connection with the suggested text of a revised Franco-Spanish agreement. It is stated in the first article of this declaration that, in accordance with article 9 of the Franco-Spanish agreement of 1904, the town of Tangier shall be administered under the sovereignty of the Sultan by a municipality of an international character.

Your Excellency informed me, in your telegram No. 188 of the 20th instant, that proposals had been drawn up by the President of the Council for an arrangement with Spain in regard to Morocco, and that they would shortly be communicated to His Majesty's Government for consideration. I trust therefore that these proposals will contain adequate safeguards for securing the internationalisation of Tangier.

I should be glad if your Excellency would take an opportunity of speaking in the sense of this despatch to the French Minister for Foreign Affairs, explaining the satisfaction of His Majesty's Government at the assurances already received and the importance they attach to a definite settlement of the matter. It is of course still necessary for His Majesty's Government to ascertain the authoritative text of the Franco-German convention, and I should be glad if your Excellency will accordingly make the necessary enquiries of the French Government with regard to this point, as proposed in my despatch No. 485.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[46706] No. 493.

Lord Acton to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 23.)

(No. 44.)

Sir, *Darmstadt, November 20, 1911.*

THE storm of abuse which has the British Government and people for its objective, and which has been maintained by the German press with untiring energy during the past few months, is evidently not intended primarily for foreign consumption as an undiplomatic weapon to harass the home Government by its recoil, but appears to have for its main purpose the education of the remoter portions of the population, to judge by the care which is expended on the concoction of printed matter which never meets other than German eyes. Intermittently, as will be seen below, views are put forward which testify to a genuine wish for a clarification of the atmosphere other than by powder and shot, and it would be as unfair to underrate the academic value of such utterances as to exaggerate the practical gravity of the more frequent type of comment. Indeed, it is, I think, unwise to yield to the universal temptation and to attach excessive weight to press opinion in Germany. It is perhaps an error to look upon the press as an invariably faithful reflector of public feeling. Leading articles are written to whet the appetite rather than to satisfy it. They are as often dictated by the personal rancour of the editor or the style exigencies of the hack as by questions of circulation or of party loyalty. The most perfect compositions on topical themes are frequently unread by those who

* No. 487.

make war and peace, whether these stand at the apex or the base; and it can scarcely be questioned that the cataclysms of history are generally due to the interplay of cosmic forces against which the written or spoken word is of only superficial avail.

In spite of this attitude of detachment, it is, however, disappointing to find single-hearted demonstrations of friendship, such as a recent effusion of the "Daily Chronicle," received with contumely by local German organs that have no axe to grind in the international forge. The London paper had innocently hazarded the view that no insuperable obstacle stands in the way of an understanding. In giving prominence to this and similarly attuned passages in the same article, the "Darmstädter Tagblatt" of the 15th November observes that it is curious that these Germanophil utterances only make themselves heard now that the conclusion of the Morocco Agreement is an accomplished fact; and it suggests the inference that England's present good-humour and satisfaction at the issue of the Franco-German negotiations is a proof that Germany has got the worst of the bargain. The fact is that, for the present, at any rate, nothing but what is evil can emanate from London. The "Frankfurter Zeitung," on the other hand, which a few days back admitted the injudiciousness of the Agadir escapade without adequate previous warning, and its responsibility for our subsequent attitude, and which interpreted the Guildhall speech of the new First Lord as a wholesome hint to dreamers of the "Flottenverein" that the distance between the strength of the two navies can never be narrowed, returns to-night to the time-honoured theme, and describes the recrudescence of bitterness as a comedy of errors. The writer regrets in vigorous terms that Germany should not be represented by a more statesmanlike diplomatist at the Court of St. James who would have given the Wilhelmstrasse timely warning of the probable effect of the meditated *coup*. (It may be noted, in this connection, that Baron Jenisch, who is well known in London, and who was at Wilhelmshöhe on behalf of the German Foreign Office on the occasion of King Edward's last visit, and whom, as I have reason to know, His Majesty would have wished to have seen installed in due course at Carlton House Terrace, is at present Prussian Minister at Darmstadt.) The "Frankfurter Zeitung," still unconvinced of the impregnability of the *entente*, thinks it not entirely outside the range of the possible that England may in the near future make a friendly *démarche* at Berlin, if only to prevent the recent agreement between France and Germany leading to a political rapprochement between those two countries from which she would find herself excluded. Ths article generously concludes with the declaration that if, in the words of Nigra, England and Germany are nations who must be either bitter enemies or close allies, the writer would unhesitatingly opt for the latter.

Mr. Churchill's speech has not met with universally friendly comment in the German press. For example, the "Hannoversche Courier" remarks in respect of it that if any innocents still exist who are unable to explain the sharp antithesis between England's German policy and the siren whispers which are wafted across the Channel by friendly societies and by orators postprandially disposed they will find a solution in the Guildhall speech, in which the declaration is made with telling force that so long as the naval competition continues the feeling of mistrust will endure. In other words, as soon as Germany abandons her policy of naval expansion the way will be paved for friendly conversation.

The recent criticisms by the "Times" military correspondent of the efficiency of the German army as revealed at the autumn manœuvres forms the subject of a violent personal attack in the "Schlesische Zeitung" on Colonel a'Court-Repington, whose family history is narrated with astonishing accuracy of detail in order to gauge the amount of credence which may be attached to his written statements. According to this journal, the British critic, who only spent four days with the opposing armies, had a threefold object in view:—

Firstly, he desired at that stage of the negotiations to incite the French to resistance *à outrance* by holding out a prospect of military success.

Secondly, by exploding the fable of her invincibility which has won her so many bloodless victories, the critic was endeavouring to diminish Germany's prestige abroad and to weaken the force of her diplomacy.

Thirdly, by attributing military imperfections to the lavish expenditure on the navy, the crafty penman, with Printing House Square at his back, wished to warn the guileless electors to the new Reichstag that naval expansion is not in the true interests of a mainland Empire, and thus to arrest that competition which is so irksome to Great Britain.

This summary of random passages, chosen perhaps from too wide a field, will at

any rate serve to show that at times there is honesty of purpose, and that where the purpose is less honest the provocation is generally manufactured at home.

Apart from newspaper controversy, I understand that the flame of bitterness against England continues to burn very high in military circles here. A few weeks ago I came upon a striking illustration of this fact at a dinner given at the Castle of Philippsruhe by the Landgrave of Hesse. The general commanding the XVIIIth Army Corps, who was among the guests, remarked with some vehemence to his neighbour at table, the wife of a well-known English peer: "We now know who our real enemies are, and I hope that my sons and my sons' sons will never forget it." I need not add that the conversation arose on the staple theme of all political conversations here—the Chancellor of the Exchequer's July declaration. A more pleasing impression is derived from an account given me by Sir Hubert Jernvngham of a conversation during a recent visit to Friedrichshof with Princess Frederick Charles of Hesse, in which Her Royal Highness assured my informant that her Imperial brother holds that Providence has destined the Teutonic races to join hands in order to take the place of the moribund Latins in carrying forward the work of civilisation. Prince Henry of Prussia, who is a frequent visitor to this capital, is equally friendly in his references to public affairs, and if in conversation with me he sometimes deplores the retirement of Sir Frank Lascelles he perhaps pays thereby an unconscious tribute to the efficiency of his successor.

I have, &c.
ACTON.

[46809] No. 494.

M. Daeschner to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 23.)

Ambassade de France, Londres,
M. le Secrétaire d'État, *le 22 novembre*, 1911.

POUR faire suite à ma lettre du 3 de ce mois, j'ai l'honneur de faire parvenir ci-jointe à votre Excellence une copie de la Convention franco-allemande sur le Maroc, telle qu'elle a été signée à la date du 14 novembre.

Comme vous le constaterez, ce nouveau texte comporte, par rapport à celui que je vous ai précédemment communiqué, une légère différence dans l'article 1er. Il est dit, en effet, à la fin du premier paragraphe de cet article que l'action de la France sauvegardera au Maroc l'égalité économique, non pas "entre les deux nations," mais "entre les nations."

Ce point avait précédemment fait l'objet d'une des observations formulées dans la note de votre Excellence du 14 de ce mois.

Veuillez, &c.
E. DAESCHNER.

Enclosure in No. 494.

Franco-German Convention respecting Morocco.

LE Gouvernement de la République française et le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté l'Empereur d'Allemagne, à la suite des troubles qui se sont produits au Maroc et qui ont démontré la nécessité d'y poursuivre, dans l'intérêt général, l'œuvre de pacification et de progrès prévue par l'Acte d'Algésiras, ayant jugé nécessaire de préciser et de compléter l'accord franco-allemand du 9 février, 1909, ont résolu de conclure une convention à cet effet. En conséquence, M. Jules Cambon, Ambassadeur extraordinaire de la République française auprès de Sa Majesté l'Empereur d'Allemagne, et M. de Kiderlen-Waechter, Secrétaire d'État des Affaires Étrangères de l'Empire d'Allemagne, après s'être communiqués leurs pleins pouvoirs, trouvés en bonne et due forme, sont convenus des dispositions ci-après:—

ARTICLE 1er.

Le Gouvernement Impérial allemand déclare que, ne poursuivant au Maroc que des intérêts économiques, il n'entravera pas l'action de la France en vue de prêter son assistance au Gouvernement marocain pour l'introduction de toutes les réformes

administratives, judiciaires, économiques, financières et militaires dont il a besoin pour le bon gouvernement de l'Empire, comme aussi pour tous les règlements nouveaux et les modifications aux règlements existants que ces réformes comportent. En conséquence, il donne son adhésion aux mesures de réorganisation, de contrôle et de garantie financière que, après accord avec le Gouvernement marocain, le Gouvernement français croira devoir prendre à cet effet, sous la réserve que l'action de la France sauvegardera au Maroc l'égalité économique entre les nations.

Au cas où la France serait amenée à préciser et à étendre son contrôle et sa protection, le Gouvernement Impérial allemand, reconnaissant pleine liberté d'action à la France, et sous la réserve que la liberté commerciale, prévue par les traités antérieurs, sera maintenue, n'y apportera aucun obstacle.

Il est entendu qu'il ne sera porté aucune entrave aux droits et actions de la Banque d'État du Maroc, tels qu'ils sont définis par l'Acte d'Algésiras.

ARTICLE 2.

Dans cet ordre d'idées, il est entendu que le Gouvernement Impérial ne fera pas obstacle à ce que la France, après accord avec le Gouvernement marocain, procède aux occupations militaires du territoire marocain qu'elle jugerait nécessaires au maintien de l'ordre et de la sécurité des transactions commerciales, et à ce qu'elle exerce toute action de police sur terre et dans les eaux marocaines.

ARTICLE 3.

Dès à présent, si Sa Majesté le Sultan du Maroc venait à confier aux agents diplomatiques et consulaires de la France la représentation et la protection des sujets et des intérêts marocains à l'étranger, le Gouvernement Impérial déclare qu'il ne fera pas d'objection.

Si, d'autre part, Sa Majesté le Sultan du Maroc confiait au représentant de la France près du Gouvernement marocain le soin d'être son intermédiaire auprès des représentants étrangers, le Gouvernement allemand n'y ferait pas d'objection.

ARTICLE 4.

Le Gouvernement français déclare que, fermement attaché au principe de la liberté commerciale au Maroc, il ne se prêtera à aucune inégalité pas plus dans l'établissement des droits de douane, impôts et autres taxes que dans l'établissement des tarifs de transport par voie ferrée, voie de navigation fluviale ou toute autre voie, et notamment dans toutes les questions de transit.

Le Gouvernement français s'emploiera également auprès du Gouvernement marocain afin d'empêcher tout traitement différentiel entre les ressortissants des différentes Puissances; il s'opposera notamment à toute mesure, par exemple à la promulgation d'ordonnances administratives sur les poids et mesures, le jaugeage, le poinçonnage, &c., qui pourraient mettre en état d'infériorité les marchandises d'une Puissance.

Le Gouvernement français s'engage à user de son influence sur la Banque d'État pour que celle-ci confère à tour de rôle aux membres de sa direction à Tanger les postes de délégué dont elle dispose à la Commission des Valeurs douanières et au Comité permanent des Douanes.

ARTICLE 5.

Le Gouvernement français veillera à ce qu'il ne soit perçu au Maroc aucun droit d'exportation sur le minerai de fer exporté des ports marocains. Les exploitations de minerai de fer ne subiront sur leur production ou sur leurs moyens de travail aucun impôt spécial. Elles ne supporteront, en dehors des impôts généraux, qu'une redevance fixe, calculée par hectare et par an, et une redevance proportionnée au produit brut de de l'extraction. Ces redevances, qui seront assises conformément aux articles 35 et 49 du projet de règlement minier annexé au protocole de la Conférence de Paris du 7 juin, 1910, seront également supportées par toutes les entreprises minières.

Le Gouvernement français veillera à ce que les taxes minières soit régulièrement perçues, sans que des remises individuelles du total ou d'une partie de ces taxes puissent être consenties sous quelque prétexte que ce soit.

ARTICLE 6.

Le Gouvernement de la République française s'engage à veiller à ce que les travaux et fournitures nécessités par les constructions éventuelles de routes, chemins de fer, ports, télégraphes, &c., soient octroyés par le Gouvernement marocain suivant les règles de l'adjudication.

Il s'engage également à veiller à ce que les conditions des adjudications, particulièrement en ce qui concerne les fournitures de matériel et les délais impartis pour soumissionner, ne placent les ressortissants d'aucune Puissance dans une situation d'infériorité.

L'exploitation des grandes entreprises mentionnées ci-dessus sera réservée à l'Etat marocain ou librement concédée par lui à des tiers qui pourront être chargés de fournir les fonds nécessaires à cet effet. Le Gouvernement français veillera à ce que, dans l'exploitation des chemins de fer et autres moyens de transport comme dans l'application des règlements destinés à assurer celle-ci, aucune différence de traitement ne soit faite entre les ressortissants des diverses Puissances, qui useraient de ces moyens de transport.

Le Gouvernement de la République usera de son influence sur la Banque d'État afin que celle-ci confère à tour de rôle aux membres de sa direction à Tanger le poste dont elle dispose de délégué à la Commission générale des Adjudications et Marchés.

De même, le Gouvernement français s'emploiera auprès du Gouvernement marocain pour que, durant la période où restera en vigueur l'article 66 de l'Acte d'Algésiras, il confie à un ressortissant d'une des Puissances représentées au Maroc un des trois postes de délégué chérifien au Comité spécial des Travaux publics.

ARTICLE 7.

Le Gouvernement français s'emploiera auprès du Gouvernement marocain pour que les propriétaires de mines et d'autres exploitations industrielles ou agricoles, sans distinction de nationalité, et en conformité des règlements qui seront édictés en s'inspirant de la législation française sur la matière, puissent être autorisés à créer des chemins de fer d'exploitation destinés à relier leurs centres de production aux lignes d'intérêt général ou aux ports.

ARTICLE 8.

Il sera présenté tous les ans un rapport sur l'exploitation des chemins de fer au Maroc, qui sera établi dans les mêmes formes et conditions que les rapports présentés aux assemblées d'actionnaires des sociétés de chemins de fer françaises.

Le Gouvernement de la République chargera un des administrateurs de la Banque d'État de l'établissement de ce rapport, qui sera, avec les éléments qui en seront la base, communiqué aux censeurs, puis rendu public, avec, s'il y a lieu, les observations que ces derniers croiront devoir y joindre d'après leurs propres renseignements.

ARTICLE 9.

Pour éviter autant que possible les réclamations diplomatiques, le Gouvernement français s'emploiera auprès du Gouvernement marocain afin que celui-ci défère à un arbitre désigné *ad hoc* pour chaque affaire d'un commun accord par le consul de France et par celui de la Puissance intéressée, ou, à leur défaut, par les deux Gouvernements de ces consuls, les plaintes portées par des ressortissants étrangers contres les autorités marocaines, ou les agents agissant en tant qu'autorités marocaines, et qui n'auraient pu être réglées par l'intermédiaire du consul français et du consul de Gouvernement intéressé.

Cette procédure restera en vigueur jusqu'au jour où aura été institué un régime judiciaire inspiré des règles judiciaires de législation des Puissances intéressées et destiné à remplacer, après entente avec elles, les tribunaux consulaires.

ARTICLE 10.

Le Gouvernement français veillera à ce que les ressortissants étrangers continuent à jouir du droit de pêche dans les eaux et ports marocains.

ARTICLE 11.

Le Gouvernement français s'emploiera auprès du Gouvernement marocain pour que celui-ci ouvre au commerce étranger de nouveaux ports au fur et à mesure des besoins de ce commerce.

ARTICLE 12.

Pour répondre à une demande du Gouvernement marocain, les deux Gouvernements s'engagent à provoquer la revision, d'accord avec les autres Puissances et sur la base de la Convention de Madrid, des listes et de la situation des protégés étrangers et des associés agricoles au Maroc dont parlent les articles 8 et 16 de cette convention.

Ils conviennent également de poursuivre auprès des Puissances signataires toutes modifications de la Convention de Madrid que comporterait, le moment venu, le changement du régime des protégés et des associés agricoles.

ARTICLE 13.

Toutes clauses d'accord, convention, traité ou règlement qui seraient contraire aux précédentes stipulations sont et demeurent abrogées.

ARTICLE 14.

Le présent accord sera communiqué aux autres Puissances signataires de l'Acte d'Algésiras près desquelles les deux Gouvernements s'engagent à se prêter mutuellement appui pour obtenir leur adhésion.

ARTICLE 15.

La présente convention sera ratifiée, et les ratifications seront échangées à Paris aussitôt que faire se pourra.

Fait à Berlin, le 4 novembre, 1911, en double exemplaire.

JULES CAMBON.
KIDERLEN.

[46791] No. 495.

War Office to Foreign Office.—(Received November 23.)

(Secret.)

Sir, *War Office, November 22, 1911.*

I AM commanded by the Army Council to acquaint you, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, that they have had under consideration the copies of despatches—forwarded under cover of your Secret letter of the 26th October, 1911—from His Majesty's Ambassadors at Madrid and Paris, reporting and commenting on certain proposals with regard to Morocco which the French Government contemplate laying before the Spanish Government.

2. It appears to the council that, in the event of strained relations or actual hostilities between this country and a strong naval Power, the possession of the coast line of the north-west corner of Morocco, including the southern shore of the Straits of Gibraltar, by that Power would considerably increase the risk to the conveyance of British troops by sea in or out of the Mediterranean, and at the same time would constitute an additional menace to the naval base of Gibraltar; for although there might be a stipulation not to fortify the coast in time of peace, there appears to be no reason why Tangier or other points along the coast line should not provide a base for the action of torpedo craft in time of war, and afford facilities for the use of air craft and wireless telegraphy.

3. In these circumstances, the Army Council are of opinion that the proposal that France should take over from Spain and establish a sphere of influence on the north-west shore of Morocco, westward from Point Alcazar on the north to a point 20 miles south of Laraiche on the west, must, from a military point of view, be regarded as disadvantageous to the interests of this country.

I am, &c.
R. H. BRADE.

[46863] No. 496.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen.

(No. 222.)

(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, November 23, 1911*

THE action of Herr von Kiderlen in making public without previous communication with me his version of conversations between the German Ambassador and myself is most unusual, if not unprecedented, and I should be justified in laying before Parliament my words of the conversation. In the first instance, however, I propose only to do in my speech on Monday what has already been done by the German Minister for Foreign Affairs. Meanwhile, you should say nothing to Herr von Kiderlen about his speech or mine.

[46431] No. 497.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 488.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, November 23, 1911.*

I HAVE received your Excellency's telegram No. 189 of the 21st instant relative to the proposed formation of a syndicate of German, French, and British financiers for commercial undertakings in Morocco.

I should be glad if you would tell the French financier who informed you of the proposal that His Majesty's Government are in principle favourable to the association of British and foreign capital, but cannot give a formal assurance of support to any particular scheme until they are in receipt of detailed information, notably as to the share to be allotted to this country.

Your Excellency might at the same time endeavour to obtain such detailed information.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[47154] No. 498.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen.

(No. 286.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, November 23, 1911*

THE German Ambassador made to me this evening a communication from the German Chancellor to the following effect:—

The disclosures made in the speech of Captain Faber, M.P., as to which the German Government did not know how far they were true, but which had not been contradicted in England, had caused in Germany a commotion which was comprehensible. The German Government were being attacked on the ground that they had not taken the public into their confidence, and had not replied sufficiently to the speech of the Chancellor of the Exchequer. The German Chancellor thought that the best way to allay this agitation would be to make a frank statement of what had taken place. Such a statement was more and more imperatively demanded by German public opinion. Herr von Kiderlen had, therefore, been instructed to make to the Budget Committee of the Reichstag the statement which had now been published. He had also made a statement about Captain Faber's disclosures that would be published shortly.

The comments in the British press upon Captain Faber's speech and upon the British readiness to go to war with Germany on the side of France had greatly intensified the temper of public opinion in Germany. The German people thought themselves face to face with a coalition ready to pounce upon them at any moment; and, as they were unconscious of having any quarrel with England itself, they looked upon England as the principal enemy: for while France took no warlike preparations last September England was ready.

The speech which I was to make on Monday would have a great bearing on all these questions. If it was irritating to German feeling, there would for a long time be no prospect of allaying the ideas which had been roused in Germany.

The general trend of the German Chancellor's communication was that he hoped I would co-operate in the attempt which he had made in his speeches to soothe the feeling of antagonism.

I replied that the character of what I intended to say on Monday in dealing with the speeches of the German Chancellor would be the same as I had already, in previous conversations with Count Metternich, said that it would be. But it seemed to me very unusual, if not unprecedented, to disclose without consulting me, as Herr von Kiderlen had done, a version of what had been said in conversations between Count Metternich and myself.

Count Metternich observed that Herr von Kiderlen had not given the whole of what had passed, but only such things as he thought were necessary and useful for public opinion.

I replied that Herr von Kiderlen had made his own selection without consulting me. I must now go through my records of the conversations and make my selection. As Herr von Kiderlen had made public a part of what had passed between Count Metternich and me as to the speech of the Chancellor of the Exchequer, it would be necessary for me to deal more fully with this speech than I would otherwise have dealt with it.

As to Captain Faber's speech: I had not expected to have to refer to it, and indeed I had so far read it only cursorily. It had apparently been founded upon such gossip as Captain Faber had been able to pick up, and my recollection was that it referred solely to certain precautionary measures which we were alleged to have taken against attack.

Count Metternich said that he thought it included a statement that British cruisers had been sent to sea with instructions to sink any German destroyers.

I said that any such statement was absolutely untrue. We had not prepared for any aggressive action. The impression on the German public mind seemed to be that we were aggressive, while the apprehension in the British public mind was that Germany might be aggressive. If the two Governments were to embark upon a public controversy as to which had most reason to think the other aggressive—a controversy which I hoped would never take place—we should have to disclose the information which poured in upon us as to the study and exploration of a large part of our coast by German officers, work that could be done only from the point of view of a German invasion of England.

Count Metternich deprecated the idea that there were German agents spying upon our fortified places; though two British officers had been taken when spying in Germany, the two Germans whom we had arrested were simply foolish or discredited persons; and with regard to the rest of our coast, he said that British maps and charts were published which gave full information.

I replied that I was not thinking of spies, technically so called, but there was no doubt that a very careful exploration of our coast and open harbours had been made on behalf of Germany. However, I had not mentioned this in order to be controversial, but only to point out that there was another side to the shield, and that if people in Germany took as evidence of aggressive intentions on our part such precautions of defence as those alleged in Captain Faber's speech, then some Captain Faber or other might pick up some gossip as to the German exploration of our coast, and might just as well excite people on this side about German aggressive intentions.

As to what had passed during the summer and autumn, there were times when we had been in the dark as to the objects at which Germany was aiming. Though I had never thought the idea probable, and though I had always refused to believe in it, there had been passages in some of Count Metternich's earlier communications the tone of which gave the impression that Germany was going to force upon France the choice between demands so humiliating that France could not honourably accept them, and war. If German public opinion thought that it was we who had warlike intentions, it ought to be borne in mind that British public opinion had had the same apprehension with regard to Germany.

The conversation was on both sides very friendly in tone, in spite of the subject matter of it.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[45870] No. 499*.

Sir Edward Grey to M. Daeschner.

Sir, *Foreign Office, November* 24, 1911.

WITH reference to the note which you were good enough to address to me on the 17th instant, I have the honour to express to you the thanks of His Majesty's Government for the communication of the notes exchanged between the French Ambassador at Berlin and the German Minister for Foreign Affairs, in connection with the recent Morocco convention.

His Majesty's Government have duly taken note of the documents in question.

I have, &c.

E. GREY.

[46837] No. 499.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 24.)

(No. 390.)

Sir, *Berlin, November* 21, 1911.

I HAVE the honour to report that the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs made a further statement before the Budget Commission of the Reichstag yesterday in regard to certain points connected with the Morocco Convention.

In reply to a question raised as to the protection of German shipping interests, his Excellency said that freedom for the coasting trade had been established by the Act of Algeciras, the continued validity of which was in no way affected by the present convention. The provisions of that convention in regard to transit traffic had special reference to the transit traffic with Algeria, and were so framed as to prevent the grant of special customs facilities on the Algerian frontier to the detriment of sea-borne commerce. Any such measures would constitute a direct infringement of the treaty, which afforded definite guarantees against a system of bounties for the benefit of French firms.

In regard to the foreign postal establishments, his Excellency referred to the fact that England had continued and extended her postal system in spite of the agreement of 1904. No mention was made of posts in the negotiations, and on this point, therefore, the *status quo* was maintained, that is to say that Germany retained the right to her own postal service. In respect of the telegraph system Germany was guaranteed generally against differential treatment, and she possessed besides the special right to land a cable at Casa Blanca.

All German treaty rights in respect of Morocco remained in force in virtue of the axiom of international law that treaties contracted by a protected State continued to be operative after such protectorate had been established. Any complaints which Germany might have to make to Morocco in regard to her treaty rights would in future be addressed to the Sultan through French channels.

I have, &c.

W. E. GOSCHEN.

[47100] No. 500.

Sir F. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 25.)

(No. 198.)

Sir, *Vienna, November* 23, 1911.

I HAVE the honour to report that the subject of Anglo-German relations during the past summer continues to occupy the Viennese press. The "Neue Freie Presse" increases in violence with each day, and in a leading article published this morning speculates on how Prince Bismarck would have treated the telegram reporting the conversation which you, Sir, had with Count Metternich.

"Never since the founding of the German Empire," it declares, "has such a telegram been received in Berlin; never since the days of Benedetti and Ems has anyone attempted to intimidate Germany by sharp words; never since the Duke of Gramont has anyone except Sir Edward Grey threatened that mighty Empire with the outbreak of war."

It maintains that you, Sir, at once adopted a bellicose tone in speaking to the German Ambassador, and that your words, spoken in private, were then underlined in public by Mr. Lloyd George's speech. What, it asks, would have been Bismarck's attitude? Would he have avenged the insult with the sword, or would his genius have found some better way?

The "Neue Freie Presse" finds it incomprehensible that the British Government should wish to evoke the hostility of Germany on account of Morocco. "Every word of Sir Edward Grey's burns," it says, "like hot lead on the heart of the German nation." What possible advantage, it asks, can it be to England to arouse such feelings, in view of Germany's declaration that she was not seeking to acquire any Moroccan territory? Why, after Mr. Asquith's declaration that England had no objection to an increase in the German colonies in Central Africa, did Sir Edward Grey use language to the German Ambassador of a kind which as a rule is only employed immediately before the outbreak of war? England's duty as an ally of France is not,

in the opinion of the "Neue Freie Presse," an adequate explanation; for that duty could never have compelled England to outdo France herself and to prepare her fleet for action while the French navy lay quiet. "Sir Edward Grey spoke," says the "Neue Freie Presse," "like a man whose temperament suddenly bursts out, and who is guided by personal dislikes and prejudices until he forgets what his aim is, and becomes the tool of alien purposes. Fidelity to a treaty cannot explain the fact that the British Secretary of State spoke with more heat than the French Minister for Foreign Affairs; and that only the prudence of some of the members of the British Cabinet prevented a war which would have been a historical crime."

It now, continues this paper, lies with the English people to determine whether this policy is to continue in the future, now that it knows the facts as to the proximity of war during last summer. The article laments that your policy, Sir, should, as it alleges, have crushed the beginnings of a reconciliation in regard to naval armaments, and should have rendered that question ten times more difficult by this pouring of oil on the flames. Threats can, it declares, never succeed in intimidating Germany, and England had better give up her mistaken policy before the German people become convinced that England is behind every attack on her; for it is impossible that the relations between the two countries should continue in their present condition. "The necessary preliminary to a new naval policy in Germany is," it concludes, "the adoption of quite a new foreign policy in England."

Articles from the English newspapers are reproduced here *in extenso*, and the entire Viennese press is much occupied by the approaching debate in the House of Commons. Your statement, Sir, is awaited with extreme interest.

I have, &c.
FAIRFAX L. CARTWRIGHT.

[47120] No. 501.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir A. Hardinge.

(No. 51.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, November* 25, 1911.

FRANCO-GERMAN Convention respecting Morocco.

My telegram No. 50 of the 10th November.

I have informed French Government that His Majesty's Government adhere to the convention.

Please ascertain if the Portuguese have decided whether they can adhere, and, in that event, whether they will now do so.

[47185] No. 502.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 26.)

[By Post.]

(No. 191.)
(Telegraphic.) *Paris, November* 25, 1911.

MOROCCO Works Syndicate.

Your despatch No. 488 of the 23rd instant. The German, French, and British participations would be equal.

I am promised a rough draft of the agreement by Monday morning.

[47136] No. 503.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 26.)

(No. 193. Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Paris, November* 26, 1911.

WITH regard to the projected negotiations between France and Spain concerning the Spanish zones in Morocco and the special position of Tangier, a very satisfactory conversation which I have had this morning with the Minister for Foreign Affairs renders it unnecessary that I should act on the instructions received in your despatches Nos. 485 of the 20th and 487 of the 22nd instant respectively.

[47201] No. 504.

Sir R. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 27.)

(No. 339.)
Sir, *Tangier, November* 17, 1911.

I HAVE the honour to report that the Tangier press of the 14th instant announced the appointment of Sid Mohammed-el-Mokri as Grand Vizier. The appointment, of course, was only a question of time.

I telegraphed my congratulations to his Excellency, and have received a telegram of thanks in reply.

I have, &c.
REGINALD LISTER.

[47202] No. 505.

Sir R. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 27.)

(No. 340.)
Sir, *Tangier, November* 18, 1911.

I REGRET to state that during the last week disclosures of a very serious nature have been made with regard to the conduct of the Basha of Tangier, who, as you will recollect, is a son of El Mokri. The young man is only about 20 years of age, perfectly unfitted for his post, and his appointment appeared to me at the time to be a most unfortunate one, made as it was under the auspices of the French, for it continued the abuse from which this country has always suffered of the appointment to all the high posts in the State of the relations of the Vizier who was in power at the moment, for the sole object of squeezing the people and adding to the wealth of the family. Young Mokri has proved no exception to the rule. Justice has been bought and sold in the most scandalous manner: innocent persons, who have been sent up to the basha as witnesses in cases, have been seized and detained, and have been made to pay a heavy price for their liberty, and tortures of all sorts have been inflicted on the unfortunate prisoners to extort money. The French are very much upset at what has occurred, as to cover himself the young scoundrel has been giving out that he has been acting in accordance with the wishes of the French. The whole matter, the discovery of which is mainly due to Mr. Harris, is being very carefully sifted, and the French are writing to El Mokri. I will report further to you on the subject as soon as the facts have been made quite clear.

I have, &c.
REGINALD LISTER.

[47203] No. 506.

Sir R. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 27.)

(No. 341.)
Sir, *Tangier, November* 19, 1911.

DURING the course of last week Menebhi received telegrams from Hadj Thami to the effect that his arrangements with the Sultan had been effected, and that the money had been actually paid over. He asked Menebhi to ascertain from the French whether there was now any objection to his leaving for the south. He has been told that the sooner he starts the better, and is no doubt already on his way. I told M. de Billy I hoped that his reinstatement as Basha of Marrakesh would not be long delayed now, as our reports as to Dris Mennou's behaviour continued to be very bad. He replied that he adhered to the views which he had expressed to me with regard to the proposed reorganisation of the bashaliks of the south, as reported in my despatch No. 337 of the 12th instant, and hoped that it might be possible to give effect to them before long.

I have, &c.
REGINALD LISTER.

[47287] No. 507.

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 27.)

(No. 193.)

Sir, *Madrid, November 22, 1911.*

I HAVE not noticed that, as the date (as yet unfixed) of the impending negotiation between France and Spain approaches, there has been any change in the attitude in which the Spanish Government is preparing to face the ordeal.

In the view of Señor Canalejas and Señor Garcia Prieto, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs, the stipulations of the new Franco-German treaty, in so far as they concern the parts of Morocco to which Spain lays claim, are powerless to cancel or even modify, without the consent of Spain, the provisions of the General Act of Algeciras and those of the secret treaty with France of October 1904. It is freely given out in the press of all parties, except the Republican, which alone desires to restrict the responsibilities of Spain in Morocco, that Spain will only consent to the modification or suppression of the Algeciras Act, in favour of the new arrangements with Germany, on the express condition that the 1904 treaty shall come into full force by leaving Spain in virtual possession of her sphere of influence as therein defined. If France insists on her demand that Spain shall make good by a cession of territory a portion of the price which France has been compelled to pay to Germany in exchange for a recognition of her protectorate in Morocco, Spain could only think of ceding a strip of her zone in South Morocco. On no account would she consent to cutting off the most productive portion of her northern zone, namely, the region of Alcazar and Larache, forming part of her sphere of influence as defined in 1904. A recent issue of the "Temps" having stated, on the authority of its correspondent in Madrid, that the Spanish Government was weakening on this point, and that a disposition now prevailed in Madrid to meet the wishes of France in return for a loan of 300,000,000 fr., the Spanish Premier, at his next daily interview with the newspaper correspondents, indignantly denied that any such idea was entertained by the Spanish Government, adding that he much doubted if any Spanish statesman could be found to barter away the honour of Spain in the manner indicated by the French newspaper. Simultaneously the semi-official "Diario Oficial" published an article which evidently expresses the views of the Government with regard to the French demand for control over the whole course of the proposed Tangier–Fez Railway. "Surely," it remarks, "the French negotiators of the stillborn convention of 1902 and of the convention of 1904 knew what they were about. But did it ever occur to them to eliminate Larache and Alcazar from the Spanish sphere, or to claim that a railway passing through it should come under French control? Did any such idea suggest itself to M. Rouvier or M. Jules Cambon when they negotiated in 1905 with Señor Montero Ríos a secret exchange of notes bearing expressly on the status of Tangier and on the distribution of public works? M. Pichon, indeed, negotiated a loan convention with Mokri in 1910 which made provision for a Tangier–Alcazar Railway under the joint control of France and Morocco. But when Spain protested, M. Cruppi hastened to explain that the French Government had never dreamed of making the railway without her co-operation. He added that he would gladly examine with the Spanish Government the best way of arranging for the joint participation of the two countries in the management of the line. The Spanish Government and press promptly replied that they did not understand the grounds on which France claimed any such participation for herself in what should be a purely Spanish enterprise. But now the French colonials return to the charge by demanding that the Tangier–Alcazar Railway shall be placed entirely in French hands. It will be interesting to hear their reasons. One could understand them, though even so they would not be convincing, if Tangier were to be French, and not autonomous, as everybody knows it is to be. As matters stand, the French contention is quite untenable. Moreover, the French protectorate at Fez will be perfectly able to communicate with Europe by way of the Atlantic coast and Algeria without using the line to Tangier; and supplies will always be obtainable from Algeria on the one side and from the Showia on the other. As for military reinforcements, Europe would never allow any considerable force to be landed at Tangier. All this shows that French control over the line would be to France a convenience rather than a necessity. How, then, can Spain be asked to surrender, in order to provide France with a mere convenience, rights solemnly conferred upon her by treaty, or a position the abandonment of which might endanger the independence and integrity of the Spanish nation?"

The publication in Paris, and subsequently in Madrid, of the secret treaty of 1904 has led to a renewed discussion in the Madrid press of the extent of the rights conferred on Spain thereby. The controversy has turned mainly on the point whether the occupation of Alcazar in June last constituted a violation of the treaty engagements of Spain, as contended by the French press, and chiefly by the "Temps." The Spanish press replies unanimously in the negative. It urges that even if there was a technical breach of article 2 of the secret convention which prohibits action in the Spanish sphere without the previous concurrence of France, Spain was morally justified in holding that the alteration of the *status quo* in Morocco, foreseen in article 3, had actually taken place, and that she was therefore at liberty to act independently. But, admitting that her action, unapproved by France, was in contravention of the secret treaty, it was undoubtedly, the press argues, in full agreement with the arrangement made at Algeciras, which are expressly stated in article 123 of the General Act to supersede all other agreements with which they may prove to be in conflict. France always contended that it was in virtue of the duty undertaken at Algeciras by herself and Spain to instruct and organise the native police at Casa Blanca that she invited Spain to embark with her on military operations to reduce to subjection the turbulent tribes of the Showia hinterland. Similarly, when the German Minister at Tangier inquired as to the truth of the rumour that French troops were to be landed to restore order in the country about Tetuan, M. Regnault had replied that the report was obviously untrue, inasmuch as it would naturally be the duty not of France, but of Spain, whose officers instructed the Tetuan police, to see to the tranquillity of that region. Why, then, was objection raised to the action of Spain when she assumed the task of keeping order at Alcazar, a place lying in the vicinity of the port of Larache, where, as in Tetuan, the native police was instructed by Spanish officers?

M. Geoffray meanwhile, the French Ambassador, whose influence continues to be strongly exerted in favour of an amicable settlement of the controversy on the basis of the 1904 treaty, has been engaged in Paris during the last ten days in consultation with the French Government. His return to Madrid was awaited with impatience, not unmixed with apprehension, lest the influence of the more extreme members of the colonial party may prove to have prevailed against his own more moderate counsels.

The Spanish Government are still in doubt concerning the point which they raised in the course of the conversations at San Sebastian between Señor Garcia Prieto, the French Ambassador and myself, in the month of August last, namely whether, after satisfying France by means of a cession of territory they would have any security against a similar demand for territorial compensation being made on them by Germany. Their perplexity on this point has naturally not been diminished by statements which appear from time to time in the press, to the effect that Germany will shortly open negotiations with them for the acquisition of Spanish Guinea. Telegrams, indeed, from Berlin have lately been published in the Madrid newspapers to the effect that negotiations with that object in view have already been opened between M. Jules Cambon and the German Foreign Minister. These statements have been met here with a peremptory denial, but the impression remains that Germany will not long tolerate the intrusion of so considerable a Spanish wedge into the body of her augmented colony of the Cameroons.

I have, &c.

MAURICE DE BUNSEN.

[47166] No. 508.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 27.)

(No. 393.)

Sir, *Berlin, November 24, 1911.*

THE explanations given to the Budget Committee by Herr von Kiderlen-Waechter with regard to the conversations which took place between the German Ambassador in London and yourself at the time of the dispatch of the "Panther" to Agadir have been discussed both in the Budget Committee and the press on strict party lines, and the various speakers and writers have had, it is presumed, one eye on the forthcoming elections.

The party of the Centre and its press state that they entirely approve the attitude of the Government towards both England and France, and express their great surprise

that after the lucid and satisfactory statements of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, people should still be found to criticise that attitude.

The National Liberals state that the Government, through their secretive methods, were themselves to blame for the charges of weakness that were so unanimously brought against them in connection with their dealings with the British Government. Herr Bassermann stated in the debate that the strong measure of sending a ship to Agadir, which had brought the country within measurable distance of war, was out of proportion with the results that had been obtained, and that its failure to do more could not fail to have an adverse effect upon German policy generally and Germany's Eastern policy in particular. He added that the whole affair showed that it was impossible for the Government to carry out a foreign policy unless they took the public into their confidence, and showed some regard for popular feeling.

The Social Democrats welcome the statement of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, that the Imperial Government had never contemplated the acquisition of any Moroccan territory, but criticise the dispatch of the "Panther" to Agadir, which had given the public a different impression.

In discussing this point in the Budget Committee, Herr Bebel, the Social Democratic leader, said that in their communication to the Powers on the 3rd July, the Imperial Government had given as a reason for the dispatch of the "Panther" the anxiety of the German inhabitants of Agadir. Nothing whatever had been heard, however, either of these inhabitants or their anxiety, and the impression everywhere had been that this reason was merely an excuse. The British Government had evidently shared this very general impression, and had, so it was said, asked for an explanation. Receiving no answer for a fortnight they had repeated their request, which appeared, from the tenour of the answer given them by the Imperial Government, to have been regarded here as an insult. It seemed to him, Herr Bebel, that the conversation between Sir Edward Grey and the Ambassador had been carried on in a very unusual form. The German Ambassador was said to have presented himself to Sir E. Grey in such a state of excitement, that the latter had said to him that before entering upon any discussion he had better go home and recover his temper. This was at all events what he and his friends had heard from London, and unless it was contradicted, it would explain the decision of the British Cabinet that Mr. Lloyd George should deliver his speech. Herr Bebel then said that it was clear that up to a certain date the British Government had not been sufficiently informed on the subject of Agadir, and in support of this statement read some extracts from Mr. Asquith's speech of the 27th. He also called attention to the fact that the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs had, in his statements, made no mention of the explanations given in that speech.

Dr. Arendt also took part in the debate in committee. He attacked Herr Bassermann for his inconsistency in first stating that his party did not want war, and then saying that instead of sending a ship to Agadir the Government ought to have demonstrated on Germany's western frontier, a proceeding which could not have failed to bring about war. He said that the dispatch of the "Panther" to Agadir had attained its object, and so far the policy of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs must be regarded as having been successful. If, however, one considered the consequences which might have arisen from that step, it must be admitted that it had been a somewhat dangerous experiment. From the statements they had just heard it was evident that in July the situation had been highly critical. He agreed with some previous speakers in thinking that as Mr. Lloyd George's speech had been a public utterance, a public protest should have been made from the German side. For this reason he regretted that the Chancellor had not taken the opportunity of his speech in the Reichstag to let that House and the country know what answer he had sent to England. He would have had the whole country with him, as he could have shown that before Mr. Lloyd George's speech was made, the British Government had been duly informed of the object with which the "Panther" had been sent to Agadir.

He finally maintained that the press had been chiefly responsible for the misunderstandings and misconceptions which had surrounded the whole question. The chief blame rested with the semi-official newspapers, which had misled public opinion by raising expectations which had not been realised by the course of events. He also gave his opinion that, when the events of the whole year came to be reviewed, it would be found that British diplomacy had been successful all along the line. This was, at all events, the impression in German national circles, and this accounted for their general feeling of depression. This depression would not have been felt in so great a degree if the public had received earlier information with regard to the

proceedings and intentions of the Government. He hoped that in the future the directors of their foreign policy would take this lesson to heart.

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs then addressed the committee. He said that no question had been asked by the British Government which had remained unanswered. He thought that he had already made that quite clear. As for the press, he had not thought it necessary to contradict all the misleading news it had published. If he had done so he would have passed his whole time issuing *démentis*, and he would have had no time for anything else. He also defended the Government against the charge of having reversed Prince Bülow's policy of maintaining the sovereignty of the Sultan of Morocco. He said that it had been impossible to continue that policy in view of the fact that the Sultan had himself sold his sovereignty. He did not think that the world of Islam expected Germany to maintain a fictitious sovereignty, and, moreover, he thought that the connection of Morocco with Turkey had been much exaggerated. He observed that the Government had been reproached for not having enlightened the public sufficiently respecting the reasons for the dispatch of the "Panther" to Agadir—to this he would answer that it had been explained through the "Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung" that the ship had been sent for the protection of German subjects at Agadir. It had also been said that he had made a statement to the effect that the Government desired to acquire one of three harbours in Morocco. That was absolutely untrue. He added that the rumour that the Government intended to acquire a foothold in Morocco was chiefly due to the publication of a certain pamphlet. This pamphlet had been shown to him before its publication. But that did not mean that he had given it his approbation. On the contrary, he had advised the author not to publish it. If, moreover, the pamphlet had been published in its original form, its reception by the public would probably have been somewhat different, as, when he saw it, it contained the suggestion that Germany should not only annex Morocco, but the department of the Rhône as well!

After a few remarks from other members of the committee, the debate was closed.

I have, &c.
W. E. GOSCHEN.

[47167] No. 509.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received November* 27.)

(No. 394.)
Sir, *Berlin, November* 24, 1911.

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith a despatch which I have received from Colonel Russell, military attaché to this embassy, relating to the employment of coloured troops by the French in European warfare.

I have, &c.
W. E. GOSCHEN.

Enclosure in No. 509.

Lieutenant-Colonel Russell to Sir E. Goschen.

(No. 30.)
Sir, *Berlin, November* 21, 1911.

I HAVE the honour to inform you that at yesterday's resumption of the proceedings in the Budget Committee of the Reichstag the question of the so-called "Black Peril" was discussed.

General Wandel, representing the Prussian War Office, attended the meeting and asserted that the "Black Peril' was not so great as had formerly been believed by many people to be the case.

In the near future, he continued, there could be no possibility of the French occupation of Morocco providing that country with any considerable accession of military strength. A long period must elapse before large bodies of troops could be raised in that region. On the other hand, it could not be denied that in course of time an increase in the military strength of France in Morocco might take place.

A National Liberal deputy then stated that he was able to assert from personal knowledge that the military qualities of the natives in question were by no means to be despised. He thought it therefore desirable to urge that one should be prepared for

the necessity of taking precautions against this danger. This remark produced a strong protest from a Socialist deputy against any increase of armaments.

Another Socialist deputy protested later on that, so far from being able to draw troops from Morocco in time of war for employment in Europe, France would be obliged to keep European troops in Morocco.

In connection with the statements which had been made with regard to the military qualities of the population of Morocco the representative of the War Office then proceeded to give some information as to the achievements of the coloured troops employed by the French in the war of 1870.

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Herr von Kiderlen-Waechter, then remarked that the figures given in the Reichstag as to the number of coloured troops taking part in the war of 1870–71 originated from the General Staff.

He further stated that the matter of universal service in Algeria was at present only a question of an experiment, which had been strongly opposed by the colonists. These latter foresaw a danger for themselves in giving the coloured men a military training, and were of opinion that the chances of insurrections were increased by this means. Those who pointed to the Sikhs and Gurkhas must not forget the action of the sepoys in the great mutiny.

A member of the Centre then enquired if, as had frequently been urged, two army corps had been mobilised instead of sending the ship to Agadir, what would have been the cost of such a mobilisation.

It was subsequently decided, however, in accordance with the wish of a majority of the members of the committee, that this question should not be proceeded with.

I have, &c.

ALICK RUSSELL, *Military Attaché.*

[47169] No. 510.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 27.)

(No. 396.)

Sir, *Berlin, November 24, 1911.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 393 of to-day's date, I have to lay before you some press opinions respecting the statements of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. The "Lokal-Anzeiger" in its new quality of a semi-official organ, pays a highly coloured tribute of praise to the Government in an article entitled "Eine erlösende Tat."

It says that France had become somewhat deaf, and that it was only after the dispatch of the "Panther" to Agadir that she recovered her hearing. She then, and only then, entered into serious negotiations with Germany, and anyone who wished for this result must also approve of the means which brought it about, namely, the dispatch of the German war-ship to Agadir.

After that event the conferences between the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and the French Ambassador had followed a normal and quiet course, until the 21st July, when they had suddenly been interrupted by "the interference of Sir Edward Grey, notwithstanding the fact that he had been duly informed at the proper moment of the intentions of the German Government." There had been, the article proceeds to say, some good people in Germany who had endeavoured to show that Sir Edward Grey had some grounds for his interference, but now the statements of Herr von Kiderlen had clearly shown that when Sir Edward Grey, in his conversation with the German Ambassador, had hinted at British intervention, he had been led to do so by the irresponsible statements of a Germanophobe press, disregarding the fact that he had been formally and officially informed of the true reasons for the German proceedings at Agadir. His extraordinary communication to the German Ambassador had been followed on the same day by the speech of Mr. Lloyd George. The German Government had therefore found themselves face to face with a thoroughly unjustifiable attempt at interference, and the statements which had just been laid before the Committee of the Budget showed that they had taken this threat of interference as seriously as it had been meant. The language in which this had been conveyed to the British Government had left nothing to be desired in the way of clearness. Without either any exaggerated Chauvinism or any undue anxiety for peace at any price, the German Government had caused Sir E. Grey and Mr. Lloyd George to retire behind their barriers, with the successful result that on the 27th July an inspired Reuter's telegram was published

in London, which was equivalent to a distinct retreat on the part of the British Cabinet.

The article then refers to the days when a united Germany found it necessary to come to a reckoning with France, and says :—

"We are not yet certain whether a more powerful enemy will not again confront us with the object of interfering with our right to manage our own national affairs in our own way. Our Government—and no one can deny that they have given proof of it—are standing on guard to defend this right. Army and navy are ready to fulfil their duty on the first call of their War Lord. In such serious and dangerous times there can only be one plan of action for the German people. Party differences must be set aside, and they must stand behind their Government, and by their support give them that strength to which we are entitled by our prestige, our position in the world and our military power.

"The statements published yesterday speak impressive and forcible words. We hope they will be understood and approved by the whole German people. If they are, then we may welcome the publication of these statements as 'eine erlösende Tat,' and we can look forward with perfect tranquillity to whatever developments the present political situation may have in store for us."

The "Tageblatt" does not share the enthusiasm of the "Lokal-Anzeiger" for the manner in which the Morocco question and the difficulties which arose in connection with it have been handled by the Imperial Government. In an able article published yesterday it lays a finger on many of Herr von Kiderlen's inaccuracies and omissions. It says that when you spoke to Count Metternich on the 21st July you knew what the German demands at that time were as you had been informed of them by the French Government. This Herr von Kiderlen had omitted to mention, and he had also, with a cleverness which was rather overdone, not disclosed to the committee the nature and extent of those demands, namely, the cession by France of the coast of French Congo, a large portion of the hinterland, and her right of pre-emption over Belgian Congo. It adds that, when you received Count Metternich on the 21st July, you had not told him bluntly that the German demands would have a detrimental effect on British interests and that you were opposed to them, but that you had merely said that they were unacceptable to France and that the question as to what would happen in Morocco and at Agadir, should the negotiations break down, was causing you some anxiety.

The article adds :—

"The truth is this, and unfortunately the committee was not provided with sufficient material to enable them to realise it : Sir Edward Grey did not wish to say straight out that the British Government disliked the German 'unacceptable' demands even more than compensations in Morocco, because he did not wish to convey the impression that England claimed to have a deciding vote in the disposal of every corner of the world. But although he always spoke of Agadir, his thoughts were elsewhere, and he showed that plainly when he said that England would not stand in the way of any increase of German colonial possessions in the heart of Africa. In the heart of Africa," the article says in parenthesis, "but not on the coast of Africa where, as the 'Times' had pointed out, any change of ownership would touch the life interests of Great Britain. No! Not on the coast, but in the heart of Africa, that is to say, n that region of swamps where we have eventually found our compensation!"

After complimenting the Imperial Government on the energy with which they had met the attempt of the British Government to take part in the Franco-German negotiations, the article calls attention to the grave political mistake which the Government have made in giving out, or causing to be given out, that they have achieved a triumph. It then falls heavily upon the article in the "Lokal-Anzeiger," to which I have called your attention above :—

"Unfortunately," it says, "we read in a semi-official Berlin newspaper an article headed in staring capitals with the bombastic words 'A momentous act,' and it is to be feared that the same sort of thing will be trumpeted forth in all directions by the semi-official manufactory of public opinion. It is the profoundest piece of folly and clumsiness that can possibly be imagined, and the Government should really make some effort to control the zeal of their lacquey press. For, as the historical exposition of the events of July has now begun, it is only to be expected that the English version of

what passed will not be wanting, and it is not difficult to forecast what form the British answer to this song of triumph will take. This is what we shall hear: In your triumphant articles you represent the course of events as having brought about a retreat on the part of England; but what did the demands of Germany look like before the 21st July, and what did they look like afterwards? The question will be asked why Herr von Kiderlen in his statements omitted all mention of his first demands, and there will be no difficulty in proving at least that the retreating was not all on the English side. Our own opinion is that in a bargain, when one always begins by demanding more than one expects to get, the word 'retreat' should never be used. As a matter of fact both sides have given up something; the British Government gave up their claim to take part in our negotiations with France, and the German Government gave up aspirations of a more material nature."

In a subsequent article the "Tageblatt" returns to the charge and says that if Herr von Kiderlen ever thought that public opinion would endorse the bombastic praise of his policy published by his semi-official paper, he must by now be entirely disillusioned, as hitherto, with the exception of that semi-official paper, scarcely a single newspaper in the whole of Germany had expressed any approval of the main points of his policy. On the contrary, the impression was every day gaining strength that the Agadir promenade had been a grave mistake, and that instead of effecting an improvement in the German position it had saddled the country with very serious international difficulties. The "Tageblatt" adds that in the foreign press Germany is now being represented as thirsting for war. This was a grievous error which should be set right at once The speeches in the Reichstag had shown that all parties were agreed that a war on account of the Morocco question was out of the question, and the dissatisfaction of the German people was to be attributed only to the fact that the Government had commenced action with a tremendous flourish of trumpets and had finally had to put up with only a corner of the French Congo.

The "Kölnische Zeitung" prints a telegram from its Berlin correspondent, which would seem to have been inspired from the Wilhelmstrasse, representing the Government as having saved the country from an imminent danger of war with England. The statements made by Herr von Kiderlen were, it says, calculated to refute the allegation that Germany had given way before an unwarrantable interference on the part of England. It was now sufficiently evident that England's attempts at interference had been resisted with calmness and determination under circumstances which were much more critical than people had imagined. No one in Germany desired war, but at the same time everyone was determined not to sacrifice the dignity and interests of the Empire to this love of peace. The Government appeared to have successfully reconciled these two standpoints in their dealings with England, and everyone must be grateful to them for having steered the ship of fate successfully through the reefs and preserved peace without making sacrifices. The crisis was now passed, but the situation was still serious, and the forthcoming declaration of the British Government was eagerly awaited. As far as past events were concerned this declaration would no doubt reveal the English point of view in regard to the disclosures of Herr von Kiderlen, but it would at the same time contain an indication as to the direction which British policy would take in the future towards Germany. Before the date of this declaration the English people would have time to form an opinion on the German disclosures, and it would be seen how they judged a situation the danger of which had never been so clearly evident as now. Germany refused to entertain the possibility that war could break out overnight between two Great Powers without the existence of any actual cause of dispute, and would indeed not admit the existence of such a probability if recent circumstances had not been only too convincing. It would soon be seen whether this opinion was shared by the English people. That such would be the case appeared probable, judging by their habitual character, but the German people must not be blamed if, having learnt wisdom by experience they no longer held optimistic views. It would depend upon the attitude adopted by the Government and by public opinion in England whether the relations between Germany and England were to continue to be mistrustful and unfriendly or whether they were to enter upon a better phase.

An editorial comment is appended to this telegram to the effect that the "Kölnische Zeitung," whilst entirely concurring in the views therein expressed, regretted that the public should not have been informed sooner as to the views and proceedings of the Government. The accusations levelled at German diplomacy, which formed the basis of unprecedented treatment of the Chancellor by the representatives of the people, were now, it says, proved to be unfounded.

The "Vossische Zeitung," in a leading article published last night, praises the attitude adopted by the Government. In July last, it says, Germany stood in danger of a war with England, which apparently a portion at least of the British Cabinet made no effort to avoid. The German Government had observed a firm and dignified attitude in the face of attempts at intimidation, but they at the same time did their utmost to ensure that the blame for a breach which must have involved the world in incalculable misery, should not fall on them.

The disclosures made in regard to the proceedings of the Budget Commission had caused, it says, intense astonishment. Nothing had hitherto been known of the language used by the British Minister for Foreign Affairs to the German Ambassador on the 21st July, and it could not clearly be perceived what had been the cause of it. It had been announced to the Powers that a German gun-boat would proceed to Agadir, and that it would be withdrawn as soon as order was restored, and German merchants required no further special protection. England had on this announcement expressed no wish for explanations, and had made no representations. Nothing had occurred between July 1st, when the notification was made to England, and the 21st, which could justify the British Foreign Office in considering British interests to be affected, and in using threatening language. The answer of the German Ambassador was clear, decided, and judicious, and the result of the conversation appeared to be calculated to affect an improvement in the situation. Then came Mr. Lloyd George's speech, which constituted an unmistakable threat of war. Germany lost no time in making representations. England attempted to mitigate the effect produced by the manifesto, and the negotiations between France and Germany proceeded without the participation of England, and peace was not disturbed.

Everything had not, however, been made clear by the German disclosures. Herr von Kiderlen had obviously been reticent in his description of the critical period, and of the attitude of the British Ministers. Further information had, however, been forthcoming from English sources, and according to all appearances England, or rather the British Government, or at least a part of it, regarded war with Germany as imminent, or even, perhaps, desired to bring it about.

The article goes on to hint that England aimed at producing a war with a view to the eventual weakening of both Germany and France, and it suggests that, when once the German fleet had been sufficiently weakened, England would have deserted her French allies in order to come to terms with Germany, and thus gain possession of the French colonies.

It goes on to say that the opinion was being freely expressed that the relations between England and Germany must become better or worse, they could not remain as they were, since they were, or had been for some months, hardly even correct. German statesmen, as was admitted in the commission even by the supporters of Herr von Heydebrand, had maintained throughout an attitude calculated to uphold Germany's prestige, and, so far as lay in their power, to maintain an honourable peace. In the face of challenges, threats, and dangers from abroad, all party differences disappeared.

Although it is true that, with the exception of the inspired press, scarcely any Germany newspapers have expressed entire approval of the main points of Herr von Kiderlen's policy, it is equally true that there is no German newspaper which has for the moment a good word to say for England. There can be hardly any doubt that, by his statements in committee, Herr von Kiderlen has created a very strong feeling against us, and his object in doing so was obviously to detract public attention from the shortcomings of his own policy. In this he has partially succeeded, aided, as he has been, by recent indiscreet utterances in England, which have been faithfully reproduced and bitterly commented upon by the whole of the German press.

I have, &c.
W. E. GOSCHEN.

[47266] No. 511.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 27.)

(No. 553.)

Sir, *Paris, November 25, 1911.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith a leading article written by the editor of the "Matin" *à propos* of the publication of the secret articles of the Anglo-French Declaration of 1904.

M. Stéphane Lauzanne has several times recently defended M. Delcassé, and

endeavoured to explain to the French public the reasonableness of his policy in signing agreements with England and Spain in 1904 on the subject of Morocco.

M. Lauzanne's defence of M. Delcassé is the counterpart of the constant attacks made on the latter by M. Calmette, editor of the "Figaro."

In the present article M. Lauzanne calls attention, in order to justify M. Delcassé's policy, to the international situation in 1904. He affirms that in 1900 Mr. Chamberlain was advocating a partition of Morocco between England, Germany, and Spain to the exclusion of France. England was to receive Tangier, its hinterland, and the Atlantic slope as far as Laraiche. Considering what danger France ran in finding her aspirations confronted by an Anglo-German combination, and in seeing Tangier in the hands of England, M. Lauzanne is of opinion that M. Delcassé was well advised to come to the arrangements with England and Spain although sacrifices were necessary. By the agreements with Spain of 1904, 160,000 kilom. of Moroccan territory fell to France and only 40,000 kilom. to Spain.

I have, &c.
FRANCIS BERTIE.

[47268] No. 512.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 27.)

(No. 556.)
Sir, *Paris, November 25, 1911.*

THE "Temps" of this evening's issue publishes a leading article on the secret portion of the Anglo-French Declaration of 1904, and on its bearing on the present situation.

It resumés its opinion as follows:—

What can France, in the light of this publication, ask England to do at Madrid in connection with the forthcoming Franco-Spanish negotiations respecting Morocco? If the present situation were the same as in 1904, the reply must be "nothing." But changes have occurred: firstly, Spain has not observed her treaty stipulations, and secondly, France has made a heavy sacrifice to free Morocco from the mortgage laid on it by the Act of Algeciras. Therefore France is justly entitled to claim England's intervention at Madrid. The question is what form should this take. The answer is not doubtful. Spain was given more by the Franco-Spanish treaty of October 1904 than was provided for in the agreement (public and secret) with England of the preceding April. A long portion of the coast was promised to Spain by article 3 of the secret agreement with England. Let her keep it, but let her give up the hinterland which France requires in order to ensure liberty of communications between Tangier, Algeria, Casa Blanca, and Fez. This is the line which England's mediation between France and Spain should take. It is her duty to take it in order to aid in the establishment of a permanent agreement between the two nations. If England declines to do so, she will imperil the future relations between Fance and Spain, and will neglect the opportunity of achieving a diplomatic success which will enhance her prestige.

I have, &c.
FRANCIS BERTIE.

[47462] No. 513.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 27.)

(No. 106.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Berlin, November 27, 1911.*

MOROCCO.

"North German Gazette" announced that German war-ship will leave Agadir to-morrow, as all is now quiet, and no further danger exists for German lives and property.

[47460] No. 514.

Sir R. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 27.)

(No. 156.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Tangier, November 27, 1911.*

A RESOLUTION to add twelve Moorish notables to the Commission d'Hygiène was passed at the last meeting of that body, and has been communicated to the Conseil sanitaire, whose assent is necessary before the resolution can become effective.

I hear from the Russian Minister that M. de Billy has admitted to him that he prompted this proposal, although he had received no instructions from his Government to that effect. M. de Billy's action is clearly dictated by a wish to obtain a majority on the commission, as the Moorish members are to be nominated by the Makhzen, and will therefore be creatures of the French. M. Botkine gave vent to a strong criticism of M. de Billy's action. The Commission d'Hygiène has always been looked upon as the body which will eventually be transformed into the municipality, and it seems to me, therefore, wholly inadmissible that so important a modification of its composition should be effected on the very eve of discussion of a scheme for the municipality, whose powers in an internationalised Tangier will be of a very extensive nature. I learn from M. de Villasinda that he intends, in drawing up the circular, to insist very strongly that the *status quo* should not be modified in any way. He tells me that this is the view held very strongly by his Government.

I went to see M. de Billy and expressed my regret to him at the adoption of such a resolution, to which I felt certain my Government would take the strongest possible objection. He replied that the whole thing had been of a merely tentative nature, and pretended to be much surprised at what I said. I said that I must, of course, refer the matter to my Government, but I felt that I should in the meantime express my personal opinion, which was that the absolute maintenance of the *status quo* was essential. My despatch No. 342, which has been forwarded to you by to-day's bag, contains full details of the matter in question.

[50326] No. 515.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir R. Lister.

(No. 93.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, November 27, 1911.*

I HAVE received your despatch No. 344 of the 1st instant, and, as I informed you in my telegram No. 67 of the 5th instant, I entirely approve your attitude in the matter of the proposed modification of the Commission d'Hygiène.

I am glad that you impressed on Mr. Harris the necessity of great caution in any dealings with the newly founded Commission of Moors. It would be unfortunate if an impression were created that a movement of this kind among the Moors was influenced by British inspiration or subject to British control.

I am, &c.
E GREY.

[47120] No. 516.

Sir Edward Grey to Count Metternich.

Your Excellency, *Foreign Office, November 27, 1911.*

HIS Majesty's Government have given their careful consideration to the convention respecting Morocco, concluded between Germany and France, which your Excellency was good enough to communicate to me on the 6th instant. I have much pleasure in informing your Excellency that they have decided to adhere to it.

I have, &c.
E. GREY.

[45541] No. 517.

Foreign Office to Board of Trade.

Sir, *Foreign Office, November* 27, 1911.

WITH reference to the Foreign Office letter of the 9th June, 1910, and previous correspondence relative to the Union des Mines marocaines, I am directed by Secretary Sir E. Grey to transmit to you herewith a copy of a despatch from His Majesty's Ambassador at Berlin,* calling attention to the report—which has since been confirmed—that an agreement has been signed between the union and the Mannesmann Morocco Mining Syndicate.

It will be remembered that when the union was first formed a share of 50 per cent. was allotted to France, 25 per cent. to Germany, and 25 per cent. to the other Powers together: 10 per cent. of this was promised to Great Britain, but, so far as Sir E. Grey is aware, only 6 per cent. was taken up by British capitalists. Under the terms of the agreement now concluded, 20 per cent. of the new combine is allotted to France, 40 per cent. to the Mannesmanns, and 40 per cent. to the old union. This amounts practically to an absolute control of the syndicate by France and Germany, and the reduction of the British share to a negligible quantity.

Sir E. Grey is considering the question whether it would or would not be advisable in the circumstances to intimate to the French Government his dissatisfaction with this particular arrangement and generally, as in the case of the Societé marocaine de Travaux publics, with the smallness of the share allotted to Great Britain in these international syndicates in Morocco. The difficulty is that Sir E. Grey understands there is no eagerness on the part of British capitalists to invest in these undertakings, and it would obviously place His Majesty's Government in an awkward position if, after making representations to the French Government and obtaining a larger allotment, the necessary capital were not forthcoming.

Sir E. Grey would be grateful for an expression of the views of the Board of Trade as to the course they would advise should be adopted in the present case, and for any observations generally, on the subject, which they may desire to offer.

I am, &c.

W. LANGLEY.

[47153] No. 518.

Extract from the "Times" of November 23, 1911.—(*Received at the Foreign Office, November* 27.)

ANGLO-GERMAN RELATIONS: THE OFFICIAL REVELATIONS IN BERLIN.

WE publish below a continuation of the official extracts from Herr von Kiderlen-Waechter's speech before the Budget Committee of the Reichstag on Friday last. The extracts published yesterday dealt principally with the conversations which took place between Sir Edward Grey and Count Wolff-Metternich. The further extracts, published to-day, describe the subsequent course of the negotiations.

Berlin, November 21.

After describing the instructions sent to the German Ambassador in London on the 26th July, Herr von Kiderlen-Waechter gave an historic review of the Morocco question. He told how in 1880 at the time of the Madrid conference Prince Bismarck in a direct report to the Emperor took the view that Germany must welcome the firmest possible establishment of the French in Morocco. Mr. Chamberlain had a scheme for the partition of Morocco in 1899 by which England was to take Tangier and Germany to have a port on the Atlantic coast, but this never came to formal negotiations. In 1905, after the Emperor's visit to Tangier, M. Delcassé made an attempt at direct negotiation, which for want of positive proposals led to no result. Afterwards M. Rouvier again expressed, through semi-official and official channels, a desire to come to an understanding. The word "Congo" was then uttered for the first time. Positive proposals were demanded from the German side, but without leading to any result.

* No. 466.

The Foreign Secretary continued:—

"In the meantime, we had taken up the position that changes in Morocco could only be brought about with the assent of all the signatories to the Madrid Convention in order not to fall between two stools. Prince Bülow was accordingly unable further to discuss the French desires for an understanding which had never been accompanied by concrete proposals."

Coming to the occupation of Shawia he said:—

"One day the Sultan, who naturally always sought to play off France and Germany against each other, protested in great excitement against the occupation of a certain village on the border of the Shawia country. The German Government considered for a long time what was to be done. An ultimatum might have been sent, but what sort of impression would it have made if the Chancellor had stated in the Reichstag that His Majesty the Emperor had declared war because the French occupied some village or other with an unpronounceable name on the edge of the Shawia? The situation for Germany was difficult because it developed gradually. One could never say the Algeciras Act was violated by such action at such a moment, and we raised no objection. We therefore decided that the best policy was to wait, and in case of persistence in the violation of the Algeciras Act to claim full freedom of action for ourselves. France, on the other hand, always represented herself as the mandatory of Europe for the restoration of order and insisted that the measures were merely temporary, and that the Algeciras Act had not been violated.

"VIOLATION OF THE ALGECIRAS ACT.

"Other Powers, notably England, were disposed to concur in the French action. Germany stood alone in her opposition, in connection with which she never even hinted at a claim to part of Morocco. We only asked that France should come to terms with us in regard to the violation of the Act of Algeciras, and that France, as the violation had been committed by her, must come forward with positive proposals. This view was finally expressed in a conversation between the Chancellor and the French Ambassador in Berlin, also in a conversation between Herr von Kiderlen-Waechter and M. Cambon at Kissingen in June. We constantly declared that Germany was willing to leave France a free hand politically, but must demand for herself better guarantees for the maintenance of the principle of the open door, and, furthermore, compensation in the colonial sphere as indemnity for the violation of the Algeciras Act committed by France in establishing herself in Morocco without a previous understanding. The French Ambassador took note of these views of the German Government, but no positive proposals were forthcoming from France. Her answer always was that later on they would be glad to come to an understanding.

"Meanwhile, France had established herself with ever diminishing ceremoniousness. Then, as complaints from German subjects of oppression and appeals for protection were received, especially from Sus, the German Government said to itself, 'France is not the mandatory of Europe; we must claim for ourselves the same right to protect our subjects.' From these considerations followed the despatch of a war-ship to Agadir."

Herr von Kiderlen-Waechter concluded with an *exposé* of the reasons why Germany did not desire territory in Morocco. A colony in Morocco, he said, would have been a great burden. They would have had to contend with perpetual opposition from the French in Morocco and Algeria. Then there were economic and climatic difficulties in the way of German colonisation. He then dealt with the "black peril," rehearsing already known arguments that it would be long before France could raise an army in Morocco, and in case of war in all probability would have to keep a greater number of European troops in Morocco than the number of native soldiers she could take from her colonial army to Europe. They had guaranteed access to ore deposits in the Sus for Germsn industry. German policy had attained in every respect the aim it set itself, namely, the recognition of French political influence in Morocco, better guarantees for the open door, and compensation for the violation of the Act of Algeciras through the cession of colonial territory. "As far as the Spaniards are concerned," he concluded, "we must wait and see how the French come to terms with them. Germany can await the development of things with great tranquillity."

Minute by Sir E. Crowe.

Herr von Kiderlen's Statement before the Committee of the Reichstag.

THE attached extract from to-day's "Times" gives a second and final instalment of Herr von Kiderlen's statement. There are several points which merit attention:—

1. We are now for the first time told on official authority that M. Rouvier in 1905 made overtures to Germany for a definite understanding concerning Morocco. We have known for some time that M. Rouvier was ready, and anxious, to sacrifice M. Delcassé in order to inaugurate a policy of a Franco-German understanding, and that he was subsequently exasperated on finding Germany as irreconcilable as before.

2. Mr. Joseph Chamberlain is now officially declared to have proposed a partition of Morocco to Germany. There is no record of any such proposal in our archives, but, unfortunately, that is not a reason for questioning the accuracy of the statement. It is notorious that in the past the Foreign Office records have never been complete, but that, on the contrary, many of the most important questions of foreign affairs were treated as the private concern of the Secretary of State. It is also known that the German Embassy here has frequently attempted to negotiate or discuss important questions with members of the British Cabinet other than the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. Mr. Chamberlain fell into the trap of conducting such pourparlers with Baron von Eckardstein and finally making at the—I believe, written—suggestion of the German Embassy his speech in which he advocated an alliance with Germany and the United States, only to be promptly and mercilessly attacked by all the semi-official German press for daring to make such a proposal.

However, we have no official knowledge of all this, and as there is no record of the alleged proposal of Mr. Chamberlain respecting a partition of Morocco, I presume His Majesty's Government will always, if necessary, be quite free to hold and declare that they have no knowledge of it, and that if Mr. Chamberlain made such a suggestion he must have done so in his private capacity, as, not being Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, he had no authority for negotiating with a foreign Power.

3. The evidently much compressed account of Germany's attitude in respect of the alleged violation of the Algeciras Act by France is full of inaccuracies, and, in its general outline, altogether misleading. In the same sentence it is said that what France did (in the Shawia) did not constitute a violation of the Algeciras Act, and also that the best policy was to wait and take a certain course "in case of *persistence* in the violation of the Act." Moreover, it is to be remembered that the Franco-German Agreement of 1909, which was subsequent to the Shawia events, avowedly stands on the basis of the Algeciras Act, which cannot therefore have been considered by the parties at that time to have become inoperative through violation of its terms. The French have not, so far as I am aware, ever told us that Germany demanded a cession of territory as *compensation for the violation of the Act*. We have been under the impression that the German demand was justified as compensation for giving France a free hand in the future. It is now stated that after M. Cambon was informed at Kissingen of what Germany was ready to concede in Morocco for compensation elsewhere no answer came from France. "Meanwhile, France was establishing herself unceremoniously in Morocco and German traders asked for protection." "*From these considerations* followed the dispatch of a war-ship to Agadir."

Nothing could be more misleading. No mention is made of the fact that M. Cambon, on returning to Paris from Kissingen, found the French Government had resigned, and that no Ministry was in existence. At that time the German ship was actually on its way to Agadir, and this was of course known to Herr von Kiderlen when he spoke to M. Cambon.

E. A. C.

Foreign Office, November 23, 1911.

[47479] No. 519.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 28.)

(No. 561. Very Confidential.)

Sir, *Paris, November* 26, 1911.

THE instructions contained in your despatch No. 485, Confidential, of the 20th instant, as modified by your telegram No. 306 of the next day and your despatch No. 487 of the 22nd instant, amounted in substance to directions to me to obtain in such manner as I might deem advisable more precise and definite assurances in regard to the internationalisation of Tangier than have been given to you by the French Minister in London and the authoritative text of the draft Franco-Spanish convention. In regard to Tangier, the French Minister informed you that he was authorised to give you officially the assurance that the Government of the republic will not take advantage of its agreements with Germany to go back on the clause in the Franco-Spanish convention of 1904 relative to the special situation of the town and region of Tangier. As a confirmation of your belief that the French Government intend to ensure that adequate arrangements will be made for placing the town and municipal district of Tangier definitely under international control, you refer me to the wording of the draft French declaration communicated to me by M. Regnault on the 19th ultimo in connection with the suggested text of a revised Franco-Spanish agreement, in the first article of which declaration it is stated that, in accordance with article 9 of the Franco-Spanish agreement of 1904, the town of Tangier shall be administered under the sovereignty of the Sultan by a municipality of an international character. You further reminded me that, in my telegram No. 188 of the 20th instant, I informed you that proposals had been drawn up by the President of the Council for an arrangement with Spain in regard to Morocco, and that they would shortly be communicated to His Majesty's Government for consideration. You therefore trusted that these proposals would contain adequate safeguards for securing the internationalisation of Tangier. You desired me to speak in the sense of your despatch No. 487 of the 22nd instant to M. de Selves, explaining the satisfaction of His Majesty's Government at the assurances already received, and the importance they attach to a definite settlement of the matter.

With the object of acting on your directions so far as in conversation with M. de Selves I might find necessary or advisable, I applied for an interview with him. He was not able to receive me yesterday, but he appointed 11 o'clock this morning for me to see him. I was anxious to avoid, if possible, any quotation of the papers left with me by M. Regnault, as I have treated the projet of which that gentleman was the author, under the inspiration of the President of the Council, as dead so far as His Majesty's Government are concerned, as a consequence of a conversation which I had with M. Caillaux on the 18th instant, when, in reply to his observation that "Il faut qu'un arrangement se fasse, il faut que nous en causions," I observed, "Oui, mais en tout cas pas le projet Regnault"; to which he answered, "Proposez donc quelque chose d'autre."

I began the interview with M. de Selves by reminding him of a conversation which, as I had informed him, I had had with M. Cruppi on the 20th instant, and the intention of that gentleman to invite me to meet M. Caillaux at dinner. I remarked that the dinner was to be on the 1st December, and enquired what MM. Caillaux and Cruppi, who evidently were acting together, were likely to say to me.

In the course of the above-mentioned conversation M. Cruppi's standpoint was as follows: In the superior interests of France and England the *entente* between them must be maintained, and the British and French Governments should come to an understanding as to what is reasonable compensation for France to have for the sacrifices which she has made to Germany for the benefit of Spain, or rather on account of which Spain will profit in Morocco. As France was more than justified in going to Fez, Spain acted contrary to treaty in occupying Larache and Alcazar, and His Majesty's Government concurred in that view; and as the Spanish occupation was continued in spite of formal protests by the French Government they would have been within their rights if they had denounced the secret Franco-Spanish agreement of 1904. They had abstained from doing so out of regard for high political considerations, viz., the desire to be in unison with His Majesty's Government and to avoid giving plausible pleas to Spain for throwing herself into the arms of Germany. France has obligations to England under the secret Anglo-French agreement of 1904 in regard to the Atlantic coast of Morocco, and England, as a, so to say, guarantor to Spain of

the Franco-Spanish secret agreement, is in a delicate position. If His Majesty's Government, however, maintain that that agreement is still in full force, the French Government would be justified in calling upon Spain to withdraw from Alcazar and Larache and all the territory occupied by Spanish troops in defiance of the terms of the agreement, and notwithstanding the protests of the French Government; or if His Majesty's Government adhere to their view that Spain was not justified in such occupation, then they must admit that Spain is not entitled to the full benefit of all the advantages accruing to her under the Franco-Spanish agreement if it had remained entirely respected and observed by the Spanish Government. M. Cruppi understood and appreciated the reasons for which His Majesty's Government stipulated for and still maintain the necessity in their naval interest for the undertaking that Spain, and not France, shall hold the Atlantic coast of Morocco as laid down in the Anglo-French secret agreement of 1904, and he considered that the engagement should be observed; but arrangements should be made for freeing from Spanish maladministration or ineptitude the territory between a certain circumference comprehending Tangier (to be neutralised or internationalised) and Alcazar for a railway line giving secure passage for French communications and international trade between Tangier and Fez. This would, he considered, be impossible if the territory through which the railway would run were under Spanish authority, for there would be no kind of proper administration. There were, he said, two suggestions *en l'air:* one for a narrow band ("tuyau") of territory to be excised from Spanish occupation and administration for the purposes of the railway, and another that the Spanish occupation and administration of the Atlantic zone allotted to Spain by M. Delcassé's secret convention of 1904 shall be restricted to the coast and a strip of territory behind it, the remainder (excepting Tangier and some territory in its immediate vicinity, which would be under international administration though within the Spanish zone) to fall to France. M. Cruppi naturally preferred the second alternative.

M. de Selves said that since that conversation and the one which, as I had informed him, I had had with the President of the Council on the 18th instant the situation had changed. He had made proposals to the Cabinet for the negotiations with Spain, which, after hearing his arguments in their support, his colleagues had accepted, and the President of the Republic had approved. They were that, inasmuch as France had in 1904 entered into engagements with England, which still existed, on the subject of Morocco, those engagements should be the basis for the negotiations with Spain in regard to such modifications as may be considered admissible by the British Government in the Franco-Spanish agreement of 1904, with the view of giving compensation to France for the sacrifices which she has made in the French Congo to Germany for a settlement of the Moroccan question as between France and Germany, the result of which will be an improved position for Spain in Morocco. The terms which M. de Selves would desire to arrange with Spain through the French Ambassador at Madrid with the aid of the British Ambassador, after a preliminary discussion and agreement between the French and British Governments, would be that no compensation should be asked of Spain in the north of Morocco. There should merely be a slight rectification of the Loukkos boundary line, so as to obviate constant disputes in regard to it in the vicinity of Alcazar; that the compensation from Spain should be sought in the Spanish southern zone, which should be claimed by France, except Ifni, which, out of consideration for Spanish susceptibilities and its position opposite to the Canaries, should be left with some surrounding territory in Spanish possession. With regard to Tangier and its immediate vicinity, arrangements should be made for its internationalisation, and the railway from Tangier viâ Alcazar to Fez should be constructed by the French Government in co-operation with the Spanish Government, viz., by a syndicate or board, on which the Spanish Government would have representatives, the railway company to be empowered to take measures for the security of the line. With regard to the question of the relations between the Spanish and Moorish Governments on matters concerning the Spanish zone, M. de Selves suggests that the Sultan should appoint a sort of commissioner with full powers to represent His Majesty and to treat all questions arising between the Spanish authorities and the Makhzen.

M. de Selves pointed out that the arrangement which he contemplated would leave Spain in the occupation of Larache and Alcazar, give to her all the zone on the north-west of Morocco, as well as the zone on the Mediterranean coast allotted to her by the convention of 1904. It would pay regard to Spanish interests on the subject of the railway between Tangier and Fez. It would provide for the internationalisation of Tangier and its vicinity—a matter to which you attach great importance—and would

provide compensation in the south for French sacrifices as I had suggested, and it offered a solution of the difficult problem of how to deal with questions between the Spanish and Moorish Governments in the Spanish zone. M. de Selves said that, in making these proposals, he had been guided by the desire to act with His Majesty's Government and to preserve intact the *entente* with England, which, in the interests of both France and England, was so necessary for the mutual protection of their general interests. He asked me whether I thought that his proposals would meet with your concurrence. I told him that I felt confident that you would consider the bases for the negotiations as satisfactory. He will furnish me with a projet for your consideration.

I have, &c.
FRANCIS BERTIE.

[47480] No. 520.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received November* 28.)

(No. 562.)
Sir,
Paris, November 27, 1911.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith the draft agreement for an international Moroccan syndicate, alluded to in my telegram No. 191 of the 25th instant, which I have received from the Paris financier who recently approached me on the subject.

I have, &c.
FRANCIS BERTIE.

Enclosure in No. 520.

Draft Agreement respecting International Moroccan Syndicate.

LES soussignés, ayant reconnu l'utilité de travailler en commun à l'étude des questions relatives au développement économique du Maroc, et à la conclusion de toutes les affaires qui, éventuellement, pourraient résulter de cette étude; convaincus d'autre part, de la nécessité d'associer en vue de cet objet, et par parts égales, les capitaux français, allemands et anglais, ont décidé de former entre eux une association en participation qui sera régie par les conventions suivantes:—

ARTICLE 1er.

Le capital de l'association sera de 750,000 fr. représentés par soixante-quinze parts de 10,000 fr. chacune.

Vingt-cinq parts sont souscrites par M. le Baron de Neuflize, au nom du groupe français.

Vingt-cinq parts sont souscrites par M. Paul de Schwabach, au nom du groupe allemand.

Vingt-cinq parts sont souscrites par Mr. ,au nom du groupe anglais.

ARTICLE 2.

Toute cession opérée par les susnommés ne pourra être faite qu'à des personnes ou sociétés de même nationalité que le cédant, et à la condition que le concessionnaire soit agréé par le comité dont il sera parlé à l'article 4 ci-dessous. Dans ce cas, le cessionnaire devra déclarer en bonne et due forme qu'il adhère à toutes les clauses contenues au présent acte.

ARTICLE 3.

L'association portera le nom d' "Association internationale marocaine."
Elle aura son siège à Paris, 31, Rue Lafayette.

ARTICLE 4.

L'association sera dirigée par un comité de six membres, chacun des trois groupes mentionnés ci-dessus étant représenté par deux membres dans ce comité.

En cas de décès ou de démission d'un membre du comité, son successeur sera désigné par le groupe auquel il appartenait.

Les six premiers membres nommés sont : MM.

ARTICLE 5.

Le comité aura les pouvoirs les plus étendus pour la gestion des intérêts de l'association, sous la seule réserve qu'il ne pourra engager des dépenses supérieures au montant du capital associé.

Toutes ses décisions devront être prises à la majorité et ne seront valables que si cette majorité contient au moins un membre de chaque groupe. Elles seront inscrites dans un registre spécial, et chaque délibération devra porter les signatures de tous les membres du comité ayant assisté à la délibération.

Le comité se réunira autant de fois que les intérêts de l'association l'exigeront.

ARTICLE 6.

Le comité devra réunir les associés au moins une fois par semestre, pour les mettre au courant de l'état des affaires de l'association. Son rapport sera rédigé par écrit, et un exemplaire en sera rémis à chacun des associés.

ARTICLE 7.

L'association sera représentée envers les tiers par un ou plusieurs membres du comité, suivant ce que ce dernier avisera.

ARTICLE 8.

Au cas où le comité jugerait utile d'augmenter le capital de l'association, il convoquera les associés ; et, dans le cas où les associés ainsi réunis décideraient à l'unanimité, l'augmentation du capital proposée, chacun des groupes aurait à souscrire les parts nouvellement créées, par tiers rigoureusement égaux, de manière que le capital ainsi accru reproduise exactement le partage des intérêts entre les trois nationalités associées, suivant ce qui est établi au préambule des présentes.

L'augmentation du capital n'introduira, ni novation, ni modification dans les clauses du présent acte.

ARTICLE 9.

Tous profits ou avantages recueillis par l'association appartiendront aux associés, au prorata de leur participation respective dans le capital.

ARTICLE 10.

Dans le cas où l'association aurait décidé de constituer une société, ou encore dans le cas où elle aurait obtenu une concession ou l'adjudication d'une entreprise, et d'une manière générale, dans tous les cas où l'association manifesterait son activité par la création d'une affaire ou par son entrée en participation dans une affaire, les associés groupés comme il est dit ci-dessus disposeront de cette affaire par tiers rigoureusement égaux, autant que possible, soit qu'il s'agisse de la fourniture des capitaux, soit qu'il s'agisse de leur représentation dans le sein de conseils ou de comités, soit qu'il s'agisse du choix d'entrepreneurs, fournisseurs et contractants, le but de l'association étant le partage équitable des affaires non seulement au profit des capitaux, mais encore au profit de l'industrie de chacune des nationalités associées.

Observation A.—Dans le cas où il s'agirait d'une concession ou adjudication où un exploitant ou entrepreneur unique devrait être employé, le comité désignera ledit exploitant ou entrepreneur, en s'inspirant des intérêts de l'association.

Observation B.—En ce qui concerne les fournitures, elles devront être réparties

de façon équitable entre des maisons ou firmes appartenant aux trois nationalités, sur la base de l'importance des commandes, et de manière que cette répartition tende à obtenir pour l'association les conditions les meilleures possible.

Observation C.—Pour la souscription des capitaux exigés par les affaires réalisées par l'association, les associés auront, chacun dans son groupe, un droit préférentiel à cette souscription ; mais il leur sera loisible de faire participer à ce droit, soit leurs autres associés du même groupe, soit même des tiers, mais à la condition, dans ce dernier cas, que ces tiers appartiennent à la même nationalité qu'eux-mêmes.

Au cas où, pour un motif quelconque, un des groupes ne pourrait assurer, soit par lui-même, soit par des intervenants nouveaux de même nationalité que lui, la souscription des capitaux lui revenant, la part totale ou partielle ainsi abandonnée, par lui, reviendra de droit aux deux autres groupes qui se la répartiront entre eux par moitiés égales, ou autrement suivant leurs convenances.

ARTICLE 11.

Dans le cas où la rémunération de l'association dans une affaire serait constituée par l'attribution d'actions d'apport, le comité aura la faculté, s'il le juge utile, de surseoir à la répartition desdites actions entre les associés, de façon à exercer un contrôle efficace sur l'affaire en question. Toutefois, cette faculté de rétention ne pourra se prolonger au delà de trois années.

ARTICLE 12.

L'association aura une durée de dix ans, sauf prorogation ou dissolution anticipée. La prorogation devra, pour être prononcée, réunir l'unanimité des associés. La dissolution anticipée, devra, pour être prononcée, réunir les trois quarts des voix des associés, chaque part comportant une voix.

En cas de dissolution, soit anticipée, soit régulière, le comité sera chargé des opérations de la liquidation ; les comptes qu'il présentera en fin de liquidation, devant être acceptés par tous les associés, sans exception ni réserve.

ARTICLE 13.

Dans tous les actes comportant un vote de la part des associés, chaque associé aura le droit de se faire représenter par un autre associé de même nationalité, au moyen d'un pouvoir en bonne et due forme, et dans ce cas l'associé muni de pouvoirs aura autant de voix qu'il possède et représente de parts.

Fait à

[47665] No. 521.

Sir R. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 28.)

(No. 157.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Tangier, November 28, 1911.*

M. DE BILLY has written an annotation on the circular referred to in my immediately preceding telegram to the effect that he is referring to his Government the resolution passed by the Commission d'Hygiène. He agrees with my view that to become operative the resolution must receive the assent of the Conseil sanitaire, and proposes that the president of the Commission d'Hygiène should be informed that, pending a decision by the conseil, the resolution remains without effect. It appears to me that M. de Billy has now realised the foolishness of the course he has adopted, and is doing his best to make it clear that the responsibility for the action of the commission is in no way his. In conversation with me, he adopted a very different tone from that which he had assumed in his interview with M. Botkine, which I had the honour to report to you in my preceding telegram.

[47912] No. 422.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen.

(No. 123.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, November* 28, 1911.

THE Spanish Ambassador came to see me to-day, and asked whether, as reported in the press, the French Government had opened negotiations with us as to an arrangement with the Spanish Government as regards Morocco.

I said that I heard from Sir Francis Bertie that the French Government were intending to consult us, but I had not yet seen their proposals. He would remember that I had some time ago expressed the opinion that the agreements of 1904 should be the basis of the negotiations, but that if Spain was getting a free hand in her sphere in Morocco in consequence of the Franco-German agreement, and was not asked for anything by Germany, she ought to make some concession to France.

The Ambassador agreed that, in such a case, some concession should be made by Spain, but it should not be in parts of Morocco that were vital to her. The railway from Tangier to Fez could go through the Spanish zone and be secured to France without a concession of territory there. He was afraid that the French wished to become *de facto* the supreme authority in Tangier, and that they hoped to obtain this by means of the railway terminus which they would establish there. Germany was to share in the railway: this participation was a sort of *pot-de-vin* to her, and was not consistent with the equal economic advantages which were so much talked of.

I observed that equal economical advantages could hardly be construed to mean that every railway was to be completely international. On the general question of a Franco-Spanish agreement, I said that he would no doubt recognise that the prospect was much more favourable than a short time ago, when he had spoken to me on the subject, and had expressed great apprehension.

The Ambassador entirely admitted this improvement, and said that it was due to the representations which we had made in Paris and the publication of the secret Franco-Spanish agreement.

I urged that Spain should now remain as quiet as possible, and avoid any incidents in Morocco of an untoward nature.

The Ambassador assured me that his Government were doing this, and would continue to keep things as quiet as possible.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[47812] No. 523.

Extract from "Parliamentary Debates" of November 27.—(*Received November* 29, 1911.)

GREAT BRITAIN AND GERMANY: SIR EDWARD GREY'S STATEMENT.

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (*Sir Edward Grey*).—I beg to move, "That the foreign policy of His Majesty's Government be now considered."

I propose, in moving this motion, that the House do enter upon the consideration of foreign affairs, to restrict myself in the speech in which I move it to one subject only, but I do that not with the intention or desire of in any way restricting the limits of the debate. I do it because the subject with which I wish to deal—which is, indeed, as I consider it, the primary cause of this day being set apart for foreign affairs—the subject of the recent Morocco negotiations and our relations with France and Germany—is so important, so serious, and at the present time still so delicate that for me in my speech to attempt to travel over other ground and mix up other matters would be for me personally exceedingly difficult, if not impossible, if I am to do justice to the one subject I want to deal with first, and I venture to say, as far as my opening speech is concerned, it might even be inconvenient for the House. So I propose to restrict myself to that subject in my speech in moving the motion.

Let me say to the House that, had it been possible, I would gladly have waited before saying anything here on the Morocco question until the conclusion of the discussion in the French and German Parliaments as to the negotiations for a

settlement between their two countries. France and Germany are the two principals in the matter. The Reichstag, as I understand, has not concluded its discussions, and the French Chamber has not yet begun its public discussions. But so much has been said in Germany already, especially by the recent disclosures of the German Foreign Secretary, that even at the risk of disturbing discussions which have still to take place in both France and Germany—a risk which I shall try to reduce to the smallest possible limit—I feel bound to make a somewhat full statement to the House. I wish to have every regard to the susceptibilities and difficulties of public opinion both in France and in Germany; but so much has been said about us in Germany in recent discussions that we must have some regard to our own public opinion, and I am sure it will be felt abroad that what has passed has made it impossible for us to postpone a full statement any longer. I am afraid I shall have to read to the House more than is usual in a speech, because I shall have to give an account of conversations which took place in the summer between myself and the German Ambassador. I want to make what I have to say about them as accurate as possible, and to do that it is necessary for me to read from my own record of what actually took place.

Communications last Summer with Germany.

The plan of what I propose to say to the House in my speech will be as follows: I propose to begin by a narrative, as clear as I can make it, of what passed between ourselves and Germany in the summer. I shall then proceed to examine what was the real ground of tension caused between Germany and ourselves by the Moroccan question. So much suspicion and gossip have collected in connection with this subject of tension in the summer that it is exciting men's minds and corroding their tempers, both here and in Germany, to a greater extent than ever before, though the crisis, whatever it was, is past. I shall endeavour to alleviate that not by belittling what was really serious, but by trying to give a true estimate of the situation. The third part of what I wish to say shall be general remarks on foreign policy, and a response to certain passages in the speeches of the German Chancellor that seem to me of hopeful augury for the future.

If, in the earlier part of my statement, there seem to be some things which do not promise a hopeful or conciliatory development, I would ask the House not to jump at conclusions, but to remember, when I am recounting what has been difficult and troublesome, I am doing it in not order to emphasise or to perpetuate it, but to get it out of the way. I will now begin the narrative part. The German Foreign Secretary has already made not a complete, but a large disclosure of what has passed in conversations between the German Ambassador in London and myself in the summer. In diplomatic procedure it is very unusual to make public an account of conversations without first consulting the other party to them. I had no knowledge of what the German Foreign Secretary was going to disclose or that he was going to make any disclosure of these conversations until I read the report of them in the "Times." I understand that the exigencies of the situation in Germany made it impossible for me to be consulted beforehand, and I quite understand what the situation was. Had I been consulted as to the disclosures he made, I should certainly have offered no objections, and I make no complaint now of their having been made. But, of course, they are not full disclosures. The German Foreign Secretary was presenting the case of his Government to the Budget Committee of the Reichstag. Here I have to give the complement of what he said by presenting our case, and I, of course, will do what he has done and disclose so much of these conversations as is necessary to put before the House the part which we took.

The German Chancellor and the German Foreign Secretary have already disposed of one misapprehension with regard to the Moroccan question. It was imagined in some quarters, I think I have seen it on the Paper of this House in a question put, that Germany had protested against the French action in going to Fez at all, and that France had persisted in going there in the face of the German protest. The German Government have now explained what the German view of the French going to Fez really was, and I have no comment or criticism to make upon what they said. I therefore begin my narrative not with the French expedition to Fez, but with the 1st July. On that day the German Ambassador came to the Foreign Office and made the following communication:—

"Some German firms established in the south of Morocco, notably at Agadir and in the vicinity, have been alarmed by a certain ferment which has shown itself among

the local tribes, due, it seems, to the recent occurrences in other parts of the country. These firms have applied to the Imperial Government for protection for the lives of their employés and their property. At their request the Imperial Government have decided to send a war-ship to the Port of Agadir to lend help and assistance in case of need to their subjects and employés, as well as to protect the important German interests in the territory in question. As soon as the state of affairs in Morocco has resumed its former quiet aspect, the ship charged with this protective mission shall leave the Port of Agadir."

That was accompanied by an explanation given to us at the same time which seemed to me much more important than the actual communication of the sending of the ship. The explanation given to us made it clear that the Moroccan question was being opened—the whole Moroccan question—by the sending of the ship to Agadir. It made it clear that the German Government regarded a return to the *status quo* in Morocco as doubtful, if not impossible, and that what they contemplated was a definite solution of the Moroccan question between Germany, France, and Spain. The whole question, or at least the kernel of the question, after that communication was received, was what was the definite solution of the Moroccan question which Germany contemplated? If a return to the *status quo* was doubtful, if not impossible, then the only alternative was a definite solution of the Moroccan question. What was the nature of that? What was clearly the objective Germany contemplated? Was it to be the partition of Morocco, or what was it to be? That was what occupied our minds after receiving that communication. The communication was made to the Foreign Office on the Saturday. On the next Monday, the 3rd July, I asked the German Ambassador to come and see me. I informed him I had seen the Prime Minister, and that we considered the situation created by the dispatch of the "Panther" to Agadir as so important that it must be discussed in a meeting of the Cabinet. I would say no more pending the meeting of the Cabinet, but I wished the German Government to learn at once that, in our view, the situation was serious and important. The next day, the 4th July, I asked the German Ambassador to come and see me again, and said that I must tell him—this was after the Cabinet meeting—that our attitude could not be a disinterested one with regard to Morocco. We must take into consideration our treaty obligations to France and our own interests in Morocco. We were of opinion that a new situation had been created by the dispatch of a German ship to Agadir. Future developments might affect British interests more directly than they had hitherto been affected, and, therefore, we could not recognise any new arrangements that might be come to without us. I made it quite clear to the Ambassador that this communication and the exact words which I used were those of His Majesty's Government sitting in Cabinet.

After that there was a period of silence. The German Ambassador was not instructed to make any comment to me with regard to my communication, and we received no information from the German Government as to what their aims or desires were or as to what they had in mind when they spoke of a definite solution of the Moroccan problem. Some information reached us from other quarters leading us to apprehend that the settlement contemplated by the German Government might be a partition of Morocco, arrived at by negotiations to which it was not intended we should be a party. I think, in the German mind, it has sometimes been assumed that our agreement made with France in 1904 entirely disinterested us with regard to Morocco, and if Germany wished to make a new settlement with regard to Morocco, it was going out of our way and intrusive for us, having given by our agreement of 1904 a free hand to France in Morocco, as far as we are concerned—it was going out of our way and intrusive to interfere with any other Power wishing to make her own arrangements. That does not take full account of the agreement of 1904 made by right honourable gentlemen opposite. It is quite true we disinterested ourselves in Morocco politically, but we did it on conditions laid down—conditions both strategic and economic. What were the reasons of our being interested in Morocco? We have no jealousy of other Powers. It is obvious, if the Moroccan question was to be reopened and a new settlement made, unless we were consulted, unless we knew what was going on, unless we were in some way parties to the settlement, the strategic and economic conditions stipulated for between ourselves, France and Spain in 1904 might be upset.

On the 12th July the British Ambassador in Berlin had occasion to see the German Foreign Secretary on some minor matters, and took the opportunity to say that there had been at one time some mention of a conversation *à trois* between Germany,

France, and Spain, the inference being that we were to be excluded from it. The German Foreign Secretary told our Ambassador to inform us that there never had been any idea of such a communication, and, except for this negative communication, we had no further information from the German Government of their views. A little later it appeared in the press that the German Government, and indeed it was the case, that the German Government had made demands with regard to the French Congo of an extent to which it was obvious to everybody who thought of it that neither the French Government nor the French Chamber could agree. That at once made me anxious as to the development of the situation. If Germany was going to negotiate with France an arrangement by which Germany received from France something in the French Congo and left France in Morocco as she is under our agreement of 1904, then, of course, we were prepared to stand aside and not to intrude, but if Germany, starting negotiations on that basis with France, made demands not for a portion, but for the greater part of the French Congo or anything of that kind, it was quite clear France must refuse those demands, and negotiations would be thrown back on some other basis, and the question of the possible partition would arise again. That is why I became anxious.

I therefore asked the German Ambassador to see me again on the 21st July. I said to him I wished it to be understood that our silence, in the absence of any communication from the German Government—our silence since the Cabinet communication of the 4th July, and since the Prime Minister's statement of the 7th July in this House—our silence since then must not be interpreted as meaning that we were not taking in the Moroccan question, the interest which had been indicated by our statement of the 4th of that month. We knew that a rectification of the frontier of the French Congo had been proposed as a basis for negotiations with France. We thought it possible that a settlement might be come to between Germany and France on this basis without affecting British interests. We would be very glad if this happened, and in the hope that it would happen at a later stage we had hitherto stood aside. But I had been made anxious by the news which appeared the day before as to the demands which the German Government had made on the French Government; demands which were in effect not a rectification of the frontier, but a cession of the French Congo, which it was obviously impossible for the French Government to concede. I heard that negotiations were still proceeding, and I still hoped that they might lead to a satisfactory result, but it must be understood that if they were unsuccessful, a very embarrassing situation would arise. I pointed out to the German Ambassador that the Germans were in the closed port of Agadir; that according to native rumours they were landing and negotiating with the tribes, so that, for all we know, they might be acquiring concessions there, and that it might even be that the German flag had been hoisted at Agadir, which was the most suitable port on that coast for a naval basis. We could not say to what extent the situation might be altered to our disadvantage, and if the negotiations with France came to nothing, we should be obliged to do something to watch over British interests and to become a party to the discussion of the matter. The longer the Germans remained at Agadir the greater the risk of their developing a state of affairs which would make it more difficult for them to withdraw, and more necessary for us to take some steps to protect British interests. I wished to say all this now while we were still waiting, in the hope that the negotiations with France would succeed, for, if I did not say this now, it would cause resentment later on if the German Government had been led to suppose by our previous silence—our silence since the 4th July—that we did not take an interest in the matter.

The German Ambassador was not in a position to give me any information, but he deprecated the assumption that what I had sketched as the possible damage to British interests would be accomplished. He was sure that his Government had no intention of acquiring commercial monopolies, and unfairly prejudicing our interests. On this, I observed that the fact that Germany remained in occupation of a closed port involved at least a monopoly of commercial opportunities. I had waited before saying anything further between the 4th July and the 21st July. I made that statement on the 21st July, because I was getting anxious because the situation seemed to me to be developing unfavourably.

The German Ambassador was still not in a position to make any communication to me from the German Government. In the course of that day, the 21st July, the Chancellor of the Exchequer told me that he had to make a speech on an occasion of importance at the Mansion House the same evening. He consulted the Prime Minister and me as to what should be said. It was fourteen days since the last public statement about Morocco had been made here, and that had been only the

very short statement made by the Prime Minister in the House. We were anxious as to the way in which things were developing, and we all three felt that for a Cabinet Minister of first-rate importance to make a speech on a formal occasion and to say no word about foreign affairs after that interview would be misleading to public opinion here and everywhere. What I had said to the German Ambassador that day as to Agadir and the negotiations with France was obviously suitable only—I read it to the House now, because the German Foreign Minister has disclosed it, and there is no reason why it should not be said now—what I said to him that day as regards Agadir and the negotiations with France was obviously suitable only for diplomatic channels and not for public statement. The Chancellor of the Exchequer therefore made his speech in quite general terms. What he said is on record. He claimed no pre-eminence, no predominance for us in international affairs. It contained no menace, such as the saying of "Hands off!" to anyone anywhere. It did not say that there was any particular demand or claim on the part of Germany that was inconsistent with British interests. Its purport and its point was that where British interests were affected, we must not be treated as if we were of no account. If the time ever comes when this cannot be said by a Minister speaking in the position the Chancellor of the Exchequer was in then, we shall have ceased to exist as a great nation.

As a matter of fact, the first German comments on this speech that I saw in the press were such as naturally might have been expected. One German Conservative newspaper said that if the word "Germany" were substituted for the word "England," the speech might have been made by a German Minister. The words of the speech were soon forgotten, and a sort of legend has grown up about them. For instance, a few weeks ago, I heard of one German who protested to an English friend of his and of mine against the speech, and was given a report of the speech to read. Having read it, he said that what was objected to in Germany was, not the speech itself, but the fact that it had been made at a moment when France and Germany were coming to terms, and that it upset the negotiations. The exact contrary is the truth as to the particular circumstances of the negotiations existing at the time. I was afraid, and I spoke to the German Ambassador because I was afraid, that things were developing in a way that would bring up the Moroccan question, force the Moroccan negotiations back, not upon an arrangement between France and Germany about the Congo and Morocco respectively, but upon something in the nature of a partition of Morocco, or some sort of solution which might make the question of British interests to be directly affected, and which would certainly directly bring into operation our treaty obligations with France.

On the 24th July, three days after the speech of the Chancellor of the Exchequer, the German Ambassador came to see me. He informed me that the German intention in sending a ship to Agadir had not changed. Not a man had been landed there. The German Government regretted the credence which was given to the insinuations as to the intentions of Germany that came from hostile quarters. Germany had never thought of creating a naval port on the coast of Morocco, and never would think of it. Such ideas were hallucinations. As to the negotiations with France, if the German demands were rather high, his Government were ready to make concessions in Morocco as well as in colonial matters; but the chauvinistic tone of the French press, and a part of the British press, menacing Germany with the interference of the friends of France, did not tend towards a settlement. I said that I was likely to be asked in Parliament what was happening in Agadir, and I should like to know whether I might say that the German Government had informed me that not a man had been landed. The Ambassador asked me to make no public statement with regard to this communication until he had had time to communicate with his Government. The next day, the 25th July, the German Ambassador came to see me again, and told me that the information that he had given me on the previous day was confidential, and that the German Government could not consent to its being used in Parliament in view of the speech of the Chancellor of the Exchequer. He then made to me, in regard to that speech, a communication which has now been published by the German Government, and which I need not read in full to the House, because it has been in the press here already, except to say about it that that communication was a strong criticism upon the effect of the speech upon the press, rather than upon the substance of the speech itself.

The communication, however, was exceedingly stiff in tone, and I felt it necessary—for, of course, I had not expected any communication of this kind—to say at once that as the speech of the Chancellor of the Exchequer seemed to me to give no cause for complaint, the fact that it had created surprise in Germany was in itself

a justification of the speech, for it could not have created surprise unless there had been some tendency to think that we might be disregarded. The speech had not claimed anything except that we were entitled to be considered as one of the great nations. It had claimed no pre-eminence, and that it had not even indicated that there was a crisis. It dealt in general terms with remote contingencies. The German Government had said that it was not consistent with their dignity, after the speech of the Chancellor of the Exchequer, to give explanations as to what was taking place at Agadir. I said to the Ambassador that the tone of their communication made it inconsistent with our dignity to give explanations as to the speech of the Chancellor of the Exchequer. Of course, by that I meant a public explanation. Explanations as to Agadir had already been given me by the German Ambassador, but it was the public explanation that the Government could not consent to. Then I thought it right to say further on the question generally, knowing that the interests of France were involved as well as our own, and that it was the desire of France that the negotiations should go smoothly—I said to the German Ambassador that it was not intended, by anything that had been said, or would be said here, to embroil the negotiations between Germany and France. On the contrary, we sincerely desired that they should succeed, but the tone of the German communication was unfavourable with regard to France as well as with regard to us, and made it more than ever evident that a very difficult situation would arise if the German negotiations with France should not succeed. There the matter was left by that conversation, and it remained for two days, until the 27th July. Then the German Ambassador came to me again and made another communication from his Government, in conversation, so that I took down the words. The communication he made to me on the 27th July was this—I put it in the words I took down:—

"We trust that Sir Edward Grey, by our very open and candid communication, has gathered the conviction that our pourparlers with France at the moment do not touch British interests. We trust to the Minister's great loyalty, that he has so often shown, that he will find it possible to state this fact in Parliament, without, however, giving any details of our confidential communication. We acknowledge with pleasure that the Minister has stated that he desires an agreement between Germany and France, and feel quite convinced that this will prove most helpful to the progress of the negotiations.

"But, having in view the wish expressed by Sir Edward, we cannot quite see how he can, in the present state of the pourparlers, describe our demands as obviously impossible, without knowing what we on our side have the intention to offer to France in the political and colonial territorial field. It is not possible in regard of the formal pledge of secrecy we have given——"

"We" means the German Government—

"to go into details; but as the territories to be eventually exchanged are exclusively German and French, we do not believe that special English interests could be touched, and that it seems advisable to leave it to the two parties immediately concerned to form an estimation of the value of the objects to be eventually exchanged.

"Adverse criticism from the English side must obviously render the negotiations more difficult. On the other hand, a public statement that England would be pleased to see a successful conclusion of the Franco-German pourparlers would have a most beneficial influence on an auspicious result, for which we most earnestly hope. We most seriously wish to diminish any points of friction we have with France in the colonial sphere, especially in Africa, and hope it may eventually be possible to make them disappear entirely. Even if this was done, we believed that it would do away with a cause of frequently recurring tension. If the wishes of England are in the same direction, the best way to help to bring about this result would be by having a calming influence on public opinion in France, which just now, by half-truths and inaccurate statements, has been brought to considerable excitement."

The House will observe that the tone of that communication was exceedingly friendly, not only to ourselves, but to France. I at once expressed appreciation of the friendly tone in which the communication was couched. The German Ambassador and myself then had some further conversation of a general and informal kind, in the course of which he expressed some regret at the way in which our public opinion had been misled to adverse conclusions as to German action. I asked, on that, what else could

have been expected, when the German Government suddenly sent a ship to Morocco, to a closed port, which was said to be the most suitable place on the west coast of Morocco for a naval base. Of course, this action had mobilised British public opinion. I also pointed out that, after I had made to him on the 4th July a declaration on behalf of the British Government, we had had no communication from the German Government until the 24th July, and even then their denial of any intention to establish a naval base had been in a form which I could not use to allay the suspicions which had been roused here. I suggested to the Ambassador, and he received the suggestion very cordially, that we should not pursue this point. I expressed the hope that this latest German communication might be taken as a new point of departure, and that we need not go back upon things which might lead to mutual recriminations. In the afternoon of the same day the Prime Minister made a statement in the House. That statement is on record, and anyone who reads that statement will, of course, see that the spirit in which we discussed the thing in public here corresponded to the spirit in which we had then been approached. From that date onwards there were no further difficulties between the German Government and ourselves about the Moroccan negotiations. That is practically the end of my narrative part, and the comment I have to make upon it is this: In the disclosures made in the Reichstag by the German Foreign Secretary I find he has stated that the intention of taking a part of Morocco had never existed in Germany, as the Secretary of State—that is, the German Foreign Secretary—distinctly stated at the time to a well-known Pan-German. Unfortunately, the gentleman in question did not believe it. If, after we had made the Cabinet statement to the German Ambassador on the 4th July that intention had been confided to us as definitely as that, I think a good deal of misunderstanding might have been avoided. As regards the subsequent course of the negotiations, I need only say this: The French Government consulted us at every point where it seemed at all likely that British interests might be affected—most loyally at every point—and except perhaps once or twice on subsidiary points of purely economic detail in Morocco itself, we were able to say that British interests were not involved by the proposals or counter-proposals made in the course of the negotiations between France and Germany, and everything we said or did in our communications with the French Government was in the direction of helping and not impeding the negotiations.

Now I come to the more general part. I propose to examine, as people will continue to discuss it, the real nature of the tension which existed. An agreement has now been reached between the French and German Governments, in which both sides have made substantial concessions and substantial gains. That this has been accomplished and peace between the two countries preserved in the face of all the excitement which arose during the negotiations appears to us, who are onlookers, a fact very creditable to the diplomatists who negotiated the agreement and not discreditable to the part which we ourselves had taken, though that was a subsidiary part. In spite of that, this is the moment chosen by some people to excite themselves, and as many other as they can, in Germany or here, by discussion of how near we came to war. There are really some people who seem to take delight in suggesting or forming the opinion, from whatever gossip or information they can get in any quarter, that we were near to war, and the nearer we came to war the greater satisfaction they seemed to get out of it. I do not say we are peculiar in this respect at this moment. It is really as if in the atmosphere of the world there was some mischievous influence at work which troubles and excites every part of it. We are passing this year through a period of great excitement. It is so still. Some countries are in revolution, others are at war, and in several countries which are neither in revolution nor at war there are people who seem to delight in discussing how near they have been or are likely to be either to revolution or to war in the past, present, or the future. Really it is as if the world were indulging in a fit of political alcoholism, and the best that can be done by those of us who are in positions of responsibility is to keep cool and sober.

A speech has been made lately by the honourable and gallant member (Captain Faber). I only refer to it because it really is the case that that speech has been forming the subject of discussion in the Budget Committee of the Reichstag in Germany, and, I am told on quite good authority, has intensified the bitterness of of German feeling. Of course, I know it is quite possible for us to reply that there are one or two speeches made in the German Reichstag—not official speeches—and the honourable and gallant gentleman (Captain Faber) is not an official member, which, if correctly reported in the paper, gives us just as much reason for saying here that our public opinion has been offended and intensified by the speeches made there. Of course, one speech leads to another. I can only do the best I can to try to alleviate

the suspicions and excited talk by examining what the tension and apprehension in the summer and on into September really were. Of course, there was anxiety—diplomatic anxiety, not always, not constant, but intermittent—and at times considerable anxiety as to how the negotiations between France and Germany were to find a solution. They were very difficult for the two countries concerned in them, and had either of them broken off the negotiations—and there were times when it looked as if negotiations must reach a deadlock—had either abruptly broken off the negotiations, it is very difficult to see what the next move would have been. We were in constant and intimate relations with France. We knew that France earnestly desired a settlement. We knew she would not break off negotiations abruptly. We did not believe that the German Government would do it either, though, of course, we were not in the same close touch with them, nor so cognisant of their view in the course of negotiations. Still, there was the possibility that negotiations might be broken off, though I never thought the probability, I never expected anything abrupt, but it did look once or twice late on in the summer as if the negotiations might reach a deadlock. If they reached a deadlock, what was the next step to be? Naturally the next step, the next diplomatic step, would have been for some Power which was a party to the Act of Algeciras to propose a conference. That was the step we had in mind, the step we should have been prepared to take if the negotiations had reached a deadlock. But in July, before the last German communication that I read to the House, what I called a friendly communication, I had sounded the German Government as to whether a proposal for a conference would be acceptable if negotiations reached a deadlock, and the reply I had received from the German Government, though not absolutely conclusive, pointed to the fact that a proposal for a conference might not be acceptable. That was what gave rise to anxiety in the diplomatic situation. The natural step would have been a conference if there was a deadlock; the doubt remained whether such a proposal would be welcome to the German Government, and if unwelcome to the German Government, then, of course, things might have been made not better, but worse, for making the proposal.

Real Ground of Tension.

Then the House will say, supposing all that had happened, supposing negotiations reached a deadlock, supposing a conference was proposed and Germany would not agree to it, what would have been the situation then? Then you would have had this situation. You would have had France, Germany, and Spain in occupation of parts of Morocco, a German ship at Agadir—because, of course, the German ship could not leave Agadir with negotiations unsettled—you would have had at any rate the beginning of a partition of Morocco without agreement between the three parties—France, Germany, and Spain—who were in occupation of different parts of Morocco. You would have had us no party to the negotiations at that time, and you would have had on record the statement made publicly by the Prime Minister here, and the statement made by the German Government on the 4th July that we could not recognise any settlement come to unless we were consulted. You had at any rate the prospect, if negotiations broke down, of a very strained diplomatic situation; and undoubtedly the period was from time to time one of tension, not as to what was going to happen in the next twenty-four hours, but tension, because of the anxiety of what one saw, might possibly take place. That I believe is as accurate and faithful an estimate as I can give—it is not a thing you can prove by documents—of the situation as it existed and of the amount of tension there was. I said I would not belittle what was serious, and I think I have not done so; but I would suggest that if that be accepted it is a statement of the truth of the actual facts of the situation which might be, and I think would be, disquieting and alarming if people had imagined that there had never been any great tension or serious difficulties, but which, considering the talk that now exists of the imminence of war, ought to be not alarming and disquieting, but a sedative to the excited state of public opinion.

Now let me say something as to foreign policy generally. First of all, let me try to put an end to some of the suspicions with regard to secrecy—suspicions with which it seems to me some people are torturing themselves, and certainly worrying others. We have laid before the House the secret articles of the agreement with France of 1904. There are no other secret engagements. The late Government made that agreement in 1904. They kept those article secret, and I think to everybody the reason will be obvious why they did so. It would have been invidious to make those articles public. In my opinion they were entirely justified in keeping those articles

secret, because they were not articles which commit this House to serious obligations. I saw a comment made the other day when these articles were published that, if a Government would keep little things secret *à fortiori*, they would keep big things secret. That is absolutely untrue. There may be reasons why a Government should make secret arrangements of that kind if they are not things of first-rate importance, if they are subsidiary to matters of great importance. But that is the very reason why the British Government should not make secret engagements which commit Parliament to obligations of war. It would be foolish to do it. No British Government could embark upon a war without public opinion behind it, and such engagements as there are which really commit Parliament to anything of that kind are contained in treaties or agreements which have been laid before the House. As for ourselves, we have not made a single secret article of any kind since we came into office.

Foreign Policy of Great Britain.

Now let me say a word upon the general aspects of what I consider is the proper foreign policy of this country, and what the foreign policy of the Government has been. It is said to be, and in a sense that is quite true, a continuation of the policy of the Government in which Lord Lansdowne was Secretary for Foreign Affairs. Some years ago we had constant trouble and friction with France and Russia. Everybody remembers it. There were continual excursions and alarms, and more than once we were supposed to be on the brink of war with one or other of these two countries. I remember when I was Under-Secretary in the Foreign Office in 1893, there was much more abrupt talk of war about Siam, although I believe it would have been madness for the two countries to go to war about Siam in the light of what has happened since. It would have been madness and a crime. But for a short time there was great excitement on that point. An end has been put to all that as far as regards France and Russia. The late Government turned relations which had been those of friction and difficulty with France, not perpetual but intermittent, into relations of cordial friendship. The friendship which they made we have kept unimpaired. As far as there are records in the Foreign Office to give me any indication of Lord Lansdowne's intentions, I think he would have desired, had he remained in office to-day, something of the same kind with Russia. I do not say they had gone far, or that he had incurred any responsibilities or committed himself in the matter, but as far as I have any indications, that is the direction in which he would have gone. We have gone on in that direction, and what was accomplished with France has been accomplished with Russia. The relations have been changed from those of friction and difficulty into relations of friendship, and it is well that it has been so, because in different parts of the world British interests touch and rub against French and Russian interests, and where that is so it is difficult to find a halfway house between constant liability to friction and cordial friendship. It is cordial friendship alone which provides sufficient mutual tolerance and good-will to prevent difficulties and friction which would otherwise arise.

In addition to that, our friendship with France and Russia is in itself a guarantee that neither of them will pursue a provocative or aggressive policy towards Germany, who is their neighbour and ours. Any support we would give France and Russia in times of trouble would depend entirely on the feeling of Parliament and public feeling here when the trouble came, and both France and Russia know perfectly well that British public opinion would not give support to provocative or aggressive action against Germany. And the same considerations *mutatis mutandis* apply to France and Russia. We know perfectly well that neither of them wishes to pursue an aggressive or provocative policy towards Germany, and if it were true, as is sometimes stated in a portion of the continental press, that we had tried to make difficulties between France and Germany, or Russia and Germany, if it had not been our policy, and if they had not known it was our policy to smooth the path of their diplomatic relations with Germany, the friendship with them would not have endured. One of the essential conditions of the friendship of ourselves with France and Russia in the last few years has been the certain knowledge that neither they nor we wish to pursue a provocative or aggressive policy.

Now let me say this: German strength is by itself a guarantee that no other country will desire or seek a quarrel with Germany. That is one side of the shield of which Germans may well be proud, but I think it ought to be remembered by German public opinion that there is another side to the shield, and that is if a nation has the biggest army in the world, and if it has a very big navy, and is going on

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building a still bigger navy, then it must do all in its power to prevent what would otherwise be the natural apprehensions in the minds of others who have no aggressive intentions towards that Power, lest that Power with its army and navy should have aggressive intentions towards them. Germany is rightly proud of her strength. She is building a big fleet. Surely it is natural and obvious that the growth of that fleet must raise apprehensions, or at least make other nations very sensitive to apprehensions, lest the Power which is becoming strong should have aggressive designs towards themselves. I do not believe in these aggressive designs. I do not wish to have it interpreted in that sense, but I think it must be realised that other nations will be apprehensive and sensitive, and on the lookout for any indications of aggression. All we or the other neighbours of Germany desire is to live with her on equal terms.

There is one foreign policy different to the one which I have been endeavouring to sketch to the House, and it seems to me to be advocated in some quarters of the country. It seems to me to be simply disastrous. It is that we should give it to be understood that in no circumstances, however aggressively, provocatively, or wantonly, a friend of ours was attacked, we should give our friend no assistance whatever. That would be an attempt to revert to what was once called a policy of "splendid isolation." It would deprive us of the possibility of having a friend in Europe, and it would result in the other nations of Europe, either by choice or by necessity, being brought into the orbit of a single diplomacy from which we should be excluded. The ideal of splendid isolation contemplated a balance of power in Europe to which we were not to be a party, and from which we were to be able to stand aside in the happy position of having no obligations and being able to take advantage of any difficulties which arose in Europe from friction between opposing groups. That policy is not a possible one now. Any single Power that attempted to adopt that policy in Europe to-day would be felt as a public nuisance, and if we were that single Power, one result would be that in the course of a few years we should be building war-ships not against a two-Power standard, but probably against the united navies of Europe. As a matter of fact that policy, which would be disastrous, is not a policy. It is the negation of policy, and if it were accompanied, as I suppose it would be accompanied, with constant criticisms of individual members of the House about the internal affairs and proceedings of other Governments, constant pressure upon the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of the day to interfere and make representations about matters which do not directly concern us, then I say that the disastrous consequences of such an attitude of mingled interference and drift would soon become apparent in an expenditure on armaments, even greater than the present expenditure, and sooner or later the very peace that people desired to preserve would topple over. Such an attitude would not even gain us the friendship of Germany.

One does not make new friendships worth having by deserting old ones. New friendships by all means let us make, but not at the expense of the ones we have. I desire to do all I can to improve the relations with Germany, as I shall presently show. But the friendships which we have have lasted now for some years, and it must be a cardinal point of improved relations with Germany that we do not sacrifice one of these, and what I desire—and what I hope it may be possible to have, though it may seem difficult at the present time—is that the improved relations may be such as will improve not only ourselves, but those who are our friends. We keep our friendships. We intend to retain them unimpaired, and the more we can do, so long as we can preserve that position, so much the better, and we shall endeavour to do it. That is an essential condition. Is the policy I have sketched out necessarily a bar to good relations with Germany? I do not believe it is. They say in Germany—I only take the opinions that are reported and as they appear in the press in Germany—that it is part of our policy always to stand in Germany's way and object to Germany's expansion. It is unfortunate that the Morocco question has come up so often. But that is a special case by itself, where we have a special agreement and have special interests, to which we attach importance, which are set out in the agreement; but in my opinion—though I do not speak for more than myself personally when I say this—the wise policy for this country is to expand as little as possible, and certainly no further the African possessions.

I do not say that there are not—of course there are—certain parts of Africa lying absolutely contiguous to British possessions, especially to those of the Government of the Union of South Africa, which, if there were territorial changes, we could not see pass into other hands; and if there are great territorial changes, there are no doubt other things close to British territory in the nature of frontier rectification. If there are to be changes brought about by the good-will and negotiation with other

Powers, then we are not an ambitious competing party, and, not being an ambitious competing party ourselves, if Germany has friendly arrangements to negotiate with other foreign countries, we are not anxious to stand in their way. I believe that is the wise policy for this country, and if it is the wise policy not to go in for great schemes of expansion ourselves, then I think it would be diplomatically and morally wrong to indulge in a dog-in-the-manger policy with regard to others. I think, indeed, the House may see something of that sort in the recent negotiations.

What was Germany's great objective, as I gather, in the later stages of the negotiations with France the other day? To obtain access to the Congo and Ubanghi. I have already said to the House we never for a moment demurred to that or put forward any plea of British interests. We have facilitated, so far as it lay with us to do anything, the negotiations. The German Chancellor recently made two speeches. He naturally presented the German view, and they were addressed mainly to German public opinion. I willingly recognise that in both those speeches of the German Chancellor, though he had a difficult situation to deal with and those speeches put the German view of the case, he was studiously careful to avoid saying anything that might offend British public opinion; and if I may speak freely about those speeches of the German Chancellor, I would say that, while upholding the German view of the particular case, the tone and spirit of them were such as to inspire us with a belief in his desire to see his country strong, but not aggressive. If that is the spirit of German policy, then I am sure that in two or three years the talk about a great European war will have passed away, and there will have been a growth of good-will not only between Germany and England, but between those two countries and the friends of both. There is a great responsibility upon the British Government and the German Government, and upon other Governments, to make the tone and spirit of these speeches, especially of the second speech of the German Chancellor, prevail in the years which are immediately before us.

Do not let us imagine that we can force the pace at this moment in improving relations with Germany. We cannot compel suddenly, after the friction of the last few months, the favourable breeze of public opinion, either in Germany or here. At present the breeze is anything but favourable. Sometimes the breeze may be so adverse that the Governments, however well disposed, may not be able to pursue a favourable course without tacking. But what we want is not to cease to steer a favourable course, and to steer it straight ahead whenever we can. I say that on the assumption that that is the desire of the German Government, too. It is certainly the natural inference from the tone and spirit of the speeches of the German Chancellor. If that is his assumption, then we shall respond to it, and in some ways, though public opinion may be adverse at the present moment excited as it recently has been, in some ways one can already see that the horizon is brightening. The German Chancellor said, in one of his two recent speeches, that Morocco is like a continually festering wound in German relations not only with France, but also with England, and that, in virtue of treaty stipulations, England stood ever on the side of France—at least, diplomatically—in all Moroccan difficulties between Germany and France. So that, as a matter of fact, the German understanding with France as to Morocco also cleaned the slate in respect of German relations with England. I welcome that statement because the German Chancellor includes France and England in it, and I would now read for the House what I said to the German Ambassador in London on the 6th of this month, when he communicated to me the text of the agreement between Germany and France, and told me that his Government asked our support of it as both Governments had agreed to do. They had of course agreed to ask the other Powers, who are parties to the Act of Algeciras, to support the agreement.

I replied that I would examine the agreement which I had not yet studied as a whole since it was signed, although the French Government had kept us informed of it during the progress of negotiations. I would, however, at once express my great satisfaction at the conclusion of the negotiations. Count Wolff-Metternich would remember that when the agreement of 1909 between Germany and France as to Morocco had been made, I had expressed great satisfaction on the assumption that the difficulties about Morocco were over, because the difficulties about Morocco were sure to throw Germany and ourselves into opposite diplomatic camps. If, as I had hoped, and must apparently be the case, the present agreement between Germany and France was a permanent settlement of the difficulties as to Morocco, it would be most satisfactory to us. It might be a little time before public opinion had calmed down sufficiently to realise the full consequences of it; but its effect must be to relax the tension and remove a great obstacle from the path of European diplomacy.

The discussion upon the agreement has not yet concluded. I have had no difficulty in speaking to the House on this subject and discussing the matter fully with them. What I have dreaded has been the risk of introducing into the discussion in either Germany or France anything of a nature to disturb the discussion of their own settlement of their own relations with each other. Whether I have altogether been able to avoid that risk I cannot yet say. It was a risk that had to be taken because of what is due to the House of Commons here. The Anglo-French agreement of 1904 as to Morocco, with which certain arrangements with Spain are intimately connected, was a great element in the foundation of our friendship with France. It has since then continued unimpaired to the mutual satisfaction of each party, I believe not only of the Governments, but also of the peoples of the two countries. During the last seven years, throughout all the strain of diplomatic discussion, closely connected as it has been with that agreement, the two Governments have held to it in letter and spirit, and during all this time our diplomatic relations have been intimate and cordial. If, as I hope is the case, the Franco-German agreement as to Morocco has secured for France the great position in Morocco which recent events have made it quite clear must be held by some European country, and which France, in the interests of her Colonial Empire, could not allow to pass into hands other than her own; if it has also removed the great obstacle in the smooth path of the diplomacy of the greatest nations of Europe, then the Anglo-French agreement as to Morocco will become, when the necessary adjustments have been made with Spain, not an active, but a passive factor in the relations between the two countries. But I trust that the fact that we have with France during the last seven years gone hand-in-hand through a great deal of rough diplomatic weather, without for a moment losing touch with each other, will have its influence in perpetuating in France and here confidence in our mutual good faith and good-will, our intention to keep in touch.

It would be presumptuous and invidious for me to appraise, or to attempt to appraise, the merits to Germany and France respectively of the bargain they have made about Morocco and the French Congo, and the comparative value of their gains and losses, or I would call it the gains and concessions to each that they are now engaged in discussing. Each Government—the French Government and the German Government—is defending the agreement before its own public opinion; each Government—the French Government and the German Government—finds critics in France and in Germany. It is difficult, perhaps, for us at the time, and it is still more difficult for France and Germany, to see the wood for the trees at the moment. But a few years hence I believe that to-day's estimate, whatever it be in France or in Germany, of the balance of losses and gains of each country respectively in the recent negotiations will seem a comparatively small matter. The great matter will be that Morocco will no longer trouble the peace of Europe. For years that question of Morocco has been the discomfort of diplomatists. There was a risk in leaving it unsolved. We all knew that. It was left unsolved because there appeared to be even a greater risk in attempting to find the solution. I trust that now a solution has been found. The part we have played has been a subsidiary one. The credit belongs to France and to Germany, the two principals. But for us to have taken less interest than we have done would have been to fall short of due care of British interests, and to fail in being honourably consistent in the fulfilment of treaty obligations with France. If this settlement between France and Germany receives the approval of both nations, it ought to secure that the Moroccan question has been honourably and permanently settled without breaking the peace of Europe. If that is so, then I do claim with confidence, as against critics, whether at home or abroad, that the part His Majesty's Government has taken has contributed, and contributed materially, to the realisation of that expectation, and I trust that that will be the general sense of the House.

[47977] No. 524.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 1.)

(No. 400.)

Sir, *Berlin, November 29, 1911.*

YOUR speech upon foreign affairs was awaited in Berlin with the deepest interest. Late in the evening of the 27th the "Lokalanzeiger" sent out a flying-sheet containing the text of the first part of the speech, and an announcement that a further sheet would be at once issued containing the rest of the speech. The second sheet,

however, contained nothing further than a revised edition of the first part of the speech, together with a few words of the remainder. It is necessary to mention this, as the morning papers of the following day based their comments on the first part of your speech, which was all that they had before them. These comments were not very enthusiastic and in some cases far from friendly.

The "Berliner Tageblatt" said that the speech would cause neither profound disappointment nor great enthusiasm. It agreed that the publication by Herr von Kiderlen-Waechter of the conversations between you and the German Ambassador, without previous agreement, was a breach of diplomatic procedure and usage. It also pointed out that although in your conversations with Count Metternich on the 3rd and 4th July you had made no actual request for information, such a request had been implied, and it was extraordinary that the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs had made no mention of these conversations, as thereby he had given it to be understood that it was only on the 21st July that you had made known your views on the situation to the Imperial Government. After criticising Herr von Kiderlen's procedure in this matter, the "Tageblatt" referred to your statement that if the British Government had not been left so long without information so much mistrust would not have arisen, mistrust which had been increased by the "inacceptable" German demands for compensation. This statement, the "Tageblatt" said, was scarcely logical, because even on the 3rd July your language to Count Metternich had been full of mistrust of German designs; still the fact remained that it was quite incomprehensible why between the 4th and the 21st July the German Government had neither said nor done anything which might have tended to avoid a very serious crisis.

Up to this point, therefore, the "Tageblatt" had summed up as regards the July conversations rather in your favour and against Herr von Kiderlen-Waechter; it then proceeded to deliver one or two criticisms of your attitude. They consisted mainly of two points:—

Firstly, that, while pleading anxiety with regard to German designs on Morocco, which was obviously feigned, as you knew perfectly well that no such designs were entertained, your real preoccupation and your real reasons for interference were your fears lest Germany should acquire the coast of French Congo.

Secondly, that your utterances indicated that Great Britain claimed the right to a deciding voice in the disposal of territory in every corner of the world.

The "Frankfurter Zeitung" treated your speech with great reserve, and confined itself to stating the opinion that it would not much contribute to the improvement of the relations between the two countries.

The "Börsen-Courier" had an article on your speech in which not a single pleasant word is to be found. It complained that your speech was not what Germany had had a right to expect. You had confined your remarks to the episodes of July alone, and had thrown no light whatever on the broad question of Anglo-German relations. Therefore, your speech was not calculated to induce people in Germany to change their opinion with regard to you and your colleagues. You had attached no weight to the feeling aroused in Germany by the French proceedings in Fez, nor had you given any explanation as to why these proceedings had been regarded so benevolently by the British Government and British public opinion, while the action of Germany in sending a ship to Agadir had been regarded with so much distrust and suspicion. Further, you had said nothing to remove the impression that you had intended to oppose the alleged far-reaching demands of Germany with regard to French Congo. The article also found fault with your defence of Mr. Lloyd George's speech, and said that what was chiefly to be condemned in your speech was that you had not uttered one word of reproof for the provocative and insulting interpretation which had been given to Mr. Lloyd George's remarks by the British and French press. Finally, the article repeated that your speech was not calculated to improve Anglo-German relations, and said that for the moment it supposed Germany must rest content with the knowledge that the Franco-German arrangement meets with your approval, and that you desired that the present tension between Great Britain and Germany should be relaxed.

The "Vossische Zeitung" is not so unfriendly as might have been anticipated from its previous utterances. Its first criticism is directed against your statement in regard to the action of the German Government in publishing conversations with you without having previously obtained your concurrence. In this connection it quotes from a speech made by Prince Bismarck in 1885, in which the British Government was reproached with publishing confidential conversations, and it says that England has no

right to complain now if other nations make use of the right which she herself had exercised.

It goes on to admit that, so far as could be judged from the telegraphic reports, your tone in speaking of the differences of opinion between England and Germany was polite, "or that you at least rejected any policy which implied a challenge to Germany."

It then points out the discrepancies between the accounts given by you and Herr von Kiderlen, in that the latter made no mention of the conversations which took place on the 3rd, 4th, and 12th July. Presumably, it says, the importance of these conversations was differently estimated in Berlin and in London. The German Secretary of State laid stress on the absence of an enquiry, the British Minister on the failure to furnish information. It still remained an enigma what gave rise to the British pronouncement at the close of the "period of silence." As regards Mr. Lloyd George's speech, it was only natural that the British Government should have denied that it was of a threatening character. They had already attempted to defend it as being reasonable, and had avoided everything which might have the appearance of undue yielding. Germany, on the other hand, refused to authorise the use in Parliament of the information that she had no designs on Moroccan territory, since it would otherwise have appeared as if this declaration had been the result of Mr. Lloyd George's speech. Whilst then both sides were attempting to avoid the appearance of weakness war became ever more imminent, and in spite of your tribute to the skill of the diplomatists who brought about the agreement between France and Germany, the credulity with which British statesmen accepted the accusations levelled against German policy could hardly have contributed to facilitate the maintenance of peace. It was difficult, it said, to make advances when they may be represented, even though falsely, as the result of outside pressure.

After mentioning your hope that the relations between the two countries might improve, and your statement that England, whilst holding to all her old friendships, would gladly have intercourse with Germany on a footing of equality, the article says that it was nothing but equality that the German people had claimed. Germany made no more bids for friendship; she did not expect a declaration of affection to ensue after ten days. So far as was to be seen from the telegraphic report at present to hand, your speech would not affect the political situation and political feeling.

For some reason or other the concluding part of your speech—that is to say, the part dealing with the Imperial Chancellor's speeches—was not given out by the Wolff Bureau last night with the rest of the speech, so that the morning papers had not seen it when they made their comments this morning. The "Tageblatt" in its evening issue calls attention to this, and, though it says that the addition of the missing part makes no material change in the impression produced by the first part, still it must be admitted that the concluding part of your speech "does not make too unfavourable an impression." To this somewhat faint praise, however, it adds that the effect of the speech was not altogether "unsympathetic," as it was always "sympathetic" to find a statesman who knew exactly what he wanted. "We do not exactly want," it continues, "the same as Sir E. Grey does; his point of view is in fact widely different from ours, but we recognise that he stated his views logically, and with both clearness and dignity. Certainly, the tone of his speech was somewhat reserved and cool; but we prefer that to a lot of fine phrases which say nothing and convince no one."

The "Tägliche Rundschau" said that the formal and polite tone of your speech gave emphasis to the studied reserve of your observations with regard to Germany, and added that, as you were unable to hold out any immediate hope of improvement in Anglo-German relations, it was just as well that you made no attempt to draw a veil over that fact by means of resounding phrases. At any rate, Germany now knew how they stood with regard to Great Britain. It added that the most important sentence of your speech was that concerning the stability of the Triple *Entente*, in which you stated that those who wished to be on friendly terms with Great Britain must also be friends of her friends.

The "Hamburger Nachrichten" said that the reasons you gave for desiring to intervene in the Franco-German negotiations were not convincing, but that on the whole the tone of your speech was not unsatisfactory, as it showed at all events that His Majesty's Government had no desire to accentuate the differences between the two countries.

The "Post" found much to criticise in the policy of His Majesty's Government, and harped on the well-worn theme of Great Britain's desire to prevent Germany from obtaining a place in the sun. It also pointed out that your utterances confirmed the

idea that in the Morocco negotiations Great Britain was all along the real opponent. "It was England," it said, "that put the drag on those negotiations and hindered us from obtaining a favourable settlement with France. England had threatened us, humiliated us, and beaten us. That neither can nor will be forgotten by a free and independent country like Germany." Nevertheless, the "Post" pays a high tribute to your speech and to that of the Prime Minister and to the general high level of the debate in the House of Commons.

This is what it says :—

"When we compare the course of the debate on Moroccan affairs in the Reichstag with that of the House of Commons, we have reason to regard the latter with feelings of profound envy. In England a skilful statesman discussed an extremely difficult question on broad and stately lines. Both Sir E. Grey's speech and that of the Prime Minister were clear, elegant in form, and breathing the very spirit of independence; every word was well weighed and dictated by statesmanlike wisdom. Their speeches were listened to by the House with the earnestness which the occasion required, and were received with expressions of the highest approval. How different was the scene in the German Reichstag. The best friend of the Chancellor cannot say that his speeches on the Morocco question were either skilful, statesmanlike, or successful. Twice during his speech his utterances were received with derisive laughter by the Reichstag, and at its conclusion there was an icy silence."

After a short and scornful reference to Herr von Kiderlen's failures as an orator, the article continues :—

"The regrettable difference between the two debates is easily explained. In England two really gifted statesmen defended their successful policy with skill and tact; whereas in Germany men of the best intentions, but lacking the necessary ability, had endeavoured to justify a faulty policy by faulty means."

A Berlin telegram, published by the "Kölnische Zeitung" last night, says that anyone who expected that your speech would reveal that British policy had taken a new direction must have been disappointed. The English Minister was satisfied with the policy hitherto pursued, and even the Opposition expressed its approval of it. It had been repeated over and over again that England was animated by no unfriendly intentions towards Germany, and that she had never thought of hampering the Franco-German negotiations, but the fact remained that Germany met with opposition almost every time that she attempted to take action in any part of the world. The telegram goes on to observe that you had failed to make it clear from what source you had derived the information as to the alleged intentions of Germany in regard to a partition of Morocco, and it expresses astonishment that credence should have been attached to coast rumours as to the landing of German crews and the hoisting of the German flag. It could only be explained by a pronounced irritation which appeared to have often assumed a personal form. It seemed as though people in England had from the first been very sensitive, because they had not been admitted to the Franco-German negotiations, and that this sensitiveness had considerably increased during the further progress of events.

As regards the future, it says that the desire expressed by you, to live on terms of equality with Germany, was in entire accordance with German wishes, but in spite of this theoretical agreement, Germans had not always had the feeling that they were treated by England on an equal and friendly footing. This fact could not be got over, and it explained the embittered feeling prevailing in Germany.

Germany, it continues, also did not believe in the possibility of a violent hastening of improved relations with England, but at the same time it was convinced that an improvement could only be slowly effected even if England showed herself a little better disposed towards Germany, and did not always place difficulties in the way of German aims, even when no British interests were involved. The "mischievous influence" of which you spoke was not to be sought in Germany, for all her interests pointed to the pursuit of a peaceful development and the avoidance of collisions, so long as this was compatible with her dignity and position as a Great Power.

In a later edition, the "Kölnische Zeitung" says that after your utterances, which promised a peaceful solution of the tension, the armament competition must begin again with increased vigour. England evidently regarded with suspicion the German declarations as to the dispatch of the "Panther." This suspicion, for which no reasonable ground was to be perceived, was not mentioned in so many words in your speech, but it

took the form of an expression of anxiety in regard to England's position as a Great Power. From your utterances it was evident that England continued to stand shoulder to shoulder with France, not only in the sense of a justifiable friendship, but also in the sense of a diplomatic demonstration directed against the German Empire.

As you will have seen from the above extracts, your speech has met with a very mixed reception. Even such praise as has been accorded to it has been tempered in nearly every case by a certain amount of cavilling. I hope, however, that after a little time for reflection the cavilling will cease, and that your straightforward and frank utterances will meet with the appreciation which most of those who are now attacking them are probably fully aware that they deserve.

I have not yet heard any official opinion of your speech, but I trust that it is not represented by the article in the "Lokalanzeiger," of which I have the honour to enclose a translation.

I have, &c.
W. E. GOSCHEN.

Enclosure in No. 524.

Translation of Leading Article in the "Lokalanzeiger" of November 29, 1911.

WHAT is bound to strike everyone most in Sir Edward Grey's speech is his confirmation of the two facts—(1) that on the 1st July he was informed by the German Ambassador of the reasons why Germany was sending a war-ship to Agadir; and (2) that he was kept *au courant* with the progress of the negotiations in the most loyal and conscientious manner by the French Government. Sir Edward Grey must, therefore, also on the 21st July, have been fully informed by the French Government as to what compensation Germany had actually demanded, and whether precise demands had really already been made; he preferred, however, to appear to the German Ambassador to be quite uninformed, and in the most unusual manner, to say the least of it, to have supported the mistrust felt by his Government with regard to the official declaration of the German Government by exercising his influence on the views of the press. It is equally new in diplomatic usage to expect that a formal and official statement should be characterised by a later statement as "final." According to our usage an official statement can only be final. The situation in July was actually as follows :—

In the period between the 1st and 21st July, Germany first attempted to convince her French neighbour, who was holding obstinately to the treaty of 1909, of the need for fresh negotiations, and a feeler was put out for a suitable basis for an understanding. This basis had not yet been definitely discovered by the 21st July; the negotiations hung fire; neither France nor Germany were able to make any positive communication to England respecting the basis of the understanding which they were striving to bring about, and that aroused the suspicion in England that France and Germany might be able to come to a rapprochement, leaving England out of it and pushing her on one side. Lloyd George was, therefore, put forward, to whose speech only the most meagre reference was made by the British Secretary of State in the House of Commons.

That which is bound to calm that portion of German public opinion, which would not believe in the firmness of the German Government, is the English confirmation of the fact that the action of Germany against Lloyd George's speech was by no means tame, but, according to Sir Edward Grey's words, extremely sharp. And it could not be otherwise, for the lasting impression of the events of the last months must, even after the recent debate in the House of Commons, be that England's attitude with respect to us during the whole crisis was unnecessarily and aggravatingly unfriendly, not to say arrogant. The fiction that England was the last and only court of appeal in all questions appertaining to the political possession of harbours and coasts was also on this occasion fully maintained by the British Government. That Government did not attempt by a single word to refute the general belief in an immediate outbreak of hostilities against Germany in the event of her not arriving at a settlement with France, although it would have been easy for her to do so already in July by simply pointing out that a conference in such case would become necessary. Instead of censuring Captain Faber's speech for having excited public opinion, it would have been better if Sir E. Grey had refuted the allegations brought forward by Captain Faber, for

although during the whole crisis no English and also no German war-ship had been placed on a war footing, and no other preparations for war worth mentioning had been made, his own country was allowed to believe the whole time, and the belief is still allowed to remain to-day, that England was equipped for war, and that she could have been compelled at any moment to draw the sword (for foreign interests). The British Government wilfully allowed the world to believe that there was a danger of war, and is therefore responsible for that wave of frantic war fever which swept over the whole world in the last months.

The reference to the Bosnian crisis, so popular in England, is not quite apt. Absolutely no negotiations on the Bosnian question took place after the annexation had been declared which could be disturbed by foreign intervention, and during the whole Bosnian crisis German statesmen abstained from mystic speeches and unfriendly demonstrations against other nations.

In the circumstances in which it was made, and in view of the present mistrust which has been once again aroused against German policy, Sir E. Grey's speech could not have had any other effect than it has. Nothing else was expected in our Government circles. Anglo-German relations will for a long time to come not be particularly friendly, but they have become normal again—till the next crisis, which we hope is a long way off.

[47978] No. 525.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 1.)

(No. 401.)

Sir, *Berlin, November 29, 1911.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 391 of the 23rd instant, enclosing translation of a semi-official communiqué in regard to the statement made by the Imperial Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs on the subject of Morocco at a secret sitting of the Budget Commission held on the 17th November, I have the honour to report that the following notice appears in the "Berliner Tageblatt" this morning:—

"Wolff's Telegraph Bureau requests us to state that Herr von Kiderlen-Waechter had nothing to do with the communications published by the bureau in regard to his statement in the secret sitting of the Budget Commission."

The fact remains that the semi-official "Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung" published the complete text of the protocol of the sitting on the evening of the 23rd November, and that the same text is contained in a parliamentary paper, of which I enclose a copy herein.*

I have, &c.
W. E. GOSCHEN.

[47973] No. 526.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 1.)

(No. 569.)

Sir, *Paris, November 30, 1911.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith a copy of the draft convention between France and Spain respecting Morocco which, as I informed you in my despatch No. 561, Confidential, of the 25th instant, M. de Selves promised to send to me for your consideration. It was brought to me to-day by M. Geoffray, French Ambassador at Madrid, who said that it was communicated to me "à titre officieux." He explained in reply to my enquiry as to the internationalisation of Tangier that it would be the subject of an annex to the convention. It was not quite complete, as it required some amendments. He would communicate it to me to-morrow.

M. Geoffray informed me by direction of M. de Selves that he (M. de Selves) would be glad to have your observations on the "projet de convention" at as early a date as possible so that M. Geoffray might without undue delay return to Madrid to resume negotiations with the Spanish Government.

I have, &c.
FRANCIS BERTIE.

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* Not printed.

Enclosure in No. 526.

"Avant-Projet" of Franco-Spanish Convention.

Préambule.

LE Gouvernement de la République française et le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté le Roi d'Espagne déclarent qu'ils demeurent fermement attachés au principe de l'intégrité de l'Empire marocain.

ARTICLE 1er.

Le Gouvernement français reconnaît qu'il appartient à l'Espagne de prêter, dans la zone d'influence espagnole, son assistance au Gouvernement marocain pour l'introduction de toutes les réformes administratives, judiciaires, économiques, financières, et militaires dont il a besoin.

De même que dans la zone française, les règlements d'application concernant ces réformes seront arrêtés par le Makhzen; ils auront un caractère général et ne comporteront aucune clause spéciale relative à l'une ou à l'autre zone sans l'assentiment préalable de la Puissance qui y exerce son influence.

Ils seront appliqués par les autorités marocaines et contrôlés par des agents de nationalité espagnole dans la zone espagnole.

ARTICLE 2.

La zone d'influence espagnole est déterminée de la manière suivante:—

Au nord, par le littoral et les présides espagnols.

Au sud, partant de l'embouchure de la Moulouya, la limite remonte le thalweg de ce fleuve jusqu'à 2 kilom. en aval du gué de Mechra-klita, au nord de Moul-el-Bacha.

De là elle gagne par un parallèle les hauteurs de Djebel Fizen; elle suit l'alignement de la crête des hauteurs séparant les bassins de l'oued Kert et de l'oued Inaouen, laissant ainsi au sud de la vallée de l'oued Meknassa, pour gagner par la crête la plus septentrionale le Djebel Moulay Bouchta.

Cette limite est tracée sur la carte qui est annexée en deux exemplaires au présent accord.* Elle pourra, s'il devient nécessaire d'adopter de nouvelles précisions géographiques faire l'objet de rectifications opérées d'un commun accord entre les deux Gouvernements, mais en se rapprochant le plus possible des données ci-dessus.

Tout le territoire marocain situé au sud et à l'est de cette limite constitue la zone d'influence française.

ARTICLE 3.

Les régions comprises dans la zone d'influence espagnole spécifiées à l'article 2 restent placées sous la souveraineté du Sultan. Elles seront administrées par un Haut-Commissaire espagnol et par un khalifa nommé par Sa Majesté chérifienne et agréé par le Gouvernement espagnol.

Le khalifa résidera à Tétouan; il sera muni d'une délégation générale et permanente du Sultan en vertu de laquelle il exercera tous les droits appartenant au Sultan tels que: nomination de fonctionnaires et agents chérifiens dans ladite zone espagnole, application des règlements, &c.

Le Gouvernement espagnol déclare assumer la responsabilité de l'ordre et de la sécurité dans la région soumise à son influence. Il assurera l'application des traités, conventions et engagements antérieurement signés par le Makhzen, ainsi que l'accord du 4 novembre, 1911, entre la France et l'Allemagne approuvé par Sa Majesté chérifienne tant au regard de l'Allemagne qu'en celui des autres Puissances signataires de l'Acte d'Algésiras qui ont accédé audit accord.

ARTICLE 4.

L'Espagne s'engage à n'aliéner ni à céder sous aucune forme, même à titre temporaire, ses droits dans tout ou partie du territoire composant sa zone d'influence.

* Not reproduced.

ARTICLE 5.

Afin d'assurer le libre passage du détroit de Gibraltar, les deux Gouvernements convennient de ne pas laisser élever de fortifications ou des ouvrages stratégiques d'aucune sorte autres que ceux déjà existants sur la partie de la côte marocaine comprise entre la Moulouya et le Loukos.

ARTICLE 6.

Ne se trouve comprise dans aucune des deux zones la ville de Tanger, qui, conformément aux principes posés dans les accords de 1904 et de 1905, sera administrée par une municipalité conformément aux dispositions arrêtées dans le règlement annexé à la présente convention.*

ARTICLE 7.

Les écoles, les consulats et agences consulaires et tous les établissements espagnols et français actuellement existants au Maroc seront respectés dans l'une et l'autre zone d'influence.

Les deux Gouvernements s'engagent à faire respecter dans leur zone la liberté et la pratique extérieure de tout culte existant au Maroc. Le Gouvernement espagnol fera en sorte que les privilèges religieux conférés au clergé régulier et séculier espagnol soient désormais localisés à la zone d'influence espagnole.

ARTICLE 8.

Il ne sera apporté aucune entrave au passage des convois de ravitaillement destinés au Makhzen, aux voyages des fonctionnaires étrangers ou chérifiens qui se rendront de Tanger à Fez et inversement, non plus qu'aux passages de leur escorte, de leurs domestiques, de leurs armes et bagages. En ce qui touche le port d'armes, on se conformera au règlement chérifien sur la matière.

ARTICLE 9.

Les crédits ouverts par l'article 6 de l'Acte d'Algésiras pour la police des ports devant être épuisés au 1er janvier, 1912, la police dans les villes de Larache et de Tétouan et dans la zone d'influence espagnole sera assurée par des troupes indigènes recrutées dans ces régions et organisées, comme il a été stipulé dans le traité hispano-marocain de 1910. Les effectifs de ces troupes seront fixés par le Haut-Commissaire espagnol et par le khalifa du Sultan.

ARTICLE 10.

Les ressources constituées par les impôts et taxes prévus au traité hispano-marocain de 1910 seront affectées aux dépenses d'entretien de troupes visées à l'article précédent ainsi qu'au traitement des fonctionnaires chérifiens, aux dépenses de travaux publics et d'administration de la zone.

ARTICLE 11.

Il est stipulé que le Gouvernement chérifien ne pourra être appelé à participer à aucun titre aux dépenses de la zone espagnole. Le Gouvernement Royal assumant les responsabilités visées à l'article 3, paragraphe 3 de la présente convention, le Gouvernement chérifien ne pourrait être mis en cause ni supporter une responsabilité quelconque du chef de réclamations motivées par des faits qui se seraient produits dans ladite zone.

ARTICLE 12.

Le Gouvernement français et le Gouvernement espagnol constatent que la création dans l'Empire chérifien de zones d'influence ne peut porter atteinte aux droits, prérogatives et privilèges antérieurement concédés à des tiers pour tout le territoire de l'Empire, par le Gouvernement marocain.

En conséquence, le Trésor français (créancier d'une annuité de 2,740,000 fr.), l'Administration du Contrôle de la Dette, qui représente les porteurs des emprunts 1904

* Not printed.

et 1910, la Banque d'État du Maroc, la Régie cointéressée des Tabacs continueront de jouir dans la zone d'influence espagnole de tous les droits qu'ils tiennent des contrats qui les régissent, sans diminution ni réserves et sans que les délimitations de zone puissent faire obstacle à leur action, notamment en ce qui concerne la surveillance et la répression de la contrebande, les excédents de douane réalisés dans les ports.

Le Gouvernement espagnol, responsable de sa zone d'influence, reconnaît expressément ces situations antérieures et s'engage à faciliter aux institutions ci-dessus le libre et complet exercice de leur droit.

Ces institutions pourront, d'accord avec le Gouvernement chérifien et les deux Puissances signataires modifier les conditions de leur fonctionnement en vue de les mettre en harmonie avec l'organisation territoriale de chaque zone.

En ce qui concerne les droits de douane à l'entrée et à la sortie, ils ne pourront être modifiés dans chaque zone que d'accord avec les deux Puissances signataires, sous réserve des droits ci-dessus rappelés et les stipulations des traités et conventions en vigueur.

ARTICLE 13.

Le Gouvernement espagnol s'engage à établir dans le délai de trois mois à dater de la signature de la présente convention le bureau de douane de Melilla dans les conditions prévues par la Convention hispano-marocaine de 1910.

ARTICLE 14.

Les chemins de fer seront placés pour tout l'Empire sous l'autorité du Ministre des Travaux publics chérifien. Il en sera de même du Service des Postes et des Télégraphes chérifien. Les tarifs et le régime administratifs seront unifiés sur toute l'étendue du territoire marocain. Le personnel local et les agents d'exécution étrangers seront recrutés suivant les zones parmi les ressortissants des deux Puissances signataires.

ARTICLE 15.

Par dispositions spéciales et en dérogation des stipulations de l'article précédent résultant des engagements intervenus entre la France et l'Allemagne relativement à la construction d'une ligne directe de chemin de fer de Tanger à Fez, le Gouvernement espagnol donne son adhésion à la construction immédiate de ladite ligne.

Les études de cette ligne et la surveillance des travaux seront assurés par le Gouvernement chérifien qui choisira tels organes d'exécution qui lui paraîtront convenables.

Les travaux seront mis en adjudication conformément à l'article 6 de la Convention franco-allemande du 4 novembre, 1911.

En ce qui touche l'exploitation de ladite ligne, le Gouvernement chérifien en déterminera librement les conditions, conformément au paragraphe 3 du même article 6.

Le Gouvernement chérifien ou la compagnie à laquelle il aura concédé l'exploitation de la ligne auront la faculté de prendre toute mesure de police et de garde que comporteront l'exploitation et la surveillance de la ligne.

ARTICLE 16.

Les Puissances signataires s'engagent à prêter dès maintenant, dans leurs possessions d'Afrique leur entier concours au Makhzen pour la surveillance et la répression de la contrebande des armes et munitions de guerre.

Lorsqu'il s'agira du droit de visite dans les eaux territoriales marocaines, les deux Gouvernements établiront d'un commun accord les règles à observer pour l'efficacité de la répression en se conformant aux règlements douaniers chérifiens.

ARTICLE 17.

Les différends qui viendraient à s'élever entre les parties contractantes au sujet de l'interprétation et de l'application des dispositions de la présente convention et qui

n'auraient pas été réglés par la voie diplomatique seront soumis à un tribunal arbitral constitué dans les termes de la convention du 18 octobre, 1907 ; un compromis devra être dressé et il sera procédé suivant les règles de la même convention en temps qu'il n'y serait pas dérogé par un accord exprès au moment du litige.

ARTICLE 18.

Toute clause des traités, conventions et accords antérieurs qui seraient contraires aux stipulations qui précèdent sont abrogés.

[47973] No. 527.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 329.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, December* 1, 1911.

I REGARD it as very satisfactory that French Government intend to make proposals to Spain upon basis of 1904 agreements. I have not had time to study carefully the French draft, which was only received heré this afternoon, and it would not be fair to regard us as pledged to all details till Spain has had an opportunity of expressing her view. But the draft is one to which I will give general support as affording a fair basis for discussion, after it has been presented to Spanish Government. I notice that there is no mention of Ifni, which I thought France was willing to leave to Spain. I presume that point is not decided adversely. We shall be ready to give our good offices, if required, when discussion takes place at Madrid. Spain will of course expect to be assured that Germany will not also claim compensation from her as well. You should inform Minister for Foreign Affairs of my views.

[48156] No. 528.

Sir R. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 2.)

(No. 342. Confidential.)
Sir, *Tangier, November* 26, 1911.

A REGRETTABLE incident took place last week which appears to me to have considerable importance in view of the future internationalisation of Tangier and the composition of the municipality by which the town will practically be governed.

A meeting of the Commission d'Hygiène et de Voirie was held on the 21st instant. The "ordre du jour," which is always circulated beforehand amongst the members, contained no matters of any interest, and Mr. Elphick, the delegate from this legation, did not attend, being detained by business at the legation. A proposal was suddenly sprung upon the meeting by Ali Zaky Bey, the representative of the Makhzen, to the effect that twelve Moorish notables should be admitted to the committee as representatives of the Moorish community. The proposal was adopted, and Dr. Peau, supported by all the French members, and more particularly by the French consul, M. Filippi, proceeded to suggest that a letter should be addressed to the Conseil sanitaire asking that the delegates appointed by the various legations should be suppressed. Mr. Abensur, one of the two representatives of the British colony, protested, pointing out that it would be improper for the Commission d'Hygiène, which was merely an emanation of the Conseil sanitaire, to ask for the withdrawal of the representatives of the foreign legations. M. Filippi, however, and other prominent French members, insisted. The proposal was put to the vote and fortunately rejected. It was resolved, however, that a letter should be addressed to the Conseil sanitaire asking them to put in force as soon as possible the "projet de municipalité," which had been drawn up on behalf of the Commission d'Hygiène by a dangerously clever French lawyer, M. Saurin.

Mr. Abensur informed me of the above on Wednesday last, and I have been daily expecting the letter in question to be circulated, but it has not yet reached me. I saw at once that the intention of the French element in the Commission d'Hygiène was, by the admission of twelve Moors, whose appointment is virtually in the hands of the Makhzen, that is to say, of the French, to swamp the international element of the commission, to obtain a certain majority for the French, and eventually, when the Commission d'Hygiène was transformed into a municipality, to be able to confront us with the *fait accompli*. As, however, the commission can take no measure of such

importance without the acquiescence of the Conseil sanitaire, which I felt sure would not be obtained, and as I did not imagine that the French Legation were directly mixed up in the affair, I waited.

Yesterday the Russian Minister called to see me, and asked me my views on the matter. I said that I thought the Commission d'Hygiène had exceeded their powers in thus taking upon themselves to modify their constitution, but that their resolution had no value until it had been confirmed by the Conseil sanitaire. I added that I felt convinced that my Government, who had always insisted upon the principle of the internationalisation of Tangier in the event of a transformation of the Shereefian Empire, would never agree to so serious a modification of the *status quo* of the Commission d'Hygiène so short a time before the question of the municipality must come up for discussion. This, he said, was what he had expected. We agreed before parting that one of us would take the first opportunity of speaking privately to M. de Billy on the subject.

M. Botkine came to see me again this morning. He had met M. de Billy and raised the subject with him. M. de Billy told him frankly that it was he who had put Ali Zaky up to making the proposal. M. Botkine asked him whether, in so doing, he had acted by the instructions of his Government. He said, no; if he had waited for instructions he might have waited a long time; that when a step which he considered useful had to be taken, he found it better to take it on his own responsibility, and then telegraph it as a *fait accompli* to his Government. M. Botkine remarked that in this particular instance he should have thought it wiser to wait either until the mandate of the present Commission d'Hygiène expired (in the month of March) or, at all events, until we had some more definite knowledge as to what the arrangement was to be, and what form the internationalisation of Tangier was going to take. He imagined that the resolution of the Commission d'Hygiène would meet with a considerable amount of opposition in certain quarters. M. de Billy said that he could not agree with that view. He thought it far better to rush the thing when the situation was still quite vague; by waiting the opportunity might be lost, and it was in his opinion essential for France to secure a majority at once. When speaking of the Moorish notables, he told M. Botkine that he might be sure that no foreign protégés would be chosen. He added that he was just starting for the Dar en Niaba to settle with Guebbas which Moors were to be selected.

I must say I was perfectly amazed at what M. Botkine told me, and if all he said be true, I can only imagine that M. de Billy has taken leave of his senses; he has in any case shown a deplorable lack of judgment, as he surely ought to have realised that neither the British nor the Spanish Governments would ever agree to the proposal of the Commission d'Hygiène. It seems, moreover, most extraordinary that he should have taken this step without consulting either me or the Russian Minister. He on one occasion mentioned the matter of the municipality to me, and made some statements as to its future composition with which I did not agree, but I thought it useless to argue, and merely said that the whole question would, I imagined, come up for discussion whenever the various arrangements pending had been concluded.

A certain amount of allowance must, I think, be made for exaggeration on the part of M. Botkine. He dislikes M. de Billy, and has already had several encounters with him in the past. He is quite aware that there is no love lost between them, and he told me to-day that he had to be very careful in his dealings with M. de Billy, as on previous occasions when he had disagreed with him, or offered advice which was unpalatable, the latter had complained of him in Paris as Francophobe. Fortunately, M. Botkine said, M. Regnault had been on the spot, and had been able to give a good account of him from an experience of three years, so he hoped no harm had been done. He held this from M. Regnault himself.

This afternoon the Spanish Minister, who is at present President of the Conseil sanitaire, called upon me by appointment made in the morning. I felt certain that his visit was in connection with the action of the Commission d'Hygiène, and I was not mistaken. M. de Villa Sinda read me the letter which he had received from them, copy of which I have the honour to enclose herewith. He said that he wished to inform me of his views and those of his Government, with whom he had already communicated on the matter. It was perfectly clear that it was a move on the part of the French to nullify the effects of the proposed internationalisation of Tangier. It was, moreover, only one among many. There existed in Tangier a strong French colonial party, and they exercised undue influence upon the legation. (He apparently was not aware of the fact that in this matter it was the legation who had taken the initiative, and I did not enlighten him.) In view of the exceptional conditions and the great changes which

were imminent, the Spanish Government could never agree to so important a modification of the composition of the Commission d'Hygiène so short a time before it was to develop into a municipality. Things must remain as they were until the provisions of the municipality scheme, which had already been submitted to us for examination, had been definitely settled. It was out of the question that changes should be made at the last moment, which would prejudice that settlement. He read to me the draft of the circular communicating to the members of the Conseil sanitaire the letter of the Commission d'Hygiène, and I have the honour to enclose herewith copy of the paragraph defining his attitude in the matter. I consider that he has taken up the right line for defeating the objectionable proposal, and his point of view is stated with great moderation. I said that personally I agreed with him, but that of course I should have to refer the matter to my Government. I would, I said, append a notification to that effect to the circular when it reached me. He said he intended to send it to me first, and I propose as soon as I receive it to go and see M. de Billy and talk the matter over with him. I shall not refer to what the Russian Minister told me as to his initiative in the matter.

After our conversation I shall have the honour of reporting to you upon the whole matter by telegraph.

It appears to me essential that it should be made quite clear at Paris that we intend to have real internationalisation at Tangier, and that the town should be governed by a municipality upon which all the various nationalities will be fairly represented. Very great care will be required in framing the scheme for such a body, as its powers will be very extensive. The French, headed I fear by M. de Billy, are no doubt hoping for an international municipality which will be merely a façade, and behind which they, with the assistance of the Moors selected by the Makhzen, will always have a majority, and consequently wield the real power.

I have, &c.

REGINALD LISTER.

Enclosure 1 in No. 528.

Note by the Spanish Minister.

POUR ma part, il me semble que, étant données les présentes circonstances spéciales et le projet du règlement municipal se trouvant encore soumis à l'étude et à l'approbation du corps diplomatique, il n'y a pas lieu d'introduire, même à titre provisoire, des modifications d'aucune sorte dans l'organisation, le régime ou le fonctionnement actuels de la Commission d'Hygiène et de Voirie, soit quant à l'adjonction proposée de notables indigènes, soit quant aux autres indications contenues dans la lettre dont il s'agit.

Enclosure 2 in No. 528.

M. Filippi to the President of the Board of Health.

M. le Président, *Tanger, le 24 novembre*, 1911.

LA Commission d'Hygiène et de Voirie, dans sa séance du 21 courant, a consenti à l'admission de douze notables marocains que Si Aly Zaky, délégué du Makhzen, proposait de lui adjoindre.

Il nous a semblé que cette participation de représentants indigènes aux délibérations de notre commission était la conséquence équitable du droit de disposition que votre haute assemblée a bien voulu nous accorder sur les revenus de la taxe urbaine destinés au service municipal, et aussi de l'obligation où nous sommes de nous concerter avec le Makhzen pour l'emploi de ces revenus. Malgré notre constant souci de réserver aux habitants marocains une sollicitude égale à celle que nous devons aux souscripteurs européens, malgré cette impartialité attentive à laquelle le délégué du Makhzen a expressément rendu hommage, il convenait d'associer les intérêts et aussi les compétences indigènes à une administration dont les charges sont aujourd'hui aussi bien supportées par tous les éléments de la population.

Toutefois, la Commission d'Hygiène et de Voirie a voulu donner à cette manifestation de notre solidarité locale une signification plus complète encore en

renouvelant son vœu en faveur de l'organisation municipale immédiate de Tanger, suivant les principes qui ont reçu l'adhésion unanime des membres de notre assemblée.

Et s'il n'était pas possible de nous accorder cette organisation avant le renouvellement du mandat annuel de la Commission d'Hygiène, nous avons décidé d'insister auprès de vous pour que notre statut soit modifié suivant les principes posés dans les projets de règlement municipal et que, tout au moins, le collège électoral actuellement composé des seuls souscripteurs volontaires—dont la souscription de plus en plus réduite ne représente qu'une très faible partie de nos ressources—soit élargi et constitué sur les bases admises par la municipalité elle-même.

Veuillez, &c.

C. F. FILIPPI.

[48157] No. 529.

Sir R. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received December* 2.)

(No. 343.)

Sir, *Tangier, November* 26, 1911.

IT appears to me that it might be useful in connection with the recent action of the Commission d'Hygiène, which formed the subject of my immediately preceding despatch, to give a short sketch of the origin and composition of that body.

It was originally of a purely private character, composed of persons elected by those who voluntarily subscribed to its funds; it had no official standing whatever. Later on the Conseil sanitaire obtained from the Sultan powers to take in hand the maintenance of the roads and general measures of sanitation for the town. They delegated those powers to the Commission d'Hygiène, which was then reconstructed. It is composed of twenty-six members, fourteen being nominated officially, eleven of these representing the Powers, and three (including the president) representing the Moors. There are also twelve members elected by the European subscribers, of whom not more than four may be of any one nationality. At present they consist of four French, four Spanish, two English, one German, and one Italian. Within the last few months, in connection with the expenditure of the money produced by the "taxe urbaine," Ali Zaky Bey was added to the commission as representing the Makhzen.

If, therefore, the proposal of the Commission d'Hygiène were adopted, there would be sixteen Moors on the commission, out of a total of thirty-nine members. The Moorish members, taken with the four selected French members, would, therefore, always give a majority.

I have, &c.

REGINALD LISTER.

[48176] No. 530.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received December* 2.)

(No. 571.)

Sir, *Paris, December* 1, 1911.

I HAVE the honour, with reference to my telegram No. 196 of to-day's date, to transmit to you herewith copies of the French draft regulations respecting the administration of Tangier, which were brought to me this morning by M. Geoffray. At M. de Selves' request, he informed me that they were in the nature of an *avant-projet* to be submitted for the observations of His Majesty's Government. The third paragraph of the draft regulations originally ran as follows:—

"Le projet sera soumis à l'examen d'une commission nommée par le Makhzen et composée d'un membre chérifien président, d'un délégué des Puissances suivantes: Allemagne, Angleterre, Espagne, France."

M. Geoffray, however, suggested to M. de Selves that it would not be desirable to include Germany in the commission, and the latter decided that, rather than striking out Germany, it would be better to take out the whole paragraph, for if it remained in as part of the draft regulations Germany might make trouble. M. de Selves was of opinion that the matter dealt with in the paragraph in question had best be treated by the exchange of notes between France, England, and Spain.

I have, &c.

FRANCIS BERTIE.

Enclosure 1 in No. 530.

French Draft Regulations respecting Municipal Territory in Tangier.

LA ville de Tanger, devant conserver un caractère international, sous la souveraineté du Sultan, sera administrée par une municipalité, instituée suivant les principes du projet antérieurement établi par le Makhzen.

Le délégué du Sultan à Tanger sera de droit président de la municipalité.

Le projet définitivement arrêté sera sanctionné et promulgué par le Makhzen.

2. Le territoire municipal de Tanger comprendra l'agglomération urbaine et une partie des environs suivant la limite décrite ci-après :—

Partant de l'embouchure du torrent appelé Jandak Zirria, sur la côte sud du détroit de Gibraltar, la ligne de démarcation remontera le thalweg de ce cours d'eau jusqu'à la source la plus orientale, de manière à comprendre, dans le territoire municipal de Tanger, le village appelé Dxar-ez-Zeitzun.

De ce point, la limite gagnera, le plus directement possible, la crête du Jebel Beni Meyimel, et se dirigera ensuite, en ligne droite vers le sud-ouest, jusqu'à un point situé à égale distance des villages appelés Dxar-Hhumsanes et Dxar-el-Hhareb, le premier de ces villages étant compris dans le territoire municipal de Tanger.

De là, la ligne de démarcation se dirigera en ligne droite sur un point situé immédiatement au sud du village appelé Azib d'Akabia, lequel village sera compris dans le territoire municipal de Tanger.

La limite suivra ensuite, vers l'ouest, le parallèle de ce point, jusqu'à la rencontre du chemin le plus oriental qui conduit, de Tanger, à la Mechra-en-Nahal, sur l'oued Marhar.

La ligne de démarcation suivra ledit chemin jusquà' la Mechra-en-Nahal de façon à ce que ce chemin reste tout entier dans le territoire municipal de Tanger.

Après avoir traversé l'oued El Marhar, à la Mechra-en-Nahal, la limite suivra la rive gauche de cette rivière, puis celle de l'oued Tzahadartz, jusqu'à la mer.

Le tout conformément au tracé indiqué sur la carte de l'état-major espagnol, qui a pour titre : " Croquis del Imperio de Marruescos " à l'échelle de 1/100,000e. Édition de 1906.

3. La sécurité du territoire municipal sera assurée par un corps de police marocain placé sous l'autorité de délégué du Sultan à Tanger. Ce corps de police sera organisé conformément aux règles posées dans la note ci-annexée. Les deux tabors actuels de la police des ports seront supprimés.

4. Au cas où le corps de police serait momentanément insuffisant pour maintenir l'ordre, il appartiendrait au délégué du Sultan, d'accord avec la municipalité, de faire appel à la coopération du Gouvernement marocain.

5. Les frais d'entretien du corps de police de Tanger seront supportées par le budget municipal, et inscrits à ce budget à titre de dépense obligatoire. En cas d'insuffisance des ressources municipales, le Gouvernement marocain examinera dans quelles conditions il pourrait participer à cette dépense.

6. Les services administratifs et techniques ainsi que les exploitations concernant les travaux publics d'intérêt général, tels que les chemins de fer, toutes communications postales et télégraphiques, qui auront leur prolongement naturel au delà du territoire municipal ainsi que le port de Tanger et ses annexes ressortiront au Gouvernement chérifien.

Seuls les services administratifs et techniques ayant un intérêt purement municipal ressortiront à la municipalité de Tanger.

7. Le service chérifien des travaux publics pourra, tant à l'intérieur qu'à l'extérieur du territoire municipal de Tanger, effectuer ou faire effectuer par ses entrepreneurs, fermiers ou concessionnaires régulièrement institués, toutes études, recherches et travaux en vue d'améliorer l'alimentation hydraulique de la ville et de sa banlieue.

Ce service pourra, à cet effet, exploiter ou faire exploiter les eaux situées dans les zones voisines et non utilisées pour l'alimentation de celles-ci.

Le service pourra en outre se procurer dans les zones visées aux deux paragraphes précédents les matériaux nécessaires à la construction du port de Tanger, de la route et du chemin de fer de Tanger à Fez, ainsi que l'eau destinée à l'alimentation de cette ligne et de la région qu'elle traverse.

Les conditions et redevances imposées à cette occasion seront celles appliquées aux concessions similaires dans la zone d'extraction.

Les autorités de la zone prendront les mesures utiles pour faciliter les études, recherches, travaux et exploitations, pour assurer la sécurité des agents qui y procèdent, ainsi que l'application des dispositions des traités, conventions ou règlements généraux.

D'une manière générale, ces autorités veilleront également à la conservation et à la protection des sources, rivières et carrières, de manière à ne pas porter préjudice aux intérêts des zones voisines.

8. En contre-partie des dépenses d'intérêt général dont il assume la charge, l'État marocain se réserve le produit des droits de douane et d'une manière générale les taxes et produits autres que ceux énumérés ci-après :—

(1.) Achour et Zekkat ou l'impôt tertib, quand il leur sera substitué.
(2.) Taxes prévues par les articles 61 et 64 de l'Acte d'Algésiras sous les conditions fixées par les règlements établis en application de ces articles.
(3.) Revenus des biens du domaine privé municipal.
(4.) Droits de toute nature perçus dans les halles, abattoirs, foires et marchés.
(5.) Permis de stationnement et locations sur le domaine public municipal.
(6.) Droits de voirie et d'occupation temporaire du domaine public municipal.
(7.) Taxes ou parts contributives perçues sur les riverains pour la construction et l'entretien des égouts, rues, trottoirs et caniveaux.
(8.) Taxes d'éclairage et de balayage.
(9.) Contributions, taxes et droits dont la perception est régulièrement autorisée.
(10.) Portion des droits de péage sur l'appontement en bois du port de Tanger restant à percevoir pour parfaire la somme déterminée par les accords intervenus entre le Mahkzen et le Conseil sanitaire, tant que cet appontement restera dans son état actuel.
(11.) Produit de l'aliénation des biens du domaine privé municipal.
(12.) Produit des dons et legs.
(13.) Produit des emprunts, avances et subventions.
(14.) Produit de toutes autres recettes accidentelles.

Il est fait au profit des emprunts 1904 et 1910 et de l'annuité française réserve expresse des droits qui leur sont conférés par les contrats qui les régissent sur le produit ou sur la perception de certaines des taxes précitées.

Les produits et taxes ci-dessus énumérés constituent les recettes du budget municipal.

8 *bis*. Pour tout ce qui concerne la création et la perception des ressources constituant son budget, la municipalité se conformera aux principes d'égalité économique et de liberté commerciale. Il ne sera créé aucun droit de transit sur les marchandises traversant le territoire municipal.

Le Gouvernement marocain réserve à tous ses agents en service dans la zone internationale la liberté d'action nécessaire à l'exercice de leurs fonctions. Même réserve est faite au profit de l'Administration de la Dette et de la Régie des Tabacs, qui continueront d'exercer librement dans la zone internationale, notamment en ce qui concerne la répression de la contrebande, les droits et prérogatives inscrits dans les contrats qui les régissent.

8 *ter*. La création à Tanger d'une zone municipale internationale ne peut pas porter atteinte aux droits, prérogatives et privilèges antérieurement concédés à des tiers, pour tout le territoire de l'Empire, par le Gouvernement marocain.

En conséquence, les porteurs des emprunts 1904 et 1910, le Trésor français créancier d'une annuité de 2,740,000 fr., l'Administration du Contrôle de la Dette marocaine, qui représente les créanciers précités, la Banque d'État du Maroc, la Régie cointéressée des Tabacs, continueront de jouir dans la zone internationale de tous les droits qu'ils tiennent des contrats qui les régissent, sans diminution ni réserve, et sans que les délimitations zonières puissent faire obstacle à leur action, notamment en ce qui concerne la surveillance et la répression de la contrebande.

Le règlement municipal de Tanger devra reconnaître expressément ces situations et la municipalité facilitera aux divers créanciers ou établissements ci-dessus visés le libre et complet exercice de leurs droits.

Les institutions précitées pourront, d'accord avec le Gouvernement chérifien et la municipalité de Tanger, modifier les conditions de leur fonctionnement en vue de les mettre en harmonie avec l'organisation territoriale de la zone.

9. Les hôpitaux, dispensaires, écoles publiques et privées, instituts scientifiques et les établissements d'assistance ou d'hygiène conserveront leur existence propre et ne subiront aucune entrave dans leur organisation et leur fonctionnement.

La municipalité de Tanger s'engage à faire respecter sur son territoire la liberté et la pratique extérieure de tous les cultes existant au Maroc.

10. Les convois de ravitaillement destinés au Makhzen circuleront sans entraves sur le territoire municipal. Il en sera de même des fonctionnaires étrangers ou chérifiens ainsi que de leurs domestiques avec leurs bagages pour le port d'armes on se conformera au règlement chérifien (*sic*).

11. Aucune fortification ou ouvrage stratégique quelconque ne pourra être élevé sur le territoire municipal de Tanger.

12. Sous réserve des stipulations ci-dessus, les traités, conventions, règlements et textes législatifs intervenus ou à intervenir dans l'Empire chérifien sont applicables sur le territoire municipal de Tanger.

Enclosure 2 in No. 530.

French Draft Regulations respecting Tangier Police.

LE corps de police de Tanger sera à l'effectif de 300 hommes, savoir: 200 cavaliers et 100 hommes à pied, recrutés par engagement volontaire parmi les Marocains musulmans, mariés ou célibataires.

2. Sa composition sera la suivante:—

Cavalerie.—Deux cents hommes répartis en quatre pelotons chacun d'eux comportant:

"Mokaddem" (sous-officiers)	3
"Maoum" (caporaux)	6
Trompettes	2
Cavaliers	39

Infanterie.—Cent hommes répartis en deux sections, comportant chacune—

"Mokaddem" (sous-officiers)	3
"Maoum" (caporaux)	6
Tambour	1
Clairon	1
Soldats	39

3. Le corps de police est commandé par un capitaine choisi parmi les officiers des Puissances européennes neutres (Belgique ou Suisse).

Ce capitaine est assisté dans le commandement des troupes par trois lieutenants ou sous-lieutenants et huit sous-officiers, dont six faisant fonctions de chefs de peloton ou de section et deux servant de secrétaires-comptables.

4. Le choix du personnel européen est fait par la municipalité de Tanger.

5. Les officiers et sous-officiers européens passent avec la municipalité un contrat qui détermine les conditions de leur engagement et fixe leur solde et leurs indemnités diverses. Celles-ci seront celles qui ont été concédées aux officiers et sous-officiers instructeurs de la police des ports instituée par l'Acte d'Algésiras.

6. La troupe marocaine du corps de police de Tanger portera l'uniforme fixé pour la police des ports.

7. La solde et les indemnités attribuées à cette troupe seront celles prévues par le Règlement de la Police des Ports.

Au cas où une modification de solde deviendrait nécessaire, une entente interviendra à cet effet entre le Makhzen et la municipalité lors de l'établissement du budget du corps de police.

8. Le règlement du corps de police sera établi par les soins du capitaine commandant et soumis à l'approbation de la municipalité de Tanger.

9. Le corps de police devra être constitué dans un délai de six mois après la date de promulgation dudit règlement.

10. Les sous-officiers, caporaux et soldats des tabors de la police des ports, y compris ceux de Tanger, seront autorisés à passer dans le nouveau corps de police.

11. Les tabors de police de Tanger seront supprimés au plus tard à l'expiration du délai prévu au paragraphe 9 ci-dessus.

12. Ils remettront au corps de police les locaux qu'ils détiennent actuellement. Ils verseront dans les magasins chérifiens de Tanger leurs armements, munitions et matériel divers.

[47480] No. 530*.

Foreign Office to Board of Trade.

Foreign Office, December 2, 1911.

Sir,

I AM directed by Secretary Sir E. Grey to transmit to you herewith correspondence relative to a proposed Moroccan International Syndicate.*

Sir E. Grey would be glad to know whether the Board of Trade see any objection to the Paris financier, who is organising the syndicate, being informed that, provided British capital participates on equal terms with foreign capital, His Majesty's Government will, if the syndicate is supported by the French and German Governments, equally support it as far as they properly can.

Sir E. Grey would be obliged for an early intimation of the view of the Board.

I am, &c.

F. A. CAMPBELL.

* Nos. 489, 497 and 520.

13. Le commandant du corps de police pourra sur autorisation du délégué du Sultan à Tanger recevoir de ces magasins les armes et munitions nécessaires à sa troupe pour son entrée en fonctionnement. Mais l'entretien et le renouvellement de ce matériel seront à la charge de la municipalité.

[48176] No. 531.

Memorandum by Sir E. Crowe respecting the Tangier Municipality.

1. THE draft regulations submitted by the French Government are, I think, unsatisfactory.*

2. Before going into particulars, it may be well to consider the procedure by which the French Government suggest that the regulations should become operative.

3. It is not made quite clear what precisely is intended to be the character or status of the regulations. It looks at first sight as if they were to be in the form of a firman, or Shereefian decree, and this would no doubt be the proper procedure. Seeing, however, that the regulations, on a number of important points, directly or indirectly affect the treaty rights of the Powers represented at Tangier, it is evident that they require the assent of those Powers, and some of the clauses are so worded as to create the impression that the regulations are themselves in the nature of conventional stipulations to be agreed upon by the Sultan and the Powers. Under article 1 of the regulations, however, it is undoubtedly the Sultan who is to decree that there shall be a municipality, and this municipality is to be on the lines of the Moorish scheme which the Maghzen submitted for the consideration of the diplomatic body at Tangier at the beginning of the present year.

4. The French Government, so Sir F. Bertie tells us, at first intended that the four principal treaty Powers, France, Spain, Great Britain, and Germany, should appoint a committee, with a Moorish president, to examine the draft regulations and, presumably, to settle its definite text. In order, as it appears, to avoid bringing in Germany, it is now proposed to agree upon a text by negotiation between France, Spain, and Great Britain, and to have it definitely approved by an exchange of notes between these three Powers. It is surprising that the French Government should consider it either proper or possible to settle the constitution of an international municipality at Tangier over Germany's head, without, apparently, any reference to the German Government. If an international municipality means anything, it means that the administration is placed under international control, which necessarily implies the active co-operation, if not direct participation, of the Representatives of the treaty Powers. It is therefore difficult to see how any ready-made regulations, however reasonable and just, could be imposed on any of those Powers without their being consulted beforehand. The Powers must in fact inevitably all be consulted, and I should have thought that the most natural procedure would have been to let the draft regulations be debated and approved by the diplomatic body at Tangier before being issued by Shereefian decree.

5. This would seem all the more called for, as, under article 1, the regulations are to be based on the previous, abortive, Moorish proposals, which were, at the time, referred to the diplomatic body, and met, on the latter's part, with absolutely destructive criticism (see Sir R. Lister's despatches Nos. 9 of the 4th February, 1911 [4129], and No. 73 of the 15th April, 1911 [13935]). It is inconceivable that a scheme which was practically declared by that body, when consulted barely nine months ago, to be quite unacceptable, should now be forced on some of the Powers, and amongst them Germany, without any further consultation at all. So much for the manner of preparing the settlement.

6. To pass to the consideration of the scheme itself: If the municipality is to be on the model of the abortive Moorish proposals, it will not in the true sense be an international, but a Moorish institution, in which foreigners will have a consultative voice only. This cuts at the root of the whole plan. Those proposals, whatever their merits, were put forward at a moment when the definite division of Morocco into a French and a Spanish protectorate was not considered imminent, and it was perhaps intelligible, in the then circumstances, that the French, who were admittedly the real authors of the proposals, should have tried to establish their own ultimate and paramount influence at Tangier under the cloak of Moorish preponderance. The cardinal point of the scheme was that it undisguisedly made that preponderance prevail. The

* See Enclosure 1 in No. 530.

municipality was to consist of a Moorish president, with extensive powers; an Administrative Committee, also endowed with important rights and duties, on which there was to be a majority of Moorish members, and a Municipal Council composed of twelve elected Europeans, and twelve Moorish members nominated by the President, who would be its chairman, and have a casting vote. These arrangements clearly concentrated all power in the hands of the Moors, who would have been in a position to override all European opposition. It was mainly for this reason that the Representatives of Great Britain, Germany, and Spain would have nothing to say to the scheme at the time. Some meetings were held with a view to amend the proposals, but the discussions appear to have been discontinued without the question ever reaching the stage of a formal submission to the governments of the Powers interested. Yet this very plan is now solemnly proposed for our acceptance. A guess may be hazarded that, as has happened before in similar cases, the officials of the French Foreign Office have not fully informed M. de Selves of the previous history of the question.

7. The recent Franco-German convention has meanwhile entirely changed the situation, and changed it in a sense still more unfavourable to the original Moorish (*i.e.*, French) scheme. Together with the proposed Franco-Spanish agreement, the convention involves practically the immediate division of Morocco into two protectorates, in which the Sultan's authority, whilst nominally maintained, will in fact be superseded by that of France and Spain respectively. Now France has herself called attention to the necessity of providing against the difficulty that would obviously arise if the Sultan's authority in either protectorate were exercised on the advice of the Power dominant in the other. The whole idea of internationalising Tangier is bound up with the policy, based on a British demand, advocated by Spain, and formally accepted by France,—that the political control over the township, which is geographically within the Spanish zone, shall not be exercised by either Spain or France. If the Moorish scheme, which leaves authority in the hands of the Sultan, were adopted, who would stand behind him? Under the clauses as drafted, it might conceivably be France, or it might be Spain. But both are, *ex hypothesi*, to be excluded.

8. The only logical arrangement, and the one clearly demanded by the term "internationalisation," is that, just as France stands for the Sultan's authority in the French, and Spain in the Spanish, zone, so the treaty Powers collectively shall stand for the Sultan's authority in the municipality of Tangier. The international, that is, treaty-Power authority must be supreme and responsible for government in the municipality in exactly the same way that France and Spain are supreme and responsible in their respective zones. Accordingly, so far as there is Moorish representation in the municipality, it must be subordinate to the position to be assigned to the European colony in a corporate capacity. It will not do to say in the same breath that in the whole of Morocco, outside Tangier, the Sultan's administration must in the interest of efficiency be subject to European advice and control, either French or Spanish, and that, at Tangier, the Moorish administration can remain uncontrolled in the Sultan's hands and yet work well. There must be European control throughout, and this control, which is to be neither French nor Spanish, must be international, that is, it must be exercised by the foreign communities. Internationalisation can have no other sense.

9. If the municipality were to be under French or under Spanish influence, then the regulations might well be drawn—as the Moorish proposals were drawn—so as to leave authority nominally with the Moorish government. For the right of general supervision exercised by the Protecting Powers would be a sufficient guarantee that their advice and directions would always be followed. But the foreign community at Tangier has no such rights of general supervision, and would have no means of directing or checking the action of a Moorish majority in the municipality. The powers of the municipality cannot derive, like those of the French or Spanish government, from the *de facto* existing state of political tutelage into which the Sultan has fallen. They can flow only from the instrument itself under which the municipality is set up. For this reason it is essential that the regulations should explicitly confer supreme authority on the foreign community, which should therefore be invested with the widest possible powers of self-government.

10. Measured by these necessities, the scheme proposed by the French Government entirely fails of its object. It is built upon a wrong foundation in taking as a starting-point the abortive Moorish plan of last January; and the superstructure which the new draft regulations would erect on it, continue and exaggerate the false lines. Thus the police is placed entirely in the hands of the Sultan (article 3). Not content with this, the French Government proposes that in case the municipal police is not equal

to the task of preserving order—and care has been taken strictly to limit their number—the Sultan's troops shall be called in (article 4). The municipality is to be bound to recruit and pay the police in accordance with police regulations which fix numbers and rates of pay, but in the preparation of which the municipality has no voice whatever (article 5 and regulations under article 3).

11. The water supply of Tangier and all control over it is to remain in the hands of the Public Works Department of the Moorish government (article 7), although the municipality is of course to pay. In the same way the construction of a port at Tangier is a matter to be reserved to the Maghzen (article 7). Then there is the rather ominous provision (article 8 *bis*) that the Moorish government "réserve à tous ses agents en service dans la zone internationale la liberté d'action nécessaire à l'exercice de leurs fonctions"—whatever this may mean.

12. Local knowledge is necessary to criticise the financial arrangements and the frontiers of the municipal district, but enough has been said to show that a municipality set up on the lines proposed would never realise the intentions with which Great Britain has always insisted on Tangier being internationalised. The best course would probably be, after an agreement has been arrived at as to the main principles on which any municipal scheme must rest, to entrust the elaboration of the detailed regulations, by which those principles are to be applied, to the diplomatic body at Tangier, who alone have the technical knowledge required to settle all particulars in accordance with local requirements. It may be observed in this connection that the international settlement at Shanghai appears to offer a sufficiently close analogy to justify its organisation being accepted as serving, in regard to many points of importance, as a useful model.

E. A. C.

Foreign Office, December 3, 1911.

[48373] No. 532.

Sir A. Hardinge to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 4.)

(No. 139. Confidential.)

Sir, *Lisbon, November* 25, 1911.

SENHOR VASCONCELLOS told me two days ago, and his statement is confirmed by what I hear from my French colleague, that the French Government is putting strong pressure on this Government to adhere to the Franco-German agreement respecting Morocco. He had, he said, to some extent replied to M. S. René de Taillandier in the same sense of your telegram No. 50 of the 10th instant, but he felt that, in view of the small interest of Portugal in the Moorish question, such a reply, and nothing more, might seem a little evasive and insincere at Paris, and he had therefore frankly explained to the French Minister his special reasons for wishing at this particular moment to avoid giving umbrage to Spain. M. S. René de Taillandier had assured him that His Majesty's Government, whose advice he professed to have sought, had adhered to the agreement, and he begged me to tell him if this was really the case, as, if it were, and if the French pressed him hard, he would be most reluctantly obliged to offend Madrid, and adhere on behalf of this country to the agreement.

I have acquainted him by a private note written this evening with the contents of your telegram No. 51 of to-day's date, but I think it unnecessary, in view of what he has already told me of his intentions under the circumstances, to ask him any further question or suggest to him any line of conduct; otherwise, he may try to make us responsible for the results of his disregard of Spanish representations on this matter. I have reason to anticipate that the relations between the two peninsular States will again become increasingly strained, and that the Spanish Government, which is greatly irritated at the demonstrations organised here in honour of the Spanish Republican leaders and at the proceedings of the Portuguese "Carbonarios" in Galicia, may retaliate by showing more indulgence than it has of late done to the loyalist conspirators in that province.

I have, &c.

ARTHUR H. HARDINGE.

[48297] No. 533.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 4.)

(No. 405. Confidential.)

Sir, *Berlin, November 30, 1911.*

SINCE writing my despatch No. 400 of the 29th instant, I have not noticed any improvement in the tone of the German press with regard to the policy of His Majesty's Government as set forth in your speech. The chief complaint now seems to be that as Great Britain had no secret agreement with France providing for mutual support nor any military convention with that Power, her action in endeavouring to intervene in the Franco-German negotiations, and her readiness to give France military and naval support, as shown by Captain Faber's speech, and by the mobilisation of the fleet, had been clearly dictated by hostility to Germany. This conclusion does not seem to be logically sound or to be justified by the premises, but it is the opinion most generally in vogue here, at all events in German journalistic circles.

The "Germania" is especially strong on this point of the policy of His Majesty's Government being dictated by hostility to Germany, and not by any treaty obligations to support France, and couples with this complaint the indictment, made so freely in the German press, that in your speech you made it more clear than ever that Great Britain had no intention of abandoning her pretensions to have the final word in the disposal of territories all over the world. The "Germania" says that this attitude does not in the least harmonise with the language in which you were good enough to state that Great Britain claimed no predominance in international affairs, and that Germany had equal rights to make her voice heard. "The fact is," the "Germania" says, "that last summer Great Britain assumed the position of the leader of the world, and, what is far worse, Sir E. Grey's speech clearly shows that the British Government consider that attitude a perfectly natural one to adopt. We must draw our own conclusions as to the consequences of this attitude, and we must admit that the conflict between the two nations is not only not set aside, but has the appearance now for the first time of becoming inevitable. Or should we wait to see whether the proud Englishmen will perhaps become a little more modest in their pretensions? Previous experience shows that that would be a foolish proceeding. Or are we to suppose that the German Michael intends humbly to submit to being placed under the guardianship of England? That, of course, is utterly out of the question. Therefore, it must come, sooner or later, to a thorough clearing up of accounts ('Abrechnung') between the two nations. As for Sir E. Grey's fine phrases about new friendships and understandings, we attach to them, in the face of the logic of events, very little importance, or—none whatever. How is it possible for Great Britain to come to an understanding with Germany when Downing Street founds its policy towards us upon mere uncontrollable rumours. Sir E. Grey must himself admit that that was what happened in the summer."

I have ventured to bring this article to your notice, as, in my despatch under reference, I omitted to make mention of the opinions held by the Party of the Centre, of which the "Germania" is the representative organ.

The belief that in your conversations with Count Metternich you founded your reference to the unacceptable German demands for compensation in the Congo upon newspaper reports only is common to the whole German press. This belief has always existed, but in any case it was confirmed by the omission in the German translation of your speech of the words, "And, indeed, it was the case." As the Berlin correspondent of the "Times" rightly pointed out, this omission has tended to delude public opinion on the point.

I have, unfortunately, not had an opportunity of seeing either the Chancellor or the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs since you made your speech, but from conversation with others I have gathered that while admitting that your speech was unimpeachable in form and friendly in tone, the feeling in official quarters is that it will not have the desired effect of calming public opinion here. From a person who is in constant communication with the Chancellor, I hear that the latter fully appreciated the references which you made to him and his speeches in the Reichstag, but rather wished that you had thought of all his genuine efforts to come to a better understanding with England before assenting to Mr. Lloyd George's speech. It is possible, of course, that the Chancellor said this, but I rather think that the view expressed was that of my informant, for he went on to say that the speech in question

had placed the Imperial Chancellor in a most difficult position, and that it was entirely owing to Mr. Lloyd George's utterances that his Excellency had had to sit down after a long and important speech in the Reichstag without one single encouraging cheer from any side of the House. This deadly silence, my informant said, was the reply of the representatives of the nation to Mr. Lloyd George's speech. He added that it was owing to this speech that your own speech had been so much criticised in the German press, and that the rather unfriendly reception accorded to it had surprised no one.

My informant desired that his remarks should be treated as confidential.

The forthcoming debate on foreign affairs in the Reichstag will probably enlighten us more with regard to official opinion; in the meantime, it is obvious that some time must elapse, probably until the Reichstag elections are over, before any real improvement can take place in the relations between the two countries.

I have, &c.
W. E. GOSCHEN.

[48398] No. 534.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 4.)

(No. 573.)

Sir, *Paris, December 2, 1911.*

M. MILLERAND, who has been taking an active part in the discussion of the recent Franco-German Treaty in the commission for foreign affairs, yesterday gave an address to the Socialist-Radical group of the Chamber on foreign affairs. He recommended the approval by Parliament of the treaty, in spite of the drawbacks to it, which had been pointed out. Germany had received by it no privileges which other Powers did not share. France had secured a protectorate over Morocco. It was inevitable that her action would at the beginning be embarrassed by the obstacles ("entraves") which were inherited by the present situation from the past. It would be for the French Government to realise fully this protectorate by taking their time about it, as had been done in the case of Tunis. He called attention to the possibility that might arise, if care were not taken, of France as a result of the future agreement with Spain, being held responsible by other Powers for the latter country's proceedings.

England would have to be closely associated with the settlement to be reached with Spain, for she was the "témoin" of French agreements with Spain in 1904. It was right that England should be so associated for a higher reason, namely, for the sake of the *entente cordiale*. It was the bounden duty of France to maintain and strengthen it, and to go hand-in-hand with England in this, as in all other questions of foreign policy.

I have, &c.
FRANCIS BERTIE.

[48399] No. 535.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 4.)

(No. 574.)

Sir, *Paris, December 2, 1911.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith a letter published in the "Temps," and addressed to the President of the Council by Baron d'Estournelles de Constant, on the subject of the desire alleged to have been expressed at one time by Mr. Chamberlain to bring about the partition of Morocco between England and Germany.

The letter has reference to an article written by M. Stéphane Lauzanne in the "Matin," which I forwarded to you in my despatch No. 553 of the 25th ultimo.

M. d'Estournelles de Constant declares that no such desire existed on the part of Mr. Chamberlain in 1903 and 1904, and gives his reasons for making this statement.

M. Stéphane Lauzanne writes a reply to M. d'Estournelles de Constant in the "Matin" of to-day's date. He points out that the matter was brought up by M. de

Kiderlen-Waechter before the German Commission for Foreign Affairs, and that the views attributed to Mr. Chamberlain were held by him in 1899, if not in 1903. M. Lauzanne quotes a speech made by Mr. Chamberlain on the 30th November, 1899, advocating an alliance between England, Germany, and the United States.

I have, &c.
FRANCIS BERTIE.

Enclosure 1 in No. 535.

Extract from the "Temps" of December 2, 1911.

MR. J. CHAMBERLAIN ET LA QUESTION DU MAROC.

M. D'ESTOURNELLES DE CONSTANT vient d'adresser au Président du Conseil la lettre suivante, où il proteste contre une allégation récente à propos de la politique de Mr. Chamberlain, l'ex-Premier Ministre anglais :—

"M. le Président du Conseil, "*Paris, le 1er décembre*, 1911.

"Pour justifier un nombre inconnu de traités secrets auprès desquels le 'secret du Roi' n'est plus qu'un enfantillage, on crée des légendes. C'est dans l'ordre. On nous dit : le traité franco-anglais de 1904 avait pour objet, en réalité, de couper court à une manœuvre de l'Angleterre ou du moins du parti Unioniste anglais, lequel rêvait, en la personne de Mr. Chamberlain, de soustraire le Maroc à l'action française pour le partager entre l'Espagne et l'Allemagne. C'est cette conception machiavélique que le traité secret de 1904 a fait avorter.

"Je dois protester, dans le double intérêt de la vérité et des bonnes relations franco-anglaises, contre cette invention, démentie par les faits que vous connaissez comme moi-même. Je le dois d'autant plus que Mr. Chamberlain, malade, ne peut se défendre.

"La vérité est qu'en 1904 Mr. Chamberlain n'a pas rêvé et ne pouvait rêver un partage du Maroc entre l'Espagne et l'Allemagne, pour plusieurs motifs, notamment :

"1er. Tout le monde sait que le Gouvernement dont il faisait partie considérait comme inadmissible la cession non pas de la moitié du Maroc, mais même d'un seul port du Maroc à l'Allemagne ; inutile d'insister sur ce point.

"2. Mr. Chamberlain pouvait si peu songer, en 1904, à prendre parti contre la France qu'il s'était prononcé publiquement pour la politique de l'entente cordiale, l'année précédente, devant vous, devant moi, devant tous ceux de nos collègues français qui ont pris part à la réception grandiose du Parlement britannique, le 22 juillet, 1903. Personne encore n'avait cru pouvoir prononcer ces mots : 'Entente cordiale" ; ce fut lui qui en prit l'initiative ; le texte de son discours figure dans les bulletins de notre groupe, et ce discours fit sensation.

"Ce n'est pas tout. En politique pratique, Mr. Chamberlain ne s'est pas contenté de cette manifestation, et c'est lui qui le premier a demandé qu'elle fût suivie d'une sanction diplomatique : il ne l'a pas fait sans y être encouragé par ces collègues du Cabinet, sans parler de l'entourage du Roi ; c'est lui qui a suggéré, réclamé verbalement et par écrit la réalisation d'un accord diplomatique franco-anglais. J'ai rendu compte de ces conversations et de sa correspondance personnelle avec moi au Ministre des Affaires Étrangères par une communication publique du 3 août, 1903, que tous les journaux ont reproduite. J'ai lieu de croire que cette lettre n'a pas été sans influence sur l'orientation des négociations engagées depuis lors.

"Il est donc pour le moins étrange aujourd'hui qu'on cherche à égarer l'opinion au point de lui persuader que l'entente cordiale ne serait l'œuvre que d'un parti alors que, réalisée par les uns, préparée par tous, elle est l'œuvre de l'Angleterre et de la France.

"Veuillez, &c.
"D'ESTOURNELLES DE CONSTANT."

Enclosure 2 in No. 535.

Extract from the "Figaro" of December 2, 1911.

L'HISTOIRE D'UN TRAITÉ.—M. DE KIDERLEN ACCUSÉ DE MENSONGE MR. CHAMBERLAIN, PÈRE DE L'ENTENTE CORDIALE.

M. D'ESTOURNELLES DE CONSTANT vient d'adresser à M. Caillaux, Président du Conseil, une longue lettre pour protester contre une affirmation parue dans le "Matin" du 25 novembre—à savoir qu'en 1900, Mr. Chamberlain, alors Ministre anglais des Colonies, avait formé le projet de procéder à un partage du Maroc entre l'Angleterre et l'Allemagne.

M. d'Estournelles de Constant déclare que c'est une légende créée de toutes pièces, que Mr. Chamberlain n'a pas rêvé et ne pouvait pas rêver un partage du Maroc entre l'Angleterre et l'Allemagne, qu'on cherche à égarer l'opinion publique pour "justifier un nombre inconnu de traités secrets," &c.

L'affirmation que Mr. Chamberlain avait rêvé un partage du Maroc n'est pas de moi ; elle est de M. de Kiderlen-Waechter, qui, le vendredi, le 17 novembre, devant la Commission du Budget du Reichstag, a déclaré textuellement ce qui suit :—

"Mr. Chamberlain avait un système pour le partage du Maroc, en 1899, par lequel l'Angleterre prendrait Tanger et l'Allemagne aurait un port sur la côte de l'Atlantique, mais cela n'a jamais abouti à des négociations formelles."—("Times" du 23 novembre, 1911, p. 5, colonne 6, 2e alinéa.)

M. d'Estournelles de Constant ne m'en voudra, toutefois, pas de trouver une certaine saveur à ce que ce soit la plume du plus éloquent apôtre de la conciliation et de la paix internationales qui formule une grave accusation de mensonge et de faux contre le Ministre des Affaires Étrangères de l'Empire l'Allemagne.

Mais ce n'est pas tout, et M. d'Estournelles de Constant ajoute que c'est Mr. Chamberlain qui, le premier, prit l'initiative, en 1903, de prononcer les mots "entente cordiale" ; que ce fut lui, le premier, qui "suggéra, réclama verbalement et par écrit la réalisation d'un accord diplomatique franco-anglais" ; bref, que ce fut lui l'auteur de l'alliance des deux pays.

Il est possible que Mr. Chamberlain ait fait tout cela en 1903 ; mais il est bien certain qu'il n'a rien fait de tout cela en 1899 et en 1900, à l'époque où, selon M. de Kiderlen-Waechter, il rêvait de partager le Maroc entre l'Angleterre et l'Allemagne.

Voici en effet comment, le 30 novembre, 1899, deux jours après avoir été reçu en audience par l'Empereur d'Allemagne, à Windsor, et après avoir eu une longue conférence avec M. de Bülow, alors Chancelier de l'Empire, il s'est publiquement exprimé dans un discours prononcé à Leicester :—

"C'est avec le peuple allemand que nous désirons avoir une entente ou une alliance. Et à ce sujet, il n'est peut-être pas mauvais de rappeler que le caractère de la race teutonne ne diffère pas beaucoup de la race anglo-saxonne ; c'est le même sentiment de justice, c'est la même littérature, c'est la même origine de langage et si l'union entre l'Angleterre et l'Amérique est un puissant facteur dans la cause de la paix, une nouvelle Triple Alliance entre la race teutonne et les deux branches de la race anglo-saxonne sera un facteur encore bien plus puissant dans l'avenir du monde. . . . ."

Si donc, en 1903, Mr. Chamberlain a, comme le veut M. d'Estournelles de Constant, été l'auteur de l'entente cordiale, il avait été, quatre ans auparavant, en 1899, le promoteur d'une autre entente qui n'avait rien de cordial pour nous et qui était même diamétralement opposée à l'entente actuelle.

Ceux qui étaient au pouvoir en 1904 en France, et qui traitaient au nom de notre pays, avaient le devoir étroit, s'ils voulaient bâtir pour l'avenir, de ne pas oublier les récentes leçons du passé. La main d'un homme qui se tendit vers nous jadis sous la forme d'un poing pouvait se refermer, de même que le rêve peut revenir quand on ne reste pas éveillé. Le meilleur moyen, en 1904, de ne point retomber dans le sommeil était de se souvenir de 1899 et de signer le traité qui empêchait à jamais le rêve d'antan de devenir une réalité.—STÉPHANE LAUZANNE.

[48440] No. 536.

Sir V. Corbett to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 4.)

(No. 81.)

Sir, [*Munich, December* 2, 1911.

YOUR statement in Parliament on Monday last was awaited with intense interest in Germany, and for the last week has been discussed in the newspapers to the practical exclusion of every other subject.

It is extremely difficult in the compass of a despatch to give anything like a coherent account of the various criticisms which have been passed both on your speech and on the general policy of His Majesty's Government. They are sometimes mutually destructive in successive issues of the same paper, and, it must be remembered, are always written with one eye on England and another on the coming elections. However, out of the hundreds of columns which I have read during the last ten days, I will endeavour to extract what appears to me to indicate the general trend of German opinion.

The earlier comments on the telegraphic report of your speech were uniformly expressive of disappointment. It was recognised that your summary of events not only knocked all verisimilitude out of the widely circulated myth that His Majesty's Government had only ceased actively to interfere in the Morocco negotiations on receipt of a sharply-worded German note, but you further made it clear that a rapprochement with Germany, however much it might be desired, would not be sought at the expense of the existing friendship with France. These two points are those which chiefly preoccupy public opinion. As to the first, it deprives Germany of the consolation of believing that if the Imperial Government made a poor bargain with France, they at any rate had the moral satisfaction of having administered an effective snub to England. As to the second, it drives home the fact that the Morocco negotiations, far from weakening the Double *Entente*, have only served to cement it. Many Germans may desire to replace France as the friend of England, few have any ambition to figure as second or third partners in a galaxy of friendly nations in which England is to be the predominant partner. In papers of every shade, with frenzied exuberance in some, with greater moderation of language in others, the complaint is made that in the speeches of Mr. Lloyd George, of the Prime Minister, and of yourself, the British Government pose as the *arbiter mundi*. Not a sparrow, says one writer, can fall to the ground anywhere on the globe but some British interest is affected, and Great Britain must have her say in the matter. Your friendly references to Germany are held to indicate that, in the opinion of the British Government, Germany is a great and cultured nation, with a fine but fossilised army; as long as she keeps within the four walls of her own frontiers she is worthy of every respect, and even of some friendly patronage, but she must not meddle in international politics under penalty of finding herself confronted with the cry that British interests are involved and the British fleet is to be reckoned with. Even the "Frankfurter Zeitung," which has usually been moderate in its attitude towards England, in an article criticising your speech, sums up the situation by saying: "It cannot be expected that Sir Edward Grey will give up the policy he inherited from his Conservative predecessors, a policy formerly nervously described as one of hemming in, and the result of which has been the situation of to-day." The article ends more cheerfully by saying that "the prospect is not hopeless, and the quarrel with France once ended, better relations with England may follow. Matters cannot be hurried on, but when the waves of political excitement have subsided the water will become calm again, and peaceful co-operation will be possible."

I think I have given with tolerable accuracy the spirit of the South German press, but I am far from asserting that it is necessarily the opinion of the country. The papers published in this part of Germany are, with the exception of the "Frankfurter Zeitung," second rate; they draw their inspiration from Berlin, and one and all have party interests to serve.

Much ink is expended in analysing the divergences between your account of the negotiations and that given by Herr von Kiderlen, but the comments are usually favourable to yourself, and need not be dwelt on. The Chancellor, Herr von Kiderlen, and Count Metternich, especially the two latter, have come in for a good deal of criticism, and as the Foreign Secretary is said to be secure as long as Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg remains in office, there is a tendency to make a scapegoat of the Ambassador.

Another point dwelt on by several writers is the absurdity of the fear which was at one time entertained by His Majesty's Government that Germany might desire to establish herself in any part of Morocco. If the idea was absurd, I can only say that the delusion of His Majesty's Government was one almost universally shared in this part of the Empire, not only by the man in the street, but by persons of information and weight.

A German of some position expressed to me the other day his regret that the debate in the British Parliament should have left Anglo-German relations much as they were, and especially your speech had not, as many of his countrymen had hoped, marked a new departure in policy. It was so easy, he thought, to have held out the hand of friendship more cordially. I pointed out that the latter part of your speech, as many of the German papers admitted, was largely made of friendly references to Germany. I hardly saw what more you could have said to emphasise the spirit of amity to which both the Prime Minister and yourself had given expression. He was quite unable to make any suitable suggestion, and in the end I gathered that it was not so much your supposed want of cordiality towards Germany which pained him as your obvious sympathy with France.

I can fully endorse the opinion of the German gentleman quoted by you as to the evil effects here of Captain Faber's speeches on German opinion. The inference that the British Government were waiting to pounce upon Germany on the first reasonable pretext has acquired wide and pernicious credence.

The gist of one or two articles from various papers, which appear to me to be worth citing, are annexed to this despatch.* I have intentionally avoided quoting the more violent diatribes. The last, from the Social-Democrat "Münchener Post," is written in a very friendly and reasonable spirit. I am assured, however, by an influential member of the Centre party (who is therefore, I hope, not an impartial authority) that it is merely a piece of Socialist election literature to justify opposition to further expenditure upon armaments.

I have, &c.

VINCENT CORBETT.

[47973] No. 537.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 334.)

(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, December* 4, 1911.

FRENCH Ambassador has now given me the draft proposals for Tangier and the police. I have said that I must have some days to study them. I have explained that you suspended action on my telegram No. 329 of 1st December, as you were sending further information about Tangier.

I think you can now safely give support to first document as a basis for discussion as in my telegram No. 329, saying that we must not be regarded as committed to details, as we do not yet know what is the modification that the French desire of the 1904 line, and the question of Ifni remains to be discussed. Reservation with regard to Spanish views is already made in my telegram No. 329.

It must also be understood that I can express no opinion yet about Tangier proposals. (End of R.)

(Very Confidential.)

I am informed by the French Ambassador that his Government intend to leave Ifni as well as Alcazar and Laraiche to Spain, but are unwilling to say so immediately.

(Repeated to Madrid, No. 100.)

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* Not printed

[47120] No. 538.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir A. Hardinge.

(No. 52.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, December* 4, 1911.

MOROCCO Agreement.

French Ambassador here informs me that Portuguese Government have stated that they are waiting for our opinion as to whether they should adhere. You should inform Minister for Foreign Affairs of this unofficially, and say that we see no reason why they should not adhere, as we have ourselves done so.

[48748] No. 539.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen.

(No. 125.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, December* 4, 1911.

THE Spanish Ambassador asked me to-day whether you would take part in the negotiations between France and Spain in Madrid, and said that if the French Government desired that you should do so the Spanish Government would be very glad that the negotiations should be *à trois*.

I replied that I was not yet sure as to this point, but I had contemplated that you should in any case be ready to use your good offices if they were required.

In reply to further enquiries from the Ambassador, I said that I had not yet read the actual proposals of the French Government as to Tangier, but the general lines of the agreement as to Morocco were based on the agreement of 1904 and were therefore satisfactory in principle. Certain details of great importance had been reserved, and I was not so far aware of what the French proposals would be with regard to them.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[48749] No. 540.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen.

(No. 126.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, December* 4, 1911.

THE Spanish Ambassador told me to-day that, if the French Government objected to the prolongation of the police arrangements for Tangier, the Spanish Government would suggest that they should be prolonged for six months.

I said that I would bear this in mind, but I had not yet heard what the French Government were proposing with regard to Tangier.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[48750] No. 541.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen.

(No. 127.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, December* 4, 1911.

THE Spanish Ambassador said to-day that his Government heard from Mogador that the French were making preparations for a landing near the Rio del Oro, in territory which the French Government had agreed with the Spanish Government in 1904 should be outside Morocco. The Spanish Government could hardly think that the French intended this.

I said that I had not before heard anything about this, and that I hoped that nothing of the sort was in prospect.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[48609] No. 542.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 5.)

(No. 576. Confidential.)
Sir, *Paris, December* 3, 1911.

AS I had the honour to inform you in my despatch No. 561, Very Confidential, of the 26th ultimo, M. Cruppi invited me to meet the President of the Council at dinner on the 1st instant. M. Cruppi's object in wishing me to meet M. Caillaux and the latter's intention in accepting M. Cruppi's invitation were, I have no doubt, to remove from your mind the bad impression which they realised must have been produced by M. Caillaux's imprudent language to me, which I reported to you in my despatches No. 495, Confidential, and No. 499, Confidential, of the 3rd and 5th ultimo respecttively, and their desire to bring me round to some of M. Caillaux's modified views in regard to the negotiations with the Spanish Government on the subject of Morocco, so that I might urge them on you as the reconsidered and essential and reasonable claims of the French Government.

No reference whatever was made during dinner to the question of Morocco. It was only after about an hour and a-half that M. Caillaux, seeing that I was not likely to start the subject, began it by observing that the reconsidered proposals of the French Government in regard to the Spanish zones in Morocco, which the Minister for Foreign Affairs must have communicated to me, had been drawn up with every desire to meet, as far as possible, the views of His Majesty's Government, which I had expressed to him so plainly (" si nettement "), and he hoped that they would be considered as satisfactory and be urged by them on the Spanish Government. I said that I had a general knowledge of the proposals, but I had not gone into the questions raised by them. M. Caillaux stated that, out of deference to the views of His Majesty's Government, the French Government would abstain from claiming Laraiche and Alcazar. Ifni would, out of regard to Spanish susceptibilities as being opposite to the Canaries, be omitted from the compensation in the south which France would require, but such compensation would not suffice. It would be absolutely essential that the line of the Spanish zone described in the 1904 agreement should be altered in the Lukkos district; guarantees must also be given for the security of the Tangier-Alcazar Railway and for French commercial enterprise of all kinds in the Spanish zone. These requirements must be regarded as very moderate and the least that France had the right to expect for the sacrifices which she had made to Germany, and which would benefit Spain. If after the construction of the Tangier-Alcazar-Fez Railway the Spanish authorities threw difficulties in the way of its efficient working as the carrier of trade, the result would be that that trade would find its inlet and outlet through Algeria or the Atlantic coast under French authority, which would be circuitous routes, and not to the advantage to trade in general and to British interests in particular. It would, therefore, be necessary to have very real guarantees for a railway passing through the Spanish zone.

As, during the conversation, in which I took but little part and M. Cruppi acted and spoke as a moderator in the zeal and arguments of the President of the Council, and frequently insisted on the necessity of maintaining the *entente* intact, M. Caillaux frequently spoke of the concessions which he was offering to Spain, I reminded him that any compensations for France would be concessions from Spain, as they would be derogations from the engagements of France towards Spain under the agreements of 1904, to which England had been a party; and as he expressed the opinion that His Majesty's Government had unduly supported the Spanish case, on the principle—a mistaken one he thought—of taking the part of the weak against the strong, I told him that, for reasons which I had on previous occasions explained to him, the general policy of England was no doubt to keep Spain in unison with her, but that in the particular case of Morocco, His Majesty's Government asked no more than an observance by the French Government of their treaty engagements of 1904 towards Spain and England, with such variations as might be necessary for reasonable compensation to France for the advantages accruing to Spain through the change in the *status quo* resulting from the Franco-German Convention. Compensations must, however, be found where they would not be inconsistent with the important interests of Spain and England.

I have, &c.
FRANCIS BERTIE.

[48610] No. 543.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 5.)

(No. 577. Confidential.)

Sir, *Paris, December 4, 1911.*

OPINION in Paris appears to be divided on the question whether the Ministry will survive the interpellations on foreign policy which are expected to begin on the 10th instant.

There is a movement on foot in Parliament which receives considerable support to approve the Franco-German Treaty first, and then to continue the debate on foreign policy.

This would not suit the Ministry, for its best safeguard for the present, is to induce the Chamber to approve by one vote, both the treaty and the policy of the Ministry with regard to foreign affairs generally.

The editor of the "Figaro" in the course of an article published to-day advocating the division of the debate into two parts says:—

"Mais que M. Caillaux n'oublie pas que l'Angleterre est l'associée de l'Espagne au Maroc, et qu'il se garde comme d'un crime contre la patrie, des pressions qu'il a un instant, hélas, exercées déjà, et qui abattraient, s'il les continuait, des humiliations ou des catastrophes incommensurables sur la France privée dès lors de tout appui."

I have, &c.

FRANCIS BERTIE.

[48611] No. 544.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 5.)

(No. 578.)

Sir, *Paris, December 3, 1911.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith, extracted from the "Gaulois" of to-day's date, copy of a leading article entitled "La Thèse espagnole," in which the views of the Spanish Government on the approaching Moroccan negotiations with France are set forth—probably at the instance of the Spanish Ambassador in Paris. It is contended that Spain does not owe France any compensation for the sacrifices made by that Power to Germany in the Congo. The Spanish Government's desire for conciliation, however, being great, they would perhaps consent to the cession of Alcazar if it were proved to them that the occupation of that town is necessary to the normal working of a French protectorate in Morocco. It is understood that Alcazar is the most important point on the line which France proposes to construct from Tangier to Fez, but it should be pointed out that that line could never become a strategical one which France could use to convey troops into the interior, for England would never allow Tangier, the terminus of the line, to be turned into a port of war to be utilised as a means of gaining access to the interior for a military expedition. The Tangier–Fez line would therefore be merely a commercial line to which all nations would have access on equal terms. It would therefore be of little moment for the security of the French protectorate if the Tangier–Fez line passed through Spanish territory in the neighbourhood of Alcazar.

I have, &c.

FRANCIS BERTIE.

Enclosure in No. 544.

Extract from the "Gaulois" of December 3, 1911.

LA THÈSE ESPAGNOLE.

NOUS ne sommes plus, comme l'a si bien exposé hier mon collaborateur, M. René d'Aral, puisque nous causons avec l'Angleterre, dans ce que l'on pourrait appeler la phase platonique des négociations franco-espagnoles. Conformément aux usages diplomatiques et à la procédure d'affaires en vigueur dans toute "tractation internationale," chacun a commencé par imposer ce qu'il croit être son droit et par préciser

son désir. C'est le jeu assez banal et un peu puéril qui consiste à demander plus pour avoir moins, à refuser tout pour ne céder que le moins possible. La France veut Larache et El Ksar; l'Espagne refuse Larache et El Ksar. Le Gouvernement français a déjà exposé à maintes reprises pourquoi il voulait Larache et El Ksar, et ici même nous nous sommes faits l'écho de ses déclarations, estimant qu'en pareille matière chacun devait avoir l'opinion de sa nationalité. Voici aujourd'hui la thèse espagnole, telle que le Gouvernement espagnol l'expose officiellement.

De l'examen des deux prétentions, il semblerait ressortir que tout accord est impossible. Faire preuve d'un tel pessimisme serait méconnaître les mœurs diplomatiques et les usages internationaux. Il est de règle, en effet, que dans toute discussion de cet ordre, les deux parties commencent par bien établir les divergences de leurs opinions, ne serait-ce que pour accentuer l'importance des concessions réciproques qu'elles se proposent de consentir. La France et l'Espagne sont en complet désaccord: donc elles vont s'entendre. Il n'est pas besoin d'être grand clerc pour découvrir le prétexte, d'ailleurs très raisonnable, qui permettra à l'Espagne de faire preuve à notre égard d'amicale confiance, et tel passage de l'exposé qu'on va lire, relatif à la construction du Chemin de fer de Tanger à Fez, laisse prévoir sur quelle base la prochaine entente franco-espagnole, si désirable et si nécessaire, sera établie, grâce à une concession de l'Espagne que le Gouvernement français s'empresserait d'ailleurs de reconnaître. Quoi qu'il en soit, voici la thèse espagnole.

Le Gouvernement espagnol nous dit:—

"Nous entendons défendre avant tout la cause de notre intégrité territoriale, qui est celle de notre honneur national. Nous estimons qu'en face de chaque côte de l'Espagne, le partage du Maroc doit nous laisser une partie du territoire de ce pays où notre influence soit prépondérante. Dans la Méditerranée c'est le Riff, dans l'Atlantique c'est la côte nord avec Larache et El Ksar, vis-à-vis normal de Cadix, et aussi Ifni, qui est en face des Canaries non pas colonie mais province espagnole. Nous ne pouvons admettre que le Maroc, où nous sommes établis depuis plus de quatre siècles, avec lequel nous avons jusqu'à des affinités de race, devienne dans sa totalité la propriété d'une autre nation qui s'établirait à proximité de nos côtes métropolitaines. Consentir à ce que la France prenne définitivement pied en face d'Algésiras, en face de Cadix, en face des Canaries, serait ratifier une diminution de notre intégrité nationale. En nous demandant un tel sacrifice on cède à une conception analogue à celle qui prétendrait exiger que l'Angleterre permit à la France de fortifier Tanger à quelques milles de Gibraltar.

"Nous avons usé de tous les moyens pour faire reconnaître par l'Europe notre décision de ne pas nous désintéresser de nos droits au Maroc, et il est permis d'avouer aujourd'hui que l'expédition de Melilla, qui fut si coûteuse, n'avait d'autre but que de proclamer par l'étendue des sacrifices consentis la sincérité de notre conviction et la fermeté de nos prétentions. L'occupation de Larache et d'El Ksar procède de la même politique; le jour où nous avons pu croire qu'en allant à Fez la France se préparait à 'réaliser,' nous avons été à El Ksar afin d'interrompre pour ainsi dire la prescription et d'indiquer que nous n'abandonnions pas ce qu'aux termes de la convention de 1904 nous considérions légitimement comme notre propriété éventuelle.

"Nous avons demandé au Gouvernement français de participer à l'expédition de Fez et lui avons dit: 'Si ce n'est qu'une opération de police, faisons-la de compte à demi, comme, sur votre propre demande, nous avons fait ensemble celle de Casablanca. Cette participation commune à l'exécution du mandat que l'Europe nous a donné laissera à l'expédition son caractère d'œuvre de police et exclura aux yeux de tous l'intention que l'on vous prête de commencer à "réaliser" à votre bénéfice exclusif.'

"Le Gouvernement français nous a opposé un refus formel, nous avons considéré que c'était de sa part l'aveu de son désir d'une réalisation immédiate et nous avons répondu à sa démonstration par la 'réalisation' de Larache et d'El Ksar, afin de maintenir nos droits et pour empêcher que l'on ne pût confondre notre inertie avec une sorte d'acquiescement tacite à l'abandon du territoire où la convention franco-espagnole de 1904 reconnaissait la suprématie de notre influence.

"On prétend, en France, que nous avons outrepassé l'article 2 de cette convention qui, pendant un délai maximum de quinze ans, nous obligeait à prévenir la France de toute action entreprise dans les territoires soumis à notre influence, et l'on a été jusqu'à affirmer que nous avions occupé Larache et El Ksar par surprise. Rien n'est moins exact. C'est à la date du 6 avril dernier que le Gouvernement espagnol a, conformément à la convention de 1904, prévenu la France de son intention de répondre à la marche sur Fez par l'occupation d'El Ksar. Que le Gouvernement français ait protesté, il importe peu: en repoussant notre collaboration à Fez, il avait le premier

méconnu le principe de l'action en commun et nous avait par le fait déliés de toute autre obligation que de celle de respecter la ' lettre ' du traité. Nous devions prévenir, nous avons prévenu.

"Le Gouvernement espagnol est si profondément convaincu de son droit que, si l'on entendait faire de cette question une question préalable à l'ouverture des négociations sur le fond, il est dès aujourd'hui disposé à la soumettre à la juridiction du Tribunal de La Haye, auquel il laissera le soin de juger si, oui ou non, l'Espagne a, la première, violé la convention de 1904. Le même tribunal aura à statuer, du même coup, sur la valeur d'un traité secret fait dans des conditions déterminées, sous l'empire de circonstances qui, depuis, ont été radicalement modifiées, traité secret auquel succéda un traité public, celui d'Algésiras, qui, lui aussi, fut signé par les représentants des deux mêmes nations qui s'étaient engagées l'une vis-à-vis de l'autre en 1904. Le Tribunal de La Haye pourrait dire si l'Acte d'Algésiras, signé par l'Espagne et la France en même temps que par les autres nations, n'annulait pas implicitement la précédente convention. Mais, encore une fois, l'Espagne est prête à faire juger cette question : ' A-t-elle violé le traité de 1904, alors même qu'on le considérerait comme survivant à l'Acte d'Algésiras ?'

"La France dit aujourd'hui au Gouvernement espagnol : ' Je viens de faire avec l'Allemagne une négociation avantageuse qui pourra, par la suite, vous profiter. J'ai dû payer, payez à votre tour.' A cela, le Gouvernement espagnol répond par l'évocation de ce principe de droit public autant que privé : ' On ne paie légitimement pour autrui que lorsqu'on en a reçu mandat ou lorsque le paiement a été ratifié par une acceptation formelle de celui au profit de qui il a été fait.' Or, l'Espagne ne vous a donné aucun mandat vis-à-vis de l'Allemagne ; que vous ayez dû payer l'Allemagne, c'est votre affaire, mais nous ne saurions contribuer à un paiement que nous ne vous avons pas donné mandat d'effectuer. Vous n'aviez pas à payer l'Allemagne pour nous, et nous ne saurions prendre à notre compte une opération qui vous a été favorable, mais à l'occasion de laquelle nous avons précisé le maintien de nos droits, justement en occupant El Ksar et Larache et en nous tenant à l'écart de toute négociation franco-allemande. On ne traite ni on ne paie pour autrui sans son assentiment. Le même Tribunal de La Haye pourrait, sans doute, reconnaître et sanctionner ce principe.

"L'Espagne ne saurait être contrainte de donner El Ksar à la France sous le prétexte que celle-ci a dû céder à l'Allemagne une partie du Congo.

"Cependant, le désir de conciliation du Gouvernement espagnol est si grand qu'il consentirait peut-être à rétrocéder El Ksar si on lui démontrait que l'occupation de cette ville est nécessaire au fonctionnement normal du protectorat français au Maroc.

"Il est entendu qu'El Ksar est l'étape la plus importante du chemin de fer que la France se propose de construire de Tanger à Fez. Mais il convient de remarquer que jamais ce chemin de fer ne pourra être une voie stratégique dont la France puisse se servir pour amener à l'intérieur soldats ou matériel de guerre, car jamais l'Angleterre ne permettra que Tanger, tête de ligne de ce Chemin de fer Tanger–Fez, soit transformé en port de guerre pouvant être utilisé comme voie d'accès à l'intérieur par une expédition militaire.

"Les deux voies stratégiques que la France pourra utiliser, si besoin en était, pour affirmer son protectorat, seront les voies Casablanca–Fez et Taza–Fez, qui relieront l'intérieur du Maroc et sa capitale soumis au protectorat français à un port de guerre d'influence et d'occupation françaises incontestées, Casablanca, et, d'autre part, à la région oranaise, Taza. C'est dire que le Chemin de fer Tanger–Fez ne pourra jamais être qu'une voie commerciale, la plus importante d'ailleurs, mais à laquelle toutes les nations devront avoir également accès. Il sera donc de peu d'importance pour l'avenir et la sécurité du protectorat français que le Chemin de fer Tanger–Fez soit aux environs d'El Ksar construit à travers un territoire d'influence espagnole. Une réglementation sage des détails d'exploitation suffira à assurer pour le bien commun le meilleur rendement commercial, sans qu'on puisse arguer de considérations militaires ou politiques pour exiger que la voie ferrée Tanger–Fez ne traverse uniquement que des territoires de protectorat français."

Le Gouvernement espagnol conclut en ces termes : "Nous n'avons donc rien à payer, car nous ne devons rien, et rien à céder par faveur ou amitié, puisque ce que vous nous demandez ne vous est pas indispensable."

Telle est la thèse espagnole, fidèlement rapportée, que nous nous abstiendrons de juger, aujourd'hui, du moins.—G. DE MAIZIÈRE.

[48156] No. 545.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir R. Lister.

(No. 67.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, December 5, 1911.*

YOUR despatch No. 342 of 26th November and your telegrams No. 156 of 27th November and No. 157 of 28th November.

Your action approved. I am strongly opposed to any change at present in constitution of Commission d'Hygiène, and you should endeavour to defeat proposal when it comes before Sanitary Council.

I am communicating with Sir F. Bertie on the subject.

[48824] No. 546.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 6.)

(No. 111.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Berlin, December 6, 1911.*

CHANCELLOR'S speech this afternoon dealt chiefly with Anglo-German relations Conversations between you and German Ambassador formed first subject. He maintained sufficiency of information given on 1st July as to intentions of German Government in sending war-ship to Agadir. He did not know on what His Majesty's Government had based their idea that Germany wanted a naval base. France had kept His Majesty's Government informed all along and asked their advice in any matters which concerned British interests ; it was therefore difficult to see how they could have regarded those interests as threatened. If, however, from press or other reports His Majesty's Government had had doubts, German Government would have been ready at any moment to dispel them. But you had asked for no information. You had made a statement to the effect that Agadir had created new situation and that possible developments might affect British interests. German Government had not regarded that statement as requiring any answer ; German Ambassador had, however, on his own initiative said all that seemed necessary. Any further information required could have been obtained between that conversation and the speech of the Chancellor of the Exchequer. Without undue criticism of the course taken by His Majesty's Government, he was bound to state that the acuteness of the resulting situation could have been avoided if the explanation of 1st July had been accepted, and if period of silence had not been broken by provocative utterance of the Chancellor of the Exchequer. He then justified widespread excitement of German public opinion by that utterance and speech of Captain Faber, which had found no parallel in anything which had been said in the Reichstag.

Taking your interpretation of Chancellor of Exchequer's speech, he said that Germany also claimed right not to be set aside in matters affecting German interests. This right had not always been respected. In 1904 England and France had disposed of Morocco without regard for German interests. Hence Algeciras Act and Agadir in order to show that Germany could not be thrust aside. If consequences of that policy had been the alleged or actual preparations for war on the part of England he was sorry for it ; but German Government must refuse all responsibility for that consequence just as they had refused to allow themselves to be turned aside from policy they had chosen.

In negotiations Germany secured what she wanted without touching any direct British interests ; but in spite of all there was one moment when in Great Britain war against Germany was regarded as a possible contingency.

As regards your wishes for better relations, he reciprocated them heartily, but stated that development of good relations could only advance in proportion as British Government gave by their policy practical expression to those wishes.

[8916] No. 547.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 6.)

(No. 198.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Paris, December 6, 1911.*

I HAVE received from M. Geoffray, in a letter dated 4th December, a fresh edition of Franco-Spanish draft convention. It differs from version forwarded to you in my despatch No. 569, Confidential, of 30th November, with respect to articles 2 and 12.

The following is a translation of article 2, from beginning of third paragraph onward, in substitution for previous text :—

"To south from mouth of Moulonia, the frontier goes up thalweg of that river to alignment of the crest of the heights nearest left bank of Oued Defla. From that point, and without being allowed in any case to cut the course of the Moulonia, the line of demarcation reaches as direct as possible the watershed separating the basins of the Moulonia [and] of the Oued Tuaouen [*sic*] from that of the Oued Kert; it then continues westward by the watershed separating the basins of the Oued Ouergha to reach Djeb-el-Moulai Bou Chta [*sic*] by way of the most northerly crest. It then follows a northerly direction, keeping at a distance of at least 25 kilom. to the east of the road from Fez to Ksar-el-Kebir by Ouezzan to the point nearest the source [of the] Oued Loukios. It is subsequently constituted by thalweg of the Oued Loukios, the course of which it follows down till it reaches a point 10 kilom. south of town of Laraiche. It then [follows] that parallel to the sea. The general line of this delimitation is traced in map annexed in duplicate to present agreement.

"Nevertheless, as absence of precise geographical knowledge of the mountain region of the Riff does not permit of this line being exactly defined, it shall be fixed, if necessary, on the spot by a delimitation commission, which will be guided by modifications set forth above.

"All Moroccan territory situated to south and east constitutes the zone of French influence."

The following paragraph is added to article 12, not being in previous version :—

"When Moroccan Government is in a position to consider eventuality of the conversion of the loans of 1904 and 1910, Spain, in exchange for levy of customs dues by which Spanish zone would benefit, will have to assume part of charges of the conversion of the loan."

[48919] No. 548.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen.

(No. 102.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, December 6, 1911.*

FRANCO-SPANISH negotiations respecting Morocco.

You may associate yourself with the negotiations, as the French Government are very willing and the Spanish Government desire that you should do so.

We have examined the French draft projet and consider that it is inacceptable as regards Tangier, the proposed municipality not being really international. Our objections will be explained to you as soon as the despatch to His Majesty's Ambassador at Paris now being drawn up is ready.

[48927] No. 549.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 7.)

(No. 583.)
Sir, *Paris, December 6, 1911.*

I HAD the honour to inform you by my telegram No. 198 of to-day's date that I had received this morning from M. Geoffray, in a letter dated the 4th instant, a fresh edition of the Franco-Spanish draft Convention respecting Morocco which differed from

the version forwarded to you in my despatch No. 569, Confidential, of the 30th ultimo, in respect to articles 2 and 12, and I embodied in my telegram above mentioned a translation of the new version.

I enclose herein the text in French of the two articles in question.

I have, &c.
FRANCIS BERTIE.

Enclosure in No. 549.

"Avant-Projet" of Franco-Spanish Convention.

ARTICLE 2.

LA zone d'influence espagnole est déterminée de la manière suivante :—

Au nord par le littoral et les présides espagnols.

Au sud, partant de l'embouchure de la Moulouia, la limite remonte le thalweg de ce fleuve jusqu'à l'alignement de la crête des hauteurs les plus rapprochées de la rive gauche de l'oued Defla. De ce point et sans pouvoir, en aucun cas, couper le cours de la Moulouia, la ligne de démarcation gagne, aussi directement que possible, la ligne de faîte séparant les bassins de la Moulouia de l'oued Inaouen de celui de l'oued Kert, puis elle continue vers l'ouest par la ligne de faîte séparant les bassins de l'oued Inaouen et de l'oued Sebou de ceux de l'oued Kert et de l'oued Ouergha pour gagner par la crête la plus septentrionale le djebel Moulai-Bou-Chta. Elle remonte ensuite vers le nord en se tenant à une distance d'au moins 25 kilom. à l'est de la route de Fez à Ksar-el-Kébir par Ouezzan jusqu'au point le plus rapproché de la source de l'oued Loukkos. Elle est ensuite constituée par le thalweg de l'oued Loukkos, dont elle descend le cours jusqu'à la rencontre d'un point situé à 10 kilom. au sud de la ville de Larache. Elle suit ensuite ce parallèle jusqu'à la mer. La ligne générale de cette délimitation est tracée sur la carte annexée en deux exemplaires au présent accord.

Toutefois, l'absence de connaissances géographiques précises sur la région montagneuse du Riff ne permettant pas de définir cette limite exactement, elle sera déterminée, s'il y a lieu, sur le terrain par une commission de délimitation qui s'inspirera des modifications exposées ci-dessus.

Tout le territoire marocain situé au sud et à l'est de cette limite constitue la zone d'influence française.

ARTICLE 12.

Le Gouvernement français et le Gouvernement espagnol constatent que la création dans l'Empire chérifien de zones d'influence ne peut porter atteinte aux droits, prérogatives et privilèges antérieurement concédés à des tiers pour tout le territoire de l'Empire, par le Gouvernement marocain.

En conséquence, le Trésor français, créancier d'une annuité de 2,740,000 fr., l'Administration du Contrôle de la Dette, qui représente les porteurs des emprunts 1904 et 1910, la Banque d'État du Maroc, la Régie coïntéressée des Tabacs continueront de jouir dans la zone d'influence espagnole de tous les droits qu'ils tiennent des contrats qui les régissent, sans diminution ni réserve et sans que les délimitations de zone puissent faire obstacle à leur action, notamment en ce qui concerne la surveillance et la répression de la contrebande, les excédents de douane réalisés dans les ports.

Le Gouvernement espagnol, responsable de sa zone d'influence, reconnaît expressément ces situations antérieures et s'engage à faciliter aux institutions ci-dessus le libre et complet exercice de leur droit.

Ces institutions pourront, d'accord avec le Gouvernement chérifien et les deux Puissances signataires, modifier les conditions de leur fonctionnement en vue de les mettre en harmonie avec l'organisation territoriale de chaque zone.

En ce qui concerne les droits de douane à l'entrée et à la sortie, ils ne pourront être modifiés dans chaque zone que d'accord avec les deux Puissances signataires, sous réserve des droits ci-dessus rappelés et des stipulations des traités et conventions en vigueur.

A l'époque où le Gouvernement marocain pourra envisager l'éventualité de la conversion des emprunts de 1904 et de 1910, l'Espagne, en échange des perceptions douanières dont la zone espagnole bénéficierait, devra assumer une partie des charges de l'emprunt de conversion.

[48928] No. 550.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 7.)

(No. 584.)

Sir, *Paris, December 6, 1911.*

WHEN I saw M. de Selves this afternoon the Spanish Ambassador had just been with him and had, so the Minister informed me, asked by direction of the Spanish Government whether the French Government would have any objection to Sir Maurice de Bunsen taking part in the negotiations about to recommence at Madrid between the French and Spanish Governments on the subject of Morocco. M. de Selves had assured him that the French Government, far from objecting to the British Ambassador joining in the negotiations, would welcome his doing so. I then informed M. de Selves that you had been glad to receive confirmation from me of the intention of the French Government to negotiate with Spain on the basis of the 1904 agreements. You had not yet examined thoroughly the "avant-projet de convention" communicated to me by M. Geoffray on the 30th November, which reached the Foreign Office on the 1st December. You were not able, therefore, to give a definitive opinion on the details of the "projet" without knowing the views held in regard to it by the Spanish Government. You were, however, ready to give a general support to it as the basis of discussion with the Spanish Government, which would of course expect an assurance from the French Government that Germany will not demand compensations from Spain in the matter of Morocco.

You had noticed that no mention is made in the "projet de convention" of Ifni, which, together with Laraiche and Alcazar, are, in conformity with the assurances given by M. de Selves and the President of the Council, to be reserved to Spain.

I further stated to M. de Selves that the communication which I was making to him did not take into account the new text of articles 2 and 12 which I received this morning from M. Geoffray in a letter dated the 4th instant, and which I had forwarded to you to-day.

I also informed M. de Selves that you did not consider that the proposals with regard to Tangier, as set forth in the annex to the "projet de convention," were acceptable, and that several modifications would be required in them.

M. de Selves reminded me that he had communicated the draft convention and annexes to me for your observations. Laraiche and Alcazar would, in conformity with the assurances which he had given to me, be within the Spanish zone, of which the boundary would, as he had informed me, require modification in order, by an easily established line, to obviate frontier difficulties. He had no doubt that in this and other matters, including the question of Tangier, the French and British Governments would be able to come to terms.

In order that M. de Selves might fully appreciate the purport and extent of the communication which I was authorised to make to him I gave him a memorandum of it in French, of which, after reading it, he had a copy made as an *aide-mémoire*, returning to me the original.

I have, &c.
FRANCIS BERTIE.

[48918] No. 551.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 7.)

[By Post.]

(No. 200.)

(Telegraphic.) *Paris, December 6, 1911.*

MOROCCO.

See my despatch No. 562 of 27th November.

The Paris financier asks me whether His Majesty's Government have taken any decision in regard to British participation in the proposed syndicate?

[49043] No. 551*.

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 7.)

(No. 94.)

(Telegraphic.) P. *Madrid, December 7, 1911.*

MOROCCO negotiations.

French Ambassador returned to Madrid yesterday, and held first conference with Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs at Ministry of State. I was present at the request of both parties. M. Geoffray handed draft convention respecting Spanish sphere of influence to Minister for Foreign Affairs, who undertook to make careful examination of it, but said that before entering upon negotiations he would like to receive an assurance that should Spain cede a portion of her southern zone to France, she would not be called on by Germany to make a further cession in exchange for recognition of the arrangement arrived at. French Ambassador expressed the opinion that at the present stage it would be useless to sound Germany with regard to her ultimate intentions, and he proposed that they should proceed with the negotiations, and that France and Spain should agree before signature that any engagements involving a cession of territory by Spain should be made conditional on no demand for compensation being put forward by Germany. Minister for Foreign Affairs expressed his agreement. French Ambassador said he expected to receive the regulations concerning Tangier mentioned in article 6 within a few days.

I have informed His Majesty's Ambassador in Paris.

[49037] No. 552.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 338.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, December 7, 1911.*

POLICE in Morocco.

Mandates to France and Spain for policing ports expire 31st December. We understand that State Bank wishes to be informed before 20th December what arrangements will be made after end of year in regard to payment of officers and men at several ports. Please ascertain if French Government would be disposed to suggest to the Powers that mandates should be prolonged for six or three months. Such a prolongation would seem desirable.

[48918] No. 553.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 342.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, December 7, 1911.*

YOUR telegram No. 200 of 6th December.

You should inform financier that, provided British capital participates on equal terms with foreign capital, His Majesty's Government will, if the syndicate is supported by the French and German Governments, equally support it as far as they properly can.

[49079] No. 554.

Sir C. Spring-Rice to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 8.)

(No. 217.)
Sir, *Stockholm, December 2, 1911.*

I VENTURE to think that it will not be without interest, in view of the recent misrepresentations of the language used by British officials, to put on record the following translation, to which attention is called in spaced type, of a passage in your recent speech. The translation is published in the "Hamburger Nachrichten," an important newspaper which is much read in this country. The passage referred to the speech of the Chancellor of the Exchequer and ran as follows (I quote from the report in the "Times"):—

"It" (the Chancellor's speech) "did not say that there was any particular demand or claim on the part of Germany that was inconsistent with British interests."

The translation in the German paper was as follows:—

"Sie brachten nur zum Ausdruck dass irgendeine Konzessionsforderung oder irgend welche Anspruche Deutschlands mit Britischen Interessen nicht zu vereinbaren wäre."

That is, you were represented as saying that Mr. Lloyd George merely maintained that any sort of demand for concessions or any sort of claims on the part of Germany were incompatible with British interests.

The sense of the passage was correctly reproduced in the Swedish press.

I have, &c.
CECIL SPRING-RICE.

[49074] No. 555.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received December* 8.)

(No. 415.)

Sir, *Berlin, December* 6, 1911.

I HAVE the honour to report that yesterday the Imperial Chancellor addressed the Reichstag for the third time on the events preceding the Franco-German Morocco-Congo agreement. A translation of his Excellency's speech is enclosed, herewith, and you will observe that it differs considerably both in tone and in the manner in which it was received in the Reichstag, from his first two speeches. In fact, the best comment on his speech of yesterday is that it was greeted throughout with cheers from those quarters in the House where his first two speeches were received with such strong disapproval. This may be attributed to the fact that his Excellency dwelt with emphasis on the points which had formed the basis of the Conservative and Nationalist attacks on England, namely, the prejudiced and provocative attitude of Great Britain towards Germany throughout the Morocco negotiations, the mistrust with which His Majesty's Government had received the German explanations and the general claim of Great Britain to have a deciding voice in the direction of the world's affairs.

In the short debate that followed, the Conservative speaker stated that he regarded the Chancellor's speech as a complete justification for the speech delivered by Herr von Heydebrand, and that appears to be also the view of a large portion of the press.

The Chancellor's speech seems to have made a very favourable impression upon public opinion here, and, as far as I am at present able to judge, is hailed with satisfaction by the greater part of the press.

I must reserve my own comments upon it for a later despatch.

At the conclusion of the debate, the Reichstag passed in all its readings a Bill proposed by the Budget Commission, providing that the following sentence should be added to § 1 of the Protectorates Law :—

"An Imperial law is required for the acquisition and cession of a protectorate or portions thereof. This provision does not apply to rectification of frontiers."

An Imperial message was then read by the Chancellor closing the present sitting. The Reichstag has, however, not yet been formally dissolved.

I have, &c.

W. E. GOSCHEN.

Enclosure in No. 555.

Speech of the Imperial Chancellor, Dr. von Bethmann-Hollweg.

(Translation.)

Gentlemen,

I RISE to speak immediately after your reporter, in order to state first of all that the Federal Governments are prepared to agree to the proposal for the modification of the Protectorates Law. We consider with you that it is not only proper, but also desirable, that alterations in the extent of our protectorates should in future be dependent on an Imperial law.

I desire, further, at the outset to deal with the reproach contained in the oft-heard question : Why did the Government not do more for the information of public opinion? Why did they not attempt sooner to dissipate the depression and displeasure felt in large circles by correcting misapprehensions and throwing light on what was obscure? Gentlemen, the reason was not bureaucratic love of secrecy, which would have been particularly foolish in this instance. It did not come from any remissness on the part of the persons who deal officially with press matters. The true reason for the slight action taken by the Government to meet that dissatisfaction lay elsewhere, and was based on careful reflection.

The difficult nature of our negotiations, the secrecy which we demanded from France, the passionate excitement aroused by the attitude of England, imposed great restraint on us. The nation was certainly exposed thereby to a severe trial of patience. But, gentlemen, what must be our first consideration in critical times? Surely to

arrive at the desired understanding with France and alone. To this supreme object we had to subordinate everything else, and especially consideration for the impatient and certainly comprehensible desire for more light on the diplomatic proceedings.

Gentlemen, had we, as has at various times been demanded in the commission, replied publicly to public utterances in England, and had we announced to the world the protest which we had lodged with the London Cabinet, we should not have rendered freer or more easy the course towards our goal; on the contrary, we should have barricaded it. We had especially to reckon with the reaction on public opinion in France. I do not believe that in such an event it would have been possible for the French Government to overcome the opposition to an agreement on the basis desired by us, and, gentlemen, do not forget that we had by our action begun a very difficult task, and had assumed a very great responsibility.

Certainly—and we foresaw it from the first—the feeling in our own country was bound to become through our reserve ever more and more excited and impatient, ever more critical of its own Government. That has been a great evil, and one difficult to bear. But we took it on ourselves and bore it in the hope that, after the conclusion of the business with France, we should succeed in reducing the patriotic excitement and critical zeal to proper proportions.

Perhaps, gentlemen, you will object that on the presentation of the agreement to the Reichstag the time had at least come to say everything which has subsequently been made known in the commission by the Secretary of State. Gentlemen, I will not argue with you whether the disclosures and indications made by me in the full sitting of the House were not sufficient, or whether they have been everywhere judged correctly and without prejudice. If I had foreseen what was said in England during the course of the proceedings of the commission in regard to certain preparations in September, and which was bound to increase considerably the excitement here, I would certainly then have not withheld any longer the publication which has now been made. It is not our fault if we have been now compelled, in order to allay unrest, to proceed to a publication which we had long delayed on well-considered grounds, and I note with satisfaction that this has also been understood in England.

As the course of the deliberations of your commission shows, our relations with England have hitherto played a large part in all negotiations in regard to our arrangements with France. The declarations of the English Minister are now also before us, and I gladly recognise that they are couched in a conciliatory tone. I, for my part, will not go further into the past than is necessary for a consideration of the future.

The English Minister for Foreign Affairs spoke quite openly of the apprehensions aroused in him by the dispatch of the "Panther" to Agadir, and by the plans of our Morocco policy generally. The advance of the French to Fez and the action of Spain had, apparently, aroused no apprehensions on the part of England as to their prejudicial effect on her Moroccan interests. I do not know on what the English assumption was based that we desired to create for ourselves a naval base on the Atlantic Ocean. What we really wanted with Agadir, England knew from the instructions sent to our Ambassador in London on the 30th June last, which have been made known to the commission. We had, therefore, on our side given no cause for doubt. France too, who was, indeed, most directly interested, and Russia, her ally, never distrusted our plans. But France was—Sir E. Grey has said so—during the whole course of the negotiations, in close communication with England and asked for England's advice in all questions which could affect English interests. In these circumstances it is difficult to understand how England could consider her interests threatened. These interests could indeed, since we were negotiating with France, not be endangered without the knowledge of France. If, however, in spite of all, doubts were entertained by England, either on account of rumours among the natives at Agadir, to which the English Minister alluded, or on account of press utterances, I would at all times have been ready to dispel these doubts if questioned by the English Government.

Gentlemen, the English Foreign Minister spoke of the period of silence from the 4th to the 21st July. Now this silence was a mutual one. Once only, on the 12th July, did the English Ambassador here speak to the Secretary of State of the possibility of a negotiation *à trois* in regard to Morocco, between Germany, France, and Spain, and added the remark that this would make an unfavourable impression in England. It was replied to the Ambassador on the same day as an official statement of the German Government that such an intention had never existed. In spite of its negative form, this reply had the very positive meaning that any apprehension on the part of England that we aimed at a partition of Morocco with Spain and France was baseless.

Our Ambassador in London had just as little opportunity of imparting information in reply to an enquiry on the part of the British Government. Sir Edward Grey stated in his speech that in his conversation with Count Metternich, on the 4th July, he had characterised the dispatch of the "Panther" to Agadir as creating a new situation, and that the British Government were disturbed on account of possible future developments directly affecting British interests. We could not see in this utterance any enquiry requiring an answer. The answer that would have been made, was made by Count Metternich himself on his own initiative. In his report of the 4th July he said:—

"I replied to the Minister that, according to my idea, the Imperial Government had absolutely no wish to exclude England from a new arrangement of things, or to prevent any possible safeguarding of British interests in Morocco."

But, even if this reply had not appeared to be sufficient, a further explanation could easily have been obtained by reference to us before the 21st July, the day of the next conversation between Sir E. Grey and Count Metternich and the speech of the British Chancellor of the Exchequer. Far be it from me to complain of the fact that this course was not adopted. For the choice of means, the interest of one's own country—in this case therefore England's interest—is the only deciding factor. I cannot, however, pass over the effects as they appear to me. And I must certainly say that, in my opinion, the tension and the fact that the situation had become more acute could have been avoided if greater confidence had been placed in our declarations of the 1st July, and if the period of silence had not been broken on the part of England by a prominent member of the English Cabinet.

Following the good example set by the English Minister, I will not enter into recriminations, for they will not help the future. I will, therefore, also not reopen the question of the effect of the above-mentioned statement on public opinion in Germany. I spoke about the feeling it caused three weeks ago, and it found still more passionate expression in speeches made in this House, speeches which—in this I cannot follow Sir E. Grey—cannot be placed on a parallel with the actual assertions of an English Member of Parliament respecting preparations for war in England. The English Minister will not be able to recognise, as we do, the justice of this feeling, which dominated a large section of our people, but he will at least find it intelligible, in view of the public demonstration made by the British Government on the 21st July. I would like to add a further observation, one which appears to me to be not without importance for the establishment of future relations. Sir Edward Grey said that the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Mr. Lloyd George, by his speech wished to make it clear, without provocation, that, where English interests were affected, England could not be treated as if she did not count. If the day ever came when that could no longer be clearly stated, then England would have ceased to exist as a Great Power.

Gentlemen, I claim the same right for Germany. When, however, I look back into the past, I find that the Moroccan complications arose because this right had not always been accorded to Germany. The year 1904, in which England and France disposed of Morocco without consideration for the interest which Germany had for the settlement of the Moroccan problem, was the *proton pseudos*. Out of this rose the necessity for us to go to Algeciras and then to Agadir, *i.e.*, the necessity for us to safeguard our economic interests ourselves, and to show the world that we are firmly resolved not to allow ourselves to be pushed on one side.

If, as the ultimate result of this, alleged or actual readiness for war ensued in England—which of these is true I cannot decide—and further an acute state of excitement arose, which the English Minister has called "political alcoholism," we can only note it with regret. But we must also refuse to take the responsibility for this just as we had to refuse to allow ourselves to be diverted from the path which the maintenance of our interests and the dignity of the Empire had marked out for us. That state of excitement led to playing with the idea of war. To a sober observer the facts, from a German point of view, are as follows:—

What did we negotiate about with France? About the cession of considerable political rights to France; that was not in opposition to the Anglo-French agreements of 1904. About the increased guarantees for our economic interests in Morocco, not only of our interests, no! of all Powers, including English interests, in accordance with the principle of the open door, which has been the fundamental principle of the English view of Government and law. About colonial compensations in Africa. And

Sir Edward Grey expressly declared that England did not think of standing in our way if we wished to conclude peaceful agreements with other Powers in respect to Africa.

Our negotiations with France were also carried out by both sides in the most difficult moments, as has been proved, with the invariable good-will to arrive at a peaceful understanding. This was also not unknown in England, for Sir Edward Grey stated that it never seemed probable to him that the negotiations would be broken off.

And finally, as I proved in detail on the 9th November, we have attained the object that we had in view from the outset. This object did not directly affect any English interests, and therefore contains in itself the refutation of the English apprehensions. The best proof lies in the fact that England has officially expressed her satisfaction at the conclusion of the negotiations.

And in spite of all this, a situation has developed which, in English eyes, brought near a war against us, *i.e.*, a world war. If all the bearings run so hot, gentlemen, then the machine must have a serious defect.

The English Ministers have unanimously expressed a desire for better relations with us, and I associate myself entirely with this desire, which was also shared by the other speakers in the English Parliament. But I notice that although this desire has already been frequently expressed in recent years on both sides, and also in this House, yet we have had to go through what we have gone through.

My remark has been taken up in England that by the settlement of the Morocco question a "clear table" has been made in this respect between England and Germany also. The Englishmen speak of a "clean slate," of a slate that has been wiped clean. Gentlemen, this slate has been written on quite recently with a hard pencil, and the slate has become scratched in consequence. It must not be mistrust which guides the pencil, if the slate is to be covered with clear writing.

The English Minister for Foreign Affairs is right in seeing no aggressive designs behind Germany's growing strength, and I welcome the fact that in agreement with him the English Prime Minister rejects every thought of envy or ill-will towards the aspirations of our growing nation. We also, gentlemen, sincerely desire peace and friendship with England. But the actual development of good relations between the two countries will only keep pace with the desire in so far as the English Government is prepared to give by her policy practical expression to her desire for such relations.

Other nations, too, must reckon with the forward development of Germany. This development cannot be checked. In what spirit it is carried out is shown by the history of Germany for the last forty years. We shall be able to continue working in the same spirit if we keep ourselves strong. For in this, too, I agree with Sir Edward Grey: the strength of Germany is in itself a guarantee that no other country will seek a quarrel with us.

Permit me, gentlemen, to recall, in conclusion, something which I said recently. I said: "The dominant chord of the passionate feeling which prevails in wide circles is the will of Germany to enforce her position in the world with all her strength and capacity"; and I continued: "That was the good and great revelation which we have experienced, and which has supported me, though as far as words were concerned it was directed against me."

It is now a question of encouraging this feeling, and holding firmly to its dominant chord. We have passed through a difficult, serious, and threatening time. This the nation has rightly felt. May it now clearly perceive what it owes to itself. That is to say, neither depression nor provocative arrogance, but a free outlook, cool blood, calm strength, and steadfast unity in great national questions.

[49100] No. 556.

Board of Trade to Foreign Office.—(*Received December* 8.)

Sir, *Board of Trade, December* 7, 1911.

I AM directed by the Board of Trade to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 2nd December, with its enclosures, relative to a proposed Moroccan International Syndicate, and, in reply, I am to inform you that the Board see no objection to the reply which Sir E. Grey proposes to make.

I am, &c.
H. LLEWELLYN SMITH.

[49274] No. 557.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen.

(No. 104.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, December* 8, 1911.

THE Spanish Ambassador informs me that the French draft respecting Morocco has made an exceedingly bad impression on his Government. Spain does not get, especially in regard to control of customs, the free hand in her sphere that the September draft would have given her and that the French will have in their sphere.

I told his Excellency that though I had informed the French Government that the draft was in my opinion a fair basis for discussion, I had not committed myself as to details pending expression of Spanish views; and I had observed that the question of Ifni remained for discussion. I said I was disappointed that no satisfaction was shown by the Spanish Government at Laraiche and Alcazar, about which they had felt such apprehension, being left to them. I quite understood that Spain desired to have as free a hand in her sphere as the French in theirs, but the objections seemed to be points of detail. It would be a great mistake for Spain to reject the draft as not affording a basis for discussion.

I informed the Ambassador that you would attend the next meeting at Madrid. I presumed that the objections of Spain to the French draft would then be stated, and that you would report to me what the French Ambassador said in reply to them.

[49252] No. 558.

Sir V. Corbett to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 9.)

(No. 83.)
Sir, *Munich, December* 7, 1911.

THE Imperial Chancellor's statement on the Morocco negotiations at the last sitting of the Reichstag has been generally well received, and is treated as an effective reply to the speeches delivered in the British Parliament.

It must be admitted that the passages selected for commendation are those least friendly to England.

The following are the principal press notices :—

The "Münchener Zeitung" (Liberal) of the 6th describes the speech as giving to the world a vigorous impression of the German national will, passionless indeed, but, as it were, hewn in granite. The writer regrets that the words of repudiation addressed to England should have been spoken four and a-half months too late; early in July they would have given support to the national pride of Germany without conveying any challenge to the British people. He concludes by observing that the Chancellor very wisely abstained from stating what had been the original German claims for compensation.

The "Münchener Neueste Nachrichten" (National Liberal) of the same date says :—

"We can without any reservation subscribe to what Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg said in this part of his speech. He avoided all challenge, but he refused to make any, even the smallest, obeisance. He established once and for all beyond possibility of criticism all the freedoms which England has allowed herself towards Germany during the past summer. Nor did he in the least disdain to mention the much-discussed remarks of Captain Faber."

The "Bayerischer Kurier" (Centre) for the 6th December has no comments of its own on the debate, but reveals its personal views by emphasising the applause with which certain passages of the Chancellor's speech were received.

The "Augsburger Abendzeitung" (Liberal) of the same date remarks that the Chancellor's tone towards England was one of cold politeness, though sharper notes were often to be heard. The public must read between the lines, and then they will see that "Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg's optimism has at length yielded to healthy mistrust and cold decision." The leading statesmen of Germany seem to be finally convinced that two parties are necessary for a friendship, and that English ill-will must be answered by dignified reserve. The writer adds that, though he values this speech above those recently made by the Chancellor, this must not be taken as implying a

changed opinion of the conduct of the Imperial Government during the last six months. The Chancellor's defence of the excessive caution exercised was by no means convincing. Passing on to the speeches of private members, the writer observes that "the citizen parties were unanimous that Germany must and would under all circumstances preserve her rights and her freedom of movement towards England."

The "Frankfurter Zeitung" (Democratic), as usual, treats the subject in a more philosophic spirit. In its issue of the 6th it says :—

"Relatives often grow cool to one another through misunderstandings or a collision of interests; but, if they are sensible people, they usually make it up again later on. When, however, one cousin suddenly discovers that the other would have shot him behind his back if the gun had not missed fire, he will in the future treat his relation's attempts at reconciliation with coolness. Such, unfortunately, is the condition of the relations between England and Germany since the English preparations for war in the late summer were revealed, and the temperature of the Chancellor's speech harmonised with it. There is in Germany no discontent with France, whose action is regarded simply as that of a good merchant, anxious to pay as small a price as possible. The English Government were more French than that of France, and have in consequence frequently been regarded in Germany as the motive force of the French resistance. Sir Edward Grey has declared that this was not the case, and it is quite probable that France would of her own accord have used the *entente* to strengthen her position against Germany, but, in the light of Sir Edward Grey's policy up to now, no one can be surprised that Germany shows mistrust of England. The Chancellor's tone was even cooler than in his previous speeches, and the reason undoubtedly is that the information regarding England's preparations for war came as an unpleasant surprise to Government circles in Berlin. Sir Edward Grey had spoken of Anglo-German relations as a cleaned slate on which something new might now be written, but the Chancellor insisted that the pencil had scratched too deeply, and that the old marks were still to be seen. This remark is typical of the conception of the German Government. The Chancellor's coolness was correct if the temperature of Sir Edward Grey's own speech be considered, and his tone entirely echoes that of the country at large. The prospect opened up by his speech was serious, but not hopeless. The suggestions of the English press that his gloomy view was dictated by a consideration for the elections were disproved when it was remembered how he rebuked the Conservatives a month ago for using foreign politics for such purposes. Germany can hope for nothing from Sir Edward Grey, who cannot be expected to give up his dislike of her, but it would seem that the English people and their representatives will change their views little by little, and will recognise how shameful it is for a great nation to be continually led astray by a small band of politicians whose ideas are the reverse of Liberalism. Germany cherishes no rancour against England, and is willing and ready for a friendly understanding with her. That can, however, only happen when the vast and peacefully disposed masses of the English nation can bring their will to expression even in matters of foreign politics."

I have, &c.
VINCENT CORBETT.

[48918] No. 559.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 347.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, December* 9, 1911.

MY telegram No. 342 of 7th December: Morocco Syndicate.

Financier will of course understand that our conditional promise of support does not involve obligation on His Majesty's Government to give *exclusive* support to the syndicate.

[49398] No. 560.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 11.)

(No. 416.)

Sir, *Berlin, December 6, 1911.*

IN his speech of yesterday the Imperial Chancellor can hardly be said to have poured oil on the troubled waters. But it is only fair to his Excellency to say that had he done so, he would not have improved his position in Germany—a matter of the utmost importance to him at the present moment, in view of the impending elections. As it is, the entire press, with the exception of that representing the Socialist party, are loud in their praise of the Chancellor, and state that he has quite atoned for the past, and regained the position he had lost. His Morocco policy continues to be criticised to a certain extent, but as regards the language he held respecting England, there is practically unanimity. It was the same in the Reichstag, when, as is pointed out cheerfully by a Conservative paper, the only member who said a word in defence of Great Britain, was the Socialist Herr Bebel. I fear that this is only too clear an indication of the present feeling of the country towards England. It is also a sign of the times that even among the Socialists, notwithstanding what is said in their papers, there is a feeling that pro-English and anti-war sentiments must not, in view of the coming elections, be too freely put forward in the addresses of the candidates, and that considerable care must be exercised in that respect.

Altogether, considering the Chancellor has regained the confidence of the Conservatives by more or less confirming the opinions which had led to their attacks on England, and by his adroit use of Captain Faber's alleged revelations, his speech must be regarded as a great personal success from the point of view of German internal politics.

If it were not for the fact that internal political exigencies required a certain amount of vigorous language on the part of the Chancellor, it might cause surprise that he took so much pains to temper his reciprocation of your and the Prime Minister's friendly words and wishes with certain qualifying observations of a not particularly cordial character. But, again, here he had to please the public, and as the phrase: "We want deeds and not words," has been the stock phrase in almost every article which has been produced by the German press during the last two months, he felt, I presume, that it would be well to bring it in and to amplify it in language suitable to the occasion. Still, in the Chancellor's mouth it gained greater significance, and what particular "deeds" his Excellency had in his mind has been a very fruitful source of discussion in Berlin diplomatic circles. My French colleague, who saw the Chancellor yesterday, asked his Excellency straight out what he had meant when he had spoken of the necessity for His Majesty's Government to give some practical evidence of their good-will. Had he had any special case in his mind? The Chancellor replied in the negative, adding that for the moment there was no particular question of importance being discussed between the two Governments. What he had meant to indicate was that in every part of the world where Germany had, or wished to create, interests, she almost invariably met with opposition from England in one form or another. His words had been intended as a warning that unless that attitude of opposition was changed, it would be impossible for Germany and England to be friends. M. Cambon told the Chancellor that he still considered that his speech had been rather unnecessarily strong after the friendly words which had been spoken in the House of Commons, and that as the Chancellor had such a high reputation for sincerity his words carried so much weight that they could not fail to create a rather uneasy feeling abroad as to the present state of Anglo-German relations. His Excellency replied that no one was more anxious than he to have good relations with England, and no one had tried harder to establish them, but that for the moment those relations certainly left much to be desired in the way of cordiality, and he would have lost any reputation for sincerity which he might possess if he had endeavoured to convey a different impression or if he had spoken otherwise than he had done.

As I said in my previous despatch on this subject, the best comment on the Chancellor's speech is to be found in the extravagant praise accorded to it by a press which, for the moment, is manifestly ill-disposed towards England. I do not propose to trouble you with a series of extracts from the newspapers, because they are all pitched in the same key, but I enclose a translation of a Berlin telegram, published in the "Kölnische Zeitung," which, owing to its manifestly official source, may be of some interest.

I cannot, however, resist from quoting the following gem from an article published in the Centre organ, the "Germania." It is a fair sample of the more exaggerated outpourings of the Conservative press:—

"For a gourmet capable of understanding and appreciating delicate satire, it was a real joy to notice the deliciously clever fashion in which the Chancellor copied the tone and form of Sir E. Grey's speech, and so drove the British Minister off the field with his own weapons. We hope that in Downing Street this irony will be appreciated at its full value. *Fortiter in re suaviter in modo* is the motto to be applied to the Chancellor's speech. While not using one single strong word against England, he told her any number of the bitterest truths, and launched arrows against her which will no doubt wound our dear cousins to the quick."

I have, &c.
W. E. GOSCHEN.

Enclosure in No. 560.

Translation of Berlin Telegram in the "Kölnische Zeitung" of December 6, 1911.

THE Reichstag concluded its sittings yesterday with a fine and weighty speech by the Imperial Chancellor. It would have been natural, after the conclusion o the Morocco agreement, for Franco-German relations to have been the main point of the discussion, for the question in hand was one mainly affecting France and Germany, and only secondarily affecting other countries in their capacity as signatories of the Treaty of Algeciras. This order of things, in itself perfectly simple, was upset in a most remarkable manner by England, who, more French than the French, pushed herself forward and took up an attitude which brought Europe within an ace of war. The honest wish for peace is so great in Germany that, in spite of all contrary signs, we would not believe in the possibility of a breach of the peace, and only the events of the last few weeks have rudely awakened us from this blissful state of confidence. What we saw and heard of England opened our eyes, I might almost say against our will, and the Chancellor's speech of yesterday contributed to throw full light upon the situation.

Herr von Bethmann spoke yesterday as we would always have a German Chancellor speak. The speech was honest from the first word to the last, it was of a candour far greater than the average, it avoided any sort of challenge, but it emphasised with the greatest energy Germany's right to a place in the sun and her firm resolve to stake the whole strength of the nation for the prestige and interests of Germany and for her equality in the council of nations.

It was not to be avoided that the speech should take the form of a discussion with England. We believe that words of goodwill and of reconciliation come more readily from Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg than stern rebukes. But even when such a quiet-thinking and moderate statesman as the Chancellor makes such a speech as he did yesterday, it may be seen that the attitude of England has placed us face to face with a situation which no amount of disguises will hide or concessions remove. In a masterly way he tore to pieces the statements of Sir Edward Grey as to the harmlessness and the goodwill of the English Government, and to anyone willing to hear and understand he gave irrefutable proof of the groundlessness of English censure of German policy, of how there was no serious or even plausible reason for the alleged English anxiety, and of how untenable is the English assertion that the development of Germany is regarded impartially and even benevolently. The word "unfairness," so often misused in our home politics, is clearly exemplified here in our relations with England, and in a manner which we wish to be clearly understood by those persons in England who are always assuring us that they wish nothing better than friendly relations between the two countries.

We must be grateful to Herr von Bethmann for having represented the true situation without any embellishment. Only too often in our real and deep-seated desire for peace have we been too punctilious and kept silence in face of a policy of insult and challenge to a degree which laid us open to the charge of sycophancy. The slate had to be written upon with a hard pencil which left its scratches behind it to cure us of our optimism and to show us the situation as it really is. It is to the credit of the Chancellor that he contributed to this result and that, regardless of the possible consequences—for by this time we must be prepared for everything—he showed us the real position with all possible clearness.

The speech must be interpreted and judged as a whole. Whoever reads it carefully gets an accurate picture of the past and the future. On the other hand, the details were not fully dealt with, though they have their importance. Only a few points must be emphasised. How is it to be explained that France and her ally Russia remained free from the anxieties which so deeply moved Sir Edward Grey? How could the voyage of the "Panther" to Agadir appear so very dangerous to that same England that watched France's expedition to Fez with equanimity and goodwill? And then the story of the "period of silence" in July? Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg rightly pointed out that, according to Sir Edward Grey's own statement, England was kept accurately informed by France as to each event as it happened. He then stated with perfect justice, even if England had been uncertain as to German intentions, it would have been very simple for her to make enquiries through her Ambassador. English diplomacy is not generally so shy as not to venture on such a simple question. If it was a mistake on the German side not to have been more communicative to England during this period, England is as much to blame as Germany, because she made no use of the simple means at her disposal for acquiring information. If her fears were really honest, why did she make no attempt to dissipate them? Instead of that, Lloyd George was put up to speak, and the situation was thereby rendered more acute. All this has been irrefutably established by Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg.

The Chancellor also dealt with the reproach of mystery-mongering. He characterised the demand for information as comprehensible, and tried to explain the attitude of the Government on diplomatic grounds. We cannot alter our view that the excitement of public opinion and the storm raised against the Government could have been avoided without sacrificing diplomatic secrets. No sacrifice of such secrets was necessary, but only a discreet hint as to the aims of the Government's policy, which would have been fully understood. Then all the unpleasantness in our home politics resulting from the Moroccan deal could have been avoided. And much could be said on this point and amongst other things that the Chancellor seems now to think that the tactics followed were not exactly happy; but in view of his declaration we will not enter upon retrospective reproaches. It is our duty to show that the German people stand united behind the Chancellor when he is protesting against a treatment which is not consonant with our position as a world Power. We know ourselves to be free from all symptoms of chauvinism, which we have opposed in other nations as we did in Germany when it first began to appear here. But Germany is well aware of its own strength, and we can only hope that all the patriotic elements of the nation will agree with the Chancellor when he asked of us neither depression nor provocative arrogance, but "a free outlook, cool blood, calm strength and steadfast unity in great national questions."

It is fully in accord with this programme when Herr von Bethmann sketches the line of Germany's policy towards England. He says, "We also, Gentlemen, fully desire peace and friendship with England, but the actual development of good relations between the two countries will only keep pace with the desire in so far as the English Government is prepared to give by her policy practical expression to her desire for such relations." That says everything that can be said as to the future policy of Germany towards England. A difficult and dangerous time lies behind us. Whether it will recur depends, not on Germany but on England, who has every day an opportunity to realise by her actions her wishes for peaceful development of the relations of the two States. This must be done by deeds, for without them the scratches on the slate cannot be removed.

[49443] No. 561.

Sir F. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 11.)

(No. 207.)

Sir, *Vienna, December 7, 1911.*

I HAVE the honour to inform you that the following paragraph, emanating from the Foreign Office Press Bureau, appeared in the "Neues Wiener Abendblatt" last night:—

"In well-informed circles here it is declared that the speech of the German Chancellor, Bethmann-Hollweg, reaffirms that Germany is firmly resolved to maintain under all circumstances her dignity and position in the world, but this together with good relations towards England, which are by no means incompatible with the preservation of German interests.

"As this point of view of the German Chancellor, which is doubtless also the point of view of the whole German Empire, is thoroughly understood in England, judging from the recent speeches of Sir Edward Grey and other members of Parliament, and as there is no serious cause for quarrel between the two countries, it is to be hoped that the antagonistic feelings which have prevailed lately will be at last dissipated. Then, as Sir Edward Grey said at Plymouth, the political barometer will mark fair weather for all Europe—nay, even for the whole world."

All the principal newspapers dedicate leading articles to the Chancellor's speech, and for the most part express admiration for the terms in which it was couched. The "Zeit" is an exception to the general rule, as it declares that all the trouble and skill wasted in negotiations over Morocco have only resulted in a bad treaty, in fomenting the bitter discontent of the German people with the policy of the Imperial Government, and in exciting a national hatred against England. It prophesies that judgment will be delivered by the new elections, and that changes in high official positions will become inevitable.

The semi-official "Fremdenblatt" observes that explanations such as have taken place between the leading statesmen of Germany and England must be of lasting value for the amelioration of the relations between the two countries, although they open old wounds and excite various susceptibilities. Both Governments are animated by goodwill, and both feel the necessity not to confine themselves merely to the expression of friendly intentions. The note of reconciliation which sounded from England was also struck by the German Chancellor. Germany is peacefully inclined, and knows that her strength is the best guarantee of her love of peace. Therefore, now that the excitement is over, one can begin to have confidence in the further development of the relations between England and Germany.

The "Neue Freie Presse" declares that Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg spoke in a more candid, truer, and more manly fashion than you, Sir. His speech was self possessed, and displayed the knowledge of one who represents a mighty Empire. It was not arrogant or offensive, but merely firm. "If," says the "Neue Freie Presse," "Sir Edward Grey thought by his speech to dissipate the notion that England acted spitefully, he must recognise now that scarcely any voice in the Reichstag acquiesces in this view." This could scarcely be called good and correct diplomacy. The question for the future was whether England would loyally recognise the progress of the German nation. That this question should have been submitted to the two Parliaments signified an improvement and might possibly influence the prospects of peace.

I have, &c.
FAIRFAX L. CARTWRIGHT.

[49674] No. 562

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 11.)

(No. 588.)

Sir, *Paris, December 8, 1911.*

THE President of the Council, whom I met last night at the dinner given by the Minister for Foreign Affairs in honour of the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, and who was most effusive in his manner, asked me whether His Majesty's Government had expressed their complete concurrence in the Franco-Spanish draft convention. He hoped that they were satisfied, for the proposals were most moderate. I replied that you accepted the draft convention in principle as a basis for discussion with the Spanish Government, but the proposals concerning Tangier in the annex were not acceptable. His Excellency asked me in what respect. The French Government would be quite ready to modify them. I said that I had not yet received your views on the subject.

I have, &c.
FRANCIS BERTIE.

[49675] No. 563.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received December* 11.)

(No. 589.)

Sir, *Paris, December* 8, 1911.

THE Spanish Ambassador having told me yesterday evening that he desired to have some conversation with me came to the embassy this morning. He is an orator, and speaks well, but at unnecessary length. His discourse occupied over an hour, with few interjections from me. He began by thanking me on the part of the Spanish Government for what I had been able to do by your instruction to mitigate the cupidity of the French Government in Morocco. He said that the "avant-projet" of convention which the French Ambassador at Madrid had communicated to the Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs had been a great disappointment to the Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs. It might be treated as a base for discussions, but it was unacceptable as it stood, and would require much modification, and Señor Garcia Prieto would prepare a "contre-avant-projet." The French draft would put on Spain great responsibilities, and give her but little authority to deal with them. The representative of the Sultan in the Spanish zone would be in reality supreme, and he would depend on the Makhzen *alias* the French Government. What Spain required was an entirely free hand in her zone, just as free as that of France in the rest of Morocco. He understood that Laraiche and El Khazar would remain in Spanish hands, and that compensation to France for her sacrifices in her Congo colony was to be found in the south. No mention was, however, made of any reservation of Spanish rights in the south, and it seemed to be intended that Ifni should pass to France, which would be quite inacceptable to Spain. M. Perez Caballero then proceeded to dilate on the grievances of Spain and the misdeeds of the French Government. He contended that no compensation was really due to France, for Spain had gained nothing from the Franco-German agreement. She would lose much of what she was really entitled to under her agreements with France. The French Government should have negotiated with the Spanish Government, and have come to an agreement as to the respective positions of France and Spain in Morocco before settling with the German Government how Spanish rights were to be disposed of. He had urged this on M. Cruppi, but that Minister had turned a deaf ear to his representations. The Spanish Government had offered to take part in the expedition to Fez. Their offer had been rejected. He had warned M. Cruppi that if the French Government sent the expedition to Fez Spanish troops must of necessity occupy Laraiche and El Khazar, in order to maintain the rights of Spain contingent on a change in the *status quo* in Morocco which would be entailed by the expedition to Fez. His warnings had been treated as bluff, and the French Government feigned surprise when the Spanish Government acted as he had intimated they would do. Unfortunately, Spain had neither a fleet nor an army to ensure respect for her rights by France. The allegations of Spanish negotiations with the German Government were false. Why had the French Government assumed to dispose of a right which was inalienable? France could not legally dispose of the right of pre-emption in regard to Spanish Guinea, and the Spanish Government would be ready to refer the question and other matters at issue to a court of arbitration, even to the French Court of Cassation, as he had stated to the French Minister for Foreign Affairs, and honourably abide by the decision. Moreover, Spanish Guinea and the island of Fernando Po were included in the agreement of 1907, by which France, Spain, and England had bound themselves not to dispose of any of their maritime possessions in the Mediterranean and on the coast washed by the Atlantic. This agreement included the French, Spanish, and British possessions in the Gulf of Guinea. The German Government might, perhaps, not require from Spain the cession of Spanish Guinea on the present occasion, but it was evident that they contemplated doing so in the future on some pretext or another. M. Caballero then returned to the question of the position assigned to Spain in Morocco by the draft Franco-Spanish agreement. He said that it would be an impossible one, and he trusted that the British Ambassador at Madrid would support the Spanish Government in their negotiations with the French Ambassador at Madrid, with the object of rendering the position of Spain in Morocco tolerable, and that I should be instructed to renew the representations in favour of Spain, which he was thankful to say had already had some effect.

I said but little during the Spanish Ambassador's speech, except that I had not understood that the Spanish, French, and British maritime possessions in the Gulf of

Guinea had been considered by the Spanish, French, and British Governments as included in the agreements of 1907, and that I hoped that the negotiations at Madrid would result in arrangements more favourable to Spain than M. Caballero at present seemed to consider probable.

I have, &c.
FRANCIS BERTIE.

[48176] No. 564.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 522.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, December* 11, 1911.

HIS Majesty's Government have been much gratified by the assurances of the French Government that provision would be made, in the proposed Franco-Spanish agreement respecting Morocco, for the internationalisation of the town and district of Tangier, and they have given most careful consideration to the draft regulations on the subject enclosed in your Excellency's despatch No. 571 of the 1st instant. I transmit to your Excellency herewith a memorandum prepared in this department,* in which the principles embodied in the French proposals and the more important points of detail are critically examined.

The memorandum, in the conclusions of which I concur, shows that there are weighty objections to the general lines on which the French scheme has been drawn up, the cardinal defect being that it does not in fact provide for real internationalisation.

The scheme is based on the abortive proposals laid before the diplomatic body at Tangier last spring, nominally by the Moorish Government, but in reality, as was not at the time concealed, under the advice of the French Legation. The proposals did not meet with the approval of the committee, consisting of the representatives of Great Britain, Germany, and Spain, as well as of France, to which it was referred for consideration, for the very reason that it practically left supreme power to the Moorish Government in the affairs of the proposed municipality.

The objections then entertained now derive additional force from the important political changes which are foreshadowed in the recent Franco-German Convention, and which are to be consolidated by the agreement now being negotiated between France and Spain. The practical outcome of these changes will be that the Sultan's authority over his dominions is henceforth to be exercised only under the advice, and with the assistance, of a European Government. His administration will be under French control as regards the French sphere, and under Spanish control as regards the Spanish sphere. Tangier, it is agreed, is to be outside either sphere; and it is obviously impossible that Tangier and its district should continue free from European control, and be governed by the very Sultan or Makhzen whose incapacity to carry on an efficient Government in the rest of Morocco forms the basis of, and justification for, the definite introduction of a system of European tutelage. Once it is admitted that there must be effective European control in the municipality of Tangier, and that such control is not to be exercised by either France or Spain or any one single Power, there can be no alternative to the controlling authority being placed in the hands of all the treaty Powers jointly. This implies subordinating the Sultan's authority in Tangier definitely and unequivocally to that of the foreign community, whose voice must be made to prevail in all questions of municipal government. Among others, matters so important as the management of the police, including the regulation of numbers and pay, as also the water supply and the control of the port of Tangier, seem essentially such as ought to be entrusted to the municipal government.

How far it may be possible, by amending the scheme proposed by the French Government, to provide adequately for the requirements which have, in the opinion of His Majesty's Government, to be met in order to give effect to the general principles above outlined it is difficult to decide without consulting the foreign representatives at Tangier, whose local knowledge could alone offer a safe guide in estimating the practical effect of any detailed arrangements contemplated, and on whose co-operation, if not direct participation, the success of any scheme must to a large extent ultimately depend.

For this reason it appears to His Majesty's Government that, if and when there is agreement as to the general principles which should be followed in setting up the

* No. 531.

proposed municipality, it would be well to entrust the elaboration of details to the diplomatic body at Tangier. This procedure would have the further advantage of bringing into the discussion the other treaty Powers, whose consent and willing support will be necessary before an international municipality can be satisfactorily worked. It is suggested in the memorandum that the international settlement at Shanghai offers a sufficiently close analogy to justify its organisation being accepted as serving, in regard to many points of importance, as a useful model. A copy of the "Land Regulations and Bye-Laws for the Foreign Settlement of Shanghai" will be found at pp. 664 *et seqq.* (Vol. 2) of Hertslet's China Treaties (1908), a copy of which is in your Excellency's possession.

To enable your Excellency more fully to understand the character and scope of the abortive "Projet de Règlement municipal" of January 1911, to which reference has been made above, I transmit herewith a copy of that document,* with the request that it may eventually be returned to me, as it is the only copy in the archives of the Foreign Office, and it has been impossible to obtain a duplicate from Tangier.

I beg your Excellency to take an early opportunity of explaining the views of His Majesty's Government to the French Minister for Foreign Affairs in such manner and form as may appear to you most suitable and judicious. I leave it to your Excellency's discretion, more particularly, to make use of so much of the considerations and arguments set forth in the enclosed memorandum as you may think desirable.

Your Excellency might also consider in this connection whether M. de Selves's attention should not be drawn to the recent attempt on the part of the French Legation at Tangier to swamp the European representation in the Commission d'Hygiène by adding twelve Moorish members to that body. The incident was reported in Sir R. Lister's despatches Nos. 342 and 343, and telegram No. 159, of which I enclose copies,† and, although the proposal was subsequently defeated when brought before the Conseil sanitaire, it affords a good illustration of the impracticable nature of any scheme founded on the idea of placing the Moorish Government in a position of real authority as regards the duties of municipal administration at Tangier.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[49720] No. 565.

Sir A. Hardinge to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 12.)

(No. 145.)
Sir, *Lisbon, December 8, 1911.*

I SPOKE to Senhor Vasconcellos yesterday in the sense of your telegram No. 52 of the 4th instant respecting the Franco-German Morocco agreement.

His Excellency said that since our last interview on this subject he had again explained to my French colleague the special reasons in connection with its relations with Spain, which made the Government of Portugal desirous of deferring its purely formal adherence to this convention. "There is," he had said to him, "no serious reason why we should notify our adherence before other Powers signatory to the Algeciras Act having no special interests in Morocco, such, for instance, as the United States and Belgium, whilst we on our side have good grounds for not going out of our way to offend Spain. France may feel sure that on the day on which the other neutral Powers express their readiness to adhere we shall do so simultaneously with them."

The French Minister, his Excellency added, had appeared to admitthe reasonableness of this argument, and until he returned, as he very probably might ere long, to the charge, Senhor Vasconcellos preferred to make the most of the time thus gained. For reasons which I have already had the honour to give you I did not press him to reconsider this decision, in which it may be reasonably hoped that the French Government will be wise enough to acquiesce.

I have, &c.
ARTHUR H. HARDINGE.

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* Enclosure in [4129].

† Nos. 527 and 528; and Sir R. Lister, No. 159 (Telegraphic).

[49889] No. 566*.

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 12.)

(No. 96.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Madrid, December 12, 1911.*

FRANCO-SPANISH negotiations over Morocco.

Yesterday the French Ambassador and Señor Garcia Prieto had their second conference over Morocco in my presence. A copy of the French draft convention was produced by the Minister for Foreign Affairs, with notes on each article in the margin. What Spain mainly criticises is the fact that France, standing as she does behind the Makhzen, has practically a power of intervention reserved to her in the Spanish sphere. The Minister for Foreign Affairs is to prepare an amended text for our next meeting, which M. Geoffray promised to submit to the French Government. No insuperable difficulties therefore appeared up to this point, but Señor Garcia Prieto went on to declare the impossibility of Spain making the concessions of territory at present demanded by France.

The demand in article 2 of the draft convention for the rectification of the frontier in the region of the River Lucus was inadmissible, as it would cut communications between Laraiche and Alcazar. The cession moreover of the whole of her southern zone, as recognised by the convention of October 1904, would never be agreed to by Spain. The French contention, which is in contradiction to the definition of the southern boundary of Morocco in paragraph 3 of article 6 of the 1904 convention, to the effect that the southern Spanish zone to be surrendered to France includes the territory between the above-mentioned boundary and the Spanish possession of Rio de Oro, was warmly rejected by the Minister for Foreign Affairs. M. Geoffray said he had the authorisation to leave to Spain a strip of coast-line about 50 kilom. long by 20 to 30 broad, including Ifni, but that in his opinion the French Government would not yield further. It was however agreed that the text, as amended by the Minister for Foreign Affairs, should detail the extent of territory that Spain was prepared to cede.

M. Geoffray and I had the impression, despite the deep dissatisfaction with the French proposals expressed by Señor Garcia Prieto, that the Spanish Government desire to reach a settlement.

[49873] No. 566.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 12.)

(No. 206.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Paris, December 12, 1911.*

YOUR telegram No. 338 of 7th December: Morocco.

Moorish Government intend to ask State Bank for funds for a three months' prolongation from 1st January of mandates for policing ports of Morocco.

French Government do not consider it necessary to prolong office of inspector-general of police or for Makhzen to consult the Powers on the subject.

[50222] No. 567.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen.

(No. 133.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, December 12, 1911.*

THE Spanish Ambassador informed me to-day that his Government desired to thank us for what we had done with regard to the Franco-Spanish negotiations. They considered it due to us that the question of Alcazar was settled favourably. They were very glad that I had mentioned the question of Ifni to the French Government, because Spain had held Ifni prior to the agreement of 1904, and the Spanish Government could never propose its cession to the Spanish Parliament. The Spanish Government would be willing to cede the "hinterland" in the south; but with regard to the coast they felt that it would be very difficult to allow it to pass into the hands of a strong foreign Power, as that would make the possession of the Canary Islands insecure.

I said that I had not yet considered the question of the whole coast, but only of Ifni itself, as the Ambassador had spoken of it with very great emphasis.

He replied that he had mentioned the coast before, but admitted that it was of Ifni that he had spoken most urgently. He then told me that his Government had replied to the French proposal, saying that they could not discuss the question of compensation until they knew what they were going to gain, and what their position would be in their own sphere. They observed that the 1904 agreement was not referred to in the French proposal, except in connection with Tangier. They also noticed that the wording as to fortifications varied from that contained in the Anglo-French Agreement and the Franco-Spanish Agreement, and was open to the interpretation that the fortifications of Ceuta were to be demolished, and Ceuta turned into a commercial port. This was a matter which could interest only Great Britain, but the Ambassador did not suppose that we had suggested this alteration of wording.

I replied that we had not suggested it. I asked him whether he had yet received the French proposal as to Tangier.

He answered that his Government had not yet received it, and he enquired whether I had said anything to the French on the subject.

I told him that we had represented to the French that the internationalisation of Tangier must be a real one.

The Ambassador said that this was exactly what his Government also desired: they did not wish to have the internationalisation rendered illusory by a control over Tangier that would be nominally Moorish, and really French.

I am, &c.
E. GREY

[49900] No. 568.

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 13.)

(No. 198.)
Sir, *Madrid, December 10, 1911.*

IN my telegram No. 94 of the 7th instant, I had the honour to report the meeting which took place on the previous afternoon between the Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs and the French Ambassador, immediately after the return of the latter from his consultation with the French Government at Paris. I felt myself authorised by your telegram No. 95 of the 26th October, informing me of the extent to which I am at liberty to support the proposals submitted by the French Government, to accede to the

courteous suggestion which was made to me on the same day by both parties, that I should be present at the discussion which was to be opened between them in respect of the relations between the French and Spanish zones in Morocco. I have since had the honour to receive, by your telegram No. 102 of the 6th instant, your full permission to attend the meetings in question.

The French invitation to attend the meeting at the Ministry of State was conveyed to me by telephone from the French Embassy at midday. Soon after I received a letter from Señor Garcia Prieto, in which he was good enough to say that he had just heard "that the French Government would welcome with the same pleasure as the Spanish Government my presence at the ensuing conversations," adding that he was arranging for a meeting to take place at 5 o'clock.

I have ventured to trouble you with the above particulars in view of the comments that I notice my participation in the opening conversation has provoked in a portion of the French and Spanish press. The evening "Epoca" of the 9th instant explains clearly the intimate relation which exists between England, France, and Spain in regard to the new Morocco settlement and the treaties out of which it has grown. It expresses surprise at the ignorance which appears to prevail on the subject in the public mind, and it points out how natural it is that the representatives of the above three countries should jointly confer with regard to a question affecting the interpretation of a set of engagements accepted by them all.

As to what passed at the opening meeting, I have little to add to my above-mentioned telegram. The Spanish Foreign Minister remarked, on receiving the draft convention from the hands of the French Ambassador, that he must make a preliminary point of the absolute necessity which existed for the Spanish Government that they should be assured, before entering upon the negotiation, that they would not have to pay twice over for the recognition of their rights in Morocco. There was still in his mind the fear which he had expressed during the brief conversations held at San Sebastian in the summer, that after ceding territory to France the Spanish Government would be called upon to cede more to Germany. M. Geoffray having expressed the opinion that it would be useless at this early stage to approach the German Government in order to ascertain what they would do on the completion of the arrangement between France and Spain, I suggested that Señor Garcia Prieto might see his way to leaving the point he had raised in abeyance till near the conclusion of the negotiations, when it might be agreed that any Spanish engagement involving a cession of territory should be conditional on no further territorial demands being made on Spain from other quarters. M. Geoffray adopted the suggestion and Señor Garcia Prieto appeared to concur, promising to study carefully the draft convention, and to let us know when he was ready for a further interview. The conversation was entirely friendly. It was agreed that the negotiation should be kept as secret as possible, and I may say that, apart from your telegram No. 104 of the 8th instant, I have since received no indication whatever of the impression produced by the French proposals. The Spanish press has received no hint of what passed at the first meeting.

I have, &c.
MAURICE DE BUNSEN.

[49873] No. 569.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 367.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, December* 13, 1911.

YOUR telegram No. 206 of 12th December: Morocco police.

French Government will presumably inform Spanish Government. Arrangement is unlikely to meet with objection from the other treaty Powers, and has our concurrence.

[50783] No. 570.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 536.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, December* 15, 1911.

REFERRING to-day to what M. Cambon had said to me on a previous occasion about the adherence of Portugal to the agreement respecting Morocco, I told him of the instructions which I had sent on the 25th November last to Sir Arthur Hardinge. I also told M. Cambon that, after he had spoken to me, I had on the 4th instant instructed Sir Arthur Hardinge to tell the Portuguese Minister for Foreign Affairs unofficially that I had heard he was waiting for our opinion, and to say to him that we saw no reason why the Portuguese Government should not adhere to the agreement, as we had ourselves done so.

I added, however, to M. Cambon, that the real reason for the hesitation of the Portuguese Government was the fear of offending Spain.

M. Cambon thanked me for what I had said.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[50326] No. 571.

Sir R. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 16.)

(No. 344. Very Confidential.)
Sir, *Tangier, December* 1, 1911.

IN continuation of my despatch No. 342 of the 26th ultimo, on the subject of the resolution adopted by the Commission d'Hygiène to admit twelve Moorish notables to their committee, I have the honour to report that as soon as the circular of the Spanish Minister (now president of the Conseil sanitaire) reached me I called upon the French chargé d'affaires. I told him that I was considerably upset by the action which the Commission d'Hygiène had taken; it appeared to me most inopportune and regrettable, as I felt certain that my Government would never agree to so important a modification of the Commission d'Hygiène, the body which has always been looked upon as the embryo municipality, on the very eve of the discussion of the scheme for the municipality which will have to be created for Tangier under the new conditions of internationalisation. M. de Billy affected to be very much surprised at my seeing anything to object to. The inclusion of the Mussulman element in the municipality had, he said, always been admitted, and the sooner we could start training them the better; moreover, the resolution had been adopted unanimously. I stopped him there, as I said I could not admit that; as a matter of fact the whole affair had been irregular, for according to the internal rules of the Commission d'Hygiène no question could be discussed at a meeting unless notice of its discussion had been given beforehand to the members in the *ordre du jour*. No such notice had been given in this case. The *ordre du jour* only mentioned a few quite unimportant matters, and it was for this reason that Mr. Elphick, the delegate from the British Legation, had not been present. Had he been there the adoption would certainly not have been unanimous. I would add incidentally that, as a matter of fact, M. de Billy was incorrect in his statement, as the Russian dragoman voted against the proposal and by so doing incurred the displeasure of M. de Billy, who complained of him to M. Botkine as being Francophobe—a perfectly groundless accusation, I believe. M. Ruiz, who is a Spaniard, is accused by his compatriots of treachery on account of the loyal support which he has always given to France. As to the point raised by M. de Billy of what had or had not been admitted in the past with regard to the Tangier municipality, I said that it appeared to me useless to hark back to that. The status of the city of Tangier was to be completely changed, and when the new conditions had been agreed upon I imagined that the representatives of the Powers would frame in concert a municipality suitable to those conditions. M. de Billy asked me what I thought the lines of such a municipality would be. I replied that I really could not tell; my contention, and that was only a personal one, until I received the instructions of my Government, was that it appeared to me unadvisable that any modification should at the eleventh hour be introduced into the *status quo*. This was what I proposed to write on the circular.

M. de Billy said that under these circumstances he would write that he also was referring the matter to his Government. He had, he said, so far merely telegraphed to

inform them of the resolution taken by the Commission d'Hygiène. He stated that he was not sure whether this resolution was effective, and I replied that in my opinion it most certainly was not. He said, "Then you think that the Moorish notables, who have already been designated, should not attend the meeting of the commission to-morrow, as they had intended?" I answered that I assuredly thought they ought not to, and to make quite certain I wrote in my annotation that, pending confirmation by the Conseil sanitaire, the resolution of the Commission d'Hygiène remained inoperative. M. de Billy, to whom the circular was sent immediately after me, appears to have acquiesced in this view, as he suggested that the President should be so informed. His arguments in favour of the resolution were vague and unconvincing, and I think he realised that a mistake had been made. He tried to explain away the whole thing on the ground that it was an experiment; that it was very necessary before framing the municipality that we should ascertain the various currents of Mussulman feeling; that thanks to his enquiries he had ascertained that (1) Ali Zaky Bey was unpopular with the Moorish notables (this I could have told him without the trouble of a special enquiry); and (2) that it would be impossible for protégés to sit as Moorish delegates, as they were certain to mix up in intrigues. I said this might be true, but we must recollect that there might be no such thing as protection in an internationalised Tangier. That brought me once more back to my contention that, in view of the uncertainty as to the conditions which were to prevail in Tangier, no alteration should be made in the *status quo* which could in any way prejudice the question of the composition of the municipality, whenever it came up for discussion. M. de Billy appeared quite amiable and moderate, but I have subsequently heard from private sources that he has spoken with great bitterness of the objections which have been raised to the resolution of the Commission d'Hygiène, which was in reality his, and that in conversation he has made wild accusations against His Majesty's Government and their agents, official and unofficial (by the latter he specially designated Mr. Harris, Menebhi, and Raisuli) of only pushing British interests in Northern Morocco, and of thwarting legitimate French aims in every possible way. He evidently has completely lost his temper, and is suffering from a severe *attaque de nerfs*, due, no doubt, to a great extent to the fact that he put himself quite in the wrong, and that he knows it. The Russian Minister tells me that as the representative of the ally of France he thought it his duty to speak to M. de Billy very seriously on the whole subject. He had said that he thought the whole incident most regrettable; that it was bad enough to incur an *échec* when acting by the instructions of one's Government, but that he could not understand how M. de Billy could have taken such action on his own initiative, which, had he thought for a moment, he must have realised could only end in failure. M. de Billy said he did not agree at all; the proposal had been a *ballon d'essai*, and as such had been most useful, as it had shown clearly what the attitude of England would be. M. Botkine remarked that he should have thought that that was clear without risking a *ballon d'essai*; an *échec* was inevitable, and that was exactly what France ought at this moment to try and avoid.

On Wednesday morning Mr. Harris came to see me. He told me that on the previous evening he had dined with Amin Tazzi, ex-Minister of Finance. He had expected an ordinary private dinner, but on arrival found thirty or forty of the principal Moors of Tangier assembled, including practically all the Government officials with the exception of Guebbas, who had not been invited. He was informed that a commission of Moors representing native public opinion at Tangier had been formed with the object of protecting native interests, and a furnished house had already been taken for holding meetings. This commission was to remain entirely Moorish, but it had been unanimously agreed to invite Mr. Harris to assist them in their deliberations with his advice, and thus save them from taking futile decisions which could only do more harm than good. It was agreed that evening that a strong protest should be made against the recent nomination by the Makhzen of twelve Moorish delegates to the Commission d'Hygiène, on the ground that delegates nominated in this way would be mere instruments of the Makhzen, consequently indirectly of the French, and in no way represent Moorish opinion. It was also decided that, when the moment arrived for the discussion of a scheme for the municipality for Tangier under the new conditions of internationalisation, it should be insisted upon that the Moorish delegates should be selected by the townspeople, and not nominated by the Makhzen, although there would be no objection to the list of delegates thus selected being submitted to the Makhzen for approval.

A special meeting was called on the following day, at which Mr. Harris, of course, did not attend. The resolutions were passed, and Mr. Harris informs me that they are

to be communicated to the representative of the Sultan, and to the doyen of the corps diplomatique.

The very genuine aim of the committee is, in Mr. Harris's opinion, to obtain absolute equality for all the Powers on the new municipality; he considers, moreover, that their healthy influence will be of great value in preventing friction between natives and Europeans, and in facilitating the introduction of reforms. Mr. Harris is quite convinced that the commission are actuated by no sort of anti-European feeling, and that the motive for their action is essentially to obviate the possibility of the administration of Tangier falling into the hands of any one Power. They fully realise that the policy of Great Britain in Tangier is actuated by no ulterior motives, and that its only object is to further commercial prosperity generally by means of justice and equality of treatment; they would consequently always be ready to support the views of the British delegates on the municipality.

Mr. Harris tells me that he saw the French chargé d'affaires since these meetings were held, and informed him of the resolutions which had been passed. M. de Billy appeared to admit the justice of the contentions of the committee, but declared that there could be no question of the Moorish delegates being selected by election. Mr. Harris pointed out to him that there had never been any idea of elections, the Moors themselves realising that such a procedure would be quite unpracticable.

I have impressed upon Mr. Harris the necessity of making it clearly understood that he does not in any way belong to the commission, and of being careful that any advice which he may give may be given quite behind the scenes.

I have, &c.
REGINALD LISTER.

P.S. *December* 4, 1911.—My Russian colleague told me last night that, although he as a rule wrote very little upon local matters to his Government, he had thought it his duty to report this incident fully. He has stated his opinion that M. de Billy has behaved very foolishly, that it was impossible for him to support him, and that the view that I had taken in the matter was a foregone conclusion, and, indeed, the only possible one. He criticises M. de Billy's want of judgment very severely.

M. Botkine also tells me that he gathers from M. de Beaumarchais that M. de Billy is covering himself *vis-à-vis* to his Government by throwing all the responsibility and blame on Ali Zaky and the Makhzen.

R. L.

[50332] No. 572.

Sir R. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received December* 16.)

(No. 351. Confidential.)

Sir, *Tangier, December* 10, 1911.

AS I had the honour to report in my telegram No. 159, the proposal of the Commission d'Hygiène to add to its numbers twelve Moorish notables, to be nominated by the Makhzen, may be considered as completely defeated.

After receiving my annotation and that of the French chargé d'affaires, the substance of which was reported in my despatch No. 344 of the 1st instant, the circular of the president of the Conseil sanitaire went on to the Russian Minister. M. Botkine wrote that he shared the view expressed by the president and me, and I understand that all the other representatives have declared themselves of the same opinion.

M. de Billy's attempt has proved a sad failure, and I hear that he now, more than ever, throws all the blame on Ali Zaky Bey.

I regret to state that the feeling amongst the French colony in Tangier is very bitter against England with regard to the arrangement to be made between France and Spain. The key of the situation, they say, was in the hands of England, as Spain would have done whatever she told her. Presuming that Alcazar and Laraiche, as well as the northern shore, are to remain in the hands of Spain, they consider that they have been defrauded of the fruits they had a right to expect—(1) by the vast concessions they have been obliged to make to Germany, (2) by the danger of war to which they were exposed during four months, and (3) by the fact that Spain had broken her obligations under the treaty of 1904, and that, consequently, a new situation had been

created. They do not appear to realise that the question is one which affects our own vital interests, and that it was with a view of safeguarding these that article 3 of our secret treaty was drawn up, which formed the basis of the Franco-Spanish Secret Treaty of 1904. I am glad to say that M. de Billy has shown more wisdom on this occasion, and the legation are doing their best to calm the agitation.

I have, &c.
REGINALD LISTER.

[50391] No. 573.

Admiralty to Foreign Office.—(Received December 16.)

(Confidential.)

Sir, *Admiralty, December* 14, 1911.

I AM commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 14th ultimo, respecting the adherence of His Majesty's Government to the recently concluded Franco-German convention, and to request you to inform the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs that, while accepting his decision, they are glad to learn that he does not intend to lose sight of the wishes of the Admiralty in the matter of the fortification of the Atlantic coastline of Morocco, should a suitable opportunity occur for pressing these views on the French Government.

I am, &c.
W. GRAHAM GREENE.

[50338] No. 574.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 16.)

(No. 602.)

Sir, *Paris, December* 15, 1911.

I HAVE the honour to inform you that before the debate which was fixed to take place in the Chamber of Deputies yesterday respecting the Franco-German Convention of the 4th November last, the following motion, proposed by the deputies of the Right, MM. de Mun, Delafosse, Denys Cochin, and Chambrun, was discussed and put out to vote :—

"Les soussignés ont l'honneur de demander l'ajournement du débat sur l'accord franco-allemand et sur les interpellations jusqu'au moment où le Gouvernement sera en mesure de donner à la Chambre des indications précises sur l'état des négociations avec l'Espagne, et sur l'adhésion des Puissances signataires de l'Acte d'Algésiras."

Count Albert de Mun, who for eleven years past had not taken part in the debates of the Chamber, proposed this motion in a speech of great eloquence, and was repeatedly cheered by various sections of the Chamber. He began by expressing the opinion that the debate on the convention should be adjourned until more light could be thrown on the obscurity surrounding it. By that convention a vast tract of French territory was ceded to a rival nation without any battle being lost, and this was the first time so great a sacrifice had been asked of France. Nor was this all, for from certain observations as to future territorial aggrandisements of Germany in Central Africa let us fall by M. de Kiderlen-Waechter, and by M. de Bethmann-Hollweg, and from a passage in your speech in the House of Commons to the effect that England would not adopt a dog-in-the-manger policy towards such aggrandisements, it might be inferred that some obscure design was already in process of evolution. What was the design? It was necessary for the Chamber to know before entering on a discussion of the convention. What reasons had induced the Government to conclude a treaty so painful for France and so perilous for others? When and how did the idea originate of the surrender of territory which is called the price of a protectorate over Morocco? Why had Germany gone to Agadir? I had been stated that she had gone thither to induce the French Government to resume an interrupted conversation. There had been a conversation then? Since when and about what? Since when and why had that conversation been broken off? Even before Agadir the Congo had been mentioned, by why? A French protectorate over Morocco might have been obtained more rapidly, with a far fewer sacrifices and above all with far fewer complications if the French

Government had considered the Moroccan question as an Algerian question and not as a European one. But what was the protectorate which France now acquired? and why was it necessary for France to purchase it?

M. de Mun then proceeded to enquire into the events leading up to the Franco-German agreement of 1909 and into the manner in which that agreement had been kept. If it were true that Germany had, in an explanatory annex to the agreement, signified clearly her political disinterestedness in Morocco and had admitted the superiority of French commercial interests over German commercial interests in that country, why had the French Government negotiated with Germany again and to obtain what? and why had a French colony been given up owing to the presence of a German ship at Agadir? In reality the agreements of 1909 and of 1911 were the same in their two most essential points. The Morocco of 1909 and the Morocco of 1911 were one and the same Morocco, an international Morocco and a Morocco burdened with the Spanish mortgage. The Chamber and the country at large could no longer endure a system whereby France could be tied in regard to England and tied in regard to Spain for seven years without the public knowing it. M. de Mun concluded by enquiring what direction M. Caillaux had given to French external policy three months ago and what direction he would give to it in the future. He alluded to the passage in your speech dealing with the old friendships of England and declared, amidst considerable applause, that France had no more reason than England to forget her old friendships, and that neither country had in the present state of Europe any other friendships to exchange them for.

M. de Selves evidently intended to cut short the discussion of M. de Mun's motion and to reserve his explanations of the policy followed by the French Government until the debate on the treaty itself had more fully developed. His Excellency therefore confined himself to a few words in answer to M. de Mun. He asked him to withdraw his motion. When that was done, the Government would then be able to explain their policy. "Nous venons demander à M. de Mun," he said, "de nous relever du silence auquel il nous condamne par sa proposition préjudicielle." After this statement M. de Selves returned to his place, but the Chamber showed such manifest signs of dissatisfaction at the matter being thus summarily treated that, after a hurried consultation with the President of the Council, M. de Selves went again into the tribune and said that, as the Chamber seemed to insist on immediate explanations on his part, he would give them.

His Excellency then proceeded to give an account of the situation which he found in existence when he took office at the end of June. A conversation with Germany was already in progress. The Fez expedition had taken place, and it appeared to Germany that the state of things resulting from the Act of Algeciras and from the Franco-German agreement of 1909 had been totally modified. The German Ambassador at Paris informed him a few days after he had taken office that Germany had sent a war-ship to Agadir. The reasons given were that there were German interests there, and that these interests were threatened. The war-ship would, however, be withdrawn as soon as order was re-established in Morocco. Shortly afterwards M. de Selves declared that Germany was desirous of having a conversation with France, that she hoped it would be carried on rapidly, and that no unfriendly idea had inspired the dispatch of the ship to Agadir. He (M. de Selves) had answered that he regretted the decision of the German Government to send a ship, that the French Government did not and had not refused a conversation with the German Government, but that he feared that the dispatch of the ship to Agadir would "underline it in an unfortunate manner." This was on the eve of his departure with the President of the Republic for Holland. On his return the French Ambassador left Paris for Berlin with instructions to resume the interrupted conversation.

M. de Selves then alluded to the criticisms addressed to the French Government for not having sent a war-ship to Agadir. They had considered the question. They had been constantly in touch on all matters with the friends and allies of France. But it appeared to them, according to the information which they had received, that if Germany had sent a ship to Agadir, she had no intention of effecting a landing there, and the French Government considered that the question of sending a ship could be adjourned. He had been asked why France had not demanded the meeting of a new conference, as Morocco was under the régime of the Algeciras Act. But he knew that Germany had clearly stated that she would not have anything to do with a conference except on condition that the actual state of affairs was re-established as it was left by the Algeciras Act, that is to say, that France should evacuate the positions which she had occupied in Morocco. If the French Government had insisted upon a meeting of a

conference, who could have said that Germany might not have effected a landing at Agadir in order to come to the conference in a new *de facto* situation? All the ideas about a conference were built up on a false conception, namely, that the Sultan was in a position himself to ensure order and tranquillity in Morocco. France was only in a position to undertake this responsibility, and therefore it was better, as the question had been raised by Germany, to face it frankly, and to negotiate as that Power had invited France to do.

M. de Selves then gave the Chamber a sketch of the conditions on which the French Government had entered upon the negotiations. Any German territorial pretension in Morocco was excluded. The German Government had been told that the French Government would keep their friends and allies informed of the negotiations, although they were *à deux*, and finally the adhesion of the signatory Powers of the Algeciras Act was laid down as necessary. Germany had replied that she agreed. "Take Morocco," she said, "establish your protectorate there; but as you have negotiated already about Morocco with England, Italy, and Spain, on what basis are you going to negotiate with us? Our public opinion will not allow us to abandon anything without compensation elsewhere."

At this point M. de Selves remarked that it was easy to say that France should establish a protectorate over Morocco without making any sacrifices elsewhere; but it was easier said than done.

This remark appeared to cause great indignation in the Chamber, and M. de Selves' speech was for a time interrupted. He resumed it to give an account of how the question of cession of territory in the Congo was first mooted. Various members continued to interrupt and press his Excellency on this point. It has frequently been asserted of late that the French Government offered to give up territory in the Congo before the German Government asked for it, and in certain quarters great indignation has been expressed in regard to this offer. M. de Selves was at pains to prove that this indignation was unfounded, as the German Government themselves first mentioned the Congo. He recounted to the Chamber how the French Government had refused to continue the conversation if M. de Kiderlen-Waechter should maintain his demand for the whole of the French colony from the Sangha to the sea. There was a period of tension at this point, and various reports had been circulated, so his Excellency said, about this matter. It had been said that the friends of France had instigated her to a conflict. This was an absolute error. It was true that they had stood by the side of France ready to give her their aid—all the aid which the circumstances might demand. But they had never let fall an irritating word; on the contrary, they used peaceful and conciliatory language, which they were able to do all the more, as the vital interests and dignity of France were not at stake.

M. de Selves then continued his account of the progress of negotiations at Berlin. He would not, he said, enter into all the details of the portion relative to the Congo, for the Minister of the Colonies would explain them to the House, but he would mention the matter of the French right of pre-emption over the Belgian Congo. He did not think that there was much chance of this right being exercised, for Belgium was jealously desirous of preserving her colonial domain. The French Government had never thought of abandoning their right in favour of Germany. Besides they were not in a position to do so, as such a right was a personal and not a transferrable one. What had been done was to insert a clause in the agreement to the effect that if modifications in the territorial status of the conventional basin of the Congo were effected, France would not refuse to "causer" with Germany as with all other signatory Powers of the Berlin Act of 1885.

M. de Selves summed up the result of the negotiations with Germany by stating that, on one side, France was now able to take all administrative, military, and financial measures which she judged necessary in Morocco. Her hands were free. She would represent Moorish interests *vis-à-vis* to foreign Powers. Such Powers as have interests in Morocco would approach the Moorish Government through an intermediary of the French representative. The political liberty of action of France was complete and absolute, more than was the case when the protectorate over Tunis was established. On the other side, the agreement, in the region of economical matters, gave equality to all and privilege to none.

Negotiations with Spain had already been begun; it was impossible to give the House details of these negotiations, but two ideas inspired them: firstly, that it was just to ask Spain for some compensation in view of the sacrifices made by France to obtain advantages in which Spain would share; and, secondly, to have regard for Spanish feelings and dignity, for a great country like France should never take undue advantage of its strength ("abuser de sa force").

The latter words of M. de Selves caused a commotion in the Chamber, and he was again prevented from continuing his speech for some minutes.

He concluded his speech by emphasising the advantage resulting from the fact that Morocco would henceforth be banished from the chess-board of France's foreign policy. In that direction, France's hands were freed—an advantage which should not be underestimated when the situation abroad was carefully considered. France should be attentive to and take part, in a pacific sense, in all that was happening, for a country which isolated itself from external events was a country which was failing and growing less. The French Government would strive to strengthen the friendships and alliances of France. In so doing, they would only be responding to the sentiments expressed before the British Parliament "by a great Foreign Minister," and by the eminent Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs who had just visited Paris.

M. Lebrun, Minister of the Colonies, then rose to defend the cession of territory made by France to Germany under the convention. He gave a fairly lengthy description of the territory ceded, of the part of the Bec de Canard which France had obtained, and of the vast territories which still remained to her. The conclusion which he drew was that no vital part of French territory had been surrendered, that the Government had been able to prevent the French Congo from being cut in two, and that by the protectorate established in Morocco the desire of all French explorers had been fulfilled, viz., that French civilisation should be spread over the largest extent possible of African territory.

M. Jaurès, the Socialist leader, having expressed the hope that France would not endeavour to break her treaty engagements with Spain, the President of the Council declared that France, in the negotiations with Spain which were based on the 1904 agreement, intended to respect the dignity of Spain but to safeguard at the same time her own interests.

M. Deschanel, President of the Commission for Foreign Affairs, then spoke briefly but strongly against M. de Mun's motion of adjournment, which was finally thrown out by 448 votes to 98.

The texts of the speeches made by the Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Minister for the Colonies are enclosed herein.

I have, &c.
FRANCIS BERTIE.

Enclosure in No. 574.

Extract from the "Journal officiel" of December 15, 1911.

DEBATE IN THE FRENCH CHAMBER RESPECTING MOROCCO.

M. de Selves (Ministre des Affaires Étrangères).—Avec toute la Chambre nous avons applaudi l'apparition à cette tribune de l'éloquent orateur que vous venez d'entendre (Très bien! très bien!); et sur nombre de points qu'il a traités vous verrez que nous sommes plus en communauté de vues avec lui que nous ne le paraissons dès l'abord.

Mais si je comprends le souci de l'honorable M. de Mun et de la Chambre d'obtenir du Gouvernement des explications complètes sur l'accord franco-allemand et sur les questions que l'honorable M. de Mun a soulevées, je comprends moins la proposition d'ajournement qu'il vient de formuler.

Je ne conçois pas que je puisse, si on l'accueille, fournir les explications qu'il désire et sur l'accord congolais et sur les négociations qui ont été suivies.

Les raisons qu'il nous donne sont que, pour que la Chambre puisse connaître complètement l'accord franco-allemand, il faut que la question espagnole soit réglée d'une part, et il faut, d'autre part, que les nations qui doivent donner leur adhésion se soient prononcées.

En ce qui concerne l'accord franco-espagnol, je ne vois pas bien en quoi la solution de la question sera favorisée par le fait que la Chambre ne sera pas prononcée sur l'accord franco-allemand. Il m'apparaît que c'est l'inverse qui en sera le résultat.

D'autre part, en ce qui concerne l'adhésion des Puissances, qu'il conviendrait d'attendre pour que nous discutions la question, qu'il me permette de lui dire qu'un certain nombre d'entre elles ont déjà donné leur adhésion, parmi celles qui pouvaient le donner sans consulter leur Parlement.

M. Jules Delahaye.—Et l'Autriche ?

(*Au Centre.*—Et les États-Unis ?)

M. le Ministre des Affaires Étrangères.—L'Autriche-Hongrie, les États-Unis, la Belgique, nous ont fait connaître qu'elles n'avaient aucune objection à soulever, mais qu'elles étaient obligées de consulter leurs Parlements et tout naturellement, au cours de la réponse qu'elles nous fournissaient à cet égard, elles indiquaient que notre Parlement lui-même ne s'était pas encore prononcé, qu'il y avait quelque chose d'un peu gênant pour elles à insister devant leurs propres Parlements, tant que le Parlement français n'avait pas encore pris sa responsabilité.

M. Armand Jousselin.—Ce n'est pas de notre faute.

M. le Ministre des Affaires Étrangères.—En telle sorte, messieurs, que, désireux au plus tôt d'aborder la question, de répondre aux observations qui ont été faites, aux questions qui ont été posées, de donner à la Chambre——

M. Joseph Caillaux (Président du Conseil).—Toutes les explications.

M. le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères.—Toutes les explications et tous les éclaircissements auxquels elle a droit et qu'elle désire, nous venons demander à l'honorable M. de Mun et demander à la Chambre elle-même de nous relever du silence auquel il nous condamne par sa proposition préjudicielle. (Mouvements divers.)

Je lui demande d'y renoncer; je demande à la Chambre d'écarter la motion d'ajournement de M. de Mun et aussitôt je reviendrai à cette tribune, abordant la question franco-allemande et répondant à l'honorable M. de Mun dans toute la mesure qu'il demande.

(M. le Ministre des Affaires Étrangères descend de la tribune et retourne à son banc.—Exclamations et bruit prolongé.)

M. Jules Delahaye.—Et c'est tout ?

M. Tournade.—C'est tout ce que vouz avez à dire ?

M. Georges Berry.—C'est la politique du silence que nous faisons ici maintenant.

(*Plusieurs membres.*—Expliquez-vous dès maintenant !)

(M. le Ministre des Affaires Étrangères remonte à la tribune.)

M. le Ministre des Affaires Étrangères.—Puisque la Chambre me marque le désir d'explications immédiates, je les donne sur-le-champ.

M. de Mun rappelait tout à l'heure que, lorsque nous nous étions présentés devant vous au mois de juillet dernier, nous vous avions dit que des conversations étaient engagées à ce moment entre la France et l'Allemagne. Nous vous demandions de nous permettre de les continuer en vous donnant l'assurance qu'elles seraient conduites avec le souci le plus entier des intérêts de ce pays et la préoccupation constante de ce que sa dignité comporte. L'heure est, en effet, venue, messieurs, de vous fournir les explications que vous souhaitez. (" Très bien ! très bien ! ")

M. Jules Delahaye.—Ce n'est pas trop tôt !

M. le Ministre des Affaires Étrangères.—Messieurs, au moment où je suis arrivé au Quai d'Orsay—M. de Mun vous le disait très justement tout à l'heure—des conversations étaient commencées entre la France et l'Allemagne.

C'était après l'expédition de Fez. Il était apparu à l'Allemagne que l'état de choses résultant de l'Acte d'Algésiras et de l'accord de 1909 avait été profondément modifié.

L'Acte d'Algésiras, d'après la thèse allemande, reposait sur ce principe, non plus seulement de la souveraineté du Sultan au Maroc, mais de la possibilité effective, pour le Sultan, de faire respecter cette souveraineté et d'assurer l'ordre. Le traité de 1909, qui constituait un progrès pour la France, puisque l'Allemagne y reconnaissait l'influence politique que la France avait au Maroc, apres cette affirmation, en contenait une autre, qui consistait à déclarer que la France et l'Allemagne s'associeraient, dans la plus large mesure, au Maroc, les intérêts de leurs nationaux.

M. Jules Delafosse.—Les intérêts économiques.

M. le Ministre des Affaires Étrangères.—Mais l'acte de 1909, prolongement de l'Acte d'Algésiras, ne donnait, dans la pensée de l'Allemagne, à la France aucune action politique au Maroc—(mouvements divers)—il apparaissait à l'Allemagne que la situation s'était, je le répète, profondément modifiée par le fait que la France, sur nombre de points, occupait le Maroc, et le fait de l'expédition de Fez lui semblait avoir compliqué la situation que j'indique. (Mouvements divers.)

Des conversations étaient donc engagées. Elles portaient sur les intérêts respectifs des deux pays, sur des points divers, mais en particulier avaient pour objet de traiter certains aspects de la question marocaine. (Mouvements divers.)

Ces conversations s'étaient engagées à Berlin entre notre Ambassadeur et le

Chancelier. Elles s'étaient poursuivies à Kissingen entre M. Cambon et le Ministre des Affaires Étrangères.

M. Jacques Piou.—Était-il alors question du Congo ? (Mouvements divers.)

M. le Président du Conseil.—Attendez ! on va vous le dire.

M. le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères.—Les choses en étaient là, messieurs, lorsque le Cabinet auquel j'appartiens se constitua. Notre Ambassadeur était venu a Paris pour nous mettre au courant et nous demander s'il devait reprendre et continuer ces conversations.

J'étais depuis quelques jours au Quai d'Orsay, lorsque l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne demanda à me voir. Il me déclara, au nom de son Gouvernement, que l'Allemagne venait d'envoyer un bateau à Agadir. Il m'en donnait pour raisons qu'il y avait à Agadir des intérêts allemands, que ces intérêts étaient menacés. Il ajouta que le bateau se retirerait, d'ailleurs, dès que l'ordre serait rétabli au Maroc.

Peu après, messieurs, M. de Schoen me déclarait que l'Allemagne était désireuse de causer avec la France, qu'elle souhaitait que ces conversations fussent menées rapidement et qu'aucune pensée inamicale n'avait inspiré l'idée de l'envoi du bateau à Agadir.

Je reçus avec calme, mais avec froideur, la communication qui m'était faite. (Mouvements divers.) Je marquai tout de suite à l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne tout le regret que j'éprouvais de la détermination du Gouvernement allemand. Je lui dis que nous ne nous refusions pas et que nous ne nous étions pas refusés à une conversation, mais que je craignais que l'acte de l'Allemagne, par l'envoi d'un bateau à Agadir, ne la soulignât d'une façon fâcheuse. J'ajoutai que quelque urgence qu'il y eût à engager la conversation, cette urgence n'était pas telle, que je dusse engager tout de suite l'entretien, que j'avais à accompagner M. le Président de la République en Hollande et que la conversation se continuerait dès mon retour.

Voilà les premiers faits. Dès mon retour, notre Ambassadeur repartait pour Berlin avec les instructions qu'il avait reçues et allait poursuivre la conversation antérieurement commencée.

Je sais que, sur ce que nous avons fait et sur ce que nous devions faire à ce moment, des questions diverses ont été posées. On m'a dit notamment : " Lorsque vous avez appris que l'Allemagne envoyait un bateau à Agadir, pourquoi n'en avez-vous pas fait autant ? "

Messieurs, cette question de l'envoi d'un bateau français à Agadir, nous l'avons examinée. Nous avons dès le commencement, comme en toutes circonstances, été en contact permanent avec nos amis et nos alliés avec lesquels nous avons eu des échanges de vues ininterrompus. Mais il nous est apparu, d'après nos renseignements, que si l'Allemagne envoyait un bateau à Agadir, elle n'avait pas l'intention d'y opérer un débarquement. (Mouvements divers.) Et nous avons estimé qu'il y avait lieu d'ajourner la question.

Une autre question qui, à ce moment-là, nous a été posée, est celle-ci : " Puisque vous étiez sous le régime de la Conférence d'Algésiras, pourquoi n'avez-vous pas demandé la réunion d'une nouvelle conférence ? " Et une critique a été formulée à ce propos.

J'avoue qu'en ce qui me concerne je n'ai pas cru un instant qu'il y eût lieu, à cette heure, de provoquer la réunion d'une conférence.

Une première raison, à mon sens, décisive, se présentait : une conférence n'a d'effet utile que si les Puissances intéressées consentent à y prendre part.

Or, l'Allemagne déclarait très nettement, je le savais, qu'elle n'accepterait pas la réunion d'une nouvelle conférence . . . . (Mouvements divers.)

M. Jules Delafosse.—Ce n'est pas une raison.

M. le Ministre des Affaires Étrangères.— . . . . qu'elle n'irait pas, qu'elle n'en tiendrait pas compte et que, si quelqu'un parlait de réunion de la conférence, il y a une première condition qu'elle y mettrait : c'est que la situation de fait fût rétablie telle qu'elle était de par l'Acte d'Algésiras, c'est-à-dire que la France évacuât les positions qu'elle occupait au Maroc.

M. Denys Cochin.—Voulez-vous me permettre de vous poser une question ?

(*A Gauche.*—" Non ! non ! ")

(*Au Centre et à Droite.*—" Parlez ! parlez ! ")

M. Marcel Sembat.—Puisque vous êtes inscrit, M. Denys Cochin, vous parlerez à votre tour ; laissez parler, M. le Ministre.

M. Jules Delahaye.—Alors, nous ne pouvons plus poser des questions ? (" Non ! non ! " à Gauche.)

M. le Président.—L'orateur désire continuer.

M. le Ministre des Affaires Étrangères.—Messieurs, je vous en prie, ne voyez,

dans mon attitude à votre égard, rien de désobligeant. Mais, comme je parle de questions graves, je demande à la Chambre de m'entendre avec le même sentiment dans lequel je lui parle. (" Parlez ! parlez ! ")

Messieurs, je vous citais des faits. Des complications étaient possibles si on avait insisté pour la réunion de la conférence. Qui vous dit que l'Allemagne n'eût pas débarqué à Agadir, afin de se présenter à la conférence avec une nouvelle situation de fait ?

Dans ces conditions y avait-il lieu de songer à réunir une conférence, et au surplus les faits qui s'étaient produits au Maroc depuis l'Acte d'Algésiras n'avaient-ils pas démontré que les solutions qui pouvaient découler d'une conférence internationale n'étaient point de nature à répondre aux besoins de la situation telle qu'elle s'était révélée au Maroc. (" Très bien ! très bien ! " à Gauche.)

Toutes ces solutions venaient d'une idée qui avait été démontrée fausse. Cette idée consistait à croire l'autorité du Sultan suffisante pour assurer au Maroc l'ordre et la tranquillité.

Il n'était plus possible de pourvoir au maintien de l'ordre sans créer du même coup une situation nouvelle qui n'eût plus été le résultat d'un accord international ; une Puissance devait être chargée d'exercer une action directe et aussi large que possible afin d'assurer au Maroc l'ordre et le calme nécessaires à la prospérité de ce pays et à ses besoins généraux.

Or, messieurs, ai-je besoin de dire que la Puissance par excellence indiquée pour l'œuvre à laquelle je fais allusion, cette Puissance, c'était la France ? (" Très bien ! très bien ! sur divers bancs à Gauche.)

Et dès lors il m'a paru que puisque la question était soulevée, que puisque l'acte de l'Allemagne l'avait posée, c'était une occasion de la résoudre. Alors, la prenant corps à corps, nous n'avons pas hésité à engager la conversation à laquelle l'Allemagne nous conviait.

M. Georges Berry.—C'est là où vous avez eu tort.

M. Joseph Caillaux (Président du Conseil, Ministre de Intérieur).—Nous verrons cela.

M. le Ministre des Affaires Étrangères.—Certains, lorsque cette conversation avec l'Allemagne s'est engagée, m'ont demandé :

" Pourquoi n'avez-vous pas admis l'Espagne à y participer, et pourquoi, du même coup, n'avez vous pas tranché la question espagnole ? "

Eh bien, messieurs, à ceux qui pourraient être tentés de poser une semblable question, je demande de réfléchir.

Avec l'Espagne, nous avons toujours traité seul à seul ; et quand une tierce Puissance a pu être avisée de nos conversations, quand une tierce Puissance a pu avoir à se préoccuper de ce qui passait entre l'Espagne et nous, cette Puissance a été l'Angleterre.

Pouvais-je admettre qu'une modification aussi important fût créée et que la question espagnole, au lieu de se résoudre entre nous et l'Espagne, au lieu de se résoudre, s'il fallait un témoin, avec l'Angleterre, fût résolue avec une autre Puissance ?

Songez à toutes les conséquences qui pouvaient être le résultat de ce changement et vous saisirez bien vite la raison pour laquelle l'Espagne n'a pas pris part à la conversation franco-allemande.

Dès lors, messieurs, la conversation s'est engagée. Et avant d'entrer dans le détail de cette conversation, nous avons dit à l'Allemagne :

" Il est bien entendu, que si, comme vous l'indiquez, vous avez l'intention de réclamer une compensation, ce n'est point au Maroc qu'elle pourra être trouvée. Il est bien entendu que vous n'élèverez pas de revendication territoriale au Maroc."

Ensuite nous avons dit :

" Nous devons vous prévenir, bien que nous causions à deux, que nos amis et nos alliés seront tenus au courant de tout."

Et enfin nous avons ajouté :

" Il est non moins entendu que nous demanderons aux Puissances signataires de l'Acte d'Algésiras d'adhérer à l'accord que nous aurons pu conclure au sujet du Maroc."

Voilà, messieurs, la triple condition que nous avons mise à nos conversations.

Pourquoi, dès le début, avons-nous précisé ? C'est parce que—et vous le sentez avec moi—le Maroc a pour la France un intérêt spécial. Le Maroc, c'est la continuation

de nos possessions algériennes, et à l'heure où nous sommes, l'Algérie et la France, il me semble que c'est la même chose. (Vifs applaudissements.)

Admettre qu'une tierce Puissance vienne s'installer au Maroc, c'est une occasion de conflits, mais cela peut être en outre un danger permanent pour la France, et il n'est pas besoin de réfléchir beaucoup pour s'en apercevoir.

Oh ! je n'examine pas en ce moment la question du Maroc au point de vue de ses richesses, des avantages divers qu'il peut procurer pour la France.

Je regarde plus et plus loin et j'entrevoir, messieurs, dans l'histoire—et pour l'histoire, il faut tout entrevoir—des conflits possibles de grands conflits possibles, que, malgré tous leurs efforts et toute leur volonté de paix, les hommes d'État ne sont pas toujours en mesure d'éviter. A cette heure, supposez donc une agitation se produisant dans ces pays, un effort qui vous y retienne, la France attaquée ailleurs et prise à revers au Maroc ! C'est à ce point de vue particulier, spécial, que j'ai constamment examiné la question marocaine ; c'est avec cette préoccupation constante que j'en ai recherché la solution. (Applaudissements.)

Alors, messieurs, que nous avions ainsi posé la question, l'Allemagne nous a dit : Soit ! nous acceptons. Prenez le Maroc, installez-y votre protectorat. Mais, alors que vous avez traité avec l'Angleterre à cette occasion, que vous avez traité avec l'Italie, que vous traitez avec l'Espagne. . . .

M. Tournade.—Nous ne le savions pas !

M. le Ministre des Affaires Étrangères.—. . . sur quelles bases traiterez-vous avec nous ?

Notre opinion publique ne permet pas que nous n'obtenions pas par ailleurs quelque compensation à l'abandon que nous allons vous consentir . . .

(*A droit*—De quoi ?)

Ministre des Affaires Étrangères.—. . . . et à la promesse que nous allons vous donner que notre diplomatie s'emploiera à faire ratifier par les Puissances l'accord que nous aurons conclu.

M. de Lanjuinais.—Alors, c'est une commission ?

M. le Ministre des Affaires Étrangères.—Il est aisé de dire que l'on pouvait résoudre autrement la question marocaine et que la France pouvait établir sur le Maroc son protectorat sans songer à supporter par ailleurs quelques sacrifices ; mais cela est plus facile à dire qu'à réaliser—(exclamations à Droite)—et je voudrais recevoir de la bouche de ceux qui critiquent la solution proposée. (Applaudissements à Gauche.)

Nous nous somme alors retournés vers l'Allemagne et notre Ambassadeur, dans les conversations qu'il engageait, a dit : " Précisez. Qu'entendez-vous ? Quelle est la base de discussion que vous proposez ? Quel est l'objet de la demande que vous formulez ? " L'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne, dans une conversation qu'il avait eue avec moi, m'avait dit —et c'est ainsi que, pour la première fois, le mot a été prononcé devant moi— : " C'est du côté du Congo que vous pouvez trouver la solution de la question."

Et M. de Kiderlen-Waechter, lorsque, dès son retour, M. Cambon le pressait, lui tenait le même langage, et il lui disait, quelques jours après la conversation que j'avais eue moi-même à Paris : " C'est du côté du Congo que nous trouvérons la compensation."

M. le Comte Albert de Mun.—On n'en avait jamais parlé avant ? (Mouvement.)

M. le Président du Conseil.—Jamais dans mon Cabinet.

M. Jules Delahaye.—Toute la question est là. Vous nous devez la vérité.

M. Georges Berry.—Quand en avait-on parlé ?

M. le Vicomte de Villebois-Mareuil.—On en avait parlé à Bruxelles.

M. Georges Berry.—Je répète ma question : Quand en a-t-on parlé ?

M. le Ministre des Affaires Étrangères.—Le 10 juillet.

Messieurs, les conversations vont se poursuivre. Je désirerais—j'aurais désiré qu'elles fussent plus rapides. J'aurais désiré que les négociations fussent moins longues. A diverses reprises, j'ai marqué le regret que j'éprouvais de ces lenteurs, de même que j'avais exprimé le regret de l'envoi d'un bateau à Agadir. (Exclamations à Droite.)

La raison, je l'ai dite : je craignais, et je l'ai manifesté, que ces lenteurs elles-mêmes ne diminuassent la valeur du résultat qui serait obtenu. Il n'a pas dépendu de nous qu'elles fussent moindres. Et lorsque je m'en vais vous tracer, à grands traits, les phases par lesquelles ont passés les négociations, vous verrez que, de ces lenteurs, il n'y a pas, messieurs, à nous savoir mauvais gré, puisqu'elles sont le résultat de la résistance même que nous avons constamment apportée aux prétentions formulées. (Applaudissements à Gauche.)

M. Tournade.—C'était prévu.

M. le Ministre des Affaires Étrangères.—Au moment où l'Allemagne a eu prononcé le mot de " Congo "——

M. Jaurès.—La première ?

M. le Ministre des Affaires Étrangères.—La première.

M. Jaurès.—Ah !

M. le Ministre des Affaires Étrangères.—. . . et où M. Cambon, regardant une carte avec M. de Kiderlen-Waechter, le Secrétaire d'État, lui dit : "Eh bien ! nous pouvons arriver à des échanges. Nous vous abondonnerons le Togoland, nous vous ferons des cessions territoriales dans le Haut-Cameroun. Mais voici ce que nous demandons," et M. de Kiderlen-Waechter indiqua sur la carte tout le Gabon, tout le Congo qui se trouve entre l'Océan et la Sang'ha—(mouvement)—messieurs, je raconte les faits—à ce moment-là, nous déclarâmes tous sans hésitation qu'ainsi engagée, dans des conditions pareilles, la conversation ne pourrait pas se continuer.

M. Maurice Barrès.—Voilà qui est mieux.

M. le Ministre des Affaires Étrangères.—Il y eut à ce moment une période de tension dont vous avez gardé le souvenir et que, en ce qui me concerne, je ne saurais oublier. A ce moment, des bruits divers ont circulé, et on a dit que nos amis nous poussaient à un conflit. (Interruptions.) C'est une erreur absolue, messieurs.

M. Jaurès.—Très bien !

M. le Ministre des Affaires Étrangères.—. . . et je dois à la vérité de déclarer qu'il n'en a jamais été ainsi. ("Très bien !" "très bien !" à Gauche et sur divers bancs.)

Certes, ils furent à nos côtés, prêts à nous accorder le concours, tout le concours que les circonstances pourraient commander. (Vifs applaudissements sur un grand nombre de bancs.) Mais à aucun moment ils ne nous firent entendre une parole irritante. Ce furent, au contraire, tout le temps des paroles d'apaisement et de conciliation qu'ils formulèrent, tout autant que les intérêts vitaux de la France et sa dignité n'étaient point en jeu. (Vifs applaudissements.)

Messieurs, à côté des bruits qui ont couru à ce moment, vous me permettrez de dire qu'il y eut aussi des calomnies ; certains en vinrent jusqu'à insinuer que le Ministre des Affaires Étrangères et le Gouvernement qui résistaient n'étaient pas éloignés de désirer un conflit. (Mouvements divers.)

(*Sur divers bancs.*—Personne ne l'a dit.)

M. le Ministre des Affaires Étrangères.—Messieurs, jamais un pareil sentiment ne fut le nôtre, j'ai à peine besoin de le dire.

Mais si nous ne l'avons pas éprouvé, j'ose déclarer très simplement que nous ne nous sommes jamais départis un instant du souci des intérêts de ce pays et de sa dignité, et que notre résistance à ce moment, comme dans tous les autres, a été uniquement dictée par notre devoir.

Nous avons donc, messieurs, répondu en indiquant que la conversation ne pouvait se continuer si des demandes pareilles étaient maintenues.

Et alors, on nous a dit : "Eh bien ! cherchons ; mais en tout cas, nous devons vous le déclarer, il nous faut obtenir un accès au fleuve Congo."

On s'est demandé pourquoi il avait été ainsi parlé de ces cessions territoriales. Pourquoi ces questions-là avaient été examinées ? Je vous l'ai dit déjà, c'est parce que la première parole qu'avait prononcée le Ministre des Affaires Étrangères en Allemagne avait consisté à dire : "Le Maroc, vous l'aurez"—il avait même ajouté : "Installez-y votre protectorat, libellez vous-même l'accord qui doit en déterminer les précisions."

Cependant comme les négociations traînent, nous donnons des instructions à notre Ambassadeur et nous lui prescrivons d'ajourner la conversation sur les questions territoriales.

On nous a dit : Rédigez l'accord sur le Maroc. Or, il ne faut pas qu'il y ait d'ambiguïté et de malentendu. Nous allons parler Maroc et nous ne causerons cessions territoriales que lorsque la question marocaine aura été réglée elles-même, lorsque nous serons tombés d'accord sur les clauses diverses du contrat que nous préparons.

M. Tournade.—Mais vous en aviez accepté le principe.

M. le Ministre des Affaires Étrangères.—Messieurs, à ce moment, les difficultés s'accusent encore, et, il vous en souvient, une interruption se produit dans la conversation. M. de Kiderlen-Waechter part en voyage et M. Cambon, notre Ambassadeur, vient à Paris. Et ceci nous amène au 30 août.

A ce moment, notre Ambassadeur repart pour Berlin, nanti d'un projet d'accord sur le Maroc et avec instruction de ne parler de rien autre tant que l'accord sur ce projet ne sera pas intervenu.

Sur ce projet, les conversations reprennent et l'Allemagne nous répond par un

contre-projet à la date du 7 septembre. Ce contre-projet non seulement apportait certains modifications aux précisions que nous avions formulées pour tout ce qui nous paraissait se rattacher à la liberté politique, à l'action politique au Maroc, mais il formulait, au point de vue économique, des demandes que nous avons jugées absolument inadmissibles. Ce projet consistait à diviser le Maroc, au point de vue économique, en deux zones : une zone qui comprenait le sud et dans laquelle il devait se produire, comme dans l'accord de 1909, des associations d'intérêts entre les Allemands et les Français, associations d'intérêts dans lesquelles les Allemands figureraient à concurrence de 70 pour cent et les Français de 30 pour cent, l'autre zone comprenant la partie plus au nord et dans laquelle c'était le contraire, les Allemands figurant à concurrence de 30 pour cent dans les associations d'intérêts qui se formeraient, et les Français à concurrence de 70 pour cent.

J'ai à peine besoin de dire que ce projet fut immédiatement écarté par nous. On invoquait les principes qui avaient marqué l'accord de 1909, il nous parut inadmissible d'accepter, au Maroc, autre chose que le principe de la liberté commerciale et économique pour tous, sans privilège pour quiconque.

Les choses n'allèrent pas sans difficulté. Le temps s'écoula. Et le 28 septembre encore, l'Allemagne reprit un certain nombre des propositions qu'elle nous semblait avoir abandonnées Elle formula quelques demandes nouvelles et ce n'est que dans les premiers jours d'octobre que, sur les diverses parties de l'accord marocain, nous pûmes penser que les conversations étaient suffisamment avancées.

Mais il y eut, à ce moment, un point que, nous soulevâmes et que certainement vous serez tout disposés à apprécier. Nous voulûmes que la convention qui était intervenue fût une convention ne prêtant pas, ou prêtant le moins possible à des difficultés ultérieures.

Toute convention, quelque soin que l'on ait pris à la rédiger, peut, dans son interprétation, prêter à un moment donné, à des difficultés. Pour prévenir ces difficultés, messieurs, nous demandâmes, et nous avons obtenu que l'Allemagne consentît, au cas où des divergences d'interprétation se produiraient par la suite, qu'il fût précisé et stipulé que la Cour de La Haye serait appelée à les trancher dans les conditions où elle fonctionne ordinairement.

Certains peuvent n'attacher aucune importance à cette précision. En ce qui nous concerne, nous avons considéré comme un point important, comme un point de premier ordre, cette affirmation que, si des difficultés survenaient, il fût précisé qu'elles seraient résolues par ce moyen pacifique et d'avenir, je me plais à le penser malgré tout, qu'est la Cour de La Haye. (Applaudissements.)

La convention relative au Maroc, les lettres interprétatives de cette convention furent signées et paraphées le 11 et le 14 octobre, et c'est à ce moment seulement que furent reprises avec des précisions les conversations relatives aux cessions territoriales.

Étant admis que nous ne pouvions pas obtenir ce que nous avions obtenu au Maroc sans un certain sacrifice, quelque douloureux qu'il fût, nous examinâmes ce qu'il était possible de faire.

Nous l'examinâmes en nous inspirant de ces préoccupations qui consistèrent à veiller à ce qu'aucune atteinte ne fût portée à la vitalité de nos colonies dans l'Afrique équatoriale ; à ce que—pour répondre au sentiment que l'opinion publique, avec une persistance grande, avait manifesté—les communications ne fussent pas interrompues entre les diverses parties de nos colonies.

Nous arrivâmes à nous mettre d'accord ; et si je n'entre point dans le détail, c'est que M. le Ministre des Colonies vous dira tout à l'heure, avec une précision que je n'y saurais mettre, tout ce qui se réfère à cette partie de notre domaine colonial ; il vous dira tout ce qu'il pense, tout ce qui est, toutes les conséquences qui découlent de l'accord que nous avons conclu.

Je ne veux toucher en ce moment qu'un seul point. M. de Mun, tout à l'heure, parlant du Congo, des stipulations que nous y avons insérées, a abordé la question du droit de préférence que nous possédions sur le Congo belge.

Messieurs, à l'heure actuelle, je ne présume pas que ce droit de préférence ait grande chance de s'exercer.

M. Pierre Leroy-Beaulieu.—On n'en sait jamais rien.

M. le Ministre des Affaires Étrangères.—Le Gouvernement belge et la Belgique sont très jalousement soucieux de conserver leur domaine colonial . . .

M. Denys Cochin.—Plus soucieux que vous.

M. le Ministre des Affaires Étrangères.—. . . et j'avoue que je n'entrevois pas l'heure où une succession s'ouvrira de ce côté. Mais jamais nous n'avons eu la pensée, nous

ne pouvions pas avoir la pensée, d'abandonner au profit de l'Allemagne ce droit de préférence qui nous avait été reconnu.

Au surplus, nous ne le pouvions pas. Chacun sait qu'un droit de préférence est un droit personnel et incessible, et, par conséquent, il ne pouvait pas entrer dans notre pensée de céder quoi que ce fût de ce côté.

Et si vous vous rappelez, messieurs, les débats qui se sont produits au sein du Reichstag, vous y verrez que le Secrétaire d'État des Affaires Étrangères l'a reconnu comme nous et a donné à notre droit de préférence le même caractère que je lui donne en ce moment.

Qu'avons-nous fait dès lors ? Nous avons inséré un article disposant que, si des modifications dans le statut territorial du basin conventionnel du Congo venaient à se produire, alors la France ne refuserait pas de causer avec l'Allemagne . . .

M. le Comte de Lanjuinais.—Ces conversations nous coûtent cher.

M. le Ministre des Affaires Étrangères.— . . . comme aussi avec toutes les Puissances signataires de l'Acte de Berlin de 1885.

M. Pierre Leroy-Beaulieu.—C'est la renonciation au droit de préemption.

M. le Ministre des Affairs Étrangères.—De sorte, messieurs, que, si vous voulez bien y réfléchir, non seulement vous ne trouvez pas le moindre danger dans cette clause, mais vous y trouvez une garantie, lorsque des changements profonds viendront à se produire—s'ils viennent à se produire—dans le basin conventionnel du Congo.

MM. Jaurès et *Marcel Sembat.*—Viendraient à se produire !

M. le Ministre des Affaires Étrangères.—Oui, sans aucun doute, viendraient. Est-ce que vous vous imaginez que nous pouvons empêcher que des conversations se produisent entre les grands pays qui se trouveront là ?

Et alors, qu'avons-nous fait ? Nous avons par avance régularisé ces conversations inévitables, et au lieu de se produire entre tel et tel, elles devront nécessairement se produire, si elles se produisent, dans cette grande conférence de tous les pays signataires de l'Acte de Berlin de 1885. (Mouvements divers.)

Et, messieurs, les Puissances qui ont examiné cette clause ne s'y sont pas méprises ; et, loin de voir un danger dans les stipulations que nous avons insérées au contrat, c'est une garantie que l'on doit y trouver.

M. Paul Escudier.—Une garantie pour elles.

M. le Ministre des Affaires Étrangères.—Voilà donc conclu dans ses deux éléments essentiels l'accord marocain.

Quelle est sa signification ? Quelle est sa portée ?

Il se divise en deux parties. D'un côté il consacre la liberté d'action politique absolue de la France. La France désormais . . . .

M. Georges Bonnefous.—Pas seule.

M. le Ministre des Affaires Étrangères.— . . . doit pouvoir prendre au Maroc toutes les mesures administratives, militaires, financières, qu'elle jugera nécessaires.

M. Paul Escudier.—Et la banque ? Et la poste ?

M. le Ministre des Affaires Étrangères.—Elle est libre de ses mouvements. Elle pourra réglementer toutes les portions du Maroc que les besoins comporteront.

Elle aura la représentation à l'étranger des intérêts marocains. Les Puissances étrangères qui auront des intérêts su Maroc interviendront auprès du Gouvernement marocain par l'intermédiaire du représentant de la France.

Par conséquent, c'est dire que, d'une façon précise, complète, absolue, la liberté de la France, au point de vue de son action politique dans le Maroc, est entière, aussi complètement précisée que possible, comme elle ne l'a pas été lorsque le protectorat tunisien a été organisé. (Interruptions à Droite.—"Très bien !" "très bien !" à Gauche.)

M. le Président du Conseil.—Parfaitement !

M. Charles Benoist.—C'est vrai, historiquement.

M. Pierre Leroy-Beaulieu.—Et l'Espagne, vous l'oubliez, M. le Ministre.

M. le Ministre des Affaires Étrangères.—Si vous voulez vous reporter à l'époque du protectorat tunisien, si vous voulez bien rapprocher les droits qui, à ce moment, furent les droits de la France, des droits que consacre l'accord marocain, vous verrez qu'il nous a fallu une série d'années pour arriver, en Tunisie, à posséder les droits que l'accord marocain accorde à la France.

Au point de vue économique—c'est la deuxième partie—qu'établit l'accord ?

De privilège pour personne. . . . .

M. Paul Pugliesi-Conti.—Pas même pour nous.

M. Pierre Leroy-Beaulieu.—Surtout pas pour nous !

M. le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères.—J'entends qu'on dit : pas pour nous, non, pas pour nous. Est-il possible de restreindre, au Maroc, la situation que les Puissances possédaient par l'Acte d'Algésiras ?

M. Jules Delahaye.—Alors, à quoi bon le protectorat ?

M. le Ministre des Affaires Étrangères.—Croyez-vous que vous eussiez obtenu leur accession à l'accord que vous allez leur soumettre si, en le leur soumettant, vous n'aviez eu que ce langage à leur tenir : Je restreins sur le terrain de la liberté commerciale et économique, les droits dont vous bénéficiez jusqu'à ce jour.

M. Jules Delahaye.—Et le Congo, alors ? (Exclamations à Gauche.) Ah ! vous trouvez cela tout simple. (Nouvelles exclamations.) Oh ! vous ne m'empêcherez pas de dire ce que j'ai à dire.

M. le Président.—M. Delahaye veuillez garder le silence et permettre à M. le Ministre de s'expliquer.

M. le Ministre des Affaires Étrangères.—Donc, messieurs, aucun privilège pour qui que ce soit, entendez-le bien ; l'égalité commerciale et économique pour tout le monde. Et laissez-moi vous dire que je considère que cette précision est utile au Maroc, puisqu'elle va permettre d'y développer des éléments de richesse et de prospérité qui auraient pu être, eux, écartes et entravés, sans le principe même de cette liberté commerciale et économique que je vous indique. (Mouvements divers.)

Messieurs, c'est ainsi que se trouve terminée cette question et, permettez-moi de dire, terminée par une solution pacifique. (Applaudissements.) Car, je ne sauras trop le dire, ceux qui la critiquent pourraient bien, à côté des critiques, marquer la solution à laquelle ils auraient eu recours. (" Très bien ! très bien " sur divers bancs à Gauche.)

Nous vous apportons donc une solution pacifique de la question ; nous vous apportons une solution qui nous paraît, je vous l'ai marqué tout à l'heure, assurer la sécurité de nos possessions algériennes, et développe la force de la France elle-même. Nous vous apportons une solution pacifique, je le répète, et que, malgré toutes les critiques formulées contre le résultat de ces négociations, j'ose croire satisfaisante de par le jugement que l'on porte au sujet de l'accord partout et notamment à l'étranger. Oui, messieurs, à l'étranger, qui nous juge quelquefois avec plus d'équité que nous ne jugeons nous-mêmes—(" Très bien ! très bien ! " à Gauche)—si bien que quelquefois c'est là qu'il faut regarder si l'on veut savoir comment les choses doivent être appréciées . . .

M. le Président du Conseil.—Oui ! croyons-en nos amis et nos alliés.

M. le Ministre des Affaires Étrangères.—. . . j'ose croire que vous estimerez avec nous que nous sortons de ces négociations avec une situation qui est loin d'être amoindrie . . . (Vifs applaudissements à Gauche et sur divers bancs au Centre.)

M. Lefas.—Grâce à elle-même.

M. le Ministre des Affaires Étrangères.—. . . qui est loin d'être amoindrie, je le dis avec joie, dans l'opinion du monde.

Certes, nous ne prétendons pas que les négociations que nous avons conduites, avec quelque dignité, quoi qu'en dise, nous ne prétendons pas que ces négociations soient la seule cause de cet état d'esprit. Cet état d'esprit général dans le monde, nous y sommes peut-être pour une faible part, mais je reconnais, je suis heureux de constater, que le pays y est pour la plus large part. (Vifs applaudissements.)

On avait raison de dire tout à l'heure, comme le disait M. de Mun, que nous avons été soutenus par le pays.

M. Tournade.—Vous ne l'avez pas suivi.

M. le Ministre des Affaires Étrangères.—Nous nous sommes sentis soutenu par lui. La fermeté . . .

M. Pourquery de Boisserin.—Le sentiment de notre force.

M. le Ministre des Affaires Étrangères.— . . . . la fermeté dont il a fait preuve, fermeté sans jactance, calme et digne, a révélé au monde et nous a révélé . . . (Exclamations et mouvements divers.)

M. Maginot.—A vous-même, peut-être ?

M. Dalbiez.—Il y a longtemps que nous nous connaissons.

M. Auguste Bouge.—La France s'est reconnue, elle ne s'est pas révélée à elle-même.

M. le Ministre des Affaires Étrangères.— . . . . a révélé une France ayant plus que jamais le sentiment de sa force et de sa dignité.

Ce que je voudrais—vous me permettrez bien cette réflexion, je le dis pour moi comme je le dis pour les autres—ce que je voudrais c'est que nous ne diminuions pas nous-mêmes les effets heureux qui ont été produits.

M. le Président du Conseil.—Très bien !

M. le Ministre des Affaires Étrangères.—On vous disait que nous avions commencé nos négociations avec l'Espagne. Nous les poursuivons.

Je ne puis, messieurs, vous donner à l'heure où je vous parle et vous le comprenez, les détails des négociations ; mais ce que je puis dire pour répondre à des sentiments qui ont été exprimé à cette tribune, c'est que nous les poursuivons avec une double orientation, l'une qui consiste à dire à l'Espagne : Ce que nous avons acquis au Maroc, nous l'avons acquis au prix d'un sacrifice ; vous allez participer à ce que nous avons acquis, nous vous demanderons, dans une mesure juste et équitable, de reconnaître le sacrifice que nous avons consenti.

Cela, messieurs, nous le lui dirons, et nous le lui disons dans l'esprit le plus amical, ayant le souci de ménager la dignité et la fierté de ce grand pays. (Vifs applaudissements.)

Nous ne voulons rien faire qui puisse lui porter atteinte, nous estimons qu'un grand pays comme la France. . . . .

(*A l'Extrême Gauche.*—Et comme l'Espagne !)

M. le Ministre des Affaires Étrangères— . . . . ne doit jamais, messieurs, abuser de sa force. (Vives exclamations au Centre, à Droite et sur divers bancs à Gauche et à l'extrême Gauche. Bruit.)

M. Plichon.—Pour qui dites-vous cela ?

M. César Trouin.—Ce langage est intolérable !

M. Paul Pugliesi-Conti.—La France est vraiment digne d'un langage plus fier ! Retirez cette parole.

M. Jaurès.—Je demande la parole.

M. le Ministre des Affaires Étrangères.—Je ne comprends pas cette émotion, qui ne peut que dénaturer le sens de mes paroles, au moment même où je vous disais que c'était dans l'esprit le plus amical que ces négociations étaient conduites et que la solution en serait recherchée. (Applaudissements.)

Nous considérons que ce serait une faute, une faute politique, en même temps que ce serait un acte blâmable que de comprendre nos négociations et nos rapports avec l'Espagne autrement que dans l'esprit amical que je vous indiquais tout à l'heure. (Applaudissements.)

Un mot encore. Je vous ai dit tout à l'heure les avantages divers que me paraissaient résulter, pour la France, de la solution de la question marocaine.

Il y en a un sur lequel je vous demande la permission d'insister en terminant. Il consiste à avoir débarrassé l'échiquier de notre politique extérieure de la question marocaine—(exclamations sur divers bancs)—qui était et qui pouvait être une source de conflits permanents.

M. d'Elissagaray.—Puissiez-vous dire vrai.

M. le Ministre des Affaires Étrangères.—La France, de ce côté, a désormais les mains libres, et ce n'est point un mince avantage au moment où la situation extérieure comporte une attention toute particulière.

Messieurs, la France doit être attentive à tout ce qui se passe, participer, par son action pacifique à tout ce qui a lieu, considérant qu'un pays qui s'isole des événements extérieurs, est un pays qui diminue et qui déchoit.

Comment participerons-nous à tous ces événements ? Dans l'esprit pacifique qui nous anime, avec ce souci de ne contribuer qu'au progrès général.

Quels seront pour participer à cette œuvre et pour la réaliser nos points d'appui ?

Messieurs, ce n'est pas au moment où nous venons d'une façon particulière d'apprécier les bienfaits de nos amitiés et de nos alliances que nous pourrions être tentés d'y porter une atteinte, si petite soit-elle. (Vifs applaudissements.)

C'est en les resserrant, s'il est possible, que nous avons le désir et le devoir d'accomplir la tâche qui nous incombe. Nous ne ferons, au surplus, que répondre aux sentiments que manifestait il y a quelques jours devant le Parlement d'Angleterre un grand Ministre des Affaires Étrangères—(applaudissements)—comme aussi aux sentiments que manifestait récemment, au cours d'une visite, dont nous garderons le souvenir et dont nous sentons tout le prix, l'éminent Ministre des Affaires Étrangères de la Puissance alliée. (Applaudissements à Gauche et au Centre.)

M. Albert Labrun (Ministre des Colonies).—Je demande la parole.

M. le Président.—La parole est à M. le Ministre des Colonies.

(*Sur divers bancs.*—Nous demandons une suspension de la séance.)

(*Voix nombreuses.*—Non ! non !—Parlez !)

M. Massabuau.—Et la motion d'ajournement ? (Interruptions à Gauche.)

M. le Président.—Tout le monde sait que les membres du Gouvernement ont la parole quand ils la demandent.

M. le Vicomte de Villebois-Mareuil.—Alors c'est un Ministre qui répond à un autre Ministre ?

M. Tournade.—Ainsi donc, il n'est plus question de la motion préjudicielle ?

M. le Président.—On me parle de la motion préjudicielle. Ainsi que tout le monde a pu le voir, j'allais la mettre aux voix lorsque M. le Ministre des Affaires Étrangères a demandé à nouveau la parole ; or les membres du Gouvernement ont toujours la parole quand ils la demandent.

C'est maintenant le tour de M. le Ministre des Colonies. Je lui donne la parole. (" Très bien ! très bien !")

M. Albert Lebrun (Ministre des Colonies).—La Chambre comprend sans doute combien est délicate à cette heure la tâche qui est imposée au Ministre des Colonies. (" Très bien ! très bien !")

Il est pris, en effet, entre un double écueil : ou bien, dans son souci légitime de défendre au mieux devant la Chambre la partie congolaise de l'accord, il risque de se laisser aller à un optimisme excessif et, par là même, de paraître s'accommoder trop aisément d'une cession de territoire qui, en tout état de cause, lui demeure comme à tous ses collègues, infiniment douloureuse—(applaudissements vifs et prolongés sur un grand nombre de bancs)—ou bien, détournant sa pensée de la partie du traité ou la France reçoit pour ne la fixer que sur celle où elle donne, la seule à vrai dire sur laquelle il ait à s'expliquer à la Chambre à cette heure, le Ministre, encore dominé par l'angoisse qu'il a connue cet été, risque de ne pas paraître convaincu des bienfaits du traité du 4 novembre et de ne pas mettre en une suffisante lumière les arguments qui, à son sens, doivent déterminer la Chambre à le voter. (Vifs applaudissements sur les mêmes bancs.)

Messieurs, je m'efforcerai d'éviter ce double écueil. J'apporterai ici en toute simplicité, en toute sincérité, réponse aux questions très nombreuses qui ont été posées de toute part depuis quelques semaines ; j'aurai le souci—je le dis tout de suite au début de mes explications—de ne déprécier en rien les territoires abandonnés en Afrique équatoriale, mais aussi de les montrer tels qu'ils se comportent, avec leurs imperfections, leurs difficultés d'exploitation.

Il faut expliquer au pays, avec une entière netteté, les clauses et les conséquences de cet accord ; il ne nous pardonnerait pas, d'avoir abandonné la moindre parcelle de son empire sans qu'il ait été mis à même de mesurer la valeur et l'importance des territoires cédés. (" Très bien ! très bien !")

Que donnons-nous en Afrique équatoriale, que nous reste-t-il après cette cession ; qu'en pouvons-nous, qu'en devons-nous faire demain ?

Telles sont les questions que successivement je voudrais envisager ici.

Messieurs, au cours des négociations difficiles qui se sont poursuivies cet été, le Gouvernement, en tant qu'il s'agissait de la partie congolaise de l'accord, a obéi à une triple pensée. Le principe de la compensation en Afrique équatoriale admis—et sur ce point mon collègue des Affaires Étrangères s'est expliqué tout à l'heure—il a veillé d'abord à ce que les cessions portent le moins possible sur cette partie de la colonie, qu'il considère comme la plus intéressante par sa proximité de la côte et par ses possibilités d'avenir, j'entends dire le Gabon et le Moyen-Congo jusqu'à la Sangha.

Il s'est efforcé, en second lieu, de sauvegarder au mieux la grande voie de pénétration vers le centre africain constituée par les fleuves Congo, Oubangui, Gribingui, Chari, qui forme en quelque sorte comme l'épine dorsale de notre possession.

Enfin il a fait effort pour que les cessions n'intéressent que les parties de notre possession qui avaient été le moins colonisées par la France, où elle avait le moins dépensé de son or et de son sang, qu'en un mot elle avait le moins marquée de son empreinte, de telle sorte que l'abandon en fût moins sensible à son amour-propre et à ses intérêts matériels. (Vifs applaudissements.)

Dans quelle mesure avons-nous réussi à ce triple point de vue ? J'ai le devoir de l'expliquer à la Chambre.

Messieurs, quand on envisage d'ensemble l'histoire de l'Afrique équatoriale, on est frappé dès l'abord par des constatations qui paraissent particulières à l'évolution de cette colonie.

Voici près de trois quarts de siècle que nous sommes à Libreville, voici plus de trente ans que notre pavillon flotte à Brazzaville, et cependant nous n'avons rien fait ou presque rien dans cette fraction de la colonie d'un accès relativement aisé.

Cela s'explique, messieurs, parce que tout l'effort de la métropole s'est porté vers l'hinterland, vers le Congo moyen, vers l'Oubangui, le Chari et leurs affluents, en vue de

gagner nos rivaux de vitesse et d'atteindre au plus tôt le centre africain ; les événements qui se déroulent à cette heure au Ouadaï et qui auront, je l'espère, une prochaine et heureuse solution, ne sont que le couronnement de ce long et héroïque effort.

Pendant que nous poursuivions cette œuvre, nous avons négligé la fraction de la colonie voisine de la côte, et cela contrairement à ce qui s'était passé dans toutes nos colonies, notamment en Cochinchine pour l'Indo-Chine, et au Sénégal pour l'Afrique occidentale.

Quel est le tableau que nous avons sous les yeux ? A l'heure actuelle, on peut à peine accéder à Libreville de nuit tant les passes sont mal éclairées. Le port rudimentaire, construit par la marine voici quarante ans, ne comporte des installations que pour les chalands et les embarcations légères.

Il n'y a pas de matériel pour charger et décharger les colis, pas de moyens de transport. A Cap-Lopez, la situation est la même dans les rades plus méridionales, celles de Setté-Cama et de Loango elle est pire encore.

Les fleuves, voies de pénétration naturelle vers l'intérieur, mais qui ne sont navigables qu'à une petite distance de la côte à raison de l'orographie de cette partie de l'Afrique et spécialement des monts de Cristal qu'ils descendent en rapides, ces fleuves n'ont pas été aménagés. Les sociétés concessionnaires auxquelles on avait à tort pensé pouvoir confier la création de l'outillage économique de la colonie, n'ont rien ou presque rien fait ; de ce côté, tout espoir doit être abandonné.

J'ai donc le droit de dire—les chiffres sont là pour en témoigner—que ce que nous avons fait jusqu'en ces toutes dernières années dans cette fraction de la colonie est négligeable. Le Gabon avait en 1898–99 un mouvement commerciale de 9,000,000 de francs. Dix ans après le chiffre des transactions était sensiblement le même.

Pourtant—et j'arrive à un point essentiel—il faut considérer que cette fraction de la colonie en est la partie la plus précieuse, à raison de sa proximité de la mer et des facilités d'accès qu'elle présente ; pourvu qu'on veuille bien les aménager, les deux ports de Libreville et de Cap-Lopez sont les plus sûrs de la côte occidentale d'Afrique, depuis Dakar jusqu'à Saint-Paul de Loanda. A l'intérieur, les populations sont commerçantes, belliqueuses il est vrai, mais elles donnent, par là même, la mesure de ce qu'elles pourront faire. C'est là une règle générale en Afrique, et il y a quelques jours je recevais un télégramme du Colonel Largeau, dans lequel il me disait qu'il avait rencontré des peuplades belliqueuses et qu'il s'en félicitait, car il y voyait pour l'avenir des concours actifs pour le commerce et l'agriculture.

De plus, ce pays du Gabon est infiniment riche par ses possibilités actuelles et d'avenir. Je ne parle pas du caoutchouc, sur lequel tout le monde est très suffisamment informé, mais des cultures de cacao, café, vanille, qui doivent réussir parfaitement, ainsi que le démontrent des exemples malheureusement trop restreints encore, mais que nous pouvons multiplier.

Les bois présentent des essences nombreuses. Enfin, on a découvert dans la région de Mboko-Sangho, du Mindouli et du Djoué, une zone cuprifère qui ouvre à l'exploitation des mines un bel avenir.

Ces renseignements vous montrent combien nous étions fondés dans cette première préoccupation, qui a consisté à retenir la plus possible de cette fraction de la colonie qui, j'ai le droit de le dire, même détachée de tout l'hinterland, représente un ensemble homogène, puisqu'il ne comprend pas moins de 500,000 kilom. carrés de superficie, et que, je le rappelle en passant, les deux diagonales, Libreville-Ouesso et Libreville-Brazzaville, mesurent près de 800 et de 900 kilom. Ces espaces sont suffisants pour former une colonie prospère. On a pu redouter à un moment donné—et M. le Ministre des Affaires Étrangères y faisait allusion—que l'emprise ne fût plus considérable. Elle se réduit heureusement à une superficie de 30,000 à 35,000 kilom. carrés.

Certes, ce sacrifice n'est pas négligeable, quand on veut bien se rappeler qu'il comporte, notamment, la rive gauche du rio Muni et une partie des affluents nord de l'Ivindo. Mais ce qu'on peut dire, messieurs, c'est que, ni par son étendue territoriale, ni par sa disposition même, cet abandon ne constitue un danger pour la partie de la colonie qui nous demeure. Il dépend exclusivement de nous, comme je l'indiquerai, tout à l'heure, il dépend de notre courage, de notre énergie, de notre foi dans l'avenir de ce pays, de faire que le nouveau voisinage qui lui est imposé n'entraîne point de conséquence mortelle pour le reste de la colonie. (Applaudissements.)

Il s'agissait, en second lieu, comme je l'indiquais tout à l'heure, de sauvegarder la grande voie maîtresse qui conduit vers le centre africain et de garder intacts les liens entre les diverses fractions de la colonie.

Messieurs, avec son clair génie le pays a compris que dans l'immense superficie de notre empire africain, certaines fractions pouvaient être abandonnées pour acquérir par ailleurs des avantages équivalents ou supérieurs. Il en a admis le principe, mais à une condition, c'est que ce qui nous resterait ne fût pas touché indirectement et que nous ne fussions pas contraints de solliciter l'intervention de tierces Puissances pour atteindre les domaines qui nous restaient. En un mot, au mois de septembre dernier, le pays s'est opposé à la coupure. Nous croyons avoir suffisamment résolu la question sur ce point et donné au sentiment national les garanties qu'il exigeait.

Voici, en effet, quelle est la situation à l'heure actuelle. Avant le traité—et je m'excuse de donner ici quelques précisions, je les crois nécessaires—(" Parlez ! parlez !")—avant le traité, trois voies d'accès conduisaient à nos possessions d'Afrique équatoriale. La voie septentrionale, celle de l'Afrique occidentale, c'est la voie Niger–Tchad, la voie Niamey–Zinder–Nguigmi. C'est la plus courte kilométriquement et c'est, à l'heure actuelle, celle que suit le fil télégraphique ; c'est peut-être, pour une fraction des transports au moins, celle qui sera suivie demain.

J'indique, en passant, messieurs, que c'est par cette voie que les renforts envoyés au Ouadaï au lendemain des événements douloureux de l'Ouadi-Kadja et de Doroté sont passés. Donc, même si la coupure par le sud avait été réalisée, nos troupes du Ouadaï n'eussent pas été isolées comme on l'a écrit à tort plusieurs fois cet été.

Cette première voie demeure intacte. Je n'insiste pas.

La deuxième voie de pénétration est celle qui emprunte la Nigéria anglaise et le Cameroun allemand : c'est la voie dite de la Bénoué. Les marchandises venues par mer débarquent à Burutu, port anglais à l'embouchure du Niger, elles sont transportées ensuite par vapeurs fluviaux sur le Niger et la Bénoué jusqu'à Garoua, en territoire allemand et, de là, acheminées, par chalands, pirogues, charrettes ou porteurs jusqu'au Logone.

Il vous apparaît tout de suite, messieurs, que cette voie était viciée et précaire par son caractère international. Elle ne pouvait donner satisfaction que si nous étions en bons rapports avec les nations dont elle traverse les territoires. Mais c'était là une situation antérieure à l'accord du 4 novembre.

Ce que pouvait l'accord du 4 novembre, c'était ne pas modifier en mal cette situation. Eh bien, nous en avons eu la préoccupation, et puisque les territoires de Léré au Logone étaient compris dans la cession, nous avons prévu une série d'enclaves permettant d'utiliser, dans les mêmes conditions qu'hier, peut-être même—des techniciens me l'ont confié depuis—dans des conditions meilleures la voie ancienne.

(*Au Centre.*—Oh non !)

M. le Ministre des Colonies.—Je tiens ces renseignements d'officiers qui ont commandé dans ces régions.

La troisième voie de pénétration est celle du Congo et de l'Oubangui, qui est à proprement parler notre voie nationale. Nous nous sommes efforcés de lui garder ce caractère. (" Très bien ! très bien !")

Oh ! je sais—M. de Mun y a fait allusion—il y a les deux pointes de la Sangha et de la Lobaye, et on n'a pas manqué de critiquer ces deux enclaves. On a voulu y voir comme deux agrafes d'une tunique de Nessus destinée à brûler un jour les flancs de notre colonie. Messieurs, la réalité est heureusement moins tragique.

Oui, l'Allemagne possédera de 12 à 20 kilom. de rives sur un ensemble fluvial qui a près de 1,500 kilom. ; mais—vous ne l'avez pas oublié—l'accord stipule en même temps que les rives ne pourront pas être fortifiées.

Il dit aussi qu'il y aura liberté de transit sur ces rives. Et si ces garanties, messieurs, pouvaient vous paraître insuffisantes parce qu'elles ne sont qu'écrites, il suffirait de se rappeler qu'au droit de Bonga, à l'embouchure de la Sangha, le Congo a plus de 10 kilom. de largeur, et qu'en face de la Lobaye, vis-à-vis de Mongoumba, l'Oubangui a plus de 1 kilom. aux basses eaux.

Ces chiffres, démontrent que la navigation française sur le Congo et l'Oubangui n'est nullement menacée. (" Très bien ! très bien !")

Enfin—et on paraît l'oublier toujours quand on parle Congo et Oubanghi—nous sommes dans le bassin conventionnel du Congo, qui a reçu un statut spécial par l'Acte de Berlin de 1885.

Aux termes de cet accord diplomatique et par suite, dès avant le traité du 4 novembre, les navires allemands pouvaient en toute liberté et avec les garanties assurées par l'Acte de 1885, circuler et sur le Congo, et sur l'Oubangui et sur la Sangha.

M. Pierre Leroy-Beaulieu.—Alors pourquoi les Allemands ont-ils demandé accès à ces deux fleuves ?

M. le Ministre des Colonies.—Il est vrai—et on a beaucoup parlé au cours de cet été—que la navigation se pratique dans ces régions dans des conditions un peu spéciales, parce que les chaudières sont chauffées au bois. Un jour viendra où elles le seront au pétrole, mais, en attendant, la Puissance qui ne détient pas une des rives n'est pas certaine de pouvoir assurer sa navigation sur le fleuve.

Je pense que l'étendue de rives que nous avons conservées prouve une fois de plus que nous sommes absolument maîtres de la navigation dans cette partie du Congo, depuis Brazzaville jusqu'à Bangui. ("Très bien! très bien!")

Quant à la dernière fraction de cette grande voie de pénétration dont je parlais tout à l'heure jusqu'au Chari et au delà de Bangui, elle n'est pas touchée; je me trompe, elle est améliorée d'une manière sensible par l'abandon qui nous a été fait par l'Allemagne des territoires compris entre le bas Logone et le bas Chari.

M. le Comte de Lanjuinais.—On nous cède la moitié d'un bec de canard et on nous prend deux trompes d'éléphant. (Exclamations.)

M. le Ministre des Colonies.—J'entends biens, messieurs: ces 12 ou 15 kilom. carrés ne constituent pas un accroissement de richesse très appréciable pour notre Afrique équatoriale, mais ces territoires ne sont pas négligeables et les documents distribués au Reichstag allemand à l'occasion de la discussion du traité indiquent qu'au delà du Rhin on considère cette partie comme ayant une valeur égale à celle que nous cédons entre le Logone et la frontière orientale du Cameroun, et que nous nous plaisons à considérer comme de très grande valeur. Mais cet abandon a eu pour résultat de rendre le fleuve Chari français jusqu'à Fort-Lamy. Quand on sait l'importance de Fort-Lamy, chef-lieu du territoire militaire du Tchad, ou reconnaît que ce n'est pas là un petit avantage; la sécurité de nos voies de communication a été accrue dans une très large mesure. ("Très bien! très bien!")

Il ne suffisait pas d'avoir sauvegardé les voies d'accès; il était encore désirable de cantonner, en quelque sorte, les territoires cédés dans la partie de la possession où nous avions fait jusqu'ici les moindres efforts. Ce but a été atteint. J'ai fait dresser, aussi approximativement que possible, l'état des dépenses effectuées par la colonie jusqu'à ce jour, d'une part dans les parties cédées, d'autre part dans les parties conservées. Je scinde cette période en deux fractions, l'une qui va jusqu'en en 1909 —c'est la date à laquelle ont commencé les travaux de l'emprunt de 21 millions—la seconde qui comprend les deux dernières années.

Avant 1909, on avait effectué dans les territoires cédés environ 100,000 fr. de travaux pour une série de postes; au contraire, pour les territoires demeurés français, on arrive à un total d'environ 5 millions pour des installations de postes, à Libreville, à Loango, à Brazzaville, à Ouesso, à Bangui, &c.; et à 1 million pour les lignes télégraphiques.

Ainsi, en résumé avant 1909, sur une dépense d'environ 6,100,000 fr., 100,000 fr. ont été dépensés dans les territoires cédés.

Depuis 1909, c'est-à-dire depuis la mise en exécution de l'emprunt de 21 millions, dans les territoires cédés, il a été fait une dépense de 400,000 fr. Dans les territoires conservés, au contraire, il a été fait une dépense d'environ 8 millions, pour les lignes télégraphiques, la route de Fort-Sibut à Fort-Crampel, les études des deux voies ferrées, des études hydrographiques, &c.

Ainsi, en résumé, pour cette second période, il a été fait 8,400,000 fr. de dépenses, dont 400,000 fr. dans les territoires cédés.

J'avais le devoir de faire passer ces chiffres sous les yeux de la Chambre. ("Très bien! très bien!")

Sans douter, pour être complet, faudrait-il ajoute à ces chiffres les dépenses effectuées par les missions religieuses et par les sociétés concessionnaires. Mais, d'abord, les premières demeurent presque toutes entières en territoire français. Quant aux secondes, les éléments d'appréciation m'ont fait défaut.

Toutefois, je puis affirmer que, sauf dans la région de la Haute-Sangha, pour laquelle un effort sérieux a été tenté, les sociétés n'ont pas fait preuve d'une très grande activité. Je m'excuse devant la Chambre de ces détails. Mais je crois que mon devoir est de les lui fournir. Je n'aurais pas pleinement rempli ma tâche si je ne l'avais pas fait. ("Très bien!—Parlez!")

En les envisageant d'ensemble, voici en résumé l'importance des territoires cédés ils mesurent une superficie qu'on peut évaleur à 225,000 kilom. carrés, chiffre faible, qui m'est venu du Gouverneur général de l'Afrique équatoriale, mieux placé que personne pour l'établir à 275,000 kilom. carrés, chiffre fort.

Ces territoires ont une population d'environ 1,000,000 d'habitants. Les effectifs militaires que nous y entretenons sont de quatre ou cinq compagnies. Les agents civils

de l'administration sont au nombre d'une cinquantaine environ. Le nombre des agents de factoreries, des commerçants et colons est à peu près double. Le montant des importations et des exportations, autant que j'ai pu l'établir, s'élève à 8,000,000 de fr. en chiffres ronds.

Enfin pour ce qui est des impôts, je me permets de rectifier des chiffres qui ont paru. Voici ceux que j'ai reçus du Gouverneur général de l'Afrique équatoriale et je l'ai prié de les vérifier à nouveau, parce qu'ils me paraissaient inférieurs à la réalité.

Les recettes effectuées dans les territoires cédés s'élèvent à environ 1,000,000 de fr. pour les douanes et les domaines, et à 750,000 fr. pour les impôts de capitation.

Envisageant d'un autre point de vue ce même ensemble, voici comment il se présente: à peu près 50,000 kilom. carrés de parcelles inondées ou marécageuses, où l'eau, la terre, la végétation s'entremêlent au point que l'homme n'y peut pas vivre et qu'il n'y pénètre que pour la chasse.

Ensuite de 60,000 à 80,000 kilom. carrés de forêts vierges très serrées, où, à la vérité, se trouvent des peuplements caoutchoutifères de première importance, mais où se trouvent aussi les germes qui provoquent le mal redoutable que vous savez, auquel je ne ferai ici qu'allusion, mais sur lequel je devrais m'étendre plus longuement, si je lui donnais la place qu'il doit tenir dans cet exposé.

Enfin de 100,000 à 140,000 kilom. carrés de terres légères, aptes à la culture et à l'élevage, découvertes dans la plus grande partie de cette étendue, habitées par des populations intelligentes, déjà habituées aux travaux de l'agriculture et de l'élevage, et préparées par l'islamisme à une discipline sociale. C'est la région qui s'étend à l'est de la frontière orientale actuelle du Cameroun.

J'indique, pour finir, qu'à peu près les trois quarts ou les quatre cinquièmes des territoires cédés sont entre les mains de sociétés concessionnaires dont le privilège d'exploitation prend fin, pour les unes, en 1920, et, pour les autres, en 1930.

Tel est, messieurs, défini aussi exactement que possible, le bilan de ce que nous cédons en Afrique équatoriale.

Si douloureusement que nous soyons affectés par ce sacrifice, nous ne devons pas nous laisser aller à certaines exagérations que cet été j'ai entendu exprimer par des esprits d'ordinaire plus mesurés. N'est-on point allé jusqu'à dire que le traité du 4 novembre compromettait irrémédiablement l'avenir de notre empire africain!

Quand on songe, messieurs, que cet empire comporte près de 6,000,000 de kilom. carrés exploitables, et je ne parle pas, bien entendu, du Sahara; qu'il est habité par à peu près 33,000,000 d'habitants; qu'il comporte un commerce de près de 2 milliards, j'ai le droit de dire qu'en mettant en balance ces chiffres et ceux que j'indiquais à l'instant, on ne peut pas déclarer que nous ayons affaibli sensiblement notre position en Afrique. J'ai le droit de dire—et je le fais sans aucune passion politique—que la troisième république, qui a reconstitué la domaine colonial de la France, mutilé par les régimes antérieurs, ne peut être accusée d'avoir inscrit dans les fastes de notre histoire des pages qui rappellent en quelque façon que ce soit notre abandon des Indes, de la Louisiane et du Canada. (Applaudissements à Gauche et au Centre.)

Messieurs, que nous reste-t-il en Afrique équatoriale et que devons-nous faire de ce qui nous reste? C'est là l'œuvre de demain, c'est celle qui nous presse.

J'ai dit tout à l'heure ce qu'est la partie côtière, celle qui s'étend de l'Atlantique à la Sangha, je n'y reviens pas. On a parlé ensuite avec quelque dédain de l'enclave qui nous demeure entre le Likvuala-aux-Herbes et l'Oubangui. Messieurs, quand on songe que ce territoire mesure 400 kilom. le long de l'Oubanghi et 150 kilom. de largeur à la hauteur de Bera Njoko, que dans le passé et dans un avenir très long encore la seule voie de pénétration dans cette région sera le fleuve Oubangui, quand on fait cette constatation, on se demande pourquoi cette fraction de notre colonie, telle qu'elle se comporte à l'heure actuelle, n'aurait pas le développement qu'elle aurait eu avant l'accord. J'ai d'ailleurs rappelé déjà les raisons d'ordre politique et économique qui nous avaient empêchés de l'abandonner.

Pour les régions situées plus au nord, dans l'Oubanghi-Chari-Tchad notamment, elles sont, il est vrai, légèrement écornées à leur extrémité occidentale.

Messieurs, on a représenté tour à tour ces régions comme des réserves de richesses mystérieuses et comme des terres maudites. Il est bien certain qu'on ne peu pas fonder de très vastes espoirs sur des terres isolées en quelque sorte à l'intérieur d'un grand continent. Les difficultés d'accès et de transport les empêchent de prétendre sur le marché mondial à une place prépondérante; mais ces régions, ne l'oublions pas, sont les réservoirs de races denses et vigoureuses dont nous avons un si grand besoin dans notre Afrique, où la densité moyennne de la population est faible. Ne nous y trompons

pas, quand nous aurons apporté à ces populations la sécurité et la paix, quand nous aurons débarrassé ces régions des tyranneaux locaux, qu'ils appellent comme hier Rabah ou comme aujourd'hui Doudmourrah, quand nous y aurons porté les premiers éléments de la civilisation, sous forme de routes, d'écoles, de dispensaires, de marchés, elles prendront le même développement qu'ont pris, à l'étonnement de beaucoup de coloniaux mêmes, les régions du Soudan, si décriées autrefois.

Messieurs, nous avions, en outre, pour conserver cette région, des considérations politiques impérieuses.

Nous ne pouvions pas admettre qu'une autre nation que la France donnât le mot d'ordre sur les confins du Sahara, où le moindre bruit, la moindre agitation ont des répercussions si étrangement lointaines.

Si enfin ces considérations d'ordre économique ou politique n'avaient point suffi pour nous faire apprécier à leur juste valeur ces territoires, je dirai après M. de Mun qu'il avait une raison de sentiment, pour les garder.

Quand au cours de cet été le lisais les objurgations adressées au Gouvernement, quand de toutes parts on nous conjurait de ne point céder le sol qui avait bu tant de sang de nos soldats et de nos explorateurs, j'avais la satisfaction de penser, et j'en apporte l'expression très loyale devant la Chambre, que, sauf deux ou trois tombes qui se trouvent dans la partie cédée, presque toutes demeurent dans le territoire conservé et que, demain comme hier, les cendres de Crampel et de Bretonnet, de Lamy et de Behagle, de Fiegenschuh, de Moll et de tant d'autres reposeront à l'ombre du drapeau national. (Applaudissements.)

Dans cette Afrique équatoriale qu'allons-nous faire? Faut-il nous laisser aller au découragement où certains pessimistes voudraient nous conduire?

Ne faut-il pas au contraire répondre au coup qui a frappé la colonie par un redoublement d'efforts?

J'ai indiqué que peu de choses avaient été faites dans cette colonie. Je dois maintenant préciser.

Il est exacte que, jusqu'il y a deux ans, presque rien n'avait été fait au Congo, mais depuis deux ans, un effort sensible a été effectué et les résultats de cet effort ont été tels qu'ils ont mis en évidence pour cette colonie une possibilité d'exploitation, et des espoirs qui ne seront pas tous démentis. Il n'y a pas à hésiter, la France doit immédiatement s'employer à réparer un passé qu'on peut regretter aujourd'hui.

Voici d'un mot quelle est en cette fin d'année 1911 la situation de la colonie.

Neuf bataillons l'occupent, trois au Tchad, six répartis dans les trois colonies du groupe. Trois cents administrateurs ou agents civils sont répartis dans une centaine de postes. On peut affirmer qu'à la fin de l'année 1912 nous aurons pris possession de toute la colonie.

Quand on pense qu'au début de 1908 un cinquième à peine était occupé, on peut mesurer le chemin parcouru depuis trois ans.

L'armature de la colonie est dès maintenant constituée. Elle peut, elle doit se développer suivant les mêmes méthodes que celles employées dans toutes nos grandes colonies. Et voici que déjà les résultats financiers indiquent que ces espoirs ne sont pas vains. Les budgets du Moyen-Congo et de l'Oubangui-Chari sont en excédent, leurs caisses de réserves sont au maximum. Le budget général, il est vrai, n'en est pas au même point. Mais je dois indiquer que, l'année dernière, il est arrivé à éteindre la dette de 1 million qui, depuis plusieurs années, grevait son passif. Dans le projet de budget que j'ai reçu ces jours derniers pour l'année 1912, le Gouverneur général avait pu inscrire l'annuité nécessaire à l'amortissement de la seconde tranche de l'emprunt de 21 millions. Lorsque la Chambre a voté cet emprunt, elle avait pensé cependant en conserver toujours la charge au budget colonial.

Enfin, messieurs, le mouvement commercial, également depuis deux ans—je souligne ces mots, car je ne voudrait point paraître, en ce moment, plaider une cause contraire à celle que je défendais tout à l'heure—ce mouvement qui ne s'est dessiné que depuis deux ans, indique un chiffre de 40 millions double de celui d'il y à dix ans. Ce mouvement ne peut que s'accroître, parce que nous rendons au commerce libre des espaces de plus en plus vastes, et qu'en même temps une administration plus attentive surveille mieux les sociétés concessionnaires et saura les diriger dans une voie plus conforme au sain développement économique de la colonie. (Applaudissements à Gauche et au Centre.)

Telle est la situation. Pourquoi ne ferions-nous pas pour cette Afrique équatoriale ce que nous avons fait pour les autres colonies, pour l'Indochine, pour l'Afrique occidentale, pour Madagascar, quand nous avons prêté 300 millions à la première, 200 millions à la seconde et 100 millions à la troisième?

Messieurs, il s'agit de savoir si la France voudra consentir ces sacrifices. Je puis vous dire que le Gouvernement, en possession des études entreprises sur l'emprunt de 21 millions, sera en état au cours de l'année 1912, de vous présenter un programme qui permettra à la colonie de prendre le développement auquel je faisais allusion. Ces études sont complètes et détaillées. Je ne saurais trop rendre hommage aux officiers qui les ont entreprises là-bas dans les conditions difficiles que vous savez.

Le projet de voie ferrée de Pointe-Noire à Brazzaville, avec une installation de port à Pointe-Noire est prêt. La France se doit de faire cette voie ferrée pour se constituer à elle-même une voie de pénétration exclusivement française et ne plus être obligée d'emprunter la voie belge de Matadi à Kinchassa, qui semble d'ailleurs avoir atteint son maximum de rendement.

Cette voie française sera assurée d'un trafic certain, non seulement par le transit, qui dépasse déjà 3,000,000, mais par l'exploitation des produits de la forêt et Mayumbe et des mines de cuivre de M'Boko Songho et de Mindouli.

En second lieu, ce programme comprendra l'amélioration des communications de Brazzaville au Tchad, d'abord en mettant à profit les résultats de la mission Roussilhe, de façon à aménager le fleuve Congo et le fleuve Oubangui, puis en terminant la route de Bangui à Fort-Archambault, dont la section médiane est en voie de construction.

Enfin, messieurs, et je tiens à le dire ici, nous devrons faire également le chemin de fer de la partie nord du Gabon. . . .

M. Tournade.—C'est très intéressant, mais ce n'est pas la question. (Exclamations à Gauche.)

M. le Président du Conseil.—Mais si, c'est tout à fait la question.

M. le Ministre des Colonies.—L'honorable M. Tournade me dit: "C'est très intéressant, mais ce n'est pas la question."

M. Fernand David.—Vous tenez un très beau langage, à tous égards. (Applaudissements.)

M. Tournade.—Je ne dis pas non, mais ce n'est pas la question.

M. le Ministre des Colonies.—J'ai indiqué tout à l'heure, afin que la Chambre en fût juge, l'étendue des territoires cédés. Puis, pour répondre à certain pessimisme, que je ne crois pas voulu, j'ai eu le devoir de dire ce qu'il nous restait de notre Afrique équatoriale et ce que surtout elle pourrait être demain si nous voulions bien faire pour elle ce que nous avions fait pour les autres colonies. (Applaudissements à Gauche et sur divers bancs.) Par conséquent, messieurs, j'ai le droit de dire que je suis au cœur de la question. ("Très bien! très bien!")

On vous a dit: "Vous avez blessé mortellement la colonie." J'ai démontré qu'il n'en est rien et qu'il suffit de volonté et de méthode de notre part pour la remettre dans l'état où elle aurait dû être si elle n'avait pas été délaissée. (Applaudissements à Gauche et sur divers bancs.)

Et je termine, messieurs, ce que je disais lorsque j'ai été interrompu; il faudra faire aussi le chemin de fer du nord du Gabon. Peut-être le tracé qui paraissait devoir être adopté subira-t-il quelques modifications, mais je considère comme nécessaire d'entreprendre au plus tôt la ligne N'Djolé à Kandjama, qui, en prolongeant par le rail la voie navigable de l'Ogooué, viendra drainer toutes ces régions de l'Ogooué et de l'Ivindo et au besoin permettra la pénétration jusqu'à Ouesso et au delà si les événements le font juger nécessaire.

J'ai dit que la France se devait à elle-même de faire cet effort et qu'elle le devait aussi à ceux de nos compatriotes, fonctionnaires, officiers ou colons qui sont en Afrique équatoriale et qui ont accueilli l'accord avec les sentiments que je viens de vous faire connaître. Ils n'ont pas protesté; ils ont dit leur tristesse; mais quand ils nous en ont envoyé l'écho, voici quelques semaines, ils ont ajouté qu'ils se sentiraient consolés si la mère patrie, au lieu d'abandonner ce qui reste de la colonie, voulait bien, par un nouvel et vigoureux effort, faire ce qu'elle n'avait pas fait dans le passé. Ils ont pensé unanimement qu'ainsi notre œuvre en Afrique équatoriale était pleinement sauvegardée. (Applaudissements.)

Messieurs, au cours des négociations, au fur et à mesure que se dessinaient les linéaments de la nouvelle frontière qui devait être assignée à notre Afrique équatoriale, l'opinion française, c'est son honneur, connut des heures d'émoi. Même ceux qui, bien informés, comprenaient que la France devait sortir de ce traité grandie en force et en puissance, ne se résolvaient pas aisément à l'idée de l'abandon d'une partie de nos possessions. Il leur apparaissait difficile que ces territoires qui avaient connu, à un moment donné, la paix française, qui avaient reçu une première empreinte de notre civilisation, pussent passer en d'autres mains. (Applaudissements.) Et des voix émouvantes se faisaient entendre qui rendaient plus aiguë encore la crise où se débattait le sentiment national.

Je n'ai pas besoin de dire que nulle part plus qu'au Gouvernement on ne ressentit ces doutes et ces angoisses, que nulle part on n'était mieux placé pour revivre l'histoire de ces régions, pour évoquer les noms des de Brazza, des Mizon, des Ballay pour ne parler que des morts. En poussant à travers l'Afrique mystérieuse leurs pointes hardies, ces valeureux pionniers avaient comme première idée de rendre la France plus grande.

Ah ! certes, ils n'étaient point partis au hasard et, comme le disait tout à l'heure très justement l'honorable M. de Mun, ils suivaient un programme bien tracé.

Quand Fourneau et Gaillard remontaient pour la première fois la Sangha, quand ensuite de Brazza et Mizon, venus l'un du sud, l'autre du nord, se rencontraient également dans l'arrière Cameroun, ils comprenaient parfaitement qu'à ce moment ils ouvraient la voie française le long du Congo, qu'ils mettaient en relation directe nos possessions gabonaises avec nos possessions sahariennes ; de telle sorte qu'on pût aller, comme le disait M. de Mun, en terre française depuis Alger jusqu'à Libreville. Mais ce qu'ils voulaient par-dessus tout, c'est que notre civilisation qu'ils savaient généreuse et accueillante aux faibles—et nul, je crois, plus que de Brazza ne l'a montrée sous ce jour au cœur de l'Afrique—(vifs applaudissements)—c'est que notre civilisation s'étendit sur la plus vaste partie possible du continent africain. (Applaudissements.)

Eh bien ! leurs désirs sont réalisés ; leur mémoire peut être satisfaite. (Applaudissements.)

Oui, il est vrai, demain le doux nom de France ne se répercutera plus sous les voûtes pleines de silence et de mystère d'une partie de la forêt équatoriale, mais par ailleurs il sonnera bien haut dans la plaine marocaine et sur les sommets du grand Atlas. Et quand on écrira l'histoire de ces événements, il faudra dire que ce Maroc nous a été donné en partie par ceux-là mêmes que leur vocation avait d'abord conduits vers l'Équateur. (Vifs applaudissements.) Je suis certain, messieurs, qu'à cette heure la France ne pourra que leur ouvrir plus larges encore les portes du temple de la Reconnaissance qu'elle élève à ceux de ses fils qui l'ont bien servie. (Applaudissements vifs et répétés à Gauche, à l'extrême Gauche et au Centre. M. le Ministre, de retour au banc du Gouvernement, reçoit les félicitations de ses collègues.)

[50508] No. 575.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 18.)

(No. 427.)

Sir, *Berlin, December 11, 1911.*

I HAVE the honour to report that yesterday the Pan-German League held a general meeting at Lübeck under the presidency of Dr. Class, the author of the pamphlet against Herr von Kiderlen-Waechter's Morocco policy, which was published on the 24th September last, and to which frequent allusion was made during the sittings of the Budget Commission of the Reichstag.

At a meeting of the working committee of the league, held on the preceding day, a unanimous vote of approval of this pamphlet was passed and a report issued, stating that the charges it had brought against the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs had neither been contradicted nor disproved, and that the attitude of the president of the league in the Morocco question was in thorough harmony with the wishes of the league and of the majority of the nation.

The following resolution was put to the general meeting and was passed unanimously :—

"That the German Empire has handed over to France political and therefore commercial supremacy in Morocco ; that the territory acquired by Germany in the Congo in return for German territory in the Cameroons must, in view of the unanimous opinion of experts, and, above all, that of the former Secretary of State for the Colonies, Herr von Lindequist, be regarded as distinctly disadvantageous to the German Empire ; that the confidence of the entire world of Islam in the German Empire has been severely shaken ; and that the depreciation by the Chancellor of the well-founded national excitement during the recent crisis had placed serviceable weapons in the hands of the opponents of a national policy, which would be most certainly used in the forthcoming elections. The presidency of the league therefore held it to be their duty, both as patriots and citizens, to point out that nothing but a change in the directors of German policy would offer any guarantee that henceforward the policy of the Empire would be conducted in a manner corresponding to the greatness of its past and to its hopes for the future."

At the close of the meeting a telegram was sent to Herr von Lindequist, thanking him for his courageous attitude towards the Congo arrangement.

The pamphlet written by Dr. Class accused the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of breach of faith and untruth, on the ground that in the Budget Commission Herr von Kiderlen-Waechter had used words to the following effect :—

"The notion that it was the original plan of the Government to obtain a territorial footing in Morocco itself was disseminated chiefly through the pamphlet of Dr. Class."

The latter has maintained all along, and, as it appears from the report of the general meeting, still maintains, that the Secretary of State had distinctly informed him that the above had been his original plan.

The "Post," in commenting upon the discrepancy between these statements, says that Dr. Class's allegation is supported by other politicians, who declare that a similar communication was made to them by Herr von Kiderlen-Waechter.

The "Post" adds that public opinion is profoundly surprised that the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs has not thought it necessary to make any answer to the charge which was publicly brought against him of breach of faith and untruth. This charge had now been repeated at the meeting of the Pan-German League, and it seemed out of the question that the Imperial Government should continue to pass over the matter in silence. It was in any case a very regrettable state of things that such charges should be brought against the leading directors of German foreign policy, and the "Post" hoped that an official explanation with regard to the affair would soon be forthcoming.

I have, &c.
W. E. GOSCHEN.

[50657] No. 576.

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 18.)

(No. 199.)

Sir, *Madrid, December 14, 1911.*

WITH reference to my telegram No. 96 of the 12th instant, reporting that I had attended on the previous day a second meeting between Señor Garcia Prieto and M. Geoffray, I have now the honour to forward an abstract of the written comments handed in on that occasion by the Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs with regard to the draft convention concerning Morocco which the French Ambassador had communicated to his Excellency at their first meeting.

It will be seen that the principal Spanish objections to the French proposals bear on the extent of the territorial compensation demanded by France and on the character of the proposed arrangements for the administration of the Spanish zone.

On the first point, the sacrifice demanded of Spain includes three pieces of territory, two in Morocco and the third, in the Spanish view, outside Morocco, namely :—

1. A triangle based on 36 kilom. of the coast southwards from the mouth of the River Lucus.

Spain objects on the ground that this cession would deprive her of several fords across the Lucus which are essential to the maintenance of the communications between Laraiche and Alcazar. She holds to the definition of her sphere of influence given in the Franco-Spanish convention of October 1904.

2. Some 500 kilom. of coast from the mouth of Wady Mesa southwards to north latitude 27° 40′ (see articles 4, 5, and 6 of the 1904 convention). This portion includes Ifni.

Spain urges that public opinion at home, and especially in the Canary Islands, would resent the surrender of this important piece of coast.

3. Some 200 kilom. of coast-line between latitudes 26° and 27° 40′.

This region, which adjoins the Spanish possession of Rio de Oro, was declared by article 6 of the 1904 convention to lie outside Morocco and to be open immediately to the free action of Spain.

Señor Garcia Prieto declared that nothing would induce the Spanish Government to surrender it. When, in September last, his Excellency called attention to the new definition of the southern boundary of Morocco which the negotiators of the Franco-German convention at Berlin were understood to have agreed upon, namely, a definition, since confirmed, by which that boundary was shifted from north latitude 27° 40′ to the northern boundary of the Rio de Oro territory, M. Geoffray had given the express assurance that this Franco-German agreement did not and could not affect the engagements existing between France and Spain on the point in question. The explanations then given are recorded in the last two paragraphs of my Confidential despatch No. 155 of the 19th September, 1911. The Spanish Government persists in regarding the definition of the boundary made in 1904 as the only correct one as between itself and the French Government.

M. Geoffray said that he was authorised to meet as far as possible the wishes of Spain by offering to leave within her zone a stretch of 50 kilom. of coast-line, including Ifni and extending from 20 to 30 kilom. into the interior. He placed a sketch map defining this region in Señor Garcia Prieto's hands.

Señor Garcia Prieto did not think that Spain could make any territorial contribution (to make good the losses incurred by France) other than a portion of the hinterland of her South Morocco zone, excluding the region lying (in her view) outside Morocco.

The French Ambassador warned his Excellency that the French Government were not likely to give way on the territorial question. It was only, he declared, by pointing to a considerable territorial gain at the expense of Spain that they would have any chance of passing the new arrangement with Spain through the Chamber of Deputies. It was agreed, however, that Señor Garcia Prieto should embody in the counter draft, which he undertook to prepare, a statement of the utmost territorial compensation which Spain would be able to offer.

On the question of the administration of the Spanish zone, the Foreign Minister began by remarking generally that under the proposed arrangements France would practically exercise her protectorate, to some extent at least, over the Spanish as well as over the French zone. The "règlements d'application concernant les réformes" having to be drawn up by the Makhzen, France, standing behind the Makhzen, would become the lawgiver for the whole of Morocco. The powers of the "Khalifa" for the Spanish zone would be limited to the mere application and enforcement in that zone of a set of regulations drawn up at the dictation of France. This, he said, was a very different thing from the entirely Spanish administration of the zone which was contemplated in the preliminary propositions submitted in September.

His Excellency said he could not understand why the powers to be exercised by Spain in her zone should be less extensive than those vested in France by the German convention. As France ceded to Spain by paragraph 2 of article 2 of the convention of October 1904 the whole of the powers vested in her by virtue of article 2 of the Anglo-French declaration of April 1904, so Spain thinks it reasonable that France should not cede to her, in the same way, with reference to the Spanish zone, the whole of the powers specified in articles 1 and 2 of the Franco-German convention of November 1911, as appertaining to France in Morocco.

In other words, in addition to the right to lend her assistance to the Government of Morocco for the introduction of all necessary reforms, whether "administrative, economic, financial, or military," Spain demands that she shall be invested with the more ample powers conferred upon France by the German convention, such as the power to lend her assistance also to the Makhzen in respect of all new regulations or alteration of existing ones; to take, in agreement with the Makhzen, all the necessary measures of financial reorganisation and control; to extend, if need be, her faculty of control and protection; to exercise a full liberty of action; to dispose, as she sees fit, of the troops and police of her zone, in the interest of public order and security for trade.

Spain contends further that the continued control of the customs within her sphere by the officers of the Public Debt—who represent the holders of the 1904 and 1910 loans—would involve an intolerable degree of French interference. She much prefers the suggestion contained in the September proposals (which were generally approved by the British Government) to the effect that the sums due in respect of existing loans should constitute a charge on the revenues of her zone for which Spain should be responsible. The same observation applies to the annuity due to the French Treasury in respect of the indemnity on account of French military operations in Morocco. Spain seeks, in short, to exclude from her zone, as far as possible, all French tax collectors and controllers of taxes.

M. Geoffray said it was materially impossible to alter the arrangements made with the issuing banks respecting the 1904 and 1910 loans. This could only be done with the consent of every individual holder of the loan stock—which it would be impossible to obtain. The control over the Morocco customs must, therefore, be maintained in the hands of the Administration du Contrôle de la Dette.

Criticising the French proposals concerning the projected Tangier–Fez Railway, the Spanish Government object to the powers proposed to be left to the Shereefian Government—that is, to the French protecting Government—in respect of—

1. Choice of the "organes d'exécution";
2. The working conditions of the line; and
3. Its police and protection.

After listening patiently to Señor Garcia Prieto's explanations on these points and the others mentioned in the accompanying abstract, the French Ambassador set forth briefly the French view of the different questions raised and impressed upon the Spanish Foreign Minister the importance of an early settlement, in view of the extreme sensitiveness of French opinion at the present moment, and the likelihood that, if a change of Government took place at Paris, the new Administration would seek to curry favour with the Chamber by imposing much more arduous conditions on Spain than those which, after protracted and laborious discussions, he had at length succeeded in inducing the Government of M. Caillaux to allow him to submit.

He begged Señor Garcia Prieto to put his comments into the concrete form of a counter-proposal, omitting any merely captious objections, and keeping, as far as possible, the phraseology of the French original.

Although the Foreign Minister manifested great dissatisfaction with the proposed settlement in some of its aspects, the general tone in which he conducted the conversation was not unconciliatory, and M. Geoffray and myself were left under the impression that the Spanish Government really desired to come to terms.

I have, &c.

MAURICE DE BUNSEN.

Enclosure in No. 576.

Abstract of Written Comments by Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs.

THE marginal observations of the Spanish Government are to the following effect:—

Commenting on the preamble, it is remarked that the present moment is not the most opportune for declaring anew the attachment of the two Powers to the principle of the integrity of Morocco. That principle is closely connected with the sovereignty of the Sultan, which is about to be profoundly modified at the demand of France.

Article 1.—Why should not the attributes of Spain in her sphere of influence be defined in the same words and to the same extent as the attributes of France throughout Morocco are defined in articles 1 and 2 of the Franco-German convention of the 4th November, 1911?

If the regulations for carrying out the necessary reforms are to be drawn up by the Makhzen, this will imply the intervention of France (who stands behind the Makhzen) in the affairs of the Spanish zones, and will place the Spanish Government in a position of dependency on that of France. This paragraph is in contradiction with the preceding one, which professes to invest Spain with the right to advise the Moorish Government in all important respects.

Article 2.—The proposed rectification of the southern boundary of the northern Spanish zone, by shifting 25 kilom. further to the north the point at which it touches the Atlantic Ocean under the convention of 1904, is inadmissible. Its effect would be to exclude from the Spanish zone the fords of the River Lucus most needed for keeping up communications between Alcazar and Laraiche. The proposal is further inacceptable on strategic grounds.

The French claim that the whole of Morocco lying to the south and east of the above boundary is to be considered as falling within the French sphere of influence is open to the following objections: in the first place, Spain cannot admit that France has any right to claim the region between north latitudes 26° and 27° 40′, which is expressly declared in article 6 of the secret convention of 1904 to lie beyond the limits of Morocco.

The region referred to is that which lies immediately to the north of the Spanish possession of Rio de Oro.

Further, Spanish public opinion would not acquiesce in the cession of the coast-line embracing Ifni. Admitting the principle that some territorial compensation is due by Spain to France, this compensation could only comprise a portion of the hinterland.

Article 3.—Nomination of the khalifa (to reside in the Spanish sphere) by the Sultan is equivalent to his nomination by France. The khalifa should be invested with all the powers appertaining to the Sultan, and it is, therefore, inexpedient to specify the power of appointing officials and applying the regulations. Nor is there any reason why the place of residence of the khalifa should be fixed.

Why is Spain called upon to declare that she will keep order an apply existing treaties, including the new convention between France and Germany, in her own sphere, when no such stipulation has been required of France?

Article 4.—Spain having bound herself by article 7 of the convention of October 1904 not to alienate or cede in any form any portion of her sphere of influence, there is no need to repeat this engagement.

Article 5.—Similarly there is no need to repeat article 14 of the convention of October 1904, which defines the zone within which no fortifications may be erected.

Article 6.—Pending receipt of the draft regulations concerning the position of Tangier, it is remarked that the convention of 1904 did not expressly exclude Tangier from the Spanish sphere. It merely stipulated that Tangier should preserve its special character.

Article 7.—Regard for existing schools is already provided for in article 2 of the convention of 1904. Why add consulates?

Article 8.—The proposed stipulation respecting the free passage of convoys, officers, &c., goes beyond what was proposed in the draft submitted last September. The arms regulations referred to could only mean, in the Spanish sphere, regulations drawn up by the Sultan's khalifa residing in that zone.

Article 9.—Organisation of troops is a question of administration, appertaining to the khalifa.

Article 10.—Prefers text proposed by M. Geoffray in September, providing that "les revenus de toute nature des régions administrées par l'Espagne seront affectées aux besoins de ces régions, à leur administration et aux améliorations jugées nécessaires."

Article 11.—Agrees that the Makhzen will not be responsible for expenses or claims arising in the Spanish zone. This is a reason the more for investing the Sultan's khalifa for that region with full administrative powers.

Article 12.—France demands that the rights secured by treaty to the French Treasury (annuity of 2,740,000 fr.), Board of Control (representing holders of the 1904 and 1910 loans), State Bank, Tobacco Régie, shall remain intact.

On this the Spanish Government remarks that the zones of influence date from the 3rd October, 1904; only the rights secured to the holders of the 1904 loan are anterior to that date, and even these are subject to modification on the expiration of the first period of application of the convention of October 1904; if these rights have since been extended, this was done without consultation with Spain and in disregard of her objections; Spain did not cease to object to the arrangements affecting her zone, as well as that of France, which were made in 1910 between France and Morocco in respect of a new loan and a French Treasury annuity. Last September M. Geoffray put forward the equitable principle that the annual sum due from the Spanish zone in respect of the service of existing loans should constitute a charge on the revenues of the Spanish zone. Spain prefers a settlement on the above lines, by which alone French intervention in her zone, through the Board of Control, can be prevented.

Article 13.—Three months is too short a period for the establishment of the Melilla Custom-house. It will be set up as soon as possible.

Article 14.—Railways, posts, and telegraphs. Repetition of observations on article 1. Spain claims the entire administration in her sphere.

Article 15.—As regards the Tangier–Fez Railway, Spain would object to the Makhzen (that is, France), reserving to itself the power to "choisir les organes d'exécution qui lui paraîtront convenables; déterminer librement les conditions d'exploitation de la ligne; prendre toute mesure de police et de garde que comporteront l'exploitation et la surveillance."

Article 16.—The required undertaking respecting contraband is made in article 13 of the 1904 convention, and need not be renewed.

Paragraph 2 requires explanations.

The remarks of the Spanish Government conclude with an enquiry as to how the following questions will be dealt with, namely:—

Protection of natives.
Consular jurisdiction.

Who will be the intermediary between the khalifa for the Spanish zones and the foreign representatives as regards questions arising in those zones?

Arbitration of claims.
Annuity due by Morocco to the Spanish Treasury.
Action of State Bank and tobacco monopoly.

[50642]

No. 577.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 18.)

(No. 607.)

Paris, December 16, 1911.

Sir,

I HAD the honour to report to you by my despatch No. 602 of yesterday the proceedings during the first day of the debate in the Chamber of Deputies on the recent Franco-German treaty.

The debate was continued yesterday, when four long speeches were made on the subject.

M. Vaillant gave the Socialist view of the matter. His party disliked the Moroccan part of the agreement even more than that relating to the Congo, for France was thereby pushed still further along the path of colonial adventure. At the same time, the signature of the agreement was satisfactory, in that it removed the nightmare of a war. The Socialist party hoped that it would prove to be the beginning of an "accord généralisé" with Germany. They did not wish to see France entangled in the strife between two rival imperialistic ambitions—that of England and that of Germany —but rather to see her as the "trait d'union" between those two great peoples.

M. Abel Ferry made an instructive speech to the House based on personal knowledge of Morocco. He was followed in the tribune by M. Jules Delahaye, a deputy of the Right, who, in an interminable speech, developed all the accusations on special and general points which his party habitually bring against the present, and, indeed, all republican Governments. He accused them, among other things, of being ruled and "run" by international financiers. "Un groupe," he said, "qui sous les noms de Banque de Paris et des Pays-Bas, d'Union parisienne, et d'autres encore, règne et domine . . . . . groupe qui fait la loi en France—occultement et à un degré que la plupart de vous ne soupçonnent guère—à tout—Banque de France, Crédit foncier, établissements de crédit, grandes enterprises métallurgiques et industrielles, transports, chemins de fer, presse, Chambre et Gouvernement."

The important speech of the sitting was made by M. Millerand, as the spokesman of the "Republican Socialist" group. It was a serious and eloquent argument in favour of the adoption of the treaty. After examining its meaning and the advantages accruing therefrom to France, he alluded to the future policy to be pursued in Morocco, and advocated a slow policy of assimilation and pacific penetration rather than one of conquest with all the expense and risks which it entailed. It was highly desirable to avoid losses of men and money, which would alarm French public opinion and were not indispensable. Wisdom and patience were needed in establishing France's protectorate over Morocco. The negotiations with Spain should be carried on in a friendly and cordial spirit. The agreements of 1904 must be duly considered, and no one, he believed, would propose to repudiate the signature which French Ministers had in the past set at the foot of engagements made in the name of France. England as the witness of these agreements should be associated in the present pourparlers between France and Spain. It was fitting that she should be so associated for higher and more general reasons than her participation in the 1904 agreements. Certain eminent people, he continued, had conceived another system of equilibrium than that actually existing, but the first duty of French foreign policy was to take account of realities, and this entailed the obligation of proceeding in company with those who had stood at France's side in difficult hours, and of holding firmly to existing friendship and ties. "Nos amitiés et notre alliance n'ont . . . . . de pointe dirigée contre personne." The stipulation that recourse should be had to The Hague Tribunal in the event of difficulties between France and Germany was of great practical and even greater moral value.

France was attached to peace, but it must be a peace with honour. She meant to defend her own rights, while respecting those of others. Her desire was to interpret the agreement with Germany with scrupulous loyalty; to avoid a policy of adventure and conflicts, but to draw from that agreement all the advantages which legitimately could be derived from it.

M. Millerand's statesmanlike speech evidently made a considerable impression on the Chamber, and is greatly praised by the press this morning. On leaving the tribune he was warmly congratulated by M. Caillaux. Several papers express the opinion that he has shown himself to be eminently qualified for the post of Minister for Foreign Affairs in the future.

I have the honour to transmit to you herewith the text of his speech, extracted from the "Journal Officiel."*

I have, &c.
FRANCIS BERTIE.

[50521] No. 578.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received December* 18.)

(No. 440.)
Sir, *Berlin, December* 16, 1911.

M. DE SELVES' speech in the French Chamber has, considering the revelations made to the German public as to the methods of German diplomacy, met with comparatively little comment.

The "Berliner Tageblatt" says that unfortunately nobody in the Reichstag had asked either Herr von Kiderlen or the Chancellor point blank "What did you demand from France at the beginning of the negotiations?" Both had maintained complete silence on this point, and now the French Minister stated that Herr von Kiderlen had told M. Cambon that Germany would be prepared to agree to an exchange in Togoland and in the Cameroons, but she demanded Gabon and the Congo from the sea to the Sangho. This statement was a confirmation of the "Times" and "Matin" reports of the 19th and 20th July respectively, and it was now announced officially that Germany had demanded nearly the whole of the Congo Colony, together with the coast, and that France had refused this demand.

The "Berliner Tageblatt" continues as follows:—

"We have already said that we did not, like the Pan-Germans, see in the subsequent yielding of the German Government, which began after Sir E. Grey's intervention of the 21st July, any sign of a retreat; for in such commercial deals one always begins by asking for the whole, although one eventually accepts a-third. But it is rare to receive, instead of a-third, a comparatively valueless remnant. According to M. de Selves, the German Government also attempted to obtain the creation of two zones in Morocco, and they wanted in one of these two zones special privileges for Germany—a desire also frustrated by French opposition. Did not the whole of our official press deny the announcements which appeared in the French papers at the end of August respecting this demand for special privileges—a demand which contrasted so very strongly with the 'equal rights' thesis always held by Germany, and which could not be granted without the consent of the other Algeciras Powers."

The article concludes as follows:—

"Yes! If Bethmann-Hollweg and Kiderlen had, in the negotiations as to that unfortunate Congo, avoided the appearance of compulsion and not sent their cruiser to Agadir, then distrust of Germany would not to-day be the sole, the ruling, and determining feeling in France. Then the last word in this Franco-Spanish [? affair] would not yet have been spoken, and every Frenchman would give clearer expression to his displeasure against England, who is trying to secure for Spain such a large piece of the Moroccan coast, and who is detracting so much from the value of the French conquest. Yesterday's session of the French Chamber shows how German diplomacy, by wrong methods, falls short of the very sensible aims which it sets itself to attain, and how it actually does attain exactly contrary aims. We are told that the 'highest circles' are uncommonly satisfied with the work done. This satisfaction can only be explained by optimistic self-deception or by a highly-developed sense of contentedness."

* See Enclosure in No. 574.

The Liberal "Voss" says: "Yesterday's debate disclosed a few facts hitherto unknown; that they were unknown is regrettable, for the German people had the right to learn them, not from a French Minister, but either from the Imperial Chancellor or from the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. The impression made by the fact that Herr von Kiderlen kept all the diplomatic conversations of the 3rd, 4th, and 12th July, first disclosed by Sir Edward Grey, both from the Budget Committee and from the public was bad enough, and it is no less unfortunate that it is from the lips of French Ministers that we first learn that Germany did not from the very beginning—as was first supposed—demand mere economic equality in Morocco, but had asked special rights in a certain zone; that, moreover, Germany had given France permission to keep the *entente* Governments *au courant* with all phases of the negotiations, and that, consequently, the oft made reproach of indiscretion is unjust; finally, that the French Government, when Herr von Kiderlen demanded the Gabon and the Congo between the sea and the Sangho, stated their inability to continue negotiations on this basis. Since this statement was undoubtedly communicated to the British Cabinet, their view that the negotiations might fail was based, not, as might be thought from the German account, on irresponsible press rumours or inaccurate reports from the British Ambassador in Paris, but obviously on official French disclosures."

The "Voss" article concludes with the usual "deeds and not words" paragraph, and with an expression of the "desire that, now the Morocco question is over, a rapprochement of all the States concerned may be brought about."

The Conservative papers are almost unanimous in maintaining complete silence on the subject. A careful search through the chief Conservative organs only reveals two paragraphs bearing on the subject. The first of these is a short comment in the "Hamburg Nachrichten," which takes the view that M. de Selves' utterances provide a proof that "the Imperial Government have not failed for one instant of the negotiations to uphold German interests," and says that the purpose which instigated the dispatch of the "Panther" has been fully carried out. France had entered upon negotiations only upon condition that Germany should demand no territory in Morocco, but as the latter had never even thought of such a thing she could cede to the French demands in this respect without accusing herself of cowardly surrender.

The fact that France had, according to M. de Selves, come strengthened out of the deal contained no reproach to Germany, and the only important question was whether the latter had gained or lost by the negotiations with France. That question had been practically answered by Count de Mun, who had stated that the agreement had opened to Germany the door to the interior of Africa, and that far-reaching changes not detrimental to this Empire would probably now be made.

The only other Conservative comment is contained in a—presumably inspired—Berlin telegram to the "Kölnische Zeitung." It is to the following effect: Attention will naturally be given to the debate in the French Chamber, and especially to M. de Selves' speech. In it less weight was laid on details than on the certainty resulting from the whole course of the debate that there existed an undoubted majority for the acceptance of the treaty. That many of the deductions of M. de Selves rested upon a one-sided French standpoint was explained by the circumstance that M. de Selves exerted himself to make the events which happened during the negotiations appear as far as possible in a light most advantageous to France. The telegram proceeds to point out that if certain portions of the speech were to be looked at from a German point of view the picture could be somewhat altered, but that this would serve no practical purpose. All the essential points were, however, clear, so that it was now a question no longer of retrospective observation, but rather of the practical results which, as the "Kölnische Zeitung" hopes, the treaty will have for the benefit of both nations.

I have, &c.
W. E. GOSCHEN.

[50645] No. 579.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received December* 18.)

(No. 610.)
Sir, *Paris, December* 17, 1911.

IN continuation of my despatch No. 607 of yesterday's date, I have the honour to report that the debate on the Franco-German Treaty was continued yesterday in the Chamber by MM. Sembat, Deschanel, and Denys-Cochin.

M. Sembat, who is a Socialist of a moderate type, concluded, after a wide survey of

the state of foreign affairs, that not only French Socialists, but intelligent and far-sighted men of all parties were beginning to comprehend that the interests of France called not only for a policy of peace but one of *entente* and conciliation with Germany.

M. Deschanel spoke as president of the Commission for Foreign Affairs, which was charged with the preliminary examination of the treaty, and advocated its acceptance by the House.

M. Denys-Cochin, the well-known Conservative deputy, criticised the treaty from various points of view and declared his intention of not voting for it.

It is thought that the debate will be over by the 19th instant, at any rate. The treaty, if passed, will then go before the Senate. There are signs that the Chamber is becoming surfeited with long speeches on the subject in which nothing new is said. The President of the Council's speech is awaited, however, with curiosity.

I enclose the text of M. Deschanel speech extracted from the "Journal officiel."* Some interesting remarks on the working of the agreement respecting the powers of the Moorish Customs Commission, the Adjudication Commission, the State Bank, and the Management of Public Works will be found on p. 4046 of the "Journal officiel."

I have, &c.
FRANCIS BERTIE.

[51176] No. 580.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen.

(No. 135.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, December* 18, 1911.

THE Spanish Ambassador, after expressing to me to-day the relief which his Government felt now that the possession of Alcazar and Larache had been settled in their favour, and telling me how grateful they were for the influence which we had exerted on their behalf, said that there were two points on which he wished me to know the views of his Government.

It had been a great shock to them to find that the territory to the south of Morocco, which by the Franco-Spanish agreement of 1904 had been recognised as outside Morocco, was now brought into the negotiations and claimed for France. It was true that, in the negotiations with Germany, Morocco had been defined as including this territory. But the Spanish Government were given to understand that this was done only in order to prevent Germany from raising questions about it, which would have been inconvenient to France and Spain. As, however, the district had been recognised by the agreement of 1904 to be outside Moorish territory, the Spanish Government could not agree to allow the question of its ownership to form part of the negotiations. The cession of this territory would mean giving to France more in area than she had given to Germany in the Congo; and the Canary Islands would be dominated from the coast by France.

I observed that, when the Spanish Government had laid great stress upon the possession of Ifni, I had assumed that they regarded Ifni as an "enclave," and did not attach the same importance to the rest of the coast.

The Ambassador said it was true that special mention had been made of Ifni, but he had also mentioned the coast. He had now ascertained that there were at least two places on the part of the coast demanded by France that might become good ports.

The other point on which he wished me to know the views of his Government was with regard to the administration of the customs in the northern zone of Morocco.

The French Government claimed the administration because the customs receipts were pledged to French creditors. But the Spanish Government would be willing to guarantee the payment of the sum realised by the customs if they had the administration.

By this, I understood him to mean that, even if the customs did not realise for the creditors under Spanish administration the amount that was expected, the Spanish Government would make good the amount.

I said that I assumed these two points were raised in the counter-project submitted by the Spanish Government to the French Government. The latter had no

* Not printed.

doubt been much occupied by the debate in the French Chamber, and I did not yet know their views. I was now in possession of the Spanish view on these points, but I must wait to hear what the French Government had to say about them before I could commit myself definitely to an opinion.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[50928] No. 581.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 20.)

(No. 613.)
Sir, *Paris, December* 19, 1911.

THE interest of yesterday's debate in the Chamber of Deputies on the Franco-German treaty centred in the very able defence of French policy on the part of the President of the Council, which seemed to make a strong impression on the Chamber.

M. Caillaux began by showing how the continuity of French policy and aspirations from 1830 onwards had gradually led up to the present agreement which, it might be said, crowned all the efforts made hitherto to constitute a great French Empire in North Africa by opening Morocco to French action. He referred to the attacks brought against M. Jules Ferry some thirty years ago for his Tunisian policy, and inferred that the present Ministry were being attacked in the same unjust manner for a policy which would, in the future, be hailed as one of the greatest value to France.

This reference to the attacks on M. Jules Ferry was understood by the Chamber as a side-hit at M. Clemenceau, who was the principal opponent of M. Ferry's Tunisian policy, and who is stated to be strongly opposed to the Franco-German treaty, and to intend to vote against it in the Senate.

M. Caillaux proceeded to review the former agreements dealing with Morocco, in the course of which he made perhaps the best answer which has yet been given by any French statesman to the charges brought against France of violating the Act of Algeciras. The intervention of Germany in 1905 had temporarily hindered France from pursuing her own independent line of action in the Moroccan question, and induced her to consent to an attempt to introduce reforms into Morocco on international lines. He (M. Caillaux) believed that the régime set up by the Act of Algeciras was an impracticable one. It contained an inherent contradiction, which vitiated it, for while recognising the special interest of France in the maintenance of order there, it refused to give her means to protect and ensure it. "En deux mots, il lui imposait à la fois le devoir d'agir et l'impossibilité d'agir." France was consequently obliged to take action which, if not in contradiction with the Act of Algeciras, was outside it. . . . . The naval demonstration at Tangier, the occupation at Oudja, of Casa Blanca, of the Shawia district, and finally the Fez expedition, undertaken at the request of the Sultan, and rendered necessary by the fact affirmed by the French consul at Fez that the triumph of the revolt would have entailed a massacre. It was evident, ever since 1907, that the rights obtained by France under the international arrangement (Act of Algeciras) were inadequate, if she was to carry out the duties which the necessities of the situation laid upon her. She was inevitably thrown back on the policy of individual as against collective action. Everything indicated the necessity for her to return to the former policy, which was the only practical one, and the only one befitting the dignity of a great country like France when it had such interests at stake. A first attempt was made in 1909 by the agreement of that year with Germany. It was a happy initiative in that it inaugurated a period of direct negotiation between France, and the only Power which barred her way in Morocco. In 1909 agreement was, however, altogether too incomplete and vague. Difficulties were sure to arise therefrom. In the first place, it was almost impossible to establish a distinction between political and economic issues, for they were intimately connected. When it was a question of deciding about such matters as the organisation of the ports, the light-houses, and, above all, the railways, it became apparent that the interpretations placed on the agreement were widely divergent. On one side a claim was made to a large share in furnishing the materials, but the stipulations for the equality of other Powers in the Act of Algeciras interfered, and among these Powers were France's friends and allies. The question of the exploitation of a great network of railways was also a difficulty, for it had to be settled whether it was one of politics or economics.

M. Caillaux then explained to the Chamber the situation with which his Ministry

was confronted when it took office. France was holding, in addition to the Shawia region, Rabat, Mequinez, and Fez. An engagement had been given to evacuate these towns, but how was that possible without running the risk of being forced to send another expedition a few weeks later, and without compromising French prestige in the eyes of the Moors and of France's own subjects in Algeria? Moreover, the resources of the Makhzen were exhausted. The meeting of a conference was open to objections and perils from the French point of view. Only one alternative remained: a direct negotiation with Germany to free France from the mortgage laid on Morocco by the Act of Algeciras.

M. Caillaux at this point turned to the objections and attacks made in various quarters on his Ministry for having given up French territory in exchange for the "shadow of a protectorate in a mutilated Morocco." He said that other countries had sacrificed territory in negotiation. England, for instance, had ceded Heligoland to Germany, and in 1904 had given up to France a band of territory in the north of Nigeria, as well as the Loos Islands. Moreover, France in 1894—at this time M. Hanotaux was Foreign Minister—had ceded a territory of 250,000 square kilom. in extent to Belgium in order to have liberty of action in the Bahr-el-Ghazal. As regards the advantages gained in Morocco, France had obtained a position there which the Treaty of Bardo had not given her in Tunisia. France had had to wait for fifteen years before she had been able to obtain in Tunisia as free a hand as the Franco-German agreement gave her in Morocco.

Turning to the economic point of view, M. Caillaux enumerated the various restrictions on the action of France imposed by the treaty. These restrictions—the only real ones—were, firstly, the State Bank; secondly, the principle of economic equality, or, in other words, the principle of ajudication in regard to public works; and, thirdly, the principle of the open door. The State bank could not be done away with, contracts entered into with third parties, and which only expired in 1936 rendered it obligatory to maintain that institution. Moreover, where was the danger arising from its existence? The State bank would merely, like the Bank of France in France, gather in receipts and make the necessary payments without having any right to interfere in any way in administrative matters. Out of fourteen votes on the board of administration nine could be counted as French, and this majority could in the future be increased. In fact a bank placed under French law, whose president and vice-president were Frenchmen, which had a certain number of French directors, and which had at Tangier a French director and a Spanish sub-director, and the greater part of whose personnel was French, could not hamper French action in Morocco.

As to the obligation to have recourse to adjudication for public works, such adjudication existed in fact in all French colonies. In Tunis an attempt had been made to abolish the adjudication system, but that attempt had not be successful.

There remained the third restriction—the principle of the open door. That principle, however, existed in a greater degree in the conventional basin of the Congo, where it was stipulated by the Treaty of Berlin that no customs duty of more than 10 per cent. must be imposed, whereas those duties in Morocco were at present 12½ per cent. On the Ivory Coast and Dahomey the policy of the open door also existed, and those colonies were among the most prosperous of the French possessions in Africa. France had at present 45 per cent. of the total commerce in Morocco, and she had 45 per cent. of the total commerce in all her colonies taken together. When her political preponderance was established in Morocco that proportion would become still greater. M. Caillaux declared that for all new countries which were opened out to commerce the policy of the open door was the only policy possible. He pointed out that in future if Morocco were called upon to conclude international agreements it was France who would negotiate those agreements, that if public works were undertaken there it was the Sultan, protected by the French, who would be master of them. In conclusion M. Caillaux declared that the most lasting guarantee of peace was the existence of a powerful military force backed up by solid credit, and that France had, by the noble and reassuring example which she had set, given to French foreign policy the firmest support and the surest guidance.

I have the honour to transmit to you herewith the text of M. Caillaux's speech from the "Journal officiel," and a summary of press opinions on that speech which is published by the "Matin."*

I have, &c.
FRANCIS BERTIE.

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* Not printed.

[51200] No. 582.

Sir R. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received December* 21.)

(No. 162.)
(Telegraphic) R. *Tangier, December* 21, 1911.

IT has been decided to construct basin to shelter lighters at a cost of 22,000*l*. In view of urgent need, French consul, as delegate of sanitary board, proposed that system *marché de gré à gré* should be adopted. French State engineer further proposed, by letter from Paris, that work should be divided into two halves, one to be constructed with funds of "Caisse spéciale," one of Shawia indemnity; latter to be given to contractor who had already executed port works at Casa Blanca. Mr. Rattigan stated view that works were too important for *marché de gré à gré*, and, fully admitting urgency, proposed that they should be submitted to an adjudication *après concours* with a delay of fifty days; he pointed out that no important work could be actually begun before March, owing to weather conditions. Second State engineer (Spanish), who has been studying question, opposes the idea of division of work. Matter to be discussed again next Wednesday. I endorse view of Mr. Rattigan and await instructions.

It appears to me that bad effect would be produced if first important work were treated exceptionally, with result that half must necessarily fall to French contractor.

At same time it is a pity that we should be again obliged to oppose the French, but why do they make such proposals?

[51213] No. 583.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received December* 22.)

(No. 615.)
Sir, *Paris, December* 21, 1911.

I HAVE the honour to inform you that the Chamber of Deputies yesterday evening passed the Franco-German Treaty respecting Morocco and the Congo by 393 against 36 votes. There were 141 abstentions.

The latter part of the debate was chiefly occupied by M. Jaurès' speech, which began the day before yesterday and was continued yesterday. It was one of those great oratorical efforts which the Chamber is accustomed to hear from M. Jaurès at important moments, and which, while they irritate it, at the same time compel its interest and occasionally its admiration.

The first part of M. Jaurès' speech caused violent interruptions, especially at one point, where he alluded to the low standard of international morality at present prevailing, and declared that he regretted that France had also her responsibility for "les violations universelles de la foi jurée, dans cet abaissement de la signature et de la loyauté internationale."

He devoted a considerable part of his speech to an examination of the manner in which French policy was influenced by great financial syndicates, and appealed to the Government to be careful not to yield to the temptation of straining the sense of the treaty too much in favour of these interests, which would create further conflicts. The value of the agreement lay in the fact that, if wisely applied, it would bring more "serenity" into European relations. He also made an eloquent appeal to the Government to treat the native population of Morocco with justice. "Une politique," he said, "est nécessaire qui protège non seulement la liberté de leurs coutumes et de leurs traditions, mais qui protège, en fait, contre les avidités, contre les roueries des hommes d'affaires leur propriété traditionnelle. Vous pouvez transformer et améliorer leurs habitudes de culture sans leur dérober le sol sur lequel ils vivent indépendants depuis des siècles; et prenons garde d'étendre au Maroc tout entier les procédés d'expropriation pseudo-légale qui déjà, à Oudjda, ont volé aux Marocains toute la riche et féconde terre." (See my despatch No. 468 of the 26th October.)

The end of M. Jaurès' speech was an impassioned argument against war and against the light-hearted and irresponsible manner in which a possible outbreak of war was often discussed. He pictured the calamities which must ensue from a war between great European Powers and the wholesale disasters which must follow, and insinuated that the upper classes would do well to work for peace, for in the social upheavals which accompanied or followed wars no one could tell what might happen.

I enclose herein a portion of M. Jaurès' speech,* in which he refers to the peace movement in the United States and Mr. Taft's efforts in favour of an arbitration treaty with England, and to the rivalry between England and Germany.

After M. Jaurès, various speakers explained why they would vote against the treaty. One of these, M. Lefébure, read out a declaration on behalf of himself and twelve other deputies of the eastern frontier departments to the effect that they could not vote for the agreement with Germany as their action might be interpreted as "un oubli du passé."

This declaration occasioned a curious scene, in which M. Lebrun, Minister of the Colonies, played the chief rôle, and which is described as follows by the "Matin":—

"Assis entre M. Caillaux et M. de Selves, M. Albert Lebrun a écouté cette lecture dans une tension de tout son être. M. Lebrun est député de Briey; il est Lorrain. Son cœur éclate, et dans un sanglot qu'il ne peut arriver à dominer, il se cache la tête dans les mains. La Chambre a vu la scène; plus profondément encore, si possible, elle est remuée par la douleur patriotique du Ministre des Colonies. Pour bien montrer qu'ils lui gardent toute leur confiance et toute leur sympathie, de nombreux députés se précipitent au banc des Ministres et prodiguent à M. Lebrun des paroles d'amitié et de reconfort. La minute après, le Ministre des Colonies quittait la Chambre. Tous ses collègues du Cabinet, M. Caillaux en tête, tinrent à lui apporter, dans un bureau voisin, le témoinage de leur solidarité et de leur affection."

As I had the honour to report to you, M. Lebrun made, on the 14th instant, an able and effective speech in defence of the treaty, which was cheered by the Chamber and was regarded as considerably increasing M. Lebrun's prestige.

Speaking generally, the debate which ended yesterday was conducted in an unusually calm tone. The Chamber listened with patience to long discourses on the negotiations and the treaty itself which contained little that was novel. M. de Selves' speech was considered disappointing, but MM. Lebrun and Caillaux both made an effective defence of French policy. Various speakers advocated a rapprochement with Germany, but their words on this subject were received with marked coldness by the Chamber. Numerous references to the friendship and support of England were made and invariably evoked manifestations of cordial appreciation in the Chamber. Several speakers alluded in a highly eulogistic manner to your speech in the House of Commons on the 27th ultimo respecting the Moroccan question.

The treaty will now go before the Senate. It will be first considered by a Special Committee appointed by the Senate to examine its clauses, and it is not expected that the public discussion in that House will take place before the middle of next month.

I have, &c.
FRANCIS BERTIE.

[51769] No. 584.

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 27.)

(No. 202.)

Sir, *Madrid, December 21, 1911.*

I HAD the honour to report in my telegram No. 97 of the 19th instant that, at a third meeting between the Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs and the French Ambassador held on the 18th instant at the Ministry of State, Señor Garcia Prieto handed to M. Geoffray the Spanish counter-proposals in respect of the Spanish sphere of influence in Morocco. I was again present at the meeting, and received from the Foreign Minister a copy of the counter-proposals, of which I now forward a translation.

The meeting passed off without any friction whatever, and though M. Geoffray made reservations on several points as to which he said that he could not prejudge the decision of his Government, he showed by his way of receiving the explanations offered by Señor Garcia Prieto on each point that he did not regard the Spanish version of the draft convention as presenting any insuperable obstacles to an agreement.

Señor Garcia Prieto remarked that in the new draft he had purposely omitted all mention of the territorial compensation demanded by France, as well as the definition of the boundary of the Spanish zones. M. Geoffray concurred that in this respect it was reasonable to follow the precedent of the Franco-German negotiation, which had

* Not printed.

[51572] No. 583*.

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 26.)

(No. 98.)

(Telegraphic.) P. *Madrid, December 26, 1911.*

MY despatch No. 202 of the 21st instant on the Franco-Spanish negotiations.

The comments of the French Government on the Spanish proposals have now been received by telegraph by the French Ambassador, in which the former continue to urge that though the general regulations when made will be administered in the two zones by the French and Spanish authorities respectively, the Makhzen must continue to draw them up for the whole Empire. The French Government will not allow that Spain should exercise greater powers in this matter than they themselves ask for.

M. Geoffray does not agree with this view, which France has also taken up regarding Tangier and which Spain will certainly reject.

The French Government cannot, moreover, they argue, sacrifice rights which have been secured to third parties. The proposed exclusion, in articles 5 and 6 of the Spanish draft, of representatives of the holders of existing loans from collecting in the Spanish zone any taxes set apart to those loans is referred to.

This point of view seems correct to M. Geoffray.

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fallen into two parts : the first dealing with the position which France was to acquire in Morocco, and the second with the price which she was to pay for it.

The Spanish draft deals, therefore, exclusively with the conditions under which Spain is prepared to take over the administration of her zone or zones, however the latter may be ultimately defined. Its main purpose is evidently that of eliminating, as far as possible, within the Spanish sphere or zone the influence and action of the central Moorish Government inspired by France. The administration of the Spanish zone is confined to a High Commissioner named by the Sultan on the proposition of the Spanish Government. This high official must conform to the advice tendered to him by Spain on all the points recognised by the Anglo-French declaration of the 7th April, 1904, and by the Franco-German agreement of November 1911, as falling within the competency of France. The inacceptable provision in the French draft reserving to the Makhzen—that is, to the French protecting influence—the power to make regulations for the whole of Morocco is of course omitted.

On this part of the Spanish draft M. Geoffrav offered no special comment, beyond an observation to the effect that the right left by the French draft to the Spanish Government to refuse its *agrément* to the High Commissioner nominated by the Sultan afforded already a sufficient guarantee that no unsuitable person would be appointed to that high post, and that it seemed unnecessary for Spain to demand the right to impose on the Sultan's choice a person presented by herself.

Articles 3 and 4 refer respectively to the State Bank and the tobacco monopoly. They provide that within the Spanish sphere the agents of these institutions representing the Sultan shall be designated by the High Commissioner.

M. Geoffray doubted whether this could be done consistently with the terms of the agreements by which the establishments in question were instituted.

Article 5 makes the important proposal that, in respect of the war indemnities of 65,000,000 pesetas and 70,000,000 fr. payable by the Makhzen to Spain and France respectively, each of the countries should surrender to the other the security which it holds in the other's sphere of influence. In other words, Spain surrenders to France, within the French sphere, the 55 per cent. of the share falling to the Makhzen of the proposed new mining tax, being the guarantee of the seventy-five annuities of 2,545,000 pesetas secured to Spain by her convention with Morocco of the 16th November, 1910. On the other hand, France surrenders to Spain, within the Spanish sphere, the revenues by which the seventy-five annuities of 2,740,000 fr. secured to France by article 9 of her convention with Morocco of the 14th January, 1910, are guaranteed, as provided by article 4 of the subsequent loan agreement of the 31st March, 1910. The revenues in question are the excess of the customs receipts, tobacco monopoly, and certain other specified taxes, after meeting the annual charges in respect of the loans of 1904 and 1910.

By article 6 Spain assumes responsibility for the punctual payment of so much of the annual sum due to the holders of the 1904 and 1910 loans to Morocco in respect of interest and sinking fund as is attributable to the Spanish sphere of influence. Instead of this amount being secured, as regards the Spanish sphere of influence, on the above-mentioned sources of revenue (see article 3 of the Franco-Moroccan loan agreement of the 21st March, 1910), it will be paid annually by the Spanish Government, in the proper proportions, to the Banque de Paris et des Pays-Bas, to the French delegate on the Administration of the Debt, and to the State Bank. The result of the arrangements contemplated by articles 5 and 6 would be to free the custom-houses of Tetuan, Laraiche, and, the Spanish draft adds, Tangier, as well as the Spanish sphere of influence generally, of all French intervention in the matter of the collection of any part of the revenues.

Señor Garcia Prieto stated that, after carefully studying the question from the point of view of a lawyer, he had convinced himself that there was nothing in the agreements between France and Morocco concerning the loans in question which would stand in the way of the adoption of the method of reimbursing the holders now proposed.

M. Geoffray said that the texts would have to be consulted, and that he could not answer for the view the French Government would take.

Article 8 deals with the question of the railway from Tangier to Fez. Agreeing to this line being immediately laid, the Spanish Government proposes that tenders for the construction of the portions of the line lying respectively within the French and Spanish spheres should be simultaneously called for by agreement between the High Commissioner for the Spanish sphere and the Moorish Department of Public Works. The necessary uniformity as regards plant, tariffs, communications, &c., throughout its

whole length would be secured by means of annual meetings, which might, as M. Geoffray remarked, be made more frequent between delegates representing respectively the two parties.

The French Ambassador reminded the Foreign Minister that, as he had pointed out at the second meeting, the arrangements respecting the above railway proposed in the French draft represented the utmost concession to the views of the Spanish Government which he had been able to extract from the French Government. He was very doubtful whether the latter would be disposed to go any further in that direction. At the same time, his Excellency has since admitted to me that the French proposal is very vague, and that he has asked his Government to enable him to put forward a more definite scheme.

Article 9 seeks to secure unity of action throughout Morocco in respect of the customs tariff, postal and telegraph charges, and coinage by means of measures to be concerted between the French and Spanish Governments.

In article 11 the Spanish Government makes certain proposals with regard to the question of the protection of Moors, which the French Ambassador declared to be inconsistent with the provisions of the Franco-German agreement, though personally he was not opposed to them.

By article 12 Spain claims the right to take charge of the interests abroad of Moorish subjects belonging to the Spanish sphere of influence.

Complaints arising in the respective zones are referred by article 13, when incapable of settlement on the spot, to an arbitrator named by the local authorities or by the Governments of the two countries.

Article 14 contemplates the establishment eventually in both spheres of influence of courts of justice, founded on the home legislation of the two countries respectively.

The question of Tangier (article 15) is reserved, pending the production of the proposals under discussion between France and England.

Article 17 provides that disputes between the two parties as regards the interpretation of the convention shall be referred, failing a diplomatic settlement, to a court of arbitration.

The French Ambassador promised to forward the Spanish draft as it stood to the French Minister for Foreign Affairs.

I have, &c.
MAURICE DE BUNSEN.

Enclosure in No. 584.

Spanish Counter-Proposals.

(Translation.)

ARTICLE 1. His Majesty the Sultan shall delegate generally the exercise of all rights and actions appertaining to him in the Spanish sphere of influence and shall confide the administration of the regions included in the same to a High Commissioner, nominated on the proposal of the Government of His Majesty the King of Spain. This act of delegation shall be of a permanent character, in order that, by virtue of it, in case of new nominations, the newly designated person may enter provisionally upon the performance of his duties from the date on which he is proposed. The High Commissioner shall reside at some point within the Spanish sphere of influence.

His Majesty the Sultan shall not be called upon to contribute on any grounds towards the expenses of the Spanish sphere of influence, nor can any responsibility be fixed upon him on account of claims arising out of events occurring, under the administration of the High Commissioner, within the region in question.

Art. 2. The Government of His Majesty the King of Spain shall have the right ("facultad") to employ ("ejercitar") upon the High Commissioner, provided for in article 1 of the present convention, the action which it had the right to employ upon the Moorish Government in matters relating to the Spanish sphere of influence. The Government of the French Republic recognises that this action is identical with that which it has reserved to itself in the remainder of the Empire, in conformity with the Franco-British declaration of the 7th April, 1904, and with the Franco-German agreement of the 4th November, 1911.

In employing this action the Government of His Majesty the King of Spain shall watch, within the Spanish sphere of influence, over the observance of the clauses

guaranteeing the freedom of commerce which the second of the above instruments contains, for the benefit both of Germany and of the remaining signatory Powers of the General Act of the International Conference of Algeciras.

Art. 3. The State Bank preserving its rights and action in the regions constituting the Spanish sphere of influence, it is understood that, in respect of the superintendence ("alta vigilancia") over the said establishment which is vested in the Shereefian Government as regards matters affecting the Spanish sphere, the High Commissioner for that sphere shall have the right to name special delegates having the powers provided for in article 42 of the General Act of the International Conferance of Algeciras.

The personnel of the branches, agencies, &c., of the State Bank of Morocco, in the regions composing the Spanish sphere of influence, shall be Spanish.

Art. 4. For the exercise of the powers vested in the Moorish Government by the contract under which the Morocco Tobacco Monopoly was adjudicated, the High Commissioner for the Spanish sphere of influence shall have the right, as regards the regions composing that sphere, to appoint Spanish delegates on the same conditions as His Majesty the Sultan in the remainder of the Empire. The Government of His Majesty the King of Spain may modify, acquire, or redeem, in agreement with the Morocco Tobacco Monopoly Company, the rights of that body.

Art. 5. Spain and France shall maintain their credits against the Morocco Government as recorded in their respective agreements with the Makhzen; but each of the two Governments renounces in favour of the other the guarantee conceded to it in the corresponding zone (*i.e.*, in the zone of the other Government).

Art. 6. In order that the taxes and resources of all kinds of the regions composing the Spanish sphere of influence may be forthwith employed in the interest of the same without prejudice to the holders of the loans of 1904 and 1910, all rights of participation in the collection and administration of the customs duties, mostafadet, sakkat, property of the Makhzen and other revenues of the ports conceded as a guarantee of the said loans, are transferred, within the said Spanish sphere of influence, to agents nominated by the Government of His Majesty the King of Spain and the High Commissioner. The Government of His Majesty the King of Spain undertakes, in return, that one month before each coupon falls due payment shall be made: to the Banque de Paris et des Pays-Bas of a-year, to the French delegate on the Administration of the Debt in the remainder of the Empire of a-year, and to the State Bank of Morocco of a-year, being the portion corresponding to the receipts of Tetuan, Tangier, and Laraiche in respect of the interest, sinking fund, &c., of the loans of 1904 and 1910 and of the advances of the State Bank secured on the 5 per cent. of the customs receipts remaining at the disposal of the Makhzen.

Provided the above payments be punctually effected, the said holders and the State Bank in respect of its existing advances, will not have it in their power to claim any other rights in the Spanish sphere of influence.

At the time when, under the loan contracts, the Makhzen would be in a position to reimburse the holders, the Government of His Catholic Majesty shall have the option of leaving the Spanish sphere of influence free of all responsibility towards the same by repaying to them the sum of , being the equivalent of the capital secured on the receipts of Tetuan, Tangier, and Laraiche.

Art. 7. The Government of His Majesty the King of Spain and the Government of the French Republic bind themselves to respect, within their respective zones, the freedom and external practice of all forms of worship existing to-day in Morocco.

The Government of His Majesty the King of Spain will see to it that the privilege at present conferred on the Spanish Franciscan Missions throughout the whole of the Shereefian dominions shall not be maintained outside the Spanish sphere of influence. It is well understood that the said missions shall preserve their property and freedom to establish themselves at any time in the French sphere of influence.

Art. 8 By virtue of the adhesion which the Government of His Majesty the King of Spain lends to the immediate construction of the Tangier-Fez Railway, the High Commissioner for the regions composing the Spanish sphere of influence shall concert with the Public Works Department of His Majesty the Sultan with a view to the tenders for the construction of the railway from Tangier to Alcazar, and to the boundary of the said sphere of influence, being called for at the same time and under the same conditions as the tenders for the railway from that boundary to Fez.

A commission, composed of two delegates of the High Commissioner for the Spanish sphere of influence and of two delegates of the Department of Public Works of His Majesty the Sultan, and meeting once a-year, shall be charged, in view of promoting

the facilities of traffic, with the task of ensuring the unity of the plant, tariffs, junctions, &c., of the companies working the two railways.

Art. 9. The Governments of His Catholic Majesty and of the French Republic shall concert together with a view to—

1. Any modification which in future may be expedient of the Imperial customs duties, subject to the clauses of former treaties.
2. The unification of the post and telegraph tariffs in the interior of the Empire.
3. The determination of the amounts of Moorish money requiring to be coined.

Art. 10. As long as the railway shall not be constructed from Tangier to the boundary of the Spanish sphere of influence the Government of His Majesty the King of Spain shall make no objection to the passage of convoys of supplies destined to the Makhzen, it being understood that previous notice shall be given of them, and that the persons in charge of or accompanying the convoys shall observe the rules then in force in the district in respect of the use of arms.

Art. 11. The Governments of His Majesty the King of Spain and of the French Republic henceforward abandon the granting, on whatsoever grounds, in Morocco, outside their respective zones, of papers of protection to natives; they further agree to revise the list of present protected persons in accord with His Majesty the Sultan, with the High Commissioner of the districts composing the Spanish sphere of influence, and with the other Powers signatories of the Act of Algeciras and of the Convention of Madrid of 1880.

Art. 12. The interests of Moorish subjects who are natives of the Spanish sphere of influence shall be confided in foreign countries to the diplomatic and consular officers of Spain.

Art. 13. When Spanish nationals and protected persons in the French sphere and French nationals and protected persons in the Spanish sphere of influence bring complaints against the Moorish authorities or against agents acting on behalf of them, and no satisfactory solution of these complaints is reached through the mediation of the French and Spanish agents, the matter shall be submitted to an arbitrator to be named by the local agents or by the Governments of the two countries.

Art. 14. The Government of His Catholic Majesty and the Government of the French Republic reserve to themselves the right to take steps to institute in their respective spheres judicial systems derived from their own laws. Whenever those institutions shall have been set up, and the nationals and protected persons of each country are subjected to the jurisdiction of such courts, the Government of the French Republic in the Spanish sphere of influence and the Government of His Majesty the King of Spain in the French sphere of influence shall likewise cause their own nationals and protected persons to be subjected to the said local jurisdiction.

Art. 15. Town of Tangier (reserved).

Art. 16. All previous conventions, agreements, and regulations opposed to what is laid down in the present convention are abrogated.

Art. 17. Differences which may arise between the high contracting parties with regard to the interpretation and application of the present convention, and which cannot be solved through the diplomatic channel, shall be submitted to a court of arbitration, composed according to the convention of the 18th October, 1907. In each case an agreement shall be entered into, and the proceedings shall be according to the rules of the said convention, in so far as they shall not be modified expressly with reference to the matter in dispute.

Article 18. The present convention shall be notified to the Governments signatories of the General Act of the International Conference of Algeciras.

[50657] No. 585.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen.

(No. 137.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, December* 27, 1911.

I HAVE received your Excellency's despatch No. 199 of the 14th instant, enclosing an abstract of the written comments of the Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs on the French draft Convention respecting Morocco.

You will have learnt my views in regard to the internationalisation of Tangier from the print sections forwarded to you in the bag which left London on the

[51200] No. 584*.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir R. Lister.

(No. 69.)

(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, December* 27, 1911.

YOUR telegram No. 162 of 21st December.

I entirely agree with views expressed by Mr. Rattigan and yourself. You should insist on principle of adjudication being upheld in accordance with treaties.

22nd instant. For His Majesty's Government the question of Tangier is the predominating one, and I may observe, in connection with Señor Garcia Prieto's comment on article 6 of the draft convention, that His Majesty's Government could not consent to Tangier being placed under either Spanish or French control, and that they must insist on the town and municipal district being placed outside either sphere and administered internationally.

With regard to Spanish criticisms of articles 4 and 5 His Majesty's Government consider it essential that the stipulations of the Franco-Spanish Convention of 1904 respecting non-alienation of territory and non-fortification should be embodied in the new convention, unless, which seems unlikely, it is expressly provided that the corresponding portions of the 1904 convention will remain in force.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[51933]

No. 586.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 28.)

(No. 620. Confidential.)

Paris, December 27, 1911.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith the account published in the "Figaro" of to-day's date of what took place at yesterday's meeting of the Senate's Commission appointed to examine and report on the Franco-German Treaty of the 4th ultimo.

You will observe that M. de Selves was pressed on the subject of a secret interpretative letter annexed to the Franco-German Agreement of 1909, and finally offered to make its contents known on the condition that the commission would undertake that they should not be divulged. As no assurance on this point was forthcoming, the matter dropped.

The letter in question is presumably that shown to Sir Charles Hardinge by M. Paul Cambon on the 6th February, 1909 (see your despatch No. 74 of the 11th February, 1909).

In spite of the fact that the negotiations and treaty with Germany have been explained and discussed from every point of view already by the Ministry before the Commission for Foreign Affairs of the Chamber and before the Chamber itself, the whole matter appears to be about to be reopened. The prospective discussion in the Senate has revived all the controversies on the subject in the press, and afforded fresh opportunities for attacking and criticising M. Caillaux's Cabinet to all those who are opposed to it.

I have, &c.
FRANCIS BERTIE.

Enclosure in No. 586.

Extract from the "Figaro" of December 27, 1911.

L'Accord franco-allemand : Premier Contact.

APRÈS s'être régulièrement constituée samedi, la Commission sénatoriale chargée d'examiner le projet de traité franco-allemand a commencé hier l'examen rétrospectif des événements qui ont abouti à la convention du 4 novembre, 1904.

Dans cette première discussion la parole a surtout été donnée au Gouvernement, représenté par M. Caillaux, Président du Conseil, et M. de Selves, Ministre des Affaires Étrangères, pour apporter des précisions sur les points spéciaux que la commission voudrait éclaircir et que son président, M. Léon Bourgeois, avait ainsi fixés dans la lettre qu'il adressait samedi dernier au Président du Conseil.

Cette lettre marque d'une façon trop explicite l'orientation que la Commission sénatoriale veut donner à ses recherches pour que nous n'en publions pas le texte, qui a du reste été communiqué aux commissaires au début de la séance :—

Le 23 décembre, 1911.

"M. le Président du Conseil,

"La commission constituée pour examiner l'accord franco-allemand exprime le désir de vous entendre ainsi que M. le Ministre des Affaires Étrangères, le jour que

vous voudrez bien fixer, s'il est possible dès mardi prochain ; elle demande l'origine des négociations qui ont abouti à l'accord du 4 novembre dernier, et notamment pourquoi et dans quelles conditions la politique suivie jusqu'aux accords de 1909 avec l'Allemagne a été modifiée.

"La commission désire que cet examen rétrospectif remonte jusqu'aux négociations engagées, puis abandonnées, avec l'Espagne en 1902, qu'il porte sur celles engagées deux ans plus tard avec l'Angleterre et avec l'Espagne pour aboutir aux accords de 1904.

"La commission demande, en outre, communication des documents susceptibles de faire l'objet d'un Livre jaune, et, en particulier, la correspondance échangée tant avec le Gouvernement allemand qu'avec notre Ambassadeur à Berlin concernant l'accord franco-allemand de 1909 et son interprétation ; les dépêches de nos agents relatives à la marche sur Fez et les conversations engagées avec les diverses Puissances à ce sujet ;

"Les correspondances résumant les conversations antérieures à l'envoi de la "Panther" à Agadir, notamment les entretiens de Kissingen ;

"Les instructions écrites remises à notre Ambassadeur à Berlin pour la conduite des négociations qui ont abouti à l'accord du 4 novembre, 1911 ;

"Les observations faites concernant l'occupation par l'Espagne d'El Ksar et Larache.

"Si la date de mardi vous convient, M. le Président du Conseil, la commission pourrait se réunir au Sénat ce jour-là et se tenir à votre disposition à 3 heures.

"Veuillez, &c.
"LÉON BOURGEOIS."

Aussitôt après la lecture de cette lettre, le Président du Conseil et le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères ont été entendus.

M. Caillaux a tout d'abord déclaré qu'il convenait, pour déférer au désir exprimé par la commission, de laisser au Ministre des Affaires Étrangères le soin de développer les réponses aux différentes questions posées.

M. Léon Bourgeois, président, a fait alors observer que la méthode la plus claire paraissait être de prendre les faits dans leur ordre chronologique, d'élucider d'abord toute la partie du traité franco-allemand relative au Maroc, avant d'aborder celle qui a trait à la cession de territoire au Congo.

M. de Selves, Ministre des Affaires Étrangères, a pris la parole. Il a fait l'exposé des différentes négociations de 1902 et rappelé que ces négociations restées à l'état de projet n'ont abouti à aucune convention définitive.

M. de Lamarzelle, interrompant le Ministre des Affaires Étrangères, lui demande si le traité secret de 1902 publié par le "Figaro" est exact. M. de Selves, sans affirmer que le texte de ce traité est exact, n'en conteste cependant pas la réalité.

Il continue ses explications, parlant de l'accord franco-anglais de 1904, dont le texte a été publié dans le rapport de M. Long à la Chambre des Députés.

Plusieurs membres de la commission interviennent alors et demandent à M. de Selves si, en ce qui concerne le Maroc, il n'existe aucune autre convention entre la France et l'Angleterre.

"Pas d'autre," répond le Ministre des Affaires Étrangères, "que celle dite : article secret. C'est la déclaration franco-anglaise du 8 avril, 1904, qui est relative à l'Égypte et au Maroc. Elle se trouve aux annexes du rapport de M. Maurice Long, pp. 46 et 47."

M. de Selves expose ensuite l'esprit des négociations et de la correspondance qui ont fixé la portée des accords de 1904 entre la France et l'Espagne.

Il passe rapidement en revue la période qui aboutit à l'Acte d'Algésiras et les dispositions de l'Acte lui-même, et aborde enfin la question de l'accord franco-allemand en 1909.

Sur ce point la discussion s'anime et les interventions des membres de la commission sont nombreuses.

M. Pichon fait observer que cet accord, qui devait aboutir à un consortium entre la France et l'Allemagne, avait une réelle portée pratique. Il réglait une situation de droit et de fait tout à fait importante et présentait des garanties économiques tout à fait sérieuses.

M. Caillaux, qui, jusque-là, avait gardé le silence, est alors intervenu. Il a contesté quelques-unes des affirmations de M. Pichon et a déclaré que, si l'on voulait entrer dans un examen approfondi de cet accord, il fournirait à la commission des documents intéressants.

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Des explications sont ensuite successivement fournies sur la portée politique et économique de l'accord de 1909, ainsi que sur les questions des chemins de fer.

Puis le Ministre des Affaires Étrangères aborde la question de la marche sur Fez et des conversations échangées avec l'Allemagne à ce sujet.

Il résulte des renseignements que nous avons pu recueillir que la délibération de la commission sur ce point a été assez vive.

M. Ribot est intervenu et a notamment demandé ce que l'on avait fait pour mettre le Sultan du Maroc en état de soutenir sa situation, tant au point de vue financier que militaire.

Il a fait remarquer qu'il y avait au sujet de l'accord de 1909 une lettre interprétative demeurée secrète, et il a demandé si l'on ne pourrait pas la fournir à la commission.

Le Ministre des Affaires Étrangères a alors déclaré qu'il était prêt à la fournir, mais qu'il désirait que ce document restât un secret entre le Gouvernement et les membres de la commission.

Une certaine agitation se manifesta alors, et la commission renonça, puisqu'elle ne pouvait en faire état, à prendre connaissance de cette lettre.

D'autres questions intéressantes ont été également posées, desquelles il résulte que, au cours de l'entrevue de M. Cambon avec M. de Kiderlen, à Kissingen, il ne fut pas question d'une cession du Congo.

A propos de la marche de nos troupes sur Fez, il résulte d'une communication du Ministre des Affaires Étrangères que l'Allemagne ne s'y opposa pas, mais qu'elle y mit la condition expresse que nous ne resterions ni à Fez, ni à Rabat.

Enfin M. de Selves a communiqué à la commission toute la correspondance échangée entre M. Cambon et M. de Kiderlen à propos de l'accord de 1909 ; puis il a établi, par la lecture de nombreux documents, l'urgente nécessité de la marche sur Fez.

Comme il y avait plus de trois heures que la séance durait et que l'on ne voulait pas aborder l'historique des récentes négociations qui ont abouti au traité du 4 novembre, la commission s'est ajournée à demain. M. de Selves achèvera ses explications.

On entre maintenant dans le vif de la question.

[51980] No. 587.

Board of Trade to Foreign Office.—(Received December 28.)

Sir, *Board of Trade, December 27, 1911.*

I AM directed by the Board of Trade to refer to your letter of the 27th November, regarding an agreement which has been signed between the Union des Mines marocaines and the Mannesmann Morocco Mining Syndicate.

As the result of unofficial enquires, the Board are informed that there is a general opinion amongst persons prominent in the iron trade that if it were possible to secure for Great Britain a larger share in the new syndicate it would be desirable to do so, and that there would be little difficulty in inducing individuals to subscribe.

In the circumstances the Board would suggest for Sir E. Grey's consideration that an endeavour should be made to obtain an allotment of at least 20 per cent. of the shares of the new syndicate to British subscribers.

I am to add that it would appear from the enclosures to your letters of the 18th May and 9th June, 1910, that 9 per cent. of the capital of the Union des Mines marocaines has been taken up in this country.

I am, &c.
GEO. J. STANLEY.

[52072] No. 588.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 29.)

(No. 622.)
Sir, *Paris, December 28, 1911.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 620, Confidential, of the 27th instant, I have the honour to inform you that the leading article in last night's "Journal des Débats" comments on the questions which have been and should be discussed by the Senate's Commission appointed to examine and report on the Franco-German treaty of the

4th ultimo, and maintains that any documents which may concern French policy in that matter should be shown to the commission, whose sittings are held in secret. The article draws special attention to the explanation furnished to the commission in regard to the application of the Franco-German agreement of 1909, and to the complaint made by M. de Kiderlen-Waechter against the action of the French Embassy at Constantinople in opposing Germany in connection with the Bagdad Railway "contrary to the spirit of the 1909 agreement."

The "Journal des Débats" points out that the agreement of 1909 was entirely confined to Morocco, although repeated attempts had been made by Germany to make her observance thereof dependent on French pliancy with regard to affairs in the Ottoman Empire.

The article goes on to express the fear that if M. de Kiderlen-Waechter appealed to the spirit of the 1909 agreement to demand facilities from France for the Bagdad Railway scheme, he will appeal to the spirit of the 1911 agreement to demand economic facilities in some other part of the world, and to state that it is essential that the following points should be cleared up before the commission:—

Firstly, how could the German Government hold themselves justified in expecting economic facilities from France outside Morocco in virtue of the 1909 agreement?

Secondly, were there in the negotiations leading up to the 1911 agreement any conversations to which the German Government could appeal at a later date with a view to making trouble for the French Government, should the latter decline to grant certain facilities outside Morocco?

Thirdly, will France be exposed to new difficulties with Germany in Morocco in regard to the interpretation or the application of certain clauses of the agreement if she does not give way to German pretensions in other parts of the world?

It was, in fact, essential that the commission should demand an explicit declaration, which should be published, as to the precise scope of the agreement of the 4th November last.

I have, &c.
FRANCIS BERTIE.

[52092] No. 589.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 29.)

[By Post.]

(No. 218.)
(Telegraphic.) *En clair.* *Paris, December* 28, 1911.

THE President of the Council complains of the attitude and requirements of the Spanish Government in the question of Morocco. He had, he said, out of regard for His Majesty's Government, made the French projet as moderate as possible, and quite expected it to be accepted practically as it stood. The Spanish counter-project is inacceptable, for it would be impossible to carry out some of the provisions, and others would amount to annexation of the Spanish zone. He hopes that you will moderate the zeal of the Spanish Government.

I told M. Caillaux that I would inform you of what he had said to me, but I had not seen the Spanish counter-project, and therefore could not say what your opinion on it might be.

[52095] No. 590.

Sir R. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 29.)

(No. 163.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Tangier, December* 28, 1911.

YOUR telegram No. 69.

French chargé d'affaires called to see me to-day in connection with proposed lighter basin at Casa Blanca. He had received long telegram from his Government, who maintain that either whole of work must be carried out by funds already affected to Casa Blanca port, of which some 2,000,000 fr. taken from Shawia indemnity remain, or that work should be divided, terreplein and sea-wall being constructed from Shawia

indemnity, actual basin from funds of "Caisse spéciale" by private contract with local firms. This latter arrangement being necessitated by urgency of need.

I replied that I fully recognised urgency, but that, as I understood that no serious work could be undertaken before March, it appeared to me most regrettable to depart from the principle of adjudication. I thought, moreover, that division of work was most undesirable. French chargé d'affaires said that chief State engineer maintained that work could be begun at once notwithstanding contrary opinion expressed by his assistant. If, however, I was so strongly opposed to second course it would perhaps be better for whole work to be defrayed from Shawia indemnity, as forming part of Casa Blanca harbour works. French Government take it for granted that in this case there would be no question of adjudication, and that matter would be taken out of hands of committee. Do you concur in this view? French Government of course prefer that half should be paid by "caisse," but if there is to be no genuine adjudication I really think that they had better undertake whole thing.

Committee meets on Saturday morning, and I should be grateful for instructions to-morrow, if possible.

[52095] No. 591.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir R. Lister.

(No. 70.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, December* 29, 1911.

LIGHTER basin at Casa Blanca. Your telegram No. 163 of the 28th December.

The principle involved is too important to permit of a hurried decision withou full consideration, though we are most anxious, if possible, to avoid raising objections to French proposals. I should therefore be glad if you would ask for delay in settling the question pending necessary study by His Majesty's Government.

Meanwhile, you should furnish me with a full report giving all the relevant facts and explaining the exact bearing of the proposal to meet the expenditure out of the Shawia indemnity on the question of adjudication and on the duties and rights of the committee.

[52223] No. 592.

Sir R. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 30.)

(No. 355.)
Sir, *Tangier, December* 2, 1911.

I HAVE the honour to report that it has been decided to construct, at a cost of approximately 22,000*l.*, a basin to shelter lighters at Casablanca. There is at present no protection of any kind at that port for lighters, which are at the mercy of the violent storms prevailing on the coast throughout the winter. The works in contemplation are of a most urgent nature, and it has therefore been resolved by the public works committee to treat the matter as "d'urgence."

A meeting of the committee was held to-day to discuss the question. It was then proposed by the French consul, délégué of the Conseil sanitaire, that, in view of the urgency of the work, it should be decided to adopt the system of "marché de gré à gré." A letter from M. Porché was then read by the president, to the effect that the works contemplated should be divided into two halves, of which one should be constructed with the funds of the Caisse spéciale, the other by means of the Shawia indemnity, to be given to the contractor who had already constructed the works at the port of Casablanca, a French firm whose work has by no means given general satisfaction.

Mr. Rattigan, delegate from this legation, stated that he could not accept such a proposal without my approval. While fully admitting the urgency of the works, he considered that they were of too important a nature to be undertaken by means of a "marché de gré à gré." In view, however, of the delays resulting from a simple adjudication, he proposed that the committee should, in accordance with article 24 of the Public Works Réglement, decide on an adjudication "après concours" with a delay of fifty days, which would give time for European contractors to tender. By this

method the work could be begun early in March, the earliest date at which the state of the whether would permit of a serious commencement. He further stated that he saw nothing in favour of a division of the work, and would like to hear the views of M. Llorens, the second State engineer, who had been studying the plans on this question, M. Llorens declared that in his opinion the work could not properly be divided, and Mr. Rattigan therefore insisted on the advisability of giving the whole work to one contractor. He had, however, no objection to half the payment being made from the Shawia indemnity, should there be any special reason for such a course. The committee being unable to agree upon the points at issue, it was resolved to discuss the matter further on Wednesday next. Meanwhile, I have approved the action of Mr. Rattigan.

The plans drawn up by the State engineer will be ready on or about 1st January, and I will at once forward them to you. Meanwhile, in view of the short notice which will probably be accorded, it has occured to me that you migh consider it desirable to give a preliminary warning to such firms as may be likely to tender, that the works in question are shortly to be offered for restricted adjudication.

I have, &c.
REGINALD LISTER.

[52230] No. 593.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 30.)

(No. 626.)
Sir, *Paris, December 29*, 1911.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 622 of yesterday's date, I have the honour to report that at the close of the sitting of the commission of the Senate appointed to report on the Franco-German treaty, M. Pichon made a communication to the press to the following effect:—

"With a view to completing the information given by him at the previous sitting respecting the conditions of the Franco-German agreement of 1909, M. Pichon states that that agreement never in any way referred to the general policy of France or of Germany elsewhere than in Africa, and that by the very text of the communications exchanged on the subject with the Government of Berlin, it cannot be considered otherwise than establishing the political renunciation of Germany in Morocco, and the recognition of the superiority of French economic interests as compared with German interests in that country. No mention was ever made in the negotiations which preceded or resulted from the agreement of questions outside its proper scope."

I have, &c.
FRANCIS BERTIE.

[52231] No. 594.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 30.)

(No. 627.)
Sir, *Paris, December 29*, 1911.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith an account published in the "Matin" of the proceedings which took place yesterday before the Senate Commission appointed to examine and report on the Franco-German treaty. Considerable curiosity was displayed by the members of the commission as to the conversations which took place at Kissingen between M. Kiderlen-Waechter and M. Jules Cambon. Certain of the members were evidently anxious to find out by whom the cession of territory in the Congo was first mentioned. Reports are current in Paris that M. Jules Cambon offered such territory, and great indignation is expressed at such a proceeding. The matter was not cleared up at yesterday's sitting of the commission.

Some considerable time was devoted to an examination of the papers referring to the communications made to Spain at the time of the occupation of Larache and Alcazar.

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I had the honour to report to you the incident before the Commission for Foreign Affairs of the Chamber of Deputies caused by the statement made by M. de Selves that no protest had been made. This incident resulted in universal criticism of the Minister for Foreign Affairs and the removal of M. Bapst from his post at the Quai d'Orsay.

According to the "Matin" several members of the Senate Commission, after having heard the details of what passed between the French and Spanish Governments at that moment, expressed the opinion that no regular protest was in fact made.

I have, &c.
FRANCIS BERTIE.

[13/12] No. 595.

Sir R. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 30.)

(No. 164.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Tangier, December 30*, 1911.

THE meeting to discuss the question of the lighter basin at Casa Blanca referred to in your telegram No. 70 has been postponed. Owing to the undoubted urgency of the matter, the delay has much upset M. de Billy. M. Porché is now in Paris, and I venture to suggest that time might be gained if Sir F. Bertie could be instructed to discuss the question with him there. A complete change takes place in the Committee of Public Works after the 1st January, the legations represented being Belgian, Dutch, German, Italian, and American. We only supply the first suppléant, who will, however, at first be sitting instead of the American, the latter being at present on leave. I have reason to believe that opposition to the proposals in question will certainly be shown by the representatives of American, German, and Dutch Legations, so new committee will be less favourable to French. I think that in any case before discussion in committee an agreement should be arrived at between two Governments.

[14/12] No. 596.

Sir R. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 30.)

(No. 165.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Tangier, December 30*, 1911.

M. LLORENS has communicated to me a telegram on the subject of the Casa Blanca lighter basin referred to in my immediately preceding telegram, which he has received from M. Porché. From this I gather that latter had at first desired to construct an "épi," or wall for sheltering lighters, to jut out from mole at present being constructed. He had reluctantly dropped this plan in favour of basin and terreplein, but now appears inclined to revert to it. I must say that there would appear to be greater advantages in the basin and terreplein scheme which seems far more practical and useful.

The company who are building the mole have of course all the requisite plant on the spot, and should therefore the "épi" scheme be decided upon, it would naturally be necessary to give them the contract.

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